71O cHAPTER 15 wHY Do WHAT I5 RIGHT?

Judith Jarvis Thomson, Why Ought

We Do What Is Right? .-11

be unjust in secret. In that case, well say that you agree with rhrasyrnachus that , of the selection, ,Adeimantus chailenges
justice is the goocl ofanother, the advantage ofthe stronger, while injustice is one's !:::."::i: -n**""or j.orlh" _".:o socrates
own advantage and profit, though not the aclvantage ofthe weaker. l :i:: :1": ::: ]*
ustice,,because n"
"f "; "i; . .^";"il,it.;. J"""..T.i:
that.independe;,-J;;;";;";:"i.,,i;
You agree that justice is one ofthe greatest goods, the ones that are worth getting *u onl:,,h
l,Ti,'i"1"":,r:,"11,-":
,^:t*:: the tife of the u"t ;.;;;".-r.*";;i:;,:
,"i,"::
:::",0
for the sake ofwhat comes from them, but much more so for their own sake, such as
ll*:nr"' as demandins that socrates .r,",'
in.i" j*.ilil";""#:;
seeing, hearing, knowing, being healthy, and all other goocls that are the just person' suppose socrates
fruitful by their courd show this. would this supply a person
the right sort of reason to do the right thing? with
own nature and not simply because of reputation. Therefore, praise justice as a good
consider the following objection: "showing
of that kind, explaining how-because of its very self-it benefits its possessors and that leading a moral life benefits
you spiritualiy just offers a variation o.,
how injustice harms them. Leave wages and reputations for others to praise. r.g,r*"nt from self-interest. Meeting
Adeimantus's challenge wourd stiil fair to ".,
others would satisfy me if they praised justice and blamed injustice in that show ti-iat we have non-serf-interested
sons to be moral.,, Do you think this objection rea-
wa extolling the wages of one and denigrating those of the other. But you, is persuasive?

unless you order me to be satisfied, wouldnt, for youve spent your whole life
investigating this and nothing else. Dont, then, give us only a theoretical ar-
gument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what effect each has
because of itself on the person who has it
bad
- the one for good and the other for
whether it remains hidden from gods and human beings or not. . . .
-
socrates: That's well said in my opinion, for you must indeed be affected by the divine
Thomson was born in New york and is professor
ifyou're not convinced that injustice is better than justice ancl yet can speak on Emeritus at Massachusetts rnstitute
of
Technology. she has made a.number of ferd-definng
its behalf as you have done. And I believe that you really are unconvinced by contributions in morar theorf appried
political philosophy, legal phirosophy,
your own words. I infer this from the way you live, for if I had only your words !.]1n'*' ."taphysics. Her books incrude Rts,
"nd
(reB6), The Reatm of Rishrc (teea), Goodness and Advceoor; una
to go on, I wouldn t trust you. *::,::::,1:::/sk
Normativity (zOoe).

WHY OUGHT WE DO WHAT IS RIGHT?

Socrates and Glaucon identify three sorts of goods. What are they? Briefly give yorr.
own examples of each of the three sorts. ,:,

Which sort of good is justice, according to Socrates? (Remember that in this pas-
sage, "justice" encompasses all forms of morally correct conduct.) Briefly explain ho!
n Plato's Republic,two young men, Glaucon and Adeimantus,
socates's classification of "justice" supports his conclusion that "it is better in every. ask Socrates a ques-
fion' socrates is among those who praise justice-who,
way to be just rather than unjust." in particurar, believe that
* <, then he p..,o, ought to < _ and rhey ask him
i:i::::::::::l
us suppose justice::i
requires Alfred to pay Bert ten
why.
dolars. Glaucon and Adeimantus
)w that socrates would say that
elfred iherefore ought to pay Bert ten dollars,
ey want to know why.
and

i.,i$ti.e that Glaucon and Adeimantus ..G&A,_

what makes - from here on,
it the- case that justice
are not asking
t. Glaucon's predictions. Suppose Glaucon's prediction is correct and that those 'g'gates requires a person to do a thing. They
possess Gyges's ring would behave terribly. According to Glaucon, this shows and tet us for the'time being agree. so,
*i":,i:.t::],.,.i
pse that Alfred ,.".rrn, for example,
we have no foundational reason to behave well, but only a reason to opper to behJ borrowed ten dollars from Bert, and prmised
to repay him;
well. Why does he think this? .Are you convinced? Can you think of an alternat Bert relied^on_being paid by arrc, and
i:: :y "": now needs the ten doilars,
explanation why others' knowledge of-your behavior might affect your
(Hint: Consider how groups like sports teams, Weight Watchers, and A
,;!1n
surely assume that justice requires
*;il,;;.;.ifi
Alfred to repay Bert. what Socrates is to
Anonymous are thought to help their members achieve their goals.) '...,,; 'only to
say why Alfred therefore ought
to ..Or;;r1
712 CHAPTER 15 WHY DO WHAT IS RIGHT?
Judith Jarvis Thomson: Why Ought We Do What
ls Right? j j3

2 we can say about arr three of_trrern, the': trrey

trrink that if a perso'asks .,why
ought I do what is right?" there hacr better
be nn o'..'..-nr answer that exprains
G&A plainly think they are asking Socrates a hard question, ancl Socrates does too. why we would be warranted in replying ,,yoiill
profit if you clo.,,
But is it
a harcl question? But what is the warrant? In what *uy
would Alfred profit by repaying
Suppose that justice requires a person to Q. Then the person's failing to Q would Bert? we can therefore see why G&A and "*o.iiysocrates think that G&As question is a
be unjust. And therefore defective. And therefore bad. And therefore wrong. But if hard o'e. For while the facts I suppried entitle us to assurre
that j'stice requires Al_
wrong, Then afortiorl, to be avoided. Thus the person ought not fail to <. Therefore fred to repay Bert, it is far from obvions how they courd
be thought to guara'tee that
the person ought to <. Alfred would profit if he repaid Bert.
Similarly for the lequirements of generosit kindness, loyalty, responsibilit and
so on. Suppose it is instead generosit kindness, loyalt or responsibility that re-
quires the person to t. Then the person's failing to Q would be defective, therefore
bad, therefore wrong. But if wrong, lhen a fortiorl, to be avoided. Thus the person 3
ought not fail to <. Therefore the person ought to <f.
In short, if a virtue such as justice requires a person to <, then the person actg But perhaps we shoulcl just reject G&As question? For there
is room for an objection
rightly only if he or she s. A fortiori, the Person ought to <. to the ought only If profitable Thesis: surely it cant be right
to think that Alfred
That certainly looks easy! So why do G&A and Socrates think they are asking ought to repay Bert onry if sheer selfishness would itself
motivate him to do so!
Socrates a hard question? And why would so many people agree with them? There is room for defense,of the ought onry If profitabre
- for objection to it. A defender might reply as follows.
Thesis against that
many people would. It is very likely that G&A and Socrates, and the many who would
agree with them, would dig in their heels at those "afortiori"s. Thus they would agree
"You bring too constrained a notion
ofprofit to bear on it.
that ifjustice
- or generosit kindness, loyalt responsibilit and so on - requires a "People often obtain
ersonar profits'by doing the things they ao. Let us say
person to <, then the person will act rightly only if he or she Qs. But they would ask
that Alice obtains a personar profit by doi'g a thi'g
why it should be thought to follow that the person oughtto <. We can expect them to if a' outcome of her doi'g
it is her getting somethi'g for herserf, where she values
say that the person might well ask "Why ought I do what is right?"
her getti'g it for herserf.
Thus suppose Alice sord a shot story she wrote,
and therebylot ,oL. money for
That G&A have that in mind emerges when they tell Socrates about a constraint herself where she varued her getting that money
for t ..r.lr] tt folrows tlt ,rr.
on his answer. , obtained a personal profit by selling the short
story.
They say people often praise justice to the young by pointing to the profits that ' "Let us say that Arice obtains an 'impe.sorar
profit' by doi'g a thi'g if an
(as people sy) come to those who act justly, namely good reputations, honors, and ' outcome of her doing it is her getting something
for others, where she values her
rewards. But G&A say that wont do. For they say that those are the profits that come, I getting it for them. Thus suppose Alice sent a
check to Oxfam, and thereby got
not of acting justl but of being thought to act justly. And they say that if that is al1 some benefits for others, whe'e she valued
, her getting those rre'efits for thern; it
that their elders can say for justice, then the appropriate conclusion for the young to ' follows that she obtained an impersoral profit y sending the check to oxfam.
draw is not that they ought to act justl but rather that they ought to seem to act justly, '1 "Three things are worth stress. First: people do not act only in order to bring
However, Socrates believes that the young ought to act justl and not merely to :; about that they get something good for thernselves; they often act in order to
G&A how justice profits its posses-
seem to act justly. Therefore, would he please tell ,,, bring about that others get something good for those othes.r we can certai'ry
sors "because not because ofthe public rewards it brings. ,.
ofits very self" ancl
,: I
suPPose that Alice got a personal profit
by sending that check to Oxfam, for we
What emerges from G&As imposing that constraint on Socrates's answer is thaf can suppose that by sending that check
',:rii she got so'rething fo herself that she
they assume the following: ,
-,
valued her getting, namery the satisfaction
tht comes of herpi'g othes. But we
can also suppose that it was not in
order to get satisfaction for herself that she
Ought Only If Profitable Thesis: Alfred ought to < only if he would profit by.-ingi ,i,, sent her check, rather that it was in order to get benefits for others.
"second: profits of both of
those two kincts realry are pr.ofits, what makes it
.,
They say that in the case of justice, the profit has to issue from what justice ls. Pre- ;
that you obtain a profit by doing a thing is that
your doing it has among
sumably they would say that in the case of the other virtues, the profits have to hat'e,l
different sources for example, what generosity ls in the case of generosity. But f.o,$
- is widely thought that.peopre wourd always
each there has to be a profit. 1Io,':t-n acr unjusrly if trrey coulcl get away wirh ir-as
a..1"-p]? they acquired the mhicar ni,rg orcfg"r, which
Socrates accepts their constraint on his answer to their question, so LiT:1i:l
rvhenever
enabtes its owner to become
he wishes. But that is surely an .our"uiew of what peopre are like. Hume, for
conclude that he too assumes the Ought Only If Profitable Thesis. rejects it in the selection reprinted "*."rriuJy
in this chapter.
[ihomsons note.]
714 cHAPTER 15: WHY Do WHAT Is RIGHT?
Judth Jrvis Thomson, Why Ought
We Do What ls Right? 7ts
its outcomes something that you vaiue
- whether the outcome that you value is are true. They jointly entail
your getting something for yourself, or yorlr getting something for others.
"Thircl: a person's act has many outcomes, some of which are personal or
ought onry If profitabre Thesis: Arfred,ought
impersonal profits, ancl others ofwhich are personal or impersonal losses. Suppose to < onry if he woulcr profit
on balance by
that another outcome of Alice's selling her story was gloom in her roommate, who Q-ing.
also writes fiction but who has had no success with hers; and suppose also that But those two premises seem very plausible.
Alice places a negative value on her roommate's feeling gtoomy. Then Alice's selling
Notice that if we accept the on the ground of those two premises, and
her story produced at least one loss for her (an impersonal loss) as well as at least
someone asks us "Why ought I_conclusion
do what is right?; then we can say rro orr ,,vou,tt
one profit for her (a personal profit). Let us say that a person profits on balance
profit if you do" but also ,.Rationality requires'you
by <-ing just in case the sum of the amounts of profit he o she obtains by <-ing, to.,,

minus the sum of the amounts of loss, is greater than that which he or she would
have obtained by doing anything else that was open to him or her at the time. To
ensure clarity, then, let us rewrite the Ought Only If Profitable Thesis as follows:
5
Ought On If Profitable Thesls: Alfred ought ro < only if he would profit on
But should we accept those two premises? I begin
balance by Q-ing. with the second, namely the Ratio_
nal Only If profitable Thesis.
"So in sum, accepting the thesis does not require you to accept that Alfred suppose that Alfred's child now has an infection
that onry penicilrin cures. Arfred,
ought to repay Bert only if sheer selfishness would itself motivate him to do so. If however, justifiably berieves that penicillin is poisonous.
(He was told so by people he
Alfred values Bert's relief from need more than he values keeping the ten dollars has every reason to trust.) so it would be rationar
for him to refuse to alow his chird
that he owes Bert, then he will profit on balance from giving it to Bert. But if to be given penicillin. The thesis yields that it
would therefore profit him o' bulu.r..
Alfred were selfish, he wouldnt be motivated to give the ten dollars to Bert: that to refuse. But on the assumption that he greatly
varues his chird,s life, he wourd lose
is because if he were seifish, he wouldn t value Bert's relief from need more than (rather than profit) if he refused. So the thesis
wont do.
he values keeping the ten dollars that he owes Bertl' Another route to that conclusion is as follows. By hypothesis,
Alfred wourd not
profit by refusing. The thesis therefore yierds
that his refusing wourd not be rationar _
Thisreplymayallaysomeofthemistrustwithwhichweinitiallyregardedthe thus that his refusing wourd be irrational.
But given what he justifiably believes,
thesis. But we might wonder why we should agree that Alfred ought to repay Beri his refusing would not be irrationar. Alfred's
refusing would issue from his being
only if he would profit on balance by doing it. What has whether Alfred would profit ill-informed, not from his being irrational. So (again)
the thesis wont do.
got to do with whether he ought to repay Bert? The explanation of the fact that the thesis
*o't do is the fact that rationarity and
the,headt, They are not a function of what
li1l^tj::'in witl or wiil nor happen,
of whether a person has this or that piece
f,r,.or of information; rather they are a function
,T pel:on.re.aso]1s from what he or she is justified
4 *':9ri"::^.-1 :,ltlt
is in the head lies behind a very familiar
in berieving.
;."1,?:::3j:T'-""itt,r conremporary
account o what rationality requires
ofa person.2
Many people would say that the answer to that question lies in the popular idea that
you-justifiably believe that your options for
there are tight connections first between what a person ought to do and what it would ...tuoo:* action here and now are
g-rng, !/_lng, and so on.
be rational for the person to do, and second between what it would be rational for th
.^uoj"se you justifiably berieve that if you <, rhen the folowing
person to do and what it would profit the person to do. For suppose that
'
*j o+,;
ourcomes
and so on. Suppose further thar you justifiably"believe
;l.::.-:,"t::t: !0.1; that
ilf rou t' then the probability that outcome o,pr wiil come about is po*,. Suppose
Ought Only tf Rational Thesis: Alfred ought to < only if it would be ratio- also
that the a-ou" *r,r.r, o, is valuabte is
nal for him to <|. *ii:::;:::*l,o]t:
Lu might justifably believe.
th_at o,r is of negative *.rri. .rr"r p"ru*
vo*,. (since

and
ht be a negative number.) rhen i"t us ,ay t"hat the expected "* ".*,
value to you of o,1 is

Kant can be interpretecl

as offering a different account
Rational Only If Profitable Thesis: It would be rational for Alfred to { only ofwhat rationality requires ofa person; on his view,
in accord with the categorical lmp"rotiv".
see the s"le.iion f.om Kunt in this chapter.
if he would profit on balance by <-ing. iJJ::i:::*t'ng
716 CHAPTER 15I WHY DO WHAT IS RIGHT? Judith Jarvis Thomson: Why Ought We Do What Is Right? tD
P6*, times Vo*r. Similarly, the expectecl value to you of O,p2 is Po*, times Ve*r' Anci the question of which act would maximize Alfred's
expected value rested heavily on
so on. Then let us say that the expected value to you of your <|-ing is the sum of the his having had that false berief. No wonder there
was troubre for the ought only If
expected values to you of O,r, O,2, and so on. Rational Thesis! Maximizing expectecr varue is surely
at the heart of rati'arit but
Similarl the expected value to you of your l/-ing is the sum of the expectecl val- not where maximizing expected value is at the mercy
of false beliefs.
ues to you of O,yr, O*2, and so on. And so on for all of the options you justifiably so let us impose a constraint that makes false beliefs
irrelevant.Imagine the fol_
believe you now have. lowing about Abigail' (i) whenever she can do a thing, she knows
she can. (ii) If she
Finally, let us say that you maximize your expectecl value just in case you choose knows she can do a thing, she knows what outcomes her doing it
would issue in.
the act that has the greatest expected value to you. (iii) If an outcome that her doing a thing would issue in has
value, positive or nega_
According to the theory of rationality I referred to, that is exactly what rationality tive, then she knows that it has value, and how much. That is,
she knws all the actual
requires ofyou. Thus ifyour <-ing has the greatest expected value to you, then you values of all the actual otltcomes of her croing the thing. ca[
Abigail .,Rerevantly
maximize your expectecl value by Q-ing; and what rationality requires you to do is Well-Informed ' A fortiori, she has no relevant false beliefs.
therefore to < or anyway to try to <, if, as it might turn out, you were mistaken in Hardly anybody is like Abigair in that respect. (Is anybody?)
- Arfred certainry
thinking you could <. isnt. But let us now ask what rationarity would require of him if he were
Relevantly
Thar is a very plausible idea. So it is very plausible that we should reject the Ratio- well-Informed. If he were, then he would not make the mistake about penicillin
that
nal Only If Profitable Thesis, and accept, instead: he actually made, and rationarity would require him to ailow his
child to be given
penicillin. That, of course, is exactly what he ought to do.
Rational On If Maximizes Expected Value Thesis: It would be rational for Alfred More generally' we can retain a tight connection between rationality
and what a
to Q only if he would maximize his expected value by Q-ing. person ought to do, while avoiding the difficulty that was made for
that connection
by mistaken beliefs' if we reject the ought only If Rationar Thesis
in favor of:
This thesis yields (as an account ofrationality should yield) that it would be irrational
for Alfred to allow his child to be given peniciilin. Revised ought only If Rationar Thesis: Arfred, ought to < onty if it would be
ratio-
nal for him to Q if he were Relevantly Well_Informed.

Notice that if we accept the revisecl thesis, and someone asks ,,why
6 ought I do
what is right?" then while we cant reply,,Rationality requires you toj,we can reply
rRationality requires you
Let us turn now to the first of the two premises of section 4, namely the Ought Only If
to ifyou are, or would require you to ifyou were, free of
ielevant false beliefsl'
Rational Thesis. Given the thesis about rationality that we reached in section 5, that first
premise wont do. For the thesis about rationality yields that it would be irrationai for
Alfred to allow his child to be given penicillin. But he ought to. Alfred's mistakenly
believing that penicillin is poisonous has no bearing on what he ought to do: what o
(J
he ought to do turns on what would be best for his child - and by hlpothesis, what
would be best for his child is for it to be given penicillin. Here, then' is what we have replaced the two premises of section 4
Since Alfred justifiably believes that penicillin is poisonous, he will not be at fault,
with:
he will not be blameworth if he refuses to allow his chitd to be given penicillin. But ': Rtional only If Maximizes Expected value Thesis:It would
be rational for Arfred
he himself will agree that he ought to have allowed it to be given penicillin when he :' to <f only if he would maximize his expected value by <_ing.
learns, after its death, that allowing this would have saved it'
So we must reject the Ought Only If Rational Thesis.

Revised ought only If Rational rhesis: Alfred.ought to < only if it wouid be rario-

7 ,.,'
nal for him to< if he were Relevantly Well_Informed.

rtheses are weaker than the two premises of section

But 4, and they clon t entail the
Having to give up the ought only If Rational Thesis may well seem unfortunate. t Only If Profitable Thesis. But they do entail something
weaker, namely:
perhaps w" can retain wht made it seem plausible if we revise it. Let us take serioug$
the fact that the difficulty we looked at in the preceding section issued from Alfredli Rev.ed ought onty profitable Thesis: Arfred,ought to < onry if he wourd profit on
to
believing, falsel that penicillin is poisonous. We might then think the answer balance by <-ing if he were Relevantly Well,informed.
718 CHAPTER I5:WHY DO WHAT I5 RIGHT? Judith Jarvis Thomson, Why
Ought We Do What ts Right? 719
For suppose that Alfrecl ought to Q. Then from the Revised Ought Only If Rational But ma.y people think that since Arfred's
repaying Bert is requirecr by justice,
Thesis we can conclucle that it would be rational for him to Q if he were Reievantly to repay Bert, clespite the gain in varue he ought
that woutiirr.r. fromi. ,rot ioi.rg
.o.n
Well-Informed. So suppose he is Relevantly Weli-Informed; it follows that it would More generall the consiclerations
that bear on whether a person ought
be rational for him to <. Then from the Rational Only If Maximizes Expectecl Value in the way they bear on that q'estion. some to < differ
considerations wourd prainly be out_
Thesis we can conclude that he would maximize his expectecl value by <|-ing. Since comes of the person's tng, and they are thought by many
p.opt. ,o .u, uy t u.,,ring
he is (as we are supposing) Relevantly Well-Informecl, maximizing his expected value higher or lower varue. (compare Bert's
needs'ieing met if Alfred repays him
is maximizing actual value. It follows that his <-ing would actually issue in outcomes he owes him') others, however' are not what
prainly outcomesof the persons <-ing. The
that he (rightly) thinks would have a higher value than those that his cloing anything person's <-ing's being just or g.n..oor,^kirrd,ioyur, o. responsibe
else would issue in. So he would profit on balance by <-ing.
-
ones that are not' How these bear on whether - are mong the
the person ought to <f is disputabre.
And we can suppose that the fact that Alfrec ought to repay Bert makes no trouble it is a very plausibre idea that they bear by But
straightforwardry entailing that the
for this thesis. For if Alfred were Relevantly Well-Informecl, then we can suppose that ought to <. person
he would (rightly) regard Bert's being relieved of his needs as having a higher value
than his retaining the ten dollars that he owes Bert higher enough for his repaying
-
Bert to profit him on balance.
Moreover, we have yet another answer available if someone asks us "Why ought 10
I do what is right?" We can reply "If you were free of relevant faise beliefs, then it If we opt for that very plausible idea, then we
would profit you to do what is right." are accepting that it is trivialry true
that ifjustice requires Alfred to repay Bert,
then Arfred ougr, to .epay nlri, und
G&s question is not the hard question they that
thought it was.
They should have asked socrates
a different question: what makes
it the case that
9 justice requires Alfred to repay Bert?
Alternativery put: what makes it the
case that
justice requires Alfred to repay Bert,
given that ifjustice does require him
Bet' then it trivia[y folows that he ought to repay
But should we accept the Revised Ought Only If Profitable Thesis? Not unless we are to? For an answer to the question
tice requires Alfred to repay Bert shourd
why jus- l

prepared to accept: itsetf supplyan answer ," n.

Alfred ought to repay Bert. lr.r,r", *rry l

Alfred ought to < only if the actual outcomes of his <-ing would be of greater And if a person is told.that he or she .ii
ought to do a thing because doing it
actual value than the actual outcomes of his doing any of the other things it is be right, and therefore asks "why would a
ought I o *hut is right?,' then we iJ

"Because of whatever it is shJuld reply

open to him to do at the time.
.l
,t
that -uk., |ou. aoirrgh. thing beright.,, .il
be misled into thinking that
we shourd not
anything more than that is called for.
,:i
And there really is no good reason to accept that unless we accept a familiar moral

theor namely:

Consequentilism: For it to be the case that a person ought to Q is for it to be the

case that his or her <-ing would maximize actual value.
ilJJ
1; what does Thomson mean by "rationar"? fi
offer your own example in which what g
Sympathetic attention to G&As question "Why ought I do what justice requires?" led is lational t1 d1 to further one,s it
.., goals, in Thomson,s sense of ..rational,,,
us by plausible-looking steps along an unusual route to Consequentialism. may fail to
$
many people have written in sup.
*
There is a rich iiterature on Consequentialism
- rhoyson c.onsiders a case in which Atfect,s
lt
port of it, many in objection to it.3 A familiar kind of objection to it issues from consid. f. ili,"_TiT.::l.:f,1-"""*
'l':lr debt to Bert would not promote the
repayins a :&.

erations of justice. Suppose that Alfred's failing to repay Bert would issue itt 6u1ernes soals ,h" Ail;
"","."ffi1:,i:;:r1;:t"J.,":

Alfred o.,sht
to,"p"y;".;. ;',-fV,^".plain ,
that have more value than the outcomes his doing anything else would have' A Conse- ;:lt:i::llat
la Alfred ousht to pay Bert if ii d;".
why rhomson betieves that
r

quentialist is therefore committed to the conclusion that Alfred ought not repay Bert::
'
",r"r., ";;;;;ff;i";ii::"i::: .,.}l
il

''.:. .i$
..',
4 A deeper objecton to ..',$
,
conseouentialisrn, and indeed, to m.ch
Reason' ofwhat discussion ofwhat G&A hacr in
3. for example, the selections in this volume by Mill an<l Scanlon in chapter 16, "Horv Do We .t$
See,
about What Is Right?" [Thomson's note.]
il l,:'j::;:1:ii'-l::11",,",:*";;;;;;;;ii"",n,.
in saying of it that
fr.rnr""i,"Lj
it,,has valuel,
o..scribins to an out.o-" orul :jfi
$
l,
.,$
t*l
:&J
. ,:qt

, :$