Section 7a Reliability Notes

1
Risk Analysis
Introduction and Overview
Thomas A. Mazzuchi
Professor and Chairman
Department of Engineering
Management and Systems Engineering
George Washington University
2
Terminology and Background
Risk
-A measure of potential loss due to natural or
human activities
-A combination of the probability or frequency of
the hazard and its consequence; e.g.,
Loss
-Adverse consequences of such activities that
affect
Human life or health
Economics or property
The natural environment
Information , etc
3
Engineering Systems Losses Can Be

-Internal to the system; i.e,
Damage to one of the systems components
-External to the system; i.e.,
Damage to a component of the external
environment in which the system must
function; e.g.,
Humans
Organizations
Economic assets
Environmental assets
4
Risk Analysis
-Is the process of characterizing, managing, and
informing others about the existence, nature,
magnitude, prevalence, contributing factors, and
uncertainties that pertain to the potential losses
-Other names for risk analysis
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA)
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)
Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA)
5
Importance of Risk Analysis

-While formal methods for risk analysis have
been shaped by modern demands, the concept
of risk analysis is not new; it is even ancient
-People are living longer, healthier, more
prosperous lives and have more to loose
-Today people expect greater protection than
before from industry and government, and they
react with litigation when they feel let down
6
Importance of Risk Analysis

-Even as public concerns about risk exert
pressure on policy makers for regulations,
engineering systems are increasing in
complexity and autonomy
Simply making regulations without studying
their effects can be costly and suboptimal
even dangerous
-A proper risk analysis will adequately model the
system, demonstrate the effect of mitigating
measures, and communicate these to the public
7
Elements of Risk Analysis
Risk Risk
Assessment Management
Risk
Communication
National Research Council (1994)

8
Elements of Risk Analysis
Risk Assessment
-The process by which the probability or frequency of
loss by or to an engineering system is assessed,
and the magnitude of the loss (consequences)
estimated
Risk Management
-The process by which the potential (probability or
frequency) for loss and/or the magnitude of loss is
minimized and controlled
Risk Communication
-The process by which information about the nature
and consequences of risk, as well as the risk
assessment approach and the risk management
options, are shared and discussed among decision
makers and other stakeholders
9
Risk Assessment
Definition of Risk (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981)

- Risk addresses three basic questions:
What can go wrong?
How likely is it to happen?
What are the losses (or consequences)?
- A combination of hazard and likelihood
- A triple <Si,Pi,Ci>
Si a specific scenario of a hazard
Pi probability of si (or frequency)
Ci consequence of si
10
Risk Assessment
Modifications
-Si may occur with a given
probability Pi or frequency fi
-Its occurrence may be static
or dynamic over time
-Pi and Ci may be uncertain
and have probability
distributions
-These distributions may be a
function of time or Si or a
combination of the two
-These quantities may be
jointly distributed
11
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Overview
12
Important Risk Journals

Health, Risk and Society
Journal of Risk and Insurance
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Journal of Risk: Health, Safety and Environment
Journal of Risk Research
Journal of Safety Research
Journal of System Safety
Risk Analysis, An International Journal
Risk, Decision, and Policy
Risk Management and Insurance Review
Risk Management: An International Journal
Safety Science
The Journal of Risk
Reliability Engineering and System Safety
International Journal of Reliability, Quality, and Safety Eng
13
Societies of Interest
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Safety Engineering and Risk Analysis Division
American Society of Safety Engineers
American Statistical Association, Section on Risk Analysi
IEEE Reliability Society
International Association for Probabilistic Safety
Assessment and Management.
Risk Assessment and Policy Association
Risk Theory Society
Society for Maintenance Reliability Professionals
Society for Reliability Engineers
Society for Risk Analysis
System Safety Society
The Safety and Reliability Society
14
Qualitative Risk Assessment:

Risk Matrices
15
Introduction
Risk Matrix
a table that has several categories of probability,
likelihood or frequency on its rows (or columns)
and several categories of severity, impact, or
consequence on its columns (or rows)
It associates a recommended level of risk,
urgency, priority, or management action associated
with each column-row pair (i,e, cell)
16
Introduction
Federal Highway Administration, 2006
Federal Aviation Administration, 2007

17
Introduction
Qualitative Risk Assessment
NASA Risk Management Reporting
Qualitative Risk Assessment
NASA Risk Management Reporting
20
Problems with Risk Matrices and
Matrix Design Cox (2008)
If Risk = probability * consequence
Risk
Consequence
Probability
p*c=constant
Probability
Consequence
21
Subjective Interpretations
and Input Bias Smith et al (2009)
1 Objective
Likelihood
Subjective
0 PROBABILITY 1 SRP Consequence

Utility
Utility
Objective
Subjective
Value
Value
22
Extension of Cox for Opt. 5x5 Matrix
Design Hong and Mazzuchi (2013)
23
Uncertainty Distribution for Portfolios
of Risks Mazzuchi and Scolese (2014)
c
p
Quantitative Risk Analysis
Scenario Analysis
25
Fault Trees
The Basics of Fault Trees
-A fault tree develops a deterministic description of
the occurrence of the top event, in terms of the
occurrence or not of intermediate events
Top events represent system-level failure
-Describes intermediate events further until, at a
finer level of detail, basic events are obtained
Basic events represent component-level failure
-By itself, a fault tree is only a visual model of how a
system failure can occur
26
Fault Trees
1. Identify undesirable
TOP event
2. Identify first
contributors
3. Link contributors to
TOP event by logic
gates
4. Identify second level
contributors
5. Link second level
contributors to TOP
event by logic gate
27
Fault Tree Construction

Symbols
Event Symbols Transfer Symbols
Basic Event
Undeveloped Event Transfer In
External Event Transfer Out
Intermediate Event
28
Fault Tree Construction

Symbols
- Gate Symbols
priority and gate:
and gate: Output Output occurs if all input
occurs if all input events occur in a
events occur specific sequence
or gate: Output inhibit gate: Output
+
occurs if any input occurs if the single input
event occurs occurs in the presence of
an enabling condition
exclusive or gate: not or gate: Output
+ Output occurs if + occurs if at least one
exactly one input input event does not
event occurs occur
not and gate: Output
occurs if all input events
do not occur
29
Fault Tree Example 2
Example with Success Event
Pressure Relief Valve Possible Ignition
PRV Source
I1
Leak
Isolation Valve
Permanent Ignition VAL
Source
I2 Gas flowing through pipe, there is a leak
after the isolation valve this valve should
close but then the pressure relief vale
must open to relieve local pressure
30
Example with Success Event
Explosion After Gas Leak

Posterior to Isolation Valve
+
Explosion Prior Explosion Posterior to

to Isolation Isolation Valve
VAL
Performs PRV VAL I1
Correctly Fails Fails Present
31
Large Example
V4
V2
P1
T1 C
V1
V5
V3
P2
C
Sensing & AC Power

Control Source
System
Pumping System Example

32

No Water Delivered When Needed
No Water Delivered from P2 Branch No Water Delivered from P1 Branch
+ +
No Water No No Water No
Delivered V3 Fails to V5 Fails to Water a Delivered V4 Fails to V2 Fails to Water
from V1 Remain Remain from P2 from V1 Remain Remain from P1
Open Open + Open Open
+ +
a
S Fails AC S Fails P1 Fails AC
T1
to Send
Signal b P2 Fails to
Function
Fails
Ruptures
to Send
Signal
to
Function
Fails
+
V1 Fails to
Remain
b
S
Fails Open
AC
Fails
33

No Water Delivered When Needed
+
No Water Delivered from V1 S AC Pumping Branches Fail
Fails Fails
+
T1 P1 Branch P2 Branch
V1 Fails to
Ruptures Remain Fails Fails
Open
+ +
V4 Fails to V2 Fails to P2 Fails V5 Fails to V3 Fails to

P1 Fails to to
Function Remain Remain Remain Remain
Function Open
Open Open Open
Alternative
Construction
34
Block Diagram Example
Circuit Block Diagram Example
3
B D
1
4
A F
7
5
C E
2
6
35

No Current
at Point F
+
No Current Unit 7
at D & E Fails
No Current No Current
at Point E at Point D
+ +
No Current Units 5 & 6 No Current Units 3 & 4
at Point C Fail at Point B Fail
+ +
No No
Current Unit 2 Current Unit 1 Unit 4 Unit 3
at Pnt A Fails Unit 6 Unit 5 at Pnt A Fails Fails Fails
Fails Fails
36
Event Tree Method

The Event Tree Method is the primary technique
used in PRA to generate risk scenarios
This method can be used when
- Successful operation of a system depends on the
approximately chronological and discrete operation
of its units
- Previous event tree model scenarios of
successive events have led to exposure to hazards,
and ultimately to undesirable consequences
37
Event Tree Method Example
Initiating Sequence System

Event A B C D E Logic Results
ABCE S
ABCE F
ABCDE S
Success ABCDE F
Failure
ABCD F
AB F
Let A denote that subsystem A
Mutually
fails and A denote that it does not Exclusive Depends on
fail Events sequence of events
38
Event Tree Method

Building an event tree
-Build from left to right
-Start the sequence at the initiating event
-Place protective barriers as the successive (binary)
events
-Calculate branching probabilities (called split
fractions) from fault trees
-Calculate the probability of the end mutually
exclusive events as the multiple of the path split
fractions
39
Event Tree Method Example 1
PUMP KLAXON
P K
A subgrade compartment
containing important control
S B equipment is protected from
flooding using the above
system. If the water rises it
should close the float switch
which operates a pump with
separate power supply, A
klaxon should also sound
and alert operators to
perform bailing.
40
Water Float
Rises Switch Pump Klaxon Bailing System System
I K B Logic Results
S P
ISP S
ISPKB S
ISPKB F
ISPK F
IS F
41
Attempted Backup
Abnormal Signal Firewall System System
Illegal
Access by Principal Detected by Initiated by Logic Results
Hacker Firewall Operator Operator
I F O B
IF S
IFOB S
IFOB F
IFO F
42
Event Tree Method

Split fractions are calculated using fault trees
Quantifying Scenario Analysis
44
Quantifying Fault Trees
and Event Trees
How Do You Quantify Fault Trees and Event Trees
-A fault tree or an event tree by itself is only a visual
model of a system
-It can be a representation of Boolean logic, i.e. a
representation of the functioning (or not) of the
system as a function of its components
-Because the basic events are 0-1 (fail-no fail), we
can use Boolean algebra to reduce the system
expression to the lowest terms
-In doing so we make the following assumptions
All events are binary
The system is coherent
I.e., failure of any component cannot improve
the system
45
Boolean Reduction:
Boolean Algebra
Notation Boolean Operator Set Theory t
X and Y XY XY
X or Y X+Y = 1-(1-X)(1-Y) XY
Not X X Xc
Important Laws
Commutative XY = YX X+Y = Y+X
Associative X(YZ) = (XY)Z X+(Y+Z)=(X+Y)+Z
Distributive X(Y+Z) = XY+XZ
Idempotent XX = X X+X = X
Absorption X+XY = X
Complementation X+X = (X) = X
De Morgans (XY) = X+Y (X+Y) = XY
Empty/Universal Set =
46
Reducing a Fault Tree Using
Boolean Algebra
T = E1E2 = (A+E3) (C+E4)
= AC + AE4 + CE3 + E3E4
= AC + A(AB) + C(B+C) +
+ (B+C)(AB)
= AC + AAB + CB + CC +
+ BAB + CAB
= AC + AB + BC + C + AB +
+ ABC
= AC + AB + BC +C + ABC
= AC + AB + C + ABC
= AB + C + ABC
= AB + C
This is the reduced tree and reduced

Boolean expression for the tree called
Min Cut Set Representation
47
Representing Systems in
Terms of Their Components
Using the convention that
XY=X*Y and X+Y=1-(1-X)*(1-Y)
we may determine the state of the top event in terms of
the component states.
From previous page T=AB + C = 1-(1-A*B)*(1-C)
For example if A occurs and C occurs but B does not
T=1-(1-1*0)(1-1) = 1 (Then the top event occurs)
48
Truth tables
-Generate all possible component states and the
probabilities associated with each.
-For m components, each can either function or not
(i.e. 2 states for each component) thus there are 2m
possible states taking in to account all components.
-Evaluate the system using the Boolean formula for
each state
49
- Generation of All Possible States
1st Col 2nd Col 3rd Col .. nth Col

20=1 0 0 0 0
21=2
20=1 1 0 2 2=4 0 :
0 1 0 .. 2n-1
2 1=2 :
1 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 2 2=4
1 1
1 1 1 :
.. 2n-1
: : : :
: : : 1
:
:
50
Truth tables
T=AB + C = 1-(1-A*B)*(1-C)
=1-(1-0*0)(1-0)
=1-(1-1*0)(1-0)
=1-(1-0*1)(1-0)
=1-(1-1*1)(1-0)
=1-(1-0*0)(1-1)
=1-(1-1*0)(1-1)
=1-(1-0*1)(1-1)
=1-(1-1*1)(1-1)
Note that if all elements of {A,B} occur or all elements of
{C} occur then the top event occurs
These are called Cut Sets
51
Truth Tables in Excel
T=AB + C = 1-(1-A*B)*(1-C)
52
Some Important Definitions

Cut Set
-A collection of basic events such that, if the events
occur together, the top event certainly occurs
Min Cut Set
-A cut set such that, if any basic event is removed,
the remaining set is no longer a cut set
Path Set
-A collection of basic events that connect input and
output
A path set merely represents a path through the
graph
Min Path Set
-A path set such that, if any basic event is removed,
the remaining set is no longer a path set
53
for Fault Trees
What is it?
-After Boolean reduction, the Boolean formula for any
fault tree will be in Min Cut Set Representation
T = X11 X12 X1n1+ X21 X22 X2n2+
.+ Xm1 Xm2 Xmnm
where {Xi1, Xi2, , Xini} is the ith cut set and
Xij=1 if ith item failed and 0 otherwise,
Letting Ci = Xi1 Xi2 Xini
where Ci is the ith cut set indicator
Ci =1 if all elements of the ith cut set fail
Then
T = C1+C2+.+ Cm
54
for Fault Trees
Converting Min Cut Set Representation to a
Calculable Formula
T = C1+C2+.+ Cm
Then we can write
T = 1 (1-C1)*(1-C2)**(1-Cm)
And since
Ci = Xi1 Xi2 Xini
We can write
T = 1 (1-C1)*(1-C2)**(1-Cm)
= 1 (1- j=1,n1X1j)*(1-j=1,n2X2j)*(1-j=1,nmXmj)
55
Example
Consider the following Fault Tree
[(D+E)B][BC+A]
(D+E)B BC+A
D+E BC
56
Example
T = [(D + E) B] [(B C) + A]
T = (BD + BE) [(BC) + A]
T = (BDBC) + (BEBC) + (BDA) + (BEA)
T = BCD + BCE + ABD + ABE
The minimal cut sets of the top event are thus
C1 = {B, C, D}
C2 = {B, C, E}
C3 = {A, B, D}
C4 = {A, B, E}
57
Example
Thus if A = 1 if component A fails and 0 otherwise
and this is true for B,C,D,E as well we can write
T = 1-(1- B*C*D)*(1- B*C*E)*(1- A*B*D)*(1- A*B*E)
And if T=1 we have system

failure and T=0 indicates
system is functioning
58
Example
59
Determining Boolean Representation

for Series-Parallel Systems
X2
X6
X4
X3
X1 X7
X5 X8
X6
X2*X3 X4
X1 X7
X5 X8
60

X6
X2*X3 X4
X1 X7
X5 X8
X2*X3 X4
X1 X6*X7*X8
X5
1-(1-X2*X3)*(1-X4)
X1 X6*X7*X8
X5
61

1-(1-X2*X3)*(1-X4)
X1 X6*X7*X8
X5
X1 [1-(1-X2*X3)*(1-X4)]X5 X6*X7*X8
1-(1-X1)*(1-[1-(1-X2*X3)*(1-X4)]X5)*(1-X6*X7*X8)
62

2
6
4
3
1 7
5 8
System Indicator
= 1 (1-X1)(1-(1-(1-X2X3)(1-X4))X5)(1-X6X7X8)
=1-(1-X1)(1-X2X3X5-X4X5+X2X3X4X5)(1-X6X7X8)
=1-(1-X1)(1-X2X3X5)(1-X4X5)(1-X6X7X8)
since for binary variables (X5)2= X5
Which is called min cut representation (no Xin terms)
63

2
6
4
3
1 7
5 8
What is min cut set representation?

1-(1-X1)(1-X2X3X5)(1-X4X5)(1-X6X7X8)
Note that for the sets of components {1}, {2,3,5}, {4,5},
{6,7,8} if all of the items in the sets fail, then the system
fails a cut set
Also not that we can not reduce any set by even a single
element and have it still be a cut set a min cut set
64

2
6
4
3
1 7
5 8
What is a min path?

Note that for the sets of components {1,5,6}, {1,5,7}
{1,5,8}, {1,2,4,6}, {1,2,4,7}, {1,2,4,8}, {1,3,4,6}, {1,3,4,7},
{1,3,4,8}, if all of the items in the sets function, then the
system functions (a path from beginning to end a path
set
Also not that we can not reduce any set by even a single
element and have it still be a path set a min path set
65
Boolean Representation
for General Systems
Non series-parallel structures
1 4
2 5
Use cut set representation
Z=1-(1-X1X2)(1-X1X3X5)(1-X4X5)(1-X2X3X4)
66
for General Systems
As structures get more complex this becomes difficult
and we may have to resort to a Fault Tree
Determine the min path and min cut sets
A D F
in B
H out
C E G
67
for General Systems
No Flow to Out
+
No Flow to H H
No Flow From F No Flow From G

+ +
No Flow to F F No Flow to G G
No Flow From A No Flow From D No Flow From C No Flow From E

+ + + +
A No Flow to D D C No Flow to E E
No Flow + No Flow +
From in From in
B B
No Flow No Flow
We will discount
From in From in
this in our analysis
68
for General Systems
[A(B+D)+F] [C(B+E)+G]+H
+
[A(B+D)+F] [C(B+E)+G] H
A(B+D)+F C(B+E)+G
+ +
A(B+D) F C(B+E) G
A B+D C B+E
+ +
A C
B D B E
B B
69
for General Systems
Failure = [A(B+D)+F][C(B+E)+G]+H
= [AB + AD + F] [CB + CE + G]+H
= ABBC+ ABCE + ABG + ADBC+
ADCE + ADG + FBC+ FCE + FG +H
= ABC+ ABCE + ABG + ABCD+ ACDE +
ADG + BCF+ CEF + FG +H
= ABC + ABG + ACDE + ADG + BCF
+ CEF + FG + H
Cut Set: {A,B,C}, {A,B,G}, {A,C,D,E}, {A,D,G}, {B,C,F},

{C,E,F},{F,G},{H}
Using our indicator notation
T=1-(1-A*B*C)*(1-A*B*G)*(1-A*C*D*E)*(1-A*D*G)
*(1-B*C*F)*(1-C*E*F)*(1-F*G)*(1-H)
Quantifying Event Trees 70
(Using DeMorgans Laws)

I A B C
ABC Scenario 1
ABC Scenario 2
AB Scenario 3
A Scenario 4
Assume split fractions are calculated using fault trees
A=b+cd B=c+e C=bd
A B C
+ +
b G1 c e b d
c d
71
Quantifying Event Trees

Scenario 4
I A = I (b+cd)
Scenario 3
I A B = I (bc+bd) (c+e)
= I (bce + bcd + bde)
Scenario 2
I A B C = I (bc+bd) (c+e) (bd)
= I (bc+bd) (ce) (bd) ={ }
Scenario 1
I A B C = I (bc+bd) (ce) (bd)
= I (bc+bd) (ce) (b+d)
= I bce
72
Calculating the Probability
of the Top Event
Three Methods
Converting Cut Set Formulation to Probability
Statements
Using Truth Tables
Using Binary Decision Diagrams
73
Calculating the Probability
of the Top Event - Method 1
Additive Law for Events A1,, An
P(A1An) = i=1,n P(Ai) i<j P(AiAj) + i<j<k P(Ai
AjAk) + + (1)n+1* P(A1An)
You know P(A1A2) = P(A1) + P(A2) - P(A1 A2)
The above general formula is called the Inclusion-
Exclusion Principle (as terms are added you
overestimate then underestimate)
for example
i=1,n P(Ai) i<j P(AiAj) P(A1An) i=1,n P(Ai)
74
Calculating the Probability of
the Top Event - Method 1
If a fault tree has minimal cut sets C1, C2, , Cm, then
T = C1 + C2 + + Cm
P(T=1) = P({C1 =1} {C2 =1} {Cm=1})
and we can calculate
P(T=1) = P(Ci =1) - P({Ci =1} {Cj=1}) + +
+ (1)m+1 P({C1 =1}{C2 =1} {Cm=1})
P(Ci=1)=P({Xi1=1}{Xini=1})
and we can calculate bounds
P1(Ci ) P1(Ci Cj) < P1(T) < P1(Ci)
where we use the notation henceforth
P1(C)=P({C=1}) and P1(Ci Cj) = P({Ci =1} {Cj=1})
75
the Top Event Method 1
Rare Event Approximation P1(T) P1(Ci)
(conservative)
-Based on the notion that the simultaneous
occurrence of several rare events is negligible
-Problematic when there is a large degree of
overlap in cut sets
-An additional simplifying assumption is the
independence of components
P1(Ci) = P({Xi1=1}{Xini=1})
= P1(Xi1) P1(Xi2) P1(Xini)
assuming independence
76
the Top Event Method 1

Example 1
C1= {A,B}
C2 = {C}
P1(A) = P1(B) = P1(C) = 0.1 and A,B,C mutually indep.

P1(T) = P1(CAB) P1(C) + P1(AB)
P1(C) + P1(A)*P1(B) = 0.110 (Bound)
P1(T) = P1(C) + P1(AB) P1(ABC)
= P1(C) + P1(A)*P1(B) P1(A)*P1(B)*P1(C)
= 0.109 (Exact)
77
Calculating Probability of Top Event:
Truth Tables Method 2
A B C P(A)P(B)P(C) System
0 0 0 (.9)(.9)(.9) = 0.729 0
1 0 0 (.1)(.9)(.9) = 0.081 0
0 1 0 (.9)(.1)(.9) = 0.081 0
0 0 1 (.9)(.9)(.1) = 0.081 1
1 1 0 (.1)(.1)(.9) = 0.009 1
1 0 1 (.9)(.1)(.1) = 0.009 1
0 1 1 (.9)(.1)(.1) = 0.009 1
1 1 1 (.1)(.1)(.1) = 0.001 1
0 denotes that component does not fail

1 denotes that component fails
P(T) = 0.081 + 0.009 + 0.009 + 0.009 + 0.001 = 0.109
Note: Independence of components is assumed
78
Binary Decision Diagrams Method 3
A
0 1
B B
0 1 0 1
C C C C
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Tree represents all possible component states

Bottom of tree represents the truth table value for the
tree path.
There are techniques to reduce the tree.
79
Binary Decision Diagrams Method 3
A
0 1
B B
0 1 0 1
C C C C
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
The tree is basically a physical

representation of the truth table
80
BDDs Method 3
.109 =.9*.10 + .1*.19
A
.9 .1
0.10= .9*.1 + .1*.1 .19 =.9 *.1 + .1 * 1
.10 B .19 B
.9 .1 .9 .1
.1 C .1 C .1 C 1 C
.9 .1 .9 .1 .9 .1 .9 .1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
Calculate probability of top event by replacing the
states with their probabilities, and folding back the tree
For example, 0.19 = 0.1 * 0.9 + 1 * 0.1
81
Putting it All Together
Example
Consider the event tree and fault trees below:
I B A
Determine a Boolean equation representing each

event tree scenario in terms of fault tree basic events
(C1, C2, C3).
82
Putting it All Together
Example
a)If the frequency of the initiating event I is 10-3 per
year, and P1(C1) = 0.001, P1(C2) = 0.008, and
P1 (C3) = 0.005, calculate the risk (injuries per
year).
83
Example
Solution
a) The Boolean equations representing each of the
event tree scenarios in terms of the fault tree
basic events (C1, C2, C3) are:
Scenario 1:
84
Example
Scenario 2:
Scenario 3:
85
Example Solution
86
Example: Solution
That is the rate of I
7.95x10-6+6.00x10-6
87
Example Solution
Advanced Probability
Analysis
89
Probability of System Failure:
Law of Total Probability
1
3
2
Z=1-(1-X1*X2)*(1-X3)
Notation
We use the event Ci (S) to denote that component i
(the system) fails and Ci (S) that it does not.
We also use the indicator Xi=1 (Z=1) to indicate that

component i (the system) fails and Xi=0 (Z=0) to
indicate that component i (the system) does not fail
Thus P(Ci)=Pr(Xi=1) and P(S)=Pr(Z=1)

90
1
3
2
Z=1-(1-X1*X2)*(1-X3)
Use probability laws
P(S) = P([C1C2 ]C3) = P(C1C2) + P(C3) P(C1C2C3)
Or condition on component states
This side will This side will be the probability
be 0 or 1 of a component state
P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3) +
P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3) +
P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3) +
P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3) +
P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3) +
+ P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3)
91
1
3
2
Z=1-(1-X1*X2)*(1-X3)
Assuming
Independence
P(C1C2C3)
Using SUMPRODUCT function

92
Advanced Probability Laws:
Conditional Probability
-P(A|B) = P(A B) / P(B) , if P(B) > 0
-Conditional probability redefines the sample
space
New Sample Space

A
B
Elements of A in the
New Sample Space
93
1
3
2
If component 2 fails what is the
probability of System Failure
Measure Component Importance
Conditioning on component 2 failure:
P(S|C2) = P(SC2) / P(C2)
= P({[C1C2 ]C3}C2} / P(C2)
= P([C1C2 ][C3C2 ]) / P(C2)
= {P(C1C2) + P(C3C2) - P(C1C2C3)} / P(C2)
If components are independent:
= {P(C1)P(C2) + P(C3)P(C2) - P(C1)P(C2)P(C3)} / P(C2)
= P(C1) + P(C3) - P(C1)P(C3)
94
1
3
2
If component i fails what is the
probability of System Failure
Note: Independence NOT Assumed

95
Probability of Component Failure:
1
3
2
If system fails, what is the
probability of component i failure
Maintenance Implications
Note: Independence NOT Assumed

96
Probability of Cut Set Causing Failure:
Non series-parallel structures
1 4
3
2 5
Cut Sets: {1,2}, {1,3,5}, {4,5}, {2,3,4}
Cut Set Representation

Z=1-(1-X1X2)(1-X1X3X5)(1-X4X5)(1-X2X3X4)
97
Calculating Complex Structure
Functions and Probability of Failure
=Pr(CS12Z}/Pr{Z}
= Pr(CS12}/Pr{Z}
98
Importance Measures
Motivation
A key challenge in a PRA is to identify the elements
in the system that contribute most to the risk
Method to accomplish this is Importance Ranking
The many importance measures used for this
process can be categorized as either
Absolute
Defines each risk element in terms of an
absolute risk metric, such as the conditional
frequency of a hazard exposure given the
state of the element; or
Relative
Compares risk contribution of each element to
that of another
99
Importance Measures
Formulation
Risk is usually composed of a collection of
scenarios that occur with a certain frequency or
probability
A series of cut sets can represent these scenarios
Wall, et al. (2001), represent total risk by a linear
function of any single risk element:
R = aP + b
100
Importance Measures
R = aP + b
where
R: total System Risk
a: total contribution from cut sets that involve a
particular element
P: total risk contribution from a particular element
b: total contribution from cut sets that do not
involve a particular element
Wall, et al.s, method is only useful for investigating

one-at-a-time sensitivity to risk elements
101
Principles of Importance Measures
IB =a , RP=1 RP=0
IFV = aP/(aP+b) , (Rbase RP=0)/Rbase
IC = aP/(aP+b) , (Rbase RP=0)/Rbase
II = aP ,Rbase RP=0
IRRW = aP , Rbase RP=0 (differential method)
IRRW = (aP+b)/b , Rbase/RP=0 (fraction method)
IRAW = a(1-P) , RP=1 Rbase (differential method)
IRAW = (a+b)/(aP+b) , RP=1/Rbase (fraction method)
DIM1 , (R/Pi)/(j=1,nR/Pj)
DIM 2 , aiPi/j=1,naiPi
102
Safety Systems:
k-out-of-n Systems
Consider a system where the system will function if
k-out-of-n of its components function or will fail is n-k+1
or more components fail
Usually these are of identical components, each with
probability of failure p, then the probability of system
failure is
Why?
1 2-out-of-3 System
Min Cut Sets {1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}
2
Prob of Failures
3
103
Modelling Dependent Failures
What is dependent failure?

-Let Ci be the event that component i fails and let
P(Ci) denote its probability
If we have n components and their failures are
independent, then
P(C1C2 Cn) = P(C1)P(C2) P(Cn)
If their failures are not independent, then this is
not a simple multiplication, we use the
Multiplicative Law
P(C1C2 Cn) = P(C1) P(C2C1)
* P(C3C1C2) ** P(CnC1C2 Cn-1)
The probabilities of n joint dependent events on
the left side are usually greater than the
corresponding independent probabilities
104
Example
105

What are Common Cause Failures
-CCFs are considered to be the collection of all
sources of dependency, especially between
components, that are not known or are difficult to
model explicitly.
-CCFs have been shown by many studies to
contribute significantly to the overall unreliability of
complex systems;
-CCFs have no unique or universal definitions.
-A fairly general definition is given by Mosleh as: A
CCF is a subset of dependent events in which two
or more component fault states exist at the same
time, or in a short time interval, and are direct
results of a shared cause.
106
Modelling CCFs: Two Components

-As CCFs have no explicit definition, their
probabilities are modelled as possible joint
combinations of failures of components
-Consider a system with two redundant components
A, B; then
P(A fails) = P(AI) + P(CAB)
AI denotes A fails separately
BI denotes B fails separately
CAB denotes A & B fail together by common
cause
107

Modelling CCFs: Three Components
-Consider a system with three redundant
components A, B and C
The total failure probability of A can be
expressed in terms of its independent failure AI
and its dependent failures as follows:
CAB, CAC denote that (A,B) & (A,C) fail
together by common cause
CABC denotes that (A,B,C) fail together by
common cause
-Component A fails if any of the events above occur
P(A fails) = P(AI) + P(CAB) + P(CAC) + P(CABC)
108

Modelling CCFs: Min Cut Representation
-The equivalent Boolean representation of total
failure of component A is AT = AI+CAB+CAC+CABC
-If the success criterion for the system is 2 out of 3
components A, B and C succeed, then failure of
the system can be represented by the following cut
sets:
- {AI,BI}, {AI,CI}, {BI,CI}, {CAB}, {CAC}, {CBC}, {CABC}
-Thus the Boolean representation of system failure
will be
S = (AIBI) + (AICI) + (BICI) + CAB
+ CAC + CBC + CABC
(why not include(AIBICI?)
109

Modelling CCFs; Probability Representation
-If independence is assumed, only the first four terms
of the Boolean expression are used, i.e., P(CAB) =
P(CAC) = P(CBC) = P(CABC) = 0;
Otherwise, applying the Rare Event
Approximation results
P(System Failure) = P(any 2 or 3 components fail)
QS P(AI)P(BI) + P(CAB) + P(AI)P(CI)
+ P(CAC) + P(BI)P(CI) + P(CBC)
+ P(CABC)
110
-Assume that components A, B, and C are similar,

and define
Qi = Probability of i simultaneous component
failures due to common cause
-and write
QS = P(System Failure)
= P(any 2 or 3 components fail)
= P(AI)P(BI) + P(CAB) + P(AI)P(CI)
+ P(CAC) + P(BI)P(CI) + P(CBC)
+ P(CABC)
= 3(Q1)2 + 3(Q2) + (Q3)
111

- In general for a k out of n system to fail there
must be n-k+1 or more failures
Example
112

-Generally, models for common cause failure derive
expressions for Qk for a system of size m, 1 k m
in terms of total probability of component failure (Qt)
113
Probability Models for Time

Dependent Analysis
114
Previous Lecture:
A Snap Shot in Time
1
3
2
Z=1-(1-X1*X2)*(1-X3)
Use probability laws
P(S) = P([C1C2 ]C3) = P(C1C2) + P(C3) P(C1C2C3)
This side will This side will be the probability
be 0 or 1 of a component state
P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3) +
P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3) +
P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3) +
P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3) +
P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3) +
+ P(S|C1C2C3) * P(C1C2C3)
Random Variables:
115
Time Dependent Behavior

Random variables are important for describing
system behavior as a function of time:
TS is system life length, Ti life length of component i
P(TS t) = P({T1 t} {T2 t}) (series system)
P (TS t) = P({T1 t} {T2 t}) (parallel system)
Note: {Ti t} defines our previous notation, Ci , for a

fixed value t but as t varies the probability is
a function of time
When T takes values in [0, ), it is called a
lifetime variable (used in reliability and risk
analysis)
Important Functions for
116
Random Variables
Probability Distribution
f(x) = Pr{X=x} for X discrete (called
pmf)
f(x)dx Pr{x<X<x+dx} for X continuous
(called pdf)
Cumulative Distribution Function:
F(x) = P(X x) = ix f(i) for X discrete
x
= 0 f(u)du for X continuous
Reliability (Survival) Function
R(x) = P(X>x) =1 F(x)
[F(x) or S(x) is often used in place of R(x)]
117
Random Variables
118
Random Variables
Failure Rate Function (Continuous rv Only)
h(x) = Lim dx0P(X x+dx|X>x}/dx
h(x)dx P(x<X x+dx|X>x}
Denotes instantaneous probability of failure
Cumulative Failure Rate Function (Continuous

RV Only)
x
H(x) = 0 h(u)du (continuous only)
Denotes cumulative wear or exposure
119
Classic Failure Rate Curve

Infant Chance Wear
Mortality Failure Out
Failure Failure
Rate
time
Note: i. life lengths said to follow a bathtub failure
rate with three phases: infant mortality,
chance failure and wear out
ii. if h(x) is nondecreasing, constant,
nonincreasing we say that X is IFR, CFR, or
DFR for Increasing, Constant or Decreasing
Failure Rate
120
Classic Failure Rate Curve

Infant Chance Wear
Mortality Failure Out
Failure Failure
Rate
time
Note: i. In practice we often only use one phase of

the curve
ii. There are example phenomena from each
phase (DFR software, CFR-electronics,
IFR-mechanical devices)
Parametric Families of
121
Distributions
When a distribution f(x) can be indexed by a
set of parameters, say , whose specification
completely determines the distribution we say
that f(x|) is a parametric family.
Important Properties
Failure Rate Behavior
Distribution of Minimums (for series systems)
TS = Min{T1, , Tn}
Distribution of Sums (for cold backup or switching
systems)
TS = T1 ++ Tn
122
Which Parametric Family
to Use?
Look at the data histogram
Use of Parametric Families: 123
System Reliability as a Function

of Time
Component Life Lengths
T1~Wei(2,10), T2~Wei(1,5) assume independence
System Life TS
P(TS t) = P({T1 t} {T2 t}) (series system)
= P({T1 t}) + P({T2 t}) - P({T1 t})P({T2 t})
= (1 - e(t/10)2) + (1 - e(t/5))
- (1 - e(t/10)2) (1 - e(t/5))
P(TS t) = P({T1 t} {T2 t}) (parallel system)
= (1 - e(t/10)2) (1 - e(t/5))
124
Making Risk Time Dependent

Some times you are lucky and the system lifelength distribution
has a closed form
Series Parallel Cold Standby
(perfect switch)
1 1

.
1 n
n n
TS=min{T1,,Tn} TS=max{T1,,Tn} TS=T1++Tn
If Ti~ Exp(i) No Distribution for If Ti~ gamma(i,)
then Ts~ Exp(i=1,n) Ti leads to a then Ts~ gamma(i=1,ni ,)
known form If Ti~ normal(i,i2)
distribution for TS then s~normal(i=1,ni,i=1,ni2)
125
Analyzing Serries Systems
1 n
TS=min{T1,,Tn}
System Failure = 1 - Pr{TS>t}

= 1- Pr{ min{T1,,Tn}>t}
= 1 - Pr{T1>t, ., Tn>t}
=1 - i=1,n Pr{Ti>t}
if components are independent
=1 - i=1,n [1-Fi(t)]
126
Analyzing Parallel Systems

1
.
TS=max{T1,,Tn}
n
System Failure = Pr{TS t}

= Pr{ max{T1,,Tn} t}
= Pr{T1 t, ., Tn t}
= i=1,n Pr{Ti t}
if components are independent
= i=1,n Fi(t)
127

1
3
2
Z=1-(1-X1*X2)*(1-X3)
Use probability laws (Cuts Set Rep)

P(TS<t) = P([{T1<t} {T2 <t}] {T3<t})
= P({T1<t}{T2<t}) + P({T3<t}) P({T1<t} {T2<t} {T3<t})
P({T1<t} {T2<t} {T3>t}) + P({T1>t} {T2>t} {T3<t})
+P({T1<t} {T2>t} {T3<t}) + P({T1>t} {T2<t} {T3<t})
+ P({T1<t} {T2<t} {T3<t})
Assuming independent components such that the CDF of
component i is Fi(t) = Pr{Tit} yields
128
1
3
2
Z=1-(1-X1*X2)*(1-X3)
Use probability laws (Cuts Set Rep)

P(TS<t) = F1(t)F2(t) + F3(t) - F1(t)F2(t)F3(t)

P(TS<t) = F1(t)F2(t)R3(t) + R1(t)R2(t)F3(t) + F1(t)R2(t)F3(t)
+ R1(t)F2(t)F3(t) + F1(t)F2(t)F3(t)
where Ri(t) = 1 Fi(t) = Pr{Ti > t}

129
Statistical Inference for Time

Dependent Model Parameters
Making Models Reflect Reality:
130
Classical Estimation
What is an estimator?
Given an unknown parameter and a random
sample X1, ..., Xn from (X|), what are some
estimators for ?
They are functions of the random sample
(X) = (1/n) i=1,n Xi), ,
(X) = max(X1, ..., Xn )
(X) = 3, ......
An estimator is a random variable with a probability
distribution and an estimate is a realization of that
random variable.
What is a good estimator?
Look at its pdf
131
What is a good estimator?
Unbiassedness E[] =
Minimum Variance VAR() as small as possible
(there is a Cremer-Rao
Lower Bound)
Consistency n as n
132
Main Parametric Estimators:
~
Given a random sample X1, ..., Xn from f(X|), with
unknown parameter(s),
Method of Moments (ok properties but easy to use)
(X) is obtained as the solution to
1. E[X|] = (1/n) i=1,n Xi, ( has dimension one)
2. E[X|] = (1/n) i=1,n Xi,
VAR[X|] = S2 ( has dimension two)
more equations for higher dimensions
Example _
^
Exponential E[X] = 1/ = 1/x
_
Gamma E[X] = / ,_VAR[X]= /2

=x2/S^2, =x/S2^

133
Main Parametric Estimators:
Method of Least Squares
(X) is obtained as the solution to
Min i=1,n {F(X(i)|) - i/n}2 , X(i) is the ith smallest Xi
value and F is a particular parametric family
Selected F(x|)
~
0
134
Method of Maximum Likelihood (Best
Properties)
(X) is obtained as that which maximizes the
likelihood function, a function essentially describing
the probability of observing what was observed
By selecting the values for the parameter that

maximize the likelihood function, we select the
parameter values which maximize the probability of
observing what we oberved
There are several forms of likelihood functions

Formulating the Likelihood
135
Function Complete Samples

The Likelihood has many forms, based on the data
Complete Samples: a random sample X1, ..., Xn

L(|X) = i=1,n f(Xi|)
X
X
X
X
Exact failure times observed

136
Function - Censoring
Right Censored Samples: A life test with n items
that stops after time t*, if r failures are observed,
let the observed failure times be denoted X(r) =
X(1), ..., X(r) in addition we know X(i) > t* for i > r,
L(|X(r),t*) ={i=1,r f(X(i)|)}R(t*|)n-r
X
X
(
(
X
0 t*
~
137
Function-Censoring
Left Censored Samples: A life test with n items
that begins at t = 0 but we do not get to observe
the condition of the items until after time t*. Let r
items be observed to be failed at t* and let the
observed failure times be denoted X(n-r) = X(r+1), ...,
X(n) in addition, we know X(i) t* for i r.
L(|X) = {i=r+1,n f(X(i)|)}F(t*|)r
X
X
)
)
X
0 t*
138
Function-Censoring
Interval Censored Samples: A life test with n
items begins at time t = 0 but observation of the
state of the items (failed or surviving) is only at
fixed time points 0 = t0 < t1< . < tk < tk+1 = . The
test is stopped at tk. Let Xi, i = 1, ...,k denote the
number of items observed failed in [tk-1,tk], Xk+1 is
the number still surviving at tk
L(|X) i=1,k+1 [F(ti|) - F(ti-1|)]Xi
( )
( )
( )
( )
0 t1 t2 t3 t4
139
Function
Or any mixture
)
( )
(
(
X
0 t1 t2 t3 t4
L(|Data)[F(t2|)]*[F(t2|)-F(t1|)]* R(t3|)*R(t4|)*f(t1|)
Usually for numeric reasons we take the natural log
and maximize
140
Function
Example:Consider the following failure time
data
from an exponential distribution
t1=5, t2=12, t3=26, t4>10, t5>17, t6<4,
t7[5,10], t8[5,10], t9[11,16], t10[20,30],
L = f(5)*f(12)*f(26)*R(10)*R(17)*F(4)
*[F[10)-F(5)]2*[F(16)-F(11)]*[F(30)-F(20)]
or
141
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
- Weibull Likelihood Plots

142
Bayesian Statistical Inference

for Time Dependent Model
Parameters
143

Given an event B and a collection of events
A1, , An which are mutually exclusive
(Ai Aj =) and collectively exhaustive (Aj =)
then P(B) = j=1,nP(B Aj) = j=1,nP(B | Aj)P(Aj)
Bayes Law
Given an event B and a collection of events
A1, , An which are mutually exclusive
(Ai Aj =) and collectively exhaustive (Aj =)
then P(Ai|B) = P(B | Ai)P(Ai)/ j=1,nP(B | Aj)P(Aj)
144
Random Variables and The Law of Total

Probability and Bayes Law
When a problem uses a random variable and
specifies its parameters conditioned on some
physical act X~f(x|) where

Unconditional questions about X Law of TP

For example
145
Questions about given observations on X

Bayes Law
For example
146
Example: Products are produced by three

separate machines. Machine 1,2, and 3 produce
defective products with probability .1, .05 and .02
respectively and account for 10%, 40% and 50%
of the total products produced.
Then X is number of defects, X|p~Bin(n,p)

where n is a sample size and
147
a. If a box of 10 product are randomly selected and

we do not know which machine manufactured the
products in the box, what is the probability of no
defects?
Pr{X =0}
= Pr{X 0|p=.10}Pr{p=.10}+Pr{X=0|p=.05}PR{p=.05}
+ Pr{X =0|p=.02} Pr{p=.02}
= (.90)10(.10)+(.95)10(.40)+(.98)10(.50) = .6829
148
b. If 1 defect is found what is the probability that

machine 1 produced the box?
149

150
Note: the spreadsheet works for a single observation

but may be used sequentially for multiple observations
Example Pr{p=.1|X1=1,X2>3}
Pr{p=.1}
Pr{p=.1|X1=1}
Pr{p=.1|X1=1,X2>3}
151
Bayes Theorem: Continuous Analogue

THM: Let X and be continuous random vectors
with joint probability density f(x,) . Let f(x|) and f(|
x) be the corresponding conditional densities and
f() = f(x,)dx be the marginal density of . Then
f(|x) = f(x|)f()/{ f(x|)f()d }
Proof: if f() > 0 and f(x) > 0, f(|x) = f(x,)/f(x)

f(|x) = f(x,)/{f(x|)f()d}
= f(x|)f()/{ f(x|)f()d}
152
Principals of Bayesian Inference

Description of uncertainty is via probability,
Uncertainty about unknown parameters , , , etc
for statistical models is expressed via probability
distributions for the parameters
Given a model f(x|) with unknown , a distribution,
g() is specified using expert judgment. This is
called the prior distribution for and describes our
uncertainty about
153

If we wish to make probability statements about the
random variable X, taking into account our
uncertainty for , we may do so using the
law of total probability f(x) = f(x|)g()d
This distribution is called the
predictive distribution for x.
Thus Pr{XA} = Af(x)dx if X is continuous or using

an appropriate summation if X is discrete
154

If data becomes available we update our
uncertainty distribution for using Bayes Theorem.
We use the probability model to describe the form
of the data as a function of the parameter. This is
called the likelihood function.
There are many forms of the likelihood function
depending on the form of the data, however for a
complete random sample X1,, Xn from f(x|), the
likelihood is given as
L(|x1,, xn ) = i=1,n f(xi|)

155

Given the data, x~ = x1,, xn the updated distribution
which describes the uncertainty for is given by
Bayes Theorem as
g(|x)
~
= L(|x)g()/{
~
L(|x)g()d}
~
This is called the posterior distribution for and it

describes our uncertainty for in light of the data.
156

If we wish to make probability statements about the
random variable X, taking into account our
uncertainty for AFTER the a random sample is
observed, we may do so using the law of total
probability
f(x|x)
~
= f(x|)g(|x)d
~
This is called
the predictive distribution for X after observing x.
~
157
BEFORE DATA AFTER DATA

Prior Posterior
OBSERVABLE Predictive Predictive
f(x) f(x|x)
~
Prior Posterior
PARAMETER
g() g(|x)
~
158

Example (Effect of Prior on Posterior)
Failure Data: (12,10,15,5,8)
159

Example (Effect of Prior on Posterior)
Failure Data: (.1,.5,.3,.1,.2)
Bayesian Statistics:
160
Defining the Prior

Methods
Conjugate Priors
Noninformative Priors
Maximum Entropy Priors
Empirical Bayes Priors
Bayesian Statistics:
161
Prior Selection
PRIOR ASSESSMENT Yes
Any Prior
Yes
Access to Experts Access to Computer
No Conjugate Prior
No
Yes Empirical
Access to Data
Bayes Prior
No
Access to Partial Yes Maximum

Information Information
Moments Prior
No
Noninformative Prior
162
Example Bayes Analysis
The number of non serious accidents at a plant is given by

a Poisson process with rate per year. However, since is
unknown, a prior distribution is constructed. The gamma
distribution with =1 and =5 is selected. Given the above,
what point estimate would you use for ?
163
The number of non serious accidents at a plant is given by

a Poisson process with rate l per year. However, since is
unknown, a prior distribution is constructed. The gamma
distribution with =1 and =5 is selected.
What is the probability that is less than .1?
What is the probability of more than 2 accidents per
year?
164

For a year period, we observe 3 accidents. Plot the prior
and posterior distribution of . In a year we observe 3
accidents, what is the probability of more than 2 accidents in
the following year?
165

Section 7a Reliability Notes

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Section 7a Reliability Notes

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Section 7a Reliability Notes

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1

Terminology and Background

Terminology and Background

Engineering Systems Losses Can Be

Terminology and Background

Terminology and Background

Importance of Risk Analysis

Terminology and Background

Importance of Risk Analysis

Elements of Risk Analysis

National Research Council (1994)

Elements of Risk Analysis

Definition of Risk (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981)

Quantitative Risk Assessment

Important Risk Journals

Qualitative Risk Assessment:

Federal Highway Administration, 2006

Federal Aviation Administration, 2007

0 PROBABILITY 1 SRP Consequence

Fault Tree Construction

Undeveloped Event Transfer In

External Event Transfer Out

Fault Tree Construction

Explosion After Gas Leak

Explosion Prior Explosion Posterior to

Sensing & AC Power

Pumping System Example

Fault Tree Example 3

No Water Delivered from P2 Branch No Water Delivered from P1 Branch

Fault Tree Example 3

V4 Fails to V2 Fails to P2 Fails V5 Fails to V3 Fails to

Fault Tree Example 4

Event Tree Method

Event Tree Method Example

Initiating Sequence System

Event Tree Method

Event Tree Method Example 1

Event Tree Method Example 1

Event Tree Method Example 2

Event Tree Method

This is the reduced tree and reduced

1st Col 2nd Col 3rd Col .. nth Col

Some Important Definitions

T = 1-(1- B*C*D)*(1- B*C*E)*(1- A*B*D)*(1- A*B*E)

And if T=1 we have system

Determining Boolean Representation

Determining Boolean Representation

Determining Boolean Representation

Determining Boolean Representation

Determining Boolean Representation

What is min cut set representation?

Determining Boolean Representation

What is a min path?

Use cut set representation

Determine the min path and min cut sets

for General Systems

No Flow From F No Flow From G

No Flow From A No Flow From D No Flow From C No Flow From E

for General Systems

T = 1-(1- BCD)(1- BCE)(1- ABD)(1- AB*E)