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Supreme Court: Recaredo Ma. Calvo For Appellant. Attorney-General Villa-Real For Appellee
Supreme Court: Recaredo Ma. Calvo For Appellant. Attorney-General Villa-Real For Appellee
Supreme Court: Recaredo Ma. Calvo For Appellant. Attorney-General Villa-Real For Appellee
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
MALCOLM, J.:
What then was the purpose of the law when it declared that
no director or officer should borrow of the bank, and "if any
director," etc., "shall be convicted," etc., "of directly or
indirectly violating this section he shall be punished by fine
and imprisonment?" We say to protect the stockholders,
depositors and creditors of the bank, against the
temptation to which the directors and officers might be
exposed, and the power which as such they must
necessarily possess in the control and management of the
bank, and the legislature unwilling to rely upon the implied
understanding that in assuming this relation they would not
acquire any interest hostile or adverse to the most exact
and faithful discharge of duty, declared in express terms
that they should not borrow, etc., of the bank.
JUDGMENT
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Antecedents
SO ORDERED.[7]
SO ORDERED.[8]
SO ORDERED.[11]
SO ORDERED.[12]
The Ruling of the MTC
The Issues
Procedural Issues
The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of possessory actions involving
these public lands before final award is made by the Lands
Department, and before title is given any of the conflicting
claimants? It is one of utmost importance, as there are public
lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especially
in newly opened regions. It also involves a matter of policy, as it
requires the determination of the respective authorities and
functions of two coordinate branches of the Government in
connection with public land conflicts.
Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil
Code, either in the old, which was in force in this country before
the American occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory
action, the aim and purpose of which is the recovery of the
physical possession of real property, irrespective of the question
as to who has the title thereto. Under the Spanish Civil Code we
had the accion interdictal, a summary proceeding which could
be brought within one year from dispossession (Roman Catholic
Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as early as
October 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we
implanted the common law action of forcible entry (section 80
of Act No. 190), the object of which has been stated by this
Court to be to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal
disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the
remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would
create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who,
believing themselves entitled to the possession of property,
resort to force to gain possession rather than to some
appropriate action in the court to assert their claims. (Supia
and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) So
before the enactment of the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926)
the action of forcible entry was already available in the courts of
the country. So the question to be resolved is, Did the
Legislature intend, when it vested the power and authority to
alienate and dispose of the public lands in the Lands Department,
to exclude the courts from entertaining the possessory action of
forcible entry between rival claimants or occupants of any land
before award thereof to any of the parties? Did Congress intend
that the lands applied for, or all public lands for that matter, be
removed from the jurisdiction of the judicial Branch of the
Government, so that any troubles arising therefrom, or any
breaches of the peace or disorders caused by rival claimants,
could be inquired into only by the Lands Department to the
exclusion of the courts? The answer to this question seems to us
evident. The Lands Department does not have the means to
police public lands; neither does it have the means to prevent
disorders arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace
among settlers; or to pass promptly upon conflicts of
possession. Then its power is clearly limited to disposition and
alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in
order to make proper award, the settlement of conflicts of
possession which is recognized in the court herein has another
ultimate purpose, i.e., the protection of actual possessors and
occupants with a view to the prevention of breaches of the
peace. The power to dispose and alienate could not have been
intended to include the power to prevent or settle disorders or
breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants prior to
the final award. As to this, therefore, the corresponding
branches of the Government must continue to exercise power
and jurisdiction within the limits of their respective
functions. The vesting of the Lands Department with authority
to administer, dispose, and alienate public lands, therefore,
must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the
Government of the exercise of the respective functions or
powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and
quell breaches of the peace by the police, the authority on the
part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions
arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly,
alienation and disposition.
EN BANC
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Nor did the decree of the lower court that ordered the sale
have the least influence in our previous decision to require
our making any finding in regard thereto, for, with or
without that decree, the Supreme Court had to decide the
ownership of the lot consistently with its titles and not in
accordance with the judicial acts or proceedings had prior
to the setting up of the issue in respect to the ownership of
the property that was the subject of the judicial decree.
He who has only the use of a thing cannot validly sell the
thing itself. The effect of the sale being a transfer of the
ownership of the thing, it is evident that he who has only
the mere use of the thing cannot transfer its ownership.
The sale of a thing effected by one who is not its owner is
null and void. The defendants never were the owners of
the lot sold. The sale of it by them is necessarily null and
void. On cannot convey to another what he has never had
himself.
FIRST DIVISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
It was at that stage that the instant cases were filed. The
Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed Civil Case No. 3607 (419)
on July 24, 1979, for recovery of possession of Lot 3; and
the Heirs of Juan Valdez filed Civil Case No. 3655 (429) on
September 24, 1979, likewise for recovery of possession
of Lot 2 (Decision, pp. 199-201, Orig. Rec.).
In Civil Case No. 3607 (419) trial was held. The plaintiffs
Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano presented one (1) witness,
Fructuoso Valdez, who testified on the alleged ownership
of the land in question (Lot 3) by their
predecessor-in-interest, Egmidio Octaviano (Exh. C ); his
written demand (Exh. BB-4 ) to defendant Vicar for the
return of the land to them; and the reasonable rentals for
the use of the land at P10,000.00 per month. On the other
hand, defendant Vicar presented the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Benguet, Atty. Nicanor Sison, who testified
that the land in question is not covered by any title in the
name of Egmidio Octaviano or any of the plaintiffs (Exh. 8).
The defendant dispensed with the testimony of
Mons.William Brasseur when the plaintiffs admitted that
the witness if called to the witness stand, would testify that
defendant Vicar has been in possession of Lot 3, for
seventy-five (75) years continuously and peacefully and
has constructed permanent structures thereon.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not meet the
requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive
prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy the
requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive
prescription because of the absence of just title. The
appellate court did not believe the findings of the trial court
that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by purchase and
Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio
Octaviano by petitioner Vicar because there was
absolutely no documentary evidence to support the same
and the alleged purchases were never mentioned in the
application for registration.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
IMPERIAL, J.:
EN BANC
ZALDIVAR, J.:
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Facts
SO ORDERED.[12]
SO ORDERED.[13]
SO ORDERED.[15]
The Issues
xxx Ilagan also had with him (before the withdrawal) a forged
check of PBC and indicated the amount of P90,000 which he
deposited in favor of L.C. Diaz and Company. After
successfully withdrawing this large sum of money, accused
Ilagan gave alias Rey (Noel Tamayo) his share of the
loot. Ilagan then hired a taxicab in the amount of P1,000 to
transport him (Ilagan) to his home province at Bauan,
Batangas. Ilagan extravagantly and lavishly spent his money but
a big part of his loot was wasted in cockfight and horse
racing. Ilagan was apprehended and meekly admitted his
guilt.[28] (Emphasis supplied.)
Mitigated Damages
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
INFORMATION
1. Intent to gain;
2. Unlawful taking;
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
Factual Antecedents
SO ORDERED.11
SO ORDERED.15
SO ORDERED.19
Issue
EN BANC
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
SEPARATION PAY
Date Hired = August 1990
Rate = 198/day
Date of Decision = Aug. 18, 1998
Length of Service = 8 yrs. & 1 month
198.00 x 26 days x 8 months = 41,184.00
BACKWAGES
Date Dismissed = January 24, 1997
Rate per day = 196.00
Date of Decisions = Aug. 18, 1998
a) 1/24/97 to 2/5/98 = 12.36 mos.
196.00/day x 12.36
= 62,986.56
mos.
b) 2/6/98 to 8/18/98 = 6.4 months
Prevailing Rate per day = 62,986.00
198.00 x 26 days x
= 32,947.20
6.4 mos.
TOTAL = 95.933.76
xxxx
SO ORDERED.4
FIRST DIVISION
MAKASIAR, J.:t.hqw
In order that this novation may take place, the law requires
the consent of the creditor (Art. 1205 of the Old Civil code;
now Art. 1293 of the New Civil Code). The plaintiff did not
intervene in the contract between Veloso and Serna and
did not expressly give his consent to this substitution.
Novation must be express, and cannot be presumed.
3. That the Venturanzas were again the ones who paid out
of their own personal funds the succeeding P40,000.00,
which fell due on January 1, 1959, to the plaintiffs;
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
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