Strategy and Stratagem

Lt Gen (retd) Asad Durrani

“Yes, I have heard that the British forces have entered Kabul, and now I am wondering, how they
would get out”

The Khan of Kalat

 That was hundred and fifty years ago. We should have in the meantime learnt a bit more,
also about getting out from Afghanistan- this eastern version of Bermuda Triangle, only this
one sucks in empires and anyone who happens to be in the neighbourhood. Just the other
day, Obama spelt out a framework that has all the ingredients of precisely such a strategy.
Some confusion is understandable: “if the idea is to leave, then why the surge; or, conditions
that could not be created in 8 years, how could they now be in one & a half”. But then exit
strategy is not merely a matter of packing one’s bags and hitting the road. Like a declared
doctrine, it hides more than it reveals. And indeed, it must provide sufficient space for
freedom of manoeuvre. How would we have evolved one if we were asked to?

 I suppose one would have started with a “review of the situation”.

o The opposition, call it The Taliban, undefeated and gaining momentum.

o The government in Kabul- though not in control of important levers of power,
money and military, and therefore not entirely to be blamed for the mess- losing
ground.
o The state security apparatus-the Army and the Police- whatever its size and even
when trained, cannot ensure security. Considering the geography, demography, and
history of the Country, it can only be done with the help of regions and tribes.
o Public support to continue the war diminishing, at home as well as amongst the
allies, some of them even raring to pullout.
o Economy, own and of the allies, under stress.
o Powerful domestic groups, the Republicans and the Military for example, building-
up pressure for more troops to Afghanistan.

 A ‘surge’ for a last “Hurrah” was indeed an option. The mightiest country on earth,
supported by the most powerful alliance ever, should be able to prevail, militarily. But what
if did not; or, what was more likely, could not restore stability before people at home ran
out of patience, or the governments out of money they would spare for an elusive victory?
An orderly withdrawal in that case might be nearly impossible.

 A surge was still needed, even if as a stratagem. It would serve multiple ends.
o If the “good” Taliban could be persuaded to cooperate by non-military means-
money, share in future power structure, commitment to withdraw- additional troops
would be needed to bring the bad ones in line.
 o In case the non-military manoeuvre failed, additional troops would be readily
available to resume battle. (That is what a strategic cycle is all about: alternating use
of battle and manoeuvre.)
o Since a victory of arms best serves a nation’s ego, the military must be seen to have
played a significant part in the ultimate outcome.
o Most importantly, if the Afghan mission was aborted without having employed all
available military means, for the incumbent government it would be politically fatal.

 The exit should ensure the following.

o It must not be seen as a retreat. One should be able to, if not declare victory, at least
claim ‘mission accomplished’. Some order therefore must be restored before
quitting. Remember, it is not only American prestige but also NATO’s credibility,
perhaps even survival, which are at stake!
o The successor government in Kabul if not exactly friendly should not be a hostile
one.

 Since a number of channels are working to bring the Taliban on board, and assuming that
some progress has been made, a public policy statement can be spun around the core
concept. Its salient points can be rationalised as follows.

o Induction of more troops, besides serving the (already discussed) multiple

objectives, would help pacify the political opposition, the military, and the corporate
lobbies (military-industrial complex/ motley crowd of private contractors).

o A dateline for the thinning out of troops can be given, not only to placate the ever
growing anti-war constituency, put Karzai on notice to get his act together, but also
as a gesture to the Taliban, whose only pre-condition for a serious dialogue is an
assurance that the occupation would be vacated. Its adherence would naturally
“take into account conditions on the ground”.

o To help the main thrust- the negotiating track- most of the additional troops should
not be employed on combat missions. Mercifully, the revised COIN doctrine-
protecting ‘key population centres’- even though it surrenders the countryside to
the Taliban (could become part of an arrangement), provides the reinforcements a
defendable (saleable) role. And undoubtedly, “force in being” is a sound concept.

o Training of Afghan security forces by private companies, who would rather not train
to get their contracts extended, is a waste of time and money. But even if duly
trained, they cannot take over from the allied troops. As part of the overall exit
strategy, it was still a sound project.

 Indeed, all that Obama said was neither subterfuge nor hot air. His reference to ‘a clearly
defined mission’, refusal to set goals that went beyond their “means”, and need to retain
‘balance between national security and economy’ were the more substantial parts of the
policy statement. “America will have to show our strength in the way that we end wars
 and prevent conflict -- not just how we wage wars”, can be read both ways: rhetorically, or
literally.

 Evolving this framework must have taken plenty of doing. (“Dithering”, too, was essential,
not so much for its evolution, but more to condition the audience.) Implementing it would
take much more. Since most of the stakeholders want Afghanistan free of foreign forces,
there are good chances of success. However, there are also a few stumbling blocks.
o Taliban are hard negotiators. Tribesmen are suspicious by nature: the key to survival
in harsh environments. Americans, not used to rough edges, are impulsive.
o All militaries have a problem restraining the use of force. The American military
cannot resist using its abundant resources. “Collateral Damage” is a concept, it had
to therefore perforce invent and formalise. Whereas it may sabotage a peaceful
transition by design, it was more likely to force the Taliban abandon the talking track
simply by using its natural instincts.

 Indeed, nothing of the above may see the light of the day if this analysis is based on faulty
assumptions.

 But if it is not, Pakistan need not have any fears. Protesting about the US not having
sufficiently consulted us, more violence along the Pak-Afghan borders due to the surge, and
Indians gaining more influence if an ‘unfriendly’ government was installed in Kabul, may
keep everyone on toes (though I doubt if anyone would be much impressed). The fact is that
Pakistan’s cooperation is so vital to this process, especially in bringing important Taliban
factions on board, that we should be able to take care of our core interests.

 And it is also a fact, proven by history, that regardless of who ruled Afghanistan; Kabul was
compelled to find at least a Modus Vivendi with Pakistan. “No favourites” is a policy that
could always serve us well.