DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 30, 1974

TIME: 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger Calls on Bangladesh Prime Minister,

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

Bangladesh:
Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
Foreign Minister Kamal Hossain
Ambassador Hossain Ali

U.S.:
The Secretary
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Robert Oakley, NSC
Mr. Peter D. Constable, NEA/PAB (Notetaker)

DISTRIBUTION: S; S/S; WH (General Scowcroft)

The Secretary called on the Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur

Rahman at the latter's suite in the Waldorf Towers. Photographers took
pictures while the Secretary and Prime Minister greeted each other.

THE SECRETARY: I am very pleased to meet you and to welcome you to

the United States. I am very much looking forward to my visit next month to
Dacca.

THE PRIME MINISTER: I am also looking forward to your visit. Please

accept my regrets for the unfortunate illness of Mrs. Ford.

THE SECRETARY: It is a great pleasure to see you here. In 1970 when

Yahya Khan was here for the UN, he explained to me why the elections in
Pakistan would be well manipulated. He said there were 20 parties in East
Pakistan. There would be no majority party and Yahya would therefore
have an excellent opportunity to maneuver to control the situation. Then of
course you achieved your spectacular majority, with 167 out of 169 seats in
East Pakistan. Ever since then I have never believed political predictions,
unless of course you make them.

PRIME MINISTER: I gave my prediction before the election at a press

conference in Dacca. I was asked if I would get 90% of the votes. I said I
would get 97%. Of course I have contested so many elections that I knew
better than Yahya. I understood his ideas and plans to maneuver --

THE SECRETARY: There would have been no elections if he had known

how it would turn out. The last time I saw Yahya was on the way to
China--the trip which he arranged for me. He gave a dinner for me and said
at the table, "People call me a dictator." He asked everyone: "Am I a
dictator?" Everyone said "No." Then he asked me, and I said: "I do not
know, but for a dictator, you run a lousy election."

PRIME MINISTER: Would you like something to drink?

THE SECRETARY: I would like some tea.

PRIME MINISTER: I am glad. I produce tea also. [Tea and coffee were
served.]

THE SECRETARY: As you know we are committed to the well-being of

Bangladesh. Within our capacity we will do all we can to help you. Without
meddling in Bangladesh's internal affairs, I want you to know that we
believe you are the best guarantee for stability in your country, and we
want to do what we can to help you.

PRIME MINISTER: Thank you. That is very kind of you. After I got out of
jail, we faced such big problems. Then you gave us massive help and we
avoided famine.

THE SECRETARY: We will do what we can. We have committed 150,000

tons of foodgrains to Bangladesh in the first quarter of this fiscal year. We
are trying to get approval for another 100,000 tons in this quarter, by the
time you meet the President. I know that doesn't meet your total needs, but
we have had a disappointing corn crop and that has put a strain on our
wheat supplies.

PRIME MINISTER: Our problem is to try to recover and to be self-sufficient

in food. We have made some progress. Our deficit of 3 million tons of rice
is down to 2 million tons. We had no government when I got out of jail. We
had nothing.

THE SECRETARY: Everything came from West Pakistan.

PRIME MINISTER: At the end of the struggle we had nothing. No money,

no resources.

THE SECRETARY: When did you return? In January 1972?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes. When I returned everyone was armed and we had
problems with that. Now we have a government. I have followed a policy of
"forgive and forget" after coming out of jail.

THE SECRETARY: We very much appreciated the trilateral

agreements you have worked out with India and Pakistan. You have
been very statesmanlike.

PRIME MINISTER: This caused me some unpopularity because of the

massacres that took place among intellectuals. I could give you
names that you would recognize.

THE SECRETARY: The Bengalees are a rebellious lot. There were a

number of Bengalees at Harvard when your Foreign Minister was a student
of mine there.

FOREIGN MINISTER: Yes there were a number of Bengalees including

Mr. Murshed.

THE SECRETARY: Is he all right?

FOREIGN MINISTER: Yes.

PRIME MINISTER: The Pakistani General, Farman Ali Khan, wrote on

his scratch pad, and we found it, "The green land of East Pakistan
must be painted red." I told Bhutto about this when he came to Dacca.
I showed it to him. I said to him, "Do something from your side."
There are 67,000 non-Bengalee families living in Bangladesh who
have opted for Pakistan. They don't want them back. We don't want
them. They are in camps. We can't feed them. We have no assets. I've
done my duty. I'm the victim of genocide. Why can't the Pakistanis
show generosity?

THE SECRETARY: We strongly favor normalization of relations between

Pakistan and Bangladesh. Our aim in the area will be to use any influence
we have to promote normalization. I have the impression that it's a question
of domestic politics in Pakistan. Is there anything concrete you want me to
do?

PRIME MINISTER: I have taken the liabilities. Why can't I have the
assets? We received no gold, no planes, no ships. I have 75 million
people. I have returned the prisoners of war to Pakistan. I could have
held back 4,000 prisoners for bargaining. But I did not want to do that.
I want good relations in South Asia. Bangladesh is a small country.

THE SECRETARY: With 75 million people Bangladesh is not a small

country.

PRIME MINISTER: We are small in territory. In the first two or three months
of independence we rebuilt the roads and the bridges, we opened
government institutions, we approved a constitution. Our senior civil
servants were detained for two years in Pakistan. I have resources in
Bangladesh --fertile land, many people, gas, coal and livestock. And we
hope to find oil.

THE SECRETARY: Is there coal in Bangladesh? Have you found oil?

PRIME MINISTER: We have signed agreements with an American

company for oil exploration and received bonus payments for the
agreements.

THE SECRETARY When you have the oil, perhaps we will borrow from
you.

PRIME MINISTER: You won't need to borrow. We will repay you for all you
have done for us. We need a Marshall Plan in Bangladesh. We need
foreign investment in fertilizer plants and in petrochemicals. We have
natural gas and we can sell it. Flood control is a very serious problem.
During the Pakistan days there was a mission to survey flood control in
1955 and 1956. During the British days they had dredges to clear out the
rivers so that they could carry goods to Calcutta. After World War II when
the British withdrew, there was no more dredging. The Government of
Pakistan buried the survey report and went ahead with the Indus Basin
Project in West Pakistan. They did nothing in Bangladesh, and now we are
suffering the consequences. We had no way to save our cattle, our
foodgrains, poultry and vegetables from the flood. We can find a solution
between us. You organized the Marshall Plan for Germany's recovery. Now
you can start a Kissinger Plan for Bangladesh.

THE SECRETARY: If I can get my name on a plan, I will do just about

anything.

PRIME MINISTER: You have had such good success in Vietnam and the
Middle East. You can have success in Bangladesh. There are famine
conditions in my country.

THE SECRETARY: The domestic situation in this country is much less

favorable than it was at the time of the Marshall Plan. In fact, the domestic
situation is unfavorable. Candidly, I must say that that sort of program is not
likely. On the other hand we are joining the Bangladesh Consortium. We
favor the most rapid development possible for your country. In 1971 our
dispute with India was related to our China policy. We supported the
independence of Bangladesh by peaceful methods. We will do the
maximum that we can, but you should not have exalted expectations. We
will be extremely active in the Consortium. Your problems will receive
special attention. The fact that I am going to Dacca means that I will give
them special attention.

FOREIGN MINISTER: Our problem is that we need a margin of time....

THE SECRETARY: It is the curse of bureaucracies that they only do

enough to avoid crises but not enough to solve the underlying problems. I
personally favor taking big steps. We will have to look again at your
problems. I will meet with Mr. McNamara and we will see what we can do.
Will you meet with him?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes, in Washington. He has been kind enough to see

me.

FOREIGN MINISTER: We need 3 or 4 years' margin to work on long term

development.

THE SECRETARY: Can you become self-sufficient?

FOREIGN MINISTER: Yes, in 3 or 4 years.

THE SECRETARY: We are looking for another 100,000 tons in this current
quarter.

MR. ATHERTON: And without prejudice for the rest of the year. We will be
considering what additional foodgrain we can provide.

FOREIGN MINISTER: We need vegetable oil, fertilizer and project aid for
the development of all our resources to increase exports so that we can get
out of the current situation. We have no political problems. We are still
winning by-elections in spite of our 40% inflation rate.

THE SECRETARY: Take about 15 minutes in your meeting with the

President to advise him on how you do this.

PRIME MINISTER: I set up 4,300 Union Councils in Bangladesh. I have to

provide a free kitchen in every Union Council.

THE SECRETARY: Do you travel a lot?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes, I try to mobilize the people to be self-sufficient, so

that the country can be self-sufficient.

THE SECRETARY: How are your relations with India?

PRIME MINISTER: Very good. We have a foreign policy that is neutral,

non-aligned and independent. We have good relations with India, USA,
USSR and Burma. We are very anxious for good relations with China.

THE SECRETARY: We are improving our relations with India.

PRIME MINISTER: We welcome that. We have a Friendship Treaty with

India and a Commission on River Control. I want to convey to you my
assurances of our good relations. When I came out of jail, there was
anti-US sentiment in Bangladesh. Now all my people are extremely friendly
to the US.

THE SECRETARY: You showed great wisdom when you came out of jail.
There must have been a great temptation to demagoguery and to deal
harshly with Pakistan and the US. We have always had great sympathy for
the Bengalees. It is a natural friendship on our side.

PRIME MINISTER: Yes. Your long-standing interest is greatly appreciated.

THE SECRETARY: You have a special place in the hearts of Americans.

On food for example, we are making a special effort.

PRIME MINISTER: I am grateful for what you are doing today and for the
massive food help you have provided.

THE SECRETARY: You went to the UK and then back to Bangladesh. Did
you take over the government immediately?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes. It was very difficult. Everyone was armed and that
created a serious problem. I appealed for everyone to surrender their arms.
150,000 arms were surrendered to me. The Pakistanis had armed
everyone. The Pakistan military asked permission to arm civilians. We have
documents that show the Pakistan Army asked permission to arm civilians
at the end.

THE SECRETARY: How about the Chinese? Are they doing anything
subversive in your country? Do you have relations yet?

PRIME MINISTER: Not yet. We know each other. I went to Peking in 1958
and they came to Dacca in 1962. I want friendship with China but we have
our self-respect. I can offer friendship but the initiative has to come from
them also. We appreciate the US support for Bangladesh in the UN. You
steadily supported us there from the first day.

THE SECRETARY: My impression is that China will start to move in the

next year to normalize its relations with you. They are concerned about
India, but they do not have anything against Bangladesh. They will move
slowly. Yours is the right policy: friendship with all the Big Powers and
avoid all their quarrels. We certainly don't object to your good relations with
the Soviet Union.
PRIME MINISTER: Thank you. You've done wonderful things over the last
two years.

THE SECRETARY: It is easy to conduct relations for an established

country, but your Foreign Minister has had to conduct relations for a new
country--to start from nothing. That is much more difficult. Were you
released together?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes. After they released me, I asked them why they
forgot my friend. I asked them to release him because he was my Foreign
Affairs Adviser.

THE SECRETARY: Were you treated badly?

PRIME MINISTER: They kept me in solitary confinement. The

conditions were bad. It was 117 degrees.

FOREIGN MINISTER: I was a little cooler because I was in the NWFP.

PRIME MINISTER: The case they made against me was a farce.

THE SECRETARY : We exerted very great pressure.

PRIME MINISTER: Yes. I know you did. They tried to kill me on the
night of the 16th. The officer-in-charge took me out and hid me for five
days near the Chashma Barrage. They planned to say that there had
been a revolt of the prisoners and the prisoners had killed me. They
tried to kill me three times: in 1958, when Martial Law came, they
arrested me; in 1966 they arrested me on a conspiracy charge; in 1971
they arrested me and tried to kill me. I am living on extensions.

THE SECRETARY: You have six more lives to live. They say that cats
have nine lives. But you have made a great achievement. You have
created a new state. You will find that the President will be very
sympathetic in your talks tomorrow. We have our own difficulties with
Congressional limits on aid and with our own food shortages, but we will
make a special effort. I look forward to seeing you again in Bangladesh at
the end of the month.
PRIME MINISTER: I have this special problem with these people who
do not want to remain in Bangladesh. I have to do something. Should
I expel them like Idi Amin did?

THE SECRETARY: You mean the Biharis?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes.

THE SECRETARY: Pakistan won't take them? We will take these

questions up when we are there. You can explain this in more detail.

PRIME MINISTER: I have nothing in my hand to bargain with. I have

taken risks. They killed professors, intellectuals, journalists just
before the surrender. I have to explain this to my people. I never go
back on my word, but this time I did. I said that they would be tried on
Bangladesh soil. There has been no trial.

THE SECRETARY: It was a very humane and statesmanlike act to forego

trials, so that you could work for a long-term relationship. I will take this up.

NOTE: As the Prime Minister and the Secretary left the Prime Minister's
suite Bangladesh reporters asked for comments on the meeting. The
Secretary said that he and the Prime Minister had a very warm and friendly
discussion. They had discussed the economic development and the
well-being of Bangladesh. They had discussed ways in which the US might
help with immediate problems and with long-term development. The Prime
Minister stated that they had a warm and friendly discussion. He was glad
to hear the Secretary's views on Bangladesh and expressions of concern
for Bangladesh. The Prime Minister said the Secretary understood
Bangladesh's problems and will try to do his best for Bangladesh. He noted
that US-Bangladesh relations are very good and will grow stronger.

Both participants made similar comments to American newspapermen who

questioned them subsequently. The Secretary was asked whether he had
set a date for his visit to South Asia. The Secretary said he hoped to have
something on that later this week.

Questioned about the Washington Post story that morning on the

relationship between Bangladesh's sale of jute bags to Cuba and the
signing of a PL 480 agreement, the Prime Minister brushed it aside, and
the Secretary said the subject did not come up in their discussion. The
Secretary introduced the Foreign Minister Kamal Hossain to the press as
"another student of mine."

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Gerald R. Ford
His Excellency Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,Prime Minister of Bangladesh
Dr. Kamal Hossain, Foreign Minister
Ambassador M. Hossain Ali
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday - October 1, 1974 3:00 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office The White House

[The press was admitted briefly for photos. There was a discussion of pipe
tobacco and Mrs. Ford's condition. The press was ushered out.]

President: It was a shock to us. We had to make the decision for the
operation, then wait for them to determine malignancy, and so forth.

Mujibur: I sincerely hope she is out of danger.

President: Yes, the prognosis cannot be certain, but only two nodes out of
30 were malignant.

It is good to have you here. It is the first time an American President has
met with the head of state of Bangladesh.

Mujibur: Yes. I am happy to have the opportunity to talk with you about my
people.

President: We are happy to do what we can for all countries.

Mujibur: You know the history of my country. Its condition after the war was
likened to that of Germany in 1945. I want to thank you for your help to us.
Before the war we were divided by India. The capital was all in the west.
Bangladesh wasn't too bad in '47. Seventy percent of the representatives in
the Parliament were from the West; I was in the Parliament. Most of the
Administration was destroyed in the war or left for India. Even in the rest we
couldn't get out of the West. Everyone has been suffering, first from the
war, then from drought, then from the floods. Thanks to help from countries
like you, no one is starving. We have had to import everything. Since then
we started to bring our trade deficit down, until the inflation, drought and the
floods came.

Bangladesh has resources. If we could control the floods, we could be

self-sufficient in five years. We produce rice, jute, wheat, and tobacco. We
have big gas deposits -- 10-20 trillion cubic feet. We were almost
self-sufficient in fertilizer but our plants were damaged. With our own gas
and fertilizer plants we could begin to export fertilizer, except for inflation.

President: We have been telling the OPEC countries that if their high prices
result in the problems that you and the industrial countries are having, the
high prices will bring a collapse and won't help them.

Mujibur: We are suffering so badly from the oil prices.

President: The OPEC countries must realize they are being shortsighted.

Mujibur: We are having a famine, and I have just heard that a cyclone is
hitting. We are in dire straits. I have opened food kitchens in each of the
regional areas to keep people from starving.

President: Wouldn't a Bangladesh Consortium to include some rich oil

producers by a good thing? It would give them a chance to....

Mujibur: Abu Dhabi and Iran have joined the Consortium. I have a crisis
immediately, Mr. President, in grain and food aid.

President: There is 250,000 tons of food grains that are being made
available for you. As we look at our food picture we will do what we can.
We had hoped for a bigger crop. We had a wet spring and then a drought,
and now an early frost. So our crop is disappointing. We must see what we
have and we will do our very best with what we have.

Mujibur: You are very kind. I hope, if I can make the flood control project
with World Bank, we will be self-sufficient within five years. With our gas we
hope for oil. We have signed contracts with Atlantic-Richfield and Union Oil.
Eventually we can export. But that is in the future, and my crisis is
immediate.

President: Do you work with the international lending institutions?

Mujibur: We are a member of the World Bank. Mr. McNamara visited

Bangladesh just after our independence. Most of my mills are working now,
but there are not enough materials and parts to go at capacity.

President: How about the price of jute?

Mujibur: It has only gone up 10-12%.

We won a majority in Pakistan. We are doing our best to be friends

with them. Though millions were killed, or jailed or exiled, we want to
forget. We released the Pakistani prisoners, including 195 war
criminals. We think we should get some share of the old Pakistani
assets. Yet I have had to take on the liabilities of the new country.
Bhutto came to Dacca and I told him this, but so far nothing has
happened. Also there are 700,000 non-Bengalees in my country.
400,000 want to stay in Bangladesh. That is fine. But Pakistan won't
take the others who want to go there. I have to feed my people. How
can I take care of my people when I have to take care of these?

I wanted to present these problems to you. I want good relations with

everyone.

President: We congratulate you on your independence and UN

membership. I was up there two weeks ago. I was encouraged with the
improving attitude toward the UN. The American people in recent times
have a better attitude towards the United Nations. I hope we can all work
better in the United Nations. If it is just a debating society, it is no good. But
we should use it to make it work.

Mujibur: We are grateful to you. We are a poor country but we want good
relations with you.

President: What is the comparison between what used to be East and West
Pakistan?

Mujibur: Pakistan is 65 million. I am 75 million. Pakistan is larger than I. I

am starting a family planning organization. We are having particular
problems now. I am glad you know our problems. I want to survive.

President: The 150,000 tons [of wheat] is all set. The 100,000 is virtually
assured and only depends on our supplies. We....

Mujibur: Would you consider edible oil and cotton? Our people are
discussing with yours now.

President: We will do what we can.

Mujibur: Thank you. I officially invite you to visit Bangladesh.

President: Thank you. Isn't Secretary Kissinger going there?

Mujibur: Yes. On 30 October, but I want to invite you.

The Secretary’s 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting

Friday, August 15, 1975

Participants:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE - HENRY A. KISSINGER

P Mr. Sisco
E Mr. Robinson
T Mr. Maw
AF Ambassador Mulcahy, Acting
ARA Mr. Rogers
EA Mr. Zurhellen, Acting
EUR Mr. Armitage, Acting
NEA Mr. Atherton
INR Mr. Hyland
S-P Mr. Lord
EB Mr. Enders
S/PRS Mr. Funseth, Acting
PM Mr. Vest
PM Ambassador Buffum
H Ambassador McCloskey
L Mr. Leigh
S/S Mr. Borg, Acting
S Mr. Bremer

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Bangladesh]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's talk about Bangladesh.

MR. ATHERTON: Well, it was a remarkably well-planned and executed

coup for Bangladesh.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What does that mean? Is Mujibur alive or

dead?

MR. ATHERTON: Mujibur is dead; his immediate clique, which was largely
family, nephews, brothers.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I get good advice from INR.

MR. HYLAND: He wasn't dead when I talked to you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Really? Did they kill him after some period?

MR. ATHERTON: As far as we know -- I can't say we have got all the
details. But the indications are that the plan was to kill him. And they simply
surrounded his palace and went in and killed him. That is as far as we
know now.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him that last year?

MR. ATHERTON: In March we had lots of indications --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him about it?

MR. ATHERTON: We told him at the time.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him who it was going to be,
roughly?

MR. ATHERTON: I will have to check whether we gave him the names.

MR. HYLAND: We were a little imprecise on that.

MR. ATHERTON: He brushed it off, scoffed at it, said nobody would do a

thing like that to him.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He was one of the world's prize fools.

MR. ATHERTON: But it seems that the coup leaders are in complete
control.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who are they?

MR. ATHERTON: They are military officers, middle and senior officers, who
are generally considered less pro-Indian than the past leadership; pro-U.S.,
anti-Soviet.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Absolutely inevitable.

MR. ATHERTON: Islamic. They have changed the name to the Islamic
Republic --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That they would be pro-U.S. was not inevitable.

In fact, I would have thought at some turn of the wheel they were going to
become pro-Chinese, and anti-Indian I firmly expected. I always knew India
would rue the day that they made Bangladesh independent. I predicted that
since '71.

MR. ATHERTON: I think our biggest problem is going to be to avoid too

close an embrace.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why -- because they are friendly to us?

MR. ATHERTON: I think they are going to want us to come in with

promises.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The principle being we only embrace on the
sub-continent those who oppose us. What is the principle?

MR. ATHERTON: I think our principle ought to be we are giving about all
the aid we can really give or Bangladesh can really absorb.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before we implement it, let's check that. I know

we can't do a huge increase in aid. But I think if people who think they are
pro-U.S. come to us and then get a technical lecture that unfortunately we
can't do any more -- there must be some maneuvering we can do on food
aid and some token increase in aid.

MR. ENDERS: We can do a little more on food aid.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like them to get it, if they are indeed
what you say they are, which I don't know.

MR. ATHERTON: These are all the initial indications.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then they ought to get a friendly reception.

MR. ATHERTON: I think the immediate question is how we comport

ourselves with the new government. It seems to me despite what the memo
says which we sent you, which I didn't have time to go over carefully this
morning -- I think we ought to simply respond to any overtures.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What did the memo say?

MR. ATHERTON: It says we ought to hold off on a decision on recognition.

But I don't think that needs to be posed as that sharp a question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We ought to recognize.

MR. ATHERTON: I don't know what recognizing means in this case. I think
we simply --

MR. SISCO: Just continue. That memo said also we have to check all this
with the Indians, as if to give the Indians a veto. I certainly don't agree with
that.
MR. ATHERTON: I think it would be useful --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We certainly shouldn't go to the Indians.

MR. ATHERTON: I think there might be some merit in an exchange of

views with them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: After we have done it. We will not even discuss
establishing contact with the new government with the Indians. After
contact is established, we would be interested to hear their views, as long
as they clearly understand that they cannot tell us what to do, and as long
as they cannot go to the Bangladesh and tell them -- and then ask
Bangladesh for their views, so that they can be transmitted to us.

MR. ATHERTON: I fully agree.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which is what India would dearly love to do.

You better let me see any approaches.

MR. ATHERTON: I think we have to prepare a telegram today, and we will

clear it with you, on what we say to the Indians. And the Pakistanis are
important. There will be some move towards Pakistan.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I also want to see you for a few minutes on a

sober instruction to Bhutto, and some of his ideas on commitments. Okay.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Bangladesh]