CONTI

1st EXAM REVIEWER

Philippine Constitutional Development and Organic Laws (Pre-1935 Constitution)

Treaty of Paris

An instrument of ratification; the USA acquired sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain
It contained instructions over police matters
The USA never intended for the Philippines to be a State, it was acquired as unincorporated territory
Gave the US Congress plenary power, which would be effective only after the President via the military quells
the insurrections
[Philippine Organic Laws]

McKinleys Instructions; April 7, 1900 divided civil and military governments (military = executive, Philippine
Commission = legislative; both branches represent the US President); it also extended the rights from the
American Bill of Rights to Filipinos EXCEPT: 1) the right to bear arms (an anti-insurrection precaution), 2) the
right to a jury trial (the Americans thought we wouldnt be intelligent or just enough to judge our peers, and in
hindsight our personalistic culture would make a jury system difficult); the instructions also established the
structure and limitations of Philippine Government
The Spooner Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of March 2, 1901rider for the Army and Navy
Appropriations Act which changed the government into a fully civil government under the US Congress (who
was then who the executive and legislative branches represented, instead of the President)
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 ratified all organic acts of the US President; the head of the Legislative/Philippine
Commission (Governor General) became the head executive (with limitations, Gov. Gen can suspend the writ of
habeas corpus only with the authorization of the Philippine Commission); the Bill was also the first to define
what a Philippine Citizen is: all inhabitants who were subjects of Spain as of April 11, 1899 and continued to
reside therein and all the children born after that (Spaniards were given a timeframe to choose what citizenship
they wanted)
The Jones Law [Philippine Autonomy Act] of August 29, 1916 suspended the Spooner amendment, and created
a tripartite government with clear separation of powers (Executive = an American Governor General who can
now suspend the writ without the Phil. Comms permission, Legislative = bicameral, and now all Filipinos,
Judicial = SC, CFI, and inferior courts)
The Tydings-McDuffie Act [Philippine Independence Act] of March 24, 1934

Provided for the mechanism for a Constitution to be adopted, and created the Commonwealth Government
The Constitution must first be accepted by the Senate and House of Representatives, and prior to this:
Constitutional Convention drafts the Constitution
Constitution must establish a Republican Government, have a Bill of Rights, and have a separation of
Church and State
Draft must be submitted to the US President for certification that the constitution was in conformity
with the conditions in the Tydings-McDuffie Act
Constitution will be ratified by the people via plebiscite
10 years after the effectivity of the Constitution, we would be given independence
THE 1935 CONSTITUTION

July 30, 1934Election for delegates of the Constitutional Convention was held, Claro M. Recto was elected
President of the ConCon and the constitution was drafted under him
Feb 8, 1935 the draft was finished and approved by the ConCon, sent to the US President Roosvelt who
 certified it, confirming its conformity to the Tydings-McDuffie Act
May 14, 1935 the People of the Philippines ratified the Constitution
In accordance to the Constitution, we elected a President and Vice-President under the Commonwealth
government
Nov 15, 1935 the Commonwealth was inaugurated, and the 1935 Constitution came into effect
Since World War II happened we didnt become independent in 10 years as the Tydings-McDuffie Act Promised
April 23, 1946First officials of the Republic of the Philippines were elected
July 4, 1946 the Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated
Did the Americans grant the Philippines independence? No, theoretical sovereignty is never granted but
earned. The more appropriate thing to say is that the US withdrew its sovereignty
What kind of independence was it? (not a very good one)
Bell Trade Act (April 30, 1946) All of our products can go into the US free of customs duties from
1946-1954, Laurel-Langley agreement increased it upto 1974; Americans in turn demanded the
same right, and US products flooded the Philippine economy, thus Filipinos were unable to
establish industries and the economy stagnated; the Act also gave Americans the right to export
natural resources (mining was controlled solely by Americans till 1974) and the right to operate
public utilities; the Act was passed in contemplation of our Independence, it was required that
the Philippine Congress accept the law (embodied by executive agreement, we had to amend
our Constitution to contain the Bell Trade Act, in fear of getting attacked))
Controversial Approval of the Bill [Vera v Avelino, Mabanag v Lopez Vito]

Vera vs Avelino 77 Phil 192

FACTS: Comelec submitted a report of the national elections to the President and Congress of the Philippines; the report
contained that the voting in the provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac involved specified acts of
terrorism and hence did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. On the basis of the report, during
the Senate session, a resolution (Pendatun) was approved ordering that petitioners Jose Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
Romero (three senators-elect from the Nacionalista Party) shall not be sworn nor seated as members of the chamber
pending the termination of the protest lodged against their election. The Pendatun included the following:

> protests have been filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal against the election of Vera, Diokno, and Romero
on the basis of the findings of the COMELEC that in the aforesaid provinces, the following incidents occurred:
- secrecy of the ballot was actually violated
-the presence of armed bands
- a lot of the voters were coerced or intimidated to vote for certain candidates
- some residents voluntarily banished themselves from their hometowns to avoid being victims of such
violence
- dead bodies found after the election with notes attached to their necks, reading Bumoto kami kay
Roxas

The petitioners filed an action for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents (for the court
to order the respondents to desist and abstain from carrying out the Pendatun Resolution until the order is remanded by
the court), and a judicial declaration of nullity of the said Resolution

ISSUES:
1. Whether the court has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction sought by the petitioners under
the facts alleged in the complaint
2. Whether the writ of prohibition is proper in this case, assuming that the court has such jurisdiction.
3. Whether the Senate exceeded its powers in deferring the administration of oath and assumption of office of the
 respondents, assuming that the court has such jurisdiction (Issue #1) and the prohibition is proper (Issue #2).

RULING: The petition was dismissed because under the principle of separation of powers following the Alejandrino
doctrine, the Court could not order a co-equal branch to reinstate a member thereof.

1. No, under the principle of separation of powers, the Court could not order a co-equal branch to reinstate a
member thereof, to do so would establish judicial predominance and to upset the classic pattern of checks and
balances woven into our institutional setup
2. No. Under the law, the writ of prohibition refers only to proceedings of tribunals, et al. exercising judicial or
ministerial functions. As the respondents are exercising legislative functions, the dispute falls beyond the scope
of such remedy.
3. No. The Pendatun Resolution recognized, and did not impair the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to decide
the contest. The 1935 Constitution did not withdraw from the Senate the power to inquire into the credentials
of any member and the latters right to participate in its deliberations. The power to defer the oath-taking until
the oath-taking was adjudged, as admitted by the petitioners themselves, does not belong to the Electoral
Tribunal. The assignment by the constitution of the Electoral Tribunal does not negative that power, provided
that the Senate does not cross the boundary line. The Electoral Commission was merely given the power to pass
upon cases of CONTESTED elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.

NOTES on JUSTICE PERFECTOS DISSENTING OPINION (warning: admittedly not as thorough as one might like, but covers
a lot of points):
KEYPOINT: The Court should have decided the case instead of begging off from ruling.
The Judicial function calls for the qualities: manliness, moral courage, intellectual decision, firmness of character,
and steadfastness of convictions
petitioners' fundamental rights have been trampled upon in open defiance of the law and the Constitution
in questions so important as those raised in this case we do not agree with indirect and diplomatic
procedures, with wavering, innocious and hesitating action, with laodicean measures and resolutions, with
equivocal, furtive, and not forth putting attitude. In judicial matters, the best policy is forthrightness, not
ambiguity. The way of Themis is always rectilinear. Her path is never tortuous, labyrinthine, or misleading.
Unconstitutional Usurpationby the Pedatun Resolution, respondents exercised, in effect, the power to judge
"the election, returns, and qualifications" of petitioners as (duly elected) senators of the Philippines, a task given
to the Electoral Tribunal by the constitution
The intent of the people in the constitution is identical with the intent of their delegates
authors of the Constitution themselves should be in the advantageous situation of construing more
exactly the product of their own minds (the Justices who have voted the respondents action was
invalid were among those who drafted the 1935 Constitution)
foreseeing the damaging consequences thereof for the majority's position, they (respondents) tried to
neutralize it or subtract its (above mentioned statements) validity by seconding the sophistic distinction
made by Willoughby as to the conclusiveness of the parliamentary proceedings as means by proper
construction of the Constitution, on one side, and of the statutes, on the other, since in the legislative
proceedings "it is the intent of the legislature we seek, " while in the preceedings of the constitution
convention "we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and the
liberations of their representative."
J. Perfecto finds this distinction groundless, whether in the constitutional convention or
legislative proceedings it is the intent of the people that reigns
There is no essential difference between the parliamentary role of the delegates to a
constitutional convention and that of the members of a legislature.
Intent of those part of the Constitutional Convention is still more valid
Unconstitutional ProcedureAs per Section 10 (2) of Article VI of the (1935) Constitution , to do
business, the Senate, being composed of 24 members, needs the presence of at least 13 senators. "A
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members," but
not in exercising any other power, such as the adoption of the Pendatun Resolution.
The procedure used by respondents in adopting the Pendatun Resolution is, therefore,
 conclusively unconstitutional.
Respondents have the duty of recognizing petitioners as legal members of the Senate, otherwise they
(petitioners) may be liable to criminal prosecution for an offense defined and punished by the Penal
Code with imprisonment ranging from 6 years to 12 years
The petitioners credentials are conclusive as to their right to a seat in the senate
Separation of Powers cannot be used as an excuse for the non-justiciability of the issue
The true concept of the principle of separation of powers may not be obtained but in
conjunction with the political structure set up by the Constitution and only in accordance with
the specific provisions thereof.
The only acceptable conception of the principle of separation of powers within our democracy
in the constitutional one (an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government)
Separation of powers means division of functions, but not of officials or organs which will
perform them
The Senate has NO POWER to suspend its members (as per the Constitution)
No Judicial Supremacy, the judiciary only claims to assert the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them
Senatorial terrorismmajority crushing the minority (no proof of a need for this, no proof that the
petitioners were indeed engaged in the election irregularities)
There are assertions to the effect that we may exercise jurisdiction against individual officers of the
Senate, but not against the Senate or against respondentsJ. Perfecto does not agree, nobody is
above the law.
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.
The framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is
interpreted and given effect by the judicial department

THE 1935 CONSTITUTION (cont. notes)

In relation to Vera vs Avelino, the 1935 Constitution provided for:

the existence of three coordinate, co-equal and co-important branches of the government
Additional exceptions to the separation of powers were added to the Organic Act such as: a) the
creation of the Electoral Tribunal where justices could take part in the decision of congressional election
protests, b) the grant of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, et al.
The power of the judiciary to review (the constitutionality of laws, et al) was expressly recognized Secs.
2 and 10, Article VIII; this power however is not the exercise of a substantive power to review and
nullify acts of Congress, for such no substantive power exists. It is simply a necessary concomitant of the
power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of
which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Minimum Wage Cas, 261 U. S., 544)
BACKSTORY OF VERA vs AVELINO [from Consti Notes]: The Philippine Senate then had 11 Nacionalistas and 13
Liberals, 3 Nacionalistas, Senator-Elect Vera, Diokno & Romero were known to be against the Bell Trade Act. The
Liberals excluded them from the vote because they needed to exclude at least 3 people in order for the Bill to
pass.
Why exactly did they need to remove them?
Congress functioned as a constituent power
of the vote was needed, i.e. they needed 18 votes, but they didnt have 18, they only had 16
which was of 21, which is why they needed to remove 3
The same sort of event occurred in the House of Representatives
The question of whether 24 or 21 was correct was tackled in Mabanag v Lopez Vito, but the SC said it
was a political question at it involved matters pertaining to the acts of a political branch of government
(i.e. the legislative) [Sir says its a stupid decision]

Mabanag v Lopez Vito 78 Phil 1

FACTS: Of the petitioners, three were senators and eight were representatives. They have won by majority vote during
the elections held April 23, 1946. However, the three senators were suspended by the senate. The eight representatives
were also not allowed to sit in the lower House. All of these were because of alleged irregularities in their election. A
congressional resolution proposing an amendment to the constitution was voted upon by Congress. Since the
petitioners were suspended (senators suspended, reps not formally suspended but not allowed to sit in the lower
house), their membership was not taken into consideration within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote
which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. A petition was filed for prohibition to prevent the
enforcement of the said resolution. Petitioners contended that if they were counted, the votes in favor of the resolution
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths. Respondents argue that in the first place, the Court does not
have jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case is justiciable (in other words, whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case in
the first place).

HELD: The petition is dismissed without costs. It is a doctrine too well established that political questions are not within
the province of the judiciary, except if it is provided for by the constitution. This doctrine is predicated on the principle
of separation of powers. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question.
According to Coleman vs. Miller, a case decided upon by the US Supreme Court, the efficacy of ratification by state
legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not justiciable. The
same applies to the Philippine Government and Constitution. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a
proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. As provided in section 1 of the Article XV of the Phil
Consti, the amendatory process consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in
attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is
a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by
the Constitution itself. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court deemed it unnecessary to decide the question
of whether the senators and reps who were ignored in the computation were members of Congress within the meaning
of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine. This is due to the fact that the case at bar has a political character, hence,
outside the jurisdiction of the judiciary.

1935 CONSTITUTION (Cont. Notes)

After the Senate ratified it, President Roxas entered into the Executive Agreement on the Eve of Independence
(Parity Rights amendment was thus included into the Constitution)
The enrolled bill theory after the legislature passes the law everyone must accept it
AMENDMENTS to the 1935 CONSTITUTION

1940 bicameral Congress composed of a Senate and House of Representatives, as well the creation of an
independent electoral commission; 4 year term for the President
1947the above mentioned Parity Rights amendment
1967resolution calling for the 1971 ConCon, calling for change from both houses, increase in seats in the
House of Representatives (to make it (the House) also function as the ConCon in effect), and Congress to
become delegates without forfeiting seats (the SC denied them this)
May 10, 1971ConCon for the 1971 Constitution, lowering of majority age from 21 to 18

Planas vs. Comelec 49 SCRA 105 (one of the plebiscite cases)

FACTS:
 1. March 16, 1967: As implemented by R.A. 6132 Constitutional Convention was called to propose amendments to
the 1935 Constitution.
2. June 1, 1971: The Performance of its functions started. Martial Law was declared by virtue of Proc. No. 1081
during one of the sessions of the convention
3. November 29, 1972: The proposal for amendments was completed. The next day, P.D. No. 73 was issued calling
for the ratification or rejection of the proposed constitution. A plebiscite date was set.
4. December 7, 1972: This petition was filed to nullify P.D. No. 73 as the President has no authority to call for the
ratification as well as the improper submission of the proposed constitution (re: elements of time and existing
social climate). Subsequently, other similar cases were filed as well.
5. December 17, 1972: Temporary suspension Proc. No. 1081 for the purposes of free and open debate.
6. January 7, 1973: G.O. No. 20 was issued. It directed the postponement of the scheduled plebiscite. The court
decided to refrain from the time being in deciding on the cases.
7. January 17, 1973: While the case was being heard, Sec. of Justice Abad Santos called C.J. Concepcion giving him
a copy of Proclamtion No. 1102 ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
ISSUES:

1. W/N the constitutionality of P.D. No. 73 is a justiciable question

2. W/N P.D. No. 73 valid
3. W/N the authority of the 1971 CON-CON to pass the proposed constitution falls within the 1935 constitutions
provisions
4. W/N Martial Law has affected the proper submission of the proposed constitution to a plebiscite. (constraints
on freedom)
5. W/N Proclamation No. 1102 has been ratified validly with respect to the 1935 Consti
6. W/N the cases should be dismissed
HELD: All cases are dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

1. W/N the constitutionality of P.D. No. 73 is a justiciable question

There is unanimity on the justiciable nature on the legality of P.D. No.73.
Justiciable: Makalintal, Zalidivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Concepcion (Sec. 2, Art. VIII of the 1935
Consti.)
Political: Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra and Barredo (w/ qualification)
2. W/N P.D. No. 73 valid
-Issue has become moot and academic/ irrelevant: Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and
Concepcion
-Decree is valid: Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio
3. W/N the authority of the 1971 CON-CON to pass the proposed constitution falls within the 1935 constitutions
provisions
Issue has become moot and academic: Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra
Uphold the authority of the Convention: Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion
4. W/N Martial Law has affected the proper submission of the proposed constitution to a plebiscite. (constraints
on freedom)
-Fernando: There are significant differences with the election procedure seen in Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution
and the existence of Martial Law.
-Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra: Issue involves a question of fact which cannot be predetermined. Martial Law
per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom.
5. W/N Proclamation No. 1102 has been ratified validly with respect to the 1935 Consti
 Question of validity has not been properly raised before the court: Makalintal, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion
Ratification not in accordance with 1935 Consti/ Proclamation has no force and effect: Zaldivar
Ratication procedure falls short of the requirements of the 1935 Consti but nonetheless, the constitution is
still legally recognizable: Barredo
Court is not competent to act on the matter since this is a political question: Antonio
6. W/N the cases should be dismissed
-Yes: Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
-Yes but allow for filing of appropriate pleadings re: the validity of the Proc. 1102: Fernando and Teehankee
-No. Zaldivar and Concepcion

1973 CONSTITUTION

Javellana vs Executive Secretary 50 SCRA 30
FACTS: Javellana (among several others) filed cases against the Executive Secutary, Secretary of National Defense (etc.)
on the grounds that the the alleged creation of the Citizens' Assemblies as instrumentalities for the ratification of the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" is inherently illegal and palpably unconstitutional and several other
unlawful acts relating to following this so-called new constitution as for instance not convening the Senate anew

ISSUES & HELD (CJ Concepcion):

Counsel for respondents claim you need 8 votes to declare Proclamation No. 1102 invalid, when in fact,
nowhere in the law does it state that it should be so (6 votes would suffice, this is the number of votes needed
to invalidate an Executive Order)
They are also wrong to assume this number of votes required will never be reached, as for instance
Justice Barredo has openly expressed willingness to reverse his vote if convinced enough
The question is not whether or not the new Constitution is invalid, but whether or not it was validly
ratified in accordance to the 1935 Constitution, which CJ maintains is a justiciable issue and to which his
answer is NO (it isnt valid)
One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of
separation of powers
"... What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it
is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it
has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the
government, with discretionary power to act.
What is in question when it is a political question is the wisdom of an act, but here the question
is on the declarations legality
The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional
amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing
Constitution is a judicial question.
Procedure for Constitutional Amendments under the 1935 Constitution
(1) That the amendments to the Constitution be proposed either by Congress or by a convention
called for that purpose, "by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives voting separately," but "in joint session assembled";
(2) That such amendments be "submitted to the people for their ratification" at an "election";
and
(3) That such amendments be "approved by a majority of the votes cast" in said election.
 Since (1) has been virtually conceded, the main use lies with (2) & (3)
ON (2) or Has the contested draft of the new or revised Constitution been submitted to
the people for their ratification conformably to Art. XV of the Constitution?
Who may vote in the plebiscite? As stated in Art V of the old Constitution:
"citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are twenty-
one years of age or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election" (though this has
been amended to include women, and age reduced to 18 or 20)
The CAs were clearly irregular, for one thing there are reportedly only around
12 million registered voters yet the plebiscite reports to have gotten the votes
of over 14 million
When Act. XV envisions votes cast it means votes cast on ballots and not by
raising hands
The COMELEC was envisioned to be independent of the President
Election Code of 1971 meticulous provisions for free and honest elections,
none of which were followed by the CAs
Inter alia
ON (3) or Has the proposed Constitution aforementioned been approved by a majority of
the people in Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held throughout the Philippines?
We have no way to ascertain of this at all the so called head Mr. Cruz part of
some Presidents association or Municipalities (or other), has no proof of ever
being part of a barangay council
People may have been intimidated into answering yes because of Martial Law
Clearly therefore, it was not validly rectified
In addition there is reason to believe a lot did not know the CAs were plebiscites seeing
as the President announced the plebiscites postponement supposedly that is, since the
CAs turned out to be plebiscites. People might have gone in there not knowing what
they were in for.
QUESTION (Solicitor General): If the enrolled bill is entitled to full faith and credence
and, to this extent, it is conclusive upon the President and the judicial branch of the
Government, why should Proclamation No. 1102 merit less consideration than in
enrolled bill?
Enrolled bills as certified by parties with authority to do it (Congress), the CAs
are clearly not the authority to certify new Constitutions
(SIDE NOTE: Perhaps others would feel that my position in these cases
overlooks what they might consider to be the demands of "judicial
statesmanship," whatever may be the meaning of such phrase. (added: the law
is more important than judicial statesmanship))
FIVE MAJOR ISSUES VOTED ON:
1) Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and
therefor non-justiciable question?
(6) justiciable, (3) hold its political
2) Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified
validly (with substantial if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable
constitutional statutory provisions?
 (6) not valid, (3) valid
3) Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution been accepted (with or without valid
ratification) by the people?
(4) people have accepted, (2) there can be no freedom of expression, and there
has been no expression form the people, (3) Im not qualified to answer this
question
4) Are petitioners entitled to relief?
(6) voted to dismiss the petition, (4) voted to deny the respondents motion to
dismiss
5) Is the aforementioned proposed constitution in force?
(4) cast no vote, (2) not in force, not enough votes to declare it is not in force
Based on the votes, THE PETITION WAS DISMISSED, and there was no further judicial obstacle for the new Constitution
to be in force and in effect.

(Since Ponente CJ Concepcions Opinion was actually one long dissenting opinion to the ruling (as per the outcome of
the votes), here are some notes on the concurring opinions):
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Makalintal, Castro)
On the Validity of CAs as an act of ratification of the Proposed Constitution:
1935 Constitution, Art XV, Sec 1: amendments "shall be valid part of this Constitution
when approved by a majority of votes cast at an election at which the amendments
submitted to the people for their ratification."
All plebiscites should be conducted as instructed in the Election Code
These constitutional and statutory qualifications (mentioned above) were not
considered in the determination of who should participate in the CAs nor were they
considered in how it was conducted
They are not ready to accept the new government is a product of a (peaceful) revolution
Plebiscites were declared via Presidential decree
Were called loose consultations (and thus, the people participating could not
have possibly understood they were voting for ratification instead of just filling
out forms for consultation)
IT IS NOT therefore, insofar as the 1935 Constitution is concerned, valid
HOWEVER, the president intended for the decisions of the CAs to be irreversible, and there is no
way to know for sure if the people have actually accepted it or not so we vote not to give due
course to the petitions
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Barredo)
He views what the counsels of the current cases are no more compelling than Counsel Taadas
presentation in the Plebiscite Cases, therefore he does not change his vote
Why to him the 1973 Constitution is already in force:
The CAss ratification of the new Constitution is a political issue since its not like the
plebiscites used to ratify the old one, it was a political and not a legal act of the people
CONCURRING OPINION (Makasiar)
Everyone else is clearly functioning other the 1973 Constitution, SO Assuming, without
conceding, that Article XV of the 1935 Constitution prescribes a procedure for the ratification of
constitutional amendments or of a new Constitution and that such procedure was no complied
with, the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102 is a political, not a justiciable, issue
the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the
 general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people

FOUR AMENDMENTS OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION

1. 1976 (Sanidad vs COMELEC)gave the President Legislative Power Even if there was Interim Batasang
Pambansa (new legislative), in other words Presidential Decrees constituted legislation
2. 1980 raised the retirement age ident is a suof SC to accommodate the aging CJ Fernando (from 65 to 70)
3. 1981changed the government from Parliamentary to Presidential again (but modelled after the French
Presidential form of Government, wherein the Presper president)
4. 1984Provided for a Vice-President (issues of succession were coming up since Marcos was sick)

1973 CONSTITUTION (Cont. Notes)

Martial Law was lifted in 1981 (but only a paper lifting)

Sanidad vs Comelec (GR. No. L-44640. October 12, 1976)

FACTS: The President issued Presidential Decree 991 (calling for a national referendum for the citizen assemblies to
resolve several issues and the referendum shall be on October 16, 1976), Presidential Decree 1031 (amending PD No.
991; declaring provisions of PD No. 229 [the manner of voting and canvass of votes in citizen assemblies] to be
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite), and PD No. 1033 (stating questions to be submitted to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite). The questions were: "Do you want martial law continued?" and "whether or not you want
martial law continued, do you approve the following amendments to the constitution?" (see proposed amendments).
The referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite. And, the COMELEC has exclusive supervision and control of the
October 1976 National Referendum Plebiscite.
Several petitioners, in three separate cases, filed prohibition suits with petitions for preliminary injunction to order
COMELEC to refrain from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16. And, for the Supreme Court
to declare without force and effect the Presidential Decrees related to the purpose of the Referendum Plebiscite and the
COMELECs role in the said Referendum Plebiscite. Petitioners claim that the President does not have the power to
propose amendments to the constitution (and how the president also does not have the power to propose how the
referendum-plebiscite should be held)\

Proposed Amendments:
1. Instead of Interim National Assembly, there will be an interim Batasang Pambansa. Listed provisions as to
how many members the interim Batasang Pambansa will have (120 members),
who the members will be (incumbent president of the Philippines and representatives elected form the
different regions of the nation and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the
Cabinet),
minimum requirements for representatives
2. interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS, PRIVILIGES, and
DISQUALIFICATIONS as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the members
thereof. HOWEVER, shall not exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(1) of the Constitution.****
3. Roles of the incumbent President as the interim Prime Minister:
- convene interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until Speaker is selected
- exercise his power even after interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions
- continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under 1935 Constitution and powers vested in the President
and Prime Minister under 1973 Constitution
4. President (PM) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of
the regular President (PM) and his Cabinet
- Cabinet shall be subject to disqualifications as the President (PM) may prescribe
 - President (PM) may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister (one or many)
5. President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.
6. President may issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letter of instructions which shall form part of the law of
the land when:
-according to Presidents (PMs) judgment, there exists a grave emergency or threat or imminence
-interim Batasang Pambansa or regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for
any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions powers, and
composition may be altered by law. Referenda conducted through barangays and under COMELECs supervision
may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ensure peoples will regarding important
matters of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue.
9. Amendments shall take effect after the President shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.

ISSUES:
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now obtaining,
does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a
sufficient and proper submission?

HELD: Type of Lawsuit/Petition/s: Prohibition Suit/s with Petition for Preliminary Injunction
to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16
to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well
as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

The vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said PETITIONS ARE HEREBY DISMISSED. This decision is immediately executory.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREES NOS. 991, 1031, 1033 = JUSTICIABLE OR POLITICAL?
JUSTICIABLE = 7 votes (Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Muoz-Palma, Concepcion Jr., Martin)

POLITICAL = 3 votes (Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino)

It is a JUDICIABLE because the constitution provides how it may be amended and the Supreme Court can declare
whether or not the procedure was followed or the proper authority carried out this procedure. The Presidential
decrees (991, 1031, 1033) that declare how the Constitution should be amended violate the Constitutions provisions
on how it should be amended THUS the Supreme Court, whose responsibility it is to interpret the Constitution,
questions whether the President is the proper authority to propose amendments(and how it should be done) and
whether or not the Presidential Decrees follow the constitutions provisions thus the questions of validity of the
decrees are JUDICIABLE. (Similar to Javellana vs Executive)

PRESIDENTIAL POWER?: During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental
circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as
well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the
people?
YES, the President does possess the power = 7 votes (Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr.,
Martin)

President opted to defer convening of the interim National Assembly in coherence with peoples preference.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land (Fernandez: indefinite power should be attributed to the
President to take emergency measures)
Increase in executive power is needed amidst the current complexity of problems
Since only the Presidency and Supreme Court are in operation, it is imperative that the president act for and
in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. (SC cannot do that without constitutional
infractions.)

NO, the President does not possess the power= 2 votes (Teehankee, Muoz-Palma)

UNDECIDED (?) = 1 vote (Fernando)

SUFFICIENT AND PROPER SUBMISSION?

YES, there is sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for RATIFICATION of the people = 6 votes
(Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Martin)

Proposal and ratification are succeeding steps hence shall not be widely separated in time.
Ratification is just the expression of the approbation of people, hence must be done at the same time.

Other VIEWS:

Barredo and Makasiar: Hope that the period of time be extended

Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio: question is political therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this
Court (Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC
21 SCRA 774)

NO, hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the
amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure
intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and
Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702) = 2 votes (Teehankee, Muoz-Palma)

GRANT OR DISMISS PETITION/S

DISMISS PETITIONS = 8 votes (Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., and Martin, Fernando
concurs in result but dissents in part)

GRANT PETITIONS = 2 votes (Teehankee, Muoz-Palma)

Mitra vs Comelec (GR No. 56503. April 4, 1981)
[Sir said this: affirmed the 1973 Constitution in the most stupid fashion]

FACTS: Instant suit proceeds on the assumption that the present Constitution is not in effect, praying for a plebiscite so
that people may vote on the ratification of the Constitution. Petitioners think that if the plebiscite results in the
negative, then the 1935 Constitution, which they think was only suspended by martial law, should be operative.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is effective.

HELD: Yes. SC either checks or legitimates acts of a coordinate department, challenged in an appropriate legal
proceedings. The decision rendered then, whether one of approval or of rejection, of validity or of unconstitutionality, is
controlling. Javellana ruled that no judicial obstacle exists to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
Petitioners did not take note of the opinion of CJ Concepcion, voting that the Constitution was ratified by virtue of the
peoples acceptance. The function of judicial review, as observed by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 8 reflects the adoption of the American type of constitutional government "where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department." 9 "Familiarity with the essential background of
the type of government established under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-known principles and practices
that go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation." 11 Even without valid ratification, a new Constitution
could come into force and effect by the acquiescence of the people. There is this excerpt in a separate opinion in
Javellana: Independently of the lack of validity of the ratification of the new Constitution, if it be accepted by the
people, in whom sovereignty resides according to the Constitution, then this Court cannot refuse to yield assent to such
a political decision of the utmost gravity, conclusive in its effect. The government which is merely an agency to register
its commands has no choice but to submit. Its officials must act accordingly. Once the fact of acceptance by the people
of a new fundamental law is made evident, the judiciary is left with no choice but to accord it recognition. The fact that
the people went to the polls would be indicative of their acquiescence in the present Constitution.

DISSENTING OPINION (Teehankee, J.): The 1973 Constitution should not be considered effective on the basis that
adequate time and information should be given to people who are required to vote regarding radical changes in the
government structure. He added as a final note that the presidential objective of Martial Law was questionable because
the language of the Constitution as to why Martial Law is in effect (necessary measure to safeguard the Republic) could
be interpreted differently, so as long as the world is in crisis, Martial Law will not end.

Legaspi vs Minister of Finance (GR No. L-58289, July 24, 1982 )

[Sir stated the issue here as such: the President shouldnt have legislative powers without emergencies]

FACTS: Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, praying that the SC declare PD 1840
unconstitutional. The said PD was issued in accordance with the legislative powers granted on the President in
Amendment No. 6 of the Constitution pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595. Petitioner claims that the said amendment is
not one of the powers granted the President by the Constitution as amended in the plebiscite of April 7, 1981.

Law:

Amendment No. 6 Whenever in the judgment of the President, there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or
the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason
that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may in order to meet the exigency, issue
the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the
land.

Sec. 1, Art. 8 The Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa

Sec.11, Art. 7 The President may grant amnesty with concurrence to the Batasang Pambansa

Sec. 16, Art. All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935
Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for on conferred upon any
official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa
provides otherwise.

ISSUES:

Whether or not PD 1840 is unconstitutional?

Whether or not Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution is unaffected or repealed by the April 7,
1981 amendment?
Whether or not the term incumbent President, as seen in all other Amendments and which only
refers to Marcos, is the person referred to as President in Amendment No.6 ?
Whether or not the phrase President (Prime Minister) means that since the position is no longer
held by one person, neither the President nor the Prime Minister can have the power vested in
Amendment No. 6?
Whether or not Amendment No. 2, which refers to the legislative assembly simply as Batasang
Pambansa, intends to convert or upgrade the present existing assembly (interim Batasang
Pambansa) into the regular Batasang Pambansa?

HELD:

Held Ratio

1. PD 1840 Constitutional
2. Amendment No. 6 is unaffected The 1981 plebiscite does not repeal
Amendment No. 6 by omission. Since it was
not voted on, it would be unfair to the people

to repeal it just because it was not included as
one of the questions in the plebiscite.

3. The term incumbent President does not Amendment No. 6 uses the term President
apply to Amendment No. 6 and not incumbent President. Therefore, it
refers to all future presidents.



When the two0sident.
4. The phrase President (Prime Minister)
does not limit Amendment No. 6

The only change made by the 1981

amendment to Amendment No. 2 is the non-
inclusion of the incumbent President to the
assembly. The reference to the legislative
body as Batasang Pambansa (as opposed to
interim Batasang Pambansa) is a non-essential
 issue since the present existing assembly is still
the interim Batasang Pambansa.
5. Amendment No. 2 did not mean to
convert or upgrade the present assembly

Philippine Bar Association vs COMELEC 140 SCRA 455

FACTS: [Presidential Snap Elections] 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP883 which
called for special national elections on February 7, 1986 for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the country. BP 883
was alleged to be in conflict with the constitution in that it allowed the President to continue holding office after the
calling of the special election. PMarcos submitted a letter of conditional resignation, but this did not create vacancy as
provided for in the Constitution. The letter stated that the President shall be: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of
President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking
his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has justiciable jurisdiction to grant said injunction and to declare BP 883
unconstitutional

HELD: The Petition was Dismissed

Does the Court have justiciable jurisdiction to grant said injunction and to declare BP 883 unconstitutional?

NO. As argued by Justice Teehankee, the questioned constitutionality of BP 883 (and its nature of being a
justiciable issue) due to the alleged lack of an actual vacancy has transformed into a political question that could
only be decided by the people, in their sovereign capacity, in an election. Thus, the SC could, should, and must
not impede upon the sovereign will of the people, as well as the presumed wisdom of both the Executive and
the Legislative, in holding this election that will ultimately decide the fate of the nation.
On the issue of WoN the conditional resignation is constitutionally valid; J. Plana argues that the
Constitution, particularly Art 7 Sec 9, does not explicitly prevent the President from tendering a
resignation that is not immediately effective. As such, there is actually no provision whatsoever
regarding such kind of resignation.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Cory Aquino and Doy Laurel (opposition candidates for President
and VP, respectively) as the parties most prejudiced in this case, did not even file any suit or petition
against said implementation of BP 883.

THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION

The revolutionary government abolished Batasang Pambansa, and the justices were asked to resign, this
constitution also gave the government power to remove LGU officials at will
Lawyers League vs Aquino (G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986)

FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. (Political Question) The Court further held that: The people have accepted the
Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact
and law a de jure government; and The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Letter of Associate Justice Puno

Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter seeking the correction of his seniority ranking (based on the
dates of their respective appointments) in the Court of Appeals. As provided by EO No.33 issued by President Corazon
Aquino, any member who is reappointed will retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original
appointment. Associate Justices Campos and Javellana questioned the petition on grounds that Puno cannot claim
reappointment because the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist when the Marcos regime
was toppled. The Court ruled in favor of Justices Campos and Javellana, thereby retaining the number 26 ranking of
Associate Justice Puno.

LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1990 June29, 1990 ||
No. 90-11-2697-CA

FACTS: Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno was first appointed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (the reorganized Court
of Appeals) in 1983. After the EDSA Revolution, he was reappointed and given the ranking of number 11, which was
subsequently lowered to number 26 after the appointment was signed by President Aquino. Petitioner alleges that there
has been a mistake in his seniority ranking because it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 33 (EO 33) that any member who is reappointed will retain the precedence to which he was entitled under
his original appointment.

(Procedural) FACTS:

The Supreme Court en banc, granted Punos request in 29 November 1990.

A motion for reconsideration of the Courts resolution was later filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr.
and Luis A. Javellana, who would be affected by the change in ranking, contending that:
the present Court of Appeals is a new Court and that petitioner could not claim reappointment
to a prior court; AND
Petitioner cannot claim that he was returning to his former court, for the courts where he had
previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present Court of Appeals is a new court or merely a continuation of the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said EO 33.

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration of Justices Campos and Javellana is GRANTED and the seniority rankings of members
of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in
1986, are recognized and upheld.

The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, for it was created in the wake of the massive
reorganization launched by the revolutionary government. Appointments thereto are of no relation to
earlier appointments to the abolished courts;
The reference to precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129, as
 amended by EO 33 refers to prospective situations as distinguished from retroactive ones.

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

48 People were appointed to be in the Constitutional Commission to draft the Consti

Feb Estrada vs. Desierto, GR Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001

FACTS:

1. In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected President of the Philippines, while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-
President. The president was accused with corruption, culminating in Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singsons accusations
that the president received millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

2. The Senate and the House of Representatives began early investigations regarding the accusation, while key socio-
political figures like Cardinal Sin, former Presidents Aquino and Ramos, the vice president, senior advisers and cabinet
members called on the president to resign, and resigned from their cabinet posts themselves.

3. The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with 21 senator-judges presided over by Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. At a point when 11 senator-judges ruled against opening a second envelope of evidence showing the presidents
P3.3 billion bank account under the name Jose Velarde, the public prosecutors resigned and a mass demonstration at
EDSA began.

4. CJ Davide granted Senator Raul Rocos motion to postpone the impeachment trial until the House of Representatives
resolved the lack of public prosecutors.

5. With the defection of more officials and of the army and police from the Estrada administration, the president
attempted to appease public sentiment by announcing a snap election and by allowing the second envelope to be
opened. The measures failed, and the calls for resignation strengthened.

6. On 20 January 2001, the president negotiated with representatives of the vice-president. News broke out that Chief
Justice Hilario Davide would administer the oath of presidency to the vice president at EDSA Shrine. Estrada issued two
statements - one stating reservations on the constitutionality of Arroyos presidency, and another stating that he is
incapable of dispensing his responsibilities as president, thus allowing Arroyo to be the acting president.

7. The Arroyo administration was met with acceptance by the different branches of government, by majority of the
public, and by the international community. The impeachment trial was closed, despite sentiments such as those of
Senator Defensor-Santiago that the impeachment court had failed to resolve the case, leaving open questions regarding
Estradas qualifications to run for other elected posts.

8. The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to file a series of cases regarding the corruption of Estrada. Estrada filed a
motion compelling the Ombudsman to refrain from further proceedings until his term as president was over. He also
filed a petition to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent president, temporarily unable to fulfill his duties, thus
making Arroyo an acting president only.

9. The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the parties that they did not declare the Office of the President vacant on 20
January 2001, b) to prohibit either party from discussing in public the merits of the case while in its pendency, c) to
enjoin the Ombudsman from resolving pending criminal cases against Estrada for 30 days.



ISSUES:

I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

III. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still president, whether he is immune from
criminal prosecution.

IV. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity

HELD:

I. The petitions present a justiciable controversy because the cases at bar pose legal, and not political, questions. Hence,
the cases are within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
Definition of political questions: ...those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government. --Former CJ Roberto Concepcion
Arroyos government is NOT revolutionary in character, since her oath was taken under the 1987 Constitution.
EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and the right to assembly. It is intra constitutional
in this regard (within the scope of the Constitution). The resignation of Estrada that it caused and the
subsequent succession of of Arroyo are subject to judicial review.

II. Estrada is NOT a President on leave while Arroyo is Acting President.
Under Section 11 Article VII, Estrada says that only Congress has the ultimate authority to determine whether
the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided by said provision.
Hence, Arroyo has no power to judge Estradas inability to do his job as President.
However, both houses of Congress expressed their recognition and support of Arroyo as the new President, and
it is implicitly clear in this recognition that Estradas inability is no longer temporary. Thus, Congress has rejected
Estradas claim of inability.
Furthermore, Court cannot exercise its judicial power to revise decision of Congress in recognizing Arroyo. To do
so would be to transgress principle of separation of powers, since this is a political issue.

III. Estrada contends that he has not been convicted in the impeachment case and that he enjoys immunity from all
kinds of suit.
Executive immunity provision of 1973 Constitution was no longer included in the 1986 Constitution. This is in
accordance with SC ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.
When the president has resigned, then proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him


IV. Estrada argued that respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed
against him because of prejudicial publicity on his guilt, and that respondent has also developed bias.
In People v Teehankee, Jr. and Larranaga v Court of Appeals it was laid down that the right of an accused to a fair
trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible press.
Our judges are smart enough to know the law and to disregard camera drama and off-court evidence. Their
exposure to media does not affect their impartiality.
February 11, 1987the new Constitution was ratified

Santiago vs COMELEC (GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997)

FACTS: Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, Filipino citizens have the right to directly propose
amendments to the said Constitution through the system of initiative. On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed a
petition to amend the Constitution. The Petition is about the lifting of term limits of all elective government officials.
Delfin asked COMELEC for an order to (1) fix the time and dates for signature gathering, (2) cause the necessary
publication in newspapers of general and local circulation and (3) instruct Municipal Election Registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. COMELEC Chairman issued an Order (a) directing Delfin to
cause the publication at his own expense and (b) setting the case for hearing Petitoners-intervenors filed motions to
dismiss Delfins petition for amendment of the Constitution. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining COMELEC from proceeding with the petition of Delfin.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue is political or justiciable

2. Whether or not the system of Section 2, R.A. No. 6735 (An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor), includes initiative on amendments to the Constitution
3. Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over Delfins petition
4. Whether or not lifting of term limits of elected officials (as proposed by Delfin) would constitute a revision (as
opposed to amendment) of the Constitution
HELD:

1. The issue is justiciable. COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain or dismiss the petition of Delfin. It
is only the Supreme Court who can decide on the case.

2. R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

Peoples petition for amendment of the Constitution is not self-executory. It is dependent on congressional
action; thus, the Congress has to provide for its implementation. Details for carrying out amendment to Section
2 are left to legislature.

3. COMELEC acted without jurisdiction on its Order to prescribe the rules and regulations for Delfins petition.

COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after the filing of the petition. The Petition of
Delfin has not yet acquired the necessary number of signatures for its approval. Thus, the prescribed rules and
regulations of COMELEC on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are void.

4. Petition for lifting of term of elected officials constitute a revision of the Constitution.

Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND, not REVISE, the Constitution. This means that the people are not
accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution. The
main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws (not the Constitution).

Lambino vs COMELEC (GR. No. 174153, October 25, 2006)

[on the Supremacy of the Constitution]

FACTS:
 15 FEBRUARY 2006 - The LAMBINO GROUP (Raul Lambino, Erico Aumentado, and other groups) gathered
signatures to create an initiative petition to change the Constitution.
25 AUGUST 2006 The Lambino group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify their
petition. They cited Section 5(b), Section 5(c) and Section 7 of RA 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act)
According to the Lambino group, they were able to collect 6,327,952 signatures amounting to 12% of the voting
population, and at least 3% of the voters per district. They also claimed that COMELEC registrars verified these
signatures.
The petition aims to change the 1987 Constitution, specifically, Sections 1-7 of Article VI (The Legislature), and
sections 1-4 of Article VII (The Executive), and seeks to add Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).
The changes sought by the groups petition would change the form of government in the country to unicameral-
parliamentary.
The Lambino group would have wanted a plebiscite asking the people if they wanted to change the 1987
Constitution, specifically changing government to a unicameral-parliamentary form.
31 AUGUST 2006 COMELEC denied the petition, citing rulings in Santiago v COMELEC and the inadequacy of RA
6735 to amend the Constitution.
The Lambino group filed a writ of certiorari and mandamus to compel the COMELEC to grant their petition
because a) Santiago is not a binding precedent and b) their petition expresses the will of the sovereign people.
Various individuals and parties filed pleadings in support of and against the Lambino groups petition. Among
them, the Binay group, the Solicitor-General, former President Estrada, and different political parties. They were
called intervenors for the case.
Opposing intervenors questioned the following:
The Lambino groups standing to file the petition
The validity of the signature gathering campaign
The compliance with the minimum number of signatures for an initiative petition (Section 2 Article XVII
of the Constitution)
The nature of proposed changes as revisions, and not mere amendments
The compliance with RA 6735, limiting initiative petitions to one subject

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2
Article XVII of the Constitution regarding amendments to the Constitution
through a peoples initiative;
2. Whether the Supreme Court should visit its ruling in Santiago v COMELEC
declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms
and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution;
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course to the Lambino Groups petition

RULING:
1. The petition does not comply with Section 2 Article XVII of the Constitution.
a. Section 2 provides for the amendment of the Constitution through initiative petition by the people.
b. However, the Constitutional Commission was very clear in their
deliberations that any initiative petition must contain the full text of
the proposed amendments before being signed by the people.
c. The Lambino group merely submitted a copy of the signatures,
which they gathered together with a question on whether or not
they agreed to a shift to a unicameral-parliamentary form of
government.
d. It is also unclear whether the Lambino group circulated copies of
their proposed amendments, but even if they did, Lambino himself
testified to circulating only a very limited number of copies.
e. Without the full text of the proposal, the people signing the petition
 could not have known what Lambino intended to allow
Parliament to choose the end of their term, to further amend the
Constitution without reason, to discriminate against senators by
choosing the Prime Minister from among the House of Representatives, etc.
f. Section 2 only allows peoples initiative to amend the Constitution,
and not to revise it. The proposed petition which changes the form
of government is a revision of the Constitution, which can only be
carried out by the Congress (3/4 vote) or by a Constitutional
Convention.
2. A revisit of Santiago v COMELEC is not necessary.
a. Regardless of any reversal in the Santiago decision, this petition will
still warrant dismissal based on its failure to comply with Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution.
b. Even if RA 6735 were valid to implement peoples initiatives, these
initiatives must first comply with the Constitution before any RA.
c. Even if the Lambino group complied with the Constitution, they still
violate RA 6735 because their signatories did not sign the petition
but were merely attached to the petition signed by the Lambino
group.
d. Furthermore, the petition violates RA 6735 that states that petitions
submitted to the electorate must contain no more than 1 subject.
3. COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
initiative.
a. COMELEC upheld the Supreme Courts ruling in Santiago and
PIRMA (Peoples Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action) v COMELEC.

Judicial Review

Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review

In People v Vera, 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that judicial review can only be exercised in
an actual case and controversy.

This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a constitutional
question raised at the earliest possible time, and (4) a constitutional question that is the very lis mota of the case, i.e. an
unavoidable question.

Seven (7) rules of avoidance of constitutional questions (J. Brandeis) :

In the following cases, the court must refrain from passing on the issue of constitutionality or from exercising
judicial review:

1. Friendly, non-adversary proceedings. (no vital conflict)

2. Anticipation of a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. (premature case)

3. Formulation of a rule broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.

4. Existence of other grounds upon which the case may be disposed of (not the very lis mota)

5. A complaint made by one who fails to show injury as to its operation. (no standing)
 6. Instance of one who has availed himself of its benefit.

7. Possibility of a construction of the statute which can avoid the resolution of the constitutional question.

Policy of strict necessity (Rescue Army case)

The court must, as much possible, refrain from exercising judicial review unless all the requirements for its
exercise are fulfilled because of :

1. The danger of exercising the function, in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from
constitutional roots.

2. Comparative finality of those consequences.

3. Consideration due to the judgment of the other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of
their authorities.

4. Necessity for each to keep within its own power.

5. Inherent limitations of the judicial process - its largely negative character, and its limited resources for
enforcement.

6. Withal in paramount importance of constitutional adjudication.

Marbury vs. Madison (5 US 137, 1803)
[on Judicial Review]

FACTS:

The late President of the US, Mr. Adams, nominated applicants, including William Marbury, to the Senate for
their consent to be appointed justices of the peace of the District of Columbia
Senate advised and consented to the appointments
Commissions in due form were signed by the said President appointing them justices and the seal of the US was
in due form affixed to the said commissions by the Secretary of State, John Marshall, but they were not
delivered before the expiration of Adams term as president
Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid
Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel
Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the commission

ISSUES:

1. Does Marbury have a right to the commission?

2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and so valid?
4. Can the Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Art 3
of the Constitution?
 5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

HELD:

1. Yes, Marbury has a right to the commission.

The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when President Adams signed the order. The
order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional power of appointment has been
exercised. This will happen when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been
performed.

2. Yes, the law grants Marbury a remedy.

The very essence of civil liberty consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. When
the President of the US appointed him as justice of peace, he already had legal rights to the office for 5 years,
which in turn, gave him a right to the commission. And the refusal to deliver is a violation of that right and hence
he is entitled to a remedy.

3. Yes, the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and valid
It is the duty of the Judicial Department to interpret the law. And if two laws conflict each other, the
Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution and the Constitution is
superior to any ordinary Legislative act, the Constitution and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both apply.

4. No, Congress can not expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in
Art 3 of the Constitution that states that:
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction.

If the Legislature had the discretion to apportion the judicial power between Supreme and inferior
courts according to the will of that body, then this section will be entirely without meaning. If Congress remains
at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be
original, and original jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.

5. No, the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus
To enable this court to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction,
or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

Application for writ of mandamus was denied and Marbury did not get the commission.

People vs Vera (G.R. No. L-45685, Nov.16, 1937)

FACTS:
The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Manila, with HSBC
intervening in the case as private prosecutor on October 15, 1931.
The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four
years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prison mayor. (Jan. 8, 1934)
Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prison
 correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the judgments in
all other respects.
Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were all denied
on December 17, 1935. Final judgment was entered on Dec. 18, 1935. He filed for certiorari to the Supreme
Court but got denied on Nov 1936. The SC subsequently denied Cu Unjiengs petition for leave to file a second
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial, then remanded the case to the court of origin for execution
of judgment.
Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the
defunct Philippine Legislature. He states he is innocent of the crime; he has no criminal record; and that he
would observe good conduct in the future.
CFI Manila, Judge Tuason referred Cu Unjiengs application for probation to the Insular Probation Office which
recommended DENIAL on June 18, 1937.
CFI Manilas seventh branch, Judge Vera, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
The Private Prosecutor, HSBC, filed an opposition to granting of probation of Cu Unjieng, assailing the
constitutionality of the Probation Act since it violates the equal protection of laws and gives unlawful and
improper delegation to provincial boards.
CFI Manila concurred in the opposition of HSBC except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act. 4221.
Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in those provinces wherein the probationary
officer is granted salary not lower than provincial fiscals by respective provincial boards.
In Sept. 14, 1937, the City Fiscal of Manila concurs for the first time with the issues raised by the other petitioner
and files a supplementary petition affirming issues raised by HSBC, arguing later on Oct. 6, 1937, that probation
is a form of reprieve, hence Act 4221 bypasses this exclusive power of the Chief Executive.
Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.


ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings;
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is constitutional based on these three grounds:
a. It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive
b. It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
c. It denies the equal protection of the laws

HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes. Constitutional questions will not be determined by the courts unless properly raised and presented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, lismota. Constitutionality issues may be
raised in prohibition and certiorari proceedings, as they may also be raised in mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus proceedings. The general rule states that constitutionality should be raised in the earliest
possible opportunity (during proceedings in initial/inferior courts). It may be said that the state can challenge
the validity of its own laws, as in this case. The well-settled rule is that the person impugning validity must have
personal and substantial interest in the case (i.e. he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement). If Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the People of the Philippines have substantial interest in having it
set aside.

2.
a. No. There exists a distinction between pardon and probation. Pardoning power is solely within the
power of the Executive. Probation has an effect of temporary suspension, and the probationer is still not
exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts upon him as he remains to be in legal custody
for the time being.
b. Yes. Section 11 of the Act. 4221 raised a problem. It states that the act shall apply only on provinces that
provide salary on probation officers. This gives the administrative board of every province the power to
 determine for themselves, whether or not to apply the law or not through providing or not providing
salary for probation officers. Probation Act does not lay down any definite standards by which the
administrative boards may be guided in the exercise of discretionary powers. This therefore becomes a
surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. It is unconstitutional.
c. Yes. Due to the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, some provinces may choose to adopt the
law or not, thus denying the equal protection of laws. It is unconstitutional.

The following must be avoided: (i) political questions, (ii) advisory opinions, (iii) moot and academic issues, and (iv) no
standing.

Advisory Opinion

A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case and controversy that demands constitutional
construction for its resolution. This may take the form of declaratory relief. It is not wise for the court to engage in an
advisory opinion because:

a) This only leads to dialectics, to abstract legal arguments and sterile conclusions (Laurel quoting Frankfurter)

b) The judicial function is impoverished since it thrives on facts that draw out the meaning of the law.

Mootness

A case becomes moot when there are facts, injuries and heated arguments but for some reason the legal
problem has become stale. When a case is moot and academic, it ceases to be a case and controversy. Any decision
reached by the court would not be conclusive on the parties.

Exceptions to mootness:

1) If the question is capable of repetition and evasive of review.

2) If there exits a mere possibility of collateral legal consequences if the court does not act.

3) Voluntary cessation from the wrongful act by the defendant, if he is free to return to his old ways.

Quizon vs. COMELEC (GR No 177927, Feb. 15, 2008)
[on Mootness]

FACTS:
Petitioner Quizon and private respondent Puno were congressional candidates for the First District of Antipolo
City during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections.
On April 17, 2007, Quizon filed a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
against Puno, claiming the latter is not a resident of the First District of Antipolo City.
Puno was declared the winner and so on June 5, 2007, Quizon filed this Petition for Mandamus alleging that the
COMELEC had not rendered a judgment on his previous petition.
On July 31, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution, dismissing the instant Petition for
Disqualification and Cancellation of the COC of respondent Roberto V. Puno because he is a resident of the First
District of Antipolo City.
The petition for mandamus was thus mooted by aforementioned Resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for mandamus holds merit to resolve Quizons pending petition for respondent
Punos disqualification

HELD:
NO. Petition DISMISSED. Because a Resolution was already issued by the COMELEC while the petition for
mandamus was pending, the instant case was then rendered moot already. The issuance of a writ commanding
COMELEC to resolve the petition for disqualification will no longer serve any purpose because there is a decision
already.

The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and expedite, not to inquire and
adjudicate. Furthermore, the writ of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty
only. When the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only
be directed by mandamus to act but not to act in a certain way. The Court may only compel COMELEC to
exercise such discretion and resolve the matter but it may not control the manner of which it will
exercise said discretion.
A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.

Court can decide cases that are moot & academic if:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution
2) The situation is of EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER and paramount interest involved
3) Constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, public
4) It is capable of repetition & evasive of review.

Ripeness

A constitutional question may come to the court either too early or prematurely, so that it is still abstract
(advisory opinion), or too late, so that the court's decision would no longer affect the parties (mootness). The court
must resolve constitutional issues only when they come to it at the right time (ripeness).

No Standing

A party has a standing in a case if his interest is such that he stands to be benefited if the case is resolved in his
favor, and he stand to be really injured if it is decided against him.

Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type of legislative act being questioned, or his
status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement.

The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure such concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions (Baker v Carr, supra.)

A person has standing to challenge the governmental act only if he has a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. (People v. Vera, infra.)

In re Saturnina Bermudez (145 SCRA 160)

[on Standing]

Quick points: This case seeks to clarify who are the incumbent Pres and VP referred to in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 of the
proposed 1986 Constitution. Note that after the February 1986 Snap Elections, Makasiar named Marcos as Pres and
Tolentino as VP, while Teehankee named Aquino as Pres and Laurel as VP. The court dismissed the case as a) it is not
within their jurisdiction, the petition is in effect a suit against the President and s/he is immune from suits during her
incumbency, and b) there is no cause of action, it being in public records and common public knowledge that Aquino and
Laurel are the incumbent Pres and VP, and in view of the fact that the Aquino Govt. is THE Philippine Government, de
facto and de jure.

Context: Post-EDSA I Revolution. The 1986 Constitution has been drafted but has not yet been ratified. The case in the
syllabus is under Freedom Constitution.

Related Law / Provision(s):
Article XVIII, Section 5 of the proposed 1986 Constitution:
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extend to noon of June 30, 1992.

FACTS: Impleading no respondents, and with reference to Article XVIII, Section 5 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, Mr.
Bermudez petitioned declaratory relief for the court to declare and answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and
the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino, being referred to under the said
section 7 [sic] of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution, refers to. That is,
the petitioner asked the court to declare WHO are the incumbent Pres and VP referred to in the aforementioned
article.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition holds in Court

HELD: The Court dismissed the petition based on, a) the Courts lack of Jurisdiction over the matter and 2) lack of cause
of action.

Lack of Jurisdiction it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. The
petition also amounts, in effect, to a suit against the President, when the President, during her incumbency and tenure,
is immune from suits or from being brought to court.

Political Question

An issue is a political question when it does not deal with the interpretation of a law and its application to a
case, but with the very wisdom of the law itself. When a judge attempts to resolve a political question, he is not
exercising a judicial function, but is rather supplanting his conscience to that of the political branch of the government.

Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) has attempted to formulate some guidelines for determining whether a
question is political or not.

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.

In PBA v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455, we see a reversal of judicial review. The case was clearly a justiciable controversy. Is
the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election, proclamation and assumption into office
by the elected President, a valid resignation as to authorize the Batasan to pass a Snap Election Law? The Court could
have validly issued an injunction to stop the COMELEC from proceeding with the preparations for the election. But it
did not, citing its delay in deciding the case and the sentiments of the people that developed in the meantime as
reason for its inaction. According to the court, what at first was a legal question became a political question because it
was overtaken by events.

VV: A Court which does not issue an injunction to enjoin an official act when it could have issued one is actually
deciding the case in favor of the validity of the act. Failure to issue an injunction is as much an exercise of judicial
review.

Lozano vs. Nograles (G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009)

[on Justiciability]

FACTS: Petitioner filed for the nullification of House Resolution 1109 that called for the convening of the members of
Congress for the purpose of amending or revising the constitution

ISSUES: Whether or not the Court has justiciable jurisdiction in deciding abstract, hypothetical, or contingent
questions

HELD: Petition DISMISSED

Does the Court have justiciable jurisdiction in deciding abstract, hypothetical, or contingent questions?
NO. While the Courts power of judicial review may be awesome, its scope is limited only to actual cases
and controversies dealing with parties with actual legal claims. The Court is in no position to decide on
actions yet to be executed.
In the present case, HR 1109 did not adversely injure or prejudice said Ps since the resultant effect of
the HR has yet to transpire and therefore could not warrant an intervention from the Court.
Furthermore, Art VIII Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the Courts settle only actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, as governed by the rule
of locus standi or the standing to sue. In the present case, Ps locus standi, a necessary requirement for
constitutional questions to flourish, has not been proven since:
P has yet to demonstrate that he personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because
of the allegedly illegal conduct of govt
Ps alleged injury is fairly traceable to challenged action
Ps alleged injury may be redressed by the legal remedy of the Court

Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the
stringent requirements of personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to
be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their
cerebral deficit. (CJ Puno, 2009)

COCOFED v. Republic GR. No. 177857-58, September 17, 2009

[on Justiciability]

FACTS:
P filed a civil class action suit in behalf of all coconut farmers for the retrieval of the sequestered shares and
assets of said members of P in the UCPB owned by alleged Marcos crony Eduardo Cojuanco Jr. R contends that
these shares and assets were sequestered on the basis that said items were ill-gotten wealth, that these coco
levy funds, by its nature, were taxes that should be used for public purposes alone, yet it has been ruled in
previous cases that Cojuangco et al used said coco levy funds for their personal gain.
Acquisition of said shares and assets were authorized by RA 6260 (1971) that established the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF), as subsequently amended by PD 276 (Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund), PD 582
(coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF), PD 755 (Acquisition of Credit bank for Coconut Farmers and
 distribution of Shares therewith), PD 961 (Codification of Coconut Laws), PD 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry
Code), and LoI 926 (Coco Levy be placed in UCPB). Transactions were handled by the Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA).
After EDSA I, the Aquino administration issued EO 1 (Creation of PCGG), EO 2 (ill-gotten wealth may come in the
form of shares of stocks, etc), and EO 14 (Sandiganbayan as the court of exclusive and original jurisdiction over
ill-gotten wealth cases)
Sandiganbayan, in both Civil Cases Nos 0033-A and F, subsequently sequestered said shares and items on the
basis of the unconstitutionality of PD 755, PD 961, and PD 1468. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
WoN the Sandiganbayan has justiciable jurisdiction to decide in this case
WoN the Sandiganbayan has the justiciable right to review the constitutionality of assailed PDs


HELD: Petition DENIED
Does the Sandiganbayan have justiciable jurisdiction to decide in this case?
YES. Jurisdiction of a court over a specific subject matter, as settled in Magay v. Estiadan and Allied
Domecq Philippines v Villon, is clearly conferred by law. Basic is the rule that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the cause or causes of action as alleged in the complaint.
In the present case, PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975 and EO 14 vests the Sandiganbayan with the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in connection
with EO 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, or cases of ill-gotten wealth.

Does the Sandiganbayan have the justiciable right to review the constitutionality of assailed PDs?
YES. As settled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, lower courts, while mindful in the fact that the
examination of constitutional questions is generally reserved for the Supreme Court, are nonetheless
not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the Supreme
Court.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan resolved itself to decide on the issue of constitutionality of the
assailed PDs since this is the core of the Ps complaint: that insofar as the coconut levy is concerned,
these decrees had been enacted as tools for the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth for specific favored
individuals and where the defense is grounded solely in the very laws the constitutionality of which
are being questioned we find more reason to resolve this constitutional question at this stage of the
proceedings (June 20, 1989).
QED: It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is
essential to the decision of the case, especially when the case of either one party is anchored on the
constitutionality of the assailed statute.

Functions of Judicial Review

1. Checking - invalidating a law or an executive act that is found to be contrary to the Constitution.

2. Legitimating (legitimizing) - upholding the validity of the law which results from a mere dismissal of a case challenging
the validity of that law.

When the Court exercises this function, it uses the double negative by declaring that the law is "not
unconstitutional". This is no mere semantics. The Court cannot declare the law constitutional for it enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality, so that a declaration to that effect by the court would not make it more constitutional.
On the other hand, anyone who challenges the validity of a law has the burden of proof to show its invalidity. Declaring
that the law is not unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the challenger has not met the burden required.

3. Symbolic - to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and concepts on matters of great public
importance.

Symbolic Function of Supreme Court to Give Guidelines to Bench and Bar in Cases which are Moot and Academic.

Salonga vs. Cruz-Pao (134 SCRA 438)

[on Symbolic/Matters of Great Public Importance]

The case against petitioner for subversion which was filed by the fiscal on the basis of flimsy testimony given by Victor
Lovely was already dismissed without prejudice by the fiscal (upon anticipation of adverse ruling). And yet, the SC
noting that as the fiscal said the dismissal of the charges was without prejudice to the filing of new ones for the same
acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply, the case is not entirely moot,
decided to perform its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts and doctrines or
rules" for the guidance of the bar and bench. It thus, went on to lecture about its antiquated understanding of the
inciting test, and how it could not be proved by a mere photograph.

Javier vs. COMELEC (144 SCRA 194)

[on Symbolic/Matters of Great Public Importance]

FACTS:

Petitioner and Private Respondent were candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in Antique (during the May 1984
elections)
Petitioner approached the Commission to question the canvass returns of the elections, because of what he
called attempts to railroad the private respondents proclamation.
His complaints were dismissed and the respondent was proclaimed the winner by the 2nd Division of the
Commission.
Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court, arguing that the proclamation was void as it should have been
made by the Commission en banc and not merely one of its divisions (en banc: term used to indicate that all of
the judges on an appeals court panel are participating in a case)
Petitioner was gunned down in broad daylight while the court was still considering his case (dated: February 11.
1986)
The Private Respondent has since gone missing, People Power overthrew the Marcos Regime, and the Batasang
Pambansa was abolished thereby rendering the issues of this case moot and academic
Justice Cruz maintains that despite it being moot and academic: Justice demands that we act then, not only for
the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the
future. (emphasis added), which is why he rejected the motion of the Solicitor General to dismiss the petition.

ISSUE: Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of proclaiming the
private respondent the winner of the election?

HELD:
Sec 3 of Art 12-C of the 1973 Constitution, which was:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided
by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en
banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of
their submission for decision.
was interpreted by the Solicitor General to allow the divisions of the Comission to decide pre-proclamation
controversies in this case as said controversy was not a contest at the time. SG describes that a contest
should involve contention of both parties for the same office where the one contesting wants not only to oust
the intruder but also to be put into office. Commission decides controversies after proclamation
SC calls the SGs interpretation irrational and couldnt have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
Interpreting it this way gives more powers to the division than to the Commission en banc. Constitution clearly
 intended for the Commission to get full authority for election cases (supported by the 1978 Election Code, Sec
175)
Further, the SC defines the term contest as any matter involving the title or claim of the title to an elective
office, made before or after the proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office
in dispute.
The purposes of Sec 3 (Art 12-C 1973 Consti) could not have been achieved had the Commission been only been
able to act en banc after the proclamation (it would have been too late).

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally
rendered it mood and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on
Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution. (emphasis added)

All courts can exercise judicial review

Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in :

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of lower courts on
cases with constitutional issues. If so, inferior courts have original jurisdiction over constitutional cases although they
decide the case only at first instance, their decision being always reviewable by the SC. Thus, for instance an RTC can
rule on the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Law.

Effect of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality

Civil Code; Article 7. xxx

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.

xxx

The effect of a declaration that a law is unconstitutional is to make the law either void or voidable.

It is void if on its face, it does not enjoy any presumption of validity. As such, it produces no effect whatsoever,
creates no right or office, it imposes no duty. Whatever penalty was paid during the period of its operation must be
remitted.

An example is BP 52 in Igot v COMELEC case, supra, providing that anyone who has been charged of rebellion,
etc. is prima facie presumed to be disqualified from running for a local post. On its face, it blatantly goes against the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

But a law declared unconstitutional is only voidable if, on its face, it enjoys the presumption of validity. In this
case, it becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And even so, the invalidation produces
no retroactive effect, since it would be unjust to hold that the law did not produce any effect at all prior to its
nullification. From the time the law was promulgated to the time it was declared invalid, people would have entered
into various transactions and relations, expecting and in fact compelled to presume that the law is valid. Thus, to now
hold that the law never produced any effect would penalize those who in faith believed the laws passed by their
representatives to be in accordance with their solemn duty under the Constitution.

Serrano de Agbayani vs. PNB (38 SCRA 429)

[on Effects of Declaration of Nullity]

FACTS: In 1944, plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB. Plaintiff was able to obtain a favorable judgment against defendants
from proceedings with the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to him, the prescriptive period having lapsed.
We find for appellant PNB. Extension of Moratorium Law. Rutter v. Esteban.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property should be sold.

HELD: Yes. The decision on appeal is orthodox, in that an unconstitutional act, one suffering from infirmity, cannot be
the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. It may not however be sufficiently
realistic. What must be considered is that before a law is nullified, it must be effective and binding. It is now accepted as
a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. It would be to deprive the law of
its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. "The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." 4 Clearly, if then it were found
unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual obligations must prevail over the assertion of community
power to remedy an existing evil. From the time the loan matured to the time the extra-judicial proceedings were
started, the time was 6 days short of 15 years. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of
the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008
[on Effects of Declaration of Nullity]

FACTS: Planters Products, Inc and Fertiphil Corp are domestic, private corporations providing fertilizers
and agricultural products such as pesticides. In 1985, President Marcos, through his legislative powers, issued Letter of
Instruction (LOI) 1465. Imposing a levy of P10 per bag of fertilizer until Planters Product, Inc. becomes financially
viable. From 1985 to 1986, Fertiphil has remitted an amount of P6, 689, 144 to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
which is the despository of PPI. FPA voluntarily stopped the collection of after the Edsa Revolution. Fertiphil demanded a
refund, however, PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages, questioning the constitutionality of
LOI 1465. PPI argues in defense that Fertiphil has no locus standi in the case because it has no personal and substaintial
interest nor will it sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. PPI continues by saying that incidence of the levy
fell on the ultimate consumer or farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.

HELD: Petition is denied. Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere
procedural technicality. Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not
disqualify it from attacking the constitutionality of the LOI or seeking

Castro v. Deloria GR. No. 163586, January 27, 2009

[on Effects of Declaration of Nullity]

FACTS: Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with Malversation of public funds. The information
alleged that Castro was a revenue officer of the BIR who misappropriated 556K+ of collections. Castro pleaded NOT
GUILTY on arraignment. On Aug 31, 2001, Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack
of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information since it failed t to
allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against
her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the
Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan.
The RTC denied & held that the (1) jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade, but on the
penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged. It also (2) sustained the prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman since in the cited case the court later overturned their decision in a clarificatory resolution. Finally, it said
that the (3) Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after Castro pleaded not guilty under the
Information.
Castro contends that the prevailing jurisprudence from Aug 9, 1999 til May 20, 2001 was that the Ombudsman had no
prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RT and since the investigation and prosecution against Castro was
conducted by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was applicable,
notwithstanding that the decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution. So, the Information that was filed
against petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the
case.
Castro filed an MR which was denied so filed a petition for certiorari w/ CA also dismissed. Filed 65 with SC.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file the information in light of the ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan"
case, which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
2. W/N the clarificatory Resolution in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Castro, without
violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process.
RULING: YES to BOTH.
In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, similar grounds were raised and the SC held that the Ombudsman has
powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the
regular courts. It held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to
any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable
by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special
Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to such cases.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the
Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.
Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and
employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision
and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
In the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, court held that the March 20, 2001 Resolution, that the Ombudsman
has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the
time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.

THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

CIR v Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23 (1971). A State is a politically organized sovereign community, independent of
outside control, bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, and acting through
government functioning under a regime of law.

A state is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory and
possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants
render habitual obedience. (Prof. Samilo Barlongay quoting Garner, Introduction to Political Law, 41.)

The elements of a state are : territory, people, sovereignty, government.
People refers simply to the inhabitants of the State.
Territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the State.
Government is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated,
expressed and realized.
Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State is
governed.

TERRITORY

The Philippine territory consists of: (1) the Philippine archipelago, and (2) all territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction. Of all the constitutions in the world, probably only the Philippines has a definition of its
territory. At first glance, this is useless since one's territory under International Law is defined not by one's self-serving
claims as to what it covers, but by international treaties and customs. Historically, however, this definition had a valid
purpose.

[(from my Consti Notes) Sir says we have Article I to continue to lay claim on Sabah and to tell the world we are doing
so. We have legitimate claim over Sabah because, as per the research of Diosdado Macapagal, it is rightfully the
Sultanate of Sulus. There was however a misunderstanding, as while we construe the term padjak to mean lease,
Malaysia construes it to mean sale.]

ARTICLE I 1935 Constitution; The National Territory

Section 1. The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded
between the United States and Spain on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the limits
which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at
Washington between the United States and Spain on the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, and the treaty
concluded between the United States and Great Britain on the second day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty, and
all territory over which the present Government of the Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction.

1935 Constitution Delimination of Territory [Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, a
Commentary, 2003 Ed.]
4 Points of Reference:
Treaty of Paris the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the
islands lying within, left doubt as to the inclusion of Batenes, Sibutu, and Cagayan de Sulu
Treaty of Washingtonencompassed Sibutu and Cagayan de Sulu
Treaty between Great Britain and the United Statesconcluded the Washington Treaty,
included Turtle and Mangsee Islands
all territory over which the present Government of the Philippine Islands Exercises Jurisdiction
(1935 Constitution, Art I)
The 1935 Constitution needed to define Philippine territory in order to prevent its dismemberment by the US.
Since, pursuant to the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the draft of the Constitution was to be submitted to the US
President for approval, defining the national territory was a way of making the US acknowledge its extent and
(to) respect its integrity. [Polifile]
ARTICLE I 1973 Constitution; THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

SECTION 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all the other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title, including the territorial
sea, the air space, the subsoil, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and the other submarine areas over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
irrespective of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

The 1973 Constitution needed a definition of national territory in order to lay claim to Sabah. The claim was
originally made by President Macapagal. Sabah was one of the territories belonging to the Philippines by
historic right and legal title. President Marcos, in 1977 on the occasion of an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in
Singapore announced that the Philippines was willing to drop its claims over Sabah; nothing was done, however
to amend the Constitution.
ARTICLE I1987 Constitution; NATIONAL TERRITORY

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part
of the internal waters of the Philippines.
 The 1987 Constitution changed the phraseology into: "all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction." In so changing, the rationale was to remove any irritant to our relations with the
Malaysia brought about by the 1973 formulation but without renouncing the claim at the same time. Anyway, if
the Philippines has the right over Sabah under International Law, it possesses that right with or without a
Constitution, the Constitution being merely a municipal law which does not bind other states.
The 1987 Constitution, therefore, contains a definition of national territory so as not to give an impression that
the Philippines is abandoning its claim over Sabah. Removing such a definition would amount to dropping the
claim altogether, a fact not for the Commissioners to decide.

Method of determining the baselines

1. RA 3046 (17 June 1961)

Determine appropriate points of the outermost Islands of the archipelago, then connect them by means of a straight line
until all islands are surrounded or enclosed by the imaginary straight lines.

"The baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate
points of the outermost islands of the archipelago." (fifth whereas clause.)

2. RA 5446 (8 September 1968).-- Sec. 2 of the Act provides that the definition of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around
the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.

Uses of the baseline:

a. Determine what is internal water (all waters inside the baseline, whether or not more than 12 miles from the
shore).

b. Determine the 200 mile EEZ.

c. Archipelagic Doctrine

The basic concept of an archipelago is that body of water studded with islands, or the islands surrounded with
water, is viewed as a unity of islands and waters together forming one unit. This is in contrast to a continent which is a
single mass of land.

The main purpose of the archipelagic doctrine is to protect the territorial interests of an archipelago. If we
follow the old rule of international law, it is possible that between islands, e.g. Bohol and Siquijor, due to the more than
24 mile distance between the 2 islands, there may be high seas. Thus, foreign vessels may just enter anytime at will,
posing danger to the security of the State. According to the doctrine, even these bodies of water within the baseline,
regardless of breadth, form part of the archipelago and are thus considered as internal waters.

The archipelagic doctrine has a two-fold purpose: (1) economic reasons; (2) national security. (Barlongay.)

The archipelagic doctrine is the principle that it is an integrated unit; everything within it comprises the
archipelago.

The Constitutional provisions embodying this doctrine are :

1. "archipelago, with all the island and waters embraced therein"

 An archipelago is a body of water, studded with islands.

2. "the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of the breadth and
dimensions, form part of internal water"

The following provisions are really superfluous:

1. "terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains"

(because land, water and air space already form part of an archipelago)

2. "territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves, other submarine areas"

"Territorial sea" means water outside the baseline extending up to 12 miles.

"Internal water" refers to water within the baseline.

"Insular shelf" means the land which is submerged under water which may extend beyond 12 miles as long as it
is not more than 300 ft. deep. It is also known as intercontinental shelf. (Barlongay.)

Other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction

PD 1596 (11 June 1978)

Claims the Kalayaan Group of Islands as part of Philippine territory on the basis of historic rights and legal title.

The claim was made "by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established
in accordance with international law. xxx"

Exclusive Economic Zone

PD 1599 (11 June 1978). There is established an exclusive economic zone extending "to a distance of two
hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. Provided, That, where
the outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or neighboring state,
the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the state concerned or in accordance with pertinent
generally recognized principles or international law on delimitation." (Sec. 1 thereof.)

Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to navigations and overflight, the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and
communications. (Sec. 4 thereof.)

Purposes:

1. Sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources, living or non-living,
renewable or non-renewable of the seabed, subsoil, and superadjacent waters. Economic exploitation and
exploration of the resources of the zone such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.

2. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with repect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore
terminals, installations and structures; the preservation of the marine environment, including the prevention
and control of pollution and scientific research.

3. Such other rights as are recognized by international law.

Other states are prohibited from using the zone to:

1. Explore or exploit any resources;

2. Carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations;

3. Conduct any research;

4. Construct or operate any artificial island, off-shore terminal, installation, or other structure;

5. Perform any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction herein
provided.

Other states are allowed to use the zone for:

1. Navigation and overflight;

2. Laying of submarine cable and pipelines;

3. Other lawful uses related to navigation and communication.

In case of overlapping of EEZs, the common boundaries are to be detemined by (i) agreement and (ii) international rules
on delimitations.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (30 April 1982.)

The exclusive economic zone which shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured, is recognized in the UNCLOS, of which the Philippines is a signatory. Its
concept is that although it is not part of the territory, exclusive economic benefit is reserved for the country.

Magallona vs. Ermita (GR No 187167, August 16, 2011)

FACTS: In 1958, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (UNCLOS I) was framed, codifying the right of
the states over the territorial sea, but it did not define the breadth of said territory. The subsequently framed UNCLOS II
in 1960 failed to still fill the void. The Philippine Congress then passed RA 3046 in 1961, which demarcated the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic force. RA 3046 remained in force for five decades, with RA 5446 correcting
typographical errors found in the law, and including the baselines in Sabah.

On February 27, 1984, the Philippines ratified UNCLOS III which prescribed water-land ration, length and contour of
baselines, and set the deadline for the filing of the application for the extended continental shelf. In compliance with
UNCLOS III, Congress passed RA 9522 in 2009, repealing RA 3046, which shortened one baseline, optimized the location
of some base points, and classified adjacent territories, such as the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), and Scarborough Shoal
as regime of islands that would have their own maritime zones.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on the grounds that: (1) it reduced Philippine territory, in violation of
Art. I of the 1987 Constitution that embodies the Treaty of Paris; (2) and it opened landward baselines to maritime
passage, thereby effectively allowing foreign vessels passing to violate pertinent provisions in the Constitution, such as
that provision prohibiting nuclear arms in Philippine territory.

Respondents contended petitioners allegations by stating that petitioners lack locus standi, and questioning the
propriety of the procedural remedies chosen certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have locus standi
2. Whether or not certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies filed in assailing the constitutionality of RA
9522
3. WHETHER OR NOT RA 9522 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

HELD:

1. YES. Petitioners have standing because they have direct and specific interest in the matter.
2. YES. Certiorai and prohibition are proper vehicles in seeking judicial review of a statute.
3. NO.

First, UNCLOS III called for the determination of baselines only, and this does not include the acquisition of territory. This
would mean that the regulation of the usage of waters or maritime zones is necessary. The baseline laws passed by
Congress are statutory mechanisms for the determination of Philippine maritime zones and continental shelf.

Second, RA 9522 increased the Philippines maritime space, contrary to petitioners assertion. The use of the
classification of regime of islands for these territories meant compliance with UNCLOS III, without necessarily
compromising the sovereignty asserted by the country over these territories. Moreover, the country still has sovereignty
over Sabah, by virtue of RA 5446, which was not repealed by RA 9522. If these territories would be included in the
drawing of the baselines, their appreciable distance from the general configuration of the archipelago would distort said
baselines.

Third, the provision in RA 9522 which allows innocent passage of foreign vessels in internal waters prevent superpowers
from taking an interest in the country and exploiting its resources; the absence of such a provision would severely
weaken the countrys claim, should a conflict arise.


The Province of North Cotabato v. The Govt of the Rep. of the Phil. Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (G.R. No. 183591,
Oct. 14, 2008)

FACTS:

1996, GRP-MILF negotiations began

July 18, 1997 GRP-MILF signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities
1999-2000, MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In response, Pres. Estrada declared
all out war against MILF
March 23, 2001, GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks bet. GRP
and MILF
June 20-22, 2001, GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
Aug. 5-7, 2001 Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement
May 7, 2002 Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the
Tripoli Agreement
2005, Draft of MOA-AD was made
July 23, 2008, Province of N. Cotabato and Vice-gov. Pinol filed a petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with
prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
City of Zamboanga filed petition for Mandamus and Prohibition and pray for injustice reliefs. Moreover pray that
the city of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland or the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE), and
that the MOA-AD be declared null and void
Aug. 4, 2008, Court issued TRO directing respondents to cease and desist from signing the MOA-AD
Aug. 5, 2008, Supposed signing of MOA-AD by GRP and MILF did not materialize because of the TRO granted by
the court
Iligan City filed for Injunction and/or declaratory relief and that MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional
 Aug. 15, 2008 Province of Zamboanga del Norte filed petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition and
prayed that MOA-AD be declared null and void
Aug. 19, 2008 Maceda, Binay, and Pimentel filed petition for prohibition, praying for judgment and prohibiting
and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD
Aug. 19, 2008 Respondents move to dismiss cases
ISSUES:

Procedural Issues:

1. WoN petitions are ripe for adjudication

2. WoN the parties petitioning have locus standi
3. WoN the petitions are moot
Substantive Issues:

1. WoN respondents violated the constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultations and the right to
information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD
2. WoN the contents of the MOA-AD violate the constitution and the laws
HELD:

Procedural Issues:

1. Yes. The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the LGU or communities
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under Executive Order No. 3. Moreover
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the constitution.
2. Yes. The court grants the requisite locus standi because the petitions involved constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance.
3. No. The Petitions provide an exception to the moot and academic principle in view of a.) grave violation of the
constitution involved b.) exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest c.) the need to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and d.) the fact that the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
But Prayers for Mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents action in providing the court
and petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.

Substantive Issues:

1. Yes. The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern. Sec. 28 Art. II of the Constitution requires the implementation of
the policy of full public disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Also, Executive Order No. 3
establishes petitioners right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to
information and disclosure.
2. Yes.
a. The associative relationship bet. BJE and the central government (stated several times in the MOA-AD)
or simply the concept of Association is NOT recognized under the present constitution for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence. The act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status for preparation for
independence is not definitely conducive to the national unity stated in Article II sec. 22 of the
Constitution.
b. Sec. 18 Art. X of the constitution provides that the creation of an autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, provided that only
provinces, cities, geographical areas voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be included in the
autonomous region. Under Territory in the MOA-AD state ARMM municipalities to be automatically
included in the BJE. This should not be because they only voted to be part of ARMM not BJE.
c. MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the Article X Sec. 20 of the Constitution since
stated under paragraph 4 of the Strand on Resources in the MOA-AD: BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries which vest upon itself the power
that is reserved only for the president under our constitution.
 d. MOA-AD is inconsistent with the prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054 or the organic
act of the ARMM and the IPRA.
i. Art. X Sec. 3 or the organic act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of the
Bangsamoro people. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles in MOA-AD states birthright of all
Moros and ALL INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF MINDANAO to identify themselves and be accepted as
Bangsamoros. This sharply contrasts with that found in Article X Sec. 3 of the organic Act
because in the said act it clearly distinguishes bet. Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples as
follows.
ii. The IPRA lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains. The MOA-ADs manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people
is a clear departure from that procedure.

PEOPLE

Three meanings of the word "People"

The word "people" is used in at least three senses in the Constitution:

a. "People" as Inhabitants

Art. XIII, Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

Art. II, Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Art. III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, xxx

Qua Chee Gan vs Deportation Board (9 SCRA 27, 1963)

FACTS:

The Court of First Instance denied the petition for writs of habeas corpus, mandamus and certiorari by the petitioners.

On May 12, 1952, Special ProsecutorEmilio L. Galang charged petitioner before theDeportation Board. The crimes:

purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank and remitted it to Hong Kong
attempted bribery of Phil and US officials In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner (E.O.
No 398, series of 1951). Upon fixing of bonds, petitioner was temporarily set free.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the President has authority to deport aliens.

2. Whether or not the Deportation Board also has authority to file warrants of arrest.

HELD:

1. Yes. Section 69 of Act No. 2711 of RAC:No alien can be deported by proxy EXCEPT upon prior investigation,
 conducted by said executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated
2. Yes, but only after investigation has resulted to the actual order of deportation. Arrest would have been necessary
for deportation to take effect. However, in the case at bar, investigations were still ongoing and no order for
deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O. No 398, series of 1951:declared illegal


b. People as Citizens

Preamble. We, the sovereign Filipino people imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve
and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.

Art. II, Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

Art. II, Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all "citizens" may be required to render personal military or
civil service.

Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertinent to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizens subject to limitations provided by law.

c. People as Electors

Art. VII, Sec. 4. The President and Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people

Art. XVI, Sec. 2. The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national anthem, or a national seal,
which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take
effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national referendum.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between Republic of the Philippines and United States
of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when Congress requires, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
party.

Citizenship

Citizenship is a privilege, not a right Sir Yu

Who are citizens

Art. IV, Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

 1) Those who are citizen of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and

4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

These citizens are classifiable into (i) natural-born citizens (covering #'s 1, 2, and 3) and (ii) naturalized citizens (covering
#4).

Natural-born citizens

Art. IV, Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

[The Problem Caused by Poor Draftsmanship of the 1973 Constitution]

The provision granting natural-born status even to those who were born of Filipino mothers before 17 January
1973 but elected Philippine citizenship after that date is meant to correct the anomalous situation where one born
under similar circumstances but made the election before 17 January 1973 is granted the status of natural-born citizen
by the 1973 Constitution. Simply because there was no definition of a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution,
that one who made the election after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution was not conferred such status. The
definition of a natural-born citizen under the 1973 Constitution, therefore made a child of Filipino mother and alien
father's right depends on the fleeting accident of time, and resulted in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the
same members.

At the same time, however, those who elected prior to 17 January 1973 could not be placed in the same footing
as those who made the election after that date, because the former already had a "vested right" to their citizenship
which could not be diminished by the 1973 Constitution.

The remedy is to place the latter in the same footing as the former. Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, this
accidental anomaly no longer exists.

To illustrate: If X was born and elected before 17 January 1973, his status under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions is that of a natural-born citizen, because although he had to perform an act to perfect his citizenship, he
could not otherwise be classified since there was no definition of natural-born citizens in the 1935 Constitution.

If X was born before and elected after 17 January 1973, whether before or after 2 February 1987, he was not a
natural-born citizen under the 1973 Constitution. If not for the proviso in the 1987 Constitution, he would not have
been deemed natural-born citizen either.

In turn the definition of "natural-born citizen" as one who is such from (not at) birth (continuously up to the
time his citizenship is questioned), was raised about the citizenship of Quezon, et. al., under the 1935 Constitution.

Having the status of a natural-born citizen is important for the purpose of certain political and economic rights
open only to such citizens.


a) Political: Qualification to run for the following posts:

Who must be natural born citizens:

(1) President Art. VII, Sec. 2

(2) Vice-President Art. VII, Sec. 3

(3) Members of Congress Art. VI, Secs. 3 and 6

(4) Justices of the SC and lower collegiate courts Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1)

(5) Ombudsman and his deputies Art. XI, Sec. 8

(6) Constitutional Commissions Art. IX, B, Sec. 1 (1)

Art. IX, C, Sec. 1(1)

Art. IX, D, Sec. 1(1)

(7) Members of the Central Monetary Authority Art, XII, Sec. 20

(8) Members of the CHR Art. XIII, Sec. 17(2)

(Commission on Human Rights)

Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative (199 SCRA 692, 1991)

FACTS:
Petitioners and respondent Jose Ong vied for the position of representative of the second district of northern
Samar during the May 1987 elections.
Ong won. However, the petitioners filed election protests against him on the ground that Ong is not a natural
born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) decided in favor of Ong. They declared that Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Yes, Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen.
Background: the father of respondent Ong, Jose Ong Chuan, was born in China in 1905. In 1915, Jose Ong Chuan
was brought to Samar by his father One Te. It is in the Philippines where Jose Ong Chuan grew up and got
married to a natural born Filipina. Respondent was born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan applied for naturalization in
1954. At the time the CFI of Samar declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen in 1955 and subsequently issued
 him a certificate of naturalization, respondent Ong was already a minor of nine years. Respondent Ong spent his
childhood and completed his elementary education in Samar. It is also in Samar where he registered himself as a
voter for the elections of 1984 and 1986.

Interpreting the provisions of Section 1, (paragraph 3) Article IV of the 1987 Constitution:

Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

the Court ruled that such provision applies not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2,
1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. This ruling
finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to
correct an unfair situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the
status of a natural born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien
father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.

Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of
time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members. It is for this
reason that the amendments were enacted, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly and treat equally all
those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the
effectivity of that Constitution.

Regarding the question of whether or not the respondent has elected Philippine citizenship, the respondent
cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as he is already a citizen. To expect the respondent to have
formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only
nine (9) years old. He could not have realized when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution
would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

Further, as HRET observed, Section 15 of the Naturalization Act squarely applied its benefit to him for he was
then a minor residing in this country when his father became a naturalized Filipino. According to the HRET, it
was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for respondent Ong by declaring him as such.

In addition, the same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that
Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen
by both bodies. Assuming that the Courts opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the
Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There
would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.

The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body.
The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a
member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges.
Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to
present. Even assuming that the Court disagrees with their conclusions, their acts cannot be declared as
committed with grave abuse of discretion.

Dissenting Opinion of J. Padilla:
Ong is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his
father at the time of his birth. Under the 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of Ong's birth, only those
whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of
the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino
citizens.

The following are natural-born citizens:

1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution (as of 2 February 1987).

a) Those who are citizens under the Treaty of Paris

Under Art. 9 of the Treaty of Paris, the civil and political status of the inhabitants of the Philippines was to be
determined by the US Congress. Pursuant to this provision in the treaty, the US Congress passed the Philippine Bill of 1
July 1902, Section 4 of which defined who the citizens of the Philippines were:

"The inhabitants of the Philippines residing therein who were subjects of Spain on 11 April 1899, and continuing to
reside therein, as well as their children born subsequent thereto." The cut-off date of 11 April 1899 was the date of
"exchange of instruments of ratification" between the US Senate and Spain, or the date of ratification of the Treaty of
Paris. The peninsulares were given a period of 18 months to indicate if they choose Filipino or Spanish citizenship, by
filing their election with the CFI. This same provision was re-embodied in the Jones Law of 29 August 1916.

b) Those declared citizens by judicial declaration applying the jus soli principle, before the 1957 case of Tio Tiam v
Republic.

In Roa v Commissioner of Customs (1912), during the regime of the Philippine Bill of 1902, Roa, who was born in the
Philippines in 1889 by a Chinese father and Filipino mother, was declared by the court to be a citizen by jus soli.

In Paz Chua v Secretary of Labor (1939), during the regime of the 1935 Constitution, Paz Chua who was born in Tarlac in
1914 of Chinese father and Filipino mother, was not declared a citizen. The SC held, without alluding to the Roa case,
that the jus soli was never adopted in the Philippines.

In Torres v Tan Chim (1940), Tan, who was in the Philippines in 1893 of Chinese father and Filipino mother, was declared
a citizen. According to J. Laurel, the principle of jus soli still applied. The 1934 Concon was aware of the Roa ruling and
did not intend to overrule it.

In Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor and Lam Swee Sang v Secretary of Labor (1947), a case decided during the regime of
the Republic upon a motion for reconsideration of a pre-war decision, Tan, who was born in 1915, and Lam, who was
born in 1900, both in the Philippines, of Chinese father and Filipino mother, were not declared citizens. According to J.
Padilla, the 1935 Constitution never adopted the jus soli principle; the mere fact of birth in the Philippines does not
confer citizenship on a person.
In Talaroc v Uy (1950), considering his service during the war and his having been elected mayor in Misamis, was
declared by the SC a citizen "simply due to birth", without mention of jus soli or jus sanguinis.

Finally, in Tio Tam v Republic (1957), the SC tried to resolve the flip-flop rulings by stating that we follow only jus
sanguinis but that those who were judicially declared citizens on the basis of jus soli prior to this case would be
considered citizens. This is the final word on the matter.

It would be worthy to note that the flip-flop in decision can be explained by the date of birth of the applicant in each
case. Those born before 11 April 1899 were the ones to whom jus soli was applied, for they very well were citizens
under the Treaty of Paris.

c) Those who were naturalized in accordance with law. (Act. No. 2927 of the Philippine Commission).

d) Those who were citizens under the 1935 Constitution.

1) Those who were citizens at the time of adoption of the Constitution (15 November 1935, the date of the
inauguration of the Commonwealth government).

2) Those born in the Philippines of foreign parent, who before the adoption of the Constitution had been elected
to public office in the Philippines.

This is the so-called "Caram rule in honor of Caram, a Syrian, elected to the 1934 Constitutional Convention. The rule
was adopted to avoid the absurdity of the situation. The rule only applies to elective positions, not appointive ones.

In Chiongbian v de Leon, the SC held that if one is considered a citizen under the Caram rule, his children would also be
considered citizens, but under the third category (those whose fathers are citizens)

3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon, reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship.

It was only beginning 17 January 1973 when children of Filipino mothers became citizens without need of
election. Children born before this date of Filipino mother and alien fathers had an "inchoate citizenship" until
they elected upon reaching 21 years.

5) Those naturalized in accordance with law.

e) Those who are citizens under the 1973 Constitution.

1) Those who are citizens as of 17 January 1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. That is, those born on or after 17 January 1973
of Filipino father or Filipino mother.

3) Those who elected Philippine citizenship pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. That is, those born before 17
January 1973 of Filipino mothers but reached the age of majority and elected Philippine citizenship on or after
17 January 1973. Note that if one was born, reached the age of majority and elected Philippine citizenship
before 17 January 1973, then he would be a citizen under e-1 (those who are citizens at the adoption of the
1973 Constitution). On the other hand, if one was born, reached 21 years, but did not or failed to elect before 17
January 1973, then he lost his citizenship then.
 4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

2.) Those born of Filipino fathers or Filipino mothers (after 17 January 1973).

3.) Those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.

This case arose under the 1935 Constitution, children of Filipino mothers did not automatically become citizens. They
had an "inchoate citizenship" during their minority, and became full-pledged citizens only upon election at the age of
majority. Beginning with the 1973 Constitution, however, children of Filipino mothers automatically became citizens.
This provision then covers those children born, before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. By January 17, 1994, this
provision would have no application anymore, since the last of those born before 17 January 1973 would have reached
the age of majority by then.

Case A: A Filipino woman married B, an American in 1961. The marriage made A an American citizen (which under CA
63, stripped her of her Philippine citizenship, the marriage having been celebrated before 17 January 1973). A and B
lived in the US since then and in 1962, begot C, who was automatically an American citizen by jus soli and jus sanguinis.

In 1983, when C turns 21, can he elect Philippine citizenship? Yes, according to obiters in Cu v Republic and
Villahermosa v CID, in order to elect Philippine citizenship, at least for election purposes, it is enough that (1) the
person's mother was a Filipino at the time of her marriage to the alien father, even if she subsequently lose her
citizenship by virtue of the marriage and (2) the person be a child of that marriage, for him to elect Philippine
citizenship. If C wants to run for Congress, is he considered a natural born Filipino? Under the 1973 Constitution, no.
But under the 1987 Constitution, yes. Note that if he were born after 17 January 1973, the child would not even be a
Filipino.

Cu vs Republic

FACTS
P is the son of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother. He was born and raised here in the Philippines.
P applied for naturalization in CFI Rizal. The lower court however denied his application since they allege that he is
already a citizen and need not apply for naturalization.
R assailed the validity of CFI Rizals ruling since they contend that (1) P is not a citizen and (2) he did not meet the
required qualifications for naturalization in this present application.


ISSUES
WoN P already a citizen
WoN P met the required qualifications for naturalization in his present application

HELD
PETITION DENIED. Decision by CFI Rizal SET ASIDE in so far as it declared P a citizen. P is also recommended to file new
naturalization application to remedy the defects of present application.

Is P already a citizen?
o NO. P allege in his testimony that he did not know WoN his Chinese father and Filipino mother may or may not have
been legally married. In the absence of any binding proof, the courts will presume that they did. Thus, the petitioner, by
jus sanguinis, is a Chinese citizen.
o However, Art IV Sec 1 (4) of the 1935 Constitution provides that he can elect to be conferred with Filipino citizenship
once he reaches the point of reckoning at the age of 21 - of which he ultimately failed to do so.

Did P meet the required qualifications for naturalization in his present application?
o NO. Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides that the applicant must produce two (2) credible witnesses
who (1) are Filipino citizens, (2) know the applicant personally and (3) could competently vouch for the applicants
moral and civil character to apply for citizenship.
o In the present case, one of Ps witnesses was NOT a Filipino citizen. Similar to the P, the witness was the son of a
Chinese father and a Filipina mother yet at the point of reckoning he also did not sought to elect for Filipino citizenship.
Given this fact, the affidavit of the witness is voided.

Villahermosa vs CID

FACTS
P is the Filipina mother of Delfin Co (whose father is Chinese). When he was 16, Delfin, without any notice to his
mother, journeyed to China to fulfill his youthful lust for adventure. After two years, however, he decided to return to
the Philippines through illegal entry in Ilocos Norte. He was apprehended by the authorities along with 69 other Chinese
aliens upon arrival.
Having learned of his sons incarceration and recommended deportation, P re-acquired her citizenship in the hopes
that this may exculpate him from deportation. Hence this petition.

ISSUES
WoN Co is a citizen of the Republic

HELD
PETITION DISMISSED.

Is Co a citizen of the Republic?
o NO. Citizenship is determined upon entry in Philippine territory (legal or otherwise) and upon the appraisal of the
proper authorities. When Co illegally entered the Philippines, he was deemed a Chinese citizen because by jus sanguinis,
his father was Chinese.
o Furthermore, while his mother did re-acquire her citizenship by virtue of CA 63 (which was lost during her marriage to
Cos father), the re-acquisition did not extend to Co since Co was never a Filipino citizen to begin with and could not
reacquire such citizenship.
o However, by Ps reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship, Co is now entitled to the provisions of Art IV Sec 1 (4) of the
1935 Constitution. Albeit, he could not avail to elect for Filipino citizenship at this time since he is still a minor and has
yet to reach his point of reckoning.

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Territorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State to have all persons and things within its territorial limits to be
completely subject to its control and protection.

Art. 14 Civil Code-- Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international la and to treaty stipulations.

>Penal laws are obligatory to even non Filipino citizens (Obligatory Force of Penal Laws)
>1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations exempts diplomatic agents/give them immunity
> e.g. immunity via treaty -- Phil-US Military Bases Agreement

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Personal jurisdiction is the authority of the state over its nationals, their persons, property, and acts, whether within or
outside its territory. The Civil Code provision that prohibitory and mandatory laws follow citizens wherever they go is an
example.

Civil Code Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

CC Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (10a)

CC Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)

EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the authority of the State over persons, things or acts, outside its territorial limits by reason
of their effects to its territory. Art. 2 of the RPC is a classic example of this.

By agreement w/ other states, a state may establish its legal institutions outside its territorial limits. Thus if a
state does not have sufficient confidence in the administration of justice and the system of law obtaining in a particular
country, it may enter into a treaty for the establishment of its own courts in the latter country where its citizens or
nationals may be tried.

Regardless of treaty or agreement, however, a state has full authority to adopt rules intended to apply to
persons, whether citizens or aliens, and things found in the territory of other states or on the high seas under certain
conditions. Of course, the actual enforcement of rules intended to have extraterritorial effect may be accomplished
only when the persons concerned are found w/in the territorial jurisdiction of the state. To enforce them in the
territorial limits of another state would be to violate the sovereignty of the latter, unless this state gives its consent
thereto. Thus, we have Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code:

RPC Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the
provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior
waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by
the Government of the Philippine Islands;

3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the presiding number;

4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of
this Code.

SUABILITY OF THE STATE

1987 Constitution Art. XVI, Sec. 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

The doctrine is also available to foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local
State. The added basis in this case is the principle of the sovereign equality of States, under w/c one State cannot assert
jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. To do so would "unduly vex the
peace of nations." (Cruz.)

Exceptions to the Nonsuability Rule:

(1) where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply w/ his statutory duty to release the
amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant

Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Adm (PVA), 51 SCRA 340 (1973)

FACTS & ISSUES: Del Mar averred that he served during WW II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command (a
duly recognized guerrilla org.) w/ the rank of major; that he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the
service on 10/20/46 on a cert. of permanent total physical disability; that upon proper claim presented and after hearing
and adjudication, the Phil. Veterans Bd granted him a monthly life pension of P50 effective 1/28/47; that in 3/50, the
said Bd. discontinued payment of monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of similar pension from the US
Govt, thru the US Veterans Admin. by reason of military service rendered in the US in the Far East during the war,
precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Phil. Govt; that he wrote the said Bd. twice,
demanding the continued payment of his monthly pension but his demands went unheeded. And petition for
mandamus was filed w/ CFI-Cebu w/c rendered judgment upholding Del Mar's claim.

The PVA argues that the court a quo was w/o jurisdiction to try the civil case bec. it involves a money claim against PVA-
a mere agency of the Govt performing governmental functions w/ no juridical personality of its own- and, in reality,
partakes of an action against the Phil. Govt w/c is immune from suit w/o its consent.

HELD: As a general proposition, the rule on the immunity of the Govt from suit w/o its consent holds true in all actions
resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of prop.
Needless to say, in such actions, w/c, in effect, constitute suits against the Govt, the court has no option but to dismiss
them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant institutes an action
against a functionary who fails to comply w/ his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds
already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. As clearly discernible from the circumstances, the
case at bar falls under the exception.

(2) where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen

Shauf v CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990)

FACTS: By reason of her non-selection to a position at Clark Air Base, Shauf filed an equal opportunity complaint against
officers of Clark Air Base, for alleged discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex. She then
filed a complaint for damages with the RTC. Respondents filed a MTD on the ground that as officers of the US Armed
Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them, they are immune from suit.

Shauf contends that the officers are being sued in their private capacity for discriminatory acts performed
beyond their authority, hence the instant action is not a suit against the US Govt. which would require its consent.
According to respondents, the complaint is barred by the immunity of the US since the acts sued upon are governmental
activities of the US.

HELD:

1. The general rule is that a state may not be sued without its consent. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself, although it has
not been formally impleaded.

2. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
govt. officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.

3. The cloak of immunity is removed from the moment the public official is sued in his individual capacity such as where
he acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official may be liable in his personal capacity
for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction. In this case, the officers are liable for damages.

(3) public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for
damages

Republic v Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124 (1993)

FACTS: The heirs of the 12 rallyists who perished during the Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages. Such action
was filed against the government. This was by virtue of a recommendation made by the Citizen's Mendiola Commission
(created for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place during the
Mendiola incident.) that the heirs and wounded victims of the incident be compensated by the Govt. Notwithstanding
such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by the victims. The Caylo Group (the group of
marchers in the said incident) filed a formal letter of demand from the govt. Still unheeded for almost a year, the group
filed an action against the govt, together w/ the military officers and personnel involved in the incident before the trial
court. Resp. Judge dismissed the complaint as against the RP on the ground that there was no waiver by the State.

HELD:

1. The principle of immunity from suit is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on
reasons of public policy -- that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority
could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions
of the means required for the proper administration of the government.

2. This is not a suit against the State with its consent. Firstly, the recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission
regarding indemnification of the heirs and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that
liability automatically attaches to the State. The Commission was merely a fact-finding body and its recommendation
was not final and executory. Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that President Aquino may have done or said, the
same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. Although consent to be sued may be given
impliedly, such consent was not given in this case.

3. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:

(1) when the Republic is sued by name;

(2) when the suit is against an unincorporated govt. agency;

(3) when the suit is on its face against a govt. officer but the case is such that the ultimate liability will belong not
to the officer but to the govt.

In this case, while the Republic is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the govt. Although the
military officers were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official
the moment they exceeded their authority. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-
accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.

The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires
no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation w/c belongs to the
State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by
virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.

They are therefore liable for damages.

(4) When the Government Gives its Consent

How consent is given--The consent to be sued, in order to be effective, must come from the State, acting through a duly
enacted statute. Waiver of state immunity can only be made by an act of legislative body.


Express consent:

(1) Money claims arising from contracts, express or implied.

Act No. 3083. An Act Defining the Conditions under which the Government of the Philippines may be Sued.

Sec. 1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippines hereby consents and submits to
be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action between private parties.

Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has presented his
claim to the Commission on Audit and that the latter did not decide the same within two months from the date of its
presentation.

Sec. 3. Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted in the Regional
Trial Court of the City of Manila or of the province where the claimant resides, at the option of the latter, upon which
court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions.

Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original and
appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.

Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippines is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original
jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action
between private parties.

Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippines pursuant to the authority granted
in this Act shall be served upon the Solicitor-General whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense, either himself
or through delegates.

Sec. 7. No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the Government of the
Philippines under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in which judgment
is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the President of the Philippines, within five days after the same
becomes final.

Sec. 8. The President of the Philippines, at the commencement of each regular session of the Legislature, shall
transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received by him, and if said body determine that payment
should be made, it shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay, including the same in
the appropriations for the ensuing year.

Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 16, 1923.

Com. Act 327. An Act Fixing the Time within which the Auditor General shall Render His Decisions and Prescribing the
Manner of Appeal Therefrom.

Sec. 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers, the
Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their
presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the
period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him.
With respect to the accounts of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act on the same within one hundred days
after their submission, Sundays and holidays excepted.

In case of accounts or claims already submitted to but still pending decision by the Auditor General on or before
the approval of this Act, the periods provided in this section shall commence from the date of such approval.

Sec. 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim
may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing:

(a) xxx

(b) To the President of the Philippines, or

(c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines, if the appellant is a private person or entity.

If there are more than one appellant, all appeals shall be taken to the same authority resorted to by the first
appellant.

From a decision adversely affecting the interests of the Government, the appeal may be taken by the proper
head of the department or in case of local governments by the head of the office or branch of the Government
immediately concerned.

The appeal shall specifically set forth the particular action of the Auditor General to which exception is taken
with the reasons and authorities relied on for reversing such decision.

Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 18, 1938.

Sec. 2 of CA 327 has been amended by Sec. 50 of PD 1445 and by Sec. 35, Chapter 5, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V,
Administrative Code of the Philippines, as follows:

Sec. 50. Appeal from decisions of the Commission.-- The party aggrieved by any decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission may within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the
manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling adversely affects the interests of
any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. (PD 1445.)

Sec. 35. Appeal from Decision of the Commission.-- Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof in the
manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order or ruling adversely affects the interest of any
government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. (Subtitle B, Title I, Book V,
Administrative Code of the Philippines.)

Republic vs Purisima
Facts:

September 7, 1972: Defendant Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) filed motion to dismiss in a pending civil suit in the
sala of respondent Judge Purisima for the collection of money claims arising from an alleged breach of contract with
plaintiff, Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. (It was agreed upon that in an event of breach, action may be filed to the Court)

Purima denied motion to dismiss because he relied on stipulation of the contract of the parties. Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc v Customs Arraste Service was applied. (Lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim
against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent is shown)

Now: On behalf of RP, Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza issued this certiorari and prohibition for failure of Judge
Amante P. Purisima of CFI Manila to apply the doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies,
from suit without consent.

Issue: Can RCA be sued?

Held: No. The RCA is part of the government under Office of the President, and cannot be sued without consent of the
State. For consent to be effective, it must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute. Whatever counsel
for defendant RCA agreed to has no binding force on the government. Clearly beyond scope of authority.

Petition for certiorari is granted; motion to dismiss filed by RCA is nullified and set aside; petitioner for prohibition is
granted restraining respondent Judge from acting on Civil Case 79082 pending in his sala except for purpose of ordering
its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. TRO issued by Court on February 8, 1973 is made permanent terminating this case.
Cost against Yellow Ball Freight Lines.

Sayson vs Singson

FACTS: On May 5, 1967, in a public bidding conducted by the Bureau of Public Highways on May 5, 1967, the committee
on award accepted the bid of Singkier Motor Service, owned by respondent Singson, for various requisitioned items or
spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. The bid was at P43,530. The bid was approved by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. A purchase order addressed to Singkier Motor Service was signed by
the District Engineer, petitioner Adventor Fernandez, by the Requisitioning Officer, petitioner Manuel S. Lepatan, and by
the Procurement Officer. Highway Auditor Sayson approved the voucher for initial payment of P34,824 with the
retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706 after indorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of Public
Highways, as well as the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communication himself that the prices of the
spare parts are just and reasonable. Sayson withheld 20% of the payment to submit the voucher to the Supervising
Auditor, petitioner Cornelio Fornier, which he did. On June 10, 1967, Sayson received a telegram from the Supervising
Auditor saying that the prices for the spare parts and equipment were excessive. A canvass was made and it was found
out that the spare parts are valued at only P2,529.64. Mandamus was granted to Singson, who was adjudged as entitled
to collect the balance of P8,706. The contract was upheld by the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to collect his money claim from the government.

HELD: No. The suit disguised as mandamus is actually a suit against the State, which cannot prosper without its consent.
Even assuming the validity of his money claim, mandamus cannot be the remedy to enforce a money claim, but rather
the performance of an action. Respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office. Also, the claim is
void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals, and public policy. According to CA327, the Auditor General
is the first to decide cases involving the settlement of accounts, and only thereafter can an appeal procedure with the
courts be done. Although it is true that once consent is secured an action may be filed, there is nothing to prevent the
State in such a statutory grant to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted (i.e. the
respondent has not exhausted all administrative means possible, not to mention the lack of jurisdiction of the lower
court on the matter). There was no ruling yet of the Auditor General here.

Implied consent:

(1) When the government enters into business contracts

When the government is in the performance of governmental function (jure imperii), even if it enters into a
contract with private persons, it cannot be sued without its consent.

Thus in United States v Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985). a contract for the repair of wharves and piers at the naval
base in Subic was held to be in line with the governmental function of the US Government and so the immunity existed.

But when the government enters into commercial contracts and descends to the status of ordinary persons (jure
gestioni), it can be sued like any other person.

In Malong v PNR, 138 SCRA 63 (1985), it was held that when the state organized the Philippine National Railway,
it divested itself of its sovereign capacity, and so became liable for damages that arose from the death of one who fell
from an overloaded train.

United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985)

State Immunity from Suits Extends to contracts Relating to Sovereign Functions.

FACTS: In 5/72, the US advertised for bid projects involving the repair of wharves and certain works on the shorelines at
its naval base in Subic, Zambales. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. (EG & Co.) submitted proposals in connection w/ w/c it
received 2 telegrams from the US govt asking it to confirm its price proposals and the name of its bonding co. However,
in 6/82, EG & Co. was informed that its proposals had been rejected and the projects had been awarded to 3rd parties.
EG & Co. brought suit in the CFI to compel the US govt to allow it to perform the work on the projects. It also asked for a
writ of prel. inj. to restrain the US govt from entering into contract w/ 3rd parties for work on the projects. The US govt
moved to dismiss the complaint, but its motion was denied. Hence the petition for review.

HELD: It has been necessary to distinguish bet. sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis.) The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. However,
the resp. Judge held that by entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shorelines the State did not act in its
governmental capacity.

A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. The rule does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base w/c is devoted to the defense of both the US and
the Phils., indisputably a function of the govt of the highest order; they are not utilized for, nor dedicated to, commercial
or business purpose.

Scope of consent

(1) Under Act No.3083

Sec. 1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippines hereby consents and submits to
be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action between private parties.

When a money judgment is given against the government, the ordinary rule for execution would not apply, for the
consent of the government to be sued is only up to the point of judgment. If it does not pay, it cannot be compelled to
pay by attachment or otherwise (how does one attach the Quezon bridge?)

The procedure is for one to furnish the Office of the President with the decision so it could include the amount in the
budget for the next year as the basis for appropriation (since there can be no disbursement of public funds except in
pursuance of law).

If the judge nonetheless issues a writ of execution against government funds or property, no ordinary civil action can be
filed against the judge, unless there is a showing of malice. But, a reinstatement of the funds to government accounts
and refund by the private party can be ordered. (Commissioner of Public Highways v San Diego, 31 SCRA 616 (1970),
reiterating the case of Alsua v Johnson.)

(2) Under a charter

When consent to be sued is provided by the charter, the consent does not stop with the rendition, but goes up
to the satisfaction of the judgment.

In PNB v CIR, 81 SCRA 314 (1978), the SC held that since the PHHC had the capacity to be sued, any judgment
against it could be enforced by a writ of execution, and its funds could even be garnished.

PNB v CIR, 81 SCRA 314 (1978), supra.

Measure of recovery

When property has been unlawfully taken by the government so that it is now compelled to make payment, the
measure of recovery is the fair market value of the property at the time of taking (Ministerio v CFI, 40 SCRA 464).

The value of the peso in relation to the dollar at the time of taking cannot be considered. For Art 1250 of the Civil Code
concerning supervening inflation has no application in eminent domain cases, being applicable only to contractual
obligations [Commissioner of Public Highways v Burgos, 96 SCRA 831 (1980)]. Ultimately, the face value of the peso
then is the amount to be paid now.

(5) Quasi-Delicts commited by Special Agents

CC Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage has been caused
by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.

CC Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (ibid.)

> Art. 2180 of the Civil Code allows a suit against the government for quasi-delicts committed by the government when
acting through special agents (those performing non-regular functions)
>But if the tortious act was committed by a regular employee, the injured party could only bring a suit for damages
against the employee in his personal capacity.

Merritt v Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil 311

FACTS: Plaintiff was a contractor. One day, he rode his motorcycle down Calle Padre Faura when he was hit by an
ambulance of PGH. The ambulance turned unexpectedly and suddenly to the right side of Taft Avenue, long before
reaching the center of the street, by movement of which plaintiff was struck. Negligence of the ambulance driver was
proven. Plaintiff was severly injured (skull, brain, broken leg). After the operation, numerous complications were
observed (weakened visual and mental faculties). Plaintiff was confined for almost 3 months and recovered at home for
another 6 months. Because of the accident, he could not work, and his partnership with an engineer was dissolved by
reason of the accident. He gave up a construction contract. Act No. 2457 was passed, authorizing plaintiff to bring a suit
against the Government of the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff may bring a suit against the government.

HELD: No. The State is not liable for damages when its agents are not performing their official functions. Negligence on
the part of the ambulance driver is not part of his official function. In enacting the law, State is simply giving consent to
waive its immunity from suit. By consenting to be sued, the state simply waives its immunity, but does not concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Act2457 only provides a judicial tribunal where well recognized
existing liabilities can be adjudicated. It does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not
previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts
of its officers, agents, and employees. The state is not responsible for damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees during office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents.

(6) GOCCs (government-owned or controlled corporations)

When the government creates a corporation, it invariably provides this corporation a separate entity and with the
capacity to sue and be sued. If the government entity is given the capacity to be sued, the suit encompasses any kind of
action, including one from tort.

SSS V. CA, 120 SCRA 707 (1983)

FACTS: In March 1963, respondent spouses were granted a real estate loan by SSS with their lot in Rizal as collateral. The
spouses constructed their house on the mortgaged property. Payments were delayed, and eventually in 1968, SSS filed
for the foreclosure of the mortgage on the ground that the conditions were broken. After the publication of the first
notice. Respondent spouses wrote SSS to withdraw the foreclosure, saying they were up-to-date in the payment
scheme. Respondents then filed for damages on the basis that they were not in default and they religiously paid their
amortizations. The lower court and CA ruled for respondent spouses.

ISSUE: Whether or not SSS is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It can sue and be sued in Court. This gives the private-
citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights SSS thereby has been required to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. SSS in a way earns profit from interests in
contractual loan agreements. SSS own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. The words
"sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. 15 So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims,
enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the
aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it
does not thereby concede its liability. That statutoy law has given to the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement
and protection of his rights.It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in
it and has snowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. Even conceding that the SSS is not, in the main,
operated for profit, it cannot be denied that, in so far as contractual loan agreements with private parties are
concerned, the SSS enters into them for profit considering that the borrowers pay interest, which is money paid for the
use of money, plus other charges.

German Agency for Techincal Cooperation (GTZ) v. CA (G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009)

FACTS: On 7 September, 1971, the governments of Germany and the Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning
technical cooperation, meaning both governments affirmed common interest in promoting the technical and economic
development of their States, recognizing the benefits derived by each. In 10 December, 1999, the agreement was
extended, and a project called Social Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment (SHINE) was jointly promoted to
enable Philippine families to secure health care. Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ
to work for SHINE on various dates between December 1998 to September 1999, as project officers/assistants, liason
personnel, information systems manager, etc. In September 1999, Anne Nicolay assumed the post of SHINE Project
Manager, and disagreements eventually arose between her private respondents. So in 8 June 2000, private respondents
wrote a letter to Nicolay (with copies furnished to officials of DOH, Philhealth, and the Manila director of GTZ) raising
their unresolved issues. Nicolay allegedly refused to support local partners and new initiatives. Then private respondents
received a letter dated 11 July 2000, informing them of the pre-termination of their contracts of employment due to
serious and gross insubordination, among others, resulting to loss of confidence and trust. On 21 August 2000, private
respondents filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. on 15 October, 2001, the Labor Arbiter granted the
complaint for illegal dismissal. CA ruled for private respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the GTZ is immune from suit.

HELD: If the foreign state acts in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. GTZ was not performing proprietary functions notwithstanding
its entry into the particular employment contracts. The doctrine of State Immunity is available to foreign States insofar
as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State,[34] necessary as it is to avoid unduly vexing the peace of
nations. The present suit was brought against GTZ (the implementing agency of the German government), not the
German government. When a suit is filed against a governmental agency, it is important to know if the agency is
incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate juridical
personality. Unincorporated agencies have no personality and are merged in the general machinery of the government.
If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter
says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing. GTZ has not supplied any evidence defining its legal
nature beyond that of the bare descriptive implementing agency. Its own website elicits that petitioner is federally
owned, a federal enterprise, and founded in 1975 as a company under private law. The apparent equivalent of GTZ
under Philippine law is a GOCC without original charter, and via the Corporation Code, they can be sued in the corporate
name. GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the
Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued. When a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign
or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the
court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. The
Labor Arbiter ruled that it was imperative for GTZ to secure from DFA a certification of diplomatic status and
entitlement of diplomatic privileges including immunity from suits, which it did not obtain. Had there been such
certification, GTZ would have established evidence to their favor. One, ascertaining immunity from suit, focuses on the
particular functions exercised by the party and determines whether these are proprietary or sovereign in nature. The
nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most important barometer for testing
whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply.

COUNTERCLAIM

If the Govt. files a complaint, defendant may file a counterclaim against it

Froilan vs Oriental Pan Shipping, 12 SCRA 276, GR L-6060 (Sept. 30, 1950)

FACTS: Froilan purchased from Shipping Commission a vessel for P200,000 paying P50 T downpayment. A CM was
executed to secure the payment of the balance. For various reasons including non-payment of installments, the
Commission took possession of the vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Commission chartered and
delivered said vessel to Pan Oriental. Froilan appealed from the action of the Commission and he was restored to all the
rights under the original contract. However, Pan Oriental retained the possession of the vessel. Froilan filed a complaint
to recover possession of the vessel. A writ of replevin was issued. The Govt intervened alleging that Froilan failed to pay
the balance to the Commission; that the intervenor was entitled to the possession of said vessel under the terms of the
original contract or in order for it to effect the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Pan Oriental answered the
complaint in intervention praying that if RP succeeded in obtaining the possession of the vessel, to comply w/ its
obligation of delivering it to Pan Oriental pursuant to their contract of bareboat charter w/ option to purchase.
Complaint in intervention was dismissed upon Froilan's payment of his account to the RP. RP filed a motion to dismiss
the counterclaim w/c Pan Oriental had filed against it in view of the court's order dismissing the complaint in
intervention. Counterclaim of Pan O. against RP was dismissed. Hence, this appeal. RP raised, among others, as ground
for the dismissal of Pan O's counterclaim, the State's immunity from suit.

HELD: By filing its complaint in intervention, the govt in effect waived its right of non-suability. Stated otherwise, by
taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the State surrendered its privileged position and came down to
the level of the def. The latter automatically acquires, w/in certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other
defenses he might have against the State.

GOVERNMENT

Government is that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those
rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state or which are imposed upon the people forming
that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of
authorities which rule a society. (US v Dorr, 2 Phil 332, 339).

U.S. vs. Dorr (2 Phil 332)

FACTS: The defendants were convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and
circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands. The complaint is based upon Sec. 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission which punishes any person who shall
"utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the U.S. Government or the
Insular Government of the Phil. Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or
which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the unlawful authorities x x x".

The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom". The article mentioned about the
"foolish work that the Civil Commission is doing all over the Islands" referring to the appointment by the latter of
natives which were referred to as "insurgents" and "rogues" to important Government positions.

ISSUE: Whether the publication constitutes an offense under Sec. 8 of ACT. No. 292

HELD: NO. The term "government" as employed in ACT No. 292 of the U.S. Philippine Commission is used in the
abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from the concrete organism of the Government. The
article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the U.S., and it is quite apparent that, though
grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack
upon the governmental system by which the authority of the U.S. is enforced in these islands. The form of Government
by a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are instructed with the
administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute.

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

FACTS:

- The shares (31% to 50%) of Manila Hotel Corporation were sold by GSIS through public bidding.

- There were two bidders Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (Filipino firm) and Renong Berhad (Malaysian firm)

- Renong Berhad bade higher than Manila Prince Hotel Corporation.

- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the highest bidder, MPHC sent a managers check amounting to the same
bid by RB

- GSIS refused to accept offer.

- Petitioner prayed for writ of mandamus and prohibition. Lower court issued a restraining order preventing GSIS and
Renong Berhad from consummating the sale.

- Invoked by petitioners: Section 10 of Article XII. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress
may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. (Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.)

- The answer of the respondents are the following:

1. Section 10 of Article 12 is not self-executing. For the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay
down conditions under which business may be done.

2. Granting the provision is self-executing, the Manila Hotel Corporation is not part of national patrimony. The mandate
of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate
and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

3. The Constitutional provision cannot be invoked because what is sold is only 51% of the total shares of the corporation,
not the building or the land where it is built.

4. Submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the
block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken
place.

5. Submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the
block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken
place.

ISSUES: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing, and Whether
the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

HELD: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to
be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The
rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is
not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon
the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second
paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic
rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made
between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and
to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements
and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.

The govt performs two kinds of functions, to wit, the constituent and the ministrant.

Constituent functions constitute the very bonds of society and are therefore compulsory. Ministrant functions are
those undertaken to advance the general interests of society, such as public works, public charity, and regulation of
trade and industry. These functions are merely optional
Parens Patriae

One of the important tasks of the govt is to act for the State as parens patriae, or guardian of the rights of the people.
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal
person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible
monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties (Cruz)

De Jure & De Facto Governments

A de jure govt has rightful title but no power or control, either bec. this has been withdrawn from it or bec. it has not yet
actually entered into the exercise thereof. A de facto govt, on the other hand, is a govt of fact, that is, it actually
exercises power or control but w/o legal title.

The three kinds of de facto govt are as follows:

(1) The govt that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful
legal govt and maintans itself against the will of the latter.

(2) That established as an independent govt by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the
parent state.

(3) That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the
enemey in the course of war, and w/c is denominated as a govt of paramount force, like the Second Republic of the
Phils. established by the Japanese belligerent.

The characteristics of this kind of de facto govt are:

(a) Its existence is maintained by active military power w/in the territories, and against the rightful authority of
an established and lawful govt.

(b) During its existence, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not
warranted by the laws of the rightful govt.

Adherence to International Law

1987 Consti; Art 2; Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Tanada vs Angara

FACTS: Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate
of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They
argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to)
promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended
that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our
Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in
favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does
not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic
seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.

The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law
of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as
regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result,
the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a
mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.

Supremacy of Civilian Authority

1987 Consti; Art 2; Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity
of the national territory.

1987 Consti; Art 7; Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote
of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Gudani vs Senga

FACTS: On September 22, 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public
hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled on September 28, 2005. The hearing
was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly
allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation
between President Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.
Gen. Francisco Gudani and Col. Alexander Balutan, who were designated as commander and member, respectively, of
the Joint Task Force Ranao by the AFP Southern Command in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur,
tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections, received invitations to attend the said
Senate hearing.

In the evening of September 27, a message was transmitted from the office of AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Generoso Senga,
stating that: per instruction of her excellency PGMA, no AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional or Senate
hearing without her approval. Inform BGen Francisco F Gudani AFP and LTC Alexander Balutan PA (GSC) accordingly. On
the day of the hearing, President Arroyo issued Executive Order 464 (E.O. 464) which enjoined officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. Despite
E.O. 464 and despite the order from Gen. Senga, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan appeared and testified during the Senate
hearing. The Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG) recommended that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan be
charged with violation of Article of War 65, for willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Article of War 97, for
conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline. The day after Gen Gudani and Col. Balutan were required
to appear before the OPMG,Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from service. Thereafter, Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and injunction, claiming that E.O. 464 is unconstitutional and seeking that the
charges against them be quashed. Furthermore, it is stressed that Gen. Gudani was no longer subject to military
jurisdiction on account of his compulsory retirement.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the violation of directive of the President could lead to any investigation for court-martial of Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan; and

2.) Whether or not the court martial has jurisdiction over Gen. Gudani in view of his compulsory retirement

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED.

AFP personnel of whatever rank are liable under military law for violating a direct order of an officer superior in rank.
A most dangerous general proposition is foisted on the Court that soldiers who defy orders of their superior officers
are exempt from the strictures of military law and discipline if such defiance is predicated on an act otherwise valid
under civilian law. Obedience and deference to the military chain of command and the President as commander-in-chief
are the cornerstones of a professional military in the firm cusp of civilian control. These values of obedience and
deference expected of military officers are content-neutral, beyond the sway of the officers own sense of what is
prudent and ash, or more elementally, of right or wrong. A self-righteous military invites itself as the scoundrels activist
solution to the ills of participatory democracy.

The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress
pertains to the commander-in-chief powers of the President. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and
supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as
commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being
clearly civil in nature.

The commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and
actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel,
movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. By tradition
and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of
restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. Any chamber of Congress which seeks
the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under the law
to compel such attendance. Any military officer whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so
by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, the attendance or
nonattendance in legislative inquiries.

The court martial has jurisdiction over Gen. Gudani since proceedings were initiated against him before his compulsory
retirement.

The Court has already declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered
to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before
the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is
terminated. Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and
the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired.

Senate vs Ermita

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution,
and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the
executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the
Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which
requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress.

ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

HELD: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine
of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information
without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of
invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Separation of Church and State

Art. II, Sec. 6. The separation of the Church and State shall be inviolable.

Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2(5) xxx Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered (as a political party, organization, or
coalition by the COMELEC).

Art. VI, Sec. 5(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to the party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Exceptions:

Art. VI, Sec. 28(3). Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable,
or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

Sec. 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.

Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3). At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught
to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated
or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to
the Government.

Sec. 4(2). Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be
owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational
institutions.

>The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines.
>No educational institutions shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise more than
1/3 of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools established for foreign
diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary
residents.

Everson vs Board of Education

FACTS: The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed suit challenging the ability of the Respondent to reimburse funds to
parents of parochial school students for the transportation of their children to and from school. The Petitioner brought
suit alleging that the New Jersey reimbursement statute respects the establishment of religion, by allowing the parents
of parochial school students to benefit from the reimbursement scheme. The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the
statute did not violate the Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari
to consider the issue.

ISSUE: This case considers whether the parents of parochial school children can benefit from the same services afforded
to the parents of public school children.

HELD: Affirmed. In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found the statute was not
unconstitutional because it was designed to provide a benefit to the parents of all school children, distinct from any
religious function in which the children engaged.