SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS:
1. Gayon vs. Gayon, GR # L-28394, 11-26-1970ANARNA
Gayon vs. Gayon 36 SCRA 104, November 26, 1970
PEDRO G AYON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE
GAYON, defendants-appellees.
GR # L-28394, November 26, 1970
36 SCRA 104
DOCTRINE: Family Relations Effects of family relationship on legal disputes
CONCEPCION, J:
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by Plaintiff Pedro Gayon, from an order of the Court
of first Instance of Iloilo dismissing his complaint in Civil Case.
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint the
spouses Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, October 1, 1952
said spouses executed a deed. They sold to Pedro Galera, for the sum of P500.00, a
parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan,
municipality of Guimbal, provice of Iloilo including the improvements thereon, subject
to redemption within 5 years or not later than 1957. That said right of redemption had
not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or
successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his
wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of deed of sale Dated March 21, 1961, sold the
aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00 that plaintiff had
since 1961, introduced thereon improvements and that he had fully paid taxes on said
property up to 1967. NCC 1606 and 1616 require a judicial decree for the
consolidation of title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and
accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plaintiffs favour for the consolidation of
ownership in and to the aforementioned property. Genoveva said her husband died on
January 6, 1954, long before the institution of the case, that the deed where they sold
property to Gelera was fake, her signature forged, and they never executed such
document, and that complaint is malicious and embarrassed her children, for they
had to employ counsel. And that being brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon,
plaintiff did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case, before filing his
complaint. She prayed, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to
pay for damages. On September 19, 1967, case dismissed, for Silvestre was dead.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to
the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the
administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the
decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the
deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this
decision, with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de
Gayon. It is so ordered.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the case at bar would fall under the provision of Art. 217 of
family code?
2. Whether or not the dismissal was valid?
HELD:
1. YES. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035. It is
noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits filed or
maintained between members of the same family. This phrase members of the same
family should, however be contrasted in the light of Art. 217 of the same code.
2. No. The wife has something to do with the property being widow, she is a
compulsory heir, interested and her motion was necessary so that other successors in
interest instead of deceased could be made parties to the case. If heirs are included as
defendants, they cannot be sued as representatives of the decedent, but rather as
owners, an aliquot interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of
their interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it from the decent.
Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is
no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Concerning FC151 (compromise efforts) applies to suits filed or maintained between
members of the same family. This phrase, members of the same family should
however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same code,pursuant to which, 1)
Between husband and wife; 2) Between parent and child;3) Among other ascendants
and their descendants;4) Among brothers and sisters. Genoveva is plaintiffs sister-in-
law, not part of enumeration, so failure to seek compromise before filing of complaint
does not bar. Remanded to lower court of administrator as defendant, or heirs if in
absence.
Referential Syllabus:
Civil Law; Succession; Acquisition of Ownership; Legitime; Widow's Interest.- As a
widow, she is one of her deceased husband's compulsory heirs [Art. 887(3), Civil Code]
and has, accordingly, an interest in the property in question.
Civil Law; Succession; Suit against heirs.- Inasmuch as succession takes place by
operation of law, "from the moment of the death of the decedent" (Arts. 774 and 777,
Civil Code) and "the inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death," (Art. 776, Civil Code) it follows that if
his heirs were included as defendants, they would be sued, not as "representatives" of
the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in the property in question, even if
the precise extent of their interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it
from the decedent. Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of
heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the decedent.
Civil Law; Succession; Family Relations; Suit between members of the same family,
defined.-It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from the provision of Art. 222 of
the Civil Code applies to suits "filed or maintained between members of the same
family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be construed in
the light of Article 217 of the same Code.
Civil Law; Succession; Family Relations; Suit against sister-in-law, nephews and
nieces.- Inasmuch as a sister-in-law, nephew or niece is not included in the
enumeration contained in Article 217, Civil Code, which should be construed strictly,
it being an exception to the general rule, it follows that the same does not come within
the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the
complaint does not bar the same
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
2. National Housing Authority vs. Almeida, GR # 162784, 06-22-2007
BELEN
National Housing Authority vs. Almeida 525 SCRA 383, June 22, 2007
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF
APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.
GR # 162784, June 22, 2007
525 SCRA 383
PUNO, J:
FACTS:
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to
Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San
Pedro, Laguna. NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.Margarita Herrera passed away on
October 27, 1971.
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late
Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self Adjudication claiming that she is the only
remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed
to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. NHA as the successor
agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.3
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late
Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self Adjudication claiming that she is the only
remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed
to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The surviving heirs of
Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication
before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna.
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication,
Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots
submitting therewith a copy of the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by her mother.
Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz HerreraMercado, protested the
application.
The NHA granted the application made by Francisca on the basis the
Salaysay which the NHA said in its decision that Margarita waived or transferred all
her rights and interest over the lots in question in favor of the Francisca. And when
Francisca died the property in question was transferred to her legal heirs.
Private respondent then filed an appeal to the Office of the President on the
decision of the NHA but the appeal was denied. Aggrieved by the decision private
respondent filed an appeal in the Supreme Court.
Supreme Courts decision:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case
No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NHA can sell the property which has been already paid by
the deceased Margarita Herrera?
HELD:
NO. The sale between NHA and Francisca is null and void.
The Court held that the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed is in the form of will
which must follow the requisites of wills and solemnities. Clearly stated in the
document is that rights over the property in question can only be transferred upon the
death of the decedent and does forms part of her estate. Considering that said estate is
not yet fully paid, the debt incurred can be chargeable to her estate in a probate
proceeding which the NHA should have done.
When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have
noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the
author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking
buhay..." Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers
and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by
virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that: Art. 774. Succession is a
mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent
of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of law
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the
original applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October
27, 1971. The NHA issued its resolution on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due
course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the
initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the
estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed
properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property,
the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property
and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly
distribute them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the
property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller.
Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor
revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both partiesMargarita Herrera
and NHA. Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became
transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.
Referential syllabus:
Administrative Law; Judgments; Administrative Res Judicata; Jurisprudence has
recognized the rule of administrative res judicatathe rule which forbids the reopening
of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
judicial powers.- Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in
accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the
rule of administrative res judicata: the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and
quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting
within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . .
. It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power
to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court,
upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
judicata. To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res
judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually
understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof and that
the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies
upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
Administrative Law; Judgments; Quasi-Judicial Power; Words and Phrases; Quasi-
judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of an administrative agency for
the formulation of a final orderthis function applies to the actions, discretion and
similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies who are required to investigate
facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.-
It should be remembered that quasijudicial powers will always be subject to true
judicial powerthat which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as
that power of adjudication of an administrative agency for the formulation of a final
order. This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public
administrative officers or bodies who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However, administrative
agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of
powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branchesthe legislative, the
executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and
supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own
fiat, impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the
expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Courts
have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the resolution of societal
conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check
whether the other branches of government committed an act that falls under the
category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Administrative Law; Judgments; The system of judicial review should not be misused
and abused to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment.- Well-within its
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled
that the issue of the trial courts authority to hear and decide the instant case has
already been settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 26, 1989
(which has become final and executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment
dated October 10, 1989). We find no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-
bound to put an end to controversies. The system of judicial review should not be
misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment. The
appellate courts decision becomes the law of the case which must be adhered to by the
parties by reason of policy.
The initial applicants death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to
the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed
properties over which she had been granted the right to buyto the extent of the
interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her
estate.By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the
original applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October
27, 1971. The NHA issued its resolution on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due
course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the
initial applicants death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the
estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed
properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property,
the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property
and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly
distribute them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law. The
death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property.
Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon
Margarita Herreras demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked.
This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both partiesMargarita Herrera and NHA.
Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herreras obligation to pay became
transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.
Administrative Law; Succession; The National Housing Authority cannot make another
contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent
such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and
obligations; When the original buyer died, the National Housing Authority (NHA)
should have considered the estate as the next person.- If we sustain the position of
the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should
transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA.
For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a
property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to
the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations. When the original buyer
died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next person
likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The
opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the
NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case
No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of SelfAdjudication) which rendered the deed therein
null and void should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests
and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate
proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
Administrative Law; Succession; Elements of Testamentary Succession.-We need not
delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine. We
affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an
element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2)
the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.
3. Macasaet vs. Macasaet, GR # 154391-92, 09-30-2004 DINGLASAN
Macasaet vs. Macasaet 439 SCRA 625, September 30, 2004
Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, petitioners, vs. Spouses VICENTE and
ROSARIO MACASAET, respondents.
GR # 154391-92, September 30, 2004
439 SCRA 625
PANGANIBAN, J:
FACTS:
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and
Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents and
Teresita is his wife.
On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTC of Lipa an ejectment
suit against the children. Respondents alleged that they were the owners of 2 parcels
of land, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement,
Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in Mar. 1992 and used them as their residence
and the situs of their construction business; and that despite repeated demands,
petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500.
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They
claimed that respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business
on the subject lots in order that they could all live near one another, employ marivic,
the sister of Ismael, and help in resolving the problems of the family.
They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned
as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children.
The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the
premises. It opined that Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a
verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.
As their stay was merely tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an implied
promise to vacate the lots upon demand.
On appeal, the regional trial court updheld the findings fo the MTCC.
However, the RTC allowed the respondents to appropriate the building and other
improvements introduced by petitioners, after payment of the indemnity provided for
by Art. 448 in relation to Art. 546 and 548 of the NCC.
The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita
had been occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.
Citing Calubayan v. pascual, the CA further ruled that petitioners status was
analogous to that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of lease had expired, but whose
occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.
Consequently, in ascertaining the right of the petitioners to be reimbursed for
the improvements they had introduced on respondents properties, the appellate court
applied the Civil Codes provisions on lease.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to reimburse
one half of the value of the useful improvements, amounting to P475,000, and the
right of Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to remove those improvements (if the
former refuses to reimburse) is DELETED.
2. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings to
determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code, specifically to the following matters:
a. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets option to appropriate
as their ownthe improvements on the lots, after paying the
indemnity, as provided under Article 546 in relation to Article 448 of
the Civil Code; or in requiring Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet
to pay for the value of the lots, unless it is considerably more than
that of the improvements, in which case petitioners shall pay
reasonable rent based upon the terms provided under the Civil Code
b. The value of the useful expenses incurred by Spouses Ismael and
Rosita Macasaet in the construction of the improvements on the lots
c. The increase in value acquired by the lots by reason of the useful
improvements
d. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets choice of type of
indemnity to be paid (whether b or c)
e. Whether the value of the lots is considerably more than that of the
improvements built thereon.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
ISSUE:
WON the courts should fix the duration of possession.
HELD:
That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear, the
issue is the duration of possession. In the absence of a stipulation on this point, Art.
1197 of the civil Code allows the courts to fix the duration or the period.
Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and
the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the
duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the
will of the debtor.
Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a
period. Such qualification cannot be inferred from the facts of the present case.
The mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not necessarily justify or
authorize the courts to do so
It can be safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the
parents and the children mutually benefited from the arrangement.
Effectively, there is a resolutory condition in such an agreement.
Their possession which was originally lawful became unlawful when the
reason therefore love and solidarity ceased to exist between them.
Referential Syllabus:
Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was
originally lawful becomes unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the
defendants right to possess, arising from an express or implied contract.-In actions for
unlawful detainer, possession that was originally lawful becomes unlawful upon the
expiration or termination of the defendants right to possess, arising from an express
or implied contract. In other words, the plaintiffs cause of action comes from the
expiration or termination of the defendants right to continue possession. The case
resulting therefrom must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an
allegation that the defendant is illegally withholding possession from the plaintiff is
sufficient.- To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is illegally withholding possession from the plaintiff is sufficient. The
complaint may lie even if it does not employ the terminology of the law, provided the
said pleading is couched in a language adequately stating that the withholding of
possession or the refusal to vacate has become unlawful. It is equally settled that the
jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, is determined from the
averments of the complaint.
Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; This court has consistently held that those who occupy
the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will
vacate the property upon demand. A summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy to enforce this implied obligation.- This Court has consistently held that those
who occupy the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the
occupants will vacate the property upon demand. A summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy to enforce this implied obligation. The unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule
18 on pre-trial applies to the preliminary conference. Under section 4 of this Rule, the
nonappearance of a party may be excused by the showing of a valid cause.-Unless
inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the
preliminary conference. Under Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
may be excused by the showing of a valid cause; or by the appearance of a
representative, who has been fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; Respondents have the right to appropriateas their
ownthe building and other improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1)
refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the increase in value acquired by
the properties by reason thereof. They have the option to oblige petitioners to pay the
price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structuresin
which case, the petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.-Respondents have the right to
appropriateas their ownthe building and other improvements on the subject lots,
but only after (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the increase in
value acquired by the properties by reason thereof. They have the option to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than that
of the structuresin which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.
4. Limjoco vs. Intestate Estate of Pedro Fragrante, GR # L-770, 04-27-1948
RIEGO
Limjoco vs. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil., 776, April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO petitioner, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGANTE,
deceased, respondent.
GR # L-770, April 27, 1948
80 PHIL 776
HILADO, J:
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of
public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing
the said intestate estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a
daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San
Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San
Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragantes intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petitioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of
the estate of Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the
certificate applied for is a contravention of the law.
Supreme Courts decision:
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case
No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality
and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragante must be deemed extended, within the meaning
and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it
is so adjudged and decreed.Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If
Fragrante had lived, in view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the
commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has not changed
except for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and
adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it
received from the decedent himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property,
rights and assets left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his
rights and obligations which survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction,
that the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to include
artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from
the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of
the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person
for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the
exercise during the judicial administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his estate which survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make
up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees
or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and
fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like his pending
application at the commission.
Referential Syllabus:
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ; CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE ; RlGHT
OF ESTATE OF DECEDENT TO PROSECUTE APPLICATION; CASE AT BAR.If P. O. F.
had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute
his application for a certificate of public convenience to its final conclusion. No one
would have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he
had invested in the ice plant in question P35,000, and from what the commission said
regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially
able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business
alone was netting him about P1,440 monthly. He was a Filipino citizen and continued
to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the
evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice
plant. The aforesaid right of P. O. F. to prosecute said application to its final
conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it
constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, f or such a right was property despite the
possibility that in the end the commission might have denied the application, although
under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the
financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his
memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (p. 3) that a certificate of public convenience
once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset." Such certificate
would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying
with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to
his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTATE OF DECEDENT, A PERSON; CASE AT BAR.Within the
philosophy of the present legal system and within the framework of the constitution,
the estate of P. O. F. should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the
purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the
exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of
those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one
involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. An
injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
ID..; ID.; ID.; ID.; CITIZENSHIP OF DECEDENT EXTENDED TO His EsTATE; CASE AT
BAR.If by legal fiction the personality of P. O. F. is considered extended so that any
debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights
may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, there is no
sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his
citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the
aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of
said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the same
creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in
the legal sense, any more than he could have done if F. had lived longer and obtained
the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon
the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension
of his personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his
estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death, to the loss of the investment
amounting to P35,000, which. he already made in the ice plant, not counting the other
expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission to
this court.
5. Pascual vs. Angeles, GR # 1511, 07-26-1905 - TITO
Pascual vs. Angeles 4 Phil., 604, July 26, 1905
MIGUEL PASCUAL, plaintiff and appellant, vs. MACARIO ANGELES, defendant and
appellee.
GR # 1511, July 26, 1905
4 PHIL 604
TORRES, J:
FACTS:
Miguel Pascual brought an action to recover the possession of a certain tract
of land unlawfully occupied by the defendant, Angeles, and for the payment of rent
due, damages, and costs. It was alleged in the complaint that the defendant, Angeles,
then held under a lease a certain tract of land 15 yards: that the land formerly
belonged to Ciriaca Pascual, his sister, from whom he inherited it; that the defendant
owed him 30 pesos for the use of the land during the years 1899, 1900, and 1901
under the terms of the lease written in Tagalog and attached to the complaint; that,
demand having been made upon the defendant for payment of the rent due for the first
two years, he asked for and obtained an extension; that by virtue of this extension the
lease was continued in force; that a subsequent demand was made upon the defendant
about the end of the year 1901 for the payment of rent due and for the possession of
the land; that the defendant refused to do either; and that he had since been in the
wrongful possession of the land.
The defendant, Angeles, entered a general denial to the complaint. He denied
specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the lease attached to the
complaint, alleging as a special defense that he was the actual occupant of the land
claimed, and had been in adverse, quiet, peaceful, public, and uninterrupted
possession of the same for more than thirty years, having during that period built
houses and planted trees thereon.
The trial court ruled favor of the defendant. The petitioner filed a motion for
new trial.
Supreme Courts decision:
For the foregoing reasons we are of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and
that the judgment of the court below should be accordingly reversed, giving the
defendant thirty days within which to vacate the land wrongfully occupied by him and
to return the same to Miguel Pascual, at the end of which period, in case of his failure
to vacate, he may be ejected. The defendant is further ordered to pay to the plaintiff all
the rent due with costs. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in
accordance herewith, and let the case be remanded to the court below for execution.
So ordered.
ISSUE:
WON the Plaintiff should be recognized as the heir of the tract of land leased
by the defendant
HELD:
YES. The heir succeeds by law to all the rights, actions, and obligations of the
deceased which were not extinguished by his death.
Miguel Pascual, as testamentary heir of his sister, was in the actual and
adverse possession of a tract of land in Uaua, Navotas, of which the land in question
was a part. His possession dated from the death of the testatrix, who must have died
prior to April 7, 1894, when her executor asked for and obtained a copy of her will
executed in January of the same year. The plaintiff was recognized by the lessee,
Macario Angeles, as such owner and lawful possessor and as heir and successor to the
deceased Ciriaca Pascual. Angeles paid him rent for the land from the time of the
death of the former lessor until the year 1898, as shown by the record. It was not until
the year 1901, when he decided to keep the land, that defendant refused to pay rent
for that and the two preceding years, 1899 and 1900.
If the juridical personality of the deceased testatrix is transmitted to the heir
and the latter is considered as identified, with his devisor, to whose rights, action, and
obligations, not extinguished by her death, he succeeded, then there is no doubt that
the plaintiff, as testamentary successor of his deceased sister Ciriaca, as appears from
the will on page 17 of the bill of exceptions, had a right to oust the defendant, Angeles,
for failure to pay the stipulated rent. Miguel Pascual is now vested with the rights of
the lessor. To him, as successor of the deceased, Angeles had been paying rent from
1894 to 1898. Angeles is now barred from questioning the rights of the deceased owner
of the land and much less Pascual's capacity and rights in the lease, under her will,
which is the only basis of his judicial claim.
Referential Syllabus:
LANDLORD AND TENANT; ACTION; EJECTMENT; REALTY.Where the existence of a
lease has been proved and it is satisfactorily shown that the lessee has failed to pay
rent for several years: Held, That a sufficient reason existed for the ejectment of the
tenant and that the lessor has a cause of action against him. (Following the doctrine
laid down by the supreme court of Spain in its decisions of April 19, 1873, November
3, 1881, and May 5, 1893.)
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POSSESSION; TITLE; CIVIL PROCEDURE.In an action for
ejectment it is presumed that the plaintiff is the owner of the property, or that he has a
right to the possession of the same, and he can not accordingly be compelled to show
his title thereto. The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time
of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Sec. 333,
paragraph 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure; judgments of the supreme court of Spain of
December 6, 1882, and October 12, 1889.)
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; USUFRUCTUARY.Those in the actual possession of the land
under a claim of ownership, right of usufruct, or any other right entitling them to the
use of the same, can maintain an action for the ejectment of the person wrongfully in
possession.
ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRACT; CIVIL PROCEDURE.An admission that a written lease
received in evidence is genuine, is a bar to a subsequent allegation tending to defeat its
validity or authenticity, particularly in view of the fact that a contract is presumed to
have been executed for a good and sufficient consideration. (Sec. 334, paragraph 36 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.)
HEIRS.The heir succeeds by law to all the rights, actions, and obligations of the
deceased which were not extinguished by his death. 6. PRESCRIPTION,
EXTRAORDINARY ; EJECTMENT.The party alleging title by extraordinary
prescription in an action for ejectment and who denies that he was in possession as a
tenant, can not deny the identity of the land if from the allegations of both parties it
appears that there is but one certain tract of land in dispute.
LANDLORD AND TENANT; ACTION; EJECTMENT.In an action for forcible entry and
detainer no question can be incidentally raised or decided tending to defeat the title or
right of possession of the plaintiff. Pascual vs. Angeles, 4 Phil., 604, No. 1511 July 26,
1905
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION (WILLS AND LEGITIME)
1. Balanay vs. Martinez, GR # L-39247, 06-27-1975 - UNAS
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez 64 SCRA 452, June 27, 1975
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
JR., petitioner, vs.HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
GR # L-39247, June 27, 1975
64 SCRA 452
AQUINO, J:
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died and was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr.,
and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his
mother's notarial will which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian
declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II);
(b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her
father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be
satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par. IV). Then, in paragraph V of the will
she stated that after her husband's death her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal
lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the
manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal
lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one
half share of the conjugal assets. Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed
the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue
influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal
estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties
which he had received from the testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit
of Felix Balanay, Sr. wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and
affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr.
signed an instrument wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he
"waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children.
In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had
perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the
manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The opposition assailed the provision of
the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of
future legitimes. They prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the
proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding. The lower court declared the will
illegal and void and converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, the lower courts orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set
aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is
affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case
No. 1808 in consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.
ISSUE:
1. WON the invalidity of one testamentary disposition invalidates the entire will.
2. WON the surviving spouse can validly renounce his hereditary rights.
3. WON the partition of the conjugal estate is valid.
4. WON testacy should be favored.
HELD:
1. No. The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a
will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be
presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first
invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). The statement of the
testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law
because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso.
But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be
divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and
that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in
article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On
the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So,
the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would
at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are
compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
2. Yes. Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his
one-half share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as said renunciation partakes of
a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate, it
should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and
maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to
his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share
became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating
the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights
of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
3. Yes. In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband
intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her
will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art.
170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such
partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
4. Yes. Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially
where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically
his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and
that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will
can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect. The law has a tender regard for the
wishes of the testator as expressed in his will because any disposition therein is better
than that which the law can make
Referential Syllabus:
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Probate court may pass upon intrinsic validity
of a will before passing upon its formal validity.- The trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the wills intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue.
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Invalidity of one testamentary disposition
does not necessarily invalidate all other dispositions made therein. - The rule is that
the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would
not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been
made (Art 792, Civil Code).
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Statement that testator owns southern half
of conjugal state is contrary to law because spouses are proindiviso owners thereof.-
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the southern half of the conjugal lands
is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was
inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code). But that illegal declaration does not
nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Provision in a will that testators estate be
kept intact and legitimes of heirs be paid in cash is contrary to Art. 1080 of Civil Code
where whole estate was not assigned to one or more heirs.- The provision of the will
that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her
husbands lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in
cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code. ... The testatrix in her will made a
partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her husband had
renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign
the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had
no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate
may remain undivided only for a period of 20 years.
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Renunciation of inheritance by widower
subject to limitation for his support and maintenance and preservation of his legitime.-
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share
of the conjugal partnership but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of
his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate, it should be subject
to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the
estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at
least his legitime should be respected.
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Husbands renunciation of hereditary rights
and share in conjugal estate make these assets part of testators estate, but without
prejudice to creditors and other heirs.- It should be stressed that by reason of the
surviving husbands conformity to his wifes will and his renunciation of his hereditary
rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wifes estate. His
conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will
without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs.
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Preterition of surviving spouse who conformed
thereto does not produce intestacy.- In the instant case, the preterited heir was the
surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his
conformity to his wifes will and renounced his hereditary rights.
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Testacy is prefereable to intestacy.- Testacy is
favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the
testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the
purpose of giving it effect.
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Probate court should not issue notice to
creditors if only special administrator has been appointed.- A notice to creditors is not
in order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 x x x
clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not
that of a special administrator.
Special proceedings; Testate succession; Courts; A court employee should not be
appointed as administrator of decedents estate.- The probate courts appointment of
its branch clerk of court as special administrator is not a salutary practice because it
might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in
cahoots in milking the decedents estate. x x x A court employee should devote his
official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration
of a decedents estate.
2. Bustamante vs. Arevalo, GR# 47305, 07-31-1942ANARNA
Bustamante vs. Arevalo et al. 73 Phil., 635, July 31, 1942
In the matter of the estate of Rufina Arevalo, Ariston Bustamante, adminis-trator and
appellant, vs. Petrona Are-valo et al., oppositors and appellees.
GR # 47305, July 31, 1942
73 PHIL 635
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
BOCOBO, J:
FACTS:
The testatrix in this case executed two wills, one on January 9, 1936, and the
other on October 2, 1937.
In the first will, the testatrix specifically referred to seven parcels of land of
considerable value and to certain personal properties.
Three of these parcels of land and all the personal properties are given to
Amando Clemente, another three to Ariston Bustamante, and the seventh parcel to
Petrona Arevalo and Carmen Papa.
In the second will, the testatrix particularly referred to only five parcels of
land and certain personal properties, all of which are given to Ariston Bustamante, as
her universal heir. The second will does not make mention of two of the three parcels
given to Amando Clemente under the first will.
Supreme Courts decision:
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from, declaring the second will Ex-hibit
C a forgery and allowing the first will Exhibit 6, should be and is hereby reversed, and
another judgment shall be entered al-lowing the later will Exhibit C, which has entirely
revoked the earlier will Exhibit 6.
No special pronouncement on costs is made. Let the record of this case be returned to
the court of origin for further proceedings. So ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the later will, whose probate is herein approved, has entirely
revoked the earlier will?
HELD:
NO. The two wills can be reconciled, the first should be considered revoked
only in so far as it is inconsistent with the second. As the second will was executed
only twenty-one months after the first, the testatrix, who has been conclusively shown
to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the later will, could not have
forgotten that she owned two other parcels of land, especially if they are of
considerable value. Even the lawyer who drafted the second will was aware that the
testatrix owned the said two parcels, because they were included in the inventory
made of her properties in connection with the administration proceedings of the estate
of her deceased husband. This omission could have been made only on purpose, and,
coupled with the circumstance that the section will does not expressly revoke the first
which has not been burned, torn, cancelled or obliterated, inevitably leads to the
inference that the testatrix in face intended to make the first will effective as to the two
parcels of land above referred to.
Section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
No will shall be revoked, except by implication of law, otherwise than
by some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of
wills; or by burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the same
with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx
If partially conflicting, that of the latter date will operate to revoke
the former so far as the provisions of the two are conflicting or
incompatible, and in such case both wills are entitled to probate. (68
Corpus Juris 805.)
Where there is no revocation in a later will of all former wills, two separate
and distinct wills may be probated, especially when the probating of one only of the
instruments would leave an intestacy as to part of the estate. This rule applies even
though the later instrument states that it is the last will and testament of the testator,
asthe use of such words in a later instrument does not of itself revoke a prior will. (Id.
p. 885)
Referential Syllabus:
Wills; Alleged Forgery of Signature of Testatrix; Case at Bar.- In passing upon
ques-tioned documents, the test is the general char-acter of the writing rather than
any minute and precise comparison of individual letters or lines (People vs. Bustos, 45
Phil., 30). In the present case, a careful scrutiny of all the questioned and the standard
signatures leaves the conviction that they have been written by the same person
because they show the same general type, quality and characteristics, with natural
variations. Moreover, a forger who has to make two or more signatures usually sees to
it that all the signatures are uniform for fear that any difference might arouse
sus-picion. In this case, however, in some ques-tioned signatures the letters "R" and
"u" are separated, but in others, they are united. Fur-thermore, the document in
question was pre-pared and signed in duplicate, so that there are six signatures of the
testatrix, instead of only three. It is reasonable to believe that a forger would reduce
the number of signatures to be forged so as to lessen the danger of detection. In this
case, the attorney who supervised the execution of the will must have known that it
was not necessary to make a signed dup-licate thereof. To conclude that a forgery has
been committed, the evidence should be force-fully persuasive. Other reasons are set
out in the decision in support of the holding that the will in question is genuine and
should be allowed.
Id.; Revocation; Interpretation by Courts.- Provisions of the second will are quoted in
the decision to show that the latter will entirely revoke the earlier one. Though it might
appear right that a relative, raised by the testatrix, should receive something from the
estate, nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to advance its own idea of a
just distribution of the property in the face of a different mode of disposition so clearly
expressed by the testatrix in the later will. As she had no forcible heirs, she was
absolutely free to give her estate to whomsoever she chose, subject of course to the
payment of her debts. It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of
a will in order to effect what the court believes to be an equitable division of the estate
of a deceased person. The only function of the courts in these cases is to carry out the
intention of the deceased as manifested in the will. Once that intention has been
determined through a careful reading of the will or wills, and provided the law on
legitimes has not been violated, it is beyond the pale of judicial cognizance to inquire
into the fairness or unfairness of Any devise or bequest. The court should not sit in
judgment upon the motives and sentiments of the testa-trix, first, because, as already
stated, nothing in the law restrained her from disposing of her property in any manner
she desired, and, secondly, because there are no adequate means of ascertaining the
inward processes of her conscience. She was the sole judge of her own attitude toward
those who expected her bounty.
3. Testate Estate of Bellis vs. Bellis GR # L 23678, 06-06-1967 BELEN
Bellis vs. Bellis 20 SCRA 358, June 06, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
GR # L-23678, June 6, 1967
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
20 SCRA 358
BENGZON, J:
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy),
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis. Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are
paid f r, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to
Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Supreme Courts decision:
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine Law must be applied in the case
HELD:
NO. Texas Law must be applied. In this regard, the parties do not submit the
case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict
of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern,
the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still
refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory.
Where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked
nor even mentioned it in their arguments.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two willsone to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estatearguing from this that he
intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the
decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law,
for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void. for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10now Article 16of the
Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State
of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Referential Syllabus:
Wills; Succession; Conflict of laws; Renvoi doctrine.The doctrine of renvoi is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country and is domiciled in another.
It does not apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was
domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that, even assuming that Texas has a
conflicts rule providing that the domiciliary law should govern successional rights, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would still
refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei
sitae, which calls for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties involved are found in the
Philippines.
Same; Foreign laws.In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of Texas, it would
be presumed to be the same as our local conflicts rule.
Same; Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to succeedThe decedent's
national law governs the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed.
Wills; Third paragraph of article 17 of New Civil Code does not modify article 16.-
The third paragraph of article 17 of the New Civil Code is not an exception to the
second paragraph of article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article," when it
incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as article 17, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph of article 10 of the old Civil Code, as article
16. The legislative intent must have been to make the second paragraph of article 176
a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession.
As a further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
article 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is governed by the decedent's
national law
Wills; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general provisions.-Whatever public policy and
good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congres has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. It has specifically chosen the
decedent's national law to govern, inter alia, the amount of successional rights.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Same; Testamentary provision that successional right to decedent's estate would be
governed by law other than his national law is void.A provision in a foreigner's will
that his properties should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not in
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
accordance with his national law is void, being contrary to article 16 of the New Civil
Code.
Wills; System of legitimes does not apply to estate of a citizen of Texas.-Where the
decedent was a citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there are no forced heirs, the
system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession to the
decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the decedent's will
and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law
4. In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Edward E. Christensen, GR # L-16749,
01-01-1963 DINGLASAN
Aznar vs. Garcia 7 SCRA 95, January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-
appellant.
GR # L-16749, January 31, 1963
7 SCRA 95
LABRADOR, J:
FACTS:
Edward Christensen, whose estate is the subject of the present case, is a
Californian citizen domiciled in the Philippines, died leaving a will. The will was
admitted for probate by the Davao CFI where it has also declared that Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. As to the partition of the
deceaseds estate, the Court of Appeals, upon appeal of Helen, ruled that the validity of
the provisions of the will should be governed by the Philippine law, and returned the
case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by the
said law.
A project of partition was submitted by the executor which was approved by
the CFI, wherein the properties of estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy
Christensen, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter,
and Maria Helen Christensen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after
his death. The said order was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had
been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and
hence, the properties passed to both of them as if he died intestate.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to
the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
ISSUES:
1. Was Helen preterited?
2. Should the estate pertain to her and to Helen in equal shares after deducting
the legacies, or whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely
reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen equivalent to of the
entire estate?
HELD:
1. No, Helen is not preterited. Preterition is the omission of the heir in the will at
all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., but not instituting him at all as heir
without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the testators
estate. Whether the testator gave a legacy to a person whom he characterized as not
related to him, but later this person was judicially declared to be his acknowledged
natural child, the case is not a case of preterition but a case of completion of legitime.
The institution in the will would not be annulled, consequently, intestacy should not
follow.
2. The inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the
extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen. In order that the rights of a forced heir
may be limited to the completion of his legitime (instead of annulment of the
institution of heirs). It is not necessary that what has been left to him in the will by
any title, as by legacy, be granted to her in his capacity as heir. As successional rights
are vested as of the moment of death, the forced heir is entitled to the fruits and
increments of his legitime from the testators death.
Referential Syllabus:
Private International Law; Determination of citizenship; U.S. citizenship not lost by
stay in Philippines before indepen-dence.- The citizenship that the deceased acquired
in Califor-nia when he resided there from 1904 to 1913 was never lost by his stay in
the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States until 1946, and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so
that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Philippine law to be applied in case at bar.-
As the domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child of the
latters legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court of domicile bound to ap-ply its own law as directed in
the conflict of law rule of dece-dents state; Application of the renvoi doctrine.-The
conflict of law rule in California, Article 946 Civil Code, refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The court of domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because
the case will then be tossed back and forth between the two states. If the question has
to be decided, the Philippine court must apply its own law as the Philippines was the
domicile of the decedent, as directed in the conflict of law rule of the state of the
decedent, California, and especially because the internal law of California provides no
legitime for natural children, while the Philippine law (Articles 887(4) and 894, Civil
Code of the Philippines makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recog-nizing them).
Same; Same; Same; Rule of resorting to the law of the domicile in determining matters
with foreign element involved.-The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with
the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Same; Same; Domicile; Factors considered in determining aliens domicile in the
Philippines.-An American citizen who was born in New York, migrated to California,
resided there for nine years, came to the Philippines in 1913, and very rarely re-turned
to California and only for short visits, and who appears to have never owned or
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
acquired a home or properties in that state, shall be considered to have his domicile in
the Philippines.
Same; Validity of testamentary provisions; Meaning of national law in Article 16, Civil
Code; Conflict of law rules in California to be applied in case at bar.-The national
law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to any general
American Law, because there is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the union having its own private law
applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. It can therefore refer to
no other than the private law of the state of which the decedent was a citizen. In the
case at bar, the State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an
internal law for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its citizens
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Hence, reason demands that the California con-flict of
law rules should be applied in this jurisdiction in the case at bar.
5. Neyra vs. Neyra, A.C No. 8075, 03-25-1946 RIEGO
Neyra vs. Neyra 76 Phil. 333, March 25, 1946
TRINIDAD-NEYRA, plaintiff and appellant, vs. ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant and
appellee.
AC # 8075, March 25, 1946
76 PHIL 333
DE JOYA, J:
FACTS:
Severo Neyra left his two daughter, Trinidad and Encarnacion, a parcel of
land. The two sisters had a misunderstanding which lead to the filing of case for the
subject land left by Severo. The lower court upheld the right of Trinidad over the half of
the land while, accordingly, upheld the right of Encarnacion for a certain amount. An
appeal was brought to the attention of the CA Manila related to the grant of the lower
court. Meanwhile, Encarnacion had a will which leaves a church group and her other
relatives, Teodora Neyra (her half sister), with no mention of her sister, Trinidad. The
church group, upon presentation of the will, rejected the same. Encarnacion asked her
lawyer to make a new will but instead only made a draft still having the church group
as beneficiary. Encarnacion, on her dying bed, asked the church members of the said
group to go to her house for holy communion. A father of the church adviser
Encarnacion to reconcile with her sister, Trinidad. On that note, she called her sister
Trinidad who immediately went to her. A conciliation happened which led to the
agreement for the withdrawal of appeal. The agreement was signed by the witnesses
(church officers, lawyer), by Trinidad, and the thumb-mark of Encarnacion was placed
on the same agreement. The day after the agreement was executed, Encarnacion died.
A lawyer, allegedly representing Encarnacion, together with Teodora,
questions the said agreement, stating among others, that when the agreement was
signed and thumb-marked by Encarnacion and the witnesses, Encarnacion was not in
the right mind because she was suffering from Addison's disease.
Supreme Courts decision:
It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been legally signed
and executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in the presence of credible
and trustworthy witnesses, and that she was compos mentis and possessed the
necessary testamentary and mental capacity at the time; the petition for
reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio Javillonar, on November 23, 1942, on behalf of a
client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been dead since November 4, 1942, and some of
her relatives, who have appeared, in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the decision of the Court of Appeals
for Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal, is hereby re-affirmed,
without costs. So ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said compromise or agreement had been legally executed and
signed by Encarnacion Neyra.
HELD:
Yes, said compromise or agreement had been legally executed and signed by
Encarnacion Neyra.
Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old
age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he
might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will.
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of
the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons,
although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still effect
the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the testator was
in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the will.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of
persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain
unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they
necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients
suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties
until the moments of their death.
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time E.
N. thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the
house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been fully shown that
said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement
and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test
is not whether they actually saw each other, at the time of the signing of the
documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do
so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it. all in this case, (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5
Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in
question is equivalent to her signature.
Referential Syllabus:
WILLS; TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY; INSOMNIA, TUBERCULOSIS, DIABETES, NOT
SUFFICIENT TO DESTROY MENTAL CAPACITY.Insom-nia, in spite of the testimony
of two doctors, who testified for the opponents to the probate of a will, to the effect that
it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not to affect the full possession of the
mental faculties deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs.
Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of
the physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in
the third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27
Phil., 579.) The testimony of the attending physician that the deceased was suffering
from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for several days, prior to his
death, was held not sufficient to establish testamentary y incapacity, in view of the
positive statement of several credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to
understand what was said to him and to communicate his desires. (Samson vs.
Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil, 573.)
ID.; ID.; OLD AGE OR ILL HEALTH INSUFFICIENT TO INVALIDATE WlLL.Where the
mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient
to invalidate his will.
ID. ; ID. ; EVIDENCE OF SOUND MIND.Where it appears that a few hours and also a
few days after the execution of the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly
conversed with other persons, although lying down and unable to move or stand up
unassisted, but could still effect the sale of property belonging to him, these
circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the
time of the execution of the will.
ID.; ID.; SLEEPING SICKNESS (ADDISON'S DISEASE) DOES NOT IMPAIR MENTAL
FACULTIES.The mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease, like
the testatrix in the case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of
the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest.
And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve
their mental faculties until the moments of their death.
ID.; SIGNING BY THUMBMARK; PRESENCE OF ATTESTING WITNESSES; TEST OF.
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time E. N.
thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house,
as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been fully shown that said
witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and
will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is
not whether they actually saw each other, at the time of the signing of the documents,
but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the
attesting witnesses actually saw it. all in this case, (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.)
And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is
equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, supra.)
6. In Re: Abangan vs. Abangan, GR # 13431, 11-12-1919 TITO
Abangan vs. Abangan. 40 Phil. 476, November 12, 1919
In re will of Ana Abangan. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix and appellee, vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN ET AL., opponents and appellants.
GR # L-13431, November 12, 1919
40 PHIL 476
AVANCEA, J:
FACTS:
On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to
probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's
appealed.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets,
the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the
bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and
by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed
at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on
the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and
these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate
of the will should have been denied.
Supreme Courts decision:
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with
costs against the appellants. So ordered.
ISSUE:
WON the will is valid
HELD:
YES
WILLS; ATTESTATION.In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all
the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the
bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on
their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
TESTATOR'S SIGNATURE.The testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation
clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to
the testator.
DIALECT IN WHICH WRITTEN; PRESUMPTION.The circumstance appearing in the
will itself that.same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality
where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the
contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which her will is written.
Referential Syllabus:
WILLS; ATTESTATION.-In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all
the testamentary dispositions and is signedat the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the
bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on
their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
WILLS; TESTATOR'S SIGNATURE.-The testator's signature is not necessary in the
attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses
and not to the testator.
WILLS; DIALECT IN WHICH WRITTEN; PRESUMPTION.- The circumstance appearing
in the will itself that.same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this
locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to
the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which her will is written.
7. Nera vs. Rimando, GR# L-597,02-27-1911 UNAS
Nera vs. Rimando. 18 Phil. 450, February 27, 1911
BEATRIZ NERA ET AL., plaintiffs and appellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant
and appellant.
GR # L-5971, February 27, 1911
18 PHIL 450
CARSON, J:
FACTS:
In this case, it was alleged that, when a certain will was being signed, the
testator and some subscribing witnesses were some eight or ten feet away, in a large
room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a
curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and
the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the
instrument. The trial court ignored this fact in its determination of the case as it ruled
that the determination of this specific fact will not affect the outcome of the case.
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
Supreme Courts decision:
The decree entered by the court below admitting the instrument propounded therein to
probate as the last will and testament of Pedro Rimando, deceased, is affirmed with
costs of this instance against the appellant.
ISSUE:
WON the testator or the witnesses, in the signing of a will, should actually
cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them.
HELD:
The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged
will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of
the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its
subscription by each of them, but whether at that moment existing conditions and the
position of the parties, with relation to each other, were such that by merely casting
their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. Under the
doctrine laid down in the case of Jaboneta vs. Gustilo the alleged fact that one of the
subscribing witnesses was in the outer room when the testator and the other
describing witnesses signed the instrument in the inner room, had it been proven,
would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate the execution of the will. But the Court
had a unanimous opinion that had this subscribing witness been proven to have been
in the outer room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses
attached their signatures to the instrument in the inner room, it would have been
invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances not being done
"in the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This because the line of vision from
this witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily have
been impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the outer one "at the moment of
inscription of each signature."
Referential Syllabus:
EXECUTION OF WlLLS; POSITION OF TESTATOR AND WlTNESS WHEN WILL is
SUBSCRIBED.- The position of testator and of the witnesses to a will, at the moment of
the subscription by each, must be such that they may see each other sign if they
choose to do so.
EXECUTION OF WlLLS; SIGNING IN THE PRESENCE OF EACH OTHER.- The question
whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the
instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that
their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each
of them, , but whether at that moment existing conditions and the position of the
parties, with relation to each other, were such that by merely casting their eyes in the
proper direction they could have seen each other sign.
EXECUTION OF WlLLS; ONE WITNESS IN OUTER ROOM WHEN WILL is SIGNED.- If
one subscribing witness to a will is shown to have been in an outer room at the time
when the testator and the other witnesses attach their signatures to the instrument in
an inner room, the will would be held invalidthe attaching of the said signatures,
under such circumstances, not being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer
room.
8. Neyva vs. Mojal, GR # 21755, 12-29-1924 ANARNA
Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar 47 Phil. 152, December 29, 1924
In the matter of the testate estate of Antonio Mojal, deceased. FILOMENA NAYVE,
petitioner and appellee, vs. LEONA MOJAL and LUCIANA AGUILAR, opponents and
appellants.
GR # 21755, December 29, 1924
47 PHIL 152
ROMUALDEZ, J:
FACTS:
Filomena Nayve filed a petition for the probate of the will of his late husband,
AntonioMojal. The petition was opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister
and niece, of the deacesed. The CFI of Albay admitted the will to probate. The will is
composed of four sheets with written matter on only one side of each. The four sides or
pages containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4,"
successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued, was signed by the
testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On the third
page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin,
left side of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about
the middle of the page, at the end of the will and before the attestation clause. On the
fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses do not appear on the margin, but at the
bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on the
margin, left side of the reader.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the will is still valid when the signatures do not appear on the
left margin of all pages?
2. Whether or not the will is still valid although the paging used was Arabic
numerals?
3. Whether or not the will is still valid if the testator failed to state the number of
sheets or pages in the attestation clause?
4. Whether or not the will is still valid if the testator and the witnesses did not
sign in the presence of each other?
HELD:
1. Signed in middle - Yes. As to the signatures on the margin, it is true, as above
stated, that the third page actually used was signed by the testator, not on the left
margin, as it was by the witnesses, but about the middle of the page and the end of the
will; and that the fourth page was signed by the witnesses, not on the left margin, as it
was by the testator, but about the middle of the page and at the end of the attestation
clause. The document contained the necessary signatures on each page, whereby each
page of the will was authenticated and safeguarded against any possible alteration. In
that case, the validity of the will was sustained, and consequently it was allowed to
probate. Applying that doctrine of Avera the instant case, we hold that, as each and
every page used of the will bears the signatures of the testator and the witnesses, the
fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page does not
detract from the validity of the will.
2. Numbers not letters - Yes. Still within the spirit of the law. As stated in the
case at bar, paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters is within the spirit of the
law, and is just as valid as paging with letters
3. Attestation clause did not state number of pages - last paragraph of the will
stated number of pages so the will is still valid.The number of sheets or pages of which
the will is composed must be stated in the attestation clause (Uy Coque vs. Navas L.
Sioca, 43 Phil., 405); but where such a fact appears at the end of the will so that no
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
proof aliunde is necessary of the number of its sheets, then the failure to state in the
attestation clause the number of the pages of the instrument does not invalidate it.
4. Signed in the presence of each other - Yes. In the attestation clause above set
out it is said that the testator signed the will "in the presence of each of the witnesses"
and the latter signed "in the presence of each other and of the testator." So that, as to
whether the testator and the attesting witnesses saw each other sign the will, such a
requirement was clearly and sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this
clause is whether the testator and the witnesses signed all the sheets of the will.
Referential Syllabus:
WILLS; SIGNATURES ON MARGIN.- Where each and every page upon which the will is
written was signed by the testator and the witnesses, the fact that the signatures on
each page do not all appear on the left margin thereof does not detract from the
validity of the will. (Avera vs, Garcia and Rodriguez, 42 Phil., 145.)
WILLS; PAGING WITH ARABIC NUMERALS.-Paging with Arabic numerals and not with
letters is within the spirit of the law, and is just as valid as paging with letters. (Unson'
vs. Abella, 43 Phil., 494.)
WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; STATEMENT OF NUMBER OF PAGES.-The number of
sheets or pages of which the will is composed must be stated in the attestation clause
(Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405); but where such a fact appears at the end
of the will so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of its sheets, then the
failure to state in the attestation clause the number of the pages of the instrument
does not invalidate it.
WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; SIGNING OF WILL.- The attestation clause must state
the fact that the testator and the witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for
such an act cannot be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated
therein. But the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of
the will can be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the
document itself, and the omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate the
will.
9. CANEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GR # 103554, 05-28-1993 DELOS REYES
Caneda vs. Court of Appeals 222 SCRA 781, May 28, 1993
TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO,
AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO,
PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO
ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA ABAPO VELANO, and
CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD
CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero,
respondents.
GR # 103554, May 28, 1993
222 SCRA 781
REGALADO, J:
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children,
already in the twilight years of his life executed a last will and testament before three
attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was
declared therein that, among other things that the testator was leaving by way of
legacies and devises his real and personal properties to specific persons, all of whom
do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after, he himself filed a petition before
the CFI seeking the probate of his last will and testament but the scheduled hearings
were postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition could finally be
heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will,
sought his appointment as special administrator of the testators estate but due to his
death, he was succeeded by William Cabrera, who was appointed by RTC which is
already the probate court.
The petitioners assails the allowance of the testators will on the ground that it was not
executed in accordance with all the requisites of law since the testator was already in a
poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same.
Petitioners likewise contend that the will is null and void because its attestation clause
is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to
the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
Respondent, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was of sound and disposing
mind and in good health when he executed his will. Further, they also contend that the
witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of
respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly
directed to forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R (Petition for the
Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE Special
Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an
active case and thereafter duly proceed with the settlement of the estate of the said
decedent.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial
compliance pursuant to Article 809 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the
attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to
the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the
facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses; it gives
affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law
has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the
complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state:
The number of pages used upon which the will is written;
That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and
That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will
and all its pages, and that the said witnesses also signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest
and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of sense, while
subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein assailed is that while
it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed
their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
What is then clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection
which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be
admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the defect in the
attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of
the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the
substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure
and influence, defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language
used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact
executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article
805.
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not
render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested
in compliance with Article 805. These considerations do not apply where the
attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and
every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a
situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but
the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated
in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the
present case since there is no plausible way by which it can be read into the
questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting
witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its
pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Referential Syllabus:
Wills and Succession; There are two (2) kinds of wills.In addition, the ordinary will
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting
witnesses, hence it is likewise known as a notarial will. Where the testator is deaf or a
deaf-mute, Article 807 requires that he must personally read the will, if able to do so.
Otherwise, he should designate two persons who will read the will and communicate
its contents to him in a practicable manner. On the other hand, if the testator is blind,
the will should be read to him twice; once, by anyone of the witnesses thereto, and
then again, by the notary public before whom it is acknowledged. The other kind of will
is the holographic will, which Article 810 defines as one that is entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. This kind of will, unlike the ordinary
type, requires no attestation by witnesses. A common requirement in both kinds of
wills is that they should be in writing and must have been executed in a language or
dialect known to the testator.
Same; Attestation clause valid even if in a language not known to testator.However,
in the case of an ordinary or attested will, its attestation clause need not be written in
a language or dialect known to the testator since it does not form part of the
testamentary disposition. Furthermore, the language used in the attestation clause
likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. The last paragraph of
Article 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the attestation clause shall be
interpreted to said witnesses. Same; Purposes of attestation clause.The purpose of
the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is
written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its
pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages; whereas the subscription
of the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of
authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same
instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses.
Same; Same.Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby
declare the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The
attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a
will and to insure the authenticity thereof. As it appertains only to the witnesses and
not to the testator, it need be signed only by them. Where it is left unsigned, it would
result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and easy to add the clause
on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the testator and the witnesses.
Same; Words and Phrases; Attestation and Subscription distinguished.It will be
noted that Article 805 requires that the witnesses should both attest and subscribe to
the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. Attestation and
subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of the senses, while subscription
is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will
is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute
an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to
write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of
identification.
Same; Attestation clause which does not state that testament was signed by the
witnesses in the presence of one another and of the testator renders the will null and
void.What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein
assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all
its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number
of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance
that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of
the testator and of each other. The phrase and he has signed the same and every page
thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin,
obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately
preceded by the words as his Last Will and Testament. On the other hand, although
the words in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us
may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must,
however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the
witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words he has signed the same
and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand
margin. What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement that
the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and
of one another. It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by
law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance
of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.
Same; Mere defects in form in the attestation clause do not render will void.We
stress once more that under Article 809, the defects or imperfections must only be with
respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or
imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was
really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however,
the manner of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to
merely an examination of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether
oral or written.
Same; Same; Defects in attestation clause which require submission of parol evidence
not mere defects of form.In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied only by extrinsic
evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no
basis whatsoever from which such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private
respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they saw the
compliance with such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the
fact that he is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would
accordingly be doing by indirection what in law he cannot do directly.
Same; Same; Same.It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that
omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need
of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions
which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation
of the attestation clause and ultimat ely, of the will itself.
10. TESTATE OF MALOTO VS. CA, GR # 76464, 02-29-1988 DELOS REYES
Testate Estate of Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals 158 SCRA 451, February 29,
1988
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO,
CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO
MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.
GR # L-76464, February 29, 1988
158 SCRA 451
SARMIENTO, J:
FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died on October 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence. On
November 1963, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto,Panfilo Maloto and Felino
Maloto, niece and nephews respectively, of Adriana Maloto commenced an intestate
proceeding in the CFI of Iloilo that was docketed as Spec. Pro.No. 1736. They executed
an intestate proceeding and divided the estate in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4)
share for each. The CFI judge approved the partition. Subsequently, on April 1, 1967, a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered
to the CFI of Iloilo. Aldina et al. were all named as heirs but Aldina and Constancio
appeared to have bigger shares in the will than what they received in the extrajudicial
partition. There were also dispositions in favor of Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic
Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor. Aldino and Constancio, along with the other
devisees and legatees, filed a motion in S.P. No.1736 for, among others, the
allowance of the will of Adriana Maloto. The CFI judge denied the motion on the ground
that the said motion had been filed out of time. The petitioners (Aldino et.al.) filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the SC but it was denied on the ground of
improper remedy. The petitioners then commenced S.P. No.2176 in the CFI of Iloilo for
the probate of the alleged last will and testament. The probate court dismissed the
petition on the basis of the finding of said court in S.P No.1736 that the alleged will
sought to be probated has been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the
Decision dated June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the
respondent Court of Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for the allowance of Adriana
Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against the private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was validly revoked by Adriana.
HELD:
REVOCATION THEREOF; PHYSICAL ACT OF DESTRUCTION; ANIMUS
REVOCANDI, A NECESSARY ELEMENT. The physical act of destruction of a
like burning in this case, does not per se constitutive an effective revocation, unless
the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It may be
performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of
the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be
the will itself. In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be
conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus
revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will
and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act
of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by
another person in his presence and under his express direction.
[There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For
one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not
satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For
another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of
Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe
and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where
the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a
will were burned It is an important matter of public interest that a purported will is
not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its very foundations.]
Referential Syllabus:
Civil Law; Wills; Revocation of Will; To constitute an effective revocation, the physical
act of destruction of a will must be coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the
testator.-It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this
case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is
coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the
physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another
person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course,
it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
Civil Law; Wills; Revocation of Will; Intention to revoke must be accompanied by overt
physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling the will by the testator or by
another person in his presence and under his express direction.-
In this case, while animus revocandi, or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for
that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is
only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and
testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by
another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of
evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or
papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be
a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not
proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the
burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in
stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably
in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proferred as a will were burned.
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
Civil Procedure; Res Adjudicata; Doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the
case at bar; Requisites of res adjudicata.-The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no
application in the present controversy. For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent
case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment;
(2) the former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there is, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of cause of action. We do not find here the presence of all the enumerated
requisites.
Civil Procedure; Res Adjudicata; Strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar
as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned.- For one, there is yet, strictly
speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is
concerned. The decision of the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although
final, involved only the intestate Settlement of the estate of Adria iana. As such, that j
udgment could not in any manner be construed to be final with respect to the probate
of the subsequently discovered will of the decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the
merits of the action for probate. This is understandably so because the trial court, in
the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the
contested will. After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded on the presence
of a will and with the objective of proving its due execution and validity, something
which can not be properly done in an intestate settlement of estate proceeding which is
predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus, there is likewise no
identity between the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for
probate, Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it was precisely because of
our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the petitioners instituted this separate action for
the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these grounds alone, the
position of the private respondents on this score can not be sustained.
11. TESTATE OF MOLO VS. MOLO, GR # L-2538, 09-21-1951 DELOS REYES
Molo vs. Molo 90 Phil. 37, September 21, 1951
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE
MOLO, petitioner and appellee, vs. Luz, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors
and appellants.
GR # L-2538, September 21, 1951
90 PHIL 37
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J:
FACTS:
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of
Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or
ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana
Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz
Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido
Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills,
one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition, seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on
June 20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon
petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to
probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties
presented their evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will
on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in
accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow
on February 24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the
deceased on August 17, 1918, in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an
opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped
from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in
the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.
Supreme Courts decision:
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellants.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Molos will of 1918 was subsequently revoked by his 1939 will
2. Whether or not the earlier will can still be admitted to probate
HELD:
1. NO. In the case of Samson vs. Naval, the court laid down the doctrine that a
subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed,
for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. Although
American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting opinions perhaps
because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each State in
the subject of revocation of wills, the court is of the impression from a review and the
study of the pertinent authorities that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is
still a good law.
2. YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of
dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon
whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a
suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a
mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render
the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the
valid execution of a new will.
Referential Syllabus:
WILLS; REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT WILL; EFFECT OF VOID REVOCATORY
CLAUSE.-A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce
the effect of annuling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void
(Samson vs. Naval, 41 Phil., 838).
WILLS; PROBATE; DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION.-Even in the supposition
that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed from the
failure of the petitionerto produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect
of defeating the prior will where it is founded on the mistaken belief that the later will
has been validly executed and would be given due effect. The earlier will can still be
admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent relative revocation". The theory
on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate.
And this intention is clearly manifest where he executed two wills on two different
occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir.
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
12. ACAIN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (IAC), GR # 72706, 10-27-
1987; CITING NUGUID VS NUGUID, GR # L-23445, 06-23-1966 - DINGLASAN
Acain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 155 SCRA 100, October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON,
respondents.
GR # L-72706, October 27, 1987
155 SCRA 100
SANCHEZ, J:
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the RTC, a petition for the probate of the will of the
late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary,
on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his
brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and
Laura were instituted as heirs. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment
of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor
of the testament.
On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided: THIRD: All my
shares that I may receive from our properties. House, lands and money which I earned
jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO
ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko
Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money
properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute
my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion,
Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo
who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner. The oppositors filed a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been pretirited.
Supreme Courts decision:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is her eby DENIED for lack of merit and the
questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985
and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents have been preterated
HELD:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow
is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if
the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted
from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the
same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39 of
P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the
adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied
that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
Adjudication:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
Referential Syllabus:
Civil Law; Succession; Preterition, meaning of; Article 854 of the Civil Code not
applicable to the surviving spouse; Adoption makes the adopted the legal heir of the
adopter.Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid,
17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]. Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend
or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise,
even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil Code)
However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez,
whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner
(Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and
preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Same; Same; Same; Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and creates intestate
succession but legacies and devises are valid and respected insofar as they are not
inofficious.Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open
to intestate succession the entire inheritance including la portion libre (que) no
hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado, mejora o donation (Manresa, as cited in
Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only
provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the
will for they should stand valid and respected, except in so far as the legitimes are
concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Institution of petitioner and his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance totally abrogates the will.The universal institution of petitioner
together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in
totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal
heirswithout any other testamentary disposition in the willamounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article
854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid),
supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of
the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters.
The effect of annulling theinstitution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total
intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises
must, as already stated above, be respected.
Same; Same; Probate of a will; Petitioner has no legal standing to petition for the
probate of the will of the deceased, hence Special Proceeding No. 591-A-CEB must be
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
dismissed.In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding
he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected
by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against
the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is
not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in
the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real
property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears
to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as
a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of
law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted
child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the
testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the
deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed.
Same; Same; Same; Rule that probate Courts authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, not inflexible and absolute; Court may pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the will under exceptional circumstances.Special Proceedings No. 591-
CEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that
the probate courts authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
come only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said
court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity
or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966];
Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982];
Cayetano v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]); and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals,
139 SCRA 206 [1985]). The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court
of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss
on the ground of absolute preterition. The probate court acting on the motion held that
the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs.
On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by
practical considerations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Trial Court could have denied outright the probate of the
will or have passed upon its intrinsic validity where on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void.For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will
and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically
void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs
coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited
would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or
could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the
extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonidas, supra; Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra). The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by
private respondents.
Certiorari; Remedy of Certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, exception.As a
general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned
order is an oppressive exercise of judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA
465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v.
Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587
[1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available
where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law (D.D. Comendador Construction Corporation v.
Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave
abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is
founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Same; Same; Certiorari may be entertained where appeal will not afford a speedy and
adequate relief.Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are
indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de
Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of
appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition
for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy
and adequate relief.
13. JLT AGRO VS. BALANSAG, GR # 141882, 03-11-2005 DELOS REYES
J.L.T. Agro, Inc. vs. Balansag 453 SCRA 211, March 11, 2005
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, petitioner, vs.
ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents.
GR # 141882, March 11, 2005
453 SCRA 211
TINGA, J:
FACTS:
Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena and had
two kids namely Josefa and Emilio. After her death, he married Milagros Teves and
they had four children namely: Maria Teves, Jose Teves, Milagros Teves and Pedro
Teves. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement. When
Antonia died an action for partition was instituted where the parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don
Julian. On the basis of the compromise agreement, the CFI declared a tract of land
known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian
and his two children of the first marriage. The property was to remain undivided
during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other
properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the movie property, the commercial
areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was
retained by Don Julian.
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of
Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
(petitioner). Later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled
Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities
(Supplemental Deed) dated 31 July 1973. This instrument transferred ownership over
Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner. The appellate court ruled
that the supplemental deed, conveying ownership to JLT agro is not valid because the
Compromise Agreement reserved the properties to Don Julians two sets of heirs their
future legitimes. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the
properties respectively adjudicated to them and Don Julian himself could no longer
dispose of the same. The appellate court in holding that the Supplemental Deed is not
valid, added that it contained a prohibited preterition of Don Julians heirs from the
second marriage.
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30 September 1999
of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not preterition is present in the case
2. Whether or not the future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and
reserved prior to the death of Don Julian.
HELD:
1. None. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will. In
the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise
Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the
death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime.
Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could
inherit from Don Julian upon his death.
2. As a general rule, No. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future
ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The
exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance,
and the exception to the exception is partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant
to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon
the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the
properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere
expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the
prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. Evidently, at
the time of the execution of the supplemental deed in favor of petitioner, Don Julian
remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only
pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death.
Referential Syllabus:
Civil Law; Contracts; All things, even future ones which are not outside the commerce
of man may be the object of a contract, except that no contract may be entered into
with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition
inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.-Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even
future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in
Article 1080.
Civil Law; Legitimes; Preterition; Preterition is defined as the omission of the heir in the
will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by
not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him
some part of the properties; It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct
line from inheritance; There is no preterition where the testator allotted to a
descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced
heir.- Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines
preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or,
while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. It is the
total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It consists in
the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the
testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the
hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in
the will in the latter case. But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a
descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced
heir.
Civil Law; Donation; Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the
donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public
instrument and the donor duly notified thereof.-In Sumipat, et al. v. Banga, et al., this
Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the
donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public
instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the
very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same
document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the
acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate
instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation
and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
Civil Law; Land Titles; A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.-Well-settled, of
course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. A certificate of title
accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title
and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.
Civil Law; Land Titles; To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title
establishes, a sufficient and convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title
must be adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens
title.- To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes, a
sufficient and convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title must be
adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens title.
Thus, contrary to the appellate courts ruling, the appearance of a mere thumbmark of
Don Julian instead of his signature in the Supplemental Deed would not affect the
validity of petitioners title for this Court has ruled that a thumbmark is a recognized
mode of signature.
14. Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, GR # 16763, 12-22-1921BELEN
Coso vs. Fernandez Deza 42 Phil., 596, December 22, 1921
Pascual Coso, petitioner and appellant, vs. Fermina Fer-nandez Deza et al., objectors
and appellees.
GR # 16763, December 22, 1921
42 PHIL 596
OSTRAND, J:
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
setting aside a will on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over
the mind of a testator by one Rosario Lopez. The will gives the tercio de libre
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the testator with said Rosario Lopez, and also
provides for the payment to her of nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way of
reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the testator in Barcelona
during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness.
The evidence shows that the testator, a married man and resident of the
Philippine Islands, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain in 1898 and that
he had illicit relations with her for many years thereafter. After his return to the
Philippines she followed him, arriving in Manila in February, 1918, and remained in
close communication with him until his death in February, 1919. There is no doubt
that she exercised some influence over him and the only question for our
determination is whether this influence was of such a character as to vitiate the will
Supreme Courts decision:
For the reasons stated, the decision of the lower court disallowing the will of Federico
Gimenez Zoboli is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the will be admitted to
pro-bate. No costs will be allowed. So ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not undue influence is present in this case
HELD:
NO. The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue
influence, in the sense above expressed, existed at the time of its execution and we do
not think that this burden has been carried in the present case. While it is shown that
the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her
influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and
make him express the will of another rather than his own." He was an intelligent man,
a lawyer by profession, appears to have known his own mind, and may well have been
actuated only by a legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare of his
illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for the
sacrifices she had made for him. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue
influence and does not invalidate a will. No imposition or fraud has been shown in the
present case.
Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if
no imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an
unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed
to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made
It may be further observed that under the Civil Law the right of a person with
legal heirs to dispose of his property by will is limited to only a portion of his estate,
and that under the law in force in these Islands before the enactment of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the only outside influences affecting the validity of a will were duress,
deceit, and fraud. The present doctrine of undue influence originated in a legal system
where the right of the testator to dispose of his property by will was nearly unlimited.
Manifestly, greater safeguards in. regard to execution of wills may be warranted when
the right to so dispose of property is unlimited than when it is restricted to the extent
it is in this jurisdiction
Referential Syllabus:
Wills; Undue Influence.In the absence of fraud or imposition, mere affection, even if
illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.
15. Teotico vs. Del Val, GR # L-18753, 03-26-1965 DINGLASAN
Teotico vs. Del Val 13 SCRA 406, March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-
appellant.
GR # L-18753, March 26, 1965
13 SCRA 406
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J:
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She
executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before
Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the
P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrixs niece, Josefina Mortera.
The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and
the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate
children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to
all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed
a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming
that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an
acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not
executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to
execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or
influence of fear.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that
the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest
of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo
for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene
in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the
property to be affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be
benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the
terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such interest
in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it did not appear therein
any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She could
have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not under
the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right
to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca because being
an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives
of her natural father and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to
the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
except only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal
heir in the probate proceeding.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which
declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to
probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to
the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
Referential Syllabus:
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
Settlement of decedents estate; Probate Proceedings; Only an interested party may
intervene.-In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding
he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be effected
by it either as an executor or as a claimant of the tate, and an interested party has
been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate like a creditor.
Settlement of decedents estate; Probate Proceedings; Oppositor who would not benefit
under the will nor as legal heir cannot intervene in proceedings.- Where under the
terms of the will an oppositor has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor or
administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, nor
would she acquire any interest in any portion of the estate as legal heir if the will were
denied probate, it is held that said oppositor cannot intervene in the probate
proceedings.
Settlement of decedents estate; Probate Proceedings; Relationship by adoption does
not extend to relatives of adopting parent or of adopted child.-Under our law the
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted
and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child
except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between
the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted
is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Settlement of decedents estate; Improper pressure on testatrix; Burden of proof on
person challenging will.-The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must
be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and
subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express
the will of another rather than her own (Goso v. Deza, 42 O.G. 596). The burden of
proof is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time
of its execution.
Settlement of decedents estate; Question of intrinsic validity of provisions of will
cannot be entertained in probate proceedings.- Opposition to the intrinsic validity or
legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate proceedings
because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
16. Raymundo vs Vda. De Suarez, GR # 149017, 11-28-2008RIEGO
Raymundo vs. Isagon Vda. de Suarez 572 SCRA 384, November 28, 2008
VALENTE RAYMUNDO, petitioner, vs. TEOFISTA ISAGON VDA. DE SUAREZ, DANILO
I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR, EVELYN SUAREZ, ET
AL., respondents
GR # 149017, November 28, 2008
572 SCRA 384
NACHURA, J:
FACTS:
Marcelo Suarez died intestate and an extrajudicial settlement was executed
by his wife, Teofista, and their children which divided the properties among
themselves. Despite the extrajudicial settlement, the properties of Marcelo and Teofista
still remains under them. This, Teofista became a de facto administrator of the
properties.
In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning
ninety percent (90%) of the former's shares of stock, were sued by petitioner Valente
Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito (plaintiffs) in
consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract and Damages, docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 21736 to 21739. Thereafter, in 1975, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal, Branch 1, rendered judgment: (1) rescinding the respective contracts of plaintiffs
with Rizal Realty and Teofista, and (2) holding the two defendants solidarily liable to
plaintiffs for damages in the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000.00.
When the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, herein subject
properties were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 to satisfy the judgment
against Teofista and Rizal Realty. The aforementioned plaintiffs were the highest
bidder, and bought the levied properties for the amount of P94,170.00. As a result, a
certificate of sale was issued to them and registered in their favor on August 1, 1983.
On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued a final deed of sale over the
subject properties.
Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, or on June 21,
1984, herein respondents filed a revindicatory action against petitioner Valente,
Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the
annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied properties.
Essentially, respondents alleged in their complaint that they cannot be held liable for
the judgment rendered against their mother, Teofista, not having been impleaded
therein; and consequently, the subject properties, which they own pro indiviso with
their mother, can neither be levied nor be sold on execution.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090 is AFFIRMED. The Orders dated May 29, 1996
and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos are REINSTATED. Costs against the
petitioner.
ISSUE:
(1) WON respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an
action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista
and Marcelo Sr. (NO)
(2) WON the auction sale is void as to the portion of the children of Marcelo. (YES)
HELD:
(1) No, respondents need not be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an
action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista
and Marcelo Sr.
Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista
and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs has been firmly established, and confirmed by this
Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals. True, this Court is not a trier of facts,36 but as
the final arbiter of disputes, we found and so ruled that herein respondents are
children, and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it
should no longer have been a litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower
court. In short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria Concepcion's
representation in the RTC that our ruling in Suarez required herein respondents to
present evidence of their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.
(2) Yes, the auction sale is void as to the portion of the children of Marcelo.
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized
as such in Article 778 of the Civil Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate of the
decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or combination of heirs, prevailing
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
over all kinds of succession. The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article 886
of the Civil Code defines legitime as "that part of the testator's property which he
cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore,
called compulsory heirs." Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs, excluding
secondary compulsory heirs, and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the
distribution of the decedent's estate. Even without delving into the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate in 1957, it must be stressed that herein respondents'
rights to the succession vested from the moment of their father's death. Herein
respondents' ownership of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became
absolute upon Marcelo's death, although their respective shares therein remained pro
indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to
answer for Teofista's judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents' share
therein was null and void.
In fine, Teofista's ownership over the subject properties is not absolute.
Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even attempt to dispute the conjugal nature
of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the subject properties,
only that portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon and sold on auction
by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by herein
respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their share in the subject
properties.
Referential Syllabus:
Remedial Law; Appeals; Interlocutory Orders; Definition of an Interlocutory Order; Test
to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final.We have defined an
interlocutory order as referring to something between the commencement and the end
of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the
whole controversy. It does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the
case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on
the merits. Upon the other hand, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing
more to do to resolve the case. On more than one occasion, we laid down the test to
ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final i.e., Does it leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is
interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when
there is something more to be done on the merits of the case. The Orders dated May
29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos are interlocutory, and
therefore, not appealable, as they leave something more to be done on the merits of the
case. In fact, in paragraph (d) of Judge Santos Order dated May 29, 1996, herein
respondents were directed to submit evidence showing settlement of the estate of the
deceased Marcelo Sr.
Same; Same; Same; The correct identification of the nature of an assailed order
determines the remedies available to an aggrieved party; Section 1, Rule 41 now
provides for the appropriate remedy to be taken from an interlocutory order.We
cannot overemphasize the rule that the correct identification of the nature of an
assailed order determines the remedies available to an aggrieved party. x x x With the
advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 41 now provides for the
appropriate remedy to be taken from an interlocutory order, thus: x x x In all the above
instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
17. Gonzales vs Court of First Instance, GR # L-34395, 05-19-1981TITO
Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Manila 104 SCRA 479, May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA
(BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA,
TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN
LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA
Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF
DONA FILOMENA ROCKS DE LEGARDA, respondents.
GR # L-34395, May 19, 1981
104 SCRA 479
AQUINO, J:
FACTS:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died in
Manila on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow Filomena and their seven
children: four daughters and three sons.
The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three
equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son
Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda. Filomena
Legarda died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an
affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties, which she inherited from her deceased
daughter, Filomena Legarda, which were the properties in litigation in this case. As a
result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces Legarda succeeded her deceased
daughter as co-owner of the properties held pro indiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter in favor of her sons
children, a total of 16 grandchildren all in all. Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving
children partitioned all the properties consisting of the 1/3 share in the estate of
Benito Legarda y Tuason, which the children inherited, in representation of their
father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died and her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda, a daughter of the testatrix filed a motion to
exclude from the inventory of her mothers estate the properties, which she inherited
from her deceased daughter on the ground that said properties are reservable
properties, which should be inherited by FilomenaLegarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on the motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil
action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mothers estate for
the purpose of serving a declaration that said properties are reservable properties
which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her will to her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her sons and daughters.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, the lower courts decision is reversed and set aside. It is hereby
adjudged that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her
daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable
properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F.
Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective
heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties are subject to ReservaTroncal
HELD:
In reservatroncal:
1. A descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister;
2. The same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by
operation of law from said descendant, and
3. The said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendants(prepositus)
and who belong to the line from which the said properties came.
So three transmissions are involved:
1. A first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an
ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant;
2. A posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime)
from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserva) in favor of another ascendant,
the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation; and,
3. A third transmissions of the property (in consequence of the reservation) from
the reservor to the reserves (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from
the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister
of the deceased descendant.
THUS, if there is only two transmission there is no reserva.
The persons involved in reservatroncal are:
1. The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by
the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
2. The descendant or prepositus who received the property;
3. The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of law; and,
4. The reservee who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who
belongs to the line (linea or tronco) from which the property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the reservor.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at
the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. He is called the propositus.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely:
1. The death of the ascendant obliged to reserve; and,
2. The survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came.
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to
the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the
reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership
of the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at
the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor.
The reservors alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition,
meaning that if at the time of the reservors death, there are reservees, the transferee of
the property should deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees at the time of
the reservors death, the transferees title would become absolute. On the other hand,
the reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right
would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute should the
reservor predecease the reservee.
Even during the reservistas lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers
of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing
anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can
compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the reservista
is alive.
The reservable property is not part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose
of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing. The reservatarios, therefore,
do not inherit from the reservista but frm the descendantprepositus, of whom the
reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservista.
Hence, upon the reservistas death, thereservatario nearest to the propositus becomes
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. The
reservee CANNOT impugn any conveyance made by the reservor BUT he can require
that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser. In this
case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable property in the hands of
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservaton became a certainty
when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the
prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Referential Syllabus:
Appeal; In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised.-In
an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under
undisputed facts Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved
only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal, that
is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
Property; Succession; Reserva Troncal explained.- In reserva troncal, (1) a
descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or
from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said
ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line
from which the said property came.
Property; Succession; Same.- So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first
transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother
or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law
(intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la
reserva)in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two
transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmission of the same
property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant
belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant.
Property; Succession; Same.- The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the
ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant
by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (propositus) who
received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained
the property from the prepositus by operation of law and (4) the reservee (reservatario)
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea o
tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved
by the reservor.
Property; Succession; The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property and
holds title subject to a resolutory condition.- The reservor has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such
title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation.
The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferees rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the
death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the
reservor.
Property; Succession; The reservee has only an inchoate right. He cannot impugn a
conveyance made by the reservor.-On the other hand, the reservee has only an
inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute should the reservor predecease the
reservee. The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can
require that the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser.
Property; Succession; A reservee may sell his right but may not renounce it.- There is a
holding that the renunciation of the reservees right to the reservable property is illegal
for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil.
89, 96). And there is a dictum that the reservees right is a real right which he may
alienate and dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer
ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the reservor (Sienes vs.
Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
Property; Succession; Case at bar involve a reserva troncal.- In the instant case, the
properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs.
Legarda Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at
the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus
Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Property; Succession; All reservees are equally entitled to share in reserva troncal.-This
Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one
reservee it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true
that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason
founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their
shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
18. Edroso vs Sablan, GR # 6878, 09-13-1913UNAS
Edroso vs. Sablan. 25 Phil. 295, September 13, 1913
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner and appellant, vs. PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN,
opponents and appellees.
GR # 6878, September 13, 1913
25 PHIL 295
ARELLANO, J:
FACTS:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property
classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration
and issuance of title to two parcels of land.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on
September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on
August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two parcels of land. Pedro
also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two
parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.Hence the
hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro
Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things:
Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by
law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." The Court of Land
Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of
exceptions. The Appellant contended that she acquired said lands from her descendant
Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant
Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired
them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez,
they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had
between him and his brothers. The appellant also contends that it is not proven that
the two parcels of land in question have been acquired by operation of law, and that
only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law,
is required by law to reserved. The Appellees argue that the appellants defense was
not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in
first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in
1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right
required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of
the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it
existed and that they had it"
The trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature
of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could
only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro
Sablan.
Supreme Courts decision:
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and
declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of
land which are the subject matter of the application, recording in the registration the
right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo
Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special finding as to costs.
ISSUE:
WON an ascendant, who inherits through a descendant, has the duty to
reserve the property.
HELD:
YES. Property which an ascendant inherits by operation of law from his
descendant and which was inherited by the latter from another ascendant of his, must
be reserved by the ascendant heir in favor of uncles of the descendant from whom the
inheritance proceeded, who are his father's brothers because they are relatives within
the third degree, if they belong to the line whence the property proceeded, according to
the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
Art. 811, OCC provides:
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which
the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve
what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property
proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two
parcels of land which he acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by
inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by
operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants, who are
uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan
and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that
they partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in
accordance with the law.
Referential Syllabus:
ESTATES; DUTY OF ASCENDANT, WHO INHERITS THROUGH A DECENDANT, TO
RESERVE THE PROPERTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW; ARTICLE 811, CIVIL CODE.-
Property which an ascendant inherits by operation of law from his descendant and
which was inherited by the latter from another ascendant of his, must be reserved by
the ascendant heir in favor of uncles of the descendant from whom the inheritance
proceeded, who are his father's brothers
ESTATES; RIGHTS OF PERSONS FOR WHOM SUCH PROPERTY IS RESERVED.- Since
the reservation does not imply cownership of any kind between the reservor and the
reservees, that is, between the ascendant who is the immediate heir of the person from
whom the inheritance proceeded and who is the actual owner of the property to be
reserved and the relatives within the third degree of such person, who are merely in
their turn and eventually his possible heirs in second place, if they outlive the heir who
.must make the reservation, such reservees, with only the expectation of inheriting, are
not in law entitled to act and be regarded as though they actually participated in the
ownership of the property to be registered by taking part or pretending to take part in
the application for registration which the reservor presents; the fact being that with
such expectation of inheriting, which is neither a real nor a personal right, but at most
a legitimate expectation of a right, they cannot be better off than a mortgagee who has
a real right to the property that his debtor attempts to register, and yet the Land
Registration Act (No. 496, sec. 19 b) only grants him the right that the application of
the mortgagor cannot be presented without his consent in writing.
ESTATES; RIGHT OF ASCENDANT TO DISPOSE OF OR REGISTER THE PROPERTY IN
His OWN NAME.- The heir of real property who has beyond any doubt the rights of
using and enjoying it, and even of alienating it, is not prevented from himself alone
registering the title to the property he has inherited, merely because to his right of
disposal there is annexed a condition subsequent arising from the expectation of a
right, when the reservees who have that expectation of a right agreed thereto, provided
that, in accordance with the law, the reservable character of such property in their
favor be entered in the record.
19. Doronio vs Sablan, GR # 169454, 12-27-2007ANARNA
Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio 541 SCRA 479, December
27, 2007
THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA AND FLORA, BOTH
SURNAMED DORONIO, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO, NAMELY:
TRINIDAD ROSALINA DORONIO-BALMES, MODING DORONIO, FLORENTINA
DORONIO, AND ANICETA ALCANTARA-MANALO, respondents.
GR # 169454, December 27, 2007
541 SCRA 479
REYES, J:
FACTS:
Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the
registered owners of a parcel of land located at Asingan, Pangasinan covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352. Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio,
now both deceased, were among their children and herein represented by their heirs,
petitioners and respondents respectively.
In 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptiaswas executed by spouses
Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latters wife
on the subject property which was occupied by both parties for several decades.
Petitioners now claim ownership of the land in view of the private deed of donation
propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and wife.
Respondents, on the other hand, contends that they acquired one-half of the
property covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or intestate succession; that the
deed of donation was null and void; that assuming that the deed of donation was valid,
only one-half of the property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica
Pico; and that respondents acquired ownership of the other half portion of the property
by acquisitive prescription and that the subject land is different from what was
donated as the descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and under the private
deed of donation were different.
Petitioners filed before RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For the
Registration of a Private Deed of Donation". Petition was granted and TCT 4481 issued
to petitioners. Respondents MR denied. Respondents, in turn, filed an action for
reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio.
CA reversed RTC. Hence, this petition with petitioners contending that the
RTC no jurisdiction to hear the case since issues on Impairment of Legitime Should Be
Threshed Out in a Special Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for Reconveyance and
Damages.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is
entered:
(1) Declaring the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of
petitioners predecessors NULL AND VOID; and
(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to:
(a) CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44481 in the names of
Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and
(b) RESTORE Original Certificate of Title No. 352 in the names of its
original owners, spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not issue on Impairment of Legitime Should properly be threshed
out in Civil Action for Reconveyance and Damages thus within the jurisdiction of RTC.
2. Whether or not the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs were established?
HELD:
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
1. No. Issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be
resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and
damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum
to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related
matters involving the settlement of estate.
2. No. Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir
may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken firstthe net estate of the
decedent must be first ascertained by deducting all payable obligations and charges
from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death, then, all
donations subject to collation would be added to it.We likewise find merit in
petitioners contention that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The
net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations
and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his
death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established;
and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes.
Referential Syllabus:
Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Official Language; Presumptions; Where a document
in unoffic ial language, not so accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino, is
offered in evidence and not objected to, either by the parties or the court, it must be
presumed that the language in which the document is written is understood by all,
and the document is admissible in evidence.The requirement that documents written
in an unofficial language must be accompanied with a translation in English or
Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission in evidence must be insisted upon by the
parties at the trial to enable the court, where a translation has been impugned as
incorrect, to decide the issue. Where such document, not so accompanied with a
translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either by
the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language in which the document
is written is understood by all, and the document is admissible in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The rule is that evidence not objected to may be deemed admitted
and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.Since
petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary evidence on time, it is now
too late in the day for them to question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not
objected to may be deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in
arriving at its judgment. This is true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible
and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence that was not objected to becomes property of the case,
and all parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable
effects resulting from said evidence.Instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the
contents of Exhibit A, that is, OCT No. 352 in their comment on respondents formal
offer of documentary evidence. In the said comment, petitioners alleged, among others,
that Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are admitted but not for the purpose Quieting of Title; Declaratory Relief; Reformation; An action for quieting of title is a
they are offered because these exhibits being public and official documents are the
best evidence of that they contain and not for what a party would like it to prove. Said
evidence was admitted by the RTC. Once admitted without objection, even though not
admissible under an objection, We are not inclined now to reject it. Consequently, the
evidence that was not objected to became property of the case, and all parties to the
case are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the
said evidence.
Special Proceedings; Probate; Settlement of Estate; Reconveyance; A probate court, in
the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the
issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the
settlement of estate; An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement
of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding.
Petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime of
Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of
spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action
for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of
legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate. An action
for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement
of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require
the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken firstthe net estate of
the decedent must be first ascertained by deducting all payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death,
then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it.We likewise find merit in
petitioners contention that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The
net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations
and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his
death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established;
and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes.
Contracts; Void Contracts; Parties; A void contract is inexistent from the beginning,
and the right to set up the defense of its illegality cannot be waived; Persons who are
not parties in the deed of donation can set up its nullity if they are directly affected by
the same.We cannot agree with petitioners contention that respondents may no
longer question the validity of the deed of donation on the ground that they already
impliedly admitted it. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is
inexistent from the beginning. The right to set up the defense of its illegality cannot be
waived. The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited
to the parties as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third
persons who are directly affected by the contract. Consequently, although respondents
are not parties in the deed of donation, they can set up its nullity because they are
directly affected by the same. The subject of the deed being the land they are
occupying, its enforcement will definitely affect them.
case for declaratory relief.Petitioners cannot also use the finality of the RTC decision
in Petition Case No. U-920 as a shield against the verification of the validity of the deed
of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one for quieting of title.
In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the
Rules of Court.
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
Same; Parties; Due Process; Suits to quiet title, being against the person in respect of
the res, are proceedings characterized as quasi in remthe judgment in such
proceedings is conclusive only between the parties; Generally accepted is the principle
that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.Suits to quiet
title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but
being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as
quasi in rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties. Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920
as they were not made parties in the said case. The rules on quieting of title expressly
provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are
not parties to the action. That respondents filed a subsequent pleading in the same
Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final did not change the
fact that said decision became final without their being impleaded in the case. Said
subsequent pleading was dismissed on the ground of finality of the decision. Thus, the
RTC totally failed to give respondents their day in court. As a result, they cannot be
bound by its orders. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected
by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by
judgment rendered by the court.
Judgments; Res Judicata; Elements.For the principle of res judicata to apply, the
following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties,
subject matter and causes of action. The fourth element is not present in this case.
The parties are not identical because respondents were not impleaded in Petition Case
No. U-920. While the subject matter may be the same property covered by OCT No.
352, the causes of action are different. Petition Case No. U-920 is an action for
declaratory relief while the case below is for recovery of property.
Appeals; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The Supreme Court can suspend its own
rules and except a case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
demand.We are not persuaded by petitioners posture that the only issue in this
action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land; and that the validity of
the deed of donation is beside the point. It is precisely the validity and enforceability of
the deed of donation that is the determining factor in resolving the issue of who has a
better right over the property. Moreover, notwithstanding procedural lapses as to the
appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the petition filed before Us, this Court
can brush aside the technicalities in the interest of justice. In some instances, this
Court even suspended its own rules and excepted a case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so demanded.
Pleadings and Practice; Assignment of Errors; A rudimentary doctrine on appealed
cases is that the Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary at arriving at a just decision of the case; An unassigned error closely related
to an error properly assigned or upon which the determination of the question raised
by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.Although respondents did not
directly raise the issue of validity of the deed of donation at the commencement of the
case before the trial court, it was stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial
conference. In any event, this Court has authority to inquire into any question
necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case before it. Though not specifically
questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important
for substantial justice to be rendered. Furthermore, this Court has held that although
a factual issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of substantial justice,
this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual matter. The Supreme
Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if
it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision. A
rudimentary doctrine on appealed cases is that this Court is clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds
that their consideration is necessary at arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an
unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which the
determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will
be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an
error.
Contracts; Donations; Statutes; It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the
execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later statutes, unless the latter
are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.We now focus on the crux of the
petition, which is the validity of the deed of donation. It is settled that only laws
existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
Accordingly, the Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias
was executed in 1919, while the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950.
Marriages; Donations; A donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by
public instrument.Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be
made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described. Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that gifts propter nuptias are
governed by the rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of the same Code. Article 633 of
that title provides that the gift of real property, in order to be valid, must appear in a
public document. It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void
unless made by public instrument. In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias
did not become valid. Neither did it create any right because it was not made in a
public instrument. Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in question to petitioners
predecessors.
Land Titles and Deeds; Torrens System; Prescription; A title once registered under the
torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession,
and neither can it be defeated by prescription.The claim of respondents that they
became owners of the property by acquisitive prescription has no merit. Truth to tell,
respondents cannot successfully invoke the argument of extinctive prescription. They
cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive prescription of the portion of the property
they have been possessing. The reason is that the property was covered by OCT No.
352. A title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by
adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. It is
notice to the whole world and as such all persons are bound by it and no one can
plead ignorance of the registration.
Same; Same; The torrens system is intended to guarantee the integrity and
conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, and it cannot be used for the
perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land.The torrens
system is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of
registration, but it cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner
of the registered land. The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it.
Certainly, it cannot be used to divest the lawful owner of his title for the purpose of
transferring it to another who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or
recognized by law. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can
it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of another. Where such an illegal transfer is made, as in the
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
case at bar, the law presumes that no registration has been made and so retains title
in the real owner of the land.
20. Tupsa vs RTC Negros Occidental, GR # L-65800, 10-03-1986BELEN
Vda. de Tupas vs. Br. XLIII, RTC of Negros Occidental 144 SCRA 622, October 03,
1986
PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. BRANCH XLIII of the
HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent, and TUPAS
FOUNDATION, INC., private respondent-appellee.
GR # L-65800, October 3, 1986
144 SCRA 622
NARVASA, J:
FACTS:
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving
his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a will
dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate on September 30, 1980 in Special
Proceedings No. 13994 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Among the
assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre,
admittedly his private capital. However, at the time of his death, these lots were no
longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before (on August 2, 1977) to
the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any
inheritance, Tupas widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the same
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed as Civil Case No. 16089) to have
the donation declared in officious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore
reducible by one-half or such proportion as (might be deemed) justified and the
resulting deduction restored and conveyed or delivered to her.
Supreme Courts decision:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant Partenza
Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the donated property in
question, as may be found in excess of the freely disposable portion of the estate of
Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the manner above-indicated. Let the case be
remanded to the Trial Court for further appropriate proceedings in accordance with
this decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is officious insofar it prejudice the legitime
HELD:
A persons prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one
of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752,
Civil Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will
is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess,
though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donors lifetime or the donees
appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code).
Such a donation is, moreover, collationable, that is, its value is imputable
into the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death for the purpose of
determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable
portion of the estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to
compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem
to limit collation to the latter class of donations.
Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having
been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law7 chargeable to the freely disposable
portion of the donors estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious, i.e., it exceeds said
portion and thus impairs the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in order to find out
whether it is inofficious or not, recourse must be had to the rules established by the
Civil Code for the determination of the legitime and, by extension, of the disposable
portion.
The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part
of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its
being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation
contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos.6 The further fact that the lots
donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment,
because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not
his, but that he gave more than what was within his power to give.
Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the
freely disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured. If
the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then
it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious asito the excess
and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be
shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole
compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant
Partenza Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the donated
property in question, as may be found in excess of the freely disposable portion of the
estate of Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the manner above-indicated. Let the case be
remanded to the Trial Court for further appropriate proceedings in accordance with
this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Referential Syllabus:
Donations; Succession; Property donated inter vivos is subject to collation after donors
death, whether the donation was made to a compulsory or a stranger.A persons
prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he
cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If he does,
so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious
and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to
its taking effect in the donors lifetime or the donees appropriating the fruits of the
thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collationable, that
is, its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the time of his death
for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the
freely disposable portion of the estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as
of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the langague of Article 1061 of the Civil Code
would seem to limit collation to the latter class of donations.
Same; Same; Fact that property donated to stranger is capital property of the husband
is no bar to collation where legitime of his heir may be affected.The fact, therefore,
that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at
the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation.
Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation contemplates and particularly
applies to gifts inter vivos. The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly
capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of
inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave
more than what was within his power to give.
 SUCCESSION SUPREME COURT CASES BATCH 1
Donations; Succession; How to determine whether a donation is inofficious or not.-
These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of
which the following step-by-step procedure has been correctly outlined: (1)
determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the testators
death; (2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid
out or deducted from the value of the property thus left; (3) the determination of the
difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate; (4)
the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were made, of
donations subject to collation; and (5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes
by getting from the total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of
each respective compulsory heir.

Donations; Succession; Same.-Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the
hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question
here must be measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not
exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is
inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this
case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant
as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.