1
damage to property "because what the law seeks to penalize is the
Reodica v. CA, G.R. No. 125006, July 8, 1996
Facts:
On the evening of October 17, 1987, while Isabelita Reodica was
driving her van in Paranaque, Metro Manila, her van hit the car of
Norberto Bonsol. As a result, Bonsol sustained physical injuries and the
damage to his car amounted to P8,542.
On Oct. 20, 1987, Bonsol filed an Affidavit of Complaint against
Reodica with the Fiscal's Office. Later, on Jan 13, 1988, an information
was filed before the RTC of Makati charging Reodica with "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical
Injury.
Reodica pleaded not guilty to the charge against her, so, trial ensued.
On Jan 31, 1991, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Reodica of
the "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with slight physical injuries" and sentencing her to suffer
imprisonment for 6 months and pay Bonsol P13,542.
Reodica contends that damage to property and slight physical injuries
are light offenses which cannot be complexed. Further, since the two
are light offenses, the RTC do not have jurisdiction over such offenses,
and even if does, the penalty imposed on her is excessive.
Being light offenses, adding up the imposable penalties of the
mentioned light offenses only sum up to 60 days of imprisonment and
not 6 months as imposed on her by the lower court.
Moreover, she also argues that "the offense of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor,
is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months". The information
was only filed on January 13, 1988 or almost 3 months from the date of
the vehicular collision, thus, the offense had already prescribed.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with the petitioner that
the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period,
pursuant to Art.365 of the RPC. But, it contends that it was proper to
"complex" reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and
single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there
was no need for two separate informations". Further, the OSG argues
that although it is the MTC which has jurisdiction over cases of slight
physical injuries, the RTC "properly took cognizance of this case
because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the
damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of
P8,542".
Issue:
1. Whether or not the two light offenses - damage to property and slight
physical injuries can be complexed, and even if it can be complexed,
was the 6 months imprisonment sentenced to Reodica proper?
2. Whether or not the crime has already prescribed.
Held: 1. The two offenses cannot be complexed, they should have
been filed separately.
2. No. The Supreme Court used Art. 91 of the RPC for resolving the
issue on prescription of the offense.
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped
by any reason not imputable to him.
Thus, the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after
the vehicular mishap interrupted the run of the offense's prescription.
G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, v. CA, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, Petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van
along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila.
Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto
Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his
car amounted to P8,542.00. Thus, on 20 October 1987, complainant filed an Affidavit
of Complaint against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office. Later, on 13 January 1988, an

information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging petitioner
with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical
Injury." Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then
ensued.
RULING OF RTC:
The RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision convicting petitioner of the "quasi
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical
injuries," and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen
P13,542, representing the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses
(P5,000.00) without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals
RULING OF COURT OF APPEALS:
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, where:
Now that an acquittal seems impossible, may we revisit the penalty and
move that it be reviewed and set aside since it is respectfully submitted to be
error to complex damage to property and slight physical injuries,
as both are light offenses, over which the respondent court had no
jurisdiction and even assuming such jurisdiction, it cannot impose a penalty
in excess of what is authorized by law.
CA denied. Hence, this petitions before the Supreme Court for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent court of appeals gravely abused its discretion
when it complexed the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property and slight physical injuries imposing a single excessive penalty
2. Whether or not the respondent court of appeals gravely erred when it
affirmed the trial court's decision notwithstanding the defense of
prescription and lack of jurisdiction.
3. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the
first time on appeal.
HELD:
1. In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a
separate information.
2
Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by
public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines
light felonies as infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under
Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the
graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower
than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property
is, as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional penalty under Article
25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave
felony not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex
crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
2. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to
actions pending before its enactment. The criminal jurisdiction of the lower
courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the
amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged.
Since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2
months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs,
it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower
than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the
jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or
MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods the duration of which was from 1 month
and 1 day to 4 months.
Therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.
Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two

months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty
is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime
is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of
substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the
Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised
Penal Code, the latter prevails.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal
Code, Article 91 thereof shall apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for
the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint
with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained
tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold
petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the
information in this case.
3. Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense
of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been
charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this
stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two
separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise
it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to
it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are
charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
3
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
NICOLAS v. ROMULO
FACTS:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the US
Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a
Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:
The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier,
Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the crime of
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 8353, upon a complaint under oath filed by Suzette S. Nicolas, which is
attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex A, committed as
follows:
That on or about the Nov 1, 2005, inside the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone, Olongapo City the above-named
accuseds (sic), being then members of the United States
Marine Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., raped one
Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman
inside a Starex Van with Plate No. WKF-162, owned by
Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address at 8900
P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by
accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and
consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her damage
and prejudice.
Pursuant to the VFA bet the Phil and the US, entered into on Feb 10, 1998,
the US, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the
proceedings.
During the trial, which was transferred from the RTC of Zambales to the RTC
of Makati for security reasons, the United States Government faithfully
complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every
time his presence was required.
RTC: the RTC of Makati, found defendant Smith guilty, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient

evidence against accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH
SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps assigned
at the USS Essex, are hereby ACQUITTED to the crime charged.
Pursuant to Art V, para No. 10, of the VFA entered into by the Phil & US,
accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the facilities
that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United
States authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL.
DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.
As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati
jail until further orders.
On Dec 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail
by a contingent of Phil law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under
orders of the DILG, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of
the US govt, provided for under new agreements between the Phil and the
US, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006
which states:
The Govt of the Phil and the Govt of the USA agree that, in
accordance with the VFA signed between our two nations, Lance
Corporal Daniel J. Smith, US Marine Corps, be returned to U.S.
military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:
The DFA of the Phil and the Embassy of the USA agree that, in
accordance with the VFA signed between the 2 nations, upon transfer
of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, US Marine Corps, from the Makati
City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG)
Building, U.S. Embassy Compound. He will be guarded round the
clock by U.S. military personnel. The Phil police and jail authorities,
under the direct supervision of the Phil DILG will have access to the
place of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with
the terms of the VFA.
CA: we resolved to DISMISS the petition for having become moot.
ISSUE:
1. Is the VFA is void and unconstitutional?
This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v. Zamora, brought by Bayan,
one of petitioners in the present cases.
4
The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines
and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
xxx xxx xxx
To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was
adopted in the 1987 Constitution.
The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall
be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved.
The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms and
conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were
binding upon us but not upon the foreign State.
Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the question is
whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Phil territory pursuant to
the VFA is allowed under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.
First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,the VFA was duly concurred in by the Phil
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested
and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
government.
The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the
United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding
international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this
is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the
internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its
Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in
nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under
the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days
from ratification.
The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-

US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was
signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and
the United States Senate.
The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Signed at
Washington, August 30, 1951.
The Parties of this Treaty
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all
peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric
of peace in the Pacific area.
Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought
their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and
mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression
during the last war.
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity
and their common determination to defend themselves against
external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be
under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific
area.
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and security
pending the development of a more comprehensive system of
regional security in the Pacific area.
Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered
or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any
existing agreements or understandings between the
Phil and the USA.
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may
be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice are not
endangered and to refrain in their international relation from
the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
5
purposes of the United Nations.
ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty,
the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual
aid will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies,
will consult together from time to time regarding the
implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of
either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or
security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed
attack in the Pacific.
ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the
common dangers in accordance with its constitutional
processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United
Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and
maintain international peace and security.
ARTICLE V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the
Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the
metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island
territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed
forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.
ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties
under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of
the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace
and security.
ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines
and the United Nations of America in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes and will come into force
when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged
by them at Manila.
ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party
may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the
other party.
IN WITHNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed
this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.
Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the
capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US
Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for
the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main
RP-US Military Defense Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states:
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and their desire to strengthen international
and regional security in the Pacific area;
Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951;
Noting that from time to time elements of the United States
armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines;
Considering that cooperation between the United States and the
Republic of the Philippines promotes their common security
interests;
Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United
States personnel visiting the Republic of the Philippines;
Have agreed as follows:
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US
Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress
under the CaseZablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for
this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as
a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this
substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25
of our Constitution.
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the
fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence allowed
under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself
has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate,
there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence.
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and provisions.
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed
6
Forces in the Philippines, the following rules apply:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the
Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside
with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the
commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal
notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make
such personnel available to those authorities in time for any
investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with
which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the
Philippine Government shall present its position to the United
States Government regarding custody, which the United States
Government shall take into full account.
In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within
one year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations
under this paragraph. The 1 year period will not include the time
necessary to appeal. Also, the 1 year period will not include
any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed
because United States authorities, after timely notification by
Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused,
fail to do so.
Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the
Constitution, namely, that providing for the exclusive power of this Court to
adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]).
They argue that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign
power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused, which
also violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).
Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial
basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces
allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter
ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed
upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around
the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties
involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the

receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State
only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to
adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is
normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure)
of one State do not extend or apply except to the extent agreed upon to
subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity
given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity
from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation
to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats
and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to
enter another States territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a
different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody.
The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule
that governs is the following provision of the VFA:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of
United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities
agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States
authorities. United States personnel serving sentences
in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and
material assistance.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between
custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided
for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement
clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed
on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be by
Philippine authorities. Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the
accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself
because such detention is not by Philippine authorities.
7
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate
with representatives of the United States towards an agreement on detention
facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the
VFA.
Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas (552 US ___ No. 06-984, March 25, 2008),
which held that treaties entered into by the United States are not automatically
part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or there is
an implementing legislation to make them enforceable.
On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:
G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R.
No. 176051 (Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v. Daniel Smith, et al.); and G.R. No.
176222 (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN], et al. v. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.).
The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit within 3
days a Comment/Manifestation on the following points:
1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement
of the recent US Supreme Court decision in Jose Ernesto Medellin v. Texas,
dated March 25, 2008, to the effect that treaty stipulations that are not self-
executory can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect;
and that, while treaties may comprise international commitments, they are not
domestic law unless Congress has enacted implementing statutes or the treaty
itself conveys an intention that it be self-executory and is ratified on these
terms?
2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic
law, either because it is self-executory or because there
exists legislation to implement it.
3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August
30, 1951 was concurred in by the US Senate and, if so,
is there proof of the US Senate advice and consent
resolution? Peralta, J., no part.
After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:
First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin

itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings
under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has
been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its
obligation to produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.
Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-
Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent
of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within
60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to
these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered
under the Case-Zablocki Act.
In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations and the Avena decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
subject matter of the Medellin decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision
are not self-executing and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act,
and thus lack legislative implementing authority.
Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by
the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US Congressional
Record, 82nd Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98 Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.
The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international
law in domestic courts varies from country to country.
As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS, some countries
require legislation whereas others do not.
It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting
Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State to convert their
system to achieve alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required that
the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. With that,
it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the
enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes
under international law.
Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v.
Rossi, an executive agreement is a treaty within the meaning of that word in
international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis--vis the United
States. Thus, the US Supreme Court in Weinberger enforced the provisions of
the executive agreement granting preferential employment to Filipinos in the
US Bases here.
8
Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American
system:
1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties These are advised and consented to by
the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution.
2. ExecutiveCongressional Agreements: These are joint
agreements of the President and Congress and need not be submitted to the
Senate.
3. Sole Executive Agreements. These are agreements entered into
by the President. They are to be submitted to Congress within 60 days of
ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which they
are recognized by the Congress and may be implemented.
As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military
aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through
implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of
its provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated January 2, 2007 is
MODIFIED. The VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but
the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are
DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States
representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under
Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which
the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related
matters pending therein, namely, the petition for contempt and the appeal of
L/CPL Daniel Smith from the judgment of conviction.
G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. AH SING, defendant-appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding
the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law),
and sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
FACTS: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the
steamship Shun Chang.
The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April
25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon.
The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board
the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip
from Saigon to Cebu.
When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the
authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium hidden in the
ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine.
The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had
purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in
buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands.
No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused
was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.
ISSUE: Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands
been proven? YES
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but with
the intimation that there exists inconsistently between the doctrines laid down
in the two cases. However, neither decision is directly a precedent on the facts
before us.
In the case of US vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the opinion handed
down by the Chief Justice, it is found
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard
a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a
crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered
as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does no apply when the article,
whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of
opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation
9
of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force
at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place
itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.1awph
il.net
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the
present instance is readily observable.
In the Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal possession and sale of opium in
the present case the charge as illegal importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the
foreign vessel was in transit in the present case the foreign vessel was not in transit;
in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the vessel upon Phil soil in the
present case of United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the
one on which resolution turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal
importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the Government must prove, or offer
evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the vessel from which the drug is
discharged came into Phil waters from a foreign country with the drug on board.
In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the
opium was imported from a foreign country;
in the present case there is no question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu.
However, in the opinion in the Jose case, we find the following which may be obiter
dicta, but which at least is interesting as showing the view of the writer of the opinion:
The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it anchored in
Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium discharged or that it be taken from the
ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine
Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a
port of the Philippine Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.
Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views just quoted, we
return to an examination of the applicable provisions of the law.
It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully
import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are
synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere
act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation.
(The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.)
And again, the importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but
merely the bringing them into port; and the importation is complete before entry of the
Custom House.
RULING: YES.
As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully
imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Phil Islands, when the prohibited
drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct

from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine
Islands.
In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless
contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.
Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb to think that the accused was
merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere
pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the
accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use.
No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the
defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands.
We accordingly find that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign
country into the Phil Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let
it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a
situation not present.
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court being within the limits
provided by law, it results that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of
this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
NORMA DE JOYA, petitioner, vs. THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS
CITY AND HON. RUBEN A. GALVEZ AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BATANGAS CITY MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH I,
respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Norma de Joya praying
for her release from the Batangas City Jail on the claim that her detention was
illegal.
FACTS: The petitioner was charged separately with violations of BP. 22 before
the MTC in Batangas City.
The docket numbers and accusatory portion of each of the Informations reads:
Criminal Case No. 25484
That on or about September 28, 1994 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, well-
knowing that she does not have funds in or credit with the Solid Bank,
Batangas Branch, Batangas City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
10
feloniously draw, make and issue to Flor Catapang de Tenorio, Solid Bank
Check No. 040297 postdated to Oct 28, 1994 in the amount of P150,000.00
pesos, Phil Currency, to apply on account or for value, but when said check
was presented for full payment with the drawee bank within a period of 90 days
from the date of the check, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank on
the ground account closed, which in effect is even more than a dishonor for
insufficiency of funds, and despite notice of dishonor and demands made upon
her to make good her check by making proper arrangement with the drawee
bank or pay her obligation in full directly to Flor Catapang de Tenorio, accused
failed and refused to do so,
which acts constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and
prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in general and of Flor
Catapang de Tenorio in particular in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 25773
That on or about Oct 17, 1994 at Batangas City, Phil the above-named
accused, well-knowing that she does not have fund in or credit with the
Security Bank and Trust Company, Batangas Branch, Batangas City, did draw,
make and issue to Resurreccion T. Castillo, Security Bank and Trust Company
Check No. 038111 postdated to Oct 24, 1994 in the amount of P225,000.00,
to apply on account or for value, but the same was dishonored by the drawee
bank on the ground of account closed, and despite notice of dishonor and
demands made upon her to make good her check by making proper
arrangement with the drawee bank or pay her obligation in full directly to
Resurreccion T. Castillo, accused failed and refused to do so, which acts
constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and prejudice
of transaction in commercial documents in general and of Resurreccion T.
Castillo in particular in the aforementioned amount.
When arraigned in both cases, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty. While trial was going on, the petitioner jumped bail.
No evidence was thereby adduced in her defense in any of the two cases.
On December 14, 1995, the trial court promulgated its decision in Criminal
Case No. 25484. The petitioner and her counsel failed to appear despite due
notice. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Norma de Joya guilty of the crime of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and hereby sentences said accused to suffer an
imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify the offended party, Flor Catapang
Tenorio, in the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency.
SO ORDERED.

On March 21, 1997, the decision in Criminal Case No. 25773 was likewise
promulgated in absentia.
The decretal portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Prosecution having satisfactorily established the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences herein-
accused Norma de Joya of imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR and to pay
complainant Resurreccion Castillo of the amount of TWO HUNDRED
TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P225,000.00) PESOS by way of damages.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner remained at large and no appeal was filed from any of the said
decisions. In the meantime, the Court issued Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 on November 21, 2000 enjoining all courts and judges
concerned to take notice of the ruling and policy of the Court enunciated in
Vaca v. Court of Appeals[5] and Lim v. People[6] with regard to the imposition
of the penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
After 5 years, the petitioner was finally arrested while she was applying for an
NBI clearance. She was detained at the Batangas City Jail on December 3,
2002.
MTC: On July 28, 2003, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the MTC of
Batangas City asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000
retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the ROC and to order her release from
detention. The public prosecutor opposed the motion.
In an Order dated August 15, 2003, the trial court denied the motion on three
grounds: (a) its decision convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
had long become final and executory; hence, could no longer be amended to
change the penalty imposed therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied
prospectively; and (c) the SC Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a
substantive law, but merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform
imposition of fine.
Hence, the petition at bar.
The petitioner posits that SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty
of imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only the imposition of
a fine. The trial court was mandated to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000
retroactively conformably with Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code citing the
ruling of this Court in United States v. Pacrose.[7] The petitioner prays that the
Court declare her detention illegal and order her release from the Batangas
City Jail.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition contending that:
1) THE TWO (2) JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION AGAINST THE
11
PETITIONER HAD LONG ATTAINED FINALITY AND COULD NO LONGER
BE MODIFIED.
2) ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 AS MODIFIED BY
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 DID NOT DELETE THE
PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT IN BP 22 CASES.
The OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Abarquez v. Court of Appeals.[9]
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ
of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment; or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final
judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City, convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably then, the petitioner is not entitled to a writ
of habeas corpus. Petitioners reliance of our ruling in Ordonez v. Vinarao[10]
that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty
introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon,[11] is misplaced. Thus, her
plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin.
Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should
benefit her has no basis.
First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those
cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already
terminated by final judgment.
Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC
Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the

application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P.
Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular
No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose
of the law but also the circumstances of the accused whether he acted in good
faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence and such other
circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to
the penalty to be imposed. The Court thus emphasized that:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative
intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in
the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith
or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine
alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a
fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that:
1. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 does not remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg.
22;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion,
and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each
case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would
best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to
impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay
the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the
Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
12
B.P. Blg. 22 provides for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both
fine and imprisonment as follows:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single
penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine,
or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
In providing for alternative penalties in B.P. Blg. 22, Congress took into
account the principal objectives of the law, namely, the prohibition on the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The practice is
prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public interest. The
effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system
and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against
public order.
However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that
Philippine penal law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted
features of the positivist theory of criminal law.
The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total
of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The
adoption of the aspects of the theory is exemplified by the indeterminate
sentence law, Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (impossible
crime), Article 68 and Articles 11 to 14, not to mention Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code (penalties for heinous and quasi-heinous crimes).
Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society. Among the
 13
important factors to be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed
on him are (1) his relationship towards his dependents, family and their
relationship with him; and (2) his relationship towards society at large and the
State. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of
protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and
other social ends.

The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties imposed must not
only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an
opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-
spirited member of the community.

The court has to consider not only the primary elements of punishment,
namely, the moral responsibility of the convict, the relation of the convict to the
private complainant, the intention of the convict, the temptation to the act or
the excuse for the crime was it done by a rich man in the insolence of his
wealth or by a poor man in the extremity of his need? The court must also
take into account the secondary elements of punishment, namely, the
reformation of the offender, the prevention of further offenses by the offender,
the repression of offenses in others.

As Rousseau said, crimes can be thoroughly repressed only by a system of

penalties which, from the benignity they breathe, serve rather than to soften
than to inflame those on whom they are imposed.

There is also merit in the view that punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the
offense is so much punishment of innocence.

In this case, even if the Court applies SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000, as
revised, retroactively, the petition must nevertheless be dismissed. The
petitioner did not offer any evidence during trial. The judgment of the court
became final and executory upon her failure to appeal therefrom. Worse, the
petitioner remained at large for five long years. Were it not for her attempt to
secure an NBI clearance, she would have been able to elude the long arm of
the law.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for

lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.