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  • 2016-06-30 - NRC - Comments Per 5 USC 1213 (E) (1) On NRC Response To OSC - ML16242A333

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    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was asked to investigate two allegations: 1) That the Oconee Nuclear Station failed to require Duke Power to safeguard its plant from flooding that could occur should the Jocassee Dam fail. 2) That the agency failed to require 80 other nuclear power stations to take appropriate measures to protect against the risk of upstream dam failures. The report prepared for the Chairman of the NRC provides a litany of steps the agency initiated, but fails to address where those actions were incomplete or ineffective. It does not mention the actions the agency was asked to take, but ignored. The comments describe problems with the investigative report and process.

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    2016-06-30 - NRC - Comments Per 5 USC § 1213(e)(1) on NRC Response to OSC - ML16242A333

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    2016-06-30 - NRC - Comments Per 5 USC § 1213(e)(1) on NRC Response to OSC - ML16242A333

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    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was asked to investigate two allegations: 1) That the Oconee Nuclear Station failed to require Duke Power to safeguard its plant from flooding that could occur should the Jocassee Dam fail. 2) That the agency failed to require 80 other nuclear power stations to take appropriate measures to protect against the risk of upstream dam failures. The report prepared for the Chairman of the NRC provides a litany of steps the agency initiated, but fails to address where those actions were incomplete or ineffective. It does not mention the actions the agency was asked to take, but ignored. The comments describe problems with the investigative report and process.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    93 views92 pages

    2016-06-30 - NRC - Comments Per 5 USC 1213 (E) (1) On NRC Response To OSC - ML16242A333

    Uploaded by

    earchives
    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was asked to investigate two allegations: 1) That the Oconee Nuclear Station failed to require Duke Power to safeguard its plant from flooding that could occur should the Jocassee Dam fail. 2) That the agency failed to require 80 other nuclear power stations to take appropriate measures to protect against the risk of upstream dam failures. The report prepared for the Chairman of the NRC provides a litany of steps the agency initiated, but fails to address where those actions were incomplete or ineffective. It does not mention the actions the agency was asked to take, but ignored. The comments describe problems with the investigative report and process.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
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    of 92

    OSC File No.

    DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on


    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 1


    1
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    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 2


    2
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 3


    3
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 4


    4
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 5


    5
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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 6


    6
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 7


    7
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 8


    8
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 9


    9
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 10


    10
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 11


    11
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 12


    12
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 13


    13
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 14


    14
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 15


    15
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 16


    16
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 17


    17
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 18


    18
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    BC7/#  +) ..*).;' -) $- /*-/ B C7)/# !!$ *!0' -
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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 19


    19
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 20


    20
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    
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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 21


    21
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 22


    22
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 23


    23
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 24


    24
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 25


    25
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 26


    26
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 27


    27
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 28


    28
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 29


    29
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 30


    30
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 31


    31
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    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    
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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 32


    32
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 33


    33
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    
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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 34


    34
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 35


    35
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 36


    36
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 37


    37
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    
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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 38


    38
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 39


    39
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 40


    40
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 41


    41
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 42


    42
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    
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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 43


    43
    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

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    Criscione ML16242A333 Exhibit 1, page 49


    49
        
     

    Review and Comments on the


    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairmans
    Letter to the Office of Special Council
    RE: File No. DI-15-5254
    Dated June 30, 2016
    By
    Jeffrey T. Mitman
    Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst
    US NRC
    August 24, 2016

    Significance of a Jocassee Dam Failure

    The Jocassee Dam is a large dam. It is 385 feet in height and impounds over a million acre feet of water. Should
    this dam fail Dukes August 2010 analysis indicated a peak flow across the Keowee Dam, and significantly onto
    the Oconee Nuclear Station, of between 2.3 and 2.8 million cubic feet per second (cfs) and a peak flow across
    the Oconee intake canal structure of between 0.7 and 0.8 million cfs.1 Dukes post Fukushima reanalysis
    essentially confirms these results.2,3,4 To put this into context, the average flow of the Mississippi River at New
    Orleans is approximately 0.6 million cfs. 5 If the Jocassee Dam fails catastrophically, there will be a lot of water at
    Oconee. Further, Dukes states: [C]ore damage occurs in about 8 to 9 hours following the dam break and
    containment failure in about 59 to 68 hours. When containment failure occurs, significant dose to the public
    would result. 6

    Near-Term Task Force on Fukushima Process Has Significantly Decreased Flood Protection at Oconee

    Overview

    The first allegation that the NRC Chairmans working group was tasked to evaluate was whether the NRC had
    failed to require Oconee to take corrective measures to safeguard the plant from a Jocassee Dam failure. The
    Executive Summary of the NRCs Flooding Working Group report (Investigative Report to the Chairman of the
    U.S. NRC, hereafter referred to as the Investigative Report), concludes:

    The NRC has required Oconee to take appropriate action to provide adequate protection to
    public health and safety from rare but credible upstream dam failures.7

    1
    Duke Letter from D. Baxter to NRC, Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003, dated August 2,
    2010, ML102170006.*
    2
    Duke Letter from T.P. Gillespie, Jr., Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, dated March 12, 2013, ML13079A227.
    3
    Duke Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Enclosure 1, dated March 2013, ML13240A016.
    4
    Duke Letter from S.L. Batson to NRC, Revised Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report per NRCs Request for Additional
    Information, dated March 6, 2015, ML15072A106.
    5
    National Park Service, Mississippi River Facts, https://www.nps.gov/miss/riverfacts.htm.
    6
    Duke Letter from D. Baxter to NRC, Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request, dated September 26, 2008, ML082750106.
    7
    NRC Letter from S. G. Burns to Office of Special Council, C.N. Lerner, Re OSC File No. Di-15-5254, dated June 30, 2016.
    *Criscione comment: See Exhibit 6 for information on how to access NRC ADAMS references.

      

        
     

    In 2011 the NRC required that Duke protect the Oconee reactors from a Jocassee Dam failure-induced flood to a
    flood depth of 19 feet.8 They also concluded that when that flood protection was in place Oconee would meet
    the adequate protection standard:

    These conservatisms provide the staff with additional assurance that the above Case 2 scenario
    will bound the inundation at [Oconee], therefore providing reasonable assurance for the overall
    flooding scenario at the site.

    However, in 2016 the NRC informed Duke that they needed to protect Oconee only to a flood height of about
    4.5 feet.9,10 The NRC made this decision without a finding of adequate protection. Instead of using a
    conservative standard they used one based on reasonableness.

    At this time, the best that can be said is that it is unclear whether the public is adequately protected.

    Detailed Discussion

    In August 2008, the NRC wrote a request for information to Duke regarding protection of Oconee from a
    Jocassee Dam failure.11 In April 2009, the NRC elevated this to an adequate protection issue. 12 In January 2011,
    the NRC wrote a safety evaluation finding that Oconee was adequately protected if it complied with a
    confirmatory action letter.13 This safety evaluation was based on a detailed two-dimensional hydrological
    analysis conducted by Duke.14 (A major shortcoming of this safety evaluation is that it is based on a hydrological
    analysis which the NRC never reviewed. See Box 1 below for a detailed discussion.) The end result of this
    process was that Duke was required to protect Oconee from a Jocassee Dam failure-induced flood of about 19
    feet above grade.

    The safety evaluation describes the flood height for which Oconee needs to be protected as Case 2. The flood
    height location that is most critical to public safety is at the standby shutdown facility (SSF). The SSF is located at
    grade at an elevation of 796 feet mean sea level (all elevations are given with respect to mean sea level). The
    calculated flood height is 19 feet. The significance of the SSF to plant safety is that the SSF, while not safety
    grade, is currently the highest permanently installed equipment in place to protect the plant and the public from
    a flood; that is, it would be the last equipment to be flooded. The top of the flood wall protecting the SSF is at

    8
    NRC Letter to P. Gillespie, Staff Assessment of Dukes Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding Dukes
    Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns at Oconee, dated January 28, 2011, ML110280153.
    9
    NRC Letter to S. Batson, Oconee Staff Assessment of Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
    Flood-Causing Mechanisms Reevaluation and Path Forward on Confirmatory Action Letter, dated April 14, 2016,
    ML15352A207.
    10
    NRC Staff Assessment by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report Near-
    Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Oconee, Enclosures 1 and 2, dated April 2016, ML15356A158 (not publicly
    available).
    11
    NRC Letter to D. Baxter, Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure
    of Jocassee Dam, at Oconee, dated August 15, 2008, ML081640244.
    12
    NRC Letter to D. Baxter, Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke), September 26, 2008, Response to NRC Letter
    dated August 15, 2008, Related to External Flooding at Oconee, dated April 30, 2009, ML090570779.
    13
    NRC Letter to D.A. Baxter, Confirmatory Action Letter Oconee Nuclear Station Commitments to Address External
    Flooding Concerns, dated June 22, 2010, ML101730329.
    14
    NRC Letter to P. Gillespie, Staff Assessment of Dukes Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding Dukes
    Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns at Oconee, dated January 28, 2011, ML110280153.

      

        
     

    about 7.5 feet. Thus, the flood height established by this analysis requires Duke to increase flood protection to
    19 feet.

    As stated previously, this level of flood protection was required for adequate protection. The safety evaluation
    reiterates this requirement when it states: The NRC staff reviewed the information [preliminary information
    submitted by the licensee at the outset of the NRCs inquiry] and based on the review, the NRC staff found that
    the information provided by the licensee did not demonstrate that the Oconee site would be adequately
    protected from external flooding events. As the safety evaluation states repeatedly, the inputs to establish
    adequate protection were required to be based on conservative assumptions. The safety evaluation concludes
    by stating that: [T]he above Case 2 scenario will bound the inundation at [Oconee], therefore providing
    reasonable assurance for the overall flooding scenario at the site. This Case 2 scenario will be the new flooding
    basis for the site. One would presume that the flood height determined by this NRC safety evaluation
    establishes the new licensing basis flood.

    As part of the post Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), the NRC, in a request for information in March
    2012, required the licensees to reevaluate the seismic and flooding hazards at their sites using updated seismic
    and flooding hazard information and present-day regulatory guidance and methodologies. 15 In almost all cases,
    new methods are more conservative than methods established for licensing older plants like Oconee. Using
    present-day methods, Oconee would never be licensed below two large dams (Keowee and Jocassee). The
    Oconee plant grade is four feet below the normal Keowee reservoir of 800 feet mean sea level, and portions of
    the dams west embankment are less than a 1000 feet from the Oconee power block. In addition, the safety-
    related electrical distribution system has critical equipment located only a foot above grade in a structure that is
    not protected from flooding. In other words, a flood with resulting water level only a little more than a foot
    above grade will destroy the distribution system and thus incapacitate most of the emergency core cooling
    system (ECCS).

    Duke submitted their initial flood hazard reevaluation report (FHRR) in March 2013. 16,17 After discussion with
    the NRC, Duke submitted their final FHRR in March 2015. 18 The NRC accepted the conclusions of the final FHRR
    by letter containing a staff assessment dated April 14, 2016. 19 Dukes final FHRR proposesand the NRC staff
    assessment acceptsa flood height from a Jocassee Dam failure of approximately 4.5 feet above grade. 20,21 This
    new flood height is about 15 feet lower than the height established by the NRCs safety evaluation of January 28,

    15
    NRC Letter to All Reactor Licensees, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)
    Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
    Accident, dated March 12, 2012, ML12053A340.
    16
    Duke Letter from T.P. Gillespie, Jr., Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, dated March 12, 2013, ML13079A227.
    17
    Duke Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Enclosure 1, dated March 2013, ML13240A016.
    18
    Duke Letter from S. L. Batson to NRC, Revised Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report per NRCs Request for Additional
    Information, dated March 6, 2015, ML15072A106.
    19
    NRC Staff Assessment by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report Near-
    Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Oconee, Enclosures 1 and 2, dated April 2016, ML15356A158 (not publicly
    available).
    20
    NRC Letter to S. Batson, Oconee Staff Assessment of Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
    Flood-Causing Mechanisms Reevaluation and Path Forward on Confirmatory Action Letter, dated April 14, 2016,
    ML15352A207.
    21
    NRC Staff Assessment by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report Near-
    Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Oconee, Enclosures 1 and 2, dated April 2016. ML15356A158 (not publicly
    available)

      

        
     

    2011.22 Thus, the NRCs NTTF process has lowered the level of protection required of Duke at the Oconee site
    from a Jocassee Dam failure. The NTTF process was never intended to lower licensee requirements, nor was it
    intended to decrease plant safety. But that is exactly what Duke and the NRC have used the NTTF process to
    accomplish.

    There are several anomalies associated with this decision. First and foremost, the basis for the requirements
    established in the NRCs January 2011 safety evaluation was a question of adequate protection. The NRCs 2011
    safety evaluation reiterates this basis when it states: The NRC staff reviewed the information and based on the
    review, the NRC staff found that the information provided by the licensee did not demonstrate that the Oconee
    site would be adequately protected from external flooding events. When the NRC completed this safety
    evaluation, it concluded in typical safety analysis language with: These conservatisms provide the staff with
    additional assurance that the above Case 2 scenario [a flood height at the SSF of 19 feet] will bound the
    inundation at Oconee, therefore providing reasonable assurance for the overall flooding scenario at the site
    [emphasis added]. When writing the staff assessment in April 2016, the NRC could have argued that the new
    and lower flood height established in the revised FHRR was sufficient to meet the adequate protection
    threshold. But the NRC made no such finding in the 2016 staff assessment. In fact, the staff assessment does
    not even acknowledge that an adequate protection issue exists; it ignores the very reason for the 2008 request
    for information. Therefore, one could assume that it does not address or resolve the adequate protection
    question.

    Second, the NRCs 2011 decision was documented in a safety evaluation. Safety evaluations are the typical
    method for articulating the NRC staffs basis and reasoning for these types of decisions. NRCs Office of Nuclear
    Reactor Regulation has a procedure for conducting and documenting safety evaluations: LIC-101, License
    Amendment Review Procedures, Revision 4, May 22, 2012 is the current version.23 Section 4 of this document
    (Safety Evaluations) states the following: [T]he [safety evaluation] provides the technical, safety, and legal
    basis for the NRC's decision regarding a license amendment request. As with every FHRR, Dukes revised FHRR
    was reviewed and accepted not under the LIC-101 safety evaluation process, but via a staff assessment. To
    my knowledge, there is no NRC guidance on the purpose of a staff assessment or how to conduct one. It
    seems surprising, to say the least, that an ad hoc processin this case a staff assessmentwas used to overturn
    a safety evaluation.

    Third, adequate protection issues are decided using conservative standards. This is typical of deterministic
    analysis and adequate protection decisions. However, the NRCs FHRR process uses a reasonableness
    standard. In fact, the staff assessment of the Oconee revised FHRR uses the phrase reasonable more than 40
    times. To me, this bar is significantly lower than the typical conservative criterion used by the NRC for resolving
    adequate protection questions. The reasonable standard has not been described in any NRC procedure or
    guidance document. One should remember that the NRC request for information required the licensees to use

    22
    NRC Letter to P. Gillespie, Staff Assessment of Dukes Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding Dukes
    Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns at Oconee, dated January 28, 2011, ML110280153.
    23
    NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Office Instruction, License Amendment Review Procedures, LIC-101, Revision
    4, dated May 25, 2012, ML113200053.

      

    2

     

        
     

    evaluation was started in October 2008 but was stopped. 30 The only LIC-504 evaluation for Oconee was not
    completed until March 2013.31 This is over four years after the original 50.54(f) letter was issued and about four
    years after the Oconee flooding issue was identified as an adequate protection issue, and not until after the
    safety evaluation was written on the adequate protection question. 32

    It should be noted that two Technical Basis for the Timeline to Resolve External Flooding Issues at Oconee
    memos were completedthe first on August 12, 2009, and the second on March 5, 2011. 33 These technical
    basis memos fail to address several of the LIC-504 required criteria, including the critical issue of adequate
    defense-in-depth. Specifically, LIC-504 Revision 2 states:

    The following are guidelines, any of which may be used to question whether additional
    regulatory action is required to place or maintain the plant in a safe condition: Defense-in-depth
    is significantly degraded (e.g., multiple barriers are moderately to significantly degraded;
    functional redundancy or diversity is significantly compromised; vulnerability to single failures is
    significantly increased, etc.).

    The Duke analysis of record shows that if the Jocassee Dam failed, core damage would occur in about 8 to 9
    hours following a dam break and containment failure in about 59 to 68 hours. 34 Therefore, the fuel and the
    containmentboth significant barriers to releasewere known to fail under these flooding conditions. In
    addition, the entire emergency core cooling system, all balance of plant equipment, as well as the SSF, were all
    expected to fail. Therefore, Oconee lacked the required redundancy and diversity. This conclusion is
    documented in an NRC assessment when it states [I]f a flooding event from a Jocassee Dam failure occurred at
    the [Oconee] site, all three units have no defense-in-depth to prevent core damage. 35 Clearly, the LIC-504
    guidelines were not met.

    Moreover, the NRCs required process for performing a LIC-504 evaluation was not completed in a timely
    manner.

    A second example of NRC failure to follow its own processes and procedures is illustrated by the NRCs review of
    the licensees flood hazard reevaluation reports. These reports are in response to the NRCs post-Fukushima
    required reevaluation of flooding hazards. Normally, when the NRC reviews licensee submittals it writes a
    safety evaluation, as it did in the case of the Oconee adequate protection issue. In the case of the NRCs FHRR
    reviews, the NRC has not issued safety evaluations, but has instead written staff assessments. To my
    knowledge, the NRC has little guidance on when to use or how to write a staff assessment, or more importantly,
    on the significance of staff assessments or their relationship to safety evaluations.

    30
    NRC Slides, Oconee Flood Protection and Jocassee Dam Hazard NRR LT Meeting, dated October 21, 2008,
    ML14058A029.
    31
    NRC Memo to File, Oconee Documentation of Staff Decision Regarding Implementation of Permanent Modifications for
    Protection from External Flooding, dated March 19, 2013, ML13063A110 (not publicly available).
    32
    Letter NRC to D. Baxter, Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke), September 26, 2008, Response to NRC Letter
    dated August 15, 2008, Related to External Flooding at Oconee, dated April 30, 2009, ML090570779.
    33
    NRC Memo to J.A. Grobe et al. from P.L. Hiland et al., Technical Basis for the Timeline to Resolve External Flooding Issues
    at Oconee, incorrectly dated March 5, 2010, ML103410042.
    34
    Duke Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Enclosure 1, dated March 2013, ML13240A016.
    35
    NRC Assessment of Oconee External Flooding Issue (October 19, 2010), ML102910480 (not publicly available).

      

        
     

    Concluding Observation

    I want to close with one final observation about the flood height issue at Oconee. I have been involved with this
    issue since January 2008, and even with this extensive background, I find it difficult to understand what the NRC
    has done and what it currently requires of Duke to protect public health and safety and the environment. Two
    of the NRCs core valuesopenness (Nuclear regulation is the public's business, and it must be transacted
    publicly and candidly) and clarity (Agency positions should be readily understood and easily applied)have
    not been met.36

    Here are a few clear and simple examples that serve to summarize the previous discussion. The NRCs April
    2016 staff assessment lowered the flood height from a Jocassee Dam failure that Duke is required to protect
    Oconee against by about 15 feet (from 19 to 4.5 feet). The 83-page staff assessment never mentions that the
    January 2011 safety evaluation established a flood height of 19 feet.

    As a result of this poorly articulated decision, some future NRC inspector or analyst (or member of the public)
    will find in the agency records these two disparate flood heightsone based on a conservative adequate
    protection decision and the second reached as part of the NTTFs reevaluationand will then have to decipher
    which is the current licensing basis flood to evaluate and make decisions against.

    This opacity was completely unnecessary; a second safety evaluation could have been written clearly articulating
    the new requirements and establishing a new licensing basis. One can only speculate why this was not done.
    Additionally, the Investigative Report to the Chairman was another missed opportunity to address these
    openness and clarity deficits.

    36
    See NRC webpage for statement of values http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/values.htm.

      

        
     

    STATEMENT FROM RICHARD H. PERKINS, P.E.

    I am a Professional Engineer and a staff member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    (NRC). I have witnessed an unremarkable bureaucratic culture that powers this agencys
    decision-making, a sorting and culling of individuals within the agency based on their tolerance
    for lackluster regulatory principles, and an atmosphere where whitewashed assessments are
    favored over more rigorous evaluations that might highlight regulatory deficiencies. This culture
    deliberates about what can be shared among employees, what isnt to be recorded in e-mail,
    and what might frighten or confuse the public if it were released. I have witnessed excessive
    regulatory self-censorship and the loss of factual fidelity. I have seen persistent overtones exert
    forces that, over time, grossly distort the analysis of safety issues. I have experienced insistent
    pressure to tweak, adjust, and remove sentences that seem too stark or blunt. At the NRC,
    there is high regard for an assessment that is, in the end, not at all offensive to industry albeit
    denuded of particular insight and straight-forward facts.

    Earlier this year, the Office of Special Council (OSC) referred a disclosure, regarding flood-
    related risks at United States nuclear power reactors, from NRC staff member Lawrence
    Criscione to the Chairman of the NRC. The NRC provided a response to the OSC on June 30,
    2016. OSC statutes allow an opportunity for the originator to provide comments on the
    agencys response. I am among a group of NRC colleagues Mr. Criscione requested
    assistance from in reviewing the NRCs response.

    The NRCs June 30, 2016, response to the OSC begins with the NRC explaining what its
    obligations are under the letter of the law and further, that it has met these obligations. On the
    first page of its response the NRC states, Adequate protection (of the health and safety of the
    public) is not a fixed standard, but rather involves a case-by-case application of technical
    judgement of the Commission. Thus, the NRC correctly describes that there is no fixed
    goalpost with regard to the agencys obligations; there is no quantitative standard for safety;
    decisions are made by the Commission based on judgement. Furthermore, the NRC states that
    the reasoning of that judgement changes on a case-by-case basis due to any number of facts (a
    subset of which the paragraph goes on to describe). The NRC continues its explanation
    acknowledging that risks do exist, but that that failure to comply with regulations can still be
    adequate if there is no undue risk to public health and safety, and that what constitutes undue
    risk is again left to the judgement of the Commission. I say sincerely and without cynicism, it
    would be hard to overstate the responsibility this places on the shoulders of the Commission.

    The Commission must balance the benefits of nuclear power production for our economy 1
    against the impacts of a nuclear accident on our countrys economy, our property, and our
    safety. I do not have confidence in the bureaucracy that informs this Commission. 2 Openness
    and transparency within the NRC has continued on a sharp decline I, therefore, do not have

    1
    This writing addresses NRCs responsibilities concerning the licensing and regulation of nuclear power
    production. The NRC has other responsibilities as well.
    2
    The defense of this statement continues in the pages that follow.

      

        
     

    confidence that the judgments of the Commission would align with the publics judgment, if the
    public at large was informed in accordance with its entitlement.

    The recent water contamination crisis in the city of Flint, Michigan is a case in point. Allegedly,
    that citys public stewards knew of a hazard, but chose to keep the information hidden from the
    public. Perhaps the citys stewards felt there was no practical alternative or that costs were
    too high. Perhaps they understood the risks and accepted them on behalf of the public. I
    argue, if the public had known of the high lead levels in their drinking water if they knew what
    the government stewards knew it is likely the public would have changed their behavior. But,
    the information was withheld from the public for various reasons and they kept drinking the
    water. As a result, thousands will likely suffer serious and permanent health consequences.
    How best can we assure ourselves that the judgments of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    are sound and competent? The responsibility of this Commission is far too great to allow the
    process that informs them to unfold in subtle light.

    The NRCs June 30, 2016, response puzzle-pieces together selections of information in a
    manner that supports a notion that the NRC identified a potential safety issue; recognized its
    seriousness; allowed full, open, informed discussions; rose to timely conclusions; and enacted
    satisfactory corrections efficiently and effectively. 3 Further, the NRCs response supports a
    notion that all of the actions occurred in a satisfactory manner, that the NRC was never
    influenced by industry, and that all the eventual actions would have happened just as they did
    regardless of the whistleblowers and advocates that stepped forward to raise their concerns in
    a public and documented manner. 4 The NRCs account is a notion that comes out of a world
    where anything is possible.

    In reality the effective consideration of flood-related nuclear safety issues was hamstrung
    within the NRC for quite some time. In its response to the OSC, the NRC puts together the best
    explanation it can, omitting everything that is not favorable. In fact, the NRC gives itself a near
    perfect score on the subject. There is no discussion about processes that could be improved.
    No miss-steps were identified. There is no acknowledgment of the employees who were forced
    to suspend their nuclear careers in order to stick to their principles. There is no discussion of
    the quietly brokered MOU 5 between the NRC and the United States Army Corp of Engineers
    that prohibits the passing of relevant flood safety data between our two agencies. No concern is
    noted regarding organizational stove piping, nor the careful pocketing of unfavorable data
    among a select subset of trusted staff. There is no concern about a culture of secretiveness.
    There is no acknowledgement of the agencys growing need-to-know mantra a phrase
    increasingly used as a warning, by managers, that NRC regulators should not discuss their work
    with other NRC regulators unless they have been approved to have a need to know by
    management. There is no discussion of negative impacts on safety culture, openness,
    3
    NRC Investigative Report, Re: OSC File No. DI-15-5254, 30 June 2016, pg. ii, bullet 5
    4
    NRC Investigative Report, Re: OSC File No. DI-15-5254, 30 June 2016, pg. ii, bullet 4
    5
    A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is a signed agreement between two or more agencies. For
    unclear reasons, this MOU was not placed in NRCs record tracking system (ADAMS) and, therefore,
    does not have a distinct accession number, nevertheless, it can be found on pp. 3-5 of ADAMS record
    ML16201A093.*
    *Criscione comment: See Exhibit 6 for information on how to access NRC ADAMS references.

      

        
     

    collaboration, engineering excellence, or teaming among the larger group of professionals who
    are, in fact, paid to study these issues. There is no discussion of the effect this has on a
    science-based, multi-disciplinary organization tasked to anticipate nuclear catastrophes such as
    those which have already occurred elsewhere in the world. Instead, the response has the
    distinct ring of a courtroom defense; the NRC has done what the law requires. 6

    I expect the authors of the NRCs response know their own personal feelings about what is
    broken. It can be assumed that the authors are honest, hard-working, well-intentioned
    individuals. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that this NRC response like so many
    other bureaucratic products is not a place for reflective, balanced, fully-truthful discussion.
    The NRC response was developed by individuals who, I expect, feel they have a duty to defend
    the agency to the best of their ability.

    Legal professionals, hired by the agency, have an obligation and a motivation to support their
    client, which is the bureaucracy that hired them. A management structure will tend to defend its
    past management practices. A bureaucracy tends to support and defend itself. Individuals,
    however, can behave contrary to bureaucracy. Individuals may decide to separate from the
    herd even when it is not in their own self-interest. If you believe that ethics is an intrinsic
    value,7 then by definition only individuals account for the ethical component of an
    organization. Whether they are engineers, NRC managers, or government lawyers I argue
    that the greatest sense of ethical responsibility exists at the individual level. This is the level
    where people become unbending and insist on their own ethical convictions, no matter what the
    cost.

    This is as good a place as any to acknowledge my own considerable imperfection. I stopped


    counting my mistakes many years ago. My greatest strength comes from the competency and
    capability of my colleagues, and I ride it for all its worth.

    In 2010, three colleagues and I were tasked to write a report 8 on Flooding of U.S. Nuclear
    Power Plants Following Upstream Dam Failures. This tasking was in response to a July 19,
    2010, preliminary assessment. 9 The report, called a screening analysis, was essentially
    complete prior to the March 11, 2011, reactor accidents at Fukushima Daiichi; the report was
    being circulated for final comments at that time. Months later after significant pushback
    concerning which relevant facts should remain in the report after the rise of the Missouri River
    and encroachment around Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station after extensive deliberations about

    6
    NRC Investigative Report, Re: OSC File No. DI-15-5254, 30 June 2016, pg. ii, bullet 2
    7
    Edward N. Zalta. Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 22 October 2002,
    retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/
    8
    Richard H. Perkins, P.E.; Michelle T. Bensi, Ph.D.; Jacob Philip, P.E.; and Salim Sancaktar, Ph.D.
    Screening Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites
    Following Upstream Dam Failures, July 2011, ML112430114
    9
    Fernando Ferrante, Ph.D., Meena Khanna, Memorandum from Lois James to Benjamin Beasley,
    Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures, 19 July 2010,
    ML101900305

      

        
     

    sensitivity and after Congressional testimony on the meltdown of the three reactors in Japan,
    the topic was designated NRC Generic Issue #204.10

    As we started our development of the report, our early research yielded bits and scraps of
    information. Some of this information was interesting and might have been relevant, but the
    information was incomplete. Some of it was without context and sometimes it was difficult to
    determine the original source of the information. We pulled threads, asked around, received
    information from other employees, and read through documents looking for similar information
    and references. As early drafts of our report took shape, I received casual advisories that some
    of the information, related to flooding and dam failure, was sensitive, for internal use only, and
    that the use of this information was restricted. I was advised that flooding, as a result of dam
    failure, was under the jurisdiction of the Army Corp of Engineers and was not to be used in NRC
    assessments. The concerns of others notwithstanding, this was information we were looking
    for. The information was salient and we needed the references in order to document the
    information sources.

    I received continuing advisories against the use of this information in our report. The advisories
    were, at first, nudging. Shortly thereafter came insistence, stern language, and calls to my
    supervision; the information could not be directly used in the report. Having had years of
    experience working with classified and sensitive information at all levels, I did not believe the
    proper marking and handling of information would pose more than an inconvenience, but I also
    knew that I would need to see the official guidance (or a directive) for the proper handling of the
    information. Proper guidance 11 provides not only the directions for handling the information, but
    the authority by which the information is withheld from routine circulation among employees. I
    became suspicious that no such guidance existed. In that case, I would need to push for the
    issuance of proper guidance. Continuing without guidance would have been highly
    inappropriate for numerous reasons:
    - This behavior of handling government information is not condoned by law.
    - Continuing under a false assumption that the topic was properly compartmented implies
    that the issue is being properly addressed by a portion of the government that is
    accountable and responsible for the subject. When an issue is simply not being
    circulated, it is unlikely the issue is being dealt with responsibly.
    - If a level of security sensitivity was, in fact, warranted, there was no evidence of the
    proper escalation of the security issue(s), nor coordination among the responsible
    security organizations.

    10
    The Generic Issues Program is a congressionally mandated, agency-wide program to address
    unresolved safety issues having significant generic implication among a group or class of nuclear power
    plants.
    11
    Classification guidance, in the United States, is any part of an extensive, authoritative, set of references
    describing the type and level of classification for various topics. Classification guidance is issued under
    the authority of specific named and titled individuals throughout the United States Government who are
    granted that authority. A much larger group of named and titled individuals are granted the authority to
    classify information based on the topical classification guidance (i.e., derivative classification authority).
    Information guidance, in general, may apply other designations as well, such as controlled unclassified
    information.

      

        
     

    - If the information was not security sensitive, the information was mischaracterized;
    visibility, research, and coordination on the safety issue had been stalled and was
    currently hampered unnecessarily.
    - The unique hazards posed to safety, to the economy of the United States, and to
    private homes and property (which cannot be insured against nuclear-related losses) 12
    requires a watchful assurance that potentially high-consequence nuclear accident
    scenarios do not fall between the cracks in a regulatory environment.

    One of the inconsistencies I have struggled with has been the NRCs approach to safety issues
    that have a conceivable security component to them. 13 Based on the failure data available to
    me, it has never been clear that hostile actions by humans (equipped with the highest
    reasonable means) pose an unmitigated threat to large dams in a manner that could result in
    flooding of downstream nuclear power plants. 14 Individuals in the NRC who vehemently insist
    that information regarding dam-failure and flooding is so sensitive that it must not circulate (even
    among regular security-cleared staff) are arguing that I am incorrect in that assumption. They
    are arguing that the threat from hostile persons, to bring about the destruction of a nuclear plant
    via the deliberate failing of a dam, is very real. So I must explore the possibility that I am
    incorrect; the possibility that the danger is much greater and more serious than I recognize it to
    be. If that is true, it means that I have been wildly under-informed and it means that the human
    threat and the commensurate risk is, in fact, extraordinary. It means that the risk is so great that
    the normal cadre of safety regulators (including the safety regulators tasked to write the
    screening analysis for the focal safety issue) cannot be allowed to fully acknowledge and
    document the safety issue because the security issue is overshadowing in its magnitude. It
    means if knowledge of the risk becomes widely known, then the surrounding community is in
    grave danger from those who might seek to damage the economy of the United States, and a
    large geographic area, by means of a major multi-reactor nuclear meltdown triggered by a dam
    failure brought about by an individual or attainable group. Inconsistently, however, the NRC
    never took an equally measured action to mitigate this danger. For years, nothing significant
    appeared to happen except for the NRC staying tight-lipped about it and making the information
    hard to find among regulators and concealing the information from the public.

    12
    Standard homeowners and renters insurance excludes damages related to nuclear incidents. The
    Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 limits the liability assumed by commercial nuclear industry.
    Instead, the Act establishes a no-fault insurance-type system to compensate residents, for damage or
    injuries resulting from a commercial nuclear accident, out of a set-aside pool of $12.985 billion in funds.
    In 2016, approximately a quarter-million Japanese remain displaced from their homes due to radiation
    from the nuclear accident at Fukushima. A similar accident in the U.S. could displace far more people.
    Nevertheless, distributed among 250,000 individuals, the average payout from the fund would be less
    than $52k. Any additional payout would be determined by Congress as part of legislated disaster-relief
    funds.
    http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/nuclear-insurance.pdf
    13
    For example, fire is a safety issue, but fire could also be utilized by a terrorist. In the past, the NRC has
    taken actions to restrict the public disclosure of nuclear safety issues that include the mention of fire.
    14
    On May 16, 1943, in a nation-state effort called Operation Chastise, British forces carried out a one-of-
    a-kind attack on the Rohr region of Germany, successfully breaching two German dams using specially
    designed bouncing bombs dropped from19 Lancaster heavy-bomber aircraft. BBC News Magazine, 15
    May 2013. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22510300

      

        
     

    While the occasion of large dam failure from hostile human action is extraordinarily rare 15, dam
    failures resulting from the stresses imposed by nature are routine. The hydraulic forces placed
    on a dam as part of its nominal use are great when we consider the total area of pressure
    applied on the dam and potential energy of the water stored behind a dam. Correspondingly,
    large dam failures have occurred routinely throughout the history of large dams. 16 Rivers,
    dams, and geographic drainage basins are subject to natural forces far more powerful than
    those created by humans. Earthquakes, tornados, storms, hurricanes, and the massive rainfall
    and flooding that is often associated, applies power that typically dwarfs that of human
    meddling. The case I make is not that security threats do not exist; it is that, regardless of the
    protections provided to mitigate hostile human threats, those predominate threats posed by the
    forces of nature are not abated. Three Mile Island, the triple-melt down at Fukushima, and the
    explosion and fire at Chernobyl which left a large section of Ukraine uninhabitable, were all
    either operator-induced accidents or deficiencies against predictable acts of nature. Ironically,
    an engineering solution which properly protects a nuclear plant from flooding would also
    inoculate that same plant from the dangers of flooding induced by hostile human intentions.

    On June 30, 2011, I received an email from Bernard Stapleton, the Chief of Information Security
    in NRCs Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, stating that the subject of flooding
    of nuclear power plants following up-stream dam failure was neither Safeguards Information
    nor an equal or greater category of security information (such as Classified Information,
    Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information, or Controlled Unclassified Information).17 Up to
    that time, I lacked written guidance. The handling of the issue from a security perspective
    was based on rumor, innuendo, and organizational habits. The June 30, 2011, e-mail was a
    positive sign that the security nature of the issue was being clarified and we might soon return to
    the usual business of regulating. Nevertheless, concerns about the sensitivity of the information
    continued and I continued to receive pressure to remove so-called sensitive information from
    the report. At one point, my management told me that if I did not convince my writers group to
    strike the information from the report, I would be removed from the effort and reassigned. I
    relayed a corresponding inquiry to the team, on behalf of our management, questioning whether
    the report would be better or worse with the inclusion of some sensitive data. I did not inform
    them of the pledged consequences to me personally. By consensus of the group, the content
    remained in the report.18 I was not removed from the effort. Although I faced continuing
    unhappiness from some levels of management, in the end, I believe everything was in the report
    that the authors wanted to include.

    15
    For large dams it is unprecedented outside of Britains 1943 wartime effort.
    16
    Based on data provided by James S. Halgren, Dam Failures and Incidents, Association of State Dam
    Safety Officials, retrieved from http://www.damsafety.org/
    17
    Safeguards Information (SGI) is a term used mostly by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
    Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) is a term used mostly by the Department of Energy
    and its contractors, and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) is a category of information established
    in 2008 to replace other categories of information including the category Sensitive But Unclassified
    (SBU).
    18
    Because the function of this report was to inform NRC decision makers, we were reluctant to remove
    significant information that was central to the issue.

      

        
     

    Over the following months, concern continued to be expressed over the content in the report.
    There was a great deal of uneasiness. Among the frustrations expressed to me, by some levels
    of my management, was that I could have made the point without the inclusion of some of the
    more stark information. I have never agreed with that reasoning. Softening the report
    (presumably as a courtesy to the affected licensees) would not have been appropriate since this
    report was intended to inform decision makers within the NRC. The purpose of the report was
    to be clear and representative of the facts and analysis at hand. Certainly, it would not have
    been proper to reverse course on an already written draft with an intention to make it less clear
    and less representative of what we knew. If we had left out certain sensitive salient
    information, different conclusions may very well have been drawn. I do not see any legitimate
    circumstances where it would have been acceptable for us to omit relevant and salient
    information just because it was sensitive to some people in the NRC. Furthermore, to this day,
    I do not know what the singular word sensitive defines within NRC; it remains to me, a vague
    unofficial term that carries an implication. It did seem to me, based on noted conversations and
    meetings I participated in, that a large component of this sensitivity was a plain discomfort in
    discussing the issue and its history within the NRC openly.

    Based on information provided by the screening report and the procedures laid out in the NRC
    Generic Issues Program, the NRC needed to determine whether Flooding of U.S. Nuclear
    Power Plants following an Upstream Dam Failures would be designated as a Generic Issue. In
    NRC parlance, a Generic Issue is a potentially significant safety issue that affects a class of
    plants not just one plant. Multiple nuclear power plants may all have the same problem. The
    importance is more than just the multiplicity. A Generic Issue may require a shift in regulatory
    thinking. For example, if regulators or licensees had drawn conclusions about safety based on
    similarity with other compliant sites, that reasoning may no longer be true. The concept of a
    Generic Issue designation was to change the regulatory approach to the issue.

    In accordance with the NRC procedures at the time, a separate independent panel reviewed the
    issue (and the screening report) and elected to recommend the issues designation as a
    Generic Issue. As part of my duties, I coordinated a signature package forwarding the panel
    recommendation to the Director of the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES). On
    October 19, 2011, the package was returned to me without signature, by the RES Director, with
    instructions to expand the scope of the analysis, report, committee recommendation, and
    signature package to include fuel fabrication facilities and independent spent fuel storage
    installations. The independent review panel subsequently determined that the change in scope
    was not warranted19 and a second signature package was again coordinated and presented for
    signature on November 16, 2011.

    19
    A fuel fabrication facility does not have an operating nuclear reactor, therefore, there is no reactor
    meltdown or core damage risk. Similarly, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations contain only
    spent fuel that has been allowed a considerable time to decay and its spent fuel heat production has been
    considerably reduced. The decay heat present in this spent fuel is low enough that appreciable damage
    from the heat buildup, during or subsequent to container flood exposure, is not possible.

      

        
     

    On March 1, 2012, the RES Director signed a document designating the issue as Generic Issue
    #204. On March 6, 2012, the public was informed of the existence of Generic Issue #204 via
    press release and a highly-redacted version of the screening report was released to the public.
    On July 2, 2012, in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the NRC released
    a second highly-redacted version of the report stating that large sections of the report could not
    be released to the public due to security concerns. 20 As a basis for the redactions, the NRC
    cited 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(F) also known as FOIA exemption 7(f) which allows the
    Government to redact from public release, information that "could reasonably be expected to
    endanger the life or physical safety of any individual. Importantly, the NRC was claiming that
    the release of safety issues description was reasonably expected to endanger the life or
    physical safety of the public; therefore, in accordance with the NRCs judgement, the public
    should not be allowed to know of the safety issue.

    The massively-redacted FOIA release was the culmination of a long-running series of NRC
    actions that illustrated the NRCs continuing desire to prevent awareness of this safety issue
    from reaching the public. After extensive NRC review, vague notions of security were the
    justification for widespread redactions to a document that had little or no bearing on security.

    On September 14, 2012, I submitted an allegation to the NRC Office of the Inspector General. 21
    My coworker, Lawrence Criscione, shared my letter, his own letter, the GI-204 screening
    analysis, and several other agency records regarding flooding with Congressional staff on
    NRCs various House and Senate oversight committees. 22 On February 4, 2013, the NRC
    Office of the Inspector general recommended, to the U.S. Justice Department, that Lawrence
    Criscione be charged with a felony for sharing sensitive information with Congress.

    Over the next two years, the NRC received, and slowly processed, FOIA requests related to the
    subject. During October and November of 2014, I received instructions and directions from the
    NRCs General Council staff and the head of the NRC FOIA Office 23 to redact from public
    release, all information that can be expected to undermine the agencys ability to effectively
    argue in the courts that the agency properly withheld certain flooding-related information under
    FOIA Exemption 7(f).24 These instructions, from the NRC and the NRC General Council staff,
    directed me to withhold from public view, any information that would indicate that the NRC had
    violated the law. I documented my concern in a November 21, 2014, memorandum 25 and asked
    for clarification. I never received a response; instead, the task of redacting the information was
    assigned to another NRC employee.

    20
    http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1222/ML122230055.html
    21
    Richard H. Perkins, P.E., "Concealment of Significant Nuclear Safety Information by the U.S. Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission." Letter to Hubert T. Bell, 14 Sept 2012, ML16204A002
    22
    See ML16204A001, ML13256A370, and ML13256A372 in NRCs record management system
    (ADAMS)
    23
    Laura Pearson, Chief; FOIA, Privacy, and Information Collection; NRC Office of Information Services
    24
    Richard H. Perkins, P.E., Concerns about the Appearance of Obstruction of Justice. Letter to Richard
    Correia, 21 Nov 2014, pp.7-8. ML14325A850
    25
    Richard H. Perkins, P.E., Concerns about the Appearance of Obstruction of Justice. Letter to Richard
    Correia, 21 Nov 2014, ML14325A850

      

        
     

    I am content to work for improvements in our regulatory culture and to support openness in our
    governments conduct and processes. Just as it is most important that an officer of the law
    follow the law those who take the responsibility to guard classified information, in an open and
    democratic society, must never abuse that special power entrusted to them. Although entirely
    unexpected, it was my previous 15 years of career experience in other agencies, working in
    high-security government programs, that made it plain to see the serious and chronic abuses
    within NRC. In as much, I am quite satisfied to be in a position to continue pressing for positive
    changes it is deeply concerning, however, that this is needed.

    September 2, 2016

      

    OSC File No. DI-1 5-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC resoonse to OSC
    Union of d ucsusa.org Two Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138 -3780 t 617.547.5552 f 61'1.864.9405
    [ Concerne Sc1ent1sts 1825 K Street NW, Su ite 800, Wash ingto n, DC 20006-1232 t 202.223.6133 f 202.223.6162
    2397 Shattuck Avenue, Suite 203, Berkeley, CA 94704-1567 t 510.843.1872 fSl 0.843.3785
    One North LaSalle Street, Su ite 1904, Chicago, IL 60602-4064 t 312.578.1750 f 312.578.1751

    Comments on Nuclear Regulatory C ommission Response to the Office of Special Counsel


    (OSC File No. DI-15-5254)

    Background
    On July 18, 2016, Lawrence Criscione contacted me an d explained that the Chai1man of the U.S.
    Nuclear R egulatory Commission (NRC) had responded to a request from the U .S. Office of
    Special Counsel (OSC) regarding the agency's handling of flooding hazards at 19 U.S. nuclear
    power plants. Mr. Criscione knew that I had been monitoring the generic flooding issue and had
    been tracking that issue more closely at some of the affected plants. Mr. Crisione infon ned me
    that OSC had given him with a copy of the NRC's response and the oppo1tunity to provide his
    comments on the response. Mr. Criscione asked if I was interested in reviewing and collllllenting
    on the NRC 's response on the condition that the response not be made publicly available. I
    agreed to review the response under those ten ns and self-imposed one additional condition- that
    my comments on the repo1t be provided only to Mr. Criscione for his use in providing comments
    to OSC about the response.

    Comments

    1. The fomth paragraph on page ii of the Executive Summaiy to the NRC 's investigative repo1t
    begins with this sentence:

    The report contains a sufficient amount ofmater;af to support the findings and conclusions
    while avoiding the disclosure ofany personally identifiable information, sensitive
    unclassified security-related information, or classified information.

    Because the repo1t contains no personally identifiable info1mation, sensitive unclassified


    security-related info1mation, or classified info1mation, there would be n o legitimate reason
    for the NRC not to make the report publicly available, either on its own volition or in
    response to a request m1der the Freedom of Info1mation Act.

    2. The NRC response to OSC question 5 stated that " the current risks to public health and
    safety are very small ... ". This NRC response is misleading at best. Appendix B of the NRC's
    response identified that Yellow fmdings were issued for flood protection violations at Fo1t
    Calhoun and Watts Bar. The NRC also issued a Yellow finding for flood protection
    violations at Arkansas Nuclear One (ML15023A076)*on Janua1y 22, 2015. The NRC failed
    to mention this relevant fact in Appendix B in its discussion of flooding issues at this
    facility. 1 In addition to only mentioning some of the Yellow fmdings related to flood
    protection violations, the NRC's response failed to provide context for these fmdings. Yellow
    is the second most serious severity level in the NRC's green/white/yellow/red classification
    process. Fmt he1more, the agency seldom classifies violations at this severity level or greater.

    1
    Section B.1 .2 described the flood protection deficiencies that led to the NRC issuing a Yellow finding, but failed to
    mention the Yellow finding.
    *Criscione comment: See Exhibit 6 for information on how to access NRC ADAMS references.

    Lochbaum  

    OSC File No. DI-1 5-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    Between 2001 (the first full year of the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process that initiated this
    color-coded system) and 2015, the NRC issued a total of 11,675 findings. Only 18 (0.2%)
    were classified as Yellow. This context reveals that flooding poses a significant hazard to
    nuclear power plant safety and that nonconfonn ing configurations have significant adverse
    risk consequences.

    The NRC ' s response describes much of th e work remaining to achieve confo1mance with the
    NRC's post-Fukushima orders. The cwTent risks to public health and safety would be very
    small if and only if (a) the findings for flood protection violations were Green or White
    (demonstrating low safety significance) or (b) the post-Fukushima orders were fully
    implemented at all 19 nucleai- plants covered in the response. The fo1mer would strongly
    suggest that the outstanding work had little risk significance. The latter wou ld strongly
    suggest that flooding risks were being properly managed. That neither applies at this moment
    strongly suggests that the NRC's response is misleading.

    The NRC cannot impose new regulato1y requirements on plant owners unless the upgrades
    are eith er necessary to protect public health and safety or are cost-justified. Thus, the
    regulatory analysis supporting the flood-related aspects of the NRC 's post-Fukushima orders
    issued in March 2012 have been dete1mined to be w01ihwhile. The NRC cannot have it both
    ways and now contend that unimplemented flood-related measm es have little to no risk
    value.

    Inspection Findings
    Yea.- White Yellow Total
    2001 23 2 685
    2002 30 1 816
    2003 19 2 773
    2004 11 0 789
    2005 10 1 860
    2006 13 0 689
    2007 9 2 770
    2008 17 0 793
    2009 7 0 886
    2010 9 2 827
    2011 13 2 861
    2012 16 1 932
    2013 10 2 718
    2014 16 3 722
    2015 8 0 790
    Sum 211 18 11,911
    Percent 1.8% 0.2% 100.0%
    Yearly Average 15 1 851

    Lochbaum  

    OSC File No. DI-1 5-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC resp on se t o OSC

    3. The third bullet from the bottom on p age ii of the Executive Summaiy to the NRC's
    investigative rep01t is this single sentence:

    The NRC actions, including orders, requests for information, enforcement


    actions, and mlemaking activities, have been in conformance with NRC
    programs, processes, and procedures, including those for addressing differing
    staffviews.

    This statement is misleading because it, and the investigative repo1t more broadly, failed
    to describe how the NRC handled similai situations ve1y differently. The disparate
    treatments may have all been within the range of options available to the agency. But the
    disparate handling of similar situations resulted in confusion and frustration within the
    NRC staff.

    The fomt h paragraph on page 8 of the NRC's investigative report begins with this
    sentence:

    The NR C has a f ormal office procedure to deterrnine whether an immediate p lant


    shutdown is warranted given new information.

    Footnote 7 at the end of this sentence refers to LIC-504, "Integrated Risk-Info1med


    Decision-Making Process for Emergent Issues" (ML14035A143). The implication is that
    the NRC used this procedure when evaluating the risk from emerging info1mation about
    flooding hazaids. But while the NRC used LIC-504 in assessing flooding hazaids at the
    Oconee Nucleai Station: it did not use LIC-504 in assessing flooding h azards at the Watts
    Bar nuclem plant. The NRC's investigative rep01t is silent about why the NRC handled
    these similar situations so differently and leaves the very false impression that the NRC
    used LIC-504 in all cases.

    Tw o NRC engineers filed a Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) within the agency
    raising concerns with how flooding hazards at Watts Bar were being handled. A three-
    person DPO panel was fo1med to examine the concerns raised by the two engineers. The
    DPO panel issued its repo1t, "Differing Professional Opinion Involving External
    Flooding at Watts Bar Nuclear Unit 1 (DP0-201 2-003)," on Janumy 17. 2013
    (ML13115A273). The DPO panel wrote :

    In April 2012, about two months before the staff issued the CAL; the Division of
    Operating Reactor Licensing (DORL) branch chiefat the time arranged a
    meeting with staff to discuss a p rocess for documenting staffdecisions associated
    with the WBN J flood issue. In an email (ADAMS Accession No. M L12335A059),
    the branch chiefstated that NRR Office Instmction LIC-504 (ADAMS Accession
    No. ML100541776) would be used. On the bases of its interviews, the Panel
    determined that the branch chiefcould not gain alignment among the staff to
    app~y LIC-504 to the WBNJ issue. Therefore, the branch chief's idea was not
    imp lemented.
    *Criscione comment: Statements in ML13052A784 pp. 5, 11, 12 & 15 pertaining to 2008-May-30, 2008-0ct-6, 2008-0ct-15 &
    2009-Jan-26 mention LIC-504, but for unexplained reasons the LIC-504 process pertaining to the Oconee/Jocassee flooding was
    turned off prior to the process being completed in 2008/2009. A LIC-504 evaluation was completed in March 2013 (ML13063A110).
    See Jeff Mitman's comments for discussion of irregularities in the NRC's application of the LIC-504 process regarding Oconee.

    Lochbaum  

    OSC File No. DI-1 5-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    Because a number of the individuals who had been involved in the ONS [Oconee
    Nucleru: Station] issue were also involved in the WBNJ [Watts BaT Unit 1] issue,
    the Panel found the apparent disparate treatment ofthe two plants particularly
    interesting and counted it as its final example ofa missed opportunity.

    In addition, for the reasons detailed in our report, we concluded that the staff's
    bases for accepting the licensee 's commitments and its reasons for choosing to
    issue a CAL instead ofan order may have been clearer and less divisive had the
    stafffollowed the proce,ss prescribed in LIC-504, Revision 3, "Integrated Risk-
    Informed Decision-Making Process for Emergent Issues. "Not following an
    available process, like LIC-504, suggests to us that the staffmay not have fully
    internalized the lessons learned from past significant events or there may be gaps
    in the staff's training or understanding about how to handle emergent issues.

    The authors of the NRC's investigative repo1i were clearly aware of the DPO Panel's
    repo1i because it was refened to within Appendix B and was cited in footnote 43 7 on
    page 130. But they curiously failed to describe the disparate use and non-use ofLIC-504
    by the NRC in handling flood hazard issues at Oconee and Watts Bar. Their omission is
    misleading at best, deceitful at worst.

    The NRC investigative repo1i superficially described another finding by the DPO panel in
    Section B.19.2 covering the Additional Plant-Specific Actions taken at Watts Bar:

    The panel observed that the issue could have been addressed better if a risk
    assessment and clear safety basis for continued operation of Watts Bar bad been
    prepared.

    The DPO panel was more critical than merely suggesting the NRC could have addressed
    the matter better:

    The Panel concluded that the staffshould have performed a risk assessment of the
    issue and prepared a clear safety bases for continued operations of WBN1.
    However, even though several years had passed since concerns had first been
    raised about the potential {or a higher flood level at WBNJ, neither a risk
    assessment nor the bases (or continued operations had been prepared or
    documented. Rather, it appeared to the panel, the staffhad relied on a qualitative
    risk-informed decision based largely on the common perception that the PMF is
    "unlikely" and that the compensat01y measures would work. Almost everyone the
    Panel asked suggested that the corrective action schedule proposed by TVA was
    acceptable to them because the design basis flood was unlikely or of low
    probability. Through its interviews, the Panel had also learned that at least one
    manager askedfor a risk assessment. The Panel understands that the staffstarted
    a risk assessment but did not complete it. All things considered, the Panel
    decided that the staff came up short on the assessment that was wa"anted by
    the potential significance ofthe WBNJ issue. [emphasis added]

    Lochbaum  

    OSC File No. DI-1 5-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213 (e) (1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    The NRC finally perfo1med a risk assessment of the flooding issues en route to issuing a
    violation to the plant's owner regarding deficient flood protection measures at Watts Bar:

    The NR C staff also evaluated the licensee's flood p rotection through inspections.
    In June 2013, the NR C issued a Yellow finding (substantial safety significance)
    associated with the licensee's inability to reconfigure and realign systems
    necesswy f or flood mode within the assumed preparation time. [emphasis added]

    Thus, when the NRC finally got around to perfo1ming the risk assessment several years
    after it was identified at Watts Bar, they concluded it had "substantial safety
    significance." And as pointed out above, the NRC rarely concludes that violations have
    "substantial safety significance." As the DPO panel concluded, th e NRC should have
    perf01m ed the risk assessment that identified "substantial safety significance" in the
    unresolved problems at Watts Bar much sooner.

    4. The NRC issued Confnmato1y Action Letters (CALs) to address similar flood protection
    issues at four nuclear plants in ve1y different ways. The NRC 's investigative rep01i mentions
    the CALs, but fails to mention the disparate ways that they were issued.

    The NRC issued a CAL on September 2, 2011 , docmnenting flood protection upgrades to be
    implemented at the F01i Calhoun nuclear plant (MLl 12490164). The NRC made this CAL
    publicly available in ADAMS, its online digital record repository, on September 26, 2011 .

    The NRC issued a CAL on June 25, 2012, documenting flood protection upgrades to be
    implemented at the Sequoyah and Watts Bar nuclear plants (ML12165A527). The NRC
    made this CAL publicly available in ADAMS on June 28, 2012.

    The NRC issued a CAL on June 22, 2010, docmnenting flood protection upgrades to be
    implemented at the Oconee nuclear plant (ML12363A086): But the NRC did not make this
    CAL publicly available in ADAMS until December 28, 201 2, and then only in response to
    Freedom of Info1mation Act requests.

    NRC Management Directive 3 .4, "Release of Info1mation to the Public" (ML0803 l 0417)
    was last revised on Febmary 6, 2009, so was in place when all three CALs were issued. The
    General Release Policy stated on page 14 of Management Directive 3.4 states: "Documents
    generated by the NR C are to be released to the public by the 61h working day after the date of
    the document."

    The NRC issued CALs for Fo1i Calhoun, Sequoyah, and Watts Bar after flooding caused
    three reactor meltdowns at Fukushima in March 2011 , and issued the CAL for Oconee before
    this disaster. But Fukushima does not explain the NRC's disparate handling of these CALs.
    The NRC did not make the Oconee CAL publicly available until 14 Yi months after it made
    the F01i Calhoun CAL publicly available. The NRC did not make the Oconee CAL publicly
    available until 5 Yi months after it made the Sequoyah and Watts Bar CAL p ublicly available.

    *Criscione comment: The version cited by Mr. Lochbaum is the one released to him under the FOIA in early
    2013 and has copious redactions. In response to a FOIA appeal and the threat of a lawsuit, the CAL was fully
    released on April 28, 2013. See www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1017/ML101730329.pdf for the non-redacted original.

    Lochbaum  

    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213 (e) (1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    Security concerns about persons exploiting the vulnerabilities suggested by the flood
    protection upgrades in the CAL not yet implemented do not explain the NRC 's disparate
    handling of these CALs. All four plants aie downriver of dams/levees whose failure could
    cause flooding at the plants. The Jocassee Dam upriver of Oconee has not been suspected,
    yet alone shown, to be more susceptible to sabotage than the dams and levees upriver ofF01t
    Calhoun, Sequoyah and Watts Bar.

    Financial considerations may explain the NRC's disparate handling of these CALs. Duke
    Power, the owner of the Oconee nuclear plant, was pursuing a merger with Progress Energy
    when the NRC secretly issued its CAL for Oconee in June 2010. The merger was publicly
    announced in eaily 2011 and completed on July 2, 2012. The owners of the Fort Calhoun,
    Sequoyah and Watts Bar nucleai plants were not unde1taking similai business financial
    activities around the times the NRC issued their CALs.

    The NRC has withheld potentially adverse safety infonnation about other m1cleai facilities in
    the past as they pursued mergers and initial public offerings of stock. In fall 2001 , the NRC
    staff drafted an order that would require the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio to shut down
    for a safety inspection. But NRC management shelved that shut down order. At the time,
    FirstEnergy (Davis-Besse's owner) was pursuing a merger with GPU Nuclear. The "secret"
    draft order was not publicly disclosed until ve1y serious safety problems were identified at
    Davis-Besse in March 2002.

    An initial public offering of the stock of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
    was made on July 23, 1998. USEC was taking over the uranium emichment facilities built by
    the federal government at Paducah, Kentucky, and P01t smouth, Ohio. The NRC conducted a
    public meeting that month about perfo1mance at the two facilities, but failed to disclose
    safety deficiencies and violations it knew needed to be remedied at the fa cilities.

    The NRC ' s mission is to protect public health and safety, not to protect the financial dealings
    of its licensees. The NRC 's disparate handling of the CALs issued to address flood protection
    problems at Oconee, Fort Calhoun, Sequoyah and Watts Bar strongly suggest that financial
    considerations aie improperly guiding the NRC's actions, and inactions.

    5. The NRC 's investigative repo1t contends that the agency handled the flooding haza1ds at the
    19 nuclear plants in a timely, efficient, ai1d effective way. The last bullet on page 29 of the
    repo1t stated:

    Continued timely, efficient, and effective use ofthese programs, p rocesses, and
    procedures by NR C staff, irnplementing Commission decisions and considering all
    available information and technical viewpoints, p rovides the best and most
    appropriate means ofbringing the ongoing dam failure and flooding revielvs to
    app rop riate conclusions.

    Comment 3 above that the disparate application of LIC-504 in handling compaiable


    flooding hazaids unde1mines the efficient and effective aspects of the NRC's response.

    Lochbaum  

    OSC File No. DI-1 5-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    The DPO Panel examining concerns raised by two NRC engineers about flooding hazards
    at Watts Bar questioned the timeliness aspect of the NRC's response wh en they wrote:

    First, in reviewing the timeline associated with the issue, the Panel noted that
    more than four years had passed between the point when the [NRC] stafffirst
    questioned the methods and results of TVA 's hydrologic analysis and the p oint
    when the staff issued the CAL [confnmato1y action letter].

    The lack of timeliness adversely impacted the NRC 's regulato1y oversight of safety at
    Watts Bar. At the bottom of page 132, the NRC's investigative report described the
    consequence from the Yellow finding issued by the NRC to TVA for flood protection
    violations at Watts Bar:

    This finding, combined with another ;dentified as part of the walkdowns described
    in the next section, resulted in Watts Bar entering the Degraded Cornerstone
    column of the NRC 's Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix, necessitating
    additional inspection by the NRC staffto assure that root and contributing causes
    were understood, independently assess the extent ofcondition, determine whether
    safety culture components contributed to the issues, and assure that corrective
    actions were sufficient to address the causes and prevent recurrence.

    The "more than four years" that passed according to the DPO panel impaired the NRC's
    regulato1y oversight of safety at Watts Bar. The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) 2 relies
    upon Perfo1mance Indicators submitted quait erly by the licensees and an anay of
    inspections conducted by the NRC. The inspections aie conducted at different
    frequencies, but every inspection within the baseline set of inspections is conducted at
    least once every three years.

    NRC Inspection Procedure 71111 .06, "Flood Protection Measures," (ML15140A133) is


    one of the baseline inspections conducted by the NRC under its ROP. Tb.is baseline
    inspection is conducted aililually.

    The NRC assesses the inputs from the perfonnance indicators and inspection findings
    quait erly to dete1mine which of five columns in the Action Matrix each operating
    reactor's safety perfo1mance wairnnts. The three-year cycle for baseline inspections and
    quait erly safety perfonnance assessments strongly suggests that taking "more than four
    years" to act upon flooding hazards at Watts Bar was untimely. Had the flood protection
    deficiencies been identified during an aililual perfo1mance of Inspection Procedure
    71111.06, the NRC's reaction would have occmTed within a qua1ter. But the
    identification outside of this process took the NRC ((more than four yearsn to get around
    to addressing the regulato1y problems at Watts Bar.

    2
    The ROP is described by the NRC at http://wv.rw.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html

    Lochbaum  

    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213(e)(1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    The additional inspections and probing into whether safety culture components
    contributed to the problems should have been perfonned sooner, contrary to the "timely,
    effective, and efficient" asse1tion made in the NRC's investigative repo1i.

    Conclusion
    The NRC ' s response concludes that the cmTent risk of the nuclear plants to flooding is small. But
    the response glosses over the fact that flood protection shortcomings have been among the
    highest risk safety problems identified over the past 15 years and many other known
    sh01icomings remain uncoITected. The risk from flooding may be small, but only after all the
    IOUs are implemented.

    The NRC ' s response concludes that the NRC handled the flooding hazards in a timely, effective,
    and efficient manner. But the response fails to mention internal conclusions about untimely
    handling of flooding hazards at Watts Bar, the use and non-use of an internal risk management
    procedme in handling flooding hazards at Oconee and Watts Bar, and the disparnte manner in
    how the NRC issued confinnato1y action letters to address flood protection upgrades at Oconee,
    Fo1t Calhoun, Sequoyah and Watts Bar.

    Sincerely,

    David A. Lochbaum *
    Director, Nuclear Safety Project
    Union of Concerned Scientists
    PO Box 15316
    Chattanooga, TN 37415
    423-468-9272, office
    dlochbaum@ucsusa.org

    July 20, 2016

    *Criscione comment: Mr. Lochbaum holds a bachelor of science degree in Nuclear Engineer and has worked in the
    national nuclear energy enterprise for several decades, including as a Shih Technical Advisor at commercial nuclear
    reactor plants and training NRC examiners and inspectors as a member of the NRC's Techincal Training Center staff.

    Lochbaum  

    OSC File No. DI-15-5254 Comments per 5 USC 1213 (e) (1) on
    2016-June-30 NRC response to OSC

    George Mulley's Comments Regarding NRC OIG Investigations Pertaining to


    the Concerns Raised under OSC File No. DI-15-5254

    Criscione's Comments: George Mulley retired in 2008 after 26 years as a federal law
    enforcement agent assigned to the NRC. Prior to his retirement he spent 12 years as
    the Senior Level Assistant for Investigations including 4 years as acting Assistant
    Inspector General for Investigations in the NRC's Office of the Inspector General. I
    provided him FOIA versions of NRC OIG Case 13-001 and 13-005 for review and
    comment. These cases pertain to the OSC disclosure that became File No. DI-15-
    5254. Mr. Mulley's comments were provided via email. The highlighting, footnotes
    and bracketed items in the email below were added by me (Criscione).

    From: George Mulley


    Sent: Saturday, July 23, 2016 12:48 PM
    To: Larry Criscione
    Subject: Re: Review of OSC File No. Dl-15-5254

    Larry,

    I have completed my review of OIG Report of Investigation 13-001. Before providing my


    critique, which I think would be best presented in long bullet form, I must start by
    noting that some background to this investigation must exist that I am missing or that I
    am unaware of.

    First, OIG claims it initiated this investigation based on receipt of information indicating
    an improper release of sensitive security information by you. However, OIG does not
    disclose who developed this information (unusual) nor does OIG interview the source of
    the allegation (violation of OIG investigative procedure) .

    Additionally, OIG claims the information it received indicates you may have improperly
    released OU01 information to members of Congress and to the US Office of Special
    Counsel. That is the sum total of the information OIG supposedly received.

    Ironically, OIG knows full well such a release does not violate any statute oir
    management directive: in fact, OIG commonly makes exactly the same releases. So why
    initiate an investigation? OIG even cites Title 5 USC 7211 2 in the ROl 3 as support of an
    employee's right to petition Congress that may not be interfered with. To me, this OIG

    1
    Official Use Only
    2
    "Employees' right to petition Congress" (which contains language specifically delineating that the right
    to furnish information to Congress "shall not be interfered with or denied")
    3
    Report of Investigation

    Mulley  

        
     

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    Note on NRC ADAMS References

        
       



    

    

    

    
    

        

      
      
     

    
    

      

      
       

    ADAMS Records Associated with these Comments

     IR 0500026906002, IR 0500027006002, IR 0500028706002,


    01/01/2006 03/31/2006; Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; Other Activities.
     
     Management Directive 3.4, "Release of Information to the Public".
     

      

        
     

     Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F) Related to External


    Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2,
    and 3 (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226).  
     Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request.
     
     Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Evaluation of Duke Energy
    Carolinas September 26, 2008, Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f), Letter Dated August 15,
    2008, Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam.
     
     Evaluation Of Duke Energy Carolina, LLC (Duke), November 30, 2009,
    Response To Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Letter Dated April 30, 2009,
    Related To External Flooding At Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, And 3 (Oconee).
     
     LIC504, Revision 3, "Integrated RiskInformed Decision Making Process
    for Emergent Issues."  
     Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis.
      
     Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3, Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL 210003),
    Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns. 
    
     Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam
    Failures.  
     Oconee Units 1, 2, & 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2
    10003.  
     NRC Assessment of Oconee External Flooding Issue (October 18, 2010).
     
     Supplement to Technical Basis for Allowing Oconee Nuclear Station to
    Remain in Operation Through November 2011, Associated with the External Flooding
    Issues.  
     Staff Assessment of Duke's Response To Confirmatory Action Letter
    Regarding Duke's Commitments To Address External Flooding Concerns At The
    Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, And 3 (ONS) (TAC NOS. ME3065, ME3066, and
    ME3067).  
     Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear
    Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures. 
     
     Screening Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of
    Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures. 
      

      

        
     

     Letter to David J. Bannister re: Confirmatory Action Letter Fort


    Calhoun Station.  
     LIC101, Revision 4, License Amendment Review Procedures.
     
     Screening Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of
    Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures_redacted.
     
     FOIA/PA20120106 Redacted Potential flooding of nuclear plants
    following upstream dam failures.  
     Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal
    Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the NearTerm
    Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima DaiIchi Accident.
     
     Confirmatory Action Letter Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, and
    Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Commitments to Address Flooding Concerns
    (TAC NOS. ME8805, ME8806, and ME8807).  
     Screening. Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of
    Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures. 
    
     FOIA/PA20120106 Resp 1 Final.  
     FOIA/PA20130008 Letter from NRC staff, Lawrence Criscione to
    Chairman Alison Macfarlane regarding Nuclear plant vulnerabilities to flooding
     
     LIC504EMcKenna.  
     Dresden, Units 2 & 3, Exelon Generation Co., LLC's 180day Response to
    NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Re: Flooding Aspects of
    Recommendation 2.3 of the NearTerm Task Force Review of Insights from the
    Fukushima Daiichi Accident.  
     Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2, 180day Response to NRC Request for
    Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Flooding Aspects of
    Recommendation 2.3 of the NearTerm Task Force Review of Insights from
    Fukushima Daiichi Accident.  
     FPL060PR001, Rev. 0, "Flooding Walkdown Report," in Response to
    NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Regarding NearTerm Task Force
    Recommendation 2.3, Flooding.  
     CAL 210003 Confirmatory Action Letter Oconee Nuclear Station,
    Units 1,2 and 3 Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns (TAC NOS.
    ME3065, ME3066 and ME3067  
     FOIA/PA20130008 RESP I Partial.  

      

        
     

     FOIA/PA20130127 Redacted Copies of September 18, 2012 email to


    the NRC Chairman and referenced documents  
     FOIA/PA20130008 Resp 2 Partial. 
    
     Oconee Timeline.  
     Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Documentation of Staff
    Decision Regarding Implementation of Permanent Modifications for Protection from
    External Flooding.  
     Email from M. Khanna, NRR to J. Mitman, NRR FW: Oconee 2D Results
    Report.  
     Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3, Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report in Response to
    NRC Ltr. "Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) re Recommendations
    2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of NearTerm Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Daiichi
    Accident.  
     03/25/2013 Slides From Meeting With Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
    Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Concerning the Flooding Hazard
    Reevaluation Report.   
      
     FOIA/PA20130008 Resp 3 Partial.  
     DPO2012003 Case File.  
     FOIA/PA20130239r Information regarding the risk of inundation
    from dam failure to operating commercial nuclear reactors 
    
     Second Quarter Operating Plan FY2013 
    
     FOIA/PA20130239 Resp 1 Partial. 
    
     Template for Staff Assessment of Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f)
    Information Request Flooding Mechanisms.  
     Complaint, Public Employees for Environmental ResponsibilityPlaintiff
    v. USNRC Defendant, Civil Action 8152013.  
     Report, Enclosure Oconee Nuclear Station Flooding Hazard
    Reevaluation Report.  
     Email from L Criscione to Chairman A Macfarlane.
     
     Letter from L Criscione to Chairman A Macfarlane.
     

      

        
     

     Joint Motion to Stay Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility


    Plaintiff v. USNRC.  
     LIC504, R.4 "Integrated RiskInformed DecisionMaking Process for
    Emergent Issues". Y020130056  
     NRR LT Meeting on Oconee Flood Protection and the Jocassee Dam
    Hazard.  
     LER 1400100 for St. Lucie, Unit 1, Regarding Internal RAB Flooding
    During Heavy Rain Due to Degraded Conduits Lacking Internal Flood Barriers.
     
     US Army Corps of Engineers Evaluation of Missouri River Mainstem
    Dams and Potential Flood Hydrographs at Fort Calhoun and Cooper Nuclear Power
    Plants  
     St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Staff Assessment of the Flooding
    Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of NearTerm Task Force
    Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DaiIchi Nuclear Power Plant
    Accident (TAC MF0274 and MF0275).  
     OIG14A17, Audit of NRC's Freedom of Information Act Process Final
    Report Dated June 16, 2014.  
     NRC Information Notice 201501, Degraded Ability to Mitigate Flooding
    Events.  
     COMSECY140037: Enclosure 3 NonConcurrence Process Record for
    NCP2014010  
     COMSECY140037: Enclosure 4 NonConcurrence Process Record for
    NCP2014011  
     Concern about the Appearance of Obstruction of Justice.
     
     Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 Final Significance Determination
    of Yellow Finding and Notice Of Violation: NRC Inspection Report 05000313/2014010
    and 05000368/2014010.  
     Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 Submittal of Revised Flood Hazard
    Reevaluation Report per NRC's Request for Additional Information.
     
     IP 71111.06 Flood Protection Measures. 
    
     Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 1206, Rev 1A, "Diverse and Flexible
    Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide."  
     Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (PUBLIC) Staff Assessment of
    Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) FloodCausing

      

        
     

    Mechanisms Reevaluation (CAC Nos. MF1012, 1013 and 1014).


     
     Oconee Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (NONPUBLIC) Staff Assessment of
    Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR 50.54(f) FloodCausing
    Mechanisms Reevaluation (TACs MF1012, MF1013 and MF1014). 
     
     INSJ, Vol. 1, No. 1, Analysis of the October 21, 2003 Unintentional
    Passive Reactor Shutdown at Callaway Plant with regard to aspects of Reactivity
    Management, Corporate and Regulatory Oversight, Nuclear Safety Culture, and
    Operating Experience.  
     Oconee Nuclear StationConfirmatory Action Letter Followup Inspection
    Report 05000269/2016009, 05000270/2016009 and 05000287/2016009.
     
     Press ReleaseII16031: NRC Completes Review of Flood Protection
    Improvements at Oconee Nuclear Plant.  
     Records associated with comments on the 2016June30 NRC response
    to the OSC referral regarding Criscione's disclosure concerning flooding at nuclear
    power plant sites 
     2016Jun30 Response by the NRC Chairman to the US Special Counsel
    regarding OSC File No. DI155254
     2016July7 Letter from the US Office of Special Counsel to Lawrence
    Criscione regarding his right under 5 USC 1213(e)(1) to comment on the 2016June
    30 response from the NRC Chairman to the US Special Counsel concerning OSC File
    No. DI20155254
     2012Nov15 Letter from the NRC Freedom of Information Act/Privacy
    Act Officer regarding FOIA request 20130034.  
     2016May19 0734, Failure to study Dam Security, from Criscione to
    Kirkwood, Holahan and Clark.  
     2016May19 0800, MOU between USACE and ACRS, from Criscione to
    Kirkwood, Holahan and Clark.  
     2016May19 0754, NeedtoKnow regarding nuclear safety issues
    associated with flooding, from Criscione to Kirkwood, Holahan and Clark.
     
     2016May19 0813, Email Regarding Keeping Inundation Levels from
    the Public, from Criscione to Kirkwood, Holahan and Clark. 
     
     2016May9 email from Criscione to Kirkwood, Holahan and Clark.pdf

     2016May17 0849 email regarding initial interview, sent from
    Criscione to Kirkwood, Holahan and Clark.pdf

      

        
     

     2016May20 0600, Clarification regarding pumps at Peach Bottom,


    from Criscione to Kirkwood, Holahan and Clark.pdf
     2012Sep14, email from Criscione to various Congressional staff
    concerning NRC Concealing Concerns Regarding Oconee Nuclear Station.pdf

     2012Sep14 Letter from Richard Perkins to Inspector General Hubert
    Bell regarding Concealment of Significant Nuclear Safety Information by the U.S.
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission
     2013Aug4 email from Scott Hodes to Lawrence Criscione.pdf

     2013Feb4 Request to DoJ for Felony Indictment and 2013Feb15
    declination_redacted
     2016Aug3 LinkedIn Profile for Jack R. Davis, Director of the NRC's
    Japan LessonsLearned Directorate
     2013Jan15 interview of George Wilson for OIG Cases 13001 & 13005
    (interview summary of the NRC's Dams Safety Officer)_redacted
     2013July5 Appeal From Initial Decision FOIAPA201300239.pdf

     2013June10 Discussion of FOIA Releases regarding the flooding issues
    at Oconee.pdf
     2013June13 Letter from Hirsch to Criscione and Criscione's
    Response.pdf
     2013May24 email from Criscione to Macfarlane, Bell, Doane, Vietti
    Cook, Borchardt, Ash, Sealing, Zobler, Grodin and Lee, subj Inquiry Regarding Overdue
    FOIA Appeals 2013004A, 006A, 009A, 010A, 011A & 013A.pdf
     2014Jan5 Input regarding Audit of NRC's FOIA Process.pdf

     2015March13 Union of Concerned Scientists' briefing package for NRC
    Chairman Burns and Commissioner Baran
     2013Mar29 Appeal for refusal to release documents requested under
    FOIA Requests 20130126, 20130127, and 20130128
     2012Nov15 Entry for FOIA 20130008 on p 25 of ML13149A079 and
    FOIA request 20130262
     Sensitivity Reviews for ML16200A049, ML16201A086, ML16201A093,
    ML16201A095, ML16201A100, ML16202A536A538, ML16204A001A002,
    ML16216A702A713
     Style Sheet for JLD Flooding Review Documents.pdf

      

        
     

     2014Jan9 mpg video of the flooding at St. Lucie, D43 MOV03976.MPG

     2014May27 and 2014June5 emails concerning the St. Lucie Jan 9
    Reactor Auxiliary Building Flooding Video
     2010Feb13 Memo from NRR requesting a Generic Issue regarding
    flooding due to upstream dam failures.pdf
     2013Mar25 Emails from the NRC to various members of the public
    (Greenville News, Westinghouse Electric Company, WGOG radio, Greenpeace, etc.)
    distributing Duke Energy power point presentation concerning flooding at the Oconee
    Nuclear Station_redacted
     2013April23 email from Duke Energy to NRC complying with NRC
    direction to redact power point presentation presented at a March 25, 2013 public
    meeting.pdf
     2013April11 Letter from a FOIA requester to the NRC EDO concerning
    an update for FOIA Appeal 2013009A
     2013Mar25 email from Greenpeace to the Union of Concerned
    Scientists and the Huffington Post containing a Duke Energy presentation obtained
    from the NRC.pdf
     2012Oct19 interview of Ben Beasley (Chief of the Operating
    Experience and Generic Issues Branch in the Division of Risk Assessment in the NRC's
    Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research)_redacted
     2012Oct23 interview of Doug Coe (Deputy Director of Division of Risk
    Assessment of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research)_redacted

     2012Oct24 interview of Daniel Cardenas (Branch Chief in Division of
    Facility Security)_redacted
     2012Nov29 interview of Craig Conklin interview (Senior Executive
    Service member at the Department of Homeland Security)_redacted

     2013Jan04 interview of Rich Correia (Director of Division of Risk
    Assessment of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research)_redacted

     2013Jan17 mp3 Recording of Interrogation of Lawrence Criscione
    corresponding to transcript pp. 87 to 95 on the topic of speculating who in Congress
    shared the GI204 screening analysis with Greenpeace
     2013Jan17 mp3 recording corresponding to pp.116144
    demonstrating the agent's lack of understanding of the relationship between
    classified information and information administratively restricted from public release
    under informal extralegal processes

      

        
     

     2012-Sep-20.NRC.Form.183,.Report.of.Security.Incident/Infraction/
    Violation.written.against Criscione.for.sending.Official.Use.Only.documents.to
     link
     2012Autumn undated Memorandum from Mary Jane RossLee to
    Richard Correia concerning preventing recurrence of events such as the September
    18, 2012 release of information to Congress link
     2014Mar12 letter and email informing Criscione's attorney that OIG
    Case 13001 and 13005 had closed.pdf
     2016Sep8 Criscione et. al. comments submitted under 5USC1213(1)(e)
    regarding the NRC Chairman's 2016June30 response to the US Special Counsel
    concerning OSC File No. DI155254 on flooding at reactor sites due to upstream dam
    failures
     Sensitivity Review: ML16195A368A369 ML16232A001 ML16236A018
    A019 ML16236A021 ML16236A230 ML16237A004A007 ML16238A005A011
    ML16238A013A014 ML16239A085 ML16242A333 ML16242A344 ML16244A000
    A009 ML16245A000A002 ML16252A004
     2016Aug29 Verification of Identity and Sworn Authorization for
    Release of Information
     2013Jan17 Transcript
     2013Jan17 mp3 recording corresponding to transcript pp. 70 to 75
    regarding the Inspector General's agents concern that Criscione did not adequately
    work through internal NRC channels prior to contacting Congress with his flooding
    concerns
     2013Jan17 mp3 recording corresponding to transcript pp. 44 to 46
    concerning protecting Official Use Only information
     2013Jan17 mp3 recording corresponding to transcript pp. 58 to 64
    concerning the need to seek approval from NRC supervision, licensees, and other
    federal agencies prior to providing information to Congress
     2013Jan17 mp3 recording corresponding to transcript pp. 79 to 83
    concerning Inspector General's agents understanding that NRC employees do not
    have an inherent needtoknow about nuclear safety issues not formally assigned to
    them
     2013Jan17 mp3 recording corresponding to transcript pp. 98 to 103
    concerning motivation of Perkins' complaint to the IG regarding redactions to the GI
    204 Screening Analysis
     2013Jan17 mp3 recording corresponding to transcript pp. 95 to 98
    concerning speaking with Tom Zeller of the Huffington Post and David Lochbaum of
    the Union of Concerned Scientists
     2013Jan17 mp3 recording corresponding to transcript pp. 153 to 159
    concerning NRC policy with regard to speaking to the media

      

        
     

     2012Dec10 email from Criscione to Commissioner Ostendorff and


    follow up correspondence arranging an Open Door policy meeting on the Oconee
    flooding issues
     2011Mar29 complaint by an agent of the NRC Office of the Inspector
    General against Criscione regarding Criscione responding to a media inquiry
    following the Fukushima accident_redacted
     2011Mar18 Seventeen month OIG investigation of Lawrence Criscione
    for statements made as a private citizen at a 10 CFR 2.206 petition meeting on
    September 17, 2010_redacted
     2013June27 Eight month OIG investigation of Lawrence Criscione
    concerning an International Nuclear Safety Journal paper on the October 21, 2003
    passive reactor shutdown at Callaway Plant that he wrote and submitted as a private
    citizen_redacted
     2013July26 Email from the NRC Office of Administration to Office of
    the Inspector General denoting that the NRC Office of General Counsel determined
    nothing security sensitive was contained in Criscione's 2016Jan17 interrogation
    transcript_redacted link
     2016Sep9 Cover Letter for 5USC1213(1)(e) comments submitted
    regarding the NRC Chairman's 2016June30 response to the US Special Counsel
    concerning OSC File No. DI155254

      

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