ELECTROMAGNETIC EFFECTS OF OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION LINES

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, SAFEGUARDS, AND METHODS OF CALCULATION

A report prepared by the Working Group on Electromagnetic and
Electrostatic Effects of Transmission Lines, General Systems
Subcommittee. L.O. Barthold, Chairman, Power Technologies
Inc; W.G. Finney, R.J. Donovan Inc; E.G. Lambert, Pacific Gas
& Electric Co; H.E. Skelton, Ontario Hydro; R.H. Schlomann,
American Electric Power Service Corp; L.E. Zaffanella, General
Electric Co; P.C. Williams, B.C. Hydro & Power Authority; C.F.
Clark, Bonneville Power Administration; D.C. Hubbard, A.B.
Chance Co; and L. Delaplace, Boston Edison Co.

ABSTRACT rents or fault currents, E/M induced voltages

appear at the open ends of partially grounded
This paper summarizes practical problems loops of the lines. These voltages can be as
associated with electromagnetic currents in- high as 0.1 volt per mile per amp of current
duced by high voltage transmission lines. It or even greater on lines which closely paral-
deals with the safeguards necessary to coun- lel other circuits. This may correspond to
teract these currents and develops a method the order of 300 volts/mile under normal load
of calculation of electromagnetically induced conditions or as high as five kV/mile under
voltages and currents. short circuit conditions. Methods for compu-
tation of current in specific cases are given
INTRODUCTION in subsequent paragraphs.
In 1971, the IEEE Working Group on E/S Where passive conductors are grounded at
and E/M Effects prepared two papers on elec- two or more points, the E/M induced current
trostatic effects of transmission lines./1,2/ which flows in the passive line is limited by
These papers treated the types of problems the total impedance of the passive circuit--
that could arise, some safeguards that were i.e., the impedance of the line plus that of
useful, and discussed methods of calculation the ground return path. For a low resistance
of E/S induced voltages. ground path, the current flowing in loops of
line of any length will be virtually constant,
This report, prepared by the same work- since the impedance of the line will increase
ing group, deals with the same issues but re- with length in the same proportion as will
stricts itself to E/M effects. Because the the induced voltage on the line. Thus, in
E/M problem is closely related to the manner the majority of cases, the E/M induced volt-
of grounding and concern over step potential, age appears as a series drop in the passive
these questions have also been dealt with in circuit and may not represent a serious
this report. problem.
References 1 and 2 include some prelimi- For high resistance ground paths, the
nary consideration of shock criteria, such current in the circuit is limited primarily
criteria being equally applicable to E/S and by the resistance of the ground path. In
E/M induced effects. However, no single cri- this case, the E/M induced voltage will ap-
terion is felt to be adequate to all classi- pear across the grounding resistance. Cur-
fications of exposure and the working group rent flow through the grounding point can
is now attempting to define classifications elevate the potential of a local or remote
of exposure and to assign shock criteria ap- ground above the true ground potential.
plicable to each.
Thus, persons at work on or near a line
The following paragraphs will identify can be subject to the following E/M induced
E/M effects of significance, give some exam- shocks:
ples where problems have arisen, and cite
safeguards that many utilities have found 1. Potentials between an open ended
useful. line and ground
E/M Induction in Parallel Circuits 2. Potentials between a grounded line
and a remote ground
- On parallel or underbuilt lines adjacent
to circuits carrying either normal load cur- 3. Step or touch potentials at or near
ground electrodes
Consider an example case where a man
comes in contact with a conductor on a sup-
posedly de-energized circuit which is ground-
ed by a single ground connection at some
point remote from him. Assume the following:
a) the E/M induced voltage is 0.1 volts
Paper T 73 441-3, recommended and approved by the IEEE Transmission & per mile per ampere.*
Distribution Committee of the IEEE Power Engineering Society for Presentation at
the IEEE PES Summer Meeting & EHV/UHV Conference, Vancouver, B.C.
Canada, July 15-20, 1973. Manuscript submitted February 21, 1973; made * These values should be specifically calcu-
available for printing May 11, 1973. lated for a given case.

892
 b) the body and contact
the man is 1500 ohms.
c) the source reactance (Thevenins equi-
valent) is small compared to 1500 ohms.*
d) the load current in a parallel
cuit is 1000 amperes.
e) the threshold of-dangerous shock is
taken as 5 milliamperes for this classifica-
tion of exposure.
Then, if the distance between
and the ground connection is D,
D = 1500 x (.005) -
075 miles 396 ft.
(0-.l).(l000)
Note that, if a short circuit of 10,000
amperes occurred on the parallel line, the
approximate safe distance would be 0.0075
miles or only 40 feet from the ground
connection.
Current flowing to ground through
sistive ground connection can cause dangerous
step or touch potentials. The discussion of
this problem in succeeding paragraphs, while
directed toward currents from E/M induction
is equally applicable toother currents--e.g.,
fault current accidentally occurring on the
circuit being worked on.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the effects
of grounding. It is useful in a general
ground analysis to consider the ground sur-
face as an imperfect surface ground below
which a "true" ground plane exists.
Figure 1(a) shows a conductor
an effective resistance R1.
through
resistance of Rl would presumably be made up of driven
grounds or a grillage of some sort. A work-
man standing at a different location is also
grounded through foot contact. R2 would nor-
mally be very much greater than Rl. Current
I, flowing through R1, produces a voltage aR1
cir- which is impressed across the workman's body
resistance, RB, in series with his local
R2i
ground resistance
An actual case history can be cited in
connection with Figure 1(a). The instance
involved inadvertent energization of a 4000-
the man volt line grounded through --an effective re-
sistance, R1, of 15 ohms. The remaining im-
pedance including the line and the station
= ground was 2.1 ohms. The fault current was
only 135 amperes, but the voltage across the
lineman and his ground contact was 15x135 or
2020 volts!
The lineman's ground contact resistance
was found to be 600 ohms. Adding to this a
1500-ohm value for body resistance, head to
foot, his combined circuit resistance was ap-
a re- proximately 2100 ohms. The resultant current
through him then was 2020/2100 or 0.96 am-
peres. Uslng Dalziel's electrocution formula
I = 0.165 VeaT t becomes less than 2 cycles
for a possible fatal duration.
His work location in this case was
grounded through moderately low resistance,
but he was not protected adequately.
Figure 1(b) shows a similar case, except
where R2 is the resistance of a remote ground
connection with which the workman might come
into contact.
grounded Figure l(c) illustrates another phenome-
effective ground
non. In this figure, the

-I-
v t X & KSX&~~I-)u h
ilL. IL ALL JIL RS R ACE RO a

Ar

-TZUE rqeoi.1a
Fig. l(a) Fig. 1(c)

COUMON J EQU
q Po E IAL

eSUCFACE
cmeOUL b
~L

RI,
*t1 fim - J - s '- ILA JL

Fig. l(b) Fig. 1(d)

* These values should be specifically calcu- resistance, R1, is more accurately represent-
lated for a given case. ed as a distributed resistance. A workman
893
bridges several feet of this resistance with
each stride, subjecting himself to a portion
of the drop IR1.
In Figure l(d), an extended local ground
is provided, minimizing all of the effects
cited above.
During normal work periods,safety grunds
should usually be fenced off or otherwise
kept clear of work sites to protect workmen
from dangerous step potentials from the
ground, should the line be accidentally re-
energized./3/ These clearances are more than
adequate to protect line personnel against
danger from ground potentials from E/M cur-
rent flow. However, where the line is left
unattended during non-working periods, un-
authorized entry to the work site by persons,
children and animals can result in severe and
even fatal shock. A particular concern re-
ported by one utility in this respect is the
case where a line is being strung and the
conductors are temporarily anchored to a tree
stump or a rod for the night. Children en-
tering the work site have been known to at-
tempt to swing on the conductors, as the angle
of the conductors to the ground often allows
this, and have received shocks as a result.
In these cases, it has been found necessary
to post watchmen at the site during non-
working hours.
Where safety grounds may be required to
ground high currents due to accidental ener-
gizing of a grounded line, attention must be
given to the current capacity, the possible
IR drop, and the E/M effect created with re-
spect to adjacent grounds and/or conductors.
Long or loosely sagging safety grounds can
whip about violently under large surge cur-
rents. The effect is more pronounced when
three phases are grounded and all three
phases are accidentally re-energized. Stres-
ses generated can also result in grounding
cable termination failure.
Clean connections are also an important
corsideration in assessing safety ground per-
formance and can be a critical factor when
high currents result from accidental energiz-
ing. High resistance contacts to oxidized
conductors contribute to excessive IR drop
and contact burning.
To protect from touch and step poten-
tials at winches and cranes in contact with
de-energized lines, some utilities use limit-
ed access ground mats in the area of winches
and cranes. Ground mats must be bonded to
vehicles to provide an equipotential situa-
tion. Caution should be exercised when step-
ping on or off these mats. Step and touch
potentials at the base of metal structures
may be eliminated by the use of mats, insula-
ted ladders or walk ways. Mats must be bond-
ed to ground rods adjacent to the vehicle or
structure.
In flat, clear areas some utilities use
ground mats to cover the entire work area
with limited access, etc., to protect person-
nel in work areas from dangerous shock if
there is a re-energization of the line from
any cause. This measure also eliminates the
possibility of shock from steady state E/M
894
induced currents. Other utilities use buried
grounding mats for the same purpose. In
locations where these procedures are impossi-
ble to carry out, the alternative of estab-
lishing two work zones within a work area is
another possible method. A "zone of equipo-
tential" is set up in the area of the line,
etc., and another area on the ground which is
protected from dangerous step potentials. All
other areas are roped off.
Safeguards:
1. When work is proceeding on a line,
safety grounds should always be applied to
the line at the work site and to all conduc-
tors in multiconductor bundles, if insulated
spacers are used.
2. All conducting objects within a work
area should be bonded together to create a
"zone of equipotential" so that it is not
possible to receive a shock through contact
with the main ground at the work site and a
second remote ground which is present in the
work area.
3. When more than one phase is ground-
ed, jumpering from phase to phase with
minimum cable sag and employing a single
common ground lead will minimize cable
stress.
4. Clean conductors using hot stick
techniques before attaching grounding or
jumper clamps.
5. The possibility of shock from step
and touch potentials is reduced by fencing
the area around the ground rod to block ac-
cess to these potentials if the line is ac-
cidentally energized.
Insulated Shield Wires
Overhead shield wires are installed on
transmission lines to provide a path to
ground for lightning protection. Previously,
the shield wires have been grounded at every
tower (see Figure 2(a)). With the advent of
high load carrying EHV transmission lines,
the insulated shield wire scheme provides a
power loss savings and may serve as a possi-
ble medium for telephone carrier communica-
tion. Insulating the overhead shield wires
does not degrade lightning protection, or
impair operation of the transmission line,
but it may create a situation that could
give rise to electromagnetic induction
problems for linemen and maintenance per-
sonnel. However, with proper designs and
working procedures, the effects are mini-
mized. /4-12/
During construction of the overhead
shield wires in the vicinity of an existing
and operating EHV transmission line, both
electrostatic and electromagnetic effects may
cause some concern to linemen. Shield wire
stringing operations might require special
rolling grounds and possibly ground grids at
tensioner and puller sites. During mainte-
nance operations when working above an ener-
gized line, the shield wire should be bonded
to the tower and/or gloves or hot stick tech-
niques employed.
 An insulated shield wire scheme, as
shown in Figure 2(b), eliminates the power
loss due to the magnetically induced circula-
ting currents. The grounds collapse the re-
latively high voltage potentials that could
be electrostatically induced from the ener-
gized transmission line. The sectionalized
lengths are established to limit the maximum
allowable electromagnetically induced voltage
on the shield wire. The induced voltage to
ground builds up linearly from the ground to
the open end. The maximum allowable induced
voltage at any point on the shield wire must
be kept lower than the reignition voltage
that will support and sustain an arc initi-
ated by a lightning stroke.
An insulated shield wire scheme, as
shown in Figure 2(c), reduces the circulating
currents induced from the power conductors, as
well as performing as a telephone communica-
tion carrier. However, the same electromag-
netic effects may occur during construction
and maintenance as previously discussed. It
is important to note that transposition of
shield wires can eliminate all or most of the
positive or negative sequence E/S or E/M ef-
fects. The zero sequence coupling is not in-
fluenced. This is important from a safety
standpoint, since the limiting concern is one
of short circuit induction. The communica-
tion protective coupling device at the termi-
nals must be able to supply a path to ground
in the event of a lightning stroke. The de-
vice must also be able to continuously dis-
charge the electrostatically induced effects
and possibly havean impedance matching trans-
former. Associated with many devices is a
ground disconnect switch which is installed
in the shield wire before the communication
coupling protector in order to ground the
shield wirefor carrier equipment maintenance.
To summarize, with the advent of higher
current carrying power circuits the induced
circulating losses becomes appreciable. To
eliminate or reduce these losses, insulating
the shield wire becomes necessary. However,
inherent with any insulated shield wire
A
- -
A A A plying or removing grounds from lines. This
Fig. 2(a)
Grounded Shield Wire Scheme
AA A; A A 'A
Fig. 2(b)
Typical Insulated & Sectionalized
Shield Wire Scheme
Protective Coupling Devices
Fig. 2(c)
Typical Insulated and Transposed
Shield Wire Scheme
895
schemes are both the electrostatic and elec-
tromagnetic effects. These effects associat-
ed with the insulated shield wire principally
affect only linemen and maintenance person-
nel. After a satisfactory design is prepared,
only working procedures for construction and
maintenance need be implemented.
Arcing on Removal of Grounds
When a ground is removed from a line
where there is E/M induced current flow
through the ground, an arc will develop across
the open break between the line and ground
conductor. The length of the arc produced
will depend upon the magnitude of the current
broken and the voltage which appears across
the open break when the arc is extinguished.
Andrews et al showed that the reach of arcs
produced by breaking currents below 100 A is
given by: /13/
Arc Reach, in feet = 0.0165 VI
where V = voltage across the break in kV
I = current broken in amps
Using this equation and typical values
of electromagnetically induced voltages and
currents on long transmission lines, it can
be shown that breaking E/M induced currents
by the removal of grounds from the line can
result in arcs several feet in length appear-
ing across the break between the line and the
ground conductor. It may be difficult or im-
possible to extinguish such an arc using a
standard ground switch, and quite dangerous
to line operating personnel if the ground is
removed manually.
Safeguards:
1. The rating of switches used to
ground lines should be chosen to ensure that
they can break induced voltage and current
arcs likely to be encountered on the line to
which they are connected. Alternatively,
load break switches can be installed.
2. Operating personnel must observe
strict limits of approach when manually ap-
procedure will ensure that personnel cannot
come into contact with the arc on removal of
the ground from the line.
Thermal Instability of Ground Rods
On wood pole lines, it may be necessary
to ground the line using a safety ground made
up from driven rods. If the power to be dis-
sipated by this ground because of induced
current flow is high enough, the ground will
begin to heat. If the power to be dissipated
is large, the rod will heat rapidly and will
eventually dry out the soil around it. If
this happens, the resistivity of the soil
will rise quickly and the resistance of the
rods will rise as a consequence. The effici-
ency of the ground as a safety device is,
therefore, impaired.
In unpublished tests conducted by B.C.
Hydro, where currents were circulated through
ground rods in various configurations in two
types of soil (alluvial loam and rocky soil),
it has been found that noticeable ground rod
heating occurs only when the power dissipated
by 5/8" diameter copper ground rods exceeds
5OW per foot of buried rod.
The B.C. tests on individual rods at
higher levels of power show that rods may
heat very rapidly, reaching the boiling point
of water within a matter of minutes. Drying
of the soll will then occur, the time taken
depending on the particular soil conditions.
In instances where this phenomenon has oc-
curred in the field, the resistance of a
single rod ground has been seen to rise from
60ato 1200,nin a matter of minutes.
Additional tests on 6 ft. single rods in
moist clay, with initial resistance as low as
7.8 ohms,displayed a rapid rise in resistance
and soil disturbance during simulated acci-
dental energizing at 15 kV.
On steel tower lines, the substantial
nature of the foundations and associated
ground conductors will probably ensure that
heating will not occur.-
Safeguards:
1. Increase the thermal capacity of the
grounds by increasing the number of ground
rods used to the point where thermal insta-
bility of the ground cannot occur over the
period that the ground rods will be in use.
2. Sectionalize the line involved so
that the maximum possible power which must be
dissipated by the ground cannot cause thermal
instability in the ground.
3. Use additional grounds in the vicin-
ity of the work ground to decrease the load
on the work ground to a point where thermal
instability is prevented.
4. Consider the use of deeper grounds
where soil conditions permit this.
Sparking at Ground Rods
In controlled tests, sparking has been
observed at the base of ground- rods and in
vegetation immediately adjacent to grounds
when the voltage on the ground with respett
to true ground potential exceeds 1200 V. The
onset of sparking is immediate even in very
wet conditions and burning and charring may
occur in green vegetation. The area affected
may extend for 3 '-6" from the rod, because
conduction occurs along plant stems and in
root systems.
In dry conditions, this effect has been
known to cause grass fires which could have
precipitated larger conflagrations.
The most practical safeguard is to cut
vegetation away from the areas around groun-d-
rods or conductors before subjecting the
ground to induced current flow.
Pole Fires
Fires on wooden pole structures may be
started by persistent arcing at loose or in-
correctly fitted grounding devices. This
896
condition is most likely to occur during con-
struction of a line when temporary grounds
may be left on remote incomplete structures
for fairly long periods of time. In reported
cases, the resulting fires have caused heavy
damage.
Fires of this type can usually be pre-
vented by applying rigid standards for the
grounding of lines under construction or
lines of a temporary nature, especially where
the line is known to be subject to high
levels of induced voltage and current.
Buried Pipes
It is a common misconception that buried
pipes, cable armor, etc., are not subject to
E/M induction and, consequently, there is a
temptation to be lax about safety precautions
in such cases. Pipelines which parallel
transmission lines, particularly if covered
with a non-conducting protective coating,
should be installed and maintained with the
same precautions cited above for parallel
above-ground conductors.
Some measurements were made on a 34-inch
coated pipe buriedin proximityto an EHV line.
The results of these unpublished tests by the
Southern California Gas Co. indicated that
with full-rated li"ne current of 1700 amperes,
pipe-to-ground voltage varied quite a bit
along the 55-mile pipe but were generally in
the range from 20 to 100 volts. To protect
personnel at valve or blow off stack loca-
tions, local ground mats were found effective.
Railroad Catenaries
Electrified railways often parallel pow-
er circuits. The overhead catenaries and on-
board electrical equipment directly connected
tothem should be maintained with the same
safety precautions as are used on a parallel
transmnission line.
Communication Circuits
Communication circuits (especially open
wire circuits) parallel to transmission lines
are subject to significant electromagnetic
coupling if the exposure is long and the
separation between facilities is insuffi-
cient. On a poorly coordinated installation,
the magnitude of induced voltage on the com-
munication facility can be substantial during
steady state conditions and excessive during
fault conditions on the power lines. /14,15/
This can result in a possible shock for per-
sons contacting the communication circuit
(maintenance, installation, etc.) and ad-
versely affect equipment at the terminals.
The longitudinally induced voltage in a
shielded communications cable will normally
be less than that of an open wire circuit.
This reduction is dependent on the shield
factor of the cable. Although the communica-
tion utility normally provides protection at
the terminal, the voltage breakdown of the
protective device may be on the order of 300
to 600 volts, and these protectors may not
always operate as designed.
It is assumed that danger exists if a
person is in contact between an energized
conductor and ground when the energized con- The short circuit (Thevenin's) impedance
ductor has longitudinally induced e.m.f. in of the parallel wire is quite simple if one
excessof 50 or 60 volts r.m.s. In this case, considers the main conductors as constant
the power line is assumed to be in normal current sources--i.e., not influenced by in-
operation (steady state condition). /141 For teraction with the fence or other parallel
transient conditions on the power lines, this circuit. In evaluating Thevenin's equivalent
voltage may be between 430-650 volts. impedance, current sources are replaced by an
open circuit, so the Thevenin's impedance is
Calculations for the induced voltage on simply the impedance of the fence itself:
the communication circuits are based on
Carson's equationsand are discussed at length
in the EEI-Bell Laboratory Reports. /15/ ZTh = Zff (3)
Approximate calculations can be made using It is apparent from Figure 3 that any
the curves developed in these reports or a resistance at the point where the fence is
more rigorous approach can be used which will grounded -must be included in the Thevenin' s
normally involve computer application. impedance. Thus, the shock current seen by
someone touching the terminal at point (p) is:
Safeguards:
VTh
To protect equipment, it is normal prac- I(Rg + Zff) + R (4)
tice to apply some sort of protective device
at the terminal such as carbon blocks, gas
tubes, or grounding relays. While these de- .where Rp is the sum of contact resistance,
vices can be obtained to give a voltage body resistance and ground resistance of the
breakdown to protect the equipment, it may be *affected person. This is illustrated in
necessary to have additional protection for Figure 4.
personnel safety, One successful means of
providing this additional safety is to reduce
the communication circuits to short segments
throughout the exposure to the power lines by
means of isolating transformers, or to "can- a I-
cel" the electromagnetic induced voltage'by
neutralizing transformers.
In some instances, it may be necessary
to establish special instructions concerning
the maintenance procedures used by communica- _-_
tion maintenance personnel. In those special
cases, where the communication circuit volt- I~~~~
age cannot reasonably be reduced to a safe
level, maintenance personnel should consider
the communication wires energized and apply
portable grounds prior to any work involving p
contact with these wires.
Figure 3
APPENDIX
CALCULATION OF E/M INDUCED VOLTAGES AND
CURRENTS
Thevenin's Equivalent Circuit for Analysis of
E/M Coupling
It was shown in a previous paper that an
object which is energized by electrostatical-
ly coupled voltage may be analyzed in terms
of a Thevenin's equivalent circuit. /2/ The
same approach is useful in representing elec-
tromagnetically induced voltages. Figure 3
shows a passive conductor (f) (fence, paral-
lel line, etc.) grounded at one point and in
parallel with a current-carrying conductor
(a). The open circuit (Thevenin's equivalent) Figure 4
voltage at (p) in Figure 3 is simply:
The foregoing discussed shock for the
VTh = IaZaf (1) case where one end of a conductor is open-
circuited. The analysis need not assume that
where Zaf is the mutual impedance per unit the fence terminates at (p), merely that it
length between conductors times their total is open-circuited at some point beyond (p)--
parallel length. If there were several i.e., thatno current flows in the fence prior
current-carrying conductors, as is the case to contact, if the fence is grounded at (p).
in a three-phase line for example, the rela-
tionship of (1) can be expanded: Addition of E/S and E/M Voltages
(2) In most practical circumstances, pro-
VTh = (IaZ af IbZbf Iczcf+ )
blems of E/M induction have no E/S component
897
and vice versa; in other words, an excessive Mutual Impedance Between Two Wires - a,b With
E/M charge usually arises when one end of a Common Ground Return
conductor is grounded or when grounds are not
sufficiently frequent. But, the fact that a Zab Rab + i Xab
ground exists anywhere on a conductor is suf-
ficient to drain off any electrostatically R ab = 10o3 , (0.2528) + ARab
induced charge. Similarly, ungrounded con- ab
ductors may see a large E/M component of
voltage included from one end to another, but Xab l0o- (0.74113 log10
assuming no E/S component, this is normally
of no concern to the first ground contact, be
it a grounding switch or a human being. + 2.4715) + A Xab
Theoretically, it is quite possible to s = spacing between conductors in feet
have both components present, in which case
they can be added by superposition. One p = earth resistivity in L * m
might imagine an insulated fence as shown in
Figure 5, for example, where a very high re- uj = 2 IlTf with = frequency in Hz
sistance to ground exists at the center--so
high that the electrostatically induced charge
has significant value, resulting in a uniform
voltage E 5 on the fence. Rab, Rab, Xab Xab inRm/mile
Rab = l10 [ - p s' cos%3
6.785 f- s'2 cos 2 %
107 P
4>
I ///*~'~I V-K (3.661 + log10 1,}
+ 2.951 f s'2.3 sin 2.3
-Em
+ 6.355 f ts 3cos 3A7
+ .1011 { Vp cos4 ]
-7.084 f2 '4 cos 4 %

1015 p2 J
Figure 5
Assuming that a very high current flows aXb = 10 [ o
103 pf s cos 3
in the energized conductor, and that its
phase angle lags the conductor voltage by
90, a value of E/M voltage of Em will result 2.318 p ,2 cos 2 .
at one end of the fence and -En at the other. 107 e
These components can be added to Er vectori-
ally to produce the composite open-circuit j
voltages, 'T and E'T. The Thevenin's equiva- + 6.355 s'3 cos 3.J
lent of the composite sources can most easily 101P
be derived independently and thus added.
2
This is, of course, conservative since the
very circumstances which cause excessive cur-
9.020 s'4 . sin 4.3
rent in the phase of concern is likely to de-
1015 p2
press its voltage. 20.77 s4 cos 4.3
Thus, the technique for adding E/M and 1015
E/S effects is not difficult, but neither is
it likely that simultaneous solution would
lead to design procedures or safety standards (3.842 + log1o ,fE: )I
that their separate consideration would have
missed. =Cos-1 ha + hb
Calculation of Self and Mutual Impedances s

Mutual impedance between transmission

line -conductors and wires close to around
(fences, communication circuits, etc.) can
be computed using the following equations,
which account for Carson's correction fac-
tors. /16/-
898
ha, hb are the heights of conductors a
and b, respectively.
s' = distance between one conductor and
the image of the other.
 A simplification is normally introduced
in power systems analysis neglecting the
terms & A
Rab and xab
This simplification practically does not
affect the results for values of terrain re-
sistivity equal to lO00f.m or higher and for
separations between wires up to 1000 feet.
REFERENCES
(1) "Electrostatic Effects of Overhead Trans-
mission Lines: Part I - Effects and
Safeguards," by IEEE Working Group on
E/S and E/M Effects, IEEE Transactions,
Vol. PAS-91, pp. 422-426, 1971.
(2) "Electrostatic Effects of Overhead Trans-
mission Lines: Part II - Methods of
Calculation," by IEEE Working Group on
E/S and E/M Effects, IEEE Transactions,
Vol. PAS-91, pp.426-433, 1971.
(3) W.L. Clifton, "Inadequacies of Safety
Grounds on Transmission and Distribution
Circuits," AIEE Conference Paper CP 60-
496, 1960.
(4) Central Station Engineers of the Westing-
house Electric Corporation, Electrical
Transmission and Distribution Reference
Book, Fourth Edition Copyright 1964,
Chapter 23, pp. 741-783.
(5) T.D. Wood, Jr., "Use of Insulated Over-
head Ground Wire for Communications,"
AIEE Conference Paper presented at the
Special Technical Conference on EHV Com-
munications, Control and Relaying, March
14-16, 1962, Dallas, Texas.
(6) G. E. Farmer, "The Use -of Insulated
Ground Wires on a Transmission Line for
Communication Channels,' IEEE Power Appa-
ratus and Systems, pp. 84-891, December
1963.
(7) J. Reichman, "Using Insulated Overhead
Ground Wires for Carrier Relaying,"
Transmission and Distribution, pp. 34-39,
November 1965.
(8) H.R. McNutt, Jr., W.C. Guyker, Jr., and
W.J. Blaser, "Economics Favor Insulated
EHV Static Wires," Electric Light and
Power, pp. 52-54, September 1966.
(9) IEEE Winter Power Meeting Report, "Static
Wire on 500 kV Used for Communications,"
Electrical WorM p. 147, February 21,1966.
(10) D.E. Hedman and H.C. Sampers, "345 kV,
60-Cycle Ground Wire Losses," Electric
Light and Power, p. 28, September 1967.
(11) J.H. Mallory, "Design Considerations in
Overhead Ground Wire Communications,"
paper presented to Pacific Coast Elec-
trical Association Engineering and Oper-
ating Section Communications Group, Los
Angeles, Calif., March 10, 1967.
(12) W.R. Johnson and E.G. Lambert, "500 kV
Transmission Lines of Pacific Gas arid
Electric," paper presented at the IEEE
899
EHV Transmission Conference, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada, September 30-October 2,
1968.
(13) F. E. Andrews, L. R. Johnson, and M. A.
Andrews, "Interrupting Ability of Horn
Gap Switches," IEEE Transactions (PAS)
pp. 1016, 1950.
(14) "Directives Concerning the Protection of
Telecommunication Lines Against Harmful
Effects from Electricity.Lines," Inter-
national Telegraph and Telephone Consul-
tative Committee (CCITT), International
Telecommunications Union 1962, p. 25,
( plemented 15).
(15) Engineering Report No. 14, Joint Subcom-
mittee on Development and Research,
National Electric Light Association and
Bell Telephone System, April 1932.
(16) E. Clarke, "Circuit Analysis of AC Power
Systems," Vol. I, pp. 372-384.
Discussion:
E.H. Skelton, (Ontario Hydro, Toronto, Ontario Canada): When
stringing a line in the near vicinity of a live line, the workers must be
protected against electromagnetically and electrostatically induced
charges, both steady state and due to surges. They must also be
protected from fault currents on the line under construction due to
accidental energizing of the line or contact with the neighbouring live
line. Such currents may be of the order of thousands of amperes, and
protection against them will easily take care of induced currents.
Ontario Hydro protects the operators of tension stringing machines
by placing the machines on a grounded metallic grid. The machine is
bonded to the grid, and the tail of the conductor is bonded to the
machine through brushes and a slip ring. Step voltages off the grid are
avoided by fencing off a three-foot no man's land outside the perimeter
of the grid. This setup, and the associated precuations followed by the
men, are cumbersome and expensive, but have proved their worth
several times. The most spectacular occasion was a windy day when a
phase of a 500 kV line flashed over to the static wire of a new circuit
being strung. Although the line was tripped off six times, the workmen,
only a few spans away, were not aware that anything was wrong until
one of them saw the flash.
Manuscript received August 2, 1973.
D. A. Gillies and D. E. Perry, (Bonneville Power Administration,
Portland, Oregon 97208): This report by the Working Group on
Electromagnetic and Electrostatic Effects on Transmission Lines calls
attention to a very real problem area for the industry. Induced voltages
will increase as right-of-way capacities are increased and we believe that
this must result in review of line designs, protective grounding practices,
and work procedures. This paper, along with those the Working Group
published on Electrostatic considerations (Ref. 1 & 2), should provide a
guide to those making such a review. However, as presented, we believe
these papers, by necessity, cover such a broad field that it would be
difficult to use as a guide for developing safe working procedures for an
individual system.
We hope that future work of the committee would be to convert
these papers into a guide with sections specifically aimed at Distribution,
Sub-transmission, EHV System, etc.
We do have the following specific comments:
1. The statement regarding the effect of high resistance ground
paths limiting current would apply to very high resistance grounds when
considering E/M. Since the E/M circuit is usually high impedance with a
large inductance, resistance, added vectorially, must be quite high to
have any appreciable effect on the current. The effect of resistance on a
low impedance fault source is well know, but users should not expect
Manuscript received August 6, 1973.
to eliminate their E/M problems by having a high footing resistance. It more terms into account. Carson's series in convenient form for
will, in fact, magnify their troubles. computer calculations2 in metric units are:
2. The principle of protective grounding at the work site to
provide a low impedance local path in parallel with the lineman was ARab = 410-4w [-b1acos0
developed to minimize the lineman hazard of an accidental energiza-
tion. As Step and Touch problems on ground due to E/M and E/S +b2a2 (c2 cos 20 + 0 sin 20)
couplings increase, protective grounding practices must be reevaluated. 3 cos 30
+b3a3
We find E/S currents of 2 to 3 amperes on EHV lines. Tower footing
resistance of over 100 ohms then can develop significant voltages to be -d4a4 cos 40
considered in developing work procedures for groundmen.
3. We believe additional work should be done on the Arc Reach -b5a 5 cos 50
formula. The formula would indicate that a recovery voltage of less
than 20 kV with 40 amperes current would not be extinguished on +b6a6 (c6 cos 60 + 0 sin 60)
BPA 500-kV lines. Single Pole Reclosing Tests have indicated about
45-kV recovery voltage at 40 amperes as about the limit. This would +b7a7 cos 70
seem to indicate that the formula is not "straight line" and that it
should be reviewed at least at EHV levels. -d8a 8 cos 80
Our protective grounding procedure is to apply the protective
grounds to an electromagnetic circuit (low voltage), for example; -.. in Q2/km
ground switches closed at each end. If necessary, then open the ground
switches during the work (low current into the ground) and close them and AXab = 4-10-4 cA [b1a cos 0
again to remove the protective grounds (low voltage). -d2a2 cos 2d
4. The paper seems to imply that the 5 milliampere let go induced
current limit is also applicable to transient induced currents. The let go +b3a3 cos 3 0
current limit should not be considered the limit for induced currents
related to high magnitude fault currents. Since fault currents are cleared -b4a4 (c4 cos 409 + & sin 40)
within cycles, the transient induced current will normally be cleared
prior to a person's reaction time and let go limits do not apply. +b5a5 cos 50
Dalziel's investigation of maximum current limits versus duration
reported in IEEE Spectrum 1969, suggests a 10 cycle fault would -d6a6 cos 60
indicate that a transient induced current of nearly 1 amp could be
tolerated. We are not suggesting 1 amp as a recommended limit, only +b7a7 cos 70
pointing out that 5 milliamps is not applicable for transient currents.
5. If series capacitors are not bypassed (either automatically or -b8a8 (c8 cos 8 0 + 0 sin 80)
manually) and remain electrically a part of the circuit and substation +... ] in 2/km
ground switches are closed, very high induced currents can result. A
condition can arise during line maintenance in which the induced circuit Each 4 successive terms form a repetitive pattern. The coefficients b,
is limited only by the positive sequence resistance with all three phases c, d, are constants, except for subtraction of lna in c, which can be
grounded since the series capacitance cancels the line inductance. The stored in lists. They are obtained from the recursive formulas
resulting impedance can be less than 0.05 ohm per mile for a 500-kV
line and can theoretically result in over a 1000 amps induced current on
a 500-kV double circuit line. b, =
6 for odd subscripts,
i2i(isign
bi = bi-2 + 2) with starting valuc
b 2= for even subscripts,
l1A
1 1 I

ci = ci2 + i + i+2 with starting value c2 = 1.3659315 - lna,

ir
H. W. Dommel (University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8, B. C.): di = 4 bi, with sign = 1 changing after each 4 successive terms
The members of the Working Group have provided an excellent (sign=+l fori= 1,2,3,4;sign=-I fori=5,6,7,8,etc.).
summary of the problems associated with electromagnetic coupling.
The following comments are rather minor and are offered to supple- For a> 5 the following asymptotic expansion should be used:
ment the section on the calculation of mutal impedances.
It is true that the equation of the paper, which has been obtained 4R10 =4 ( _ osO a + cos3 _os2
a2
_
+3 cos 56
+
by truncating Carson's infinite seriesl after the 4th term, is quite Rab a_ a

accurate for many applications. There are cases, however, where more
terms in Carson's series must be used, namely in cases of wide separa-
tion, low earth resistivity or higher harmonics (e.g., harmonics on dc -45 cos70
lines). Figures 1 and 2 show the exact values for Rab and Xab (solid in Q2/km a7
lines) as well as the values obtained with equation of the paper (dotted Is
lines) as a function of separation for a low earth resistivity of 10Q2-m 2d210-4
and a frequency of 60 Hz. Conductor a was 50 feet above ground and
Xab = 5iInn-
conductor b 0.5 feet above ground. Obviously, the equation of the
paper becomes unacceptably inaccurate in this cases as the separation 4l10-4 (cos* cos 3 3 cos 56 45 cos 70\
becomes large. aa3 aa 5 a7
The number of terms of Carson's series which must be used is i12k
basically a function of the parameter in Q2/km.
a = 47r/Y. 10-4
p
REFERENCES
[11 J.R. Carson, "Wave Propagation in Overhead Wires With Ground
(s'
in m, f in Hz, p in 12 -m). The equation of the paper is very accurate Return," Bell System Technical Journal, Vol. 5, 1926, pp.
for f = 60 Hz, p = 100 12-m for separations up to 1000 feet (a = 0.663); 539-554.
at 3000 feet the error is still only about 3% (a = 1.99). Since most [2] H. W. Dommel, "A Method for Solving Transient Phenomena in
calculations are made on computers nowadays, it is very easy to take Multiphase Systems," Second Power System Computation Con-
ference, Stockholm (Sweden), June 1966, Report No. 5.8.
[3] S. Butterworth, Electrical Characteristics of Overhead Lines. El.
Manuscript received July 27, 1973. Research Association, Techn. Report Ref. O/T4, 1954,
900
 0.1 r
llJ
-j
ci 0 I-.
z 500 1000 1500 ",N2000
DISTANCE IN FEET NN
4 in Parallel Circuits deal with hazards caused directly by the high currents
-0.1
Fig. 1. Rab as a function of separatioin (p = 10 Q2-m, f = 60 Hz,
ha = 50 feet, hb = 0.5 feet)
0.3
LLI
ci
z
C:4
m 0.1
.-*
0 Impedances do the authors offer a calculation of self impedance. The
0 500 1000 1500 2000
DISTANCE IN FEET
Fig. 2. Xab as a function of separation (same assumptions as in Fig. 1.)
R. E. Judkins and D. E. Nordell (Northern States Power Company,
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401): This paper focuses attention on a
hazard area that is often neglected in the field. Personnel hazards due to
both electrostatic and electromagnetic effects are particularly severe in
the case of close separations for extended distances, as in the instance
of unenergized conductors of double circuit lines and in the case of
insulated shield wires. Electromagnetic induction hazards can be
especially severe in the case of line to ground (zero sequence) faults on
long parallels of this type of construction.
In order to clarify the contents of this paper and to make it
valuable for future reference, there are several points on which we
would appreciate the authors' further comment:
In the section under EIM Induction in Parallel Circuits, the authors
state that induced voltages can be "as high as 0.1 volt per mile per
ampere". It is not stated whether this ballpark figure applies to a
balanced or to an unbalanced (fault) current situation. Modeling of a
benchmark case indicates that induction on an adjacent conductor (a
shield wire in this case) would be on the order of 0.6 volt/mile/ampere
for induction from a faulted phase. The value of 0.1 volt/mile/ampere
would be typical of voltages calculated and measured by NSP for
instances involving balanced phase current induction on underbuilt
communication facilities. Could the authors comment on the basis of
their figure?
In their first example, the authors assume a body and contact
resistance of the man of 1500 ohms. If combined with an allowable
shock current of 5 milliamperes, their calculation would indicate a
threshold of safety of 7.5 volts across the body. This low a value for an
allowable shock level seems unnecessarily restrictive. Assuming that an
allowable current level is 5 milliamperes (to which we agree), this would
indicate that the body resistance of 1500 ohms is unreasonably low.
Manuscript received August 6, 1973.
901
Is it not true that the commonly used 1500 ohm value is applicable
only as a limiting resistance when a solid contact has been made and a
substantial body current is flowing? It would seem more realistic to
define a safe exposure potential for consideration in E/M effects (where
the source impedance tends to be much lower than E/S source
impedances) and to eliminate the nonlinear body resistance as a factor
in this calculation. The authors quote acceptable levels of 50 to 60
volts r.m.s. later in the paper under the topic Communication Circuits.
Wouldn't these levels also be applicable here?
Substantial portions of the discussion of hazards of ElM Induction
which could be produced by accidental energization of a grounded line.
While many of the safety practices will be the same for both cases, the
reader should not confuse the two hazards.
One possible practice which could be useful in eliminating some of
the high currents and resulting potentials from severe cases of
longitudinal induction would be to ground long double-circuit lines
only at the work site, and not at the substation. While this would
introduce additional hazards in the event of a flashover and power
follow-through, it could be used to eliminate the steady-state hazard of
E/M induction.
The authors state that transposition of shield wires can eliminate
all or most of the positive or negative sequence E/S or E/M effects. We
disagree. There is no way that transposition of shield wires can create
the condition of equal exposure to each phase that this would require.
Under Communication Circuits the danger values (50-60 volts
r.m.s. steady state and 430-650 volts for transient conditions) originated
in Reference #13 rather than #11 as stated by the authors. In addition,
there are a number of additional references which we feel would be
helpful in this area and which we are including below.
Appendix Eqn. 2 gives VTh as a sum of several terms. It should be
noted that this will be a vectorial sum and that in the balanced phase
current case much of the induced voltage from one phase will be
cancelled by the other phases.
The authors state that both E/M and E/S voltages may be present.
Is it not also true that if a high enough resistance is present to allow a
substantial E/S voltage, no E/M currents of consequence could flow in
the affected circuit?
Nowhere under the heading Calculation of Self and Mutual
self impedance terms are necessary in the consideration of the shielding
effects of transmission line shield wires and of any grounded conductors
included in a communication circuit for shielding purposes.
Even the simplified forms of John Carson's equations presented in
the Appendix are sufficiently complicated that the digital computer is
a most useful tool in evaluating them. The subset of Carson's work
presented here is valid only for certain cases of ground resistivity and
circuit separation. It seems likely that some future reader of this paper
will almost certainly misapply these formulas in computerized calcula-
tions. Therefore we feel that Carson's work should be published in its
generalized form. A consistent generalized set of equations based on
Carson's work and which can be used in place of the simplified forms in
the Appendix is presented below.
Two parallel, ground return conductors (usually taken as above the
earth but the method will give good results for shallowly buried conduc-
tors also) have impedances as follows2 (notation and dimensions as in
the appendix except as noted):
Self
Zaa =Raa +aa +Zaa (1)
Mutual
ab iXab + Z ab (2)
Where the usual impedance terms in ohms per mile are defined by
Raa = metallic resistance of conductor (3a)
aa~~~2
Xaa = .002022 If*n (3b)
GMRa
Xab = .002022 f *ln- (3c)
GMR = geometric mean radius of particular conductor (3d)
(taken from tables of conductor characteristics)
and the terms added by Carson to include the effects of the earth are
Z'aa = .004045 *f [P(ra
* Oa)+iQ (ra Oa)] (4a)
Z'ab = .004045 fPrab, abab ab, 0ab)] (4b)
The functions P and Q are solved using two new variables defined here 1) Edison Electric Institute - Bell System Joint Engineering Reports:
for each case. a) No. 26, "Shielding of Ground - Return Circuits at Low
Frequencies", March, 1934.
Self b) No. 31, "Low Resistance Grounds", June, 1935.
c) No. 36, "The Use of Power and Telephone Transpositions within
ra =/T7p
a .8565 * 10-3
2 h~~~~~~a
'
(Sa) Exposure Sections", July, 1936.
d) No. 44, "Neutralizing Transformers", August, 1940.
Oa= 0 (5b) e) No. 48, "Low Frequency Shielding in Telephone Cables", July,
1941.
Mutual 2) "Wave Propagation in Overhead Wires with Ground Return", J. R.
Carson, Bell System Technical Journal, Vol. 5, pp. 539-554, 1926.
rab=Tph- .8565 S' 103
3) Interference Between Power Systems and Telecommunication Lines,
(6a) H. R. J. Klewe, London: Edward Arnold, 1958.
4) "Mutual Impedance of Crossing Earth-Return Circuits", M. Kra-
fab= tan1
I
Wab
ha+h
(radians) (6b)
(6b)
kowski, Proceedings of the IEE (London), Vol. 114, pp. 253-257,
Feb., 1967.
5) "Telephone-Interference Calculation for Multiconductor Power
Wab horizontal separation of conductors (6c) Lines", W. S. Meyer and H. W. Dommel, IEEE Transactions on
Power Apparatus and Systems, PAS-88, pp. 35-41, Jan., 1969.
Then 6) "A System Approach to Inductive Coordination", R. E. Judkins
7r 1 2 and J. M. Thorson, IEEE paper #T 73 368-8, presented at the 1973
1 Summer Power Meeting in Vancouver, B.C.
P(r, 0) =- -S4) +
2 (In-)
y S2 + 2 0 ' S 2
- +/yl1
Vs/F
+1
2 2
+ a3
VT3- P. C. Williams and A. P. Lyttle (British Columbia Hydro & Power
= Authority Vancouver, 1 B.C. Canada): The B.C. Hydro and Power
Q(r, 0)
4
+
2
(ln- )
yr
(1-S4) 2
0 -
S'4 Authority has an extensive high voltage network which includes 1,137
circuit miles of 500kV lines. Most, if not all of the 500 kV lines either
(8) run in parallel with other 500kV lines or with lines of a lower voltage.
Ia01
- + 2 04 The system crosses all types of terrain at altitudes ranging between
72 8 03-2 2 sea level and
encountered.
6,500 ft. All types of climatic and soil conditions are
In these equations, ln y is .57722 (Euler's constant) and S2,S'2,S4,S'4, Our experience with the problems of electromagnetic induction
01, 03, a2, and a4 are the following infinite series: on parallel lines is therefore quite extensive and our general findings are
as follows:
1. Under conditions of normal load current flow, measurements
made on our system tend to suggest that for single circuit lines of
n=nEZ 2cos[(4n-2)01(
(r/2)4n minimal intercircuit spacings the magnitude of the voltages elec-
S2 (2n)! (2n- 1)!
1
n (9a tromagnetically induced on a partially grounded parallel line will not be
greater than the figure of 0.1 volts per mile per amp of parallel load
current given in the report and that for normal circuit spacings this
(r/2)4n 2 sin [(4n - 2)0] ( l)n+l value of induced voltage will be substantially reduced. However, we
2= 1 have not, as yet, made any measurements on double circuit lines and we
n=1I (2n)! (2n- 1)! are therefore unable to confirm the existence of induced voltages in
excess of 0. 1 volts per mile per amp of parallel load current.
2. With regard to voltages induced on circuits as the result of
S4 =E (r/2)4n cos[4n ] n+ l short circuits on a parallel line we have also concluded that very high
n= I (2n+l)! (2n)! values of voltage may be electromagnetically induced under these
conditions.
00
An However, our calculations indicate that voltages of a much lower
(r/2) sin [4n 0] n +l magnitude than those given in the report will exist under the worst
n
n= (2n+l)! (2n)! conditions possible and that the effect of such an occurrence at a work
site along a line will not be worse than accidental re-energization or an
00 r4n-3 cs(n30 intercircuit fault to the line. Since our safety regulations already protect
personnel from the hazards which result from accidental line re-
a = E r43 cos [(4n 3) 01
n=l (4n- l) 2n- (2k-1)2] I-l)n +l energization or intercircuit faults and because the frequency of occur-
rence of parallel line faults during work periods is very low we do not
feel that this type of condition encroaches upon the basic safety of line
k= 1 personnel.
3. The main operational problems that we have experienced have
00
1 r4n [(4n- 1) 0J cos
resulted from the flow of steady state 60 Hz electromagnetically
03=5 (-
- I )n+ 1 induced currents into field grounds at work sites remote from terminal
(4n+ 2n (2k- 1)2 stations. This situations has also been compounded by the generally
n=l
k= 1
k=Yr poor soil conditions which exist throughout British Columbia.
We have found that under these conditions field grounds built
from driven rods:
00 2n (a) invariably support a considerable potential to true ground
since their resistance to ground is usually high,
a2= n=lI
[ k l kI 4I ' term inS2l [nth (b) have a tendency to become thermally unstable unless a
substantial number of rods are driven and,
00 2n+l (c) are subject to spontaneous, continuous sparking at the soil to
rod interface if the potential on the ground rod exceeds 1200 V.
04
- 51
I
__
1 kn term inS4] ~~~~~th As we are invariably forced to use driven rods as ground electrodes
(9h) at remote sites because of difficulties in terrain we are therefore forced
to accept that high potentials will almost certainly be present on all
grounded and bonded structures at work sites for the entire period that
As Carson pointed out in his paper, "It is to be regretted that the the safety ground at the site is attached to the line and that a multi-rod
foregoing formulas appear so complicated. The series, however, are ground must be used if a thermally stable ground electrode is to be built.
very rapidly convergent . . .". We agree and would add that the 4. Under test conditions, we have found that the maximum lengths
programming effort required to handle this solution is minimal. Wehave of arcs drawn on breaking elect-rostatically and electromagnetically
a BASIC subroutine which evaluates P and Q for an r and 0, and will induced currents with ground disconnects and by manual operation of
supply it on request.
Additional references include the following: Manuscript received August 13, 1973.
902
field grounds corresponded roughly to the dimensions given by insertion
of the appropriate parameters into the equation for arc reach given by
Andrews et al. However, we also found that during these tests the arcs
of largest dimensions were only produced when the contact separation
was extremely slow and that arcs of this type were very unstable and
tended to self-extinguish quickly.
We have therefore concluded that the likelihood of a self
perpetuating arc forming across an insulator stack or across the contacts
of a ground disconnect on removal of a circuit ground carrying EjM
current is very remote. However, we have found that where an arc is
repeatedly restruck due to some secondary effect i.e. a loose conductor
swinging in the wind; pole fires or insulator damage can occur.
5. Concerning safe working practices we have found that a greater
number of incidents involving hazard to personnel were recorded on
parallel lines than on isolated lines. In these cases the incidents almost
invariably resulted from misinterpretation or momentary disregard of
the safety regulations under which the linemen were working at the
time. In fact, after experiencing several of these incidents over a short
period subsequent to the construction of the major sections of the
500kV system it became obvious that some form of advanced training
program was needed.
Accordingly a comprehensive training scheme for tradesmen was
established. The program:
(a) covered the theoretical and practical aspects of E/S and E/M
induction, safety grounding and the existing safety regulations.
(b) developed the concept of providing an equipotential zone in
all work areas.
(c) gave methods by which dangerous situations might be avoided
using actual case histories as examples.
(d) promoted an infeed of information to the safety engineer so
that new or unique difficulties could be dealt with quickly.
Our conclusion therefore, with regard to the Report presented by
the Work Group is of general agreement with the information presented
on those areas covered by this discussion. This report will undoubtably
be of great use to those utilities presently experiencing operational
difficulties with parallel transmission circuits and might possibly be used
with some modification, to form the basis of standardized work
proceedures in the furture. We would however, stress the need for a
comprehensive training program for operational personnel if hazardous
situations are to be avoided since, in our experience, the concept of
induction and hence the need for a variety of work procedures to suit a
range -of complex practical situations, is not readily appreciated.
IEEE Working Group or Electromagnetic and Electrostatic Effects of
Transmission Lines, General Systems Subcommittee, Transmission and
Distribution Committee. The authors appreciate the contributions
made by discussions submitted on this Committee's report.
Mr. Dommel correctly pointed out that special applications require
more rigorous calculation of mutual impedance than provided by the
equations presented in the Appendix. The additional details supplied by
Dommel are a valuable addition to the Committee's report.
Mr. Skelton's comments regarding the proper grounding of string-
ing equipment are also useful. It is probably as important to cite
instances such as Mr.- Skelton mentions, where precautions against E/M
effects are successful, as it is to cite those where inadequate precautions
can cause difficulty.
Messrs. Gillies and Perry aptly observed that a Working Group
paper of this breadth can present almost rudimentary principles of safe
working procedures, recognizing that detailed guides of practice must,
to some extent, vary with the systems and practices used within individ-
ual companies.
The authors do not agree with the discussor's statement that an
E/M circuit is usually a high-impedance source. Considering the
Thevenin's equivalent shown in Figure 3 of the paper, the Thevenin
voltage, ETh, is; dependent only on the current flowing in the
energized circuit and the relative spacing of the conductors. The current
which flows in a passive circuit as a result of this induced voltage, how-
ever, is limited by the self-impedance of the passive circuit, comprised
of the self-impedance of the passive conductor with its earth return,
plus the sum of grounding resistances at the two terminals through
which current circulates. The self-impedance of the passive conductor is
typically in the range of 0.8 ohm per mile. Thus, a passive conductor of
one mile between ground points with a 1-ohm ground at each terminal
would still be limited more by grounding resistance than by the
conductor impedance. It is almost axiomatic that for closely spaced
grounds and practically achievable ground resistance, most of the
induced voltage will appear across the grounding resistances. This argues
for close spacing of ground points to keep that drop and the consequent
step potential to a minimum.
Manuscript received October 31, 1973.
903
The discussor's observation of E/S currents in the range of
several amperes flowing in a single-point ground is not surprising. For
long lines this current can exceed ten amperes. Where current of this
magnitude can result from grounding of a passive conductor to a tower,
particularly where shield wires are not used or are insulated and cannot
be counted on to provide alternative paths to ground through lower
resistances, precaution should be taken not only to protect linemen, but
to protect the public from access to such towers.
These discussors also point out the importance of including a more
complete representation of Carson's corrections and present them in an
alternative form. Subsequent to their discussion, they have supplied an
intermediate debugging check which the authors are pleased to include
in this Closure.
Based on the configuration shown in Figure 1 of this Closure, and
assigning shield wire characteristics as Raa (shield) = 6.09 ohms/mile
and GMR (shield) = .000398 ft., the following values for r, 0, P and Q
result:
Power Shield
.10283, 0 .10615, 0
r,6: Shield
Communication .071224, - .48448 .074175, - .46365
Power Shield
P, Q: Sheild .37088, 1.4690 .37024, 1.4539
Communication .37869, 1.6436 .37801, 1.6241
These, in turn, result in the following self- and mutual impedances:
Z .090007 + i .77319
=
Sp
Z PC = *091902 + j .44349
Zss = 6.1798 + jl.9187
Zsc = .091736 + j .43767
The authors agree that additional work should be done on the
arc-reach formula. The formula given is quite elementary and obviously
not applicable for many ehv applications. The authors are aware of no
data extending this arc-reach to longer gaps.
The term "transient," as applied to induced currents, is generally
used to describe the one-time discharge of a capacitive current, not a
short-duration a-c discharge as the discussors bring up. In any case, the
discussors' point is technically correct; i.e., most exposures which limit
the current to 5 ma under normal operating conditions could produce I
ampere or more for the time it normally takes for a protective relay to
clear. But, the prudence of permitting high currents because of coordina-
tion of relay times with human capacity for various current levels is
debatable.
Messrs. Gillies and Perry bring up an important point in citing
the effect of series capacitors in the E/M current problem.. Users of
series-compensated lines would be well-advised to review the effect of
series compensation on induced current levels and the consequent
exposures during anticipated maintenance procedures.
Messrs. Judkipnsand Nordell bring up a series of additional points
which are significant in the evaluation of E/M effects.
The value of 0. 1 volt/mile/ampere was cited as an example value,
representative of coupling to an individual conductor of a closely
spaced or underbuilt circuit for balanced conditions. This is consistent
with the discussors' observations.
The discussor's criticism of the example calculation made is
probably justified. Although the text explicitly suggests that example
values are given and recommend specific values for a particular case,
1500 ohms while a reasonable and conservative criteria for body contact
resistance in its own right is lower than should be used where a combina-
tion of other adverse circumstances are also hypothesized. The authors
do feel, however, that the current level is a Inore'fundamental criteria
than open-circuit voltage and feel that shock exposure should be
described in these terms. This particularly true for electrostatic coupling
(probably more limiting tb dimensional design of transmission lines than
E/M coupling) where the current flow is relatively independent of body
resistance.
Whether or not a safer practice would result from a single point
ground at the work site, as mentioned by the discussors, is safer or more
dangerous than multiple grounds would seem to depend heavily on the
working rules established by a particular company. For example, a line
deemed to be "grounded" by virtue of a very remote single-point
ground, would be most hazardous to personnel who presumed such a
ground was effective at a point some distance from the work site.
Conversely, grounding a line at both terminals, while not affording
maximum protection at intermediate sites, will usually hold conductor
voltage within reasonable bounds at intermediate points.
 With regard to transposition of shield wires, there is a locus of
shield wire positions for single-circuit, horizontal configurations, where
transposition of the shield wires will cancel E/S and ElM currents due to 50'
positive- or negative- sequence currents in the phase conductors. For
shield wire locations close to that locus,'including normal placement of 0 Shield
shield circuits, the transposition eliminates most such coupled current.
it is true, however, as pointed out in the text, that no amount of '
IF-Power
transposition of either shield wires or phase conductors will eliminate
zero-sequence coupling between the two circuits.
Judkins and Nordell are correct in their observation that ETh is the
sum of several terms which tend to cancel one another, and that the
vector sum of E/S voltage and E/M voltage is of little practical concern 7 5' 80'
when circuit constants are such as to permit significant components of Comm Is
each.
Messrs. Williams and Lyttle contribute usefql observations on
experience of B.C. Hydro with 500-kV lines. Particularly important is 20'
the observation made by these discussors to the effect that protective
measures which prepare for accidental energization of a line 'being
worked on are apt to be more than adequate for any coupled E/M
effect. Of course, the procedures, equipment, and crews themselves e : 100 meter ohms
involved in construction of lines often differ from those involved'in f : 60 Hz
maintenance. -The danger of accidental energizatipn of lines during
construction is often academic, and in such circumstances the E/M
hazard is predominant.
The authors agree with the advantage in training linemen as to the
principles involved in E/S and E/M induction. Certainly'no practical set
working rules can anticipate all circumstan6e$, and in that regard there Fig. 1. Example configuration for debugging and numerical check of
is no substitution for a basic understanding of the phenom-ena involved. Carsons Equation

904