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Foreword
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The Author
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Preface
This book describes military operations during the Korean War from
late November 1950 to early July 1951, a period in which battle lines did
indeed ebb and flow in pronounced surges. The volume is one of several
in the United States Army in the Korean War series. In its coverage of
combat operations, the book falls in the series between South to the Naktong,
North to the Yalu by Roy E. Appleman and Truce Tent and FightingFront by
Walter G. Hermes.
In describing the large-scale engagements that occurred between siz-
able opposing forces over seven months' time, I had to focus treatment of
the battles at a somewhat high level, often corps or army. I also had to be
selective in the use of detail. While this approach does not fully record
the gallantry, suffering, and achievements of individual men in combat, I
hope that the battle descriptions clearly indicate the substantial measure
of their individual accomplishments and valor.
I wrote this book over many years, interrupting my work on numer-
ous occasions and for long periods to carry out other responsibilities and
assignments. In fact, I gave the account its final touches after I retired
from the Center of Military History. It was also in retirement that I
designed the maps and selected the photographs that illustrate the book.
During the years spent writing the book, I received valuable support
and assistance from many people. Supervisory officials at all levels pro-
vided unfailing support. The successive Chiefs of Military History included
Brig. Gen. James A. Norell, Brig. Gen. William H. Harris, Brig. Gen.
Hal C. Pattison, Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr., and Brig. Gen. Will-
iam A. Stofft. Holding the post of Chief Historian during the period of
preparation were Dr. Stetson Conn, Dr. Maurice Matloff, and Dr. David
Trask. I received valuable assistance and guidance from a considerable
number of officers who served as Chief, Histories Division: Lt. Col.
James C. Griffin; Col. Louis G. Mendez, Jr.; Col. Paul P. Hinkley; Col.
Leonard G. Robinson; Col. Albert W. Jones; Col. John E. Jessup,Jr.; Col.
James W. Dunn; and Lt. Col. Richard O. Perry. Wise counsel also came
from my branch chiefs: Charles B. MacDonald, Robert Ross Smith, Rob-
ert W. Coakley, and Walter G. Hermes.
Over the course of my research, Hannah M. Zeidlik, currently the
Chief, Historical Resources Branch, was a mainstay in obtaining and
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Contents
Chapter Page
I. THE MISSION 3
The Battleground . 3
The Initial Mission 7
The Mission Expanded. 17
The Mission Reconsidered 21
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Support Force 21 . . . . . . 269
From the RoadJunction to Hoengsong . 272
The Costs. . . . . . . ...279
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Page
Tables
No.
1. Major North Korean People's Army Units, 23 November 1950 . . 52
2. Major Chinese Units in Korea, 23 November 1950 ........ 54
3. X Corps Battle Casualties, 27 November-10 December 1950 . . . 147
4. Losses by Major Unit, 11-13 February 1951 . . . . . . . . . 279
Charts
1. Theater Lines of Command for Operations in Korea,
23 November 1950 . .. . . . . . . . . . 26
2. Organization of UNC Ground Forces in Korea,
23 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3. Organization for UNC Air Operations in Korea,
23 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4. Organization for UNC Naval Operations in Korea,
23 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5. Enemy Lines of Command, 23 November 1950 .. . . . . . . . 57
Maps
1. East Central Asia 4
2. Korea ................... 6
3. The Battlefront, 23 November 1950 46
4. Battle of the Ch'ongch'on, 25-28 November 1950 ... 66
5. The X Corps Zone, 26 November 1950 85
6. 5th and 7th Marines at Yudam-ni, 27 November 1950 91
7. The 31st RCT East of the Reservoir, 27 November 1950 93
8. Battle of the Changjin Reservoir, 27-29 November 1950 95
9. Battle of the Ch'ongch'on, 28 November-1 December 1950 . 106
10. The 2d Infantry Division at Kunu-ri, 29-30 November 1950 . 110
11. Concentration at Hagaru-ri, 1-4 December 1950 . . . . 133
12. Withdrawal From the Reservoir, 6-11 December 1950 . 144
13. Eighth Army Withdrawal, 1-23 December 1950 . 152
14. X Corps Evacuation Plan . 168
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15. Enemy Third Phase Offensive, the Opening Effort,
26 December 1950-1 January 1951 . 181
16. Withdrawal to Line D, I and X Corps, 4-7 January 1951 215
17. NK II Corps and V Corps Attacks, 7-22 January 1951 218
18. Operation THUNDERBOLT, 25-31 January 1951. 241
19. Operation ROUNDUP, the X Corps Plan, 4 February 1951 250
20. Operation THUNDERBOLT, 1-11 February 1951. 253
21. Operation ROUNDUP, 5-11 February 1951. 260
22. Battle for Hoengsong, 11-13 February 1951 267
23. Chip'yong-ni, 13-14 February 1951 286
24. Defending the Wonju Line, 13-18 February 1951 . 289
25. Operation KILLER, 20 February-6 March 1951 303
26. Operation RIPPER, Western Front, 6-31 March 1951 316
27. Operation RIPPER, Eastern Front, 6-31 March 1951 . 318
28. Operation COURAGEOUS, 22-28 March 1951 336
29. The RUGGED and DAUNTLESS Operations, Western Front,
1-22 April 1951 . 354
30. The RUGGED and DAUNTLESS Operations, Eastern Front,
1-22 April 1951 . 357
31. Hwach'on Dam, 9-11 April 1951 363
32. The Chinese Spring Offensive, the Main Effort,
22-30 April 1951 380
33. The Eastern Front, 22-24 April 1951 . 390
34. The British 29th Brigade Sector, 25 April 1951 423
35. Battle Below the Soyang, 16-20 May 1951. 446
36. 38th infantry and Task Force Zebra Positions, 16 May 1951 . 449
37. Eighth Army Advance, 20 May-I July 1951 . 471
Illustrations
The Axial Taebaek Mountains Along the East Coast 5
Typical Terrain Near the 38th Parallel in the West 8
The Port of Pusan .
C-46 Pushed to Solid Ground After Runway Collapse 11
View of Rail Lines and Roads . 11
Soldier Enduring Winter Weather. 12
President Harry S. Truman 13
Secretary of State Dean Acheson . 13
The Joint Chiefs of Staff 14
General J. Lawton Collins. 15
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 15
Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer . 16
Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy. 16
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CHAPTER I
The Mission
By the Thanksgiving holiday in 1950, released Korea from forty years of
an autumn offensive had carried the Japanese rule. After American and So-
United Nations Command (UNC) deep viet military forces entered the land to
into North Korea. Opening the advance take the surrender of Japanese troops
in South Korea, UNC forces had moved stationed there, most of the world out-
some three hundred miles to a front side Asia gave scant notice to the fur-
slanting northeastward across the Ko- ther course of events in Korea. When
rean peninsula from the mouth of the the outbreak of war inJune 1950 again
Ch'ongch'on River on the Yellow Sea drew attention, few could recall with
to the southern outskirts of the city of any certainty just where this country
Ch'ongjin on the Sea of Japan. 1 A full was located or what it looked like.
resumption of the offensive was set for Shaped much like the state of Florida,
Friday, 24 November, to clear the re- the Korean peninsula, measuring about
maining hundred miles or less that lay two hundred miles at its widest, reaches
between the front and Korea's north- some six hundred miles southeastward
ern border. Despite recent encounters from the central Asian mainland.
with fresh forces from Communist (Map 1) In the north it borders on
China, there was considerable optimism Manchuria, the northeasternmost re-
for the success of renewed advance and gion of China, and for a few miles in
even some speculation that UNC forces the far northeast on the Union of Soviet
would reach the border and end the Socialist Republics (USSR). To the west,
Korean War by Christmas, the date on the Yellow Sea separates Korea from
which the war would be exactly six north-central China. To the east, the
months old. Sea of Japan stands between the penin-
sula and the islands of Japan. Less than
a hundred fifty miles off the southeast-
The Battleground
ern tip of the peninsula, across the
Until the war had begun during the Korea and Tsushima Straits, lies Kyu-
past summer, Korea had received world shu,Japan's southernmost main island. 2
attention only briefly, when the Allied
victory over Japan in World War II 2 So shaped and located, Korea is a strategic cross-
roads in the Far East, a fact long and well appreciated
by the geopoliticians of the country's stronger neigh-
1For a detailed account of ground operations in bors, China, Russia, and Japan. Past rivalries among
Korea during 25 June-24 November 1950, see Roy E. these nations for control of Korea are described in
Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, U.S. George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.:
ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR (Washington: Gov- Harvard University Press, 1950); Andrew J. Grajdan-
ernment Printing Office, 1961). zev, Modern Korea (New York: The John Day Co.,
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THE MISSION 5
As the UNC troops now deep in lands), the main Taebaek Mountains
North Korea could attest from experi- run the length of the east coast without
ence, Korea's steep, ubiquitous moun- interruption except for a narrow north-
tains, inferior communications system, east-southwest corridor (the Wonsan-
and severe climate sharply inhibited the Seoul corridor) in central Korea that
conduct of military operations-most divides the Taebaeks into northern and
sharply the operations of a modern, southern ranges. (Map 2) From this
highly mechanized force such as the axial spine, spur ranges spread south-
United Nations Command. Extending westward across most of the peninsula.
south from a high, jumbled mountain The few existing lowlands, themselves
mass in the country's far north and dotted by imposing mountain masses,
northeast (the Northern Korea High- lie principally along the west coast. This
mountain framework made movement
1944); M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in any direction difficult, particularly
in EasternAsia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univer- cross-country and east-west.
sity Press, 1946); and Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan:
The Story of a Nation, rev. ed. (New York: Alfred A. Poor lines of communication compli-
Knopf, 1974). cated the movement of UNC troops
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MAP 2
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THE MISSION 7
and supplies into and inside Korea. All usual amount of rainfall. This phe-
harbors were year-round, warm-water nomenon had increased the number of
ports, but few were good, and extreme days of high temperatures, many over
tidal ranges limited the use of those on 100 degrees Fahrenheit and several as
the west coast. Airfields were dated. Al- high as 120 degrees. In some summer
though they were numerous and well actions heat exhaustion caused more
located for troop transport and cargo UNC casualties than did enemy gun-
planes, putting and keeping them in fire. By late November 1950 UNC
condition to handle the heavy aircraft forces also had had a taste of Korea's
(tactical aircraft, as well) often required winter weather. Snowfall began in mid-
more than available UNC engineer November, and in the higher moun-
crews could provide. The railroad, tains in the far northeast the heaviest
Korea's chief means of overland com- falls made roads dangerous or impass-
mercial transportation, had suffered able. Although snow was light else-
from hard use and inadequate mainte- where, bitter cold intensified by brisk
nance in recent years, and by late 1950 northern winds created problems all
heavy war damage to bridges, tracks, along the UNC front, disabling vehi-
and rolling stock had further reduced cles and weapons and causing numer-
its capacity. The road net, which had ous cases of frostbite among the troops.
been designed primarily to serve and As UNC forces restarted their advance
supplement the railways, was a primi- toward the northern border, they could
tive system of narrow, one-lane, mostly anticipate a winter of few deeper snows
gravel-surfaced roads with steep grades, but still stronger winds and decidedly
sharp curves, and equally narrow brid- lower temperatures. 3
ges with low load capacities. Because of
poor construction, few lateral routes,
and vulnerability to weather damage, The Initial Mission
the road system was scarcely suitable The northern border of Korea was
for UNC military traffic. not the original objective of UNC oper-
Hardly a lesser obstacle was Korea's ations. The initial decision on the
monsoonal climate with its characteris- purpose of these operations, made
tic reversal of prevailing wind direction concomitantly with the fundamental
in summer and winter. Marked by vari- decisions of the United States and the
able winds and changeable precipita- United Nations (U.N.) to enter the war,
tion and temperature, spring and au- had limited the mission to repelling the
tumn are transitional periods for the North Korean invasion of South Korea.
wind shift. In summer the prevailing On the ground, this meant driving the
winds generally move northward off North Koreans back beyond the 38th
the Pacific Ocean, and in winter the
principal flow of air comes southward
out of the Asian interior. Consequently, 3 For additional information on Korea's relief, ports,
summers are typically rainy, humid, airfields, rail system, roadnet, and climate, see Korea
and hot, winters relatively dry and cold. Handbook (Washington: Department of the Army,
Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, September 1950).
But the summer of 1950 had been one For the effect of weather conditions on past opera-
of drought-only about one-fourth the tions, see Appleman, South to the Naktong.
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parallel of north latitude crossing the established under U.S. and U.N. spon-
peninsula at its waist. This was the line sorship in the south.4
that for three years after World War II The hardening of the division of Ko-
had served as a boundary first between rea at the 38th parallel had begun with
American and Soviet forces taking the an impasse in U.S.-USSR negotiations
surrender of Japanese troops, then be- convened in 1946 and 1947 as an early
tween U.S. and USSR occupation zones, measure in honoring Allied wartime
and finally between the Communist
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
4 The two areas of the divided land acquired their
founded by the Soviets north of the par- commonly used names, North Korea and South Korea,
allel and the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the occupation.
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THE MISSION 9
THE MISSION 13
armed forces and under his general to the U.N. resolutions of 25 and 27
powers to conduct the foreign relations June were "solely for the purpose of
of the United States. 8 Partly out of restoring the Republic of Korea to its
these conditions of entry, the president status prior to the invasion from the
avoided the word war in references to North."l0 In line with this limitation,
operations in Korea in favor of police President Truman intended to avoid
action. He also used the euphemism to heavy commitments of American re-
dramatize the limited scope of UNC sources in Korea and to take no steps
operations. As formally resolved by the that would prompt the Soviet Union or
U.N. Security Council, the purpose was the People's Republic of China, the
"to repel the armed attack and to re- newly risen Communist state on the
store international peace and security mainland, to enter the conflict.
in the area.9 As explained on 29 June Acknowledging the United States as
by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Ache- the major contributor to the effort in
son, American actions taken in response Korea, the U.N. Security Council on 7
July 1950 recommended that other na-
tions supplying forces and materiel
8 See J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: contribute them to a single command
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), pp. 31-35.
9 U.N. doc. S/1511, reprinted in Dept of State Pub
3922, Far Eastern Series 34, United States Policy in the 10 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York:
Korean Crisis (Washington, 1950), p. 24. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 450.
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. Left to right, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, General of
the Army Omar N. Bradley (chairman), General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and GeneralJ.
Lawton Collins.
under the United States.11 President tions in Korea. In the strictly military
Truman formally accepted the respon- channel, the Joint Chiefs issued instruc-
sibilities of leadership on 8 July. tions to the unified command in the
12
The evolving command structure field through its Army member. This
placed Truman in the role of executive
agent for the U.N. Security Council,
although he had no obligation to clear 12 The Joint Chiefs of Staff included General of the
his decisions with that agency. Assist- Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman; General J. Law-
ing him in this role were the U.S. Na- ton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Forrest P.
Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; and General
tional Security Council and the Joint Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff. Al-
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who helped de- though the Joint Chiefs instructed the U.N. Com-
velop the strategic concept of opera- mand, not all directives originated with them, nor did
the directives in every case represent their recom-
mendations. For an account of operations at the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and U.N. Command headquarters le-
vels during the first year of the war, see James F.
11 The council also authorized the new command to Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, U.S.
fly the U.N. flag in the course of operations against ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR (Washington: Gov-
North Korean forces. ernment Printing Office, 1972).
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THE MISSION 15
method followed an existing Depart- East, under Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy. 13
ment of Defense agreement whereby He assigned all UNC ground forces en-
the chief whose service was playing the tering Korea to Lt. Gen. Walton H.
primary role in a command area, in this Walker's Eighth U.S. Army, then on
case Army Chief of Staff General J. occupation duty in Japan with head-
Lawton Collins, would serve as execu- quarters in Yokohama. After moving
tive agent for the Joint Chiefs. The to Korea in mid-July, General Walker
command in the field, the United Na- also assumed control of the operations
tions Command, was formally estab- of the ROK Army at the offer of South
lished on 24 July 1950 under General Korea's president, Syngman Rhee.14
of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who
superimposed its headquarters over
that of his existing Far East Command 13 It was not until 27 August 1950, however, that
in Tokyo. General MacArthur officially designated these air and
naval organizations as parts of the U.N. Command.
While the top echelons of command He issued this order primarily to clarify the relation-
were being shaped, General MacArthur ship of the air and naval commands to him as UNC
assigned control of air operations in commander in chief.
14 On 15 July 1950 President Rhee wrote to General
Korea to the air arm of the Far East MacArthur: "I am happy to assign to you command
Command, the Far East Air Forces, authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Re-
commanded by Lt. Gen. George E. public of Korea during the period of the continuation
of the present state of hostilities; such command to be
Stratemeyer, and allotted control of na- exercised either by you personally or by such military
val operations to Naval Forces, Far commander or commanders to whom you may dele-
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In the van of forces from other U.N. interdicted traffic on the enemy's long
members, American ground troops be- overland supply lines. Admiral Joy's
gan entering Korea in July to join the force wiped out what little naval opposi-
ROK Army in blunting the invasion, tion the North Koreans could offer and
only to be shoved back into the south- clamped a tight blockade on the Korean
eastern corner of the country by the coast to prevent the movement of ene-
surprisingly strong North Korean Peo- my troops and supplies by water.
ple's Army. But there, in defenses based As the costs of repeated attempts
on the Naktong River and arching to penetrate the Pusan Perimeter grad-
around the port of Pusan, General ually reduced the North Koreans'
Walker through August and the first ground strength, the favor of the war
half of September successfully coun- shifted to the United Nations Com-
tered further North Korean attacks. mand. On the west coast, far behind
General Stratemeyer's air command North Korean lines, the U.S. X Corps,
meanwhile all but eliminated North commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M.
Korea's small air forces and severely Almond and operating separately from
the Eighth Army, made an amphibi-
ous landing at Inch'on on 15 Septem-
gate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in ber and drove inland through Seoul,
adjacent seas." See Dept of State Pub 4263, Far East-
ern Series 44, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, the South Korean capital. In concert,
July 1950- February 1951 (Washington, 1951), p. 10. the Eighth Army opened an overland
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THE MISSION 17
offensive on the 16th. The X Corps'
operation and the Eighth Army's fron-
tal effort forced a North Korean retreat
that quickly degenerated into a rout.
By the end of September, although
some bypassed North Korean troops re-
mained in the southern mountains, the
enemy ceased to exist as an organized
force anywhere in the Republic of Korea.
15 Secretary of State Acheson. quoted in U.S. Con - 17 For a full discussion of the decision on crossing
gress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Co m- the 38th parallel, see Schnabel, Policy and Direction,
mittee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Military pp. 177-84. For documents pertaining to the matter,
Situation in the Far East ... (hereafter cited as MacArthur see Dept of State Pub 8859, Foreign Relations of the
Hearings), 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951. p. 1832. United States, 1950. vol. VII, Korea (Washington, 1976).
16 Soviet statement, 29 Jun 50, quoted in Dept of 18 For a discussion of occupation planning, see
State Bulletin, vol. XXIII, no. 575, 10 Jul 50, p. 48. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 219-21.
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United Nations.19 The assembly re- 4263, Far Eastern Series 44, U.S. Policy in the Korean
Conflict, pp. 17-18.
21 Marshall became secretary of defense on 21 Sep-
19 See Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXIII, no. 587, 2 tember 1950, replacing Louis A. Johnson.
Oct 50, p. 526. 22 Rad, JCS 92801, JCS to CINCUNC, 27 Sep 50.
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THE MISSION 19
to capture P'yongyang, the North Ko-
rean capital 120 miles north of Seoul,
and ordered the X Corps, still a sepa-
rate force, to make an amphibious land-
ing eighty miles north of the 38th paral-
lel at Wonsan, North Korea's major east
coast seaport. After seizing these objec-
tives the two ground arms were to
march toward each other over a lateral
road connecting P'yongyang and Won-
san, a move designed to trap any
North Korean forces still straggling
northward through the Taebaek Moun-
tains. But because of the manner and
speed of the Eighth Army's plunge over
the parallel, the latter plan was not
executed.
On the Eighth Army right, a South
Korean corps crossed the parallel on 1
October and started a fast march along
the eastern shore. The corps entered
Wonsan nine days later and by the last SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MARSHALL
week of October pushed northward an-
other hundred miles to a line reaching going ashore until the last week of
inland from the coastal town of Iwon October.
to positions within twenty miles of the The Eighth Army's strides into North
huge Changjin Reservoir atop the Tae- Korea stimulated new warnings from
baek Mountains.2 3 West of the Taebaek China. At midnight on 2 October, after
divide, Eighth Army forces moved into South Korean but as yet no American
North Korea between 6 and 9 October, forces had crossed the parallel, Foreign
entered P'yongyang on the 19th, and Minister Chou En-lai formally sum-
by the last week of the month reached moned Indian Ambassador Kavalam
and crossed the Ch'ongch'on River M. Panikkar to the Ministry of Foreign
within sixty-five miles of the Yalu River, Affairs in Peking. Dismissing the South
the boundary between Korea and Man- Korean advance as inconsequential,
churia. The X Corps meanwhile out- Chou declared that if American or
loaded for the landing at Wonsan but other U.N. forces crossed the parallel,
did not reach its objective until after China would enter the war. 24
the port had fallen to the Eighth Army. After Panikkar relayed Chou's warn-
With an assault landing obviated, the ing through diplomatic channels to
need to clear the heavily mined Wonsan Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
harbor prevented the X Corps from with President Truman's approval, au-
23 UNC forces best knew the Changjin Reservoir as 24 K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas (London: Allen
the Chosin Reservoir, its Japanese name. and Unwin, 1955), pp. 109-10.
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THE MISSION 21
Yalu. UNC columns moved steadily son to reexamine and possibly change
along both coasts, and South Korean the UNC mission.
reconnaissance troops with an interior The reexamination was complicated
Eighth Army column reached the Yalu by difficulty in judging the extent and
at the town of Ch'osan. But almost ev- purpose of the Chinese intervention.
erywhere else, UNC forces encountered Intelligence from the field placed the
stout resistance and on 25 October dis- Chinese strength involved in the recent
covered they were being opposed by engagement at no more than five divi-
Chinese. In the X Corps zone, Chinese sions, or about 50,000 troops. This rela-
defenses slowed Almond's column on tively small force and its voluntary with-
the road climbing the Taebaeks to the drawal from contact on 6 November
Changjin Reservoir until 6 November, scarcely supported any conclusion that
when the Chinese withdrew from con- China had decided on an all-out effort
tact. In the Eighth Army zone, Chinese in Korea, nor could other intelligence
attacks forced back the columns in the and diplomatic agencies offer conclu-
center and on the east. Although the sive evidence of such a decision.28 The
columns near the coast were not at- Joint Chiefs of Staff considered more
tacked, the loss of ground elsewhere limited interests, such as a Chinese wish
compelled General Walker to recall his to protect Yalu River electric power
western forces lest they be cut off. plants on which Manchuria heavily
Walker's pursuit thus came to a com- depended, but this reasoning rested
plete halt. As the Eighth Army fell more on speculation than on evidence.
back to regroup in positions astride the The Joint Chiefs also heard strong
Ch'ongch'on River, Chinese forces objections to any change of mission
continued to attack until 6 November from General MacArthur. In his view,
and thenas in the X Corps sector not only did the reasoning behind the
abruptly broke contact.
The Mission Reconsidered 28 One prophetic warning that seems not to have
received serious consideration came from Karl Lott
Rankin, ambassador to Nationalist China. In a tele-
In Washington, the twelve-day en- gram dispatched to the Department of State on 6
gagement drew attention to the want November, Mr. Rankin advised: "Chinese military in-
of a precise course of action to be fol- telligence forwarded to Washington by the Embassy's
service attaches during the past few days lends strong
lowed if the U.N. Command met Chi- support to the assumption that the Chinese commu-
nese forces. Earlier instructions from nists plan to throw the book at the United Nations
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had author- forces in Korea and in addition to step up their pres-
sure in Indochina. Allowance evidently should be
ized General MacArthur to continue made for wishful thinking among the Chinese military,
operations against any Chinese encoun- most of whom regard a general conflict as the only
tered if he thought he could succeed, means of liberating China from the communists. In
the present instance, however, such a caveat still leaves
but they had not prescribed or required an imposing array of apparently established facts, as
him to develop the exact lines of action well as evidence of' sincerity among the best informed
that continued operations against the Chinese, such as to render quite possible the correct-
ness of their consensus of opinion that all-out action
Chinese might follow. The Joint Chiefs, in Korea by the Chinese communists should be ex-
in any case, now considered the actual pected." Quoted in Rankin's book, China Assignment
introduction of Chinese forces as rea- (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 65.
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current mission remain valid, but "it rently in Korea, and he was certain that
would be fatal to weaken the ... policy his air power could prevent Chinese re-
of the United Nations to destroy all re- inforcements from crossing the Yalu
sisting armed forces in Korea and bring into Korea in any substantial numbers.
that country into a united and free Unconvinced themselves that China
nation."29 He considered the existing had decided on full intervention, un-
situation to be satisfactorily covered by certain about any other purpose of the
the earlier instructions allowing him to Chinese entry, and feeling both justi-
judge whether his forces had a reason- fied and obligated to accept their field
able chance of success. He did not claim commander's appraisal, the Joint Chiefs
to have determined the strength of the of Staff were willing to await clarifica-
Chinese in Korea with any precision. tion of Chinese objectives in Korea be-
On the contrary, he declared that only fore deciding whether to recommend a
by advancing could he obtain "an accu- change in the UNC mission. President
rate measure of enemy strength." 3 0 He Truman approved this position, pre-
nevertheless believed that his command sented in a meeting of the National Se-
could defeat the Chinese forces cur- curity Council on 9 November. MacAr-
thur could continue toward the border,
and the forces and plans for a full re-
29 Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 9 Nov 50. sumption of the UNC offensive were
30 Rad, C 68465, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 7 Nov 50. ready by Thanksgiving Day.
KWP-EBB-0043
CHAPTER II
missions the Eighth Army had been their operations thus rested in General
performing in Japan. 6 MacArthur at theater, or UNC, level in
The other change had occurred in Tokyo. (Chart 1)
September when the separate X Corps
under General Almond landed at
Inch'on. Until that time, General Wal- Ground Forces
ker had commanded or exercised oper- The heart of the UNC ground com-
ational control over all ground forces. bat strength comprised Eighth Army
As of 23 November Walker was respon- headquarters, ROK Army headquar-
sible for the logistical support of Al- ters, six corps headquarters, seventeen
mond's forces, but otherwise the Eighth infantry divisions (including one of U.S.
Army and the X Corps remained sepa- marines), three infantry brigades, two
rate commands. The centralized con- separate infantry regiments (one of
trol of ground forces within Korea and U.S. airborne troops and one of ROK
marines), and three separate infantry
6 Mono, Hq, Eighth Army, "Logistical Problems and
battalions. Among lesser formations
Their Solutions," and Mono, Hq, JLC, "Logistical were a number of ROK Army security
Problems and Their Solutions," copy of both in CMH. battalions and ROK National Police
KWP-EBB-0046
battalions, all low-strength units orga- quarters during the autumn offensive,
nized primarily for antiguerrilla opera- establishing main headquarters in
tions. Also included were a few sepa- Seoul while he and a small staff oper-
rate ROK marine battalions, which ated from a forward command post in
came under ROK Army control when P'yongyang.
operating on the mainland but under U.S. combat formations of the Eighth
ROK Navy control when located, as Army included two corps (I and IX),
they were most of the time, on offshore four infantry divisions (1st Cavalry, 2d,
islands. Still smaller units included a 24th, and 25th), the airborne regiment
provisional company of U.S. Rangers, (187th Airborne Regimental Combat
a company of British marine com- Team), and the Ranger company
mandos, and a U.S. special operations (8213th).8 Other U.N. forces in Walker's
company-a provisional unit of Army command accounted for the three in-
troops originally organized for com- fantry brigades (1st Turkish Armed
mando-type operations during the Forces Command, 27th British Com-
Inch'on landing.7 monwealth Infantry Brigade, and 29th
By far the larger portion of the British Independent Brigade Group)
ground strength was vested in the and the three separate infantry battal-
Eighth Army and was located west of ions (10th Battalion Combat Team,
the main Taebaek spine, where, in the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Ko-
wake of the drive out of the Pusan Pe- rea; 21st Regimental Combat Team,
rimeter and the pursuit above the 38th Thailand Expeditionary Force; and
parallel, General Walker's forces had Netherlands Detachment, United Na-
become spread from the port of Pusan tions) .9
northwestward to the Ch'ongch'on Most of the ROK Army also was un-
River. Walker also had split his head- der General Walker's control. The ma-
campaign, see Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Victory at High its former designation.
Tide: The Inch'on-Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia: J. B.
9
The 27th British Infantry, which had arrived in
Lippincott, 1968), pp. 60-61, 79, 145, 186. Korea from Hong Kong with only two battalions, had
KWP-EBB-0047
of the assorted ground forces assem- fantry weapons. Continuing in use were
bled under U.S. command. ROK for- Colt .45-caliber pistols, .30-caliber car-
mations and, except for the British bines, .45-caliber Thompson and M3
Commonwealth forces, all U.N. units submachine guns, .50-caliber Browning
were structured under modified U.S. machine guns, and 60-mm., 81-mm.,
Army tables of organization, and all of and 4.2-inch mortars (but a new model
their weapons and almost all of their of the 4.2 with considerably greater
other equipment and supplies were of range). Although 2.36-inch rocket
American manufacture.14 launchers remained standard weapons,
As a result of revised tables of organi- they were being supplanted by a new
zation and equipment, the structure of and more powerful 3.5-inch version.
U.S. divisions was distinctly different Virtually new were 57-mm. and 75-
in many respects from that of their mm. recoilless rifles tested but used very
World War II counterparts. The modi- little during the last few months of
fications affected every unit level from World War II.
squad upward; the latest change, to be- The tank units assigned to infantry
come effective on 29 November 1950, divisions were equipped with light M24
set the authorized war strength of an Chaffee, medium M4A3 Sherman, and
infantry division at 18,855, more than heavy M26 Pershing tanks, all World
4,000 greater than that of a World War War II models, and the M46 Patton, a
II division. A comparable increase in modified version of the Pershing intro-
organic firepower came largely from duced in 1948. New tank models were
an increase in the number of field artil- being developed, but none would reach
lery pieces and the addition of tanks, Korea in time to play a combat role.
antiaircraft artillery, and heavy mortars British tanks in use included the World
that previously had not been included War II vintage Churchill and a new 52-
in a division's own arsenal.15 ton Centurion.
The weapons being used in Korea, The basic divisional field artillery
as well as the vehicles and other equip- weapons continued to be the 105-mm.
ment, were in the main the same mod- and 155-mm. howitzers, but now with
els and types used during World War six tubes in each battery instead of four
II. Large numbers were the very same as in World War II, an increase that
weapons. The .30-caliber M1 rifle, raised a division's total to fifty-four
.30-caliber Browning automatic rifle, 105-mm. and eighteen 155-mm. pieces.
and light and heavy .30-caliber Brow- Nondivisional battalions in Korea also
ning machine guns remained basic in- were equipped with these weapons and
with 155-mm. guns and 8-inch how-
14 See Fox, "Inter-Allied Co-operation During Com- itzers. Except for the single 8-inch unit
bat Operations." in Korea, their batteries, too, had six
15 For accounts of the development of postwar ta- tubes each.
bles and the resulting changes in units, see John K.
Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular The antiaircraft battalion now or-
Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, ganic to division artillery was equipped
1972), a volume in the ARMY LINEAGE SERIES, with twin 40-mm. guns and quad .50-
pp. 70-87; and MS, John B. Wilson, Divisions and
Separate Brigades, also to be in the same series, CMH caliber machine guns, all self-propelled.
files. In addition to the same weapons, a few
KWP-EBB-0051
nondivisional antiaircraft artillery bat- practice had started in July 1950 with
talions in Korea were armed with 90- occasional requests from ground units
mm. guns. Of significant benefit to the to the 3d Air Rescue Squadron of the
divisions in Korea was the virtual ab- Fifth Air Force for the help of Sikorsky
sence of enemy air attacks on UNC H-5s in evacuating critically wounded
ground troops, which permitted exten- men from forward aid stations. An in-
sive use of divisional antiaircraft weap- creasing demand for such assistance
ons in a ground support role. The and the success of the squadron in
value of these weapons in support of safely bringing back wounded who
both offensive and defensive ground might not have survived a slow, rough
operations had been well established overland move led to the Army's for-
during World War II and was quickly mal adoption of helicopters for medi-
reaffirmed. cal evacuation. The Army's 2d Helicop-
An operational innovation of grow- ter Detachment, the first of four such
ing importance was the use of helicop- units scheduled for deployment to
ters as ambulances to evacuate seriously Korea, arrived on 22 November. Fol-
wounded men from the front. This lowing a two-month training period to
KWP-EBB-0053
became familiar with its Bell H-13 craft shortage of evacuation hospitals, each
and the Korean terrain, the unit was to MASH had been enlarged to 150 beds
become operational as an attachment and was handling more than just sur-
to the 8055th Mobile Army Surgical gery patients. But the early treatment
Hospital. of wounded at a MASH located only
The mobile army surgical hospital, minutes from the battlefield, combined
or MASH, as it was instantly and per- with the swift, comfortable delivery of
manently dubbed, also was a new kind seriously hurt men by helicopter, had
of organization conceived soon after helped to lower the fatality rate for the
World War II, mainly as a way of bring- Army's wounded. The rate had been
ing emergency lifesaving surgery closer 4.5 percent during World War II. In
to critically wounded men. The con- Korea, it would eventually reach a new
cept called for placing and keeping a low of 2.5 percent.16
sixty-bed, truck-borne MASH in a for-
ward location just out of enemy artil-
lery range in support of each division.
Only four of the mobile units were in 16 The rates cited are from Frank A. Reister, Battle
Korea, not enough to place one in sup- Casualties and Medical Statistics: U.S. Army Experience in
the Korean War (Washington: Department of the Army,
port of each division; and, because of a Office of the Surgeon General), pp. 15-16.
KWP-EBB-0054
Air Forces
pull in units from distant theater loca-
For air operations in Korea, it had tions and adjust the locations of some
been necessary at the beginning of units within Japan to bring them within
hostilities to make expedient and expe- range of the battle area. Additional
ditious changes in Far East Air Forces forces and equipment also had had to
dispositions, equipment, and organiza- be requisitioned from the United States.
tion. General Stratemeyer's principal The change in equipment had
prewar mission of maintaining an air stemmed from a recent conversion of
defense of his theater had compelled Far East Air Forces fighter units from
the deployment of subordinate air com- F-51 Mustangs to F-80C Shooting Stars,
mands over a wide area. Only the Fifth short-range jet interceptors not meant
Air Force and the Far East Air Mate- to be flown at low altitudes in support
riel Command, which handled air logis- of ground operations. The U.S. Air
tics throughout the theater, had been Force inventory included the F-84E
based in Japan. To create a force capa- Thunderjet that was adaptable to air-
ble of operations in Korea, General ground operations, but its use required
Stratemeyer had found it necessary to better airfields than those existing in
KWP-EBB-0055
Japan and Korea. The immediate alter- Far East Air Forces had been estab-
native had been to return to the F-51 lished, Bomber Command under Maj.
with its longer range and its capacity Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., to handle
for low-level missions and operations deep interdiction and strategic bomb-
from short and rough fields. In strik- ing operations and Combat Cargo
ing a balance to meet all air require- Command under Maj. Gen. William H.
ments, Stratemeyer had reconverted Tunner to lift troops and supplies. 17
half of his F-80C squadrons to F-51s. Bomber Command currently possessed
As of 23 November the F-80Cs and ninety-five B-29s, now classed as me-
F-51s remained the basic fighter air- dium bombers, and included the 19th
craft, but the Far East Air Forces were and 307th Bombardment Groups based
in the process of importing both F-84Es at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa and
and the high performance F-86A Sa- the 98th Bombardment Group and 91st
bres from the United States and were Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron at
improving airfields in Japan and Korea
to handle them.
17 General O'Donnell was on temporary duty from
In organizational changes, two provi- his assignment as commander of the Fifteenth Air
sional commands subordinated to the Force, Strategic Air Command.
KWP-EBB-0056
A MASH NURSE
KWP-EBB-0058
(Top to bottom) THE F-80C SHOOTING STAR, F-84E THUNDERJET, AND F-86A
SABREJET
KWP-EBB-0059
force also had a number of Japanese- len E. Smith, constituted the U.N.
manned and -supported freighters and Blockading and Escort Force. Incorpo-
landing ships of the Shipping Control rated with the U.S. contingent of the
Administration, Japan, that were em- force were all line ships furnished by
ployed in the intra-area lift of troops other U.N. countries and South Korea.
and supplies.23 Joy himself was the task To enforce the blockade of the Korean
force commander. From a nucleus of coast and to perform bombardment
five ships, Task Force 90 commanded and minesweeping assignments, Admi-
by Rear Adm. James H. Doyle had be- ral Smith's force was deployed in both
come a full-fledged amphibious force. 24 the Yellow Sea washing Korea on the
So far in the war, Admiral Doyle's west and the Sea of Japan on the east.25
force had participated in three major Before the outbreak of hostilities, the
landings-at P'ohang-dong, Inch'on, Seventh Fleet:, commanded by Vice
and Wonsan-and was currently posted Adm. Arthur D. Struble, had been
in both Japanese and Korean waters. based in the Philippines. Its operations
Task Force 95, under Rear Adm. Al- at that time were under the control of
Adm. Arthur E. Radford, Commander
23 On 25 June 1950, Joy's line ships had consisted of
1 antiaircraft light cruiser, 4 destroyers, I frigate 25 Another assignment, the escort of convoys be-
(Australian), and 1 submarine. tween Japan and Korea, was canc eled early in the war
24 The five original vessels were a command ship, after it became obvious that the North Koreans would
attack transport, attack cargo ship, LST, and fleet tug. make no effort against shipping.
KWP-EBB-0061
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, but standing or- 72 were handling the Formosa patrol.
ders passed control to Admiral Joy Admiral Struble himself and two task
whenever the Seventh Fleet operated forces were in the immediate battle
in Japanese waters or in the event of an area. Task Force 77, a fast carrier force
emergency. When these orders went commanded by Rear Adm. Edward C.
into effect after the war started, the Sev- Ewen, was deployed off the eastern Ko-
enth Fleet, at the direction of President rean coast in the Sea of Japan. Its two
Truman, was assigned both to conduct carriers, the Leyte and Philippine Sea,
combat operations in Korean waters each carried an air group of five squad-
and to operate in the Formosa area rons and, together, were operating with
where its presence and patrolling could approximately a hundred fifty planes.
discourage the Chinese on the main- Underway replenishment for Ewen's
land and the Nationalists on the island ships was provided by a logistical sup-
from attacking each other and thus pre- port force, Task Force 79.26 (Chart 4)
vent a widening of hostilities.
As of 23 November Fleet Air Wing 26 The information on UNC naval forces is based
One, headquartered on Okinawa, and on Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea; Cagle
surface ships constituting Task Force and Manson, The Sea War in Korea.
KWP-EBB-0062
crossing, and at the last week of Octo- offensive. This rate could be established
ber train service on the main line had only by repairing the main rail line
been restored no farther than the Imjin from the existing railhead at the south
River, thirty miles above Seoul and a bank of the Imjin River into P'yongyang
hundred fifty miles below the Eighth and by opening the west coast port
Army front on the Ch'ongch'on River. of Chinnamp'o on the estuary of the
Even then, Walker's engineers had Taedong River twenty-five miles south-
pieced together only a single pair of west of P'yongyang. 34
rails out of a double track system, The time needed to meet these re-
which, together with the poor condi- quirements, in particular to complete
tion of the bridges, sharply limited the railroad bridge repairs and to sweep
line's capacity. This restriction had away mines strewn by the North Ko-
forced extremely heavy supply traffic reans at Chinnamp'o, forced Walker to
onto the roads. Three-fourths of the drop his 15 November target date. By
Eighth Army's trucks had operated the 17th, however, five trains were run-
around the clock out of Pusan and ning about a hundred cars with 2,000
Inch'on and from railheads and air- tons of supplies into P'yongyang daily,
heads to keep Walker's forces moving. and at Chinnamp'o the daily discharge
This support had threatened to wear was reaching upwards of 1,500 tons.
out before the Eighth Army reached With his transportation system moving
the Ch'ongch'on because of too many into higher gear, Walker was able to set
deadlined vehicles and too few repair the 24th as the date for reopening his
parts. In fact, only through the addi- offensive.35
tion of a daily airlift of 1,000 tons from During the time used to arrange ade-
Kimpo Airfield to P'yongyang had the quate logistical support, Walker main-
Eighth Army been able to support its tained some contact with enemy forces
advance from the North Korean capi- through patrolling and short advances.
tal to the Ch'ongch'on. 33 He mounted the advances with the I
Far too few supplies were stockpiled Corps and ROK II Corps, keeping the
at the front on 6 November to support IX Corps, which only recently had come
the advance; petroleum products and forward, to his right rear to secure and
ammunition were especially short, the refuse the Eighth Army's east flank. En-
latter amounting only to a single day of emy resistance initially ranged from lit-
fire. With winter approaching, Walker tle or none in the west to sharp local
also needed to equip his troops with counterattacks in the rougher ground
heavier clothing. In addition to build- to the east, then subsided everywhere
ing up stocks in forward areas, he faced after 12 November. Later, in final prep-
the necessity of accelerating the north- aration for the attack, Walker inserted
ward flow of resupply. His logistics offi-
cer, Col. Albert K. Stebbins, estimated
that a daily flow of at least 4,000 tons 34 Ibid.; Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 771.
35 Eighth Army G4 SS Rpts, 7-18 Nov 50; Eighth
was needed to sustain a three-corps Army Trans SS Rpts, 7-18 Nov 50; Rad, GX 27880
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C:/S ROKA et al., 17 Nov
50; Rad, GX 50025 KGLX, CG Eighth Army to
33 Ibid. CINCFE, 22 Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0065
41 X Corps WD, Sum, Nov 50; X Corps Opn Plan 8, 43 Ltr, Maj Gen Leven C. Allen, CofS Eighth Army,
16 Nov 50; Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, to CG Fifth Air Force, 23 Nov 50.
23 Nov 50. 44 Eighth Army G3 Air Briefing Rpts, 24 and 25
42 X Corps WD, Sum, Nov 50; X Corps Opn 0 7, 25 Nov 50; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea,
Nov 50. p. 262.
KWP-EBB-0069
about the extent and purpose of Com- to obtain by advancing, and the clarifi-
munist China's participation in the cation of Chinese objectives, which the
war. Indeed, persisting questions in- Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided they
volved the "accurate measure of enemy needed before considering a change in
strength," which MacArthur intended the UNC mission.
KWP-EBB-0071
CHAPTER III
The Enemy
Kanggye, the town considered but feated early in the war, remained virtu-
not selected as the objective of the X ally nonexistent, and the North Korean
Corps' planned attack to the west, was People's Army, while on paper an impres-
now the seat of North Korean govern- sive organization of eight corps, thirty
ment. Forced out of P'yongyang by the divisions, and several brigades, was in
Eighth Army's advance in October, fact a depleted force. 2
Kim II Sung, the premier of North Ko- The only major North Korean unit
rea and commander in chief of the actively engaged at the front on the 23d
North Korean Armed Forces, had estab- was the IV Corps employing one divi-
lished a new capital at Sinuiju, the sion and two brigades, its bulk oppos-
Yalu River city opposite An-tung, ing the ROK I Corps in northeastern
Manchuria. When UNC forces moved Korea. The II Corps also was active, but
toward Sinuiju a short time later, he as a guerrilla force operating from a
took his government to Kanggye, deep command post hidden high in the cen-
in the mountains of north central tral mountains near the 38th parallel
Korea. 1 under the direction of General Kim
Chaek, previously the commander of
Front Headquarters, the now defunct
The North Korean Armed Forces
tactical echelon of the North Korean
Also in Kanggye under Kim II Sung People's Army General Headquarters.
was a recently formed Combined Head- Along with bands of South Korean dis-
quarters staffed by both North Korean sidents and North Korean irregulars
and Chinese officers. Kim was publi- who had long populated the Taebaek
cized as commanding the operations of and southwestern mountains, four re-
both North Korean and Chinese forces duced divisions of the II Corps con-
from this headquarters, but the com- ducted desultory guerrilla opera-
bined agency was really no more than a tions both above and below the 38th
mechanism for coordinating North parallel while they gradually reorga-
Korean operations with those of the nized around their own remnants and
3
Chinese, and Kim's voice in the con- stragglers from other units.
duct of joint operations was no stronger
than the forces he was able to field. As 2 Ibid., p. 769; GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Infor-
mation, North Korean Army, 20 Aug 51 and 16 Sep
of 23 November, these forces were few. 51.
North Korean air and naval forces, de- 3 GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, North
Korean Army, 20 Aug 51 and 16 Sep 51. See also
Appleman, South to the Naktong, ch. XXXVII, "Guerrilla
1 Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 663-64. Warfare Behind the Front."
KWP-EBB-0072
THE ENEMY 53
to reduce the risk of aircraft losses, the Some 200,000 Chinese constituting
Chinese so far had confined their air the XIII Army Group of the Fourth Field
operations to northwestern Korea and Army faced the Eighth Army in western
had made no real attempt to establish North Korea.10 With six armies, each
air superiority in that region. They with three infantry divisions and a total
were, however, putting up MIG-15s, of about 30,000 men, two artillery divi-
which could outmaneuver the Ameri- sions and the bulk of a third, a cavalry
can F-80C Shooting Stars and F9F regiment, and two truck regiments, the
Panthers. The MIGs were a particular XIII Army Group had entered Korea
reason why the Far East Air Forces during the last half of October, cross-
were importing higher performance ing the Yalu at Sinuiju and Manp'ojin.
F-84E Thunderjets and F-86A Sabres Forces from four of its armies had
from the United States.7 fought the Eighth Army and X Corps
Only a fraction of the Chinese People's in what the Chinese called their First
Liberation Army had entered Korea.8 Phase Offensive between 25 October
Field armies, or "tactical field forces," and 6 November. 11 The air attacks on
which were the elite of the organiza- Yalu bridges opened by General Mac-
tion's combat strength, numbered Arthur on 8 November obviously had
somewhere between two and three mil- no chance to interdict the group's
lion men. Local garrison armies, which movement across the river.
were second-line troops, numbered be- The IX Army Group, part of the Third
tween one and two million more. In Field Army, had entered Korea with
addition, a militia, from which the three armies during the first half
People's Liberation Army drew recruits, of November. The leading army had
had a strength of five million. The frac- crossed the Yalu at Manp'ojin, the other
tion of the Chinese Army in Korea, two at Lin-chiang on a big bend in the
however, was not the 70,000 given in river about sixty miles northeast of
the latest UNC intelligence estimate. Manp'ojin. Far East Air Forces plan-
Over four times that number were ners had not selected the highway
massed in the mountains opposite the bridge at Lin-chiang as a target for the
Eighth Army and X Corps. Yalu bombings, judging it less impor-
tant than the crossings at Hyesanjin and
twin-engine bombers, and 75 transports. See Gittings, over the lower reaches of the river.
The Role of the Chinese Army. p. 136, and Futrell, The
United States Air Force in Korea, p. 231. With the Manp'ojin crossings (a high-
7 Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, pp. 136-37; way bridge and a railway bridge) stand-
Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 205-07, ing despite the bombing and with the
210-12, 230-33; Field, United States Naval Operations,
Korea, p. 259.
Lin-chiang bridge untouched, the IX
8 In this volume People's Liberation Army refers only
to ground forces, although by Chinese definition it
includes air and naval forces as well. The term Chinese 10 People's Liberation Army tactical field forces were
Communist Forces, frequently used in official reports organized as four numbered field armies, the First
and the press to designate Chinese military formations, through the Fourth, and some separate units known
is of U.N. Command origin. collectively as the North China Independent Unit. In each
9 Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, pp. 76-79; field army, the major groupings in descending order
GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, Chinese were army groups, armies, and divisions.
Communist Regular Ground Forces (China, Man- 11 Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig (Digest), vol. 1, no. 4,
churia. and Korea), 9 Dec 51; Appleman, South to the 1-15 Feb 53, pp. 26-38; Appleman, South to the Naktong,
Naktong, pp. 768-69. pp. 766-68.
KWP-EBB-0074
Army Group had crossed the river with each in the IX Army Group had been
little difficulty, then moved southeast reinforced by a fourth, giving it about
to the Changjin Reservoir in the X 40,000 men, and the group a strength
Corps zone. Although a Chinese army approaching 120,000. The total Chi-
normally comprised three divisions, nese commitment in Korea by 23 No-
THE ENEMY 55
vember thus had risen above 300,000
men. 1 2
A major reason UNC intelligence
failed to reveal more closely the extent
to which the Chinese had entered Ko-
rea was their concerted effort to avoid
aerial observation through a rigid
march and bivouac discipline, move-
ments under the cover of darkness, and
substantial use of secondary roads. In
fact, UNC aerial reconnaissance had
made small opportunity to observe the
Chinese. Other than Mosquito control
aircraft operating at the front, the Far
East Air Forces had no planes commit-
ted to visual reconnaissance, and as of
8 November available photo reconnais-
sance aircraft were committed mainly
in support of the attacks on the Yalu
bridges. 13 These aircraft appeared over
Sinuiju and Manp'ojin too late to spot
LIN PIAO
the crossing of the XIII Army Group and
were in the wrong place to sight the
crossing of the bulk of the IX Army
Hiding the fact further were code
Group. The area between the river and
designations the Chinese used to iden-
the front was not entirely neglected, but
the limited number of reconnaissance tify units. Perhaps most deceptive was
a battalion designation for a division. 15
planes largely restricted coverage to
But even after captives from the initial
areas adjacent to main roads, and few
sorties were flown at night. Conse- engagement had explained the designa-
tions and correctly identified their
quently, very little evidence of the Chi-
units, skeptical intelligence officers ac-
nese entry was from the air.14
cepted only parts of the units named as
being in Korea. By 23 November the
U.N. Command had acknowledged the
12Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 768; Hq, FEC, presence of twelve Chinese infantry
History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52; Hq,
USAFFE, Intel Dig, vol. I, no. 3, 16-31 Jan 53, pp. divisions when in fact there were nine
32-37; Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. armies with thirty infantry divisions.16
212-13. The units committed included the
13 The Fifth Air Force's 45th Squadron, the single
visual reconnaissance unit in the theater, apparently best in the People's LiberationArmy. The
was not employed over Korea until early 1951, and Fourth Field Army, commanded by Lin
after 9 November 1950 the B-29 photo planes of
Bomber Command were not used along the Yalu
because they proved to be easy marks for the MIG- 15 The 55th Unit, for example, was the 39th Army,
15s. and the 1st Battalion, 55th Unit, was the 115th Division,
14 Appleman, South to the Naktong, p. 770; Futrell, 39th Army.
The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 216-17. 16 Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 752-54, 763.
KWP-EBB-0076
Piao, was the strongest, and its XIII porting the efficacy of this "man-over-
Army Group included armies honored weapons" doctrine were successes
for past achievements with the title of against the Japanese and Nationalist
"iron" troops. 17 The Third Field Army, Chinese, and most recently against the
commanded by Chen Yi, was not partic- United Nations Command.18
ularly strong as a whole, but its IX Army Upon leaving their parent field ar-
Group included at least one army con- mies in China, the two army groups
sidered to be a crack unit. But however had come under Headquarters, Chinese
highly rated by People's Liberation Army People's Volunteers, specially organized
standards, the two groups essentially for operations in Korea.19 Under the
constituted a mass of infantry with lit- command of Lin Piao, the special head-
tle artillery support, no armor or air quarters was located in Mukden, Man-
support, and primitive, haphazard lo- churia. It was Lin in Mukden, not Kim
gistical support. They were, character- II Sung at Combined Headquarters in
istically, poorly equipped. Individual Kanggye, who made the basic tactical
and crew-served weapons, from com- decisions, including those affecting the
pany to army, were a collection of operations of North Korean forces. But
diverse makes and calibers; other publicizing the Kanggye headquarters
equipment was equally mixed; and both under the North Korean premier as
weapons and equipment were in short controlling all military operations lent
supply, small arms to such a degree that support to claims made by both Chi-
as many as two-thirds of some infantry nese and North Korean officials that
units lacked them. Their strongest the Chinese presence in Korea was sim-
points were experience and morale. ply the result of individuals and units
Most of the troops were veterans of the having volunteered to assist the North
recent civil war, and virtually all senior Koreans.20 (Chart 5)
officers had fought the Japanese dur-
ing World War II. Their high morale
18 Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army
presumably was the result of effective in Action (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),
political indoctrination, notwithstand- pp. vii-viii, 5-7, 83-84, 173; Samuel B. Griffith II, The
ing that former Nationalist Army mem- Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 131; Gittings, The Role
bers constituted much of the strength of the Chinese Army, p. 77; DA Pam 30-51, Handbook on
of the intervention force. It was on a the Chinese Communist Army, 7 Dec 60, pp. 8. 66; ibid.,
combination of morale and guerrilla Sep 52, pp. 38-39; GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Infor-
mation, Chinese Communist Regular Ground Forces
warfare tactics that Chinese leaders had (China, Manchuria, and Korea), 9 Dec 51.
long depended to compensate for infe- 10 The shape of the Chinese field command would
riority in weapons and equipment. Sup- elude UNC intelligence for some time. As late as
March 1951, for example, the Eighth Army intelli-
gence officer could state only that "it is possible that
17 Officers of the People's Liberation Army were not the XIII CCF Army Group may be the controlling
designated by nominal ranks as in the U.S. Army. headquarters of 4 CCF armies.... Unconfirmed." See
Troop commanders held positional ranks and staff Eighth Army PIR 234, 3 Mar 51.
officers held equivalent ranks. The commander of a 20 A communique released by the North Korean gov-
regiment, for example, held the positional rank of ernment on 7 November stated that "volunteer units
regimental commander, and a regimental staff officer formed by the Chinese people participated in opera-
held the equivalent rank of assistant regimental com- tions along with the People's Armed Forces, under
mander. See DA Pam 30-51, Handbook on the Chinese the unified command of the General Headquarters."
Communist Army, Sep 52, pp. 75-76. On 11 November a spokesman for Chou En-lai,
KWP-EBB-0077
THE ENEMY 57
CHART 5-ENEMY LINES OF COMMAND
23 NOVEMBER 1950
Giving China's entry into the war a ated deliberations leading to the deci-
veneer of voluntary participation evi- sion to enter the war.21 Intervention,
dently had two purposes. In China according to the same source, had been
itself, the image of voluntary action was stoutly opposed by a number of Peking
projected to gain total popular support, authorities, including some People's
material and moral, for the commit- Liberation Army officials. They had ar-
ment in Korea. Otherwise, that image gued that the newly established regime
attempted to reduce the risks of inter- needed peace so that it could concen-
vention, primarily to mitigate the U.S. trate on national reconstruction and
response. According to a former high- that China, in any case, could not af-
ranking Communist Party member, ford to accept the risks of waging war
concern that Chinese forces might be with a first-rate power like the United
defeated in Korea, that American States. 2 2 Officials in favor of entering
forces might invade the Chinese main- the war had insisted that the threat to
land, and that the United States might China posed by a UNC victory in North
employ the atomic bomb had perme- Korea made it necessary to accept the
China's minister of foreign affairs, admitted that Chi- 21 This was Chou Ching-wen, a prominent writer
nese forces were fighting in Korea but denied official and scholar and former president of Northwestern
responsibility. As precedents the spokesman cited the University in Manchuria, who held high party posi-
French assistance to the American colonists during tions for eight years. Chou broke with the Peking
the Revolutionary War and the individual volunteers, regime and fled to Hong Kong in 1957. See Chou
including Americans and British, in the Spanish Civil Ching-wen, Ten Years of Storm (New York: Holt, Rine-
War. Captives taken from the first forces to enter hart and Winston, 1960).
Korea revealed that, before entering, the members of 22 This account is borne out by contemporaneous evi-
some units were asked, or, if they refused, pressured, dence. A 6 November 1950 editorial in the Jen-min
to sign statements volunteering their service in the Jih-pao (People's Daily), an official Communist Party
war. See Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 137-38, organ in China, stated and then refuted the views of
and George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action, pp. those who had opposed China's intervention.
156-57.
KWP-EBB-0078
THE ENEMY 59
did in fact remove machinery and other broken contact, group commander Li
material, including the huge furnaces T'ien-yu set out light forces to screen
of an important steelworks, from the his major units, which assembled far
coastal provinces. Thus is appears that north of the line reached during their
the Chinese entered the war not confi- initial attack. As disposed on 23
dently, but gingerly.2 6 November, the group's six armies were
The voluntary disengagement of the located ten to fifteen miles north of the
XIII Army Group on 6 November is fur- Eighth Army front. The 50th and 66th
ther evidence of how warily the Chi- Armies stood opposite the I Corps in
nese entered the war. The disengage- the west; the 39th and 40th Armies were
ment suggests that Lin Piao was centrally located north of the IX Corps;
reluctant to continue operations with- the 38th and 42d Armies were above the
out a greater concentration of force and ROK II Corps in the east.29 The 42d
ordered a pause while the IX Army Army earlier had opposed X Corps
Group completed its move into Korea, forces below the Changjin Reservoir but
or that the Chinese leadership sus- had shifted west into the Eighth Army
pended operations until the UNC re- zone after being relieved by the 20th
sponse to China's intervention could be Army of the IX Army Group. The latter
determined.27 These considerations, of group, also deployed with major units
course, could have been restraints only assembled behind screening forces, was
briefly. The additional army group now located above and west of the
reached the Changjin Reservoir by mid- reservoir. Group commander Sung
November, and by the last week of the Shih-lun had set the 20th Army to the
month it was clear that the U.N. Com- west and south of Yudam-ni, in the path
mand would limit its response to bomb- of the X Corps' coming westward drive,
ing Yalu bridges on the Korean side of and had assembled the 26th and 27th
the river. However cautiously and ten- Armies in the mountains to the north
tatively the Chinese may have inter- and northeast of the reservoir. 30
vened, their ultimate decision, evidently This arrangement of forces followed
made soon after the XIII Army Group a long-existing Chinese concept of mo-
broke off its opening attack, was to re- bile defense designed for operations
sume offensive operations. Perhaps re- against a superior force.31 Aimed not
lieved when the U.N. Command did
not carry the war to China, and per-
firepower, and air support but depreciated American
haps encouraged by the confident tone infantry and summarized results as satisfactory. See
of field appraisals of the initial battles Appleman, South to the Naktong, pp. 719-20.
especially those with U.S. forces-the 29 The 50th Army was formerly Nationalist China's
60th Army, which had defected en masse during the
Chinese high command concluded that civil war. It was kept intact except for being given a
the two army groups would be able to Communist cadre. See George, The Chinese Communist
operate successfully against the United Army in Action, p. 6.
30 Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig, vol. 1, no. 4, 1-15 Feb 53,
Nations Command.2 8 pp. 28-33, 36-38; ibid., no. 3, 16-31 Jan 53, pp. 34-
Earlier, after the XIII Army Group had 37.
31 Chinese defensive tactics would not include the
26 Tang Tsou, America 's Failure in China, pp. 578-79; development of a main line of resistance until later in
Chou, Ten Years of Storm, p. 117. the war when the front became stabilized during ar-
27 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 132, 138-39. mistice negotiations. See Mono, Hq, Eighth Army,
28 The field appraisals lauded American equipment, "Enemy Tactics," 26 Dec 51, copy in CMH.
KWP-EBB-0080
to hold ground but to destroy oppos- major forces well behind screening
ing forces in brief actions, the underly- units that Eighth Army patrols and X
ing strategy was to invite attack; fight a Corps assault forces had encountered
delaying action while allowing the at- only outposts after mid-November.
tack force to penetrate deep; then, at a Showing little awareness of their adver-
point of Chinese choice, counterattack sarys doctrine, however, UNC officials
suddenly while the opposing force was had assumed from the light contact that
ill-prepared to receive the assault.32 the Chinese had withdrawn into posi-
It was because the Chinese deployed tion defenses far to the north, and they
had interpreted the deep, voluntary
32 Like all Peoples Liberation Army precepts, the strat- withdrawal as further indication that
egy reflected the guerrilla warfare doctrine developed the Chinese were weak in numbers.33
by Mao Tse-tung. As Mao expounded it in his classic
study. On the Protracted War: To achieve quick deci-
With unwarranted optimism, then, the
sion we should generally attack, not an enemy force Eighth Army and X Corps started for-
holding a position, but one on the move. We should ward on 24 November, believing that
have concentrated, beforehand under cover, a big
force along the route through which the enemy is they comfortably outnumbered enemy
sure to pass, suddenly descend on him while he is forces and expecting to encounter these
moving, encircle and attack him before he knows what in defensive positions that their weak-
is happening, and conclude the fighting with all speed.
If the battle is well fought, we may annihilate the ness, and perhaps their mission, had
entire enemy force or the greater part or a part of it. forced them to establish.
Even if the battle is not well fought, we may still inflict
heavy casualties. See Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu,
pp. 132-33, for a correlation of Maos teaching with 33 Eighth Army PIRs 118-335, 7-24 Nov 50; Hq,
Chinese strategy so far employed in the Korean War. USAFFE, Intel Dig, vol. 1, no. 4, 1-15 Feb 53, p. 26.
KWP-EBB-0081
CHAPTER IV
and 11th) which was operating against and Taechon, holding his British bri-
guerrillas in central and southern gade in reserve. Maj. Gen. John B.
Korea. The infantry battalion from Coulter, in command of the interior IX
Thailand had just finished processing Corps, kept the Turkish brigade in re-
at the U.N. Reception Center and was serve at Kunu-ri, sent one division
en route to Pyongyang on the eve of north astride the Kuryong River toward
the advance. Replacing the Thais at the Unsan and Onjong, and moved his
reception center was the Netherlands other division up the Chongchon val-
Battalion, which had reached Korea on ley in the direction of Huichon. On
23 November and was to receive two the army right, Maj. Gen. Yu Hae
weeks training before joining opera- Ucng, the ROK II Corps commander,
tions.3 started two of his three divisions north
On the morning of the 24th Maj. through the mountains toward terrain
Gen. Frank W. Milburn, commander objectives aligned with those of
of the I Corps, sent his two divisions Coulters forces.
west and northwest toward Chongju
4 Eighth Army WD, Nar, Nov 50; I Corps Opn O4,
18 Nov 50; I Corps Opn Dir 23, 19 Nov 50; IX Corps
Opn Plan 3, 18 Nov 50; IX Corps Opn Dir 8, 20 Nov
3 Eight Army Opn Plan 15, 14 Nov 50; Eighth Army 50; IX Corps Opn Dir 9, 23 Nov 50; ROK Opn Plan 5
WD, Sum, Nov 50; Fox, Inter-Allied Co-operation (Overlay), and Rpt of Staff Visit to II ROK Corps on
During Combat Operations. 23 Nov 50, both in IX Corps G3 Spot Rpts, Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0083
At the I Corps left, Maj. Gen. John H. southeast of Unsan the Dolvin force re-
Churchs 24th Division led off with a covered thirty members of the 8th Cav-
regimental attack over Route 1, its 21st alry who had been captured at Unsan
Infantry and a company of tanks mov- in early November and then released
ing westward toward Chongju, eighteen by the Chinese. Most were wounded
miles out. On the corps right, two regi- and frostbitten.7
ments of Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yups Maj. Gen. Laurence B. Keisers 2d
ROK 1st Division supported by a com- Division, at the IX Corps right, sought
pany of American tanks advanced on no sweeping first-day gains since it was
Taechon, moving upstream on both already three miles ahead of the 25th
sides of the Taeryong River over sec- Division. Rather than risk an open west
ondary roads that converged on the ob- flank, General Keiser ordered short
jective ten miles northwest. General moves by his line regiments, the 9th
Churchs single regiment marched and 38th, to mass along the lower bank
more than halfway to Chongju during of the Paengnyong River, a westward-
the day, receiving only a little long flowing tributary of the Chongchon.8
range small arms fire from the hills In the ROK II Corps zone, gains by
north of Route 1 as it moved. Two pla- the ROK 7th and 8th Divisions ranged
toons of Chinese infantry and a ditch from a quarter to a full mile but none
that delayed the tanks were the only at all against two enemy battalions dug
opposition to General Paiks forces, who in near the boundary between them.
established night defenses within four In one of the deeper gains, the 3d Regi-
miles of Taechon.5 ment of the ROK 7th Division at the
In the left half of the IX Corps zone, corps left came up to the Paengnyong
the 25th Division, commanded by Maj. River and tied in with the 38th Infan-
Gen. William B. Kean, moved north try of the 2d Division.9
astride the Kuryong River toward Un- Chongju and Taechon remained the
san with two regiments and an armored immediate I Corps objectives on 25
force, Task Force Dolvin.6 General November. Chongju, previously tagged
Keans 35th and 24th Infantry Regi- as a probable center of enemy resis-
ments on left and right, respectively, tance, was empty when the 21st Infan-
advanced four miles unopposed, while
Task Force Dolvin in the middle moved
7 25th Div OI 18, 20 Nov 50; 25th Div Opn O 15, 21
seven miles along the east bank of the Nov 50; 25th Div WD, 24 Nov 50; 25th Div Nar Rpt,
Kuryong, receiving only small arms fire Nov 50; 35th Inf Opn O 19, 22 Nov 50; 35th Inf Hist
as it covered the last mile. Four miles Rpt, Nov 50; 35th Inf Unit Rpt 43, 24 Nov 50; 24th
Inf Opn O 20, 22 Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, 24 Nov 50;
24th Inf Unit Rpt 54, 24 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot
5 Eighth Army PIR 135, 24 Nov 50; I Corps PORs Rpts, Entries 1479 and 1491, Nov 50; IX Corps G2
219 and 220, 24 Nov 50; 24th Div WD, Nov 50; 24th Spot Rpts, Entry 241915 Nov 50, Interrogation of
Div OI 70, 19 Nov 50; 21st Inf Unit Rpts 138 and 139, Released U.S. PW (Capt Ray J. Yantis).
23 and 24 Nov 50. 8 2d Div Opn O 10, 20 Nov 50: 2d Div WD, Nar,
6 The task force, led by Lt. Col. Welborn G. Dolvin, Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 23-24 Nov 50; 38th Inf Opn O
commander of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion, in- 20, 22 Nov 50; 38th Inf Nar Sum, Nov 50; 9th Inf
cluded Company B, the Assault Gun Platoon, and the Hist, Nov 50, Incl H.
Reconnaissance Platoon of the 89th; the 25th Recon- 9 Eighth Army POR 406, 24 Nov 50; IX Corps Sit
naissance Company; Company E, 27th Infantry; Overlay, 242400 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpts,
Company B, 35th Infantry; and the 8213th Ranger Entry 1535, 24 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 113,
Company. 24 Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0084
Casualties had not been heavy in any ward from the Chongchon to the lower
of the corps zones. The advance, more- bank of the Paengnyong. Beyond a half-
over, was soon to be reinforced by the mile gap to the right of the 9th, the 2d
X Corps attack from the east. Walker and 3d Battalions of the 38th Infantry
issued a single order on the 25th, one carried the division line along the south
that shortened the final objective line bank of the Paengnyong to the bound-
of the ROK II Corps to conform with ary with the ROK II Corps. After a
the 27 November attack by General daylight patrol, Company A of the re-
Almonds forces. Otherwise, he in- serve 1st Battalion was in perimeter two
tended that the Eighth Army would miles north of the Paengnyong.16
continue its advance on the 26th as Two miles behind the 9th Infantry,
originally conceived. 14 the headquarters, tank company, and
The Eighth Armys optimism still 1st Battalion of the 23d Infantry occu-
hinged on the assumption that the Chi- pied a position arching from the lower
nese had not tapped their large Man- bank of the Chongchon eastward
churian reserve for offensive operations across the valley road. Col. Paul L.
in Korea. Although the final army intel- Freeman, commander of the 23d, had
ligence report on 25 November showed taken these forces forward during the
an increase in Chinese forces opposing day under General Keisers order to
the advance, the new figure stood at pass through the 9th Infantry on the
only 54,000, just 6,000 more than the 26th. When Keiser later postponed this
pre-attack estimate. In reviewing possi- change, Colonel Freeman held his re-
ble enemy actions, army G-2 Tarkenton maining battalions near Kunu-ri and
added only that he now expected en- deployed his leading units behind the
emy forces to employ local counter- 9th, amid the firing positions of three
attacks in conjunction with their artillery battalions supporting the divi-
defense.15 sions advance.
Between dark and midnight two Chi-
nese regiments struck the 9th Infantry
The Chinese Attack
in the Chongchon valley while a third
At dark on the 25th the 2d Division hit the center of the 38th Infantrys
occupied a fifteen-mile front centered Paengnyong position. Coming south-
in the Chongchon valley twenty miles east from the area above the 25th Divi-
north of Kunu-ri. (Map 4) In the 9th
Infantry sector at the division left, the
16 The account of the opening enemy attacks against
companies of the 3d Battalion and all the 2d Division is based on the following sources: IX
but one company of the 2d Battalion Corps G2 Spot Rpts 2990, 2997, and 3026, 26 Nov
occupied separated positions atop the 50; 2d Div PIR 68, 26 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov
50; 2d Div Arty WD, 26 Nov 50; 2d Div Arty POR 94,
first ridges west of the Chongchon. 26 Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, Entry 15, 26 Nov 50;
The remainder of the regiment was east 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; 9th Inf PIR 75, 26 Nov 50; 1st
of the river on a line hooking southeast- Bn, 9th Inf, WD, Nov 50; 2d Bn, 9th Inf, Unit Jnl, 26
Nov 50; 3d Bn. 9th Inf, Nar Diary, 25 Nov 50; 23d
Inf, Nar Sum, Nov 50; 23d Inf WD, Nov 50; 38th Inf
14 Eighth Army G1 SS Rpt, 25 Nov 50; Rad, GX Comd Rpt. Nov 50; General Charles D. Palmer, MS
30007 KGOO, CG; Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., review comments, 1985. General Palmer was the divi-
25 Nov 50. sion artillery commander of the 1st Cavalry Division
15 Eighth Army PIR 136, 25 Nov 50. at the time of the action.
KWP-EBB-0086
KWP-EBB-0087
sion, one enemy regiment advanced in In company with the attack from the
several columns toward the two battal- northwest, a second Chinese regiment
ions of the 9th Infantry west of the struck south along the east side of the
Chongchon. Moving mostly over val- Chongchon. While some of its search-
ley trails, the Chinese missed the 2d ing columns hit and hurt the 1st Bat-
Battalions hilltop positions, which talion, 9th Infantry, another moved
were farthest north, but found either behind that battalion through the half-
the front or flanks of the three sepa- mile gap between the 9th and 38th
rated companies of the 3d. At the sound Regiments. Part of the forces reaching
of bugle signals, the Chinese in file the rear area overran the 1st Battalion
changed formation for assaults that command post and aid station, then
through the night gradually pressed the climbed Chinamans Hat to join the
3d Battalion toward the river. forces who had broken away from the
Other columns of the same regiment 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry. Following
infiltrated the gaps between companies this juncture, the Chinese moved off
and waded the cold Chongchon to hit the Hat and again attacked Colonel
the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, and the Freemans battalion, focusing this time
61st Field Artillery Battalion just north on the refused right flank east of the
of Colonel Freemans position.17 The valley road. Freeman lost part of his
strike startled the 61st into retreat, es- flank position but then shifted forces
pecially the members of Battery A, who, to the east and blocked the assault. Near
after their commander had been killed dawn, the Chinese again withdrew to
and all other battery officers wounded, Chinamans Hat.
abandoned both guns and vehicles. A Farther east, some of the Chinese en-
few artillerymen withdrew eastward, tering the gap between regiments dis-
but most of them, with Chinese follow- covered and assaulted Company G,
ing, moved south over the valley road 38th Infantry, holding a detached posi-
through Colonel Freemans position. tion at the west end of the 38ths line.
Though the confused southward rush About 2330 a third enemy regiment
of American artillerymen and Chinese opened an attack against the 38ths
infantry complicated the defense, center, part of it surrounding and en-
Freemans forces eventually beat off the gaging Company A north of the Pa-
Chinese without losing ground. Seek- engnyong, the bulk crossing the river
ing both cover from Freemans fire and to attack at the boundary between the
a position on which to reorganize, the 2d and 3d Battalions. Pressing frontal
Chinese pulled away and climbed a low assaults against the central companies,
but rugged mountain, called China- F and L, the Chinese invested portions
mans Hat, located northeast of Free- of the company positions, then called
man and immediately below the rear- off their attack near 0230 after suffer-
most position of the 1st Battalion, 9th ing heavy casualties.
Infantry. Within two hours the Chinese re-
newed their attacks against the regi-
17The 61st Field Artillery Battalion was a 1st Caval- mental center, this time forcing Com-
ry Division unit that had been attached to the 2d
Division to provide additional direct support to the
panies F and L to withdraw. Their
9th Infantry. withdrawal, although short, isolated
KWP-EBB-0088
Companies I and K to the east. Col. slip out of the encirclement and with-
George B. Peploe, the regimental com- draw eastward into the 2d Division
mander, countered near dawn, attack- sector. Against this new threat, Kean
ing with his reserve 1st Battalion, less ordered the bulk of his reserve 27th
Company A but with Company C of Infantry to assemble behind the weak-
the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion at- ened position of the 24th. Leaving the
tached as the third rifle company. Start- 2d Battalion to back up Task Force
ing from a point west of the enemy pen- Wilson, Col. John H. Michaelis, com-
etration and moving east into the mander of the 27th, started the remain-
Chinese flank, the 1st Battalion cleared der of his regiment toward the right
the area sufficiently to permit Colonel sector around midnight.20
Peploe to restore his central positions. In the 2d Division sector, General
West of the 2d Division, Chinese also Keiser spent the 26th rebuilding his line
struck the 25th Division during the in the Chongchon valley. Near dawn
night, centering a small but sharp blow he authorized Col. Charles C. Sloane,
on Task Force Dolvin on the east side commander of the 9th Infantry, to pull
of the Kuryong. In a give-and-take bat- in the 2d Battalion, which, although it
tle that ran the course of the night and had survived the night without diffi-
into the morning of the 26th, Colonel culty, was precariously separated from
Dolvins forces lost one of two hills at the remainder of the regiment. Colo-
their forwardmost position.18 nel Sloane then established the entire
Although the 25th had not been hit regiment in a tight position facing gen-
in strength, General Kean canceled erally northwest on high ground along
plans for continuing the advance on the the upper bank of the Chongchon. To
morning of the 26th. Against a possi- compensate losses in the 3d Battalion
ble renewal of the attack at the division the previous night, Keiser gave Sloane
center, he merged the 1st Battalion, all but Company C of the 2d Engineer
24th Infantry, and all Dolvin elements Combat Battalion for use as infantry.21
except the ranger company (which East of the Chongchon, Keiser as-
withdrew from the front) into Task signed the 1st and 2d Battalions of the
Force Wilson under Brig. Gen. 23d Infantry to defend the ground just
Vennard Wilson, the assistant division below Chinamans Hat. While Colonel
commander.19 Freeman brought the 2d Battalion up
A half hour after noon the Chinese from Kunu-ri into position at the right
switched attention to the rightmost po- of the 1st, members of the 61st Field
sition of Col. John T. Corleys 24th Artillery Battalion, at Keisers order, re-
Infantry, surrounding two companies turned to the position they had vacated
of the regiment while they were receiv- during the night, just above Freeman,
ing a supply airdrop in somewhat iso- and recovered most of the equipment
lated positions at the east flank. Most
members of the two units managed to
2025th Div WD. 26 Nov 50; 25th Div O1 21, 26 Nov
50; 24th Inf WD, 26 Nov 50; 1st Bn, 24th Inf, WD, 26
18 25thDiv WD, 25-26 Nov 50; 25th Div PORs 64 Nov 50; 27th Inf Hist. Nar, Nov 50; 27th Inf Unit Rpt
and 65, 26 Nov; 25th Div PIR 150, 26 NOV 50. 82, 26 Nov 50.
1925th Div WD, 26 Nov 50; 25th Div O1 20, 26 NOV 21 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50;
50. 9th Inf Hist Nar, Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0089
they had left behind. As the other two he had to remain north of this road to
artillery battalions that had been below insure the receipt of supplies and to
Freeman already had done, the 61st hold open an exit route should a with-
then moved south to new and safer drawal be called.24
positions.22 By noon Peploe knew that his prob-
Keiser gave his sole remaining re- lem was much greater than just hold-
serve, the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, a ing a road-poor interior position with
blocking assignment behind Freemans reduced forces. Fragmentary reports
front, placing it a mile east of the valley made it clear that the ROK II Corps
road town of Kujang-dong on a lateral had been under attack for some time,
road leading to and serving as the main that the South Koreans were not hold-
supply route for the 38th Infantry. Sev- ing their positions, and that the 38th
eral times through the day Colonel Infantry was fast becoming the right
Peploe had asked division to reinforce flank unit not only of the 2d Division
the 38th Infantry with part of the 23d. and the IX Corps but also of the Eighth
His central companies had been se- Army.
verely reduced by casualties; only a The piecemeal information coming
handful of Company As men returned out of the ROK II Corps sector left
to the regimental line after fighting free obscure the exact chronology of the at-
of encirclement north of the Paeng- tacks against General Yus forces. It ap-
nyong, and Company G, after its en- peared that during the previous night
gagement at the west end of the regi- a Chinese regiment had skirted the 21st
mental line, counted no more than one Regiment of the ROK 8th Division at
officer and sixty men. But Keiser had the far right of the Eighth Army front
judged the Chongchon valley to be the and broken through the flank position
more critical area. Although Freemans of the divisions 16th Regiment six miles
3d Battalion could have been sent to east of Yongdong-ni. A stronger force
Peploe, Keiser chose not to commit the of two regiments at the same time infil-
last of his reserves to the line.23 trated the ROK front at the center of
Peploe thus was left to his own re- the 7th Divisions position and at the
sources in defending his Paengnyong boundary between the 7th and 8th
position. However he decided to hold Divisions. By 0800 on the 26th heavy
his ground, he had to take into account enemy pressure had developed across
that no north-south road served his the entire corps front except in the sec-
sector. The only accessible road ran lat- tor of the 3d Regiment on the west
erally close behind his forward units, flank. By that hour the 8th Divisions
westward to Kujang-dong and south- 21st Regiment on the corps east flank
eastward toward Tokchon in the ROK had given up its position and moved
II Corps sector. In setting a defense, south to Yongdong-ni, and its 10th
Regiment was withdrawing to the same
area. Elsewhere, as reported at that
22 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50; 2d
Div Arty S3 .Jnl, 26 Nov 50; 23d Inf, Nar Sum, Nov hour by the IX Corps liaison officer
50; 23d Inf WD, Nov 50.
23 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50;
38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50. 24 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0090
with General Yu, "things are slightly roads leading south from Tokchon and
confused."25 southwest from Maengsan. He in-
In the late morning hours the Chi- tended to hold the Pukchang-ni area
nese who had infiltrated the South Ko- with the remaining strength of the ROK
rean front moved ten miles south to 6th Division and while holding his posi-
Tokchon, blocked the road serving as tion there to reorganize his 7th and 8th
the main ROK supply route north and Divisions as the remnants drifted south.
south of town, and trapped the 2d Regi- But until and unless such a reorganiza-
ment of the reserve ROK 6th Division tion could be accomplished, the ROK
inside. Another Chinese regiment at- II Corps could not be considered an
tacked south between the 5th and 8th effective force.27
Regiments of the ROK 7th Division, in- After learning of the collapse of the
ducing both to withdraw. Since the 8th ROK II Corps, Colonel Peploe bent the
Division already had left its position, 38th Infantrys line. Retaining his 2d
the withdrawal of the ROK 7ths 5th Battalion in its western position above
and 8th Regiments left only the 3d the road to Kujang-dong, he pivoted
Regiment on the original front. The the remainder of the regiment on Somin-
3d, too, soon vacated its left flank posi- dong, a village near the center of his
tion and sought safety by sliding west- sector, so as to form a horseshoe-shaped
ward into the IX Corps sector behind arc running from his existing left flank
the positions of the 38th Infantry.26 eastward to Somin-dong, then south-
Thus, near noon of the 26th, the east along the high ground rising west
ROK II Corps front folded. General of the road to Tokchon. Peploes forces
Yu attempted through the afternoon completed this shift by 1800, thus se-
and evening to establish a new line be- curing the regimental supply route and
tween Tokchon and Yongdong-ni but refusing the Eighth Armys new right
was defeated by broken communica- flank.28
tions, the confusion of the withdrawals, Peploes adjustment, of course, pro-
and continued enemy pressure. By dark tected the flank only at the immediate
the Chinese who had come through the front. As reports of the ROK II Corps
center of the corps front fully con- failure reached army headquarters,
trolled the Tokchon area. The smaller General Walker moved against the pos-
group that had come in from the north- sibility of deeper incursions from the
east had seized Yongdong-ni and northeast.
moved south another four miles to the From Tokchon and Maengsan, two
village of Maengsan. Yu planned next roads entering the army rear were open
to defend Pukchang-ni, twelve miles to the Chinese, one leading west from
south of Tokchon, at the junction of Tokchon to Kunu-ri, the other run-
ning deeper through Pukchang-ni to
25 EighthArmy WD, G3 SS Rpt, 26 Nov 50; Eighth Sunchon. To block the deeper route,
Army G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50; Eighth Army POR 410, 26 Walker relieved the 1st Cavalry Divi-
Nov 50; IX Corps PIR 61, 26 Nov 50; IX Corps G2
Spot Rpt 2982, 252255 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot
Rpt 1692, 260800 Nov 50. 27 Eighth Army G3 Jn1, 26 Nov 50; Eighth Army G3
26 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Briefing for CG, 26 Nov SS Rpt, 27 Nov 50; IX Corps G2 Spot Rpt 3050,
50; IX Corps PIR 61, 26 Nov 50; IX Corps PIR 62, 261505 Nov 50.
an. 2, 27 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50. 28 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0091
sion from protecting supply installa- chopped off by a deep Chinese pene-
tions in the Kunu-ri and Sukchon areas tration farther east. Milburn therefore
(substituting the 187th Airborne Regi- ordered General Churchs attack to a
mental Combat Team and Philippine halt. Church meanwhile committed his
10th Battalion Combat Team for that 5th Regimental Combat Team to the
mission) and ordered it into position at right of his two regiments on Route 1
Sunchon and along the road to the east. in a gap between his division and the
Division commander Maj. Gen. Ho- ROK 1st Division, created and widened
bart R. Gay scheduled the move to be- as they had moved forward on diver-
gin on the 27th.29 gent axes. This move protected against
To deny the Tokchon-Kunu-ri road, an enemy strike from the Taechon
Walker instructed General Coulter to area, where General Paiks forces had
send the IX Corps reserve, the Turkish spent a difficult day beating off several
brigade, from Kunu-ri eastward over strong Chinese attacks.31
that road and to clear Tokchon. Once In less that twenty-four hours, Chi-
Tokchon was retaken, Coulter was to nese attacks thus had achieved effects
place the Turks in defense of the town both wide and deep. The Eighth
and tie their positions to those of the Armys advance had been brought to a
2d Division to the northwest. Coulter full halt; the ROK II Corps had been
moved one battalion of Turks to Wa- knocked completely out of position and
won, about ten miles east to Kunu-ri, almost completely out of action; and
before midnight and planned to assem- along most of the army line, command-
ble another battalion there by daylight. ers had been obliged to redeploy forces
At that time the Turks were to start for in an attempt to prevent further Chi-
Tokchon. Since employing the Turkish nese gains. By the night of the 26th,
brigade would leave Coulter with few however, no one at Eighth Army head-
uncommitted troops, Walker also or- quarters had concluded that the Chi-
dered the British 27th Brigade trans- nese had opened a major offensive.
ferred to Coulter from the I Corps and There was concern over the collapse of
moved to Kunu-ri.30 the ROK II Corps and the possibility
While Walker was able to draw troops that the Chinese might exploit the
from the quieter I Corps sector, Gen- South Korean withdrawals. The intelli-
eral Milburn was by no means free of gence staff raised the estimate of Chi-
the threat posed by the Chinese attacks. nese strength opposite the Eighth Army
Although the 24th Division far out on from 54,000 to 101,000. But the predic-
Route 1 appeared to have an open road tion of the enemys most likely course
to the Yalu ahead of it, any advance of action continued to be that the Chi-
would perch it on a limb that could be nese would conduct an active defense
in depth along present line employing
strong local counterattack.32 In Tokyo,
29 Rad, GX 30017 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 13; Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, the
1st Cav Div et al., 26 Nov 50; Eighth Army POR 412,
26 Nov 50; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, 26 Nov 50; Eighth
Army G3 Jnl, 27 Nov 50.
30 Rad, GX 30019 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG; 31 24th Div WD, 26 Nov 50; 1 Corps POR 22.5, 26
IX Corps. 26 Nov 50; Rad. GX 30022, CG Eighth Nov 50.
Army to CG; I Corps et al., 26 Nov 50. 32 Eighth Army PIR 137, 26 Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0092
33 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 274. 36 I Corps PIR 73, 27 Nov 50; I Corps PORs 227
34 USAFFE Intel Dig, vol. 1, no. 4, 1-15 Feb 53. and 228, 27 Nov 50.
35 Ibid.; 24th Div WD, 27 Nov 50. 37 Ibid.; 24th Div WD, 27 Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0093
38 25th Div PIR 131, 27 Nov 50; 25th Div PORs 67 40 Ibid.; 25th Div PORs 67 and 69, 27 Nov 50; 27th
and 68, 27 Nov 50; 35th Inf Hist Rpt, Nar, Nov 50. Inf Hist Nar, Nov 50.
39 25th Div WD, Nov 50; 25th Div PIR 131, 27 Nov 41 25th Div WD, 27 Nov 50; 25th Div OI 22, 27 Nov
50. 50.
KWP-EBB-0094
on the flanks had completed their with- mainder of the day, Freeman worked
drawals, and Colonel Michaelis had to reestablish his regiment in approxi-
taken his 27th Infantry to its assigned mately the same position it had held
sector. Having reached the Ipsok line, the previous evening.44
Kean once more had his left flank cov- An hour before midnight on the
ered by the ROK 1st Division, and his 26th, another strong force of Chinese
forces were free, for the moment at attacked the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry,
least, of the punishing assaults of the near the center of the regimental line
39th Army.42 on the west side of the Chongchon.
On the east wing of the main attack, Supported by fire from mortars, 3.5-
the 40th Army struck at several points inch rocket launchers, and recoilless
along the 2d Division front. Shortly af- rifles, the Chinese loosened the 2d Bat-
ter dark on the 26th, Chinese forces talion from its position and pushed it
came off Chinamans Hat in a two- against the west bank of the river. In
pronged assault on the 23d Infantrys disarray, and at the expense of some
position just east of the Chongchon. weapons and equipment, the battalion
One prong penetrated the northeast- forded the river and entered the 23d
ern corner of Colonel Freemans line Infantrys area about the time Freeman
and reached the regimental command was making his first attempt to regain
post, forcing Freeman and his staff back his command post site. As the battalion
to the 1st Battalion command post a crossed, Colonel Sloane, the regimen-
quarter-mile south. Freeman counter- tal commander, called down artillery
attacked, using Company F, in regi- fire on the area his men had vacated.
mental reserve, and the headquarters The Chinese neither followed the bat-
companies of the regiment and of both talion across the Chongchon nor
forward battalions. He regained the turned their attack against any other of
command post area but was driven out Sloanes units.45
again almost immediately by fire from After crossing the river, the men of
the surrounding high ground.43 the 2d Battalion regained some order
Electing to await first light before at- and reassembled by midafternoon near
tacking again, Freeman pulled all his Kujang-dong. Though the battalion was
forces south to positions around the 1st by no means primed for further action,
Battalion command post. At dawn the Colonel Sloane was obliged to recom-
1st and 2d Battalions returned to the mit it to help protect his left flank,
former regimental headquarters area, which had been made more susceptible
found that the Chinese had withdrawn, to enemy attack by the 25th Divisions
and recovered most of the headquar- withdrawal to Ipsok. By evening of the
ters equipment intact. Through the re- 27th the 2d Battalion again was on the
west side of the Chongchon, this time
at the extreme left of the regimental As Chinese appeared behind the lines
line.46 and as companies were penetrated or
While Sloane and Freeman were able pushed back, Peploe dispatched what-
to concentrate on well-defined enemy ever uncommitted force was available
attacks, Colonel Peploe to their right at a given moment to clear the rear area
became embroiled in a melee in which or plug a gap at the front. Battalions
the Chinese hit the 38th Infantry from gradually lost identity as lettered com-
several directions. The battle developed panies became intermingled. Peploe
in a west-to-east pattern around the used the ROK 3d Regiment for extra
38ths arch of position at Somin-dong, help. Instructions down the chain of
starting after dark on the 26th when command from army had given him
Company C moved west to restore the control of the South Korean unit after
former Company G position at the regi- it had sideslipped westward out of the
mental left. The company had gone ROK II Corps sector. Assisted by the
only part way when it was surrounded 2d Reconnaissance Company, which
and split by Chinese coming from the halted most of the withdrawing South
northwest. Some of the Chinese passed Koreans by blocking the Kujang-dong
by the encircled company, moved east road not far behind the 38ths lines,
between the front and the Kujang-dong Peploe assembled the bulk of the regi-
road, and attacked Companies F and ment and inserted it piecemeal in his
L, still holding the regiments central arc of defenses.49
positions, from the rear. At the same Notwithstanding these additional
time, the remainder of the 3d Battal- troops, Peploe lost ground on both the
ion to the southeast came under intense north and east, and in the afternoon of
and accurate small arms fire from the the 27th he ordered a withdrawal into
east.47 the southwestern portion of the regi-
This action opened a series of con- mental sector. Executing a covered
fused engagements lasting the night withdrawal, the 38th and ROK 3d Regi-
and the daylight hours of the 27th. ments at dusk occupied a perimeter two
Units of the 40th Army launched hard miles in diameter centered midway be-
assaults on the 38th Infantry from the tween Kujang-dong and Somin-dong.
north while forces of the 38th Army The new position allowed Peploes men
came out of the ROK II Corps sector still to cover the Kujang-dong road, and
in strong strikes from the east. Both the withdrawal gave them a respite
attack groups, whose total strength was from attack.50
estimated as high as two divisions, tried, General Keiser meanwhile decided
with some success, to work troops in that the 2d Division could improve its
behind Peploes lines.48 chances of stopping the Chinese by
withdrawing into a shorter and tighter
46Ibid
47 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26 Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, 49 EighthArmyPOR412, 26 Nov50; IX CorpsG3
Nov 50. SpotRpt 1757,i6 Nov50; 2d DivPOR342, 27 Nov
48 IX Corps PIR 62, 27 Nov 50; IX Corps G2 Spot 50: 2d Div G3 Jnl. 26 Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt,
Rpts 3108 and 3172, 27 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Nov50.
Rpt 1830, 27 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl, 26-27 Nov 50; 50 38th Inf ComdRpt, Nov50; Sit Overlaywith2d
38th Inf. Comd Rpt, Nov 50. DivPOR342, 27 Nov50.
KWP-EBB-0096
55 Ibid.
56 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, 27 Nov 50; Rad, GX 57 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 27 Nov 50; IX Corps WD, 27
30039 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., NW 50; Rad, IXACT-396, CG IX Corps to Sn Adv
27 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30038 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 1st TAFC, 27 Nov 50; Rad, IXACT-390, CG; IX Corps
to CG 1st TAFC, 27 Nov 50.
to CG 1st Cav Div, 27 Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl.
21-30 Nov 50: 7th Cav Regt Hist Rpt. Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0098
the 25th Division. Situated at the inter- bling his regiment near the village of
section of roads serving the flank units Yongbyon east: of the Kuryong.58
of the two divisions, Yongsan-dong was The 39th Army also sent forces down
a choice objective. Its seizure not only the east side of the Kuryong against
would cut both routes but also would Task Force Wilson. By dawn Wilson
give the Chinese access to good roads had withdrawn from contact to a posi-
leading to Chongchon River crossings tion immediately northeast of the 35th
some fifteen miles to the south and Infantrys new location. General Kean
southeast near Anju and Kunu-r-i. meanwhile moved the 27th Infantry to
The 66th Army enjoyed rapid success positions in line with and to the right
against the reduced numbers of the of Wilsons force.59
ROK 11th and 15th Regiments. Attack- The total result of the Chinese at-
ing east and south, the army occupied tacks against the I Corps through the
Yongsan-dong and, before easing its at- night of the 27th was a wedge driven
tack near dawn, drove the South Ko- about five miles between the Taeryong
reans one to two miles below the village. and the Kuryong. Any deepening of
The ROK ground loss, as on the day the wedge portended the isolation of
before, uncovered the left flank of the General Milburns forces west of the
25th Division. The flank was exposed Taeryong and the envelopment of
at the same time that the 39th Army those behind the Kuryong.
pushed a strong attack down the west In the IX Corps sector, the 40th and
side of the Kuryong against the 35th 38th Armies repeated the pattern of their
Infantry. previous attacks by launching several
In response to both threats, General regimental assaults against the 2d Divi-
Kean ordered Col. Henry G. Fisher, sion during the night and in the first
commander of the 35th Infantry, to daylight hours of the 28th. West of the
pull his regiment four miles southeast Chongchon, two Chinese regiments
behind the Kuryong. This move would concentrated on the 2d Engineer Com-
face the 35th to the northwest, thus bat Battalion and 1st Battalion of the
would refuse the divisions left flank, 9th Infantry. Both battalions withdrew
and since the new line crossed the road across the Chongchon. East of the
leading southeast from Yongsan-dong, river, three enemy regiments took
would obstruct any Chinese attempt on turns hitting the 38th Infantry from
Kunu-ri. After the Chinese assaults the north and east, gradually forcing
against the 35th subsided around day- Colonel Peploes forces toward Kujang-
light, the regiment started south, battal- dong. As a total effect, the pressure
ions in column, over a route leading
through Yongsan-dong. Unaware that
the Chinese had taken the village, the 58 I Corps PORs 230 and 231, 28 Nov 50; I Corps
PIR 74, 28 Nov 50; I Corps Intel Sum 222, 28 Nov
column was surprised by enemy fire. 50; 25th Div POR 70, 28 Nov 50; 35th Inf Hist Rpt,
Casualties were not heavy, but a large Nar, Nov 50; 1st Bn, 35th Inf, WD, 28 Nov 50; 2d Bn,
number of vehicles was lost as the 35th Inf. WD, 27-28 Nov 50: 3d Bn. 35th Inf, Nar of
Opns, Nov 50.
battalions fought through, and Colo- 5925th Div POR 70, 28 Nov 50; 27th Inf S3 Jnl,
nel Fisher spent several hours reassem- 27-28 Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0099
THE
THE BATTLE
BATTLE OF THE
OF CH'ONGCH'ON
THE CHONGCHON 81
hind the 2d Battalion,
Battalion, 9th 9th Infantry,
Infantry, at out at the
the time Yasici
Yasici ordered
ordered the the with-
2330.
2330. Sinnim-ni.6868
drawal to Sinnim-ni.
Keiser
Keiser planned
planned to complete
complete his de- Not long
Not long after midnight, 38th
after midnight, 38th Army
Army
ployment
ployment between
between PugwonPugwon and and Wawon forces
forces reached Sinnim-ni and
reached Sinnim-ni and reopened
reopened
after daylight on
after daylight on thethe 29th, but events
29th, but events their
their assaults against
against the Turks. Hence,
Turks. Hence,
dictated
dictated otherwise.
otherwise. The 40th
The 40th Army
Army both Wawon and
both Wawon and Pugwon,
Pugwon, the anchor
the anchor
forces that had
forces that had trailed
trailed the the division's
divisions points
points of the line
of the line assigned
assigned to to the
the 2d2d
withdrawal
withdrawal beganbegan pushing
pushing the the 2d Bat-
Bat- Division,
Division, werewere gone.
gone. General
General Keiser's
Keisers
talion, 9th Infantry,
talion, 9th Infantry, behindbehind Pugwon
Pugwon alternative would be
alternative to organize
be to organize de- de-
around midnight. At
around midnight. At the
the opposite
opposite end end fenses closer
fenses closer to Kunu-ri,
Kunu-ri, how close close de-
of the division
of the line, the
division line, the Turkish
Turkish bri- bri- pending
pending on the the outcome
outcome of of the continu-
continu-
gade completed
completed a three-mile three-mile with-
with- ing attacks
ing attacks on on both
both flanks.
flanks.
drawal
drawal to the the village of of Sinnim-ni
Sinnim-ni justjust Southeast of
Southeast of the Turks,
Turks, General
General Gay
before midnight following
before midnight following a series series of of moved none none of of his cavalrymen
cavalrymen forward
forward
engagements
engagements with forces
with forces of of the
the 38th
38th the ROK
to the ROK 6th Divisions
Division's position
position three
three
Wawon. 67
Army at Wawon.67 miles below
miles below Pukch'ang-ni.
Pukchang-ni. Although
Although
Though General
Though General Yasici had held held his Gay had
Gay had been instructed to do so on
been instructed on
ground against the
ground against the Chinese,
Chinese, he chose chose the 28th,
the 28th, he elected
elected to wait until the
to withdraw west westtotoSinnim-ni
Sinnim-ni atat dark
dark- 5th Cavalry,
5th Cavalry, then then marching
marching south south out out
a move thatthat did
did not
not conform
conform with or- or- of the Kunu-ri
of Kunu-ri area,area, completed
completed its its move
move
ders for
ders for a new lineline through Wawon. A
through Wawon. into the
into the divisions
division's sector.
sector.
lack of
of communications
communications explained explained this The 5th
The Cavalry had
5th Cavalry had started
started that that
second instance in which
second instance which TurkTurk tactics
tactics morning, moving
morning, moving south over aa road
south over road
were contrary
were contrary to instructions.
instructions. When
When from Kaech'on,
from Kaechon, miles east
five miles east of
General Coulter
General Coulter sent
sent the Turks
Turks toward
toward Kunu-ri.
Kunu-ri. Near Near the the village of Samso-ri,
of Samso-ri,
Tokch'on, the
Tokchon, the brigade
brigade had had direct
direct con-
con- seven miles below
seven below Kaech'on,
Kaechon, about about aa
tact with Coulters
Coulter's headquarters
headquarters by ra- ra- hundred Chinese
hundred Chinese in the bordering
bordering high high
dio and wire. But But similar connections
similar connections ground opened
ground opened small small arms
arms and and ma- ma-
not exist
did not between Keisers
exist between Keiser's head-
head- chine
chine gungun fire
fire on the intelligence
intelligence and and
quarters and the
quarters the Turks
Turks when when thethe latter
latter reconnaissance platoon
reconnaissance leading the
platoon leading the
were attached
were attached to the 2d Division. Division. Nei- regiment. Only
regiment. Only the the platoon
platoon sergeant
sergeant
ther Yasici
ther Yasici nor
nor his advisers
advisers knew
knew of of the
the and three
and three menmen escaped.
escaped. The The 2d 2d Bat-
Bat-
brigade's attachment
brigades attachment to the the 2d Division
Division talion, following
talion, following the the platoon,
platoon, deployed
deployed
until very late
until late on the the 28th,
28th, and their
and their in the
the high
high ground
ground on on both
both sides
sides ofof the
the
and radio contacts
wire and radio contacts with corps were
corps road
road and attacked south
attacked south to clear
clear the
enemy
enemy blockblock but encountered an
but encountered an even
even
67At least
67 least one
one ofof the Wawon engagements
the Wawon engagements proved proved larger force and failed to advance. Re-
larger force and failed to advance. Re-
have been
to have been aa case
case of of mistaken
mistaken identity when 125
identity when 125 forming on the road,
forming road, the
the cavalrymen
cavalrymen
"prisoners" sentsent toto the
the rear
rear by
bythe
theTurks
Turks turned
turned out
bypassed enemy roadblock
prisoners
to be
to be members
members of of the ROK 6th
the ROK 6th and
and 7th
7th Divisions.
Divisions. The
out
The
bypassed the enemy roadblock and and pro-
pro-
South Koreans
South Koreans apparently
apparently movedmoved west west after
after being
being ceeded
ceeded toward
toward Sunch'on. Because of
Sunchon. Because of
squeezed out
squeezed out ofof Tokch'on
Tokchon and blunderedblundered into into the
the this entanglement
entanglement at at Samso-ri, the regi-
Samso-ri, the regi-
Turks either
Turks either ahead
ahead of of or
or amidst
amidst thethe Chinese
Chinese assaults
assaults
on the brigade.
on brigade. SeeSee IXIX Corps
Corps G2 Spot Spot Rpts
Rpts 3252,
3252, 28
Nov 50,50, and
and 3301,
3301, 29 Nov 50; 2d Div G3 Jnl,
50; 2d Jnl, 28 Nov
Nov
50; 2d Div
50; Div G2
G2 Jnl,
Jnl, Entry
Entry J-1447,
J-1447, 28
28 Nov 50; 50; Mono,
Mono,
"Turkish U.N.
Turkish U.N. Brigade
Brigade Advisory
Advisory Group,
Group, 2020 Novem-
Novem- 68"Turkish
68 "Turkish U.N.
U.N. Brigade
Brigade Advisory
Advisory Group, 20 Nov-
Group, 20 Nov-
ber 1950-13 December
ber 1950-13 December 1950, 1950," copy
copy inin CMH.
CMH. 13 Dee
Dec 50.
50."
KWP-EBB-0102
ment was still assembling near Sunchon toward the ROK 6th Divisions position
long after dark on the 28th.69 below town. In the hills five miles south-
As a result of Gays decision to wait east of Pukchang-ni they saw what they
for the 5th, the 7th Cavalry, ear- believed to be two thousand enemy
marked to join the South Koreans be- cavalrymen, and they reported another
low Pukchang-ni, stood fast at enemy force to be moving north from
Kujong-ni, seven miles below the ROK Songchon toward the 7th Cavalry at
position. The regiment was now to Kujong-ni. Although a sortie by Gen-
move forward on the 29th. The 5th eral Gays 16th Reconnaissance Com-
Cavalry meanwhile was to organize de- pany revealed no large force in the
fenses north of Sunchon, and the 8th Songchon area, the reconnaissance
Cavalry was to move from Sinchang-ni troops did discover and kill ten enemy
to Songchon and block the areas main soldiers in the town.72
lateral road, which passed through Against this growing threat of a deep
Songchon and reached Pyongyang.70 envelopment, Walker ordered General
Gays delay in reinforcing the ROK Milburn to transfer all but one regi-
6th Division below Pukchang-ni, the ment of the 24th Division to the IX
Turk withdrawal from Wawon, and the Corps and to dispatch it to Sunchon as
loss of Pugwon in the Chongchon val- soon as all I Corps forces reached the
ley all worked against the rather high bridgehead line to which they were then
hopes General Walker held for the line withdrawing. To compensate this re-
he had delineated. While calling for the duction of Milburns forces, Walker
withdrawal to that line, he also had in- alerted the British 29th Brigade for a
structed his forces to prepare for the northward move to Anju and attach-
Eighth Army resumption of offensive ment to the I Corps.73
at early date.71 With a bridgehead over The Turkish brigades engagements
the Chongchon and with all main with 38th Army forces at Wawon made
roads blocked, he hoped that he could it clear that the northern wing of the
turn back the Chinese and then revital- XIII Army Groups enveloping force was
ize his own march to the border. headed for Kunu-ri. From all the evi-
Any such achievement, even of turn- dence reaching the army G-2 on the
ing back the Chinese, began to appear 28th, Colonel Tarkenton judged that
doubtful long before the IX Corps the Chinese would sustain their pres-
problems arose. By midday Walker had sure against Kunu-ri and would attempt
ample evidence of a strong Chinese to envelop the Eighth Army via the
push toward Sunchon. Aerial observ- Sunchon road. He placed in a maybe
ers saw at least four enemy regiments
pass southward through Pukchang-ni
72 Eighth Army PIR 139, 28 Nov 50; Eighth Army
G3 Jnl, 28 Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 28 Nov 50.
73 Rad, GX 3005 I KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG
69 5th Cav WD, 28 Nov 50; 5th Cav S2-S3 Jnl, 28 IX Corps et al., 28 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30053 KGOO,
Nov 50. CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 28 Nov 50;
70 IX Corps G3 Spot Rpts 1962 and 1971, 28 Nov Rad, GX 30061 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CO 29th
50; 1st Cav Div POR 378, 28 Nov 50; 7th Cav Hist Brit Brig, 28 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30068 KGOO, CG
Rpt, Nov 50; 8th Cav G3 Jnl, 28 Nov 50. Eighth Army to CG I Corps et at., 28 Nov 50; Rad,
71 Rad,GX 3005 1 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG GX 30068 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et
IX Corps et al., 28 Nov 50. al., 28 Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0103
category a deep enemy strike at Pyong- the 38th Army had turned west to ex-
yang through Songchon. The possibil- ploit the collapse of the ROK II Corps,
ity of these maneuvers was increased Li had ordered the entire army to oc-
by the findings of observers flying over cupy the Samso-ri area and cut off
enemy territory above Tokchon. In UNC forces withdrawing via roads
that area they sighted a continuous leading south out of Kunu-ri. Colonel
train of enemy troops moving south Peploes quick action in turning the
in small groups through gullies, down 38th Infantry to refuse the army flank
ridgelines, and over all roads and and General Walkers employment of
trails.74 The commander of the XIII the Turkish brigade at Wawon appar-
Army Group obviously knew the maxims ently had pulled most of the 38th away.
of offensive operations. Having gained On the 28th, in any event, just two regi-
an advantage over Walker by turning ments of the 113th Division remained
the Eighth Armys east flank, he now under orders to block the roads below
was hurriedly reinforcing his effort in Kunu-ri. But two regiments in a well-
the zone where so far he had achieved set ambuscade could raise havoc with
the greatest success. any withdrawing Eighth Army column,
Tarkentons conclusions were almost and their most likely victim, since it
exactly what the enemy group com- probably would move south from
mander had in mind. Li indeed was Kunu-ri in any future withdrawal, was
shifting the emphasis of his attack from the 2d Division.76
a penetration of the Eighth Army line General Walker, understandably, was
in the Chongchon valley to the exploi- not particularly concerned at the mo-
tation of his gains in the former ROK ment over one roadblock that had trou-
II Corps sector. His 42d Army, in greater bled one regiment. As the situation
strength, was swinging southwest to- stood late on the 28th, the chances that
ward Sunchon, and the bulk of his 38th the Chinese pushing in from the east
Army was now headed for Kunu-ri, could capture Kunu-ri and Sunchon
from the east and northeast.75 were good. Walkers problem and
The 5th Cavalrys engagement with larger interest therefore was to prevent
the roadblock at Samso-ri introduced the Chinese from isolating the bulk of
an important feature of Lis plans. The the Eighth Army by cutting westward
cavalrymen estimated the force they across its rear. The obvious answer was
had encountered at anywhere from a a withdrawal, one deep enough to take
battalion to a regiment, but even the the Eighth Army below the Chinese
top estimate was only half what the Chi- thrusts from the east.
nese intended to emplace there. When
CHAPTER V
MAP 5
KWP-EBB-0106
86
EBB AND FLOW
Division five miles beyond Chongjin, Hyesanjin. General Chois 26th Regi-
the industrial center and port sixty-five ment was in Tanchon, near the coast
miles below the USSR border. Having due south of Hapsu, en route to the
met only desultory resistance from the 7th Division zone as a substitute for
North Korean IV Corps, General Song forces of the 7th being shifted to the
intended next to veer inland to Hoer- Changjin Reservoir area to accommo-
yong, reported to be a mobilization cen- date the 1st Marine Divisions advance
ter for new North Korean units, on the on Mupyong-ni.
Manchurian border forty-five miles due In the 7th Divisions zone, the 17th
north. Infantry occupied Hyesanjin on the
Brig. Gen. Choi Suk had sent Yalu and the area ten miles southwest.
the two forward regiments of his 3d The bulk of the 32d Infantry held the
Division out of Hapsu at right angles to Kapsan-Samsu region below the 17th.
each other. Against light, sporadic Division commander Maj. Gen. David
North Korean resistance, the 23d Regi- G. Barr was in the process of moving a
ment had moved six miles north of combat team (the bulk of the 31st
Hapsu toward the border town of Infantry; the 1st Battalion, 32d Infan-
Musan, and the 22d Regiment had try; all but one battery of the 57th Field
traveled fifteen miles west toward Artillery Battalion; and Battery D, 15th
KWP-EBB-0107
Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weap- The lower half of the long supply
ons Battalion) into his newly added road between Hungnam and the
zone at the Changjin Reservoir. The Changjin Reservoir and a stretch of
1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, commanded narrow-gage railway lay in the area as-
by Lt. Col. Don C. Faith, Jr., already signed to the 3d Division. The north-
had reached the east side of the reser- ern half of the road and the region
voir. With Colonel Faiths battalion was beyond rested in the zone of the 1st
a Marine Corps tactical air control party Marine Division. The 1st Marine Regi-
commanded by Capt. Edward P. Stam- ment, commanded by Col. Lewis B.
ford. Col. Allan D. MacLean, com- Puller, held three key points along the
mander of the 31st Infantry and now supply road. Farthest south, the 1st
commanding the combat team, was still Battalion occupied Chinhung-ni,
moving the bulk of his regiment and Marine railhead and starting point
the artillery units south from var-
ious locations along the Pukchong-
reservoir, General Barr had dispatched his nearest
Hyesanjin road en route via Hamhung unit, the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, then at Hamhung
to the new zone.4 en route to join its parent unit in the Kapsan-Samsu
area. The 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry, stayed on the
4 Prompted by a X Corps warning order on 24 No- Pukchong-Hyesanjin road to help protect the open
vember to relieve Marine forces on the east side of the west side of the divisions supply road.
KWP-EBB-0108
of the roads twisting ten-mile climb Changjin Reservoir, roads from the
through Funchilin Pass to Kot'o-ri, west, north, and southeast met just out-
where Colonel Puller had established side Yudam-ni. Because enemy forces
regimental headquarters. The 2d Bat- had not defended this rare road junc-
talion manned a perimeter around tion, the Marine division G-2, Col.
Kot'o-ri and a small airstrip above the Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr., believed the
village. The 3d Battalion, less Com- 5th Marines would encounter only weak
pany G still to the south awaiting trans- opposition when they started toward
portation, was in Hagaru-ri, eleven Mup'yong-ni. The absence of enemy
miles north of Kot'o-ri at the lower end patrolling and the failure of ground
of the reservoir. The battalion and a and aerial reconnaissance to reveal any
variety of service and headquarters large enemy concentrations nearby
troops were developing a defense of supported his judgment. Contradicting
the division command post, supply it were reports from civilians of sizable
dumps, hospital facilities, and airstrip enemy concentrations around Yudam-
in the Hagaru-ri area. ni, but these reports were considered
North of Hagaru-ri, the 5th and 7th misinterpretations of North Korean
Marines had extended the divisions Army remnants moving; away from and
holdings up both sides of the reservoir. around the Yudam-ni area.5
The bulk of the 7th Marines, com- The X Corps G-2, Col. James H. Polk,
manded by Col. Homer L. Litzenberg, expected the enemy to resist the attack,
Jr., held Yudam-ni, fourteen miles to especially when the Eighth Army and
the northwest, and the 5th Marines, un- the marines closed on Huich'on and
der Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray, had Mupyong-ni. But Polks estimate of ini-
gone ten miles north over a road fol- tial opposition was optimistic. Besides
lowing the east bank of the reservoir. remnants of the North Korean 2d and
Orders for the Mup'yong-ni attack had 5th Divisions withdrawing northward off
halted the 5th at this point. Consider- to the west of Yudam-ni, Polk believed
ing Colonel Murrays regiment fresher just two Chinese divisions, the 89th and
than the 7th, division commander Maj. 124th, were anywhere near the town.
Gen. Oliver P. Smith had designated The 126th Division as well as the 124th,
the 5th to open the advance to the west. both of the 42d Army, previously had
Murrays forces consequently had be- been identified in the reservoir area.
gun to shift west to Yudam-ni, the start- But the 126th had sideslipped south-
ing point of the attack. The 2d Battal- westward at least as far as Sach'ang-ni,
ion was in Yudam-ni, having left the as evidenced by a 23 November skir-
area east of the reservoir upon the ar- mish between troops of the 126th and
rival of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry. the ROK 26th Regiment, then holding
The remainder of Murrays regiment the town.
remained in place awaiting relief by the
balance of Colonel MacLeans combat
team.
5 This section based on X Corps WD, Sum, Nov 50;
X Corps Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-10 Dec 50; 1st Marine
The Advance Toward Mup'jong-ni Div Opn O 24-50, 26 Nov 50; 7th Div Opn O 26, 26
Nov 50; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir
Near the southwest corner of the Campaign.
KWP-EBB-0109
Polk was not sure where the 124th did incoming reports of strong attacks
was located but believed that the divi- against the Eighth Army.
sion likely had moved into defenses Smith ordered the 5th Marines to
north of the reservoir. The 89th Divi- strike first for the village of Yongnim-
sion, whose army affiliation Polk had dong, twenty-seven miles west of
not yet determined, had briefly op- Yudam-ni, where the Marines route of
posed the marines at Hagaru-ri on 23 advance joined a road leading south-
November. He no longer knew the lo- west along the upper reaches of the
cation of the 89th but considered the Ch'ongchon River to Huichon. The
division a probable opponent in the 7th Marines, when passed through,
Mup'yong-ni venture. While allowing were to protect the division supply road
that the 124th and 89th Divisions could between Yudam-ni and Sinhung-ni, a
be reinforced, Polk proposed with- village located in the Toktong Pass mid-
drawal, delaying action, and limited at- way between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri.
tacks as the extent of enemy capabilities. Smith appointed the 1st Marines, in and
He offered no order of probability, but below Hagaru-ri, as division reserve.
he, as well as Colonel Holcomb of the His reconnaissance company, then pull-
Marine division, seemed to consider an ing west flank security duty off the left
enemy withdrawal to be the most likely rear of the division, was to reconnoiter
event. north of Yudam-ni; the 41st Indepen-
General Smith, on the other hand, dent Commando, Royal Marines, only
believed his marines would meet Chi- recently attached to the division, was to
nese in strength west of Yudam-ni, a come forward from Hungnam to pro-
belief that had prompted his decision tect the marines left flank by recosnnoi-
to pass the fresher 5th Regiment tering southwest of Yudam-ni.6
through the 7th in the opening attack. In planning the advance, Smith had
Smiths more cautious attitude had been assumed the full relief of the 5th Ma-
apparent for some time. He had not rines east of the reservoir by noon of
shared the mid-November optimism for the 26th. He apparently expected the
an early UNC victory, and from the entire 7th Division combat team to ar-
start of his divisions advance toward rive by that hour; but General Barr had
the Changjin Reservoir he had doubted called for the relief of the marines by a
the wisdom of stringing forces over a minimum of one infantry battalion, an
long, poor, and unprotected mountain
road.
Supporting Smiths judgment of
probable resistance, three Chinese cap-
6 Earlier, on the night of 12-13 September 1950, the
tured by the 7th Marines on the 26th British company had participated in a landing opera-
asserted that the 58th, 59th, and 60th tion at Kunsan on the west coast of South Korea as
Divisions of the 20th Army were in the part of an attempt to distract North Korean attention
from the coming landing at Inch'on. The unit had
Yudam-ni area and would move south then returned to Japan and been attached to Naval
and southeast from Yudam-ni to cut Forces, Far East, until 20 November when, at its own
the marines supply road. This infor- request to serve with American marines, it returned
to Korea and was attached to the 1st Marine Division.
mation, however, had no effect on plans See Heinl, Victory at High Tide, p. 79, and Montross
for the Mupyong-ni attack. Neither and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, p. 140.
KWP-EBB-0110
order satisfied by the arrival of the 1st grees, Fahrenheit, and a wind off the
Battalion, 32d Infantry. In any event, frozen reservoir intensified the cold, the
the remainder of Colonel MacLeans marines had their attack under way by
forces did not reach the new zone by 0815 on the 27th. (Map 6) On the ridge
noon on the 26th, nor by 0800 on the northwest of the axis road, Company
27th, the scheduled hour of the Ma- H, 7th Marines, met no opposition and
rine advance. The full 5th Marines con- seized the terminal height, Hill 1403,
sequently did not reach Yudam-ni on by midmorning. Below the road, Com-
the 26th, and the plan of attack had to pany G, 7th Marines, moved unop-
be changed. Since Colonel Murray was posed down the southwest ridge and
with his forces east of the reservoir, within thirty minutes occupied the next
Colonel Litzenberg, commanding the commanding height, Hill 1426. In the
7th Marines, took charge of the open- middle, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,
ing effort. moved over the road in a column of
Forces available to Litzenberg in- companies, meeting nothing in the first
cluded the bulk of the 7th Marines and three-quarters of a mile except several
the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. The 7th undefended obstacles across the road.
held a perimeter rimming the valley in The easy march ended there. The
which Yudam-ni was located. The 1st forces both on the road and on the
Battalion and two companies of the 2d southwest ridge came under fire about
occupied high ground north of town the time the pilot of an observer plane
and the terminal heights of two ridges overhead reported Chinese across the
to the south and southeast overlooking entire Marine front. Help from the
the road to Hagaru-ri. The 3d Battal- ground and air supporting arms al-
ion held the terminal hills of a ridge to lowed the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, to
the southwest. Between the latter and move only another quarter mile before
an unoccupied ridge to the northwest intense enemy fire forced the battalion
ran the road to Mupyong-ni. The 2d to discontinue. A similar additional gain
Battalion, 5th Marines, was to attack was all Company G, 7th Marines, could
over this road from an assembly at the manage on the southwest ridge. All
edge of Yudam-ni. told, the days advance netted a mile.
Litzenberg instructed the 2d Battal-
ion, 5th Marines, to seize a pass ten
miles to the west in its opening attack.
The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was The IX Army Group Attacks
to make parallel advances along the
ridges on either side of the road, and The 124th Division, contrary to X
Litzenbergs 1st Battalion was to assume Corps and Marine estimates, was not in
the flank security roles originally as- the reservoir area. It had moved south-
signed to the reconnaissance company west into the Eighth Army sector with
and the 41st Commando, neither of its parent army, the 42d. But the 89th
which had reached Yudam-ni. Division was present, and the Chinese
After an uncomfortable night when captured on the 26th had truthfully
the temperature dropped to zero de- identified the 58th, 59th, and 60th Divi-
KWP-EBB-0111
MAP 6
KWP-EBB-0112
sions. These four divisions constituted route. By orders from X Corps head-
the 20th Army.7 quarters, which controlled all move-
Sung Shih-lun, the IX Army Group ment of convoys over the reservoir
commander, launched the 20th and road, the battalion for the time being
27th Armies in attacks on the night of was halted at Hamhung.
the 27th. From the north, the 27th Army Liu Fei, the 20th Army commander,
moved south on the west side of the committed all four of his divisions to
reservoir against Yudam-ni and down the southeastward attack. At Yudam-ni,
the eastern side to seize Hagaru-ri. The all but one regiment of the 89th Divi-
20th struck Yudam-ni from the west sion moved after dark on the 27th to-
and made ever-deepening southeast- ward the marines on the ridge north-
ward swings at the Marine positions and west of the road to Mup'yong-ni. The
supply road below Yudam-ni. 59th Division started a shallow swing be-
Nieh Feng-chin, commander of the low Yudam-ni to cut the fourteen-mile
27th Army, sent his 79th Division toward stretch of road between Yudam-ni and
Yudam-ni and his 80th Division to seize Hagaru-ri. Below the 59th, the 58th Di-
Hagaru-ri. The 80th first had to elimi- vision swung wider to attack Hagaru-ri
nate Colonel MacLeans combat team, and cut the road immediately below the
most of which had gone into position town. The 60th Division took a still
north of Hagaru-ri by dark on the 27th. deeper route through the mountains
(Map 7) The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, toward Kot'o-ri; and, in the deepest
sat astride the road ten miles north of move, the remaining regiment of the
Hagaru-ri. Four miles south, the 3d 89th Division started over a mountain
Battalion, 31st Infantry, and the 57th track leading south from Yudam-ni to
Field Artillery Battalion held positions Sachang-ni in the sector of the 3d
where the road made a hairpin turn Division.
around a narrow finger of the reser-
voir at the mouth of the P'ungnyuri Yudam-ni
River. MacLeans command post and
Colonel Murray had moved the re-
tank company were in Hudong-ni, a
mainder of the 5th Marines to Yudam-
village another four miles south. The
ni on the 27th as more of Colonel
2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, was still en
MacLeans combat team reached the
eastern side of the reservoir. Murrays
1st and 3d Battalions assembled in the
7 This section and the one following are based on
USAFFE Intel Dig No. 99, 16-31 Jan 53; Order of valley, creating a substantial reserve for
Battle Information, Chinese Communist Third Field the ten companies holding the heights
Army, GHQ, FEC, 1 Mar 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, 27 north, northwest, southwest, and south
Nov-10 Dec 50; X Corps WD, Sum, Nov 50; 7th Div
Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50; Mono, Chosin Reser- of town. This reserve, a fairly tight in-
voir, 1st Bn, 32d Inf, 24-30 Nov 50, 3d Hist Det, fantry line, and the support of forty-
copy in CMH; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Dolcater, eight artillery pieces and two regimen-
3d Infantry Division in Koreas; Captain Russell A.
Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington: Com- tal 4.2-inch mortar companies gave the
bat Forces Press, 1954), pp. 62-87; 7th Infantry Division marines a reasonably good defense.
in Korea (Atlanta: Ambert Love Enterprises, n.d.); More precariously situated were Com-
Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign;
MS, Lt. Col. C. P. Miller, Chosin Reservoir, Novem- panies C and F of the 7th Marines,
ber-December 1950, copy in CMH. which had outposted the supply road
KWP-EBB-0113
MAP 7
KWP-EBB-0114
MAP 8
KWP-EBB-0116
the Marine units that reinforcement or arms and mortar fire from Chinese on
replacement was essential if the 79th both sides of the road forced their
Division was to be held out of Yudam-ni. withdrawal. At the other end of the
The 59th Division meanwhile com- road segment, stiff opposition on both
pleted its short sweep to the southeast, sides of the road so slowed the 1st
slicing across the supply road between Battalion, 7th Marines, that dark had
Yudam-ni and the two Marine compa- fallen by the time it reached Company
nies outposting the road and through C. Lest the battalion be trapped in the
the two-milt gap between companies darkness, Colonel Litzenberg ordered
as well. Once across the road, the Chi- it back to Yudam-ni. Hence, only Com-
nese surrounded and assaulted both pany C was retrieved. Company Fs res-
Marine positions but failed to penetrate cue now rested on an order issued
and backed off at dawn. The marines, by General Smith late on the 28th that
still hemmed in and too burdened with the entire 7th Regiment attack south
casualties to attempt to fight their way from Yudam-ni to clear the road to
out of encirclement, could only tighten Hagaru-ri.
their perimeters and await rescue.
Colonels Litzenberg and Murray dis-
East of the Reservoir
patched a rescue force after daylight
on the 28th and meanwhile realigned On the IX Army Groups east flank
their units at Yudam-ni. The realign- the leading forces of the 80th Division
ment, interrupted only by harassing en- moved south toward Hagaru-ri shortly
emy fire, was complete by late evening. after dark on the 27th. Liu Yung, the
The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, an- division commander, sent some troops
chored the new line at Hill 1426 on the over the road along the east bank of
southwest ridge. The 2d Battalion, 5th the reservoir, the bulk through high
Marines, took position on the same ground farther east. The Chinese fol-
ridge, facing northwest. The 3d Battal- lowing the road were to attack the 1st
ion, 5th Marines, carried the line north- Battalion, 32d Infantry, frontally while
ward across the Yudam-ni valley and the others came westward off the high
eastward into the northern heights to ground against that battalion and
and including Hill 1282. Company B, against the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry,
5th Marines, took over the defense of four miles farther south. Those mov-
Hill 1240 while the remainder of the ing deeper also were to separate and
1st Battalion went into reserve. isolate Colonel MacLeans forces by es-
Efforts to rescue the two isolated tablishing roadblocks above and below
companies came from both ends of the the 3d Battalion.
fourteen-mile stretch of road. From Having heard from the marines that
Hagaru-ri, a company reinforced by three new Chinese divisions were in the
three tanks moved toward Company F reservoir area, Colonel Faith had placed
at Toktong Pass while the 1st Battalion, his 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, in a tight
7th Marines, struck south out of Yu- defense. At Faiths left, Company A
dam-ni toward Company C. The faced north. On the right, Companies
Hagaru-ri troops made only half the C and B held a line curving south to
distance to Toktong Pass before small face the high ground to the east. As
KWP-EBB-0117
Lius forces approached, however, Faith itzers; but after combining forces
was occupied with plans for starting the around the guns of Battery B, the in-
battalion north toward the border at fantrymen and artillerymen finally
dawn next day. Colonel MacLeans or- halted the Chinese and turned back fur-
der for the advance had reached Faith ther assaults until the Chinese withdrew
around 2100, and at 2200 he had as- at dawn. Afterward, the 3d Battalion
sembled his company commanders at and the artillery, harassed only by mor-
the battalion command post for instruc- tar fire, moved into a tight perimeter
tions. near the lower bank of the ice-covered
Chinese patrols brushed the battal- finger of the reservoir.
ion line while Faith was briefing his Early in the afternoon of the 28th,
officers. As company commanders General Almond flew by helicopter to
scrambled back to their units, an attack Colonel Faiths position. He awarded
hit Company A from the north while Faith and two other men the Silver Star
another from the high ground to the and just before leaving appraised the
east struck at the boundary between Chinese encountered as only remnants
Companies B and C. In assaults that fleeing north and announced that the
lasted the night, the Chinese dented X Corps attack would continue. But his
each company position, seized a knob words apparently were an attempt to
of ground at the boundary between B raise morale, not a true appraisal of
and C, and managed to move around the enemy. On the previous day he
Company A and force the company had visited Yudam-ni, where Marine
mortars out of position. Yet when the commanders informed him that they
Chinese lifted their attacks at dawn, had encountered strong Chinese forces
Faiths position was reasonably sound. at three points of the compass. On the
Through the day Faith reclaimed all 28th, before flying to Faiths position,
ground lost except the knob on the east, he had stopped at Hagaru-ri where
which the Chinese, though struck by General Smith brought him up to date
several combinations of air and ground on the Marine divisions situation, and
attacks, refused to yield. Faiths casual- he had visited Colonel MacLeans com-
ties through the night and day ap- mand post where the combat team
proached sixty. leader briefed him on conditions east
At the lower perimeter, the 3d Battal- of the reservoir. Almond must have
ion, 31st Infantry, and 57th Field Artil- been aware that the strong attacks on
lery Battalion came under attack near the marines and MacLeans men repre-
the same hour as Faiths forces. Compa- sented a southerly surge of fresh Chi-
nies I and K nearest the high ground to nese forces.
the east received the first assaults and When he stopped at Hagaru-ri on
were pressed southwest toward the his return flight to transfer from his
artillery. Those wounded in the close helicopter to an L-17 aircraft, Almond
fighting included the commanders of may have learned from the marines that
both the 3d Battalion and the artillery a Chinese division was marshaling in
battalion. The Chinese next forced the the high ground southwest and south
men of Battery A away from their how- of Hagaru-ri. As the L-17 carried him
KWP-EBB-0118
tions. High casualties in Companies K through the high ground to the north
and L, however, forced the two units to flank the Chinese.
to combine. While waiting for the maneuvering
To the north, the Chinese first struck force to destroy the roadblock, Faiths
the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, from troops on the road received fire from
the knob of high ground on the east, across the reservoir finger. MacLean,
then opened frontal assaults against convinced that the fire was coming
each of the rifle companies. Company from his own forces, immediately
B on the right lost some ground but started over the ice to stop the shooting.
regained it. Elsewhere, the battalions He was mistaken. Hit at least four times
heavy defensive fire beat back repeated as he crossed, he walked into the hands
Chinese rushes. By 0300 on the 29th, of the Chinese who had crept in along
however, Faiths forces had used most the bank of the far shore, apparently
of their ammunition. MacLean hence in preparation for an attack on the
ordered Faith to move south and join lower perimeter. Once Colonel Faith
the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry. Faith realized what had happened, he formed
was to take cargo off battalion trucks to a skirmish line and led it across the ice.
make room for the hundred wounded Faiths men killed at least sixty Chinese
he now had. and drove off others, but a thorough
As Faiths forces gained respite from search of the area uncovered no trace
assault, but not fire, they fell back to of Colonel MacLean.
assemble on the road. The Chinese did Faiths flanking force meanwhile
not pursue but increased their fire as closed in on the Chinese blocking the
the battalion broke contact. Starting road and scattered them into the hills
south at 0430 with a company stum- to the east. Faiths motor column thus
bling in the darkness over snow-covered was able to proceed, and the last of
high ground on either side as flank se- Faiths men reached the 3d Battalion,
curity for the troops and trucks on the 31st Infantry, by 1230.
road, the battalion covered three-quar- While Faith fought through to the
ters of the way without opposition. At lower perimeter, the bulk of the 31st
daylight, as the leading forces entered Tank Company and a composite com-
the upper half of the road segment pany of riflemen again attempted to
bending around the frozen finger of reach it from Hudong-ni. As on the
the reservoir, they took fire from Chi- previous day, the northward move was
nese located at the tight turn of the stopped, this time by two battalions of
road near the Pungnyuri River cross- Chinese. A stronger effort clearly was
ing. This was the roadblock MacLean required to break through to the iso-
had encountered the previous after- lated force. Now the senior able-bodied
noon. Faith halted the column directly officer present, Colonel Faith assumed
across the narrow expanse of ice from command of the two infantry battal-
the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, ordered ions and the artillery, designating the
machine guns and a recoilless rifle into consolidated units Task Force Faith.
position to return the fire, and dis- Air-dropped rations and ammunition
patched the bulk of two companies (but only forty rounds of artillery am-
KWP-EBB-0120
munition) reached the task force dur- boasts that the division would occupy
ing the afternoon, and Marine aircraft Hagaru-ri on the night of the 28th. The
orbited its position constantly, striking roadblock to the south was discovered
Chinese forces in the surrounding high during the afternoon of the 28th by a
ground with napalm, rockets, and ma- platoon of infantry and three tanks who
chine gun fire. But while fresh supplies were turned back by enemy fire when
and good air support helped, Faith now they attempted to patrol the road to
pinned his hopes of avoiding defeat on Kot'o-ri.
the arrival of the 2d Battalion, 31st Figuring the time it would take the
Infantry. He apparently was not aware Chinese to reach Hagaru-ri after dark,
that the 2d Battalion was held up for Carey predicted that the first assault
lack of transportation at Majon-dong, would come around 2130. On this and
more than thirty miles to the south, he Careys other findings Colonel Ridge
had not realized the extent of the Chi- based his plan of defense. Using his
nese roadblocks between him and the own battalion, which was still short
relief unit, nor had he learned that the Company G, and a hodgepodge of
Chinese attacks had spread during the other Marine and Army units, he fash-
previous night to Hagaru-ri. ioned a four-mile perimeter around the
Changjin River flats in which Hagaru-ri
Hagaru-ri was located.
By evening on the 28th the bulk of To the south and southwest, the most
the 58th Division was concentrated likely area of enemy attack and the site
about five miles southwest of Hagaru-ri. of airstrip construction, Ridge put his
The remainder had crossed the supply 3d Battalion on the lower reverse slopes
road to the south where some troops of the high ground in which the major
blocked the route while others turned Chinese strength was located. He faced
north and assembled in the heights east the remaining troops of the 2d Bat-
of Hagaru-ri. talion, 7th Marines, and a mixture of
Lt. Col. Thomas L. Ridge, com- Marine artillery, service, and headquar-
mander of the 3d Battalion, 1st Ma- ters troops northwest toward Yudam-ni
rines, and officer in charge of the de- and north toward the reservoir. Ridge
fense of Hagaru-ri, was well informed considered East Hill, the marines name
of the location, size, and intent of the for the first mass rising in that direc-
58th, though not of its numerical iden- tion from Hagaru-ri, to be the second
tity. His S-2, 2d Lt. Richard E. Carey, most likely point of enemy attack. He
had had phenomenal success over the intended that Company G, once it ar-
past two days with two Korean agents. rived, would hold the hill. In the mean-
By interrogating civilians coming into time, he manned it with Marine service
Hagaru-ri from the countryside, the units, Company D of the 10th Engi-
agents learned of the approach of the neer Battalion (an Army unit), and de-
Chinese. By making a circuit of the tachments from X Corps headquarters
high ground around Hagaru-ri, they and signal units.
next determined the enemys location Liao Chen-chou, commander of the
and approximate size, and while min- 58th Division, took longer than pre-
gling among Chinese troops they heard dicted to reach the marines. Amid fall-
KWP-EBB-0121
ing snow, his 172d Regiment attacked makeshift unit with Company G as soon
on a half-mile front against the center as possible. The company, Ridge knew,
of the 3d Battalions line just after 2230. had started north from Kot'o-ri that
Staggered by high losses to the marines morning in convoy with the British
carefully prepared defensive fire, the 41st Commando, an Army infantry
Chinese managed only small penetra- company, and assorted other troops.
tions, and those who broke through But word also had reached Hagaru-ri
were too disorganized to do much that the convoy had come under fire
damage. By 0400 the regiment was and that its commander had requested
beaten, and the marines quickly elimi- a decision from General Smith on
nated the Chinese lingering in rear of whether to continue.
their positions. Incongruous with the
fighting taking place only a short dis-
Task Force Drysdale
tance to the southwest was the engi-
neers continuing work on the airstrip, Encounters with Chinese near Koto-
part of the time under floodlights. ri and at Sachang-ni on the 28th her-
Liao had better luck with his second- alded the arrival of the 60th Division
ary effort, driving off the defenders of and the regiment of the 89th Division in
East Hill in a sharp attack at 0130. their objectives areas. At Sachang-ni,
Company D, 10th Engineers, took the prisoners taken by the 1st Battalion, 7th
brunt of the blow. Of the 77 Ameri- Infantry, during a small skirmish first
cans in the company, 10 were killed, identified the 89th, and strong night
25 wounded, and 9 missing. Among 90 assaults not broken up until after day-
South Koreans attached to the com- break on the 29th indicated the size of
pany, about 50 were casualties, mostly the force. Reinforcements and new
missing. The Chinese, however, either supplies were rushed to the 1st Battal-
had no plans or were too weak to ex- ion, 7th Infantry, lest this enemy regi-
ploit their success and halted their at- ment gain access to Hamhung over the
tack after capturing the height. road protected only by the Sach'ang-ni
By 0630 on the 29th Colonel Ridges position.
forces on the southwestern arc of the The presence of the 60th Division
perimeter had restored the line every- was discovered by Company D, 1st
where it had been punctured during Marines, and division headquarters
the night. Maj. Reginald R. Myers, personnel who patrolled north from
Ridges executive officer, meanwhile as- Kot'o-ri during the afternoon of the
sembled a composite company of Ma- 28th. The patrol engaged Chinese
rine and Army service troops and tried about a mile above town in the ground
to retake East Hill. But inexperience, a bordering the road. The marines
slippery and exhausting climb, and Chi- fought all afternoon without breaking
nese fire stopped the group short. At through but returned to Kot'o-ri with
dusk Major Myers set up defenses on three prisoners from the 179th Regi-
the near military crest of the hill. ment, 60th Division.
Considering enemy control of East This encounter, the experience of the
Hill to be a grave threat to Hagaru-ri, patrol from Hagaru-ri the same after-
Ridge intended to replace Myers noon, and air observer reports indi-
KWP-EBB-0122
cated that Chinese positions along the ing resumed his advance about 1400.
reservoir road extended, with gaps, Heavy small arms and mortar fire
south from the outskirts of Hagaru-ri struck the column almost immediately,
to within a mile of Kot'o-ri. At least and progress was slow as tankers and
parts of two Chinese divisions, the 58th foot troops attempted to shoot their way
and 60th, held the heights on both sides through the resistance. By 1615 the task
of the road, with their strongest posi- force again was stopped after having
tions on the eastern edge. Any force moved only a mile and a half nearer
moving north from Koto-ri would run Hagaru-ri.
a ten-mile gauntlet. Two more platoons of Marine tanks
By evening of the 28th Kot'o-ri was meanwhile moved out of Kot'o-ri un-
fairly full of troops who had been or- der Pullers orders to join Drysdale. But
dered north, principally the 41st Com- even though he was to get additional
mando, Royal Marines; Company G, armor, Drysdale was uncertain whether
1st Marines; and Company B, 31st he should risk moving his men, now
Infantry. In addition, the Marine di- numbering about a thousand, the re-
vision headquarters troops who had maining seven miles to Hagaru-ri. By
failed to get through earlier in the day radio, he posed the question to Gen-
with Company D were still wanted at eral Smith. In view of the considered
General Smiths command post in need for reinforcements at Hagaru-ri,
Hagaru-ri. An Associated Press pho- Smith directed him to continue.
tographer, Frank Noel, also was trying Air-strikes sufficiently dampened
to move north. Colonel Puller formed enemy fire to permit the task force to
a motorized task force from these units, resume its march, but when it entered
placed Lt. Col. Douglas B. Drysdale, a mile-long valley midway between
the commander of the 41st Commando, Kot'o-ri and Hagaru-ri, heavy fire
in charge, and ordered the force to from the ridges to the east again halted
make its way to Hagaru-ri on the fol- the column. As troops jumped from
lowing day. trucks to reduce the resistance, a mor-
Task Force Drysdale started north at tar round set fire to a truck near the
0930 on the 29th, the British marines middle of the column. The Chinese
in the lead, followed by Company G, concentrated small arms and mortar
Company B, and the headquarters fire around the damaged vehicle to
troops. Chinese dug in east of the road prevent its removal and thus obstruct
about a mile and a half above Kot'o-ri the road and split Drysdales column.
offered the first resistance. They were Ahead of the truck, Drysdale with most
eliminated, but a mile farther north, of his commandos, two platoons of
fire from a stronger Chinese force in tanks, Company G, and a few members
the high ground on the east brought of Company B managed to move on.
the task force to a full halt by noontime. Drysdale expected the remainder of
Colonel Drysdale, near that hour, the column to close ranks. But behind
received word from Colonel Puller the burning vehicle, in what Drysdale
that two Marine tank platoons would later dubbed Hell Fire Valley, about
be available at 1300. Drysdale waited sixty commandos, most of Company B,
for the armor, then with the tanks lead- and the division headquarters troops
KWP-EBB-0123
remained pinned down in ditches and firefight most of the men in the three
depressions along the road. clusters farther south managed to es-
Only intermittent fire and one strong cape into the high ground west of the
Chinese position about a mile and a half road. Though pursued, they managed
below Hagaru-ri obstructed Drysdales to reach Koto-ri, bringing the total of
movement north of Hell Fire Valley. men who escaped south to about three
Drysdale was wounded while fighting hundred. At the northern position, only
past the Chinese strongpoint, where- a few British commandos were able to
upon the Company G commander led slip away toward Koto-ri. When pho-
the column the remaining short dis- tographer Frank Noel and two other
tance to its destination. About an hour men jumped into a jeep to make a run
after dark Drysdales four hundred for it, they were captured before they
men entered Hagaru-ri. They were had moved a hundred yards.
surprised, in view of their own day of At 0430 the Chinese sent these cap-
fighting, to find the town quiet and the tives to McLaughlin with a surrender
engineers working under floodlights at demand. Stalling to enable as many
the airstrip to the southwest. men as possible to escape, McLaughlin
The Chinese meanwhile began the finally agreed to surrender himself
reduction of Drysdales forces caught and the forty able-bodied men re-
in Hell Fire Valley. Before dark a force maining. The Chinese allowed him to
sliced west across the road between the place his more seriously wounded men
immobilized troops and the two pla- in a nearby house as the Hell Fire Val-
toons of tanks coming from Kot'o-ri. ley affair ended. Task Force Drysdales
Some of the tail-end armored troops, total casualties exceeded three hun-
receiving considerable fire themselves, dred. About seventy-five trucks were
returned to Kot'o-ri during the night; lost during the day and night.
the remainder went back at dawn.
To the north, near the damaged
The Tokyo Conference
truck, another pre-dark attack isolated
about a hundred forty troops from the Not long after Colonel Drysdale and
rest of the trapped men while the latter the men with him reached Hagaru-ri,
gradually gathered in three clusters as they knew they would soon be making
they sought cover from the fire coming a return trip through Hell Fire Valley.
in from east of the road. Thereafter This decision was one result of General
until midnight the Chinese were con- MacArthurs conference with General
tent to fire on the four separated Walker and General Almond in Tokyo
groups while they looted the trucks on on the night of the 28th.8
the road. Having heard Walkers and Almond
In the early hours of 30 November on what had happened in their respec-
they sent small forces armed with gre- tive sectors, MacArthur judged that the
nades against the northernmost group. Eighth Army was in greater danger
The latter, led by Marine Maj. John N. than the X Corps. But he wanted both
McLaughlin, held off the Chinese but
took high losses and by 0430 expended 8 This section is based on Schnabel, s
most of their ammunition. During this tion, pp. 278-79.
KWP-EBB-0124
commands to step back. Walker was to through the Taebaeks toward Tokchon
make whatever withdrawals were neces- to attack the Chinese pressing Walkers
sary to escape being enveloped. Al- right flank. Almond argued that the
mond was to maintain contact with the road Wright had in mind did not exist
Chinese but also was to pull the X (it did, but it was not made for military
Corps out of its spread-eagle positions traffic) and that the severe winter
and concentrate it in the Hamhung- weather combined with any strong Chi-
Hungnam coastal area. nese force in the gap between com-
MacArthur next asked Almond what mands might destroy the division. Al-
the X Corps could do to help the Eighth mond agreed to the move, however, if
Army. Almond pointed out that the iso- the Eighth Army would supply the 3d
lated Marine and Army troops at the Division after it reached the western
reservoir had to be retrieved before slopes of the Taebaeks. General Walker
anything else could be done. MacAr- offered no such support, and the con-
thur agreed but then restated his ques- ference closed an hour past midnight
tion to ask what Almond could do to without a final decision on the proposed
relieve the threat to Walkers east move. But owing to MacArthurs clear
flank. The answer to this question held interest, such a maneuver would come
MacArthurs primary interest. up again after Walker and Almond re-
General Wright, MacArthurs G-3, turned to Korea on the 29th to get their
suggested that Almond send the 3d disengagements started.
Division west over the road leading
KWP-EBB-0125
CHAPTER VI
5 Ibid.
4 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 29 6 25th Div Hist, Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50.
Nov 50; 1st Cavalry Division, Korea, June 1950 to Janu- 7 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50;
ary 1952. 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0128
12 I Corps Intel Sums 226 and 227, 29 Nov 50; I 14 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50;
Corps PORs 233 and 234, 29 Nov 50; 24th Div WD, "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13
Nov 50; 25th Div WD, Nov 50. Dec 50."
13 Rad, GX 30085 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 15 "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-
Corps et al., 29 Nov 50. 13 Dec 50."
KWP-EBB-0130
MAP 10
KWP-EBB-0131
orders from their own regimental had been established inside Kunu-ri at
commander, to continue south to an city hall. The attack came while the bat-
assembly in Sunchon.24 talion commander was talking by phone
with the regimental commander, Colo-
In the Bridgehead nel Corley, to arrange a withdrawal
southwest of Kunu-ri to tie in with the
Late in the afternoon of the 29th
23d Infantrys new main position be-
General Milburn ordered the I Corps
low the Kaechon River. Battalion com-
to abandon its bridgehead in a two-step
munications with both regiment and the
withdrawal. The ROK 1st and 25th Di-
frontline companies went out soon,
visions first were to fall back after dark
thereafter, and the battalion head-
to a line running from a western an-
quarters group withdrew, with some
chor three miles above the Chongchon
difficulty, to the regimental command
northeast to the mouth of the Kuryong
post five miles southwest of Kunu-ri.
River, then along the lower bank of the
Colonel Corley and the battalion com-
Chongchon to the 2d Divisions left
mander then arranged air support and
flank below Pugwon. The two divisions
placed guides along the Kunu-ri - Anju
were to pull completely behind the
road in an effort to help Companies I,
Chongchon at daylight on the 30th.
K, and L move south past Chinese, who
This second move would be covered by
meanwhile had swept to behind them
the 5th Regimental Combat Team, now
from the east. The three companies fi-
detached from the 24th Division and
nally got out at 1630 on the 30th at a
under corps control, from positions im-
cost of 1 killed, 30 wounded, and 109
mediately north and northeast of the
missing.26
river -- crossings in the Sinanju-Anju
area.25
Attack at Sinchang-ni
Milburns forces occupied the first
phase line before midnight. At the far At the army right, the respite gained
right, the 3d Battalion of the 24th by the 7th Cavalry when it disengaged
Infantry, which had tied the 25th Divi- at Kujong-ni on the Sunchon road dur-
sions position to that of the 2d Divi- ing the afternoon of the 29th lasted not
sion about 2100, was left with an open quite to midnight. At 2230, heavy small
east flank an hour later when the 3d arms, machine gun, and mortar fire
Battalion of the 23d Infantry withdrew swept the 7ths new position above
after being hit by the Chinese coming Sinchang-ni; a half hour later, Chinese
down the Chongchon valley road. following the road wedged between the
Near midnight, when the Chinese bat- two forward battalions. Heavy defen-
talion opened assaults on Colonel sive mortar and artillery fire threw back
Freemans blocking force at the north- the assault, but not before a hundred
ern edge of Kunu-ri, part of the enemy fifty Chinese slipped through the open-
unit also attacked the command post of ing in the cavalry line and attacked the
the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, which command posts of both battalions.
Some of the attackers made it all the While the 19th Regimental Combat
way into Sinchang-ni.27 Team was moving the first four miles
From below Sinchang-ni, a rifle down the diagonal road below Anju,
company, two tanks, and a motorized Church received aerial observer reports
section of heavy machine guns of the that the road ahead of the team was
reserve battalion counterattacked at blocked in two places. He instructed
0200 and cleared the forward head- Colonel Moore to destroy the blocks
quarters areas. Near 0230 the Chinese with part of his force and to shift the
began to pull out of contact, electing remainder westward to take Route 1
only to harass the cavalrymen with mor- south to Sukchon, then a lateral road
tar fire through the remainder of the east to Sunchon. Leaving the intelli-
night. The 7th Cavalry suffered 38 gence and reconnaissance platoon, an
killed, 107 wounded, and 11 missing infantry company, and a tank company
during the engagement. Known enemy to deal with the roadblocks, Moore took
losses were 350 killed and 10 captured. the rest of his combat team over the
One prisoner identified the assault unit new route, assembling it near Sunchon
as the 37th Regiment of the 125th Divi- shortly after dark. Colonel Stephens
sion, whose mission, he asserted, had combat team also used Route 1 and the
been to open the road preliminary to lateral road, taking up the better part
an attack on Sunchon by a larger of the night to reach the Sunchon
force.28 assembly.30
Moores task force meanwhile en-
Trouble on the Lines of Communication countered the first roadblock about
1400, after moving three miles farther
On the Anju-Sunchon Road
down the diagonal road, and drove the
By morning of the 30th the 24th Chinese away with only small arms fire.
Division, less the 5th Regimental Com- Another three miles southeast, the
bat Team, was available to help block force spotted Chinese in high ground
any attempt to seize Sunchon. General overlooking the road near an irrigation
Church had started his forces out of reservoir. Tank fire, mortar fire, and
the I Corps sector near noon on the an air strike killed several Chinese and
29th. Col. Ned D. Moores 19th Infan- scattered the remainder. The task force
try and its combat team attachments then continued to Sunchon, reaching
moved first, motoring from Pakchon the assembly area at 2300.31
to Anju and then down a diagonal road
leading southeast toward Sunchon. On the Kunu-ri-Sunchon Road
Col. Richard W. Stephens 21st Regi-
The Chinese on the diagonal road
mental Combat Team followed late in
evidently had moved in the van of the
the afternoon after being relieved at its
enemys westward push toward Kunu-
position at the I Corps left by South
ri. While they proved no real hindrance
Korean Troops.29
to the 24th Divisions move to Sunchon,
27 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50. it became clear that forces following
28 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 29 and 30 Nov 50; 7th Cav
Hist Rpt, Nov 50.
29 24th Div WD, Nov 50; I Corps POR 234, 29 Nov 30 24th Div WD, Nov 50.
50. 31 Ibid.
KWP-EBB-0135
them had established a much stronger around noontime. Keiser then called
block farther east on the 2d Divisions for a rifle company from the 38th In-
supply road between Kunu-ri and fantry. Colonel Peploe sent Company
Sunchon. C, now no more than seventy-five men
Before daylight on the 29th, Turk who, accompanied by a tank platoon
soldiers from a convoy carrying sup- from the 72d Tank Battalion, in mid-
plies to the brigade stopped at the 2d afternoon joined the reconnaissance
Division command post six miles below force at the pass. This combination also
Kunu-ri to report that they had encoun- was unable to eliminate the fire block,
tered a roadblock while traveling north and near dusk Keiser ordered the
from Sunchon. At 0900 a patrol from force to withdraw into positions around
the division military police company division headquarters. The Chinese
moved south to investigate, came un- unit in the ass was now believed to be
der fire about four miles below divi- a battalion.34
sion headquarters, and lost one man General Coulter meanwhile started
killed and three wounded in attempt- part of his reserve north toward the
ing to define the enemy position.32 roadblock. Earlier in the morning he
General Keiser next ordered his had ordered Brig. B. A. Coad, com-
reconnaissance company to clear the mander of the British 27th Brigade, to
obstruction, evidently only a fire block send a battalion to Samso-ri to elimi-
centered in a pass four miles south just nate the Chinese encountered there the
above the village and railroad station previous day by the 5th Cavalry. After
of Yongwon. Keiser apparently did not learning of the 2d Divisions predica-
know at the time that a platoon of tanks, ment about 0830, he redirected the
attached from the 72d Tank Battalion British against the newer roadblock.
to the British 27th Brigade but not mov- The Middlesex Battalion, motorized for
ing with the brigade from Kunu-ri to its mission, headed toward its new desti-
Chasan on the 28th, had just headed nation shortly after 1000 and in the re-
south over the blocked road. Only the maining daylight assembled seven miles
protection of armor allowed this pla- south of the blocked pass.35
toon to proceed through the pass un- Coulter informed General Keiser that
der intense fire from what appeared to the British battalion would move to-
be two enemy companies in the sur- ward the roadblock from the south at
rounding high ground.33 daylight on the 30th and instructed him
The reconnaissance company to mount in concert a vigorous attack
reached the pass at midmorning but, from the north. The 2d Division com-
despite fire support from a battery of mander needed little prompting. To his
the 503d Field Artillery Battalion, front, the 40th Army was pressing the
stalled before the Chinese position
ous service units and a large number of ing Coulters withdrawal instructions,
southbound supply vehicles that had Keiser and his staff worked out the
collected on the blocked supply road. divisions order of movement. As pre-
A division headquarters advance party viously planned, the 2d and 3d Battal-
joined the column of trucks as it turned ions of the 9th Infantry were to attack
back north to get on the road to Sinanju to open the road at daylight. When the
at a junction just behind the position of road was clear, the remainder of the
the 23d Infantry. Colonel Gerald G. division was to withdraw in increments:
Epley, the chief of staff, apparently the division and division artillery head-
judged this to be the only use of the quarters first, then the engineer bat-
road intended by General Milburn: as talion, the remainder of the 9th Infan-
the service train started over the I try with its direct support artillery and
Corps route, he refused a division artil- the bulk of the divisions antiaircraft
lery request to base withdrawal plans artillery attached, the two general sup-
on that axis on grounds that it was not port artillery battalions, the various
available to the 2d Division.43 pieces of the Turkish brigade, the 38th
Colonel Holden attempted to make Infantry and its direct support artillery,
it available around 2000 when he ra- the ROK 3d Regiment, and finally the
dioed the IX Corps G-3 and asked him rear guard composed of the 23d In-
to clear the 2d Divisions unlimited use fantry, 15th Field Artillery Battalion,
of the Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukchon route 72d Tank Battalion, Battery B of the
with General Milburn. But although the Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weap-
G-3 reported that he obtained the re- ons 82d Battalion, and 2d Chemical
quested clearance with the provision Mortar Battalion.45
that Keisers forces work in on the All of General Keisers plans so far
road as they can, Colonel Holden la- were based on the assumption that the
ter denied having received it. The Kunu-ri-Sunchon road was blocked
question of permission, in any event, only at the pass four miles south of the
was soon replaced by doubt that the division command post and that the 9th
roads use was possible. Before 2100, Infantry would have no particular diffi-
Colonel Becker, the provost marshal, culty clearing it. This assumption was
reported that Chinese had cut the challenged during the night when a
Kunu-ri-Anju segment. The road actu- Chinese patrol attacked and took a hill-
ally was still open, but Keiser sought no top from a squad of military police on
confirmation of the report and, upon the perimeter protecting Keisers head-
receipt of the IX Corps order about quarters and when mortar, machine
0100 on the 30th, based his withdrawal gun, and small arms fire fell for about
plan on the use of the blocked road to an hour on both the division headquar-
the south.44 ters area and the nearby position of the
In the hour and a half after receiv- 503d Field Artillery Battalion. But while
all of this heralded the westward ap-
proach of 38th Army forces north of the
43 Ltr, Holden to Applemen, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty
WD, Entry 58, Nov 50.
44 2d Div WD, G3 Activ Rpt, Nov 50; IX Corps G3
Spot Rpt 2140, 29 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 45 The order of march is given in 2d Div Arty POR
26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty WD, Entry 61, Nov 50. 98, 1 Dec 50.
KWP-EBB-0139
Apparently unable to raise the Brit- the 23d Infantry just below the
ish by radio, Keiser sent a request Kaechon River. Although near-
through IX Corps headquarters for the continuous air strikes on Kunu-ri and
Middlesex Battalion to strike north into its vicinity so far had helped materially
the pass area. About the same time, in holding off the enemy, the Chinese
Colonel Sloane dispatched his platoon strength across the river from the regi-
of tanks south to contact the British ment was growing. Freeman also had
unit. Sloanes tanks, like the platoon observed enemy troops moving around
from the 72d Tank Battalion the previ- his right flank toward Keisers units to
ous day, weathered enemy fire without the south.53
loss and reached the British below the The combination of conditions above
pass about 1030. The Middlesex Battal- and below Keiser pushed him to the
ion already had tried to clear the pass, decision to run his forces through the
had been stopped by strong mortar and roadblock. Whereas speculation had
machine gun fire, and had then taken continued, especially among artillery
position near Yongwon to cover 2d Di- units, on a withdrawal over the Kunu-
vision forces when they came through ri-Sinanju-Sukchon route, the latest
the pass. Sloanes tankers remained reports from Freeman discouraged that
with the British to add their guns to choice as the way out. To get on that
the cover.51 route, almost all of Keisers forces first
Near the time that Sloanes tanks would have to move north to the road
reached the British, the ROK 3d Regi- junction just behind the 23d Infantry
ment passed through Sloanes 2d Bat- which now appeared in immediate
talion. Supported by an air strike of danger of seizure by the Chinese ac-
rockets and napalm and by .50-caliber cumulating in Kunu-ri. In view of that
machine gun fire from a platoon of possibility, the earlier report that the
tanks from the 72d Tank Battalion Kunu-ri-Anju road segment had been
(previously with the Turks) on the road, cut, and General Coulters orders to
the South Koreans drove a small group the 2d Division to withdraw over the
of Chinese off the first hill south, then Kunu-ri-Sunchon road, General Keiser
failed in two assaults to carry the ridge dismissed any further consideration of
beyond. Altogether, the ROK regi- using the I Corps route.54
ment gained just under three-quarters There were, on the other hand, at
of a mile.52 least two prospects that favored run-
By noon Sloanes forces and the ning the roadblock. Although Sloane
South Koreans had gained no more had failed to clear the ridges below divi-
ground. Equally disturbing to General sion headquarters, the Chinese had not
Keiser, Colonel Freeman notified him exhibited any heavy firepower. The
that Chinese were beginning to press near enemy position also appeared to
be shallow. His forces, Keiser reasoned,
51 IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2174, 30 Nov 50; 9th Inf
Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p.
309. 53 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to
52 9th Int Hist, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, App leman, 26 Feb 52.
26 Feb 52; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 54 Ltr,Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty
273, 276-79. WD, Nov 50.
KWP-EBB-0141
probably could rush past it and then Peploes 2d Battalion riding trucks and
face only the problem of negotiating regimental tanks passed through the
the pass farther south. Even the latter 9th Infantry about 1300. The lead tank
problem might already have been bearing three officers and eighteen
solved. Having no communication with men in addition to the crew received
the Middlesex Battalion, Keiser as- intermittent bursts of machine gun fire,
sumed that the British were attacking but no one was hit. The men aboard
northward. Hence, the pass might be the tank sprayed return fire into the
clear and a linkup with the British occur heights commanding the road as they
not far down the road.55 sped over the first mile and a half, then
Before signaling the start of the run encountered a barricade. Apparently
south, Keiser reversed previous instruc- between the time that Sloanes tanks
tions that only necessary battle gear be moved south during the morning and
taken. Near noon his assistant, General Peploes forces started an hour past
Bradley, passed the word to all units to noon, the Chinese had obstructed the
bring out all serviceable vehicles and road with an M39 carrier, an M4 tank,
equipment. Keiser evidently believed and a 2-ton truck lost by Keisers
the Chinese opposition below him could forces on the 29th. Although the time
be handled without stripping to bare taken to shove the obstructions off the
combat essentials, and for a speedy trip road was brief, the delay started a chain
to Sunchon he could use all transporta- reaction of halts to the rear that fixed a
tion available. Keisers final order of stop, wait, and go pattern to the entire
march kept the 38th Infantry in the withdrawal.57
lead, followed by division headquarters The leading tank and its passengers
and division artillery headquarters, next received and returned fire as before
all artillery battalions except the 15th while negotiating the next two and a
with Freemans regiment, then the en- half miles, including the quarter-mile
gineer battalion, and finally the rear- length of the pass. Another quarter
guard 23d Regimental Combat Team. mile beyond the pass, a second barri-
All other forces-the 9th Infantry, cade of trucks and assorted equipment
Company C of the 72d Tank Battalion, lay across the road, but the driver kept
the ROK 3d Regiment, and troops of his tank at full speed and rammed
the Turkish brigade-were expected to through it. Around the next turn of
work into the column ahead of the rear the road he passed behind the outposts
guard, those on foot hitching a ride of the Middlesex Battalion about
wherever they could. The order to all 1400.58
units was to keep moving.56 The tanks successful one-hour run
Keiser instructed Colonel Peploe to prompted a message from the British
move about 1245. Since Peploe already that when recorded at army headquar-
had organized the 38th Infantry for the ters pronounced the "MSR between
ride south, there was little delay in
starting. At the head of the column, 57 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov
50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 289-94.
55 Ltr Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Marshall, 58 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Eighth Army G3
The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 280-81. Jnl, 30 Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet,
56 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50. pp. 286-87.
KWP-EBB-0142
Kunu-ri and Sunchon open as of some South Korean and Turkish troops
1400. But the scene along the road scattered among them, managed to
behind the lead vehicle belied this opti- move in spurts and get through the pass
mism. As Peploes 2d Battalion with the a little before 1500. By the time the tail
3d Battalion and regimental headquar- of Peploes serial got through, the Chi-
ters group immediately behind moved nese in the pass area had greatly in-
over the four-mile stretch below divi- creased their fire and were moving
sion headquarters, the two regiments guns in an effort to block the quarter-
of the 113th Division in the bordering mile cut completely.60
heights began strengthening their elon- Coming next into the pass were the
gated fire block. The heaviest fire fell 2d Battalion and mortar company of
in the pass, but the Chinese also maneu- the 9th Infantry. Colonel Sloane dis-
vered to bring down small arms, ma- patched these two units onto the road
chine gun, and mortar fire on much of about 1330 behind Peploes lead serial,
the road above the defile. The Chinese keeping the 3d Battalion deployed
placed perhaps thirty or forty machine against the Chinese near the divisions
guns and about ten mortars in action. point of departure. Part of the ROK
Most of the direct fire was delivered 3d Regiment and some Turks were
broadside, and much of it plunged onto mixed in. On the heels of the 9th Infan-
the road from long range. Peploes col- try troops came General Keisers head-
umn nevertheless began to lose men quarters troops and the reconnaissance
and vehicles, especially while at a halt; company who had begun to move im-
as more trucks were disabled, the fre- mediately after learning that Peploes
quency of the halts increased.59 first troops had gone through the pass.
At each halt, riders leapt from tanks Right behind were the division artillery
and trucks for the roadside ditches. headquarters, the bulk of the 82d Anti-
Some fired into the heights, others only aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons
sought cover. When able to move again, Battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 38th
drivers often left passengers behind. Of Infantry, and the division military po-
those left afoot by the destruction of lice company. Besides the division rear
their transportation or by a driver who guard, the division engineers, four ar-
failed to wait, the able-bodied straggled tillery battalions, and the rest of the 9th
south, some managing to catch another Infantry had yet to take to the road.61
ride. Wounded were picked up by The ride south toward the pass was
troops following when there was room every bit as harrowing for this group as
in their vehicles; for lack of space or it had been for Peploes men. Moving
notice, other casualties were left where through the defile was even more pain-
they had fallen. This scrambling grad- ful. As Sloanes leading troops entered
ually broke down tactical unity and the pass, the Chinese loosed efilading
troop control. But despite disorganiza- machine gun fire from both ends of
tion and casualties, Peploes forces, with
60 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Marshall, The River
59 2d Div G2-G3 Jnl, Entry J-1490, 30 NOV 50; 2d and the Gauntlet, pp. 288-90, 306-07.
Div Arty WD, Nov 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 30 Nov 61 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman,
50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Marshall, The River 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50; Marshall, The
and the Gauntlet, pp. 287-88. River and the Gauntlet, pp. 318, 326.
KWP-EBB-0143
dong and trained a few automatic weap- the slowness. The battalion suffered 1
ons and mortars to the northwest. This killed and 16 wounded and lost 1 how-
fire would be the heaviest faced in the itzer, 22 vehicles, and 11 trailers.66
pass area by the last section of Keisers The 37th Field Artillery Battalion,
column, which included four artillery next in column, suffered more than
battalions, the division engineers, and double the 17ths losses. By the time
the remainder of the 9th Infantry. the 105s of the 37th cleared the ford
Whereas the 23d Regimental Combat west of Karhyon-dong, the battalion
Team originally was scheduled to bring had lost 35 men killed, wounded, or
up the rear over the Kunu-ri-Sunchon missing, and had left 10 howitzers, 53
road, the long delay caused by the Chi- vehicles, and 39 trailers strewn along
nese fire block to the south coupled the road to the rear. But, like the 17th,
with enemy pressure from the north the 37th was still intact.67
had prompted Colonel Freeman to To the rear, the story was different.
choose another way out; by dusk his Whereas the 503d and 38th Field Artil-
forces already were moving over the lery Battalions, 2d Engineer Combat
Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukchon route.65 Battalion, and remainder of the 9th In-
The 17th Field Artillery Battalion, fantry had started down the road be-
the only S-inch howitzer unit in Korea, hind the 37th, only a trickle of troops
led the last section of Keisers column. and trucks would come through the
After passing through sporadic ma- pass. Although some of the Chinese
chine gun fire, the battalion halted in had climbed down from the bordering
midafternoon just below the village of heights to firing positions nearer the
Wa-dong, a little over two miles north road, none so far had made an assault
of the pass. Following one stiff ex- on the division column. But after dark,
change of fire with nearby Chinese just below the divisions point of depar-
forces, the 17th started to move again ture, strong Chinese forces opened
at dark. The battalion negotiated the attacks against the two remaining artil-
pass without trouble, but, on descend- lery battalions and the engineers. Vehi-
ing and turning west to ford the stream cles knocked out during the assaults
west of Karhyon-dong, a howitzer blocked the road in considerable depth,
tipped over and rolled into a deep and enemy fire during and following
gulley. When an artilleryman went into the assaults defeated all attempts to re-
the gulley to destroy the gun, lights move the obstructions. Only a few
turned on to help him see attracted troops near the head of the 503d Field
mortar fire from Karhyon-dong. Har- Artillery Battalion managed to break
assed by continued fire, the remaining away and continue down the road. The
tractors and howitzers crossed the others, including the remainder of the
stream slowly and one at a time. It was 9th Infantry caught at the very end of
midnight when the battalion got out of the division column, abandoned all
the fire, but losses were light in spite of
66 17th FA Bn WD, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Apple-
65 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 340; Ltr, man, 26 Feb 52; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pp.
Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Ltr, Col Paul L. 58-60; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 342-44.
Freeman to CG, 2d Inf Div, 9 Dec 50, sub: With- 67 37th FA Bn WD, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and
drawal of the 23d Infantry From KUNU-RI. the Gauntlet, p. 347.
KWP-EBB-0145
guns, equipment, and remaining vehi- Sunchon road before dark and was
cles and left the road to make their way deeply concerned over the pressure
to Sunchon cross-country. Not all being exerted against his forces by the
succeeded in getting past the Chinese Chinese concentrated in and around
around them. Of those who did, the Kunu-ri. Twice, at 1430 and an hour
last straggler would not reach safety for later, Freeman reported to division
some days to come.68 headquarters-although by feeble and
In view of this debacle, Colonel Free- interrupted radio contact-that the
man had made a wise choice in electing 23ds situation was becoming increas-
to withdraw over the Kunu-ri-Sinanju- ingly precarious. He made the earlier
Sukchon route. By early afternoon he report to General Bradley and at that
was convinced of the improbability time proposed that he be allowed at
that the 23d Regimental Combat Team least two hours before darkness or
could withdraw via the Kunu-ri- when in Freemans judgment the situa-
tion became critical to withdraw the
68Comd Rpt, 503d FA Bn, Nov 50; Comd Rpt, 38th combat team using the I Corps roads.
FA Bn, Nov 50; Hist Rpt, 2d Engr C Bn, Nov 50; 9th
Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet,
Although the weak radio signal caused
pp. 347-61. some confusion at division headquar-
KWP-EBB-0146
ters as to Freemans exact plan, Gen- mite grenades in the already damaged
eral Bradley at 1600 authorized him to tubes, the artillerymen boarded their
put the plan into effect.69 trucks and joined the withdrawal. A
In preparation, Freeman invited the noticeable and prolonged lull in enemy
commander of the 38th Field Artillery fire followed the heavy artillery bom-
Battalion and the officer in charge of bardment, and forward observers
the rearmost troops of the 9th Infantry, watched the Chinese hurriedly dig in
both nearby and not yet able to move to the front of the infantry positions
south over the Kunu-ri-Sunchon road, being vacated. Colonel Freeman cred-
to join in withdrawing through the I ited the artillery action with having
Corps sector. Both declined. Therefore, made a safe withdrawal possible. Un-
only the combat teams attachments- der continued air cover, his leading
Battery B of the 82d Antiaircraft Artil- troops made their way behind the 5th
lery Automatic Weapons Battalion, the Regimental Combat Teams position
72d Tank Battalion less Company C, near Anju by sunset; by dark his last
and the 15th Field Artillery Battalion- troops-from the 3d Battalion and 72d
would accompany Freemans infantry. Tank Battalion-were clear of the
With the agreement of the commander rearguard position; and just before
of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion, midnight, the combat team closed in
Freeman decided not to take the howit- an assembly area near Sukchon.71
zers out. For one reason, the fewer A count rendered on 1 December
towed pieces on the road, the less listed 2d Division battle casualties at
chance there would be of having the 4,940 for the last half of November. Of
column blocked by an accident at a these, 90 percent, or about 4,500, had
sharp turn or defile. Second, he been incurred since the 25th. Officer
wanted the guns in action up to the casualties alone numbered 237 and
moment of withdrawal to discourage touched most grades and branches.
any pursuit by the Chinese then press- These losses represented one-third of
ing his position.70 the divisions actual strength of 15,000
In the hour and a half before sunset on 15 November, and when reconciled
Freeman spotted all available transpor- with non-battle casualties, replace-
tation on the road behind his rearguard ments, and returnees, left the divi-
position, then began peeling troops sion 8,662 men short of authorized
from the front a battalion at a time, strength.72 Equipment losses were
beginning with the easternmost. The equally heavy. In addition to hundreds
15th Field Artillery Battalion mean- of trucks and trailers, the major losses
while began a phenomenal shoot, fir- included 64 artillery pieces, almost all
ing all ammunition on hand in just over of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalions
twenty minutes at deep and close-in equipment, and between 20 and 40 per-
targets. After gunners exploded ther-
71 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 329; Ltr,
69 Ltr, Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50; Ltr, Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50; 23d Inf Comd
Maj Gen J. S. Bradley to Maj Roy E. Appleman, Rpt, Nov 50; Comd and Unit Hist Rpt, 72d Tk Bn,
2 Apr 52. Nov 50.
70 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 328; Ltr, 72 2d Div Pers Per Rpt no. 12, 1 Dec 50. This report
Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50. shows the following breakdown:
KWP-EBB-0147
CHAPTER VII
Concentration at Hungnam
By 30 November the changing pulled the Eighth Army out of the
ground situation had in turn altered path of the Chinese enveloping maneu-
the course of UNC air and naval opera- ver and reduced the likelihood that his
tions. General Partridge, whose Fifth forces would have to be sea lifted from
Air Force within its own arena now some isolated beachhead deep in north-
faced a growing challenge from MIG-15 ern Korea. Nor was General Almond
jet aircraft over northwestern Korea, then planning any sea evacuation of
had received a sharp increase in close the X Corps. Almonds purpose, as
support requirements. Admiral Ewen, General MacArthur had instructed,
whose Task Force 77 planes previously was to pull his far-flung forces into
had been held to interdiction and defenses around Hamhung and
armed reconnaissance, also had begun Hungnam, a task that had its own com-
to send close support sorties into both plications without regard for what
the Eighth Army and X Corps sectors.1 might come next. His ROK I Corps had
To meet any increased demand for to backtrack some three hundred miles
aircraft carriers and gunfire support, along the coast, 7th Division forces at
Admiral Joy not only had recalled ships Hyesanjin faced a 200-mile withdrawal
of the line previously redeployed out through the mountains, and the Ma-
of the theater but had ordered those rine and Army forces in the Changjin
under way to their first Korean assign- Reservoir area could expect to fight
ments to sail at maximum safe speed. their way out at least as far as Koto-ri,
He also had deployed Task Force 90, probably farther.
dividing Admiral Doyles amphibious
force into one group on each side of
New X Corps Orders
the peninsula, so as to be able to evacu-
ate the Eighth Army from western Almond had begun work on plans to
beaches and the X Corps from the east carry out MacArthurs instructions, in-
coast.2 cluding a westward move to assist the
Joys deployment of Task Force 90, Eighth Army, while flying back to Ko-
for the time being at least, was only rea from the Tokyo conference on the
precautionary. General Walker had afternoon of the 29th. His staff com-
pleted the plans that night.3
1 F u t r e l l , The U n i t e dStatesAir Force in Korea, 1950-
1 9 5 3 , pp. 230-38; Field, United States Naval Operations,
Korea, pp. 265-68. 3 This section is based on X Corps Special Report
2 Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. on Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov-10 Dec 50; X Corps WD,
265-66, 268-69. Sum, Nov 50; 7th Div Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50;
KWP-EBB-0149
cember were confusing, especially for Barrs block at the right was tem-
the troops of subordinate units who porary. General Almonds plan for
without knowing why shuttled like yo- ringing Hamhung and Hungnam now
yos to, from, and back to the Hamhung- called for the ROK I Corps to hold the
Hungnam complex. But by nightfall on northeast sector, including the coastal
the 4th General Soule concentrated the road. But the nearest ROK I Corps
bulk of his division in the Hamhung- troops were still a hundred miles up
Hungnam area. With the 1st Korean the coast at Songjin, the rearmost an-
Marine Corps Regiment attached, he other forty miles north in Kilchu. To
deployed on the 5th to defend a sector assist the Korean withdrawal, General
anchored below Yonpo airfield south- Almond arranged on the 5th through
west of Hungnam and arching north- Admiral Doyle to send five ships to
west through Chigyong southwest of Songjin to pick up the tail-end ROK 3d
Hamhung to the village of Oro-ri on Division. The ROK I Corps headquar-
the Changjin Reservoir road eight miles ters and the leading Capital Division
northwest of Hamhung.5 meanwhile continued to withdraw
By dark on the 5th the greater part overland.7
of the 7th Division also reached the
Hamhung-Hungnam area. To assist the
Concentration at Hagaru-ri
7ths evacuation of Hyesanjin, the at-
tached 26th ROK Regiment had taken On 1 December, as General Almond
covering positions astride the main began to shape the defense of Ham-
Hyesanjin-Pukchong withdrawal route hung and Hungnam, the marines at
about midway between the terminal Yudam-ni and Colonel Faiths forces
towns. But General Barrs forces came east of the Changjin Reservoir started
south without enemy contact. They back toward Hagaru-ri. General Smith,
demolished bridges and cratered the now commanding all forces in the res-
road behind them as far as the South ervoir area, had given the two regi-
Korean position and in continuing their ments at Yudam-ni their withdrawal
withdrawal prepared similar demoli- order the previous evening following
tions to be exploded by the South his afternoon conference with Almond.
Koreans bringing up the rear. Barrs Smith placed neither Colonel Litzen-
forces, after completing their with- berg nor Colonel Murray in charge but
drawal, put up defenses north and merely directed both to Expedite . . .
northeast of Hamhung adjacent to movement RCT-5 and RCT-7 to
those of the 3d Division. The leftmost Hagaru prepared for further with-
position was not far east of Oro-ri, drawal south. Destroy any supplies
astride the road leading south from the which must be abandoned during this
Pujon Reservoir; the rightmost blocked withdrawal."8
the coastal road.6
Smith sent withdrawal instructions to aircraft came on station. (Map II) The
Task Force Faith at 1100 on the 1st. By 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, now com-
that time Smith had dropped all plans manded by its former executive officer,
for sending a rescue force to Faith, Maj. Crosby I. Miller, led the way.
whose forces had taken strong assaults Then came the 57th Field Artillery
around their lakeshore perimeter dur- Battalion, the heavy mortar company
ing the night of the 30th. Although they of the 31st Infantry, and at the tail of
had defeated these attacks, it was doubt- the column the 3d Battalion, 31st
ful they could withstand more. Hence, Infantry. Battery D of the 15th Antiair-
Smith judged, waiting to dispatch rein- craft Artillery Automatic Weapons Bat-
forcements to Faith until the Yudam-ni talion interspersed its .50-caliber and
troops returned to Hagaru-ri would be 40-mm. guns among the other units.
too late. Nor could he use the 2d Bat- Faith kept his column short, taking only
talion, 31st Infantry, ordered forward twenty-two vehicles to carry his six
from Majon-dong by General Almond hundred wounded. Before moving,
the day before, since that battalion was his troops destroyed the remaining
only at Koto-ri and had had to fight to vehicles, excess supplies, and the 105-
get that far forward. The two previous mm. howitzers of the field artillery
failures of the 31st Infantrys rear battalion. 10
troops to reach Faith from Hudong-ni The leading battalion moved one ri-
even when accompanied by tanks fle company down the road, the other
proved them too weak for a rescue two in column over the high ground
mission. In fact, they had been recalled east of the road as flank security. Faiths
to Hagaru-ri on the 30th lest they be column received fire almost from the
destroyed by the Chinese below Faiths minute it started, and four pilots over-
position. Finally, Smiths previous judg- head made the rough start rougher
ment that none of the Hagaru-ri troops when they miscalculated their runs and
could be spared seemed even more dropped napalm on the leading troops.
sound by morning of the 1st after the Several men burned to death, and the
forces defending the base again had two front companies became disorga-
beaten back several night assaults at the nized while scattering to escape their
southwestern arc of the perimeter and own air support. 11
at East Hill. Smiths only course was to After some delay while Colonel Faith
arrange ample close air support and steadied his force, the column pushed
order Colonel Faith to fight his way past small groups of Chinese along the
south.9 road until midafternoon when the lead
troops came upon a destroyed bridge
Task Force Faith two miles below the point of departure.
After a crude bypass was constructed,
Colonel Faith started south at 1300
a half-track towed each truck across.
on the 1st, right after his supporting
9 7th Div Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50, Chosin 10 7th Div Comd Rpt. 27 Nov-12 Dec 50, Chosin
Reservoir; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reser- Reservoir; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 77-78.
voir Campaign, pp. 240-43; Gugeler, Combat Actions in See also, MS, Lt. Col. C. P. Miller, Chosin Reservoir,
Korea, pp. 75-76; Field, United States Naval Operations, November-December 1950.
Korea. p. 277. 11Gugler, Combat Actions in Korea, p78.
KWP-EBB-0153
1Y
KWP-EBB-0154
AREA ALONG EAST SIDE OF THE CHANGJIN RESERVOIR occupied by Task Force
Faith (viewed from the southeast).
Small arms fire ranged in during the saddle and descended to the southwest.
crossing, but by late afternoon the last As Faith moved east over the half-mile
vehicle was south of the stream. A few stretch leading to the saddle, small arms
of Faiths men meanwhile left the and machine gun fire from the sharp
column, walked westward to the reser- turn and the high ground on either side
voir, and started south over the ice to- struck the column head on and broad-
ward Hagaru-ri. The napalm episode, side, damaging some of the trucks and
the near-constant enemy fire, and the halting all of them. Moving along the
delay at the bridge had begun to test stalled column, Faith got an attack
Faiths ability to retain control of his started, first to clear the 1221 mass di-
column. 12 rectly above him from where heavy fire
Just below the bridge, the road south was raking his column, then to elimi-
climbed into the lower northern slopes nate the remainder of the Chinese
of Hill 1221 for a quarter mile, turned blocking force by an enveloping move
east for half a mile for a more gentle via Hill 1221 and an assault from the
ascent, then made a hairpin turn at a rear. 13
Faith pushed a conglomeration up voir or down the road to find their own
Hill 1221. The first seventy-five to a ways south.16
hundred men cleared the peak, a half Almost all of the trucks had flat tires,
mile west of the hairpin turn in the and several were beyond repair. Jones
road. Because they believed some of men eventually got about fifteen to run,
the Chinese holding the high ground not enough to carry all of the casualties.
farther east had come in behind them, Jones made the difficult decision to
these troops then moved west to the leave guards with the wounded for
reservoir and south on the ice toward whom there was no room on the trucks
Hagaru-ri. 14 and to continue south in the hope that
Behind the initial assault, Faith the marines at Hagaru-ri, once in-
climbed 1221 with a hundred men; be- formed of the abandoned men, could
hind him Maj. Robert E. Jones, the S-2 somehow retrieve them. 17
of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, Not much beyond a half mile south
started up with two hundred more. Just of the hairpin turn, two burned-out
before dark Major Jones joined Faith, tanks lost earlier by the 31st Infantry
who by then had moved down the troops based at Hudong-ni partially
southeastern slopes of 1221 to a point blocked the road and slowed Jones
on the road perhaps a quarter mile column as the trucks squeezed by.
south of the hairpin turn. Here Faith Otherwise, the column, except for over-
put troops on both sides of the road taking several knots of men who had
and attacked north. Faith himself fell started south on their own, moved with-
seriously wounded by grenade frag- out incident until 2100 when it reached
ments before his assault force reached the northern end of Hudong-ni, half-
the road turn, but his troops fought way to Hagaru-ri. Here, fire from Chi-
through the Chinese position and nese inside the village applied the
opened the road so that the trucks again final disintegrant to the withdrawing
could move south.15 column. Major Jones and about half the
Jones took charge of what was left of able-bodied and walking wounded left
the column. The dispersion of troops the road and moved west to follow a
during the effort to open the road, plus narrow-gage rail line near the reser-
casualties that included leaders from voir shore. These men followed the
platoon to task force level, had now tracks for perhaps a mile before ma-
nearly completed the disintegration be- chine gun fire forced most of them onto
gun when the first troops trickled off the reservoir ice. Back on the road, an
toward the reservoir. Besides the seri- artillery officer led seventy men into
ously wounded, Jones had no more Hudong-ni but was pushed out. For
than two hundred men to take south. about an hour the troops still with the
The others, in small groups and indi- trucks stood fast, then elected to run
vidually, had wandered off to the reser- the vehicles through the village. Chi-
nese fire killed the drivers of the first
three trucks and raked the remaining
14 Ibid.; Action Rpt, 7th Div, 21 Nov to 20 Dec 50,
From Hyesanjin to Hungnam Outloading; Mono, 16 7th Div Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50, Chosin
Martin Blumenson, Chosin Reservoir, copy in CMH. Reservoir; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, p. 82.
15 Ibid. 17 Ibid.
KWP-EBB-0156
troops and vehicles. Everyone who of the wounded and released them. Af-
could, scattered. Most of the men ter the first survivors reached Hagaru-
headed for the reservoir. By midnight ri, motorized Marine parties searched
only the dead and seriously wounded the reservoir and brought back others.
remained at Hudong-ni. Among them A company-size task force of Army
was Colonel Faith, who sat dead of his troops and tanks also attempted to
wounds in the cab of a 21/2-ton truck. move up the road toward Hudong-ni
Survivors straggled into Hagaru-ri but turned back after meeting strong
for the next three days, almost all of resistance. A few more than 1,000 of
them coming off the frozen reservoir. about 2,500 troops who originally com-
The Chinese seemed to consider those posed Task Force Faith eventually got
who reached the ice as out of the game back to Hagaru-ri. Just 385 of the survi-
and molested them little. At Hudong-ni vors were able-bodied. They received
the Chinese administered aid to some new equipment from 1st Marine Divi-
sion stocks and with the other Army
troops in Hagaru-ri became a provi-
18 Ibid. Colonel Faith was posthumously awarded sional battalion attached to the 7th Ma-
the Medal of Honor. rine Regiment after the 5th and 7th
KWP-EBB-0157
Marines completed their withdrawal climbs and descents exhausted the men,
from Yudam-ni. 19 and a minus 16 Fahrenheit tempera-
ture numbed them, especially when
Withdrawal From Yudam-ni they stopped to rest. But after pushing
Chinese forces off two mountaintops,
When Colonels Litzenberg and Mur-
the cross-country force reached Fox
ray received General Smiths order to
Hill about 1130 on 2 December and a
withdraw from Yudam-ni, they already
short time later secured the heights
were regrouping their regiments un-
overlooking Toktong Pass.
der Smiths previous order for one regi-
The marines on the road needed a
ment to clear the supply road and
day longer to fight their way to the pass,
rescue the marines on Fox Hill. By
reaching it about 1300 on the 3d. After
midmorning of 1 December all of Lit-
a brief rest, and again in single column,
zenbergs and Murrays forces were
they continued over the road toward
concentrated astride the road about two
Hagaru-ri. Largely because of excellent
miles below town.20 (See Map 11.)
air support, no serious opposition de-
The two colonels planned to move
veloped on the last leg of the with-
down the road toward Hagaru-ri as a
drawal, although eight 155-mm. howit-
single column during the day of the
zers and the prime movers had to be
1st, leaving a rear guard to barricade
abandoned when the latter ran out of
the front entrance to their position
fuel. Marine aircraft later destroyed
while the main body unlocked the rear
them. At 1630 on the 3d, British com-
door. The key was judged to be
mandos accompanied by tanks came
Toktong Pass. The two commanders in-
out of Hagaru-ri to clear a short stretch
tended to send one battalion cross-
of the withdrawal route, and about two
country east of the road after dusk to
and a half hours later the leading ma-
relieve the Fox Hill troops and secure
rines marched in cadence into the
the pass before the main column
Hagaru-ri perimeter. The rear guard
arrived.
entered at 1400 the next day. Between
The leading marines started south at
the two regiments were some fifteen
0900 and by 1930 were four miles be-
hundred casualties.
low Yudam-ni, having wedged aside
Chinese forces holding heights flank-
ing the road. An hour and a half later
the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, started Withdrawal From the Reservoir
through the mountains toward Fox Hill
and Toktong Pass. Darkness and snow The Hagaru-ri perimeter had been
cover made maintaining direction quiet for four days by the time the last
through the rugged terrain difficult; troops from Yudam-ni arrived. After
failing to take the base during the night
of 30 November, the 58th Division had
made no more attempts to force its way
19 Blumenson, Chosin Reservoir; Gugeler, Combat in. About fifteen hundred dead Chi-
Operations in Korea, p. 85; Montross and Canzona, The nese counted so far by the marines
Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 244-45, 288.
20 This subsection is based on Montross and along with information from prisoners,
Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 249-75. indicated that the enemy division
KWP-EBB-0158
needed reinforcement and new figure, General Smith on the 1st au-
supplies .21 thorized a trial landing by larger air-
During those four days and on the craft on the airstrip southwest of town
5th, the evacuation of casualties was a even though it was only 40 percent
major activity at Hagaru-ri. As of the complete, the runway measuring 50 by
1st some six hundred casualties already 2,900 feet. A C-47 landed successfully
taxed the base medical facilities, a total that afternoon, and by dark on the 5th
that would enlarge considerably upon some forty-three hundred casualties
the arrival of the Yudam-ni force and had been airlifted south.22
the survivors of Task Force Faith. Evac- General Almond on 2 December
uation so far had been by helicopter had ordered General Smith to leave
and light plane with the highest daily Hagaru-ri as soon as the evacuation of
total reaching no more than sixty casualties permitted. Since few casual-
casualties. With a view to increasing this ties remained after the airlifts of the
5th and his forces from Yudam-ni had the withdrawal as far as Koto-ri and
had a day of rest, Smith ordered the set the scheme for moving all the way
withdrawal to begin the following to Hamhung. In the overall plan, the
morning.23 forces at Hagaru-ri were to pass south
General Tunner, commander of the through those at Koto-ri and continue
Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo withdrawing with the Koto-ri contin-
Command, flew into Hagaru-ri on the gent bringing up the rear. On the first
5th with an offer to lift Smiths troops leg the 7th Marines, with the battalion
out-at the expense of Marine equip- formed from Task Force Faith survi-
ment. But although Tunner believed vors and the other Army troops at
he could fly ten thousand Marine and Hagaru-ri attached, would lead the
Army troops out of Hagaru-ri, and al- way to Koto-ri. The 5th Marines, the
though a withdrawal by air might have 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines, and the
minimized troop losses, Smith refused British commandos would be the rear
the offer in favor of moving overland guard and would man the Hagaru-ri
so that he could take out the bulk of his perimeter until Colonel Litzenbergs
equipment, including about a thousand forces were clear. Smith divided the re-
vehicles. General Almond had been maining division troops and vehicles
briefed by Smith on 2 and 4 December, into two trains, attaching one to each of
and, although he earlier had author- the Marine regiments for the with-
ized Smith to destroy equipment, he drawal.26
apparently was satisfied with Smiths To insure constant artillery support,
intention. 24 the Marine batteries at Hagaru-ri were
To assist the overland withdrawal, to leapfrog south, about half the guns
Smith since the 1st had flown in over always in firing position. Marine artil-
five hundred replacements on the lery at Koto-ri was to provide additional
planes coming for casualties and had support. Overhead, a daytime umbrella
brought in supplies at least sufficient of twenty-four planes was to cover the
to move as far at Koto-ri, where resup- entire length of the withdrawing col-
ply would be available. When room on umn while other aircraft searched the
the planes permitted, he sent out valu- ridges east and west of the road. Night
able but unneeded equipment; before hecklers were to come on station to in-
leaving Hagaru-ri, he ordered the de- sure round-the-clock support.27
struction of all items that had to be left Once his Hagaru-ri forces were well
behind.25 started, General Smith intended to take
Smiths 5 December order detailed his staff by air to Koto-ri, where he
would complete the detailed planning
for the remainder of the withdrawal.
23 Ibid., p. 399; X Corps OI 22, 2 Dec 50; 1st Ma-
He already had taken steps to meet two
rine Div Opn O 25-50, 5 Dec 50. problems connected with the next
24 X Corps Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 phase. By the 6th his intelligence indi-
Nov-10 Dec 50; Field, United States Naval Operations,
Korea, p. 280; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Res-
ervoir Campaign, pp. 281, 307.
25 Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Cam- 26 Ibid., pp. 283-88, 300.
paign, pp. 280-82, 285. 27 Ibid., pp. 286-87.
KWP-EBB-0160
cated that at least two 26th Army divi- the 6th.29 Soule also ordered the 2d
sions, the 76th and 77th, had moved Battalion, 65th Infantry, and the 999th
south into the mountains east of the Armored Field Artillery Battalion for-
Changjin Reservoir road between ward to cover Task Force Dogs advance
Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. They appar- and to protect the reservoir road from
ently had relieved the 20th Armys 60th positions in and north of Majon-dong.30
Division near Koto-ri, and the 60th in Smiths second problem was a six-
turn had moved farther south to block teen-foot chasm in the road three and
the reservoir road in and around a half miles south of Koto-ri. Here,
Funchilin Pass. On the other side of where the road had been cut into the
the withdrawal route, the bulk and per- side of a steep slope at the northern
haps all of the 20th Armys 89th Division end of Funchilin Pass, water from the
now appeared to be southwest of Koto- Changjin Reservoir poured in warmer
ri. Forces of the 89th had followed the weather from a pipeline north of the
withdrawal of 3d Division troops from road into four penstocks that carried
Sachang-ni when the latter were pulled the torrent down the mountainside to
back to Hamhung, and the Chinese a power plant. A gatehouse covered the
were reported to be moving east on upper ends of the penstocks, and where
Chinhung-ni and Majon-dong.28 the roadway crossed the penstocks im-
Because Smith believed the Chinese mediately below the gatehouse now lay
might offer their strongest resistance only the rubble of the original concrete
along the winding road between Koto- bridge, the remains of a wooden cross-
ri and Chinhung-ni, he wanted to move ing, and the broken sections of an M-2
the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, north steel treadway bridge. Since the begin-
from Chinhung-ni to clear those ten ning of their offensive the Chinese had
twisting miles ahead of the withdrawal successively destroyed all three, knock-
from the north. To do this and at the ing down the treadway spans on either
same time protect Chinhung-ni, Smith 4 or 5 December.31
on the 5th asked General Almond to
furnish a relief force for the Chinhung-
ni garrison. Almond turned to the 3d
Division for the needed troops, direct-
29 Task Force Dog included the 3d Battalion, 7th
ing General Soule to shape a motor- Infantry; 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (self-
ized force around a battalion of in- propelled); Company A, 73d Engineer Combat Bat-
talion; a platoon of Company A, 10th Engineer Com-
fantry, a battalion of artillery, and a
bat Battalion; 3d Platoon, 3d Reconnaissance
complement of engineers. Commanded Company; 52d Transportation Truck Battalion; a de-
by assistant division commander tachment from division headquarters; a detachment
General Mead and designated Task from the 3d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weap-
ons Battalion (self-propelled); a bomb disposal detach-
Force Dog, this group was to assemble ment; a tactical air control party; and a detachment
in Majon-dong prepared to move for- from the 3d Signal Company.
ward on six hours notice after 0600 on 30 X Corps Special Rpt on the Chosin Reservoir, 27
Nov to 10 Dec 50; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin
Reservoir Campaign, pp. 308-09; X Corps OI 26, 5 Dec
50; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Dec 50; Dolcater, The 3d Divi-
28TLCN 668, FEC-X Corps, 3 Dec 50; Montross sion in Korea, p. 92.
and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, pp. 31 Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Cam-
285-313. paign, pp. 309-11.
KWP-EBB-0161
Because the gatehouse and the sheer hundred killed before they subsided
slope prevented the construction of a near dawn on the 7th.33
bypass on either side of the gap, new From the moment they started south
bridging had to be installed before the 7th Marines met resistance, particu-
Smiths trucks, tanks, and guns could larly just below Hagaru-ri and in Hell
proceed below Koto-ri. Smiths engi- Fire Valley. (See Map 12.) But the air
neer officer, Lt. Col. John H. Partridge, umbrella, artillery and tank fire, and
surveyed the site from the air on 6 coordinated assaults by the foot troops
December, then made an unusual re- against Chinese strongpoints-permitted
quest of corps for an airdrop of eight steady if slow progress. Behind the lead
2,500-lb. treadway bridge sections at battalion, which reached Koto-ri about
Koto-ri, where Army engineers had the time the East Hill battle closed, the
two Brockway trucks designed to put remainder of Colonel Litzenbergs
them in place. After an unsuccessful force completed its withdrawal before
trial drop at Yonpo airfield in which 1700 on the 7th.
several small parachutes were attached By midmorning of the 7th, all of the
to the test span, a special crew of Army rear guard except a detachment of
parachute riggers flown in from Japan engineers, a tank platoon, and the 2d
attached two larger chutes to each sec- Battalion of the 5th Marines had left
tion, and on 7 December eight of Gen- Hagaru-ri. These last troops set fire to
eral Tunners C-119s delivered the the Marine ration dump, which on the
bridging to Koto-ri. One span fell in day before had been smashed and satu-
Chinese territory, and another was rated with fuel oil, and touched off ex-
damaged; but only four of the remain- plosives to destroy all other abandoned
der would actually be needed to bridge supplies. As the last of the rear guard
the gap. Plywood center sections also withdrew just past noon, small groups
were dropped so that the bridge could of Chinese entered Hagaru-ri and be-
carry all types of vehicles.32 gan picking over the debris.
Hundreds of refugees who had col-
lected in and around Hagaru-ri fol-
From the Reservoir to Koto-ri lowed the rear guard, risking their lives
to cross bridges before Marine engi-
Since some of the Chinese positions
on East Hill dominated the Marine neers destroyed them. Aside from this
withdrawal route, General Smiths rear interference with demolitions, the rear
guard attacked the height on the morn- guard withdrew easily. Chinese opposi-
ing of 6 December as the 7th Marines tion amounted only to small arms fire
moved out of Hagaru-ri. The assault as far as Hell Fire Valley and a few
cleared the hill but also prompted hard mortar rounds in the valley itself. Once
counterattacks from ground farther below this point, Colonel Murrays
east that cost the Chinese over twelve forces met almost no resistance and en-
tered Koto-ri before midnight. As the
first stage of the withdrawal closed
about thirty-eight hours after it began, before Pullers force left Koto-ri to
Marine battle casualties totaled 103 b ring up the rear during the last phase
dead, 493 wounded, and 7 missing. of the withdrawal.34
General Smith and his staff had
From Koto-ri to the Coast flown to Koto-ri during the afternoon
of the 6th to complete plans for with-
To permit the rapid evacuation of
drawing the remaining distance to the
casualties incurred during the move
coast. Late that night he asked General
from Hagaru-ri, Colonel Puller, the
commander of the Koto-ri garrison, on Almond to move Task Force Dog to
Chinhung-ni by the following after-
6 December had set his engineers to
noon. Smith now intended that the 1st
lengthening the Koto-ri airstrip to ac-
Battalion, 1st Marines, would move
commodate C-47s. The strip was long
northward through Funchilin Pass at
enough by morning of the 8th, al-
0800 on the 8th, the same time that the
though a heavy snowstorm on that date
canceled all but one flight. On the fol-
lowing two days the larger aircraft, ob-
servation planes, and helicopters took 34 Ibid., pp. 3O6-35, 356, 382; 3d Div Comd Rpt,
out all of the casualties, the last shortly Dec 50; X Corps OI 26, 5 Dec 50.
KWP-EBB-0163
leading force started south from Koto- hold Koto-ri until all other troops had
ri. The southern force was to clear the left, then bring up the rear as far as
road and a ridge commanding the pass Hill 1081. From that point the 1st Bat-
on the east as far as and including Hill talion, 1st Marines, was to take rear-
1081, three miles north. From Koto-ri, guard duty until it passed through Task
the 7th Marines and a battalion of the Force Dog at Chinhung-ni.
5th were to move over the road and To assist the withdrawal behind Task
the bordering heights as far as and in- Force Dog, Smith asked corps to assem-
cluding the penstocks that had to be ble freight cars at Majon-dong to take
bridged a short distance above Hill some of his forces to Hamhung over
1081. Once the withdrawal route was the narrow-gage rail line. He also
clear and the penstocks were spanned, asked for as many trucks as could be
the divisions trains and then the trains furnished. When Smiths units passed
and troops of the 7th and 5th Marines through Task Force Dog, the trucks
were to continue south in that order. were to come forward from Majon-
Colonel Pullers 1st Marine Regiment dong as far as Chinhung-ni to carry
(less the 1st Battalion), the 2d Battalion the troops either to the Majon-dong
of the 31st Infantry, and the forty tanks railhead or all the way to Hamhung.
of the several armored units were to After receiving General Almonds or-
KWP-EBB-0164
MAP 12
KWP-EBB-0165
der to dispatch Task Force Dog, Gen- trol from the 7th Marines reached 1081
eral Soule first moved the 999th Ar- to make first contact with the southern
mored Field Artillery Battalion to force.
Majon-dong on the morning of the 7th. Behind this scene Colonel Partridge,
Under the fire support of this battalion, the Marine engineer, accompanied by
Soule next sent the 2d Battalion, 65th both Army and Marine troops, the
Infantry, forward to secure high Brockway trucks, an the treadway sec-
ground west of the road between tions, reached the bridge site right
Majon-dong and the village of Sudong after the penstock area was cleared.
to protect Task Force Dogs movement. Three hours later the bridge was in
Task Force Dog left Majon-dong an place, and near 1800 the Marine divi-
hour before noon and without encoun- sion trains began to cross.
tering opposition reached Chinhung-ni Only a few vehicles had used the
about three hours later. The 2d Bat- bridge before a tractor broke through
talion, 65th Infantry, except Company and destroyed the plywood center
G, then moved back to protect Majon- panels. Colonel Partridges adjustment
dong. of the spacing of the steel treadway sec-
Task Force Dogs prompt arrival per- tions to accommodate the treads of all
mitted General Smith to start the sec- vehicles prevented further difficulty at
ond phase of withdrawal on time and the crossing. Led by the 1st Battalion
as conceived. But the snowstorm on the of the 7th Marines, the trains, the re-
8th kept his close air support on the mainder of the 7th Regiment, the bulk
ground and, in combination with mod- of the Marine artillery, and the 5th
erate to strong Chinese resistance, Marines, with refugees interspersed,
slowed the forces approaching each passed over the span during the night
other. The 7th Marines, with the Army of the 9th and the following day. Re-
provisional battalion still attached, and ceiving only a few scattered shots en
the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, cleared route, the leading battalion reached
the road and bordering high ground Chinhung-ni at 0245 on the 10th, the
south within a mile of the penstock 5th Marines about the same time on
bridge site by nightfall; at the same the 11th.
time, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, sup- The last troops left Koto-ri at midaf-
ported by Task Force Dogs artillery ternoon on the 10th. Behind them
and accompanied by General Meads came the bulk of the refugees. Task
engineers and self-propelled antiair- Force Dogs artillery fired on the town
craft guns, moved north into Funchilin after it was vacated, and no serious op-
Pass within a half mile of Hill 1081. position developed as the last units
The sky cleared before morning of started toward the penstock bridge. But
the 9th. With good support from the progress was slow. By 0100 on the 11th
air again available, the 7th Marines tanks and a platoon of the Marine
pushed to the bridge site about. a half divisions reconnaissance company at
hour past noon. The marines from the the tail end of the column were still
south meanwhile fought a stiff battle more than a mile above the treadway
for Hill 1081, capturing the height span. Frozen brakes halted the ninth
around 1500. Shortly afterward a pa- tank from the rear at that point, and as
KWP-EBB-0166
tankers worked to free the vehicle, Chi- reconnaissance troops reached their
nese troops among the refugees and in position. The rearmost troops never-
the nearby high ground opened fire. theless reached Chinhung-ni safely dur-
The last seven tanks, the crews of the ing the morning of the 11th.
last two, and three men from the recon- By the time these rear forces passed
naissance platoon were lost in the me- behind Task Force Dog, the deepest
lee that followed. Chinese effort to obstruct the with-
After the remaining tanks and recon- drawal already had been encountered
naissance troops passed over the pen- at Sudong. Between late afternoon on
stocks, Marine engineers demolished the 10th and dawn on the 11th, Chi-
the treadway bridge. Denied the use of nese forces struck Company G, 65th
the crossing, the trailing refugees got Infantry, three times in the heights
past the gap by walking through the west of town, and during the second
gatehouse north of the road. The ma- attempt, launched about an hour past
rines on Hill 1081 were scheduled to midnight, opened fire from houses in-
bring up the rear after all Koto-ri side Sudong and swarmed onto the
forces passed by but mistakenly took to road as the regimental train of the 1st
the road before the last tanks and Marines started through town. Lt. Col.
KWP-EBB-0167
John U. D. Page, the X Corps artillery No further fighting took place while
officer, who had moved down from the men from Koto-ri completed their
Kot'o-ri with Colonel Pullers train, and withdrawal behind Task Force Dog.
Pfc. Marvin L. Wasson, a Marine driver, The last of them left Chinhung-ni near
made a two-man assault against some 1300 on the 11th and cleared Majon-
twenty Chinese during the battle, kill- dong by 1730. Freight cars and trucks
ing about sixteen. But Page himself was carried all but the tank column to
killed and Wasson was wounded.35 Lt. the Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter by
Col. Waldron C. Winston, commander 2100; the slower-moving armor closed
of Task Force Dogs 52d Transporta- a half hour before midnight. Task
tion Truck Battalion, then organized a Force Dog, bringing up the rear from
stronger counterattack using both Chinhung-ni, reached Majon-dong at
Marine and Army troops and finally 2000. Here the task force disbanded
cleared the road and bordering build- and its units along with the other 3d
ings by daybreak. Division forces involved in supporting
the withdrawal from the reservoir
moved back to help defend Hamhung
35Colonel Page was posthumously awarded the Navy and Hungnam.
Cross, and also the Medal of Honor in 1956 after
Congress passed a special bill to allow the award so
The Marine divisions battle casual-
many years past the event. ties during the move from Koto-ri to
KWP-EBB-0168
the coast numbered 75 dead, 256 high Chinese casualties, both battle and
wounded, and 16 missing.36 These non-battle, had rendered militarily
brought the divisions battle losses for non-effective a large part of the 9th
the entire 6-11 December period to 178 CCF Army Group.37
dead, 749 wounded, and 23 missing. On 10 December General Smith and
The marines also had suffered 1,534 members of his staff had flown out of
non-battle casualties, a very large per- Koto-ri to Hungnam. Until that date
centage of whom were frostbite cases. Smiths next assignment had been to
Marine losses thus totaled 2,484, or put his division in position on the
just over 20 percent of the 11,686 ma- southwestern end of the Hamhung-
rines involved in the withdrawal from Hungnam perimeter. But on arriving
Hagaru-ri. (Table 1) at the coast Smith learned that develop-
Between 27 November and 11 De- ments and decisions in the Eighth Army
cember the Marine and Army troops sector, in Tokyo, and in Washington
in the reservoir area had met all three over the first eight days of December
armies, the 20th, 26th and 27th, of the had changed the plans not only for the
IX Army Group and had engaged eight 1st Marine Division but for the entire
of the twelve divisions constituting these X Corps; on the 11th he received a new
armies. They had exacted an especially corps order that proved Admiral Joys
large toll on the 20th and 27th. From late November deployment of Task
evidence gained later through captured Force 90 to have been a well-conceived
documents and prisoner interrogations, and timely precaution.
36 No breakdown is available for losses sustained 37 Marine Corps Board Study, II-C-125, quoted in
among the 2,353 Army troops, 125 Royal Marine Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign,
Commandos, or 40 ROK police. p. 356.
KWP-EBB-0169
CHAPTER VIII
Redeployment South
The Eighth Army Leaves North Korea other reserves were the 187th Airborne
Regimental Combat Team and its at-
The Chinese did not pursue the tached Filipino and Thai battalions then
Eighth Armys twenty-mile withdrawal guarding forward army supply installa-
from the Chongchon to the Sukchon- tions; the Netherlands battalion, which
Sunchon-Songchon line. Only light en- had just completed its processing at the
emy patrolling occurred along the new U.N. Reception Center; and an infan-
line on 1 December, mostly at its east- try battalion from France, which had
ern end where there had been no deep just debarked at Pusan.2
withdrawal the day before. General By Walkers comparison of forces, the
Walker nevertheless believed that the injured Eighth Army could not now set
Chinese would soon close the gap, re- a successful, static defense. Considering
sume their frontal assaults, and again delaying action to be the only course
send forces against his east flank.1 open, a course in which he should not
Walker now estimated the Chinese risk becoming heavily engaged and in
opposing him to number at least six which he should anticipate moving out
armies with eighteen divisions and of Korea, Walker began to select delay-
165,000 men. Of his own forward units, ing lines behind him. He intended
only the 1st Cavalry; 24th, 25th, and to move south from one to the next
ROK 1st Divisions; and the two British well before his forces could be fixed,
brigades were intact. The ROK 6th Di- flanked, or enveloped.3
vision could be employed as a division Though the XIII Army Group re-
but its regiments were tattered; about mained out of contact on 2 December,
half the ROK 7th and 8th Divisions Walker received agent and aerial ob-
had reassembled but were far less able server reports that Chinese were mov-
than their strengths indicated; and both ing into the region east of Songchon
the 2d Division and Turkish brigade and that either they or North Korean
needed substantial refurbishing before guerrillas infesting that area had es-
they could again function as units. Of tablished blocking positions below
his reserves, the four ROK divisions the Pyongyang-Wonsan road from
operating against guerrillas in central
and southern Korea were too untrained
to be trustworthy on the line. His only
2 Ibid.; Eighth Army PIR 142, 1 Dec 50; Sawyer,
KMAG in Peace and War, p. 146; Appleman, South to
the Naktong, pp. 618, 667.
1 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth 3 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth
Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50. Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50.
KWP-EBB-0170
in the Pukhan River valley during anti- as Hwachon, more than fifty miles east
guerrilla operations. Route 33 thus was of Munsan-ni, in case it became neces-
protected at important road junctions, sary to employ 2d Division troops in
and Walker at least had the semblance those areas guarded by South Korean
of an east flank screen all the way from units of doubtful ability. Walker at-
Pyongyang to Seoul.8 tached the Turkish brigade to the
Walker moved the damaged 2d Divi- 2d Division. Hurt less by casualties
sion from Chunghwa into army re- than by disorganization and equip-
serve at Munsan-ni on the Imjin River ment losses, the Turks had collected
twenty-two miles north of Seoul, where bit by bit at several locations, mostly at
General Keiser, with priority on re- Pyongyang. On 2 December, after Gen-
placements, was to rebuild his unit. But eral Yasici had recovered some thirty-
while Keisers immediate and main task five hundred of his original five thou-
was to revive the 2d Division, Walker sand men, Walker ordered the brigade
wanted him also to reconnoiter as far to Kaesong, fifteen miles north of
Munsan-ni, to complete refurbishing
8 Ibid.; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50. under General Keisers supervision as
KWP-EBB-0172
ryl\
4
KWP-EBB-0173
more of its members were located and eastward through Singye, then east-
returned.9 ward through Ichon in the Imjin River
Walker held the 187th Airborne valley. The latter withdrawal would set
Regimental Combat Team and its at- Walkers rightmost units athwart the
tachments in the Pyongyang area to Yesong valley in fair position to delay
protect his supply routes and installa- an enemy strike through it and would
tions. In preparation for the coming eliminate concern for the army left
withdrawal south of the city, the air- flank, which, after the initial withdrawal
borne troops also were to keep civilians below Pyongyang, would open on the
from moving over four ponton bridges large Hwanghae peninsula southwest
spanning the Taedong River, two in- of Kyomipo.11
side Pyongyang and another pair three In withdrawing south of Pyongyang,
miles east of the city, and to take what- the IX Corps, now with the 24th Divi-
ever other precautions were necessary sion attached, was to move on Route
to insure an uninterrupted flow of mili- 33, occupy the right sector of the new
tary traffic over the crossings.10 army front, and reinforce the weak
On 3 December, after receiving more ROK II Corps in protecting the army
reports of sizable enemy movements east flank in the Yesong valley. The I
and concentrations east and northeast Corps was to withdraw to the west sec-
of the Eighth Army position, Walker tor of the new line over Route 1 and,
anticipated not only a westward enemy while passing through Pyongyang, de-
push into Pyongyang but also a deeper stroy any abandoned materiel found
thrust southwest through the Yesong within the city.12
valley and across the army withdrawal General Milburns demolition assign-
routes in the vicinity of Singye. In- ment was likely to be sizable. Aside
duced to haste by this possibility, he from organizational and individual
ordered his line units to drop fifteen equipment lost by the line units, the
miles behind Pyongyang beginning on only notable materiel losses since the
the morning of the 4th, to a line curv- Chinese opened their offensive had
ing eastward from Kyomipo on the been fourteen hundred tons of ammu-
lower bank of the Taedong to a point nition stored at Sinanju and five hun-
short of Koksan in a subsidiary valley dred tons at Kunu-ri. But now Walkers
of the upper Yesong River. Walker forces were about to give up the locale
warned them to be ready to withdraw of the Eighth Armys main forward
another fifty miles on the west and stockpiles, and although the smaller
twenty miles on the east to a line run- stores at Chinnampo might be evacu-
ning from Haeju on the coast north- ated, it was less likely that the larger
quantities brought into Pyongyang
9 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth
over the past several weeks could be
Army G1 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, completely removed on such short
Dec 50; Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20
Nov-13 Dec 50; Rad, GX 30139 KGOO, CG Eighth
Army to CG 2d Div, 2 Dec 50; Rad, GX 30142 KGOO, 11 Eighth Army PIRs 143, 2 Dec 50, and 144, 3 Dec
CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps et al., 2 Dec 50. 50; Rad, CG 30162 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I
10 EighthArmy G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Rad, GX 30146 Corps et al., 3 Dec 50.
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 2 Dec 12 Rad,
GX 30162 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I
50. Corps et al., 3 Dec 50.
KWP-EBB-0174
In an attempt to fill the intelligence But what now worried Walker most
gap deriving from the withdrawals and were the whereabouts and intentions
the Chinese slowness to follow, Walker of the Chinese he previously had sus-
on the 5th ordered General Milburn pected were maneuvering into attack
and General Coulter to send strong re- position just beyond his east flank. Be-
connaissance patrols, including tanks, cause his forces at no time since 30 No-
north as far as the Taedong River. But vember had captured or even sighted a
only the 1st Cavalry Division reported Chinese soldier during the sporadic en-
any noteworthy deep patrolling, on 6 counters along the army right, he was
December when two battalions sortied beginning to believe that all enemy
northeast up the Yesong valley and into troops immediately east of him were
Kokson, where they fought a minor North Korean. Chinese forces, then,
skirmish with North Korean troops, possibly were moving south, not into
and on 7 December when two compa- position for a close-in envelopment but
nies made another, but uneventful, visit around the Eighth Army some distance
to the town.18 to the east through the X Corps rear
Most of Walkers information contin- area. Since General Almonds forces
ued to come from agents and aerial were concentrating at Hamhung and
observers. The latter reported on the Hungnam far to the northeast, any such
6th that enemy troops were moving into march by the Chinese would be unop-
Chinnampo and south across the Tae- posed, and if the Chinese moved
dong estuary by ferry to the Hwanghae through the open area in strength, they
peninsula. Agents on the same day veri- possibly could occupy all of South Ko-
fied the presence of Chinese troops in rea with little or no difficulty. Walker
Pyongyang and reported that North anyway granted the Chinese this capa-
Korean regulars were joining North bility and against the possibility of such
Korean guerrillas to the east and right a sweep took steps on 6 December to
rear of the Eighth Army. To escape deploy troops across the entire penin-
the trouble these reports portended, sula. He planned no static defense. His
Walker instructed his forward units to concept of fighting a delaying action
withdraw on 8 December to the Haeju- without becoming heavily engaged re-
Singye-Ichon line and to extend that mained unchanged except that he now
line east to Kumhwa. The west flank would delay from preselected lines
would again be anchored on the sea, stretching coast to coast.20
and Walkers forces would be able to As a preliminary, Walker obtained
present a front instead of a flank to the General MacArthurs agreement to
North Korean units reported gathering erase the southern segment of the
on the east.19 Eighth Army-X Corps boundary so
that the Eighth Armys sector spanned
the peninsula below the 39th parallel,
18 Rad,
GX 29613 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I
Corps and CG IX Corps, 5 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29660
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps, 5 Dec 50; PIR 147, 6 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29685 KGOO, CG Eighth
Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 6 and 7 Dec 50. Army to CG I Corps et al., 6 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29706
19 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 6 Dec
Army G3 Jnl, 5 Dec 50; Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Dec 50.
50; Eighth Army G2 Brief, 6 Dec 50; Eighth Army 20 EighthArmy G3 Jnl, 5 and 6 Dec 50.
KWP-EBB-0177
thur to consolidate the Eighth Army the Eighth Army. General Collins, while
and X Corps sufficiently to prevent touring Korea between 4 and 6 Decem-
large enemy forces from passing ber, heard General Walker and Gen-
between the two commands or out- eral Almond on the best beachheads
flanking either of them. But MacArthur and on how best to handle their respec-
defended his view of a Pyongyang- tive commands. Almond believed that
Wonsan line, pointing out that he and he could hold Hungnam indefinitely
Walker already had agreed that Pyong- and wanted to stay there out of cer-
yang could not be held and that the tainty that by doing so he could divert
Eighth Army probably would be forced substantial Chinese strength from the
south at least as far as Seoul. Turning Eighth Army front. Walker, on the
his reasoning in support of a request other hand, believed the preservation
for ground reinforcements of the of the Eighth Army required a deep
greatest magnitude, he emphasized on withdrawal. Walker attempted to fore-
3 December that his present strength stall any order to defend Seoul, insisting
would allow him at most to prolong his that tying his forces to the ROK capital
resistance to the Chinese by making suc- would only allow the Chinese to encir-
cessive withdrawals or by taking up cle the Eighth Army and force a slow,
beachhead bastion positions and that costly evacuation through Inchon. He
a failure to receive reinforcements por- favored pulling back to Pusan, where
tended the eventual destruction of his once before he had broken an enemy
command.23 offensive and where now, if reinforced
The response to MacArthurs esti- by the X Corps, the Eighth Army might
mate was as gloomy as his predictions. hold out indefinitely.25
Prompted by earlier dismal reports to MacArthurs G-3, General Wright,
visit the Far East for a firsthand ap- meanwhile recommended Pusan as the
praisal, Army Chief of Staff General best beachhead for both the Eighth
Collins informed MacArthur on 4 Army and X Corps on grounds that
December that no reinforcement in should UNC forces be compelled to
strength, at least in the near future, was leave Korea, they should leave the dis-
possible. The remaining Joint Chiefs tinct impression of having delayed the
meanwhile replied from Washington enemy as long and as well as possible.
that preservation of the U.N. Com- Wright also pointed out that defend-
mand was now the guiding consider- ing successive Lines into the southeast-
ation and that they concurred in the ern tip of the peninsula would afford
consolidation of MacArthurs forces UNC air forces the greatest opportu-
into beachheads.24 nity to hurt the Chinese; further, if a
Beachhead sites that in varying de- withdrawal from Korea became neces-
grees could facilitate a withdrawal from sary during the remaining winter
Korea were Hungnam and Wonsan for months, MacArthurs command could
the X Corps, Inchon and Pusan for escape extreme weather conditions at
Pusan; finally, an evacuation at any time
23 Rad, JCS 97772, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Dec 50; Rad,
C 50332, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 3 Dec 50. 25 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 283; Ltr, Lt Gen
24 Chief
of Staff, FEC, Memo for Gen Collins, 4 Dec Edward M. Almond (Ret) to Col C. H. Schilling, 21
50; Rad, JCS 97917, JCS to CINCFE, 4 Dec 50. May 1965, copy in CMH.
KWP-EBB-0179
azines or other publicity media in the mand change he had ordered three
United States.30 The Joint Chiefs of days before.
Staff forwarded the presidents instruc- When MacArthur reached Walkers
tions to MacArthur on 6 December. headquarters (having first stopped in
northeastern Korea to confer with Gen-
eral Almond), he was able to see not
Withdrawal to Line B
only the Eighth Army plan for with-
On 7 December General MacArthur drawing to line B but also Walkers
had radioed a warning to both Walker plans in case the Eighth Army again
and Almond of the next days order was squeezed into the southeastern cor-
for successive withdrawals, the defense ner of the peninsula. Reviving an un-
of Seoul short of becoming entrapped, used plan developed by the Eighth
and the assignment of the X Corps to Army staff in September, Walker rees-
the Eighth Army. So guided, Walker tablished not only the Naktong River
on the 8th laid out line B, which dupli- defenses but also three lines between
cated line A eastward from Hwachon the old perimeter and Pusan, each arch-
but in the opposite direction fell off to ing between the south coast and east
the southwest to trace the lower bank coast around the port. Nearer Pusan,
of the Imjin and Han rivers, some the Davidson line curved northeast-
twenty miles behind the Yesong River. ward sixty-eight miles from a south
This line was at least twenty miles coast anchor at Masan; next south-
shorter than line A, fairly coincided east, the Raider line stretched forty-
with the northernmost coast-to-coast eight miles from the south coast resort
line designated by MacArthur, and now town of Chinhae; and just outside the
became the line toward which Walker port, the Pusan line arched twenty-eight
began to move his forces for the de- miles from the mouth of the Naktong.
fense of Seoul.31 Walker instructed General Garvin to
On 11 December MacArthur made fortify these lines using Korean labor
his first visit to Korea since he had and all other means and manpower
watched the start of what was hoped available within Garvins 2d Logistical
would be the Eighth Armys final ad- Command.32
vance. He was now on the peninsula On the day following MacArthurs
for a firsthand view of the Eighth visit Walker established two more let-
Army and X Corps after their setbacks tered lines. Line C followed the lower
at the hands of the Chinese and for bank of the Han River just below Seoul,
personal conferences with Walker and curved northeast to Hongchon, thirty
Almond on the steps the two line com- miles below Hwachon, then reached al-
manders had taken or planned to take most due east to the coast at Wonpo-ri,
in carrying out the maneuvers and com- fifteen miles behind Yangyang. Line D,
the ROK forces along the eastern two- quarters, less a small group to remain
thirds of the line. He doubted that they in Seoul, south to Taegu. He already
would hold longer than momentarily had directed the removal of major sup-
against a strong enemy attack, and, ply stores located in or above Seoul to
should they give way, his forces above safer positions below the Han River and
Seoul in the west would be forced to had ordered the reduction of stocks
follow suit. It was to meet this particular held in the Inchon port complex. On
contingency that he had established the 18th he assigned corps boundaries
lines C and D on 12 December. On the along line C and described the deploy-
15th he extended his effort by dis- ment of army reserve units to cover a
patching the 1st Cavalry Division out withdrawal to this first line below Seoul.
along the connected Routes 2-18-17 Two days later he ordered the still-weak
northeast of Seoul as added protection 2d Division, which by then had stepped
against any strike at the capital city from back from Munsan-ni to Yongdungpo,
the direction of Chunchon.37 a suburb of Seoul just below the Han,
The same day, he started army head- to move to the town of Chungju, some
sixty miles southeast of Seoul. From
there the division was to be ready to
37 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Rad, GX
35176 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps and move against any enemy force break-
CG 1st Cav Div, 15 Dec 50. ing through South Korean lines in cen-
KWP-EBB-0183
tral or eastern Korea and was to pro- lapses of ROK forces twice before had
tect the flank of Walkers western placed the Eighth Army in jeopardy.
forces in any withdrawal prompted by Nor had the ROK Army shown any in-
such an enemy thrust. General Keiser creased stability even after strenuous
in the meantime had been evacuated efforts to improve it. If, as he suspected,
because of illness, and Maj. Gen. the ROK units now along the eastern
Robert B. McClure now commanded two-thirds of line B failed to stand
the 2d Division.38 against an attack, his positions north
To General MacArthur, the elabo- of Seoul could not be held and the
rate preparations for a withdrawal be- then-necessary withdrawal would have
low Seoul indicated that Walker had to be made over an obstacle, the Han
decided against a determined defense River. In Walkers mind these two
of the city. When MacArthur raised the dangers, of another sudden ROK Army
question, Walker assured him that he collapse and of making a river crossing
would hold Seoul as long as he could. in a withdrawal, made his extensive
But, Walker pointed out, sudden col- preparations a matter of reasonable
prudence.39
38 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Rad, GX
35255 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al.,
18 Dec 50; Rad, GX 35300 KGOO, CG Eighth Army 39 Rad,
CX 51694, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 20
to CG 2d Div, 20 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 20 Dec Dec 50; Rad, GX 35321 KCG, CG Eighth Army to
50. CINCFE, 21 Dec 50.
KWP-EBB-0184
Walker also was convinced that his IX Corps sectors in the west. General
adversaries were now capable of open- Partridge, who had shifted the empha-
ing an offensive at any time. He still sis of Fifth Air Force operations to
had no solid contact with enemy forces, armed reconnaissance and interdiction
but by pressing intelligence sources over about the time Walker had given up
the previous two weeks he had obtained Pyongyang, was able to verify that
sufficient evidence to predict an immi- Chinese forces had moved south in
nent attack and to forecast the strength, strength from the Ch'ongch'on battle-
paths, objective, and even possible date fields, but not how far.42 Until mid-
of the next blow.40 December his fighter pilots and light
Between 8 and 14 December Walker bomber crews discovered and attacked
caught a southeastward shift of the large troop columns moving openly in
North Korean II Corps, the bulk of daylight over main and secondary
which previously had been concentra- roads between the Chongchon and
ted in and operating as a guerrilla force Pyongyang. But then, to escape
out of the mountains between Koksan Partridges punishing attacks, the Chi-
and Inchon. Apparently having re- nese reverted to their strict practices
taken regular status, the corps paral- of concealment and camouflage and
leled the Eighth Armys southeastern halted virtually all daytime movement.43
withdrawals below Pyongyang. As Walker, consequently, had no clear
Walkers forces spread out along line evidence that the main body of the XIII
B, the North Korean unit followed suit, Army Group had moved any farther
occupying positions just above the 38th south than Pyongyang. But on the ba-
parallel in the central sector, principally sis of repeated reports from agents and
between Yonchon in the Wonsan-Seoul air observers that Chinese troops and
corridor and Hwachon, due north of supplies were moving southeastward
Chunchon. It also seemed that earlier from the North Korean capital, by the
reports of reconstituted North Korean 23d he considered it possible that three
units joining the II Corps were correct. or four Chinese armies with about a
Several renewed North Korean divi- hundred fifteen thousand troops were
sions apparently had assembled imme- bunched within a days march of the
diately behind the II Corps to make a Eighth Armys central front. This possi-
total strength of sixty-five thousand bility brought the estimate of enemy
plausible for the North Korean troops strength above Walkers central posi-
directly opposite the Eighth Armys tions to a hundred eighty thousand.
central sector as of 23 December.41 Furthermore, Walker judged, these
As late as 17 December Walker was troops could be reinforced by any units
still completely out of contact with Chi- of the XIII Army Group remaining in
nese forces and by the 23d had encoun- the Pyongyang area within four to
tered only a few, these in the I and eight days and by the Chinese and
40 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army 42 Bomber Command meanwhile halted its attacks
PIRs 149-156, 8-15 Dec 50; Rad, GX 35266 KGI, CG on the Yalu bridges and devoted its main effort to the
Eighth Army to CINCFE, 18 Dec 50; Eighth Army interdiction of rail lines.
PIRs 163, 22 Dec 50, and 164, 23 Dec 50. 43 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp.
41 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army 243-45. The FEAF estimate of enemy troops killed in
PIRs 148-164, 8-23 Dec 50. December was 39,694.
KWP-EBB-0185
North Korean units currently operat- to refurbish them for employment un-
ing in the X Corps sector within six to der the Eighth Army.46
ten days.44
To Walker, the apparent concentra-
The X Corps Evacuates Hungnam
tion and disposition of enemy forces
opposite his central front clearly sug- By the time General Almond re-
gested offensive preparations in which ceived General MacArthurs 8 Decem-
the North Korean II Corps was screen- ber order to evacuate the X Corps
ing the assembly of assault forces and through Hungnam, two sideshows to
supplies. Small North Korean attacks the coming main event were well
below Yonchon and from Hwachon under way. Out of the earlier decision
toward Chunchon seemed designed to to concentrate X Corps forces at
search out weaknesses in the Eighth Hungnam, the evacuation of Wonsan
Army line in those areas and indicated had begun on 3 December. In a weeks
the possibility of a converging attack time, without interference from enemy
on Seoul south along Route 33 and forces, the 3d Division task force and a
southwest over the road from Chun- Marine shore party group totaling some
chon. A likely date for opening such 3,800 troops loaded themselves, 1,100
an attack, because of a possible psycho- vehicles, 10,000 tons of other cargo,
logical advantage to the attackers, was and 7,000 refugees aboard transport
Christmas Day.45 ships and LSTs provided by Admiral
Walkers largest hope of holding Doyles Task Force 90. One LST sailed
Seoul for any length of time in these north on the 9th to Hungnam, where
circumstances rested on the arrival of its Marine shore party passengers were
the remainder of the X Corps from to take part in the forthcoming sea lift.
northeastern Korea. Once he had The remaining ships steamed for Pu-
General Almonds forces in hand, san on the 9th and 10th.47
Walker planned to insert them in the The Task Force 90 ships dispatched
Chunchon sector now held by the un- to Songjin on 5 December to pick up
tried ROK III Corps. This move would the tail-end troops of the ROK I Corps
place American units athwart the meanwhile had reached their destina-
Chunchon-Seoul axis, one of the more tion and by noon on 9 December had
likely enemy approaches in an attack to taken aboard the ROK 3d Division (less
seize the South Korean capital. the 26th Regiment, which withdrew
Whether the X Corps would be avail- to Hungnam as rear guard for the 7th
able soon enough depended first on Division); the division headquarters, di-
how closely Walker had estimated the
opening date of the threatening enemy
offensive and second on how long it 46 Rad, GX 35226 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG X
would take General Almond to get his Corps, 17 Dec 50; Rad, GX 35321 KCG, CG Eighth
forces out of northeastern Korea and Army to CINCFE, 21 Dec 50; Eighth Army PIRs 160,
19 Dec 50, and 163, 22 Dec 50.
47 Rad, CX 50635, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army et
al., 7 Dec 50; Rad, CX 50801 (CINCUNC Opn O No.
44 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army 5), CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army et al., 8 Dec 50;
PIRs 148-164, 8-23 Dec 50. Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp. 183-84;
45 Ibid. Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 286-88.
KWP-EBB-0186
and spread his remaining forces to issue docking and sailing instructions.
cover the vacated sector on a shorter Direct liaison was established between
front. Since some units were more bat- Almonds control group ashore and
tle worn than others, especially the 1st Doyles control group at sea to match
Marine Division, he elected the latter outgoing troops, supplies, and equip-
method and intended to ship the ma- ment with available ships. Almond also
rines first. They were to be followed dispatched a control group under Lt.
by the 7th Division, then the 3d Di- Col. Arthur M. Murray from corps
vision.53 headquarters to Pusan to receive
Almond planned to phase out the troops, supplies, and equipment arriv-
ROK I Corps, corps support units, ing by sea and air and to move them
bulk supplies, and heavy equipment as rapidly as possible to assembly
simultaneously with the American areas.
Army divisions. This was to be done Including the troops and materiel
carefully enough to keep a proper outloaded at Wonsan and Songjin,
balance between combat and support Almond needed shipping space for
troops and to insure adequate logistical 105,000 troops, 18,422 vehicles, and
support. To maintain this balance some 350,000 tons of bulk cargo. Al-
yet guarantee that the evacuation pro- though Admiral Doyle commanded a
ceeded as rapidly as possible, he estab- transport group of over 125 ships, some
lished three points of control. From X would have to make more than one trip
Corps headquarters, his G-3 and G-4 to meet Almonds needs. The Far East
together guided the dispatch of units Air Forces Combat Cargo Command
to the beach. To supervise the actual flying out of Yonpo airfield was to ful-
loading of troops and materiel at fill airlift requirements.55
waters edge, he organized a control Tactical air support during the evac-
group under Col. Edward H. Forney, a uation would be a Navy and Marine
Marine officer serving as Almonds responsibility, the Fifth Air Force fight-
deputy chief of staff. Under Colonel ers previously located in northeastern
Forneys direction, the 2d Engineer Korea having flown out to Pusan on 3
Special Brigade was to operate dock December. The 1st Marine Air Wing,
facilities, a reinforced Marine shore based at Yonpo and aboard escort
party company was to operate the LST carriers, was to devote its full effort to
and small craft beaches and control the supporting the corps operation. In ad-
lighterage for ships to be loaded in the dition, Admiral Doyle was to arrange
harbor anchorages, and some five thou- both naval air and naval gunfire sup-
sand Korean civilians were to work as port. Reinforced by ships supplied by
stevedores. On the Navys end of the Admiral Struble, the Seventh Fleet
outloading procedure, Admiral Doyle, commander, Doyle eventually was able
through a control unit aboard his flag-
ship Mount McKinley, was to coordinate 54 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Field, United
all shipments, assign anchorages, and States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 289-90.
55 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Field, United
States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 289; Cagle and
53 Ibid.; X Corps Opn O 10, 11 Dec 50; X Corps Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp. 512-14; Futrell,
POR 76, 11 Dec 50. The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 241-42.
KWP-EBB-0188
MAP 14
this second line, which would mean the commander. After briefing MacArthur
abandonment of Yonpo airfield, was on corps dispositions and the plan of
scheduled to take place as the 7th Divi- evacuation, Almond predicted that the
sion began its embarkation. The third evacuation would be orderly, that no
and final line was a tight arc about a supplies or equipment would be de-
mile outside the limits of Hungnam to stroyed or abandoned, and that enemy
be occupied by the 3d Division as that forces would not interfere seriously.
division itself prepared to outload. The redeployment of the X Corps to
During this final phase of the evacua- southern Korea, he estimated, would
tion General Soules units were to use be complete by 27 December.58
rearguard tactics to cover their own
embarkation.57 The Outloading
General Almond published his for-
mal evacuation order on 11 December, The 1st Marine Division, as it came
into Hungnam from the Changjin Res-
the date on which General MacArthur
visited Korea and flew into Yonpo air-
58 Ibid.; X Corps Comd Rpt, 11 Dec 50; Memo, Gen
field for a conference with the X Corps Almond, 11 Dec 50, sub: Movement of X Corps to the
Pusan Area: Ltr. Gen Almond to CINCUNC, 11 Dec
57 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps Opn 50, sub: Redeployment of X Corps in Pusan - Pohang-
O 10, 11 Dec 50. dong Area.
KWP-EBB-0190
tached to the 3d Division, moved to Hamhung that the X Corps would pro-
Yonpo for evacuation by air. General vide transportation for all civilians who
Soule had planned to compensate for wished to leave North Korea. The in-
the loss of the South Korean marines tention was to create a mass move to
by pulling his division to the shorter cover the infiltration of enemy agents
first phase line on 16 December. and saboteurs. To prevent overcrowd-
But several sharp attacks against his ing and infiltration, military police, in-
positions between Chigyong and Oro- telligence agents, and perimeter troops
ri during the morning of the 15th attempted to block civilian entry, partic-
prompted him to make his withdrawal ularly over the Hamhung-Hungnam
that afternoon.61 road, which carried the larger number
By the 16th the attacks against the of refugees. They were only partially
3d Division on the western and north- successful. Those civilians already in
western arcs of the perimeter, enemy Hungnam and those who managed to
patrol contact with the ROK I Corps in reach the city were screened, then
the northeast, and other ground and moved to the southeastern suburb of
air reports indicated that enemy forces Sohojin, where corps civil affairs per-
were closing in around the X Corps pe- sonnel distributed food and organized
rimeter but not in great strength. Parts them for evacuation as shipping space
of the Chinese 81st Division, 27th Army, became available.63
appeared to have made the attacks on On the heels of the Marine division,
the 3d Division, and a North Korean the 7th Division began to outload on
brigade apparently was moving toward 14 December, embarking first the worn
Hungnam over the coastal road from troops of the 31st Infantry, 1st Battal-
the northeast. A greater immediate ion of the 32d Infantry, and 57th Field
problem than the approach of relatively Artillery Battalion, who had been with
few enemy forces was a mass move- the marines in the reservoir area. Most
ment of civilians toward the corps of the divisions service units went
perimeter. Although General Almond aboard ship on the 15th and 16th. The
had planned to evacuate government 17th Infantry and remainder of the 32d
officials, their families, and as many Infantry meanwhile relieved the ROK
others as shipping space allowed, he I Corps on the perimeter and withdrew
had not anticipated that thousands of to the first phase line. Hence, the corps
civilians would try to reach Hungnam.62 perimeter on the 16th was divided into
Besides hampering evacuation oper- two nearly equal parts by the Songchon
ations by overcrowding the port area, River, the 7th Division in position above
the large refugee movement posed a it, the 3d Division holding the sector
danger of enemy infiltration. Accord- below. Patrols and outposts deepened
ing to corps intelligence sources, the the defense as far out as the lower edge
enemy was circulating a rumor in of Hamhung.
61 X Corps PORs 79, 14 Dec 50, and 80, 15 Dec 50; 63 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps PIRs
Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, pp. 97-100. 77, 12 Dec 50, and 78, 13 Dec 50.
62 X Corps PIRs 77-80, 12-l5 Dec 50; X Corps Comd 64 X Corps PORs 79-81, 14-16 Dec 50; X Corps OI
Rpt, Sum, Dec 50. 31, 16 Dec 50.
KWP-EBB-0192
After being relieved by the 7th Divi- planes had lifted out 3,600 troops, 196
sion, the ROK I Corps outloaded and vehicles, 1,300 tons of cargo, and sev-
sailed at noon on 17 December. Al- eral hundred refugees.66
though original plans called for the The 18 December withdrawal of
South Koreans to go to Pusan, General General Soules left flank units to the
MacArthur, apparently as a result of lower bank of the Songchon River was
his 11 December visit to Korea, had di- a preliminary move in the 3d Divisions
rected that the corps units then on the relief of the two 7th Division regiments
Hungnam perimeter be sea lifted to still on the perimeter. Soules forces
Samchok. These units and those being stepped behind the Songchon to the
carried to Pusan from Songjin were to second corps phase line on the 19th
pass to Eighth Army control upon and on the 19th and 20th spread out to
debarkation. This transfer would per- relieve the 17th and 32d Regiments.
mit General Walker to deploy the South General Almond closed his command
Korean corps immediately, and the post in Hungnam on the 20th and
landing at Samchok would put much reopened it aboard Admiral Doyles
of it close at hand for deployment Mount McKinley in the harbor, leaving
at the eastern end of line B. The land- General Soule in command of ground
ing, actually made at a small port just troops ashore.67
north of Samchok, was completed on Enemy probing attacks, which had
20 December.65 slackened noticeably after the 3d and
The ROK I Corps departure on the 7th Divisions withdrew to the first corps
17th coincided with the evacuation of phase line, picked up again on the 18th
most X Corps headquarters sections and became still more intense on the
and troops. Their final destination was- following day. Three Chinese divisions,
Kyongju, fifty miles north of Pusan, the 79th, 80th, and 81st, all from the
where they were to establish an advance 27th Army, were believed to be in the
corps command post. On the same day, nearby ground west of Hungnam, al-
operations at Yonpo airfield closed as though only the 79th was currently
the left flank units of the 3d Division in contact. North and northeast of
prepared to withdraw to the lower bank Hungnam, a North Korean brigade
of the Songchon River behind the field and the reconstituted North Korean 3d
the next day. The Marine squadrons Division had been contacted, as had an-
that had used the field already had other North Korean force, presumably
withdrawn to Pusan and Itami, Japan. a regiment.68
Last to leave was a Fifth Air Force base None of the enemy strikes on the pe-
unit that had serviced the Marine fight- rimeter did more than penetrate some
ers and General Tunners cargo air-
craft. By the closing date Tunners 66 X Corps POR 79, 14 Dec 50; X Corps Comd Rpt,
18 Dec 50; X Corps OI 36, 18 Dec 50; Futrell, The
United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 241, 248-49; X
65 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Rad, CX 51019, Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Cagle and Manson,
CINCFE to CG Eighth Army et al., 11 Dec 50; Rad, The Sea War in Korea, p. 191.
CX 51102, CINCFE to DEPTAR, 12 Dec 50; X Corps 67 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps PORs
PORs 80-83, 15-18 Dec 50; Field, United States Naval 83-85. 18-20 Dec 50: Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division
Operations, Korea, p. 295; Rad, AG IN BSF-1305, CTF in Korea, p. 102.
90 to CG Eighth Army et al., 20 Dec 50. 68 X Corps PIRs 81-85, 16-20 Dec 50.
KWP-EBB-0193
outposts, and counterattacks rapidly corps phase line to cover the outloading
eliminated these gains. So far, all of the last corps artillery units and the
action appeared to be only an attempt first of the divisions service units. On
to reconnoiter the perimeter. Several the 23d, when Soule pulled his regi-
explanations for the enemys failure ments to the last corps phase line in
to make a larger effort were plaus- preparation for the final withdrawal
ible. The bulk of the Chinese in the from Hungnam, only a small amount
Changjin Reservoir area apparently of mortar and artillery fire struck the
were taking time-probably forced to perimeter troops. Whatever conditions
take time-to recuperate from losses so far had kept the Chinese and North
suffered in the cold weather and re- Koreans from opening a large assault
cent battles. All enemy forces undoubt- obtained even after the X Corps pe-
edly were aware that the X Corps was rimeter strength dwindled to a single
evacuating Hungnam and that they division.71
would be able to enter the city soon The indirect fire received on the 23d
without having to fight their way in. proved to be the last opposition offered.
The contraction of the corps perimeter By morning of the 24th the perimeter
probably forced the enemy to repeat was silent and remained so as the last
his reconnaissance. Artillery fire, naval of the 3d Divisions service units out-
gunfire, and ample close air support loaded and as General Soule started his
may well have prevented the enemy rearguard action to take out his regi-
from concentrating sufficient strength ments and artillery. A battalion from
for strong attacks. Whatever the each regiment stayed on the perimeter
reasons, enemy forces had not yet while the remaining infantry and the
launched a large-scale assault.69 artillery outloaded and while the divi-
Although an additional unit, a regi- sions 10th Engineer Combat Battalion
ment of the North Korean 1st Division, and Navy underwater demolition teams
was identified near the northeastern prepared port facilities for destruction.
anchor of the corps perimeter on 20 At the same time, the last corps sup-
December, enemy attacks diminished plies, the port operating units, and as
on the 20th and 21st as the last troops many of the remaining refugees as
of the 7th Division embarked and sailed possible were put aboard ship. After
for Pusan. General Barrs troops com- General Almond made a final inspec-
pleted their redeployment on the 27th tion ashore, seven platoons established
and moved into an assembly around strongpoints near the beaches to pro-
Yongchon, west of the new X Corps tect the embarkation of the remainder
headquarters at Kyongju.70 of the covering battalions and the bulk
New but still small attacks harassed of the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion.
the 3d Division on the 22d as General In the final steps, Admiral Doyles war-
Soules 7th, 65th, and 15th Regiments ships laid down a wide barrage about a
from west to east stood at the second mile and a half inland as the last pla-
toons of the covering force outloaded bombs, and about 200 drums of oil and
and as the 10th Engineer Combat Bat- gasoline had not been taken out, but
talion and Navy demolition teams blew all of this [had] added to the loud-
up the port before leaving the beaches ness of the final blowup of the part of
aboard LVTs and LCMs shortly after Hungnam. 73 A remarkable number of
1430.72 refugees, over 86,000, had been lifted
By Christmas Eve the ships carrying out of Hungnam since the 11th. In-
the last X Corps troops and supplies cluding those evacuated from Wonsan
were well out of Hungnam harbor en and Songjin, the total number of civil-
route to Pusan and to Ulsan, a small ians taken out of northeastern Korea
port thirty miles north of Pusan. They reached 98,100. About the same num-
left behind no serviceable equipment ber had been left behind for lack of
or usable supplies. About 200 tons of shipping space.74
ammunition, a like amount of frozen
dynamite, 500 thousand-pound aerial
73 Col Edward H. Forney, Special After Action
Report, Deputy Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 Aug-Dec
72 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; X Corps PIR 50, p. 14.
89, 24 Dec 50; X Corps POR 89, 24 Dec 50; Dolcater, 74 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Field, United
3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 102. States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 304.
KWP-EBB-0195
CHAPTER IX
of command of the Eighth Army with Washington, at dawn the next day, he
instructions that his message, translated flew to Seoul, where the handful of staff
as necessary, be read by all officers and officers he found deepened his resolve
by as many enlisted men as possible. to remedy the headquarters arrange-
You will have my utmost, he advised ment.7 He planned not only to redis-
his new command. I shall expect tribute his staff but also to move the
yours.6 forward command post to a more cen-
Reaching the main Eighth Army tral location from where he could reach
headquarters at Taegu late on the 26th, all corps and divisions in minimum
Ridgway was displeased at finding the time.8
bulk of his staff so far to the rear, a Following a staff conference and
matter he resolved to correct eventually. meetings with American Ambassador
His immediate step was to get to the John J. Muccio and President Rhee in
army forward command post. In battle
dress for the first time since leaving 7 Later Ridgways daily garb would include a gre-
nade hooked to the right suspender of his web equip-
6 Eighth Army GO 215, 26 Dec 50; Rad, H 50965 ment and a first aid packet to the left. These items
KCG, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 26 Dec became his trademark.
50; MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli- 8 Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 116, 203, 219; MS, Ridgway,
cies, pp. 353-54. The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 353, 390.
KWP-EBB-0200
Seoul, Ridgway began a four-day re- Corps sector. Next east, the Turkish
connaissance of the line B front that brigade overlooked the Han River estu-
took him to all corps and divisions ex- ary from the upper end of the Kimpo
cept the ROK Capital Division on the peninsula. Above the Han, the 25th
east coast, whose sector was quiet and Division, to which the Turks and Rang-
unthreatened by impending enemy ers were attached, straddled Route 1
action.9 along the lower bank of the Imjin River,
By evening of the 30th he was back and the ROK 1st Division defended the
at Eighth Army main in Taegu, much corps right from positions along the
disturbed by what he had learned. The Imjin reaching northeast almost to
Eighth Army was clearly a dispirited Route 33 in the Wonsan-Seoul corridor.
command. I could sense it the moment The British 29th Brigade was assem-
I came into a command post . . . I could bled in I Corps reserve along Route 1
read it in the faces of. . . leaders, from just outside Seoul. 12
sergeants right on up to the top. They The IX Corps lay across the Wonsan-
were unresponsive, reluctant to talk. I Seoul corridor along the 38th parallel,
had to drag information out of them. the ROK 6th Division astride Route 33
There was a complete absence of that at the left, the 24th Division across
alertness, that aggressiveness, that you Route 3 at the right. In corps reserve,
find in troops whose spirit is high.10 the British 27th Brigade was assembled
The attack that Ridgway had hoped near the junction of Routes 33 and 3 at
would be possible he now considered Uijongbu. The 1st Cavalry Division,
plainly out of the question. He also also in reserve, retained the mission as-
considered it imperative to strengthen signed to it while under army control
the Eighth Army front if his forces were of blocking the Chunchon-Seoul road.
to hold line B. Whether he had time Now attached to the cavalry division
enough to do so was questionable. Ad- were the Filipino battalion and the
ditional evidence of an imminent en- Greek Expeditionary Force, an infan-
emy offensive had appeared as Ridgway try battalion that had reached Korea
reconnoitered the front, and the com- on 8 December.13
ing New Year holiday was now a logical Near the 38th parallel above Chun-
date on which to expect the opening chon, the ROK III Corps defended a
assault. 11 wide sector with the ROK 2d, 5th, and
Unit dispositions along the line had 8th Divisions on line and the ROK 7th
changed little since General Walker Division in reserve. In the narrow ROK
succeeded in manning it. (Map 15) II Corps sector next east, a single divi-
The 8213th Army Unit (Eighth Army sion, the ROK 3d, continued to block
Ranger Company) patrolled Kanghwa Route 24 running southwestward
Island at the extreme west in the I through the Hongchon River valley.
The ROK I Corps defended a gaping
9 Ridgway,
Text Soldier, p. 204; MS, Ridgway, The Korean
War, Issues and Policies, pp. 355-57. 12Situation Overlay, Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 27 Dec
10Ridgway, Soldier, p. 205. 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 28 Dec 50.
11Ibid., p. 209; Memo, Ridgway for Chief of Staff, 13Ibid.; Fox, Inter-Allied Co-operation During
GHQ, 7 Jan 51, copy in CMH. Combat Operations.
KWP-EBB-0201
Vl\
KWP-EBB-0202
line at the Eighth Army right, with the the west, the 187th Airborne Regimen-
ROK 9th Division in the high moun- tal Combat Team, with the Thai battal-
tains at the corps left, and the ROK ion attached, was assembled at Suwon
Capital Division across the slopes and south of Seoul. Outside these forces,
coastal road at the eastern anchor of the only available unit was the ROK
the front.14 11th Division currently operating
Ridgways main reserve for strength- against guerrillas in various locations
ening the front was the X Corps. Other to the south. The 2d Battalion of
resources present or scheduled to ar- Canadas Princess Patricias Light
rive in Korea by the end of the year Infantry had reached Korea in mid-
were exceedingly few. The 2d Division, December but was at Miryang in the
still not fully recovered from its late southeast for eight weeks of training
November losses but now reinforced by before entering battle. Similarly, the
the Netherlands and French battalions, 16th New Zealand Field Regiment, ac-
was centrally located at Chungju. In tually an artillery battalion, due to reach
Korea on the 31st, would require train-
ing before it moved to the front. The
14 Situation Overlay, Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 27 Dec only units en route to Korea that might
50. be able to move forward upon arrival
KWP-EBB-0203
were two U.S. airborne Ranger com- whose main feature was a big red
panies, the 2d and 4th.15 goose egg . . . with 174,000 scrawled
Holding against the threatening en- in the middle of it, Ridgway was
emy offensive, Ridgway judged, rested astounded. Here the enemy was lean-
on committing most of his reserves ing right up against us, but we did not
early and on revitalizing the spirit of know his strength, and we did not have
the Eighth Army. By the time he re- his location pinpointed. He attrib-
turned to Taegu on the 30th he had uted such imprecision directly to the
taken several steps toward achieving Eighth Armys tendency to look over
both. 16 its shoulder. As a result of this ten-
Restoring the Eighth Armys morale dency, the line troops had not main-
and confidence, Ridgway believed, de- tained proper contact with enemy
pended mainly on improving leader- forces or learned enough about the ter-
ship throughout his command, but it rain to their front. He promptly re-
was not his intention to start lopping buked his subordinates for failing to
off heads. Before he would relieve any meet these two basic combat require-
commander, he wanted personally to ments. They were to patrol until they
see more of the man in action, to know had defined the enemys positions and
that the relief would not damage the determined the strengths of units op-
unit involved, and, indeed, to be sure posite them, and he warned that he
that he had a better commander avail- didnt want to ask any man where a
able. For the time being, he intended trail went and have him tell me he
to correct deficiencies by working on didnt know.l9
and through his current corps and di- Ridgway did receive another intelli-
vision commanders. One deficiency he gence report that, if unacceptably
had noted was that many commanders imprecise, was more than a goose
conducted operations from command egg estimate of the opposition. The
posts far behind the front. To correct 174,000, Colonel Tarkenton ex-
this practice, he ordered division com- plained, was the estimated strength of
manders to be up with their forward the Chinese XIII Army Group. The
battalions, and . . . corps commanders groups six armies, each with a strength
up with the regiment that was in the of 29,000, were either along the Eighth
hottest action. 17 Army front or in the immediate enemy
He saw further weaknesses in leader- rear area. Tarkenton believed three
ship and staff work in the intelligence North Korean corps totaling 65,800
briefings he received. Confronted dur- men also were at the front and that a
ing one of the first briefings with a map fourth was approaching it.20
The greatest enemy strength seemed
to be massed opposite the Eighth
15 Eighth Army G3 Jnls, 27-31 Dec 50; Fox, Inter-
Allied Co-operation During Combat Operations.
16 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli- 18Ridgway, Soldier, p. 205.
cies, p. 358. 19Interv, Mossman, Carroll. and Miller with Ridg-
17Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen J. Lawton Collins, 8 Jan way, 30 Nov 56; Ridgway, Soldier, p. 206.
51, copy in CMH; Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and 20 EighthArmy G2 SS Rpt, Dec 50, Enemy Situa-
Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56; Ridgway, Soldier, pp. tion-special Report for the Army Commander:
206-07. Ridgway, Soldier, p. 209.
KWP-EBB-0204
sembly area to the battle zone was eight ble in the west. As soon as General
to ten days. Once forward, the X Corps Soule finished reorganizing and re-
was to operate with the initial mission equipping his forces he was to move
of destroying any enemy penetration them into the Pyongtaek-Ansong area
of the South Korean front above it and forty miles south of Seoul and prepare
of protecting the IX Corps east flank.28 them for operations in either the I or
Ridgway gave Almond detailed in- IX Corps sector.30
structions on the 30th. Having learned
that the 7th Division would be ready Establishing the Seoul Bridgehead
ahead of the other two divisions, he di-
While reinforcing the South Korean
rected Almond to move one of its regi-
sector of the front, Ridgway also deep-
ments the next day to Chechon, twenty
ened the defense of Seoul. After con-
miles below Wonju, where Route 60
ferences with General Milburn and
and a mountain road coming from the
General Coulter on the 27th, he in-
east and northeast joined Route 29.
structed them to organize a bridgehead
When Almond could get the remain-
above Seoul along a line curving from
der of General Barrs forces forward,
the north bank of the Han west of Seoul
he was to assemble the 7th near the 2d
through a point just below Uijongbu at
so that both divisions could be deployed
the junction of Routes 33 and 3 to the
quickly against any enemy penetration
north and back to the Han east of the
from the direction of Chunchon and
city. The bridgehead would be deep
Inje or from the east toward Hoengsong
enough to keep the Han bridges below
and Wonju. Almond subsequently could
Seoul free of enemy artillery fire. The
expect to occupy a sector of the front.
position therefore would be suitable for
In the meantime, he was to develop
covering a general withdrawal below
Route 29 southeastward from Wonju
Seoul that might accompany or follow
through Chechon, Tanyang, Yongju,
the occupation of the bridgehead line.31
and Andong as the main X Corps sup-
Milburn and Coulter each were to
ply route.29
place a division on the bridgehead line
On the last day of the year Ridgway
if the expected enemy attack forced
placed the 1st Marine and 3d Divi-
them to vacate their line B positions.
sions in army reserve. When fully re-
Ridgway at first restricted any I and IX
furbished, the marines were to move
from Masan to an east coast assembly
in the Yongchon-Kyongju-Pohang- 30 Rads, GX 20295 KGOO and GX 20332 KGOO,
dong area and prepare to occupy block- CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 30 and 31 Dec 50;
Rad, GX 20335 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 1st
ing positions wherever needed to the Marine Div, 31 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 31 Dec
north. The 3d Division was to reassem- 50.
31 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli-
cies, p. 356; Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 207-08; Rad, GX
28 Rad, GX 20217 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 10009 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I and IX
Eighth Army Fwd, for Gen Ridgway from Gen Allen, Corps, 28 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 28 Dec 50.
28 Dec 50; Rad, G 10014 KCG, Dep CofS Eighth Most of the fortification work at the bridgehead line
Army Adv to CofS Eighth Army Main, 29 Dec 50. was to be done by South Korean laborers. During the
29 X Corps CG Diary, 30 Dec 50; Rad, GX 20294 meeting with President Rhee on the 27th, Ridgway
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 30 Dec 50; asked him for 30,000 civilian laborers to be employed
Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 30 Dec 50; Rad, GX 20329 in building fortifications above and below Seoul, and
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 31 Dec 50. Rhee provided the first 10,000 by dawn on the 28th.
KWP-EBB-0207
Corps withdrawal from the present 72d Tank Battalion to the west for at-
front to his own personal order. But tachment to the IX Corps, which might
on reconsidering the high estimate of use it to punish an enemy advance on
Chinese strength opposite the two corps, Seoul.34
the tendency of some South Korean Anticipating an opening enemy at-
units to break under pressure, and the tack toward the capital on New Years
demonstrated Chinese preference for Day, Ridgway returned there on the
night attacks, he realized that this re- afternoon of the 31st.35 According to
striction could create a costly delay Colonel Tarkentons latest intelligence
should Milburn and Coulter be unable estimate, enemy forces were fully de-
to contact him promptly. He therefore ployed. In the west, the North Korean
authorized the two corps commanders I Corps straddled Route 1 at the Imjin
to withdraw on their own at any time with the Chinese 50th Army concentrated
they agreed that it was necessary but just behind it; the 39th Army had spread
could not reach him.32 out near the Imjin between Routes 1
No matter who gave the order, and 33; the 38th Army sat astride Route
Ridgway insisted that a withdrawal to 33 below Yonch'on with the 40th Army
the bridgehead be more than a mere assembled to its rear; and the 66th Army
move from one line to another; both lay across Routes 3 and 17, its forces
corps were to attack enemy forces who pointed at both Uijongbu and
followed. The terrain could accommo- Chunchon, with the 42d Army backing
date this tactic, especially in the Wonsan- it up at Kumhwa.36
Seoul corridor where the enemy would Farther east, the full North Korean
be obliged to use routes surrounded by V Corps, previously in the area now
higher ground. Ridgway expected occupied by the 66th Army, had joined
Milburn and Coulter to leave strong the North Korean II Corps in the re-
forces of infantry and armor posted in gion between and below Hwachon and
this high ground as the two corps with- Inje. This concentration, the expected
drew; these forces would strike advanc- arrival of the North Korean III Corps
ing enemy units and disrupt the follow- in the same area, and the probability
up before they themselves moved back that forces from the Chinese IX Army
to the bridgehead.33 Group would move down into the same
region from Hungnam represented, in
Ridgway Returns to Seoul Tarkentons estimation, a sufficient
In smaller steps taken before the year force to exploit successfully the North
was out, Ridgway attached the 2d Ranger Korean gains already registered in the
Company to the 1st Cavalry Division in east.37
the west and the 4th Ranger Company
34 Eighth Army GO 219, 30 Dec 50; Eighth Army
to the 7th Division in the east. Since the G3 Jnl, 30 and 31 Dec 50.
2d Division was operating in the Wonju 35 "It is not enough [for a commander] to move in
area where the surrounding mountains response to critical situations, they must be antici-
pated. Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and Miller with
prohibited armor, he ordered McClures Ridgway, 30 Nov 56.
36 Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen Collins, 3 Jan 51, copy
32MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli- in CMH; Eighth Army PIR 172, 31 Dec 50.
cies, p. 369. 37 Eighth Army PIRs 171, 30 Dec 50, and 172, 31
33Ibid., p. 365; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 28 Dec 50. Dec 50.
KWP-EBB-0208
The preponderance of enemy forces hard at the ROK 6th Division on the
above Seoul still pointed to a main ef- IX Corps left while the 114th Division,
fort against the South Korean capital 38th Army, opened smaller, intermittent
over the Uijongbu-Seoul axis. In addi- assaults against the 24th Division at the
tion, enemy artillery positions sighted IX Corps right. Two hours later the
from the air disclosed a large number 66th Army sent forces against the ROK
of guns generally astride an extension 5th Division in the center of the ROK
of the I and IX Corps boundary, all III Corps sector and near 0500 hit the
well disposed to support an attack ROK 2d Division
at the ROK III Corps
through the Wonsan-Seoul corridor.
Further, aerial observers had spotted In grand tactics, the Chinese New
an enemy buildup of bridging materi- Years offensive, or Third Phase Offen-
als near the Imjin. Prisoners confirmed sive as the Chinese called it, resembled
these indications. Several revealed that their previous effort, strong forces push-
a main offensive toward Seoul would ing a main attack in the west while other
open on the night of 31 December, and forces threatened envelopment in the
an officer from the 38th Army said that east. The hardjolts of the 38th and 39th
the offensive would begin with a coor- Armies against the I and IX Corps aimed
dinated attack by the 38th, 39th, 40th, the main Chinese effort generally south
and 42d Armies.38 astride Route 33 toward Seoul. The
66th Armys attacks against the ROK III
Corps farther east widened the Chinese
The Opening Enemy Assaults
advance to a front of forty-five miles
Ridgway had judged the signs cor- but were pointed mainly at Kapyong,
rectly. As he flew into Seoul and visited thirty-five miles northeast of Seoul and
the western front by jeep during the twelve miles west of Chunchon. Sei-
afternoon of the 31st, vanguards of the zure of Kapyong, situated as it was on
116th Division, 39th Army, moved down the Chunchon-Seoul road, could be
to the Imjin near Korangp'o-ri and the beginning of a flanking movement
forced outposts of the ROK 1st Divi- against Seoul or the start of a deeper
sion to withdraw below the river. Be- sweep to envelop the city. It also posed
hind a thirty-minute artillery prepara- the danger of envelopment to the South
tion, forces of the 116th then crossed Korean forces defending Chunchon,
the Imjin just after full dark to attack forces whose positions already were
the ROK divisions main defenses.39 threatened by the deep North Korean
From this opening at the I Corps salient in the Hongchon area.41
right, the XIII Army Group commander The 38th and 39th Armies reinforced
broadened his attack eastward. Around the main drive during the night but
midnight units of the Division and
116th kept it massed near the I - IX Corps
of the 113th Division, 38th Army, struck boundary. The 25th Division on the left
flank of the I Corps was not touched,
38 Ibid.
and attacks against the 24th Division
39 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR
173, 1 Jan 51; FEC Intel Dig, no. 115, l-15 Feb 53; 40 Ibid.;IX Corps PIR 97, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps POR
24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Ltr, Ridgway to 293, 1 Jan 51.
Collins, 3 Jan 51; Ridgway, Soldier, p. 209. 41 Ibid.
KWP-EBB-0209
on the IX Corps right, though numer- fore it could escape the trap. From this
ous, remained small and ineffective. Ei- point the edges of the V-shaped enemy
ther by a decision to single out the inte- salient driven into the right half of the
rior ROK 1st and 6th Divisions or by ROK 1st Division sector traced second-
the coincidence of their adjoining posi- ary Route 5Y northwestward to the
tions athwart Route 33, the Chinese Imjin through the middle of General
concentrated on wedging through the Paiks sector and traced secondary Route
South Koreans, particularly the 1st 11 northward, not far west of the I-IX
Division.42 Corps boundary.44
The reinforced night attack of the From reports reaching Eighth Army
Division against the ROK 1st Divi-
116th headquarters through the night, Gen-
sion shoved the 12th Regiment out of eral Ridgway suspected that the Chi-
position on the division right and sent nese advance toward Seoul was fast be-
its troops streaming to the rear. Gen- coming more than the I and IX Corps
eral Paik tried to refill the vacated sec- could handle. No more than three Chi-
tor with his reserve 15th Regiment, but nese divisions so far had been identi-
that regiment and the 11th on the divi- fied in the assault in the west, but the
sion left were hit hard and forced back Chinese, in all logic, would exploit their
to the south and west, leaving much gains in the ROK 1st Division sector
ground open to Chinese exploitation. and could commit additional divisions
The ROK 6th Division fared better, giv- with no great delay. A paucity of re-
ing little ground to the 116th and 113th ports left Ridgway somewhat in the
Divisions, but by daylight faced a threat dark about what was happening in the
of entrapment, posed to some extent South Korean sectors farther east. Al-
by enemy groups who managed to work though American advisers, the main
into its rear area but posed most seri- sources of information on ROK Army
ously by those forces of the 116th cut- operations, were at the principal South
ting deep through the ROK 1st Divi- Korean headquarters, breakdowns in
sion to its left.43 communication between front line and
The deepest point of Chinese pene- headquarters seemed to be the rule
tration by daylight on 1 January had rather than the exception in ROK units.
been marked by Battery C of the U.S. Ridgway nevertheless was aware that
9th Field Artillery Battalion, which had Chinese forces had hit the ROK III
been supporting the ROK 1st Division Corps, a portent that made the I and
from positions behind the 12th Regi- IX Corps positions even less tenable.45
ment. When the battery withdrew after By the time Ridgway started north
the 12th abandoned its position, the ar- out of Seoul near dawn on New Years
tillery column was caught in an ambush Day toward the sectors of the ROK 1st
about eight miles south of the Imjin and 6th Divisions, he had few doubts
and lost four 155-mm. howitzers be- that he would have to withdraw from
line B. His concern heightened to alarm
a few miles north when he met trucks
42 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR
173, 1 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; I Corps POR
332, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps POR 293, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps
PIR 97, 1 Jan 51. 44 Ibid.
43 Ibid. 45 Ibid.; Ridgway, Soldier, p. 210.
KWP-EBB-0210
packed with South Korean troops. No up Route 1 from Seoul toward a for-
weapons other than a few rifles were in ward assembly behind the 25th Division.
sight. He sensed immediately that the From there the British were to attack
South Koreans were running and northeast into the flank of the enemy
jumped from his jeep to wave the trucks salient. Ridgway discouraged this move,
to a halt. But he might as well had believing a counterattack to have any
tried to stop the flow of the Han. The chance at all would require at least a
most he could do was order straggler full American division. But such a com-
points established where retreating mitment seemed neither wise nor feasi-
troops could be stopped and reassem- ble. The two nearest U.S. divisions were
bled.46 the 25th and 24th. The 25th, though
The episode on the road, as Ridgway still not directly involved except for hav-
discovered when he visited the I and ing received mortar and artillery fire,
IX Corps headquarters before noon, was the only unit standing before the
had not signaled the collapse of the two North Korean I Corps and the Chinese
ROK divisions. The bulk of both was 50th Army. The 24th on the opposite
still forward, and both were attempt- flank had been hit hard after daylight,
ing to erect defenses along the shoul- apparently by all three regiments of the
ders of the Chinese penetration. Gen- 114th Division, and had backed away to
eral Paik was setting his 11th and 15th positions two miles south. Even if one
Regiments across hills overlooking Route of these divisions were to be used,
5Y along the southwestern shoulder, a Ridgway saw no way, in view of their
small part of the 15th stood below the dispositions on the flanks, that a coun-
point of the wedge, and about half the terattack could be started in less than
12th Regiment was now loosely assem- forty-eight ho-m-s. Such an effort, he
bled some two miles below the deepest judged, would be too late since the Chi-
penetration. On the other side of the nese were not only maintaining strong
salient, Brig. Gen. Chang Do Yong, pressure but, according to early morn-
commander of the ROK 6th Division, ing air reports of heavy troop move-
was moving his reserve 2d Regiment ments down Route 33 from the direc-
into position along Route 33 to refuse tion of Chorwon, also were showing
his left flank. Rearward along this long clear signs of further reinforcing their
open flank, General Coulter had or- advance.48
dered the British 27th Brigade from From additional reports reaching
Uijongbu into blocking positions near Ridgway by noon of the 1st, he now
Tokchong, eight miles north, where a knew that the ROK III Corps had been
road coming southeastward out of the under attack since early morning, that
area invested by Chinese joined Route the ROK 2d and 5th Divisions at the
33.47 corps left and center had received the
General Milburn, Ridgway learned, attacks, and that the heaviest assaults
had started the British 29th Brigade
48 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; Msg, G3 I Corps
46 Ridgway, Soldier, p. 210. to G3 IX Corps, in IX Corps G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; I Corps
47 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; I Corps POR 333, POR 333. 1 Jan 51: IX Corps POR 294, 1 Ian 51:
1 Jan 51; IX Corps G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps POR Ridgway, Memo for Cofs GHQ, 7 Jan 51, copy in
294, 1 Jan 51. CsMH.
KWP-EBB-0211
had hit the 5th. While these reports still the east to line C. Although having to
gave Ridgway scant information, they call a withdrawal only six days after he
made plain that the Chinese were mov- had taken command of the Eighth Army
ing on a broad front and pointed out was disappointing and was certainly
more sharply the possibility of a flank- contrary to his original intention of at-
ing or enveloping move against Seoul. tacking or at least standing fast, he gave
From this clearer picture of the General Milburn and General Coulter
Ch'unch'on sector and the circumstances withdrawal orders at noon.49
facing the I and IX Corps in the west,
Ridgway was fully convinced that the
wisest moves were to withdraw the lat-
49 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; Rad, GX 10023
ter two corps to the Seoul bridgehead KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 2 Jan 51; Ltr,
and to pull all South Korean forces in Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0212
CHAPTER X
The British brigade, having moved less it is clear that their relief will result
north under Milburns previous order by [sic] the loss of equal or greater
to counterattack, needed only to march numbers. Ridgway, in any case, had
east to reach its bridgehead position not designed the Seoul bridgehead as a
which it occupied by 1800.5 Taking last-stop position, and he counter-
longer to make a covered withdrawal manded Milburns instructions.7
from line B, although without enemy Milburn had ordered the ROK 1st
contact, the 25th Division was fully de- Division to wait until daylight on the
ployed at the bridgehead by midnight 2d to withdraw. On the way back Gen-
after establishing outposts astride eral Paik was to drop off a regiment to
Route 1 some three miles above its main reinforce the British brigade at the
position.6 bridgehead, then take his remaining
Milburn inadvertently collided with forces into defenses along the lower
Ridgway by ordering General Kean and bank of the Han directly beneath Seoul.
the British brigade commander, Briga- Through the afternoon of the 1st,
dier Thomas Brodie, to defend the Paiks forces received several heavy at-
bridgehead at all costs. Ridgway tacks and backed off about three miles
claimed such an order as his preroga- to the southwest as the Chinese began
tive. Milburns directive also ran some- to widen their wedge. After a lull last-
what counter to what Ridgway consid- ing almost to midnight, the Chinese
ered an important step in restoring again tested Paiks position, pushing
confidence among the rank and file, light forces south against a battalion of
that of assuring them that their safety the 15th Regiment at the point of the
was an immediate concern of their com- salient. This push proved preliminary
manders. He expected his command to to a hard attack at 0300 that sliced
fight hard, but he also was doing through the battalion and carried the
everything I could think of to impress Chinese two miles south before its im-
upon the Corps and Division Com- petus faded.8
manders that no unit was to be left to Though still engaged at daylight,
be overwhelmed and destroyed; that the South Koreans had not given any
any units that are cut off will not be more ground. Paik broke contact by
abandoned, but will be fought for un- regiment, sending each southwest to
Pongilchon-ni on Route 1 where Mil-
burn had assembled trucks to carry
5 Brigadier Thomas Brodie, the brigade com- Paiks forces the remaining distance
mander, noted in his order of the day that this was
the brigades first appearance at the front since its
south. By midnight the 11th Regiment
arrival in Korea: At last after weeks of frustration we joined the British, and the remainder
have nothing between us and the Chinese. I have no
intention that this Brigade Group will retire before
the enemy unless ordered by higher authority in or-
der to conform with general movement. If you meet 7 Courier Msg, CG I Corps to CG 25th Div et al.,
him you are to knock hell out of him with everything 011400 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 1 Jan 51;
you have got. You are only to give ground on my MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies,
orders. Order of the Day, Brig Thomas Brodie, Com- p. 368.
manding 29 Independent Infantry Brigade Group, 1 8 Courier Msg, CG I Corns to CG 25th Div et al.,
Jan 51, copy in I Corps G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51. 011400 Jan 51; Msg, CG I Corps to CG 29th Brit Brig
6 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 1 and CG 1st ROK Inf Div, 011630 Jan 51; I Corps
Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. PORs 333 and 334. 1 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 2 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0214
of the division was spreading out to oc- regiments manned bridgehead sectors
cupy its river position below Seoul. 9 before midnight, tying in with the at-
In the IX Corps sector, General tached 7th Cavalry, which earlier had
Coulter planned to withdraw to the occupied the southeastern end of the
bridgehead in two steps: to line Wolf, a bridgehead. 12
delaying position fifteen miles below In taking the ROK 6th Division
line B, then to the bridgehead itself an- off line B, General Chang originally
other eight miles south. He opened the planned to move cross-country to Tok-
first step at 1400 on the 1st, leaving the chong, then use Route 33 to pass be-
move below the Wolf line to be taken hind the British 27th Brigade and
when mutually agreed by the 24th and complete his move. But before the divi-
ROK 6th Division commanders. He di- sion got under way, Chinese forces
rected the 24th Division, reinforced by pushed out of the salient in the adja-
the 7th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry cent ROK 1st Division area and occu-
Division, to man the bridgehead line pied Tokchong. To avoid having to
and the ROK 6th Division and remain- fight through the town, Chang elected
der of the 1st Cavalry Division to oc- to withdraw cross-country all the way.13
cupy line C along the lower bank of the Unlike the 24th Divisions easy de-
Han eastward from a point opposite parture from line B, the 2d Regiment
the right flank of the bridgehead.10 covering the remainder of the ROK 6th
Left to their own devices, General from positions facing both north and
Church and General Chang planned west close by the division and corps
no stay at the Wolf line except that left boundary suffered heavy casualties
Church would leave two battalions from hard attacks by Chinese coming
there to help cover both divisions. They out of the ROK 1st Division area and
also would have cover on the vulnera- down Route 33. A prisoner taken from
ble west flank from the British 27th a group advancing along Route 33 iden-
Brigade now in position just below tified his unit as the 118th Division,
Tokchong near the west end of line 40th Army, apparently the force sighted
Wolf. 11 earlier in the day moving south from
Each division protected its own ini- Chorwon.14
tial withdrawal. The 24th, in a column After breaking contact, the 2d Regi-
of regiments with the covering forces ment, like the remainder of the divi-
falling in at the tail end, moved with- sion that had started south through the
out contact down Route 3 to Uijongbu hills before it, ran into small groups of
at the left anchor of the corps bridge- Chinese who previously had infiltrated
head position. Behind the two battal- the divisions lines. For reasons that
ions left at the Wolf line, Churchs three never became entirely clear, but proba-
bly because of these encounters and the
9 I Corps PORs 335 and 336, 2 Jan 5I; I Corps G3 difficulties of moving cross-country, the
Jnl, 2 Jan 51.
10IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Opn
Plan 6, 29 Dec 50; Change 1 to IsX Corps Opn Plan 6, 12IX Corps G3 Msg File, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd
29 Dec 50; IX Corps Opn Dir 20, 1 Jan 51. Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
11IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army 13IX Corpss G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51.
G3 Jnl, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps POR 294, 1 Jan 51; 24th 14IX Corps G3 Msg File, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR
Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 174, 2 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0215
division broke up into disorganized further encounter the brigade and Gen-
groups before it reached the Wolf line. eral Churchs two covering battalions
By dark General Chang had lost all con- withdrew from the Wolf line before
trol of his forces.15 midnight, the battalions rejoining their
To assist the withdrawal, Coulter regiments while the British assembled
had established an entrucking point on near the northeastern limits of Seoul as
Route 33 about three miles north of a reserve for the fully committed 24th
Seoul where Changs forces were to be Division. 18
directed for motor lift to their line C
position. By daylight on the 3d only
The Outlook, 2 January
the equivalent of four battalions had
assembled at that point. General Chang On the 2d, as the ROK 1st and 6th
used a IX Corps plane to search for his Divisions made their way back to Seoul
troops during the morning, and addi- and as the remainder of the I and IX
tional entrucking points were set up to Corps settled more solidly into their
accelerate the movement of troops as bridgehead and line C positions, the
they filtered south. About ninety truck- deepest known point of Chinese ad-
loads were carried south of the Han vance had been marked by the previ-
through the day, but the head count, ous nights engagements with the Brit-
even at 0900 on 3 January, stood ish at Tokchong. Chinese forces were
at only six thousand, or about half at least within nine miles of the bridge-
the divisions original strength; of head and probably nearer. In view of
these, only twenty-five hundred were the rate of advance the Chinese had
infantry. 16 sustained so far, attacks could be ex-
As the disorganization of the ROK pected at the bridgehead on the 3d.
6th Division became apparent, Coulter The next attacks probably would be
ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to stronger than those at line B. Four divi-
spread out into the line C sector pre- sions now had been identified in the I
viously assigned to Chang. Since and IX Corps sectors, and a fifth had
Coulter had given the 7th Cavalry to hit the ROK 5th Division in the ROK
the 24th Division and also had taken I II Corps sector. These five, while
the bulk of the 5th Cavalry to reconsti- not a great number, represented four
tute a corps reserve after moving the armies, the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 66th.
British 27th Brigade to Tokchong, Gen- These armies could, and very likely
eral Gay hasd to stretch his remaining would, commit additional divisions.
forces thin to cover the two division Moreover, the 50th Army, known to be
sectors.17 in the Kaesong area, could easily join
Meanwhile, between 1700 and 2130 the offensive by moving on Seoul via
on the 1st, the British 27th Brigade had Route 1, and the 42d Army, concen-
driven off three small Chinese groups trated near Kumhwa, could advance
at its Tokchong position. But without toward Seoul over Route 3 or south
toward Kapyong and Chunchon. route from Kyongju in the far south-
The Seoul bridgehead was, at best, east were the X Corps 92d and 96th
precarious. 19 Field Artillery Battalions. Reasoning
Further testimony on just how pre- that General Almonds artillery could
carious the position was came from en- best be used against the main enemy
gineers on duty at the Han bridges who effort, Ridgway had ordered the two
reported on the 2d that the river was battalions forward in the west; they
frozen solid enough to support foot were to be divided between the I and
traffic, as evidenced by Korean civil- IX Corps. He also ordered the 3d Divi-
ians leaving the Seoul area. The forces sion to move two regiments and a com-
above the city faced not only the likeli- mand group to the Ansong-Pyongtaek
hood of strong frontal attacks and the region on 4 January and to bring its
chance of being enveloped by enemy remaining units forward as soon as it
forces to the east but also the possibility became possible to transport them. All
of being trapped by enemy forces cross- but one company of the 72d Tank
ing the ice just outside the flanks of the Battalion, previously taken from the 2d
bridgehead.20 Division, now had joined the IX Corps
Civilians moving in large numbers to- and been attached to the 24th Division.
ward the bridgehead from the area just The remaining company was en route
vacated as well as south out of the Seoul to Suwon to join the 187th Airborne
area posed additional dangers. Enemy Regimental Combat Team, which
forces could use the civilian movement Ridgway had alerted for counterattacks,
toward the bridgehead as cover for particularly in the Yangpyong and
their own advance, and, to the rear, Yoju areas, two Han River crossing sites
any mass milling on the main lines of on the IX Corps right flank twenty-five
communication could seriously inter- and forty miles southeast of Seoul.22
fere with troop and supply movements. Ridgways instructions to Brig. Gen.
Ridgway consequently issued instruc- Frank S. Bowen, Jr.s combat team were
tions on 2 January that refugees were a hedge against a surprise appearance
not to be permitted to pass through a of enemy forces pushing in from the
forward position and that those mov- northeast or east. Indeed, what had
ing out of the Seoul-Inchon area were happened or was likely to happen in
to be levered away from Route 1 to the South Korean corps sectors re-
lesser roads on either side.21 mained difficult for Ridgway to ascer-
By nightfall on the 2d Ridgway com- tain. From reports reaching him on the
pleted or started several other moves
to strengthen his position in the west. 22 Ibid.; Rad, GX--1-3 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to
The Thailand battalion, previously with CGs I, IX, and X Corps, 31 Dec 50; Rid, GX-l-82
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG
the 187th Airborne Regimental Com-
187th Abn RCT, 1 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-101 KGOO,
bat Team at Suwon, joined the British CG Eighth Army to CG, IX Corps and CG 187th Abn
29th Brigade in the bridgehead. En RCT, 2 Jan 51; Eighth Army POR 520, 1 Jan 51;
Rad, GX-1-138 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 3d
Inf Div, 2 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 2 Jan 51;
19 Eighth Army PIR 174, 2 Jan 51. Eighth Army G3 Briefing for CG, 3 Jan 51; Eighth
20 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 2 Jan 51. Army G3 Jnl, 3 Jan 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar,
21 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0217
2d he knew that the ROK Capital Divi- The corps lineup was to include the
sion on the east coast had reached line U.S. 2d and 7th Divisions and the ROK
C without contact, but about the most 2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions. General Al-
that could be positively said of the re- mond was to block enemy advances
maining ROK divisions was that no one from the direction of Chunchon as
knew for sure where the were or what well as from the northeast and east out
condition they were in. 23 of the North Korean salient. This as-
The ROK 2d Division on the ROK signment gave Almond the immediate
III Corps left apparently was in bad task of locating and gaining control of
shape. One regiment was reported to the three South Korean divisions, and
be almost completely disorganized. The he had yet to bring up the remainder
other two were believed to be cut off of the 7th Division from the south. For
about live miles north of Kapyong by the time being, his defense would de-
66th Army forces who had moved in be- pend mainly on the U.S. 2d Division.26
hind the 2d after penetrating the left With the intention of establishing po-
flank of the ROK 5th Division. Ridgway sitions below the North Korean salient,
knew nothing about the ROK 5th and Ridgway ordered the ROK III Corps
8th Divisions but had received an air to take control of the ROK 9th Division
observers report that Chunchon had and use it along with the ROK 7th
fallen during the afternoon of the 2d. Division to organize a line through the
The one ROK III Corps unit he could steeper mountains between the X Corps
definitely locate was the reserve 7th and the ROK I Corps. But the ROK
Division, which, except for a missing 9th Division was scattered, and two
regiment, was assembling twenty miles of its regiments were reported sur-
northwest of Wonju.24 rounded. This situation and the ROK
The most Ridgway knew about the 7th Divisions current location far to the
ROK 3d Division was that it was slowly west in the new X Corps sector posed
backing out of its ROK II Corps sector problems of movement and consolida-
and moving southwestward over Route tion not easily solved.27
24 toward Hongchon. According to Similarly, Ridgway directed the ROK
plans, the division would continue I Corps to take control of the ROK 3d
south until it could move laterally Division and emplace it in the moun-
below the North Korean salient and tains west of the Capital Division. This,
assemble at Pyongchang, twenty-five though, could be done only after the
miles east of Wonju.25 3d Division completed its circuitous
In an attempt to stabilize the line in march from the west. In the meantime
the central region, Ridgway ordered the there would be no forces between the
X Corps to assume responsibility on 3 Capital Division on the east coast and
January for a 35-mile sector of line C the 2d Division in and above Wonju
centered approximately on Route 29. capable of withstanding a North Ko-
rean push south out of the Hongchon
23 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 2 Jan 51; Eighth Army PORs salient.28
521, 522, and 523, 2 Jan 51.
24 Ibid.; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 26 Ibid.; Eighth Army Opn 0 109, 2 Jan 51
25 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 2 Jan 51; Eighth Army PORs 27 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Jan 51.
521, 522, and 523, 2 Jan 51. 28 Ibid.
KWP-EBB-0218
Faced with these near-chaotic condi- 29th Brigade, opening a strong attack
tions in the east and the imminent on the Northumberland Fusiliers at the
arrival of Chinese forces at the bridge- brigade right at 0730 and then striking
head, Ridgway reminded his forces that still harder at the Royal Ulster Rifles
they would defend their positions only on the left. The Fusiliers gave ground
as long as they could do so without risk and two companies of the Rifles were
of being enveloped or trapped. The overrun, but counterattacks by infan-
danger of entrapment applied espe- try and tanks recaptured the lost posi-
cially to the I and IX Corps. Yet, while tions in midafternoon and forced the
he attached this limit to the defense of Chinese to disengage.31
the bridgehead, he did not intend that In the IX Corps sector, leading units
Milburn and Coulter adopt only an of the 40th and 38th Armies opened light
alert wait-and-see attitude. On the pre- jabs and small arms fire against the
vious day, through either lack of effort 24th Division about 0500. The small
or lack of opportunity, neither Milburn attacks-the largest by a company at
nor Coulter had executed the punish- the division left-hit but failed to pene-
ing attacks Ridgway had directed. Ir- trate the 21st Infantry and finally died
ritated by this failure, Ridgway per- out at midmorning. In the 19th Infan-
sonnally made it clear to both corps try sector to the east of the 21st, the 2d
commanders on the 2d that these Battalion steadily lost ground to attacks
attacks would be made.29 that grew from company to regiment
in size. Counterattacks well supported
by air and artillery restored the battal-
The Evacuation of Seoul ion line early in the afternoon, but not
The Chinese first hit the Seoul without a continued contest for the
bridgehead from the northwest along ground regained.32
Route 1. The 50th Army sent forces By noon on the 3d the attacks on the
against the I Corps left, those in the bridgehead convinced Ridgway that a
van reaching the outpost line of the withdrawal below Seoul had to start
25th Division just before 0300 on the soon. While the assaults themselves
3d. Forced back by the encounter, the were not overwhelming, they laid the
outpost troops passed behind the main proverbial final straw on a heavy bur-
division position two hours later. Either den of other problems and disadvan-
pursuing troops of the 50th or west tages. The administrative and logistical
flank forces of the 39th Army next complexity of moving close to seventy-
opened small arms fire on the 35th In- five thousand troops and their equip-
fantry on the division right.30 ment across the Han was a prime
Other forces of the 39th marching concern. So was the problem of clear-
south through the hills west of Route ing the Seoul area of ROK national,
33 meanwhile approached the British provincial, and local government offi-
cials, foreigners who included an
29 Eighth Army Opn O 109, 2 Jan 51; Ltr, Ridgway 31 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps POR
to Collins, 8 Jan 51. 339, 3 Jan 51.
30 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps POR 32 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps POR
338, 3 Jan 51. 300, 3 Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0219
American Embassy group, and possi- preempt the bridges, or Ridgway would
bly the citys entire populace.33 have to employ drastic measures against
A limited number of bridges would the civilians to regain the crossings for
complicate the river crossing. All per- military use.
manent bridges had been destroyed in Enemy operations east of the bridge-
past days, and none had been repaired. head also had a strong influence on
Just two engineer structures, one 50-ton Ridgways decision. In the deep North
hybrid M4-M4A2 floating bridge and Korean salient extending south from
one 50-ton shoofly (decked railroad) Inje, the division and reinforced regi-
bridge spanned the Han directly below ment earlier estimated to be in the
Seoul behind the I Corps; just one 50- Hongchon area were now identified as
ton M2 floating bridge, four miles east the 2d Division of the North Korean II
of Seoul, crossed the river behind the Corps and the 12th Division of the North
IX Corps. Only five floating footbridges Korean V Corps. According to current
were available for the potentially large estimates, these two corps together con-
civilian exodus. The ice was solid trolled either ten or twelve divisions.
enough to support pedestrians but not Intelligence sources, moreover, contin-
vehicles.34 ued to report the movement of the
The bridges, moreover, were vulner- North Korean III Corps, which had
able. The Chinese had not yet made three divisions, from the Wonsan-
any lasting penetration of the bridge- Hamhung region to the Inje area.35
head, but if stronger attacks succeeded, Apparently shaping up were a North
they could deploy artillery far enough Korean attack to seize the Wonju rail
forward to destroy the crossings. Since and road center and a concurrent at-
the Han in the Seoul area was tidal and tempt, as evidenced by strong guerrilla
threw up chunks of ice as the water operations along Route 29 as far south
level shifted, the river itself was a threat. as Tanyang forty miles below Wonju,
Although engineers were on round-the- to cut off the forces defending the
clock duty to protect the spans from ice North Korean objective. Since the ene-
damage, the periodic upheavals never- mys seizure of Wonju would prevent
theless could tear loose the supporting the Eighth Army from using the cen-
pontons at any time. Another danger tral rail line to support operations in
was the possibility that panic-stricken the Seoul area, Ridgway now consid-
civilians might surge from Seoul and ered the North Korean effort in the
overwhelm the troops guarding the east to be a well-planned maneuver
crossings. Either of two results would timed and tied to the main Chinese at-
be calamitous: civilian traffic would tack in the west.36
That the X, ROK III, and ROK I
Corps could establish an adequate de-
33 MS Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli-
cies, p. 373; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I fense in the east remained, at best,
Corps G3 Jnl, 4 Jan 51. General Ridgway estimated uncertain. General Almond, with char-
Eighth Army troops north of the Han to have num-
bered a hundred thousand, but the records do not
acteristic alertness, viewed the presence
support this high figure.
35 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Jan 51; X Corps Comd
33 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli-
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
cies, p. 373; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I
36Ibid.; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
Corps G3 Jnl, 4 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0220
of North Korean forces between his D defenses. The forces in the west
three ROK divisions retiring from the therefore faced an increasing threat of
north and his 2d Division in the Wonju deep envelopment, a threat that would
area as an opportunity for a hammer- become an immediate danger if Wonju
and-anvil maneuver with the South Ko- fell since Route 20 led some fifty-five
reans pounding the enemy against Gen- miles due west from Wonju to an inter-
eral McClures positions. But Almond section with Route 1 at Suwon.39
had yet to get a grip on the hammer. Closer to Seoul, the 66th Army, possi-
There was still no definite word on the bly with help from the 42d Army,
whereabouts of the ROK 5th and 8th now had occupied Kapyong, and at
Divisions, and the latest information on 0800 on the 3d a long column of Chi-
the ROK 2d Division indicated that two nese was sighted moving southwest of
of its regiments were still surrounded Kapyong on the Chunchon-Seoul
and that the third had been reduced to road, its head within fifteen miles of
a battalion.37 the 1st Cavalry Division on the IX
Nor had the ROK III Corps com- Corps right flank. As General Ridgway
mander, Brig. Gen. Lee Hyung Keun, reasoned the possibilities, the Chinese
yet occupied any part of his line C could veer to the east around the caval-
sector. The ROK 7th Division was fully rymen, then strike west to cut Route
assembled but was still northwest of 1.40
Wonju, and the ROK 9th Division was All factors considered, Ridgway con-
still engaged and much disorganized cluded that the risk to his command
north of line C. Brig. Gen. Kim Paik had reached the critical point. At mid-
Il, the ROK I Corps commander, had morning on the 3d he alerted his forces
had no more success in emplacing the that he probably would withdraw the
ROK 3d Division in the mountains ad- bridgehead units later that day and that
jacent to the Capital Divisions coastal when the bulk of them were south of
position. The 3d Division had been lo- the Han he would pull the entire Eighth
cated in perimeter around Hongchon, Army from line C to line D. For the
a long way from the new sector assigned move out of the bridgehead, he handed
to it.38 General Milburn responsibility for con-
In view of the obvious design of the trolling traffic over the Han bridges
North Korean move below Inje, the and placed Brig. Gen. Charles D. Pal-
depth of gains already registered, the mer, the artillery commander of the 1st
sizable North Korean forces that could Cavalry Division, under Milburn for
be added to the operation, and the dis- that particular duty.41
array of Eighth Army units in the east,
Ridgway doubted that his eastern forces 39 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth
could organize and hold line C. His G-3, Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 3 Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, The Ko-
Colonel Dabney, believed they would rean War, Issues and Policies, p. 373.
40 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 3 Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, The
have difficulty even in establishing line Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 373.
41 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli-
37 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army cies, p. 373; Rad, GX 10026 KGOO, CG Eighth Army
G3 Jnl, 3 Jan 51. to CG X Corps, 3 Jan 51; Rad, GX 10027 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 3 Jan 51.
38 Ibid.
KWP-EBB-0221
Ridgway gave the withdrawal order enemy with minimum harm to the
to Milburn and Coulter about an hour civilian population. Nothing approach-
past noon, instructing them to pull out ing scorched earth tactics would be
of the bridgehead as soon as they condoned.44
worked out a coordinated withdrawal. Milburn and Coulter already had
Below the Han, Milburn was to deploy prepared and regulated plans for pull-
to protect the final evacuation of the ing out of the bridgehead, and much
Seoul airport, Kimpo airfield, and earlier, while the Eighth Army was re-
Inchon. Coulter was to man the lower tiring to line B, Milburn had devised a
bank of the river from the eastern edge system for controlling traffic over the
of Yongdungpo, the industrial suburb Han bridges that with one change
or Seoul, to the junction of the Han remained workable. The earlier plan
and Pukhan eighteen miles east. Both called for the I and IX Corps to cross
were to stand ready for Ridgways sig- the river at widely separated points,
nal to withdraw to line D.42 Milburn using the two bridges directly
Again because of the prevalent lack below Seoul, Coulter the single bridge
of spirit within his command, Ridgway east of the city. The two commanders
wrote out instructions on two matters now agreed that more than half of the
usually handled as routine. He specifi- IX Corps, including the covering force,
cally directed that no usable equipment should cross on one of the I Corps
was to be abandoned and that all sick, spans. This would facilitate Milburns
wounded, and dead were to be evacu- task of controlling all traffic and would
ated. Still irritated by a general lack of assist the eventual decision on remov-
tenacity among his principal subordi- ing the bridges.45
nates, he also explained once more that To centralize the direction of I Corps
withdrawals would be executed with forces out of the bridgehead, Milburn
all necessary coordination, with maxi- placed the British 29th Brigade under
mum losses inflicted on the enemy and General Keans control. Once below
with maximum delay, consistent with Seoul, the 25th Division was to occupy
the maintenance intact of all your ma- line C above Kimpo airfield between
jor units.43 the ROK 1st Division and the Turkish
Disturbed also after observing that brigade while the British continued
in large part demolitions executed in south and assembled at Suwon. Kean
the past appeared to be destruction for was to set a regiment near Seouls
destructions sake, he had announced northwestern edge to cover I Corps
on 2 January a policy that was to gov- movements through the city itself,
ern during this and any future with- coordinating the operations of this
drawals. The execution of demolitions covering regiment with its IX Corps
and necessary military destruction in counterpart, the British 27th Brigade,
South Korea, he insisted, shall be such
as to combine maximum hurt to the 44 Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CG 1 Corps et al., 2 Jan
51, sub: Demolition Policy in South Korea. Ridgway
also sent a copy of this letter to the Fifth Air Force.
42 Rad, GX-l-236 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S 45 I Corps Opn Dir 34, 1 Jan 51; IX Corps Opn Plan
ROKA et al., 3 Jan 51. 7, 1 Jan 51; I Corps Memo, DCofS to CofS, 9 Jan 51,
43 Ibid.; Rad, GX-1-207 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to sub: Corps Control Activities, 2-4 January 1951, with
C/S ROKA et al., 3 Jan 51. Incls, in I Corps G3 Jnl, 4 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0222
in position at Seouls northeastern out- ers to stop all civilian traffic through
skirts. Keans covering force, the 27th their sectors, using their own judgment
Infantry, also was to protect the pas- in the use of gunfire. When he asked
sage of the British 27th Brigade and ROK government officials to notify
the removal of the bridges and was to Seoul citizens of these instructions, he
be the last unit out of Seoul.46 explained that the eventual stoppage
By the IX Corps withdrawal plan, of civilian movement would save Ko-
including the change for crossing the rean lives by preventing enemy forces
Han, the 24th Division was to peel off from using refugees, as they had in the
the bridgehead line by regiment, begin- past, to cover their own advance.48
ning at the left. The first two regiments As a result of I Corps activity over
off the line and division troops were to the previous two weeks, the sticky prob-
cross the Han bridge east of Seoul. The lem of civilian evacuation was not as
remaining two regiments and the Brit- great as it might have been. Under the
ish covering force were to use the I guidance and urging of Milburns civil
Corps shoofly bridge. After crossing the assistance officers, most nonessential
river, the 7th Cavalry was to return to government employees and the fami-
its parent division while the 24th Divi- lies of government officials already had
sion with the British brigade attached left the city. Refugee camps holding Ko-
passed behind line C and assembled in reans who previously had come into the
corps reserve. city from the north had been cleared.
All inmates of Seouls prisons and jails,
The Civilian Exodus the staffs and patients of all but one
hospital, and the small residents of most
After giving the word to withdraw,
orphanages also had been sent south.
Ridgway set 1500 on the 3d as the last
Likewise, all ROK currency and money
moment that civilian traffic could use
plates and the holdings of archives,
the Han bridges. Other than specific
museums, and galleries had been
exceptions he might authorize, the ap-
shipped out.49
proach and exit roads would be closed
Still in Seoul were members of the
after that time to all but Eighth Army
ROK national, provincial, and city
movements. Unsure of the civilian reac-
governments, United Nations Commis-
tion to being ordered off the main
sion for the Unification and Rehabilita-
roads and bridges, he passed instruc-
tion of Korea, and U.S. Embassy. With
tions through General Milburn to the
I Corps assistance, they had prepared
traffic coordinator, General Palmer,
evacuation plans. Arrangements for re-
that the latters military police first were
moving other Americans and foreign
to fire over the heads of evacuees who
refused to stay clear of Route 1 and as
a very last resort fire at them. Similarly, 48 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; MS, Ridg-
way, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 374-75;
Ridgway authorized corps command- General Charles D. Palmer, MS review comments,
1985.
46 I Corps Opn Dir 34, 1 Jan 51' I Corps POR
339, 49 I Corps Memo, DCofS to CofS, 9 Jan 51, sub:
3 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. Corps Control Activities, 2-4 Jan 51, Incl 3.
47 IX Corps Opn Plan 7, 1 Jan 51; 24th Div OI 84, 2 50 The U.N. Commission (UNCURK) had come to
Jan 51; I Corps Memo, DCofS for CofS, 9 Jan 51, Korea the past fall when a UNC victory had seemed
sub: Corps Control Activities, 2-4 Jan 51, Incl 5. near.
KWP-EBB-0223
Seoul over both Routes 1 and 33. miles above the city to cover the with-
Though the 38th and 40th Armies drawal of the leftmost 24th Infantry.
seemed to have bogged down before The other two battalions straddled
the IX Corps, the Chinese in front of Route 1 five miles above Seoul to pro-
Milburn appeared to be in suitable posi- tect the passage of the 35th Infantry
tion and formation to press and pur- and the British 29th Brigade. The re-
sue his bridgehead forces.59 connaissance company furnished con-
Before opening a left-to-right with- tact between battalions and Colonel
drawal, General Kcan placed the 27th Michaelis command post and with the
Infantry, reinforced by the division re- IX Corps covering force.60
connaissance company and supported The 24th and 35th Regiments passed
by a battery of the 8th Field Artillery behind Michaelis cover without enemy
Battalion, in a covering position three interference and by 0100 on the 4th
to five miles northwest of Seoul. One were south of the Han en route to line
battalion sat astride the rail line and a C sectors. When the British 29th Bri-
secondary road near the Han three gade started back at 1845, the prospect
THE LAST BRIDGE OVER THE HAN RIVER at Seoul is demolished, 4 January 1951.
was that it, too, would escape engage- unit commanders, including those of
ment. But just before midnight a strong the IX Corps, met at Colonel Michaelis
39th Army force surrounded and at- command post around 0900 and con-
tacked the brigade rear guard, com- sidered sending a rescue force from the
posed of Company B and part of the 27th Infantry, Brodie would not per-
heavy weapons company of the Royal mit Michaelis to risk losing troops in an
Ulster Rifles plus a dozen tanks, and attempt to free the rear guard. Nor
blocked its withdrawal.61 would Brodie himself attempt a rescue.
Neither Brigadier Brodie nor Gen- The trapped troops, he said, would
eral Kean made any immediate attempt have to knock it out for themselves.
to rescue the trapped British troops. Some of the rear guard did knock it
When General Ridgway learned that out, but most, between two hundred
nothing had been done, he sent orders fifty and three hundred men and at
that every effort would be made to ex- least ten tanks, were lost.62
tricate them. But when all bridgehead
62 Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and Miller with Ridg-
61 I Corps POR 340, 3 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, way, 30 Nov 56; I Corps Memo, DCofS to CofS, 9 Jan
Nar, Jan 51; Brig. Gen. C. B. Barth, Tropic Light- 51, sub: Corps Control Activities, 2-l Jan 51, 1x1 4;
ning and Taro Leaf in Korea, p. 52, copy in CMH Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf, p. 52;
Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 4 Jan 51. Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 4 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0227
ing had been removed, Palmer ordered Within an hour of Company Ks with-
the rest of the structure demolished; drawal, air observers sighted Chinese
around 1400, after two charges, the patrols inside Seoul. A reconnaissance
bridge began to sink unspectacularly as patrol sent into the city a little later by
the water that had been kept open the ROK 1st Division observed Chinese
around it began to freeze. The men of troops raising a North Korean flag over
Company K, last to come out of Seoul, city hall in the heart of town. That
walked south over the ice immediately flourish marked Seouls third change
afterward.67 of hands.68
CHAPTER XI
Withdrawal to Line D
Even as his forces were giving up ther use of the heavier guns. Although
Seoul, General Ridgway wrote General pilots reported they had sighted and
Collins in Washington that although the attacked tanks behind enemy lines, the
Eighth Army was in for some difficult Chinese had used no armor in their
days, he was certain of its intrinsic abil- recent assaults. Nor had they employed
ity to perform well against the Chinese. air support.2
Also prompting his confidence was the In Ridgways appraisal, the Eighth
manner in which the Chinese had con- Army was opposed by an enemy whose
ducted operations since New Years only advantage is sheer numbers, whose
Day. The Chinese probe on a wide armament is far inferior quantitatively
front, he told Collins. When they and qualitatively, who has no air sup-
strike resistance their overwhelming port whatever, meager telecommunica-
numbers immediately flow around both tions and negligible armor. But while
flanks and join in the rear.1 As the Ridgway believed the Eighth Army to
North Koreans had learned when they have the strength and means to handle
met close-knit defenses for the first time the enemy, most of his commanders-
at the Pusan Perimeter, this tactic could and so most of his forces-did not share
be countered. his confidence. He had found only one
The armament employed by the Chi- or two cases where a Division has shown
nese had been largely small arms, auto- any appreciable resourcefulness in
matic weapons, and mortars. They had adapting its fighting tactics to the ter-
used some artillery in breaching line B, rain, to the enemy, and to conditions in
but problems in moving the pieces and this theater. His dominant problem
in supplying ammunition combined was to achieve the spiritual awakening
with the Eighth Armys counterbattery of the latent capabilities of this com-
fire and air support had frustrated fur- mand. If he could manage this, he was
certain that the Eighth Army would
achieve more, far more, than our peo-
1 Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 3 Jan 51, copy in CMH.
Ridgway at this time urged Collins to press for the
ple think possible-and perhaps inflict
addition of helicopter companies to Army transporta- a bloody defeat on the Chinese which
tion facilities: Such situations [as the Chinese method even China will long remember.3
of attack] could be more effectively met and many
thousands more of the enemy destroyed, if we had
For the time being there was no es-
the capability of putting down small reconnaissance
groups on ridges and hilltops, and could withdraw 2 Eighth Army PIRs 173-176, 1-4 Jan 51; IX Corps
them at will. We could also supply temporarily iso- Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
lated units in a more efficient and economical way 3 Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51; Ltr, Ridgway to
than by parachute. Haislip, 11 Jan 51, copy in CMH.
KWP-EBB-0230
caping further withdrawal. While the the Han and hold until Air Force and
last steps in evacuating Seoul were Army supplies stocked at Suwon, ten
being taken on the 4th, Chinese patrols miles farther south and about midway
were observed investigating the Kimpo between Seoul and line D, had been
peninsula off the west flank of the I removed. Ridgway expected the sup-
Corps and were reported to be cross- plies to be cleared within twenty-four
ing the Han to the right rear of the IX to thirty-six hours.6
Corps. This reconnaissance and the Ridgway intended that the starting
concentration of Chinese forces above hour of the intermediate move provide
Seoul indicated that the enemy would time for the 3d Logistical Command to
advance below the city with hardly a finish evacuating Inchon, ASCOM
pause.4 City, and Kimpo airfield.7 (The Seoul
It was the shambles farther east, airport already had been emptied.) On
however, that made a withdrawal to line 3 January Ridgway had notified Col.
D mandatory. This segment of the John G. Hill, commander of the 3d
Eighth Army line remained a large- Logistical Command, to cease port op-
hole sieve through which an estimated erations at Inchon at noon the next
seventy thousand North Koreans day.8 The deadline seemed reasonable
grouped in the Chunchon-Inje-Hong- since the gradual reductions of stocks
chon area, and possibly Chinese forces at the port and airfield areas since early
as well, could push attacks south on the December already had brought items
Route 29 axis through Wonju and on hand to modest quantities. But un-
through the undefended mountains foreseen delays in getting some reserve
east of Route 29. Or they could move stocks released from Eighth Army staff
southwestward to envelop the I and officers, too few tankers, too little suit-
IX Corps, or both. By pulling back to able shipping for such items as long
the Pyongtaek-Ansong-Changho-won- lengths of railroad track, and an overes-
ni sector of line D, the I and IX Corps timate of the ammunition that would
would no longer be open to envelop- be issued to line troops had prevented
ment from the northeast, and the X Colonel Hill from removing all stocks
Corps and the two South Korean corps by the designated hour.g
might be able to organize a satisfactory
line in the Wonju-Wonpo-ri sector.5 6 Msg, CG Eighth Army to CG I U.S. Corps et al.,
041215 Jan 51. copy in IX Corps Comd Rpt. Jan 51;
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
7 A former Japanese arsenal area four miles east of
Withdrawal From the Han Inchon had been christened ASCOM (Army Service
Command) City by American occupation forces in
Ridgway warned his forces around 1945 and occupied during recent operations by en-
noon on the 4th to expect orders to gineer, quartermaster, ordnance, and signal supply
depots and by Headquarters, 3d Logistical Command.
withdraw to line D, all corps abreast. In December Hill had replaced General Stewart,
The I and IX Corps in the meantime who became the assistant division commander of the
were to pull back at 2000 to intermedi- 2d Division.
9 3d Log Comd Daily Opns Rpt 103,4 Jan 51; Eighth
ate positions six to eight miles south of Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Hq, 3d Log Comd,
Memo, Col Hill for CG Eighth Army, 9 Jan-51, sub:
4 Eighth Army PIR 176, 4 Jan 51. Major Items Destroyed at the Port of Inchon; 3d Log
5 Ibid.; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Jan 51. Comd G4 Hist Rpt, Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0231
Nor would Hill get everything out. Hill received Milburns instructions,
After receiving Ridgways noontime and the last Fifth Air Force unit except
orders, General Milburn, in whose sec- for Army aviation engineers had flown
tor the port and airfield lay, instructed from Kimpo to a new base in Japan.
Hill to execute his demolition plans as Through the afternoon these engineers
soon as he had removed all troops other burned the airfield buildings and the
than demolition crews. While back ship- drums of aviation gasoline and napalm
ment at Inchon did continue through remaining at Kimpo while Eighth Army
the favorable afternoon tide on the 4th, engineers from the 82d Engineer Pe-
Hills main attention was diverted to troleum Distribution Company de-
rendering the airfield and port facili- stroyed the four- and six-inch pipelines
ties useless to enemy forces. 10 between Inchon and Kimpo and the
All port units scheduled to travel booster pumps and storage tanks at the
south by road had gone by the time airfield. 11
10 Msg, CG I Corps to CG 25th Div et al., 041300 113d Log Comd Engr Monthly Activ Rpt, Jan 51;
Jan 51; IX Corps Opn Dir 21, 041500 Jan 51 (confirms Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, p. 259; 3d
oral orders issued 041200 Jan 51). Log Comd Daily Opns Rpt 104,5 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0232
THE PORT OF INCH'ON. The tidal basin is at upper right. In foreground is the island of
Wolmi-do.
Coulter ordered the ROK 6th Division front before midnight but somehow
to protect Milburns east flank. But missed finding the vulnerable east flank
Coulter did not dispatch his instructions earlier left open by the IX Corps. By
until an hour after the ROK 6th had daylight on the 6th the patrol contact
started for line D, and General Chang in the center of General Paiks front
did not receive them until midafter- developed into a general engagement
noon. It took Chang another half hour between an enemy battalion and the 3d
to get his division stopped. By that Battalion, 11th ROK Regiment, but the
time his forces were almost due east of enemy attempt to dislodge the South
Suwon, where, with Coulters agree- Koreans eased by noon and ended al-
ment, Chang deployed them astride together at 1400. By then supplies had
Route 17.17 been cleared from Suwon and Milburn
During the night of the 5th an en- and Coulter could continue south to-
emy regiment crossed the Han and ward line D.18
assembled east of Yongdungpo. Pa- The two corps completed their with-
trols from the regiment moved south drawals on the 7th. Since the 15th In-
through the hills east of Route 1 and fantry and 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry,
reconnoitered the ROK 1st Division of the 3d Division in the meantime
17 I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 5 Jan 51; IX Corps POR 18 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl,
306, 5 Jan 51. Sum, 6 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0234
had arrived from Kyongju and been Turkish brigade went into corps reserve
attached to the I Corps, Milburn was at Chonan, thirteen miles south of
able to keep a substantial reserve and Pyongtaek. 19
still organize a fairly solid twenty-mile Along a slightly longer front tipping
line D front from the west coast east- to the northeast and reaching beyond
ward through Pyongtaek and Ansong. Changhowon-ni to the Han River
The British 29th Brigade and the Thai Coulter deployed the ROK 6th Divi-
battalion stood at the far left astride sion, British 27th Brigade, and 24th
Route 1 just below Pyongtaek. The 3d Division, west to east. Hard against the
Division held a sector across the hills right corps boundary twenty miles be-
between Routes 1 and 17, which Gen- hind the front, the bulk of the 1st Cav-
eral Soule manned with the 15th In- alry Division was in corps reserve at
fantry. Lending depth to this central Chungju on Route 13, now the IX
position, the 3d Battalion, 65th In- Corps main supply route. To protect
fantry, and the 35th Infantry of the the route from attacks by guerrillas
25th Division were assembled not far
behind it. Above Ansong, the ROK 1st
19 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth
Division lay across Route 17. The re- Army G3 Jnl, 7 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 5, 6, and
mainder of the 25th Division and the 7 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0235
MAP 16
known to be located in the Tanyang the 7th, "indicate your forces withdrew
area twenty miles farther east, the 5th to D line without evidence of having
Cavalry had begun to patrol the road inflicted any substantial losses on en-
from Chungju south through a moun- emy and without material delay. In fact,
tain pass at Mungyong.20 some major units are reported as hav-
The way Milburn and Coulter had ing broken contact. I desire prompt
moved to line D exasperated General confirming reports and if substantially
Ridgway. "Reports so far reaching me," correct, the reasons for non-compliance
he told the two corps commanders on with my basic directives.21 The reports
reaching Ridgway were true. Except for and the British 29th Brigade moved
the clashes between the Chinese and north as far as Osan, eight miles short
the ROK 1st Division east of Anyang of Suwon, without making contact. In
on the 6th, the I Corps had withdrawn the IX Corps sector, the 24th Division
from the south bank of the Han with- at the far right sent patrols into Ichon
out contact, and the IX Corps had not and Yoju, both on an east-west line with
engaged enemy forces since leaving the Suwon. Both towns were empty. Shal-
Seoul bridgehead.22 lower searches to the north by the Brit-
Attempting once more to get the ish 27th Brigade in the center of the
quality of leadership he considered corps sector also failed to reestablish
essential, Ridgway pointed out to contact. (The ROK 6th Division, at the
Milburn and Coulter that their oppo- corps left, sent. out no patrols while it
nents had but two alternatives: to make absorbed twenty-three hundred sorely
a time-consuming, coordinated follow- needed replacements.)24
up, or to conduct a rapid, uncoordi- General Ridgway considered the at-
nated pursuit. If the Chinese chose the tempts by patrols to regain contact at
first, the Eighth Army could at least least to be moves in the right direction.
achieve maximum delay even though What he wanted and planned to see
there might be few opportunities for next in the west was more vigorous pa-
strong counterattacks. If they elected trolling by gradually enlarged forces.
the second, the Eighth Army would This patrolling would be the main mis-
have unlimited opportunities not only sion of the larger efforts to acquire bet-
to delay but to inflict severe losses on ter combat intelligence, which in his
them. In either case, Ridgway again judgment had been sadly neglected and
made clear, Milburn and Coulter were which was a prime requisite for the still
to exploit every opportunity to carry larger offensive action that he intended
out the basic concept of operations that would follow. His attention meanwhile
he had repeatedly explained to them.23 was drawn to the east, where the with-
The immediate response was a flurry drawal to line D was still in progress
of patrolling to regain contact. Accord- and where North Korean forces, as
ing to the I Corps intelligence officer, expected, had opened an attack to seize
the 39th and 50th Armies were now ad- Wonju.25
vancing south of Seoul, and their van-
guards had reached the Suwon area.
Wonju and Hill 247
An ROK 1st Division patrol moving
north over Route 17 during the after- To promote continuous defenses
noon of the 7th supported this assess- through the mountains east of Wonju,
ment when it briefly engaged a small Ridgway on the 5th had redrawn line
enemy group in Kumnyangjang-ni, D in the ROK III and I Corps sectors,
eleven miles east of Suwon. Farther replacing the original line stretching
west, patrols from the 15th Infantry
24 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps POR
351, 7 Jan 51; IX Corps PIR 103, 7 Jan 51; IX Corps
22 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. POR 312, 7 Jan 51; IX Corps PIR 104, 8 Jan 51.
23 Rad, GX-1-526 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I 25 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli-
Corps and CG IX Corps, 7 Jan 51. cies, p. 380.
KWP-EBB-0237
MAP 17
KWP-EBB-0239
the ROK 8th Division, then the 23d and To seize Wonju itself, the North Ko-
38th Regiments of the 2d Division, car- rean plan called for a two-division fron-
ried the front a short distance beyond tal attack by the V Corps. The Wonju
Wonju.30 attack was to be assisted by the envelop-
Prisoners taken earlier by the 2d ing effect of other V Corps attacks far-
Division-while wedging aside the re- ther west and by the II Corps advance
mainder of the North Korean force that on the east. Moving down from Hoeng-
had blocked Route 29 six miles below song during the night of the 6th, Gen-
Hongchon and during later skirmishes eral Pangs 6th and 27th Divisions
farther south at Hoengsong-had sup- before dawn were poised just above
plied a fairly clear picture of enemy Wonju for the frontal attack. Ahead of
intentions in the east. A boundary be- these two forces, Pangs 12th Division,
tween the North Korean V and II Corps previously in the Hongchon-Hoeng-
appeared to parallel Route 29 just to its song area, had crossed from the east to
east. On the east, the II Corps,, com- the west side of Route 29 and had come
manded by Lt. Gen. Choe Hyon and south to a position northwest of Wonju,
operating with the 2d, 9th, 10th, and just north of the 10th Regiment of the
31st Divisions, was to seep south through ROK 8th Division. On the opposite
the mountains east of Route 29, avoid- side of Route 29, General Choes 2d
ing engagements during this move, and 9th Divisions had marched from
then was to attack Wonju, Chechon, Hongchon to the area northeast of
Tanyang, and Taegu. Along and west Wonju, and the 10th Division, coming
of Route 29, Maj. Gen. Pang Ho San, from Chunchon, was approaching
commander of the V Corps, was to em- Wonju for the II Corps thrust through
ploy his 6th, 7th, 12th, 27th, 28th, and the unoccupied mountains.32
43d Divisions in frontal attacks to seize Wonju sits in the bottom of a bowl in
Wonju and force a general withdrawal the valley of the Wonju River. Hills
of the X Corps. Enemy guerrillas, forming the rim of the bowl begin to
numbering between five thousand and rise about a mile from town. To de-
seventy-five hundred and currently fend the town and an airstrip at its
massed around Tanyang and along southeastern edge, General McClure
the twenty miles of Route 29 cutting had established the 23d and 38th Regi-
through a high mountain spur between ments in an inverted U atop the bowl
Tanyang and Yongju, were to displace rim. The 23d was deployed across
south and southeast to disrupt the Route 29 and in an arc to the west and
Eighth Armys Pusan-Andong line of southwest, and the 38th was similarly
communication. The whole operation, aligned north, east, and southeast of
according to the captives, was to be con- town. Bulging out as this position did
ducted in conjunction with Chinese ad- at the northeastern corner of the X
vances in the west.31 Corps line, and, for the time being, the
Eighth Army line, McClures two regi-
30Ibid.
31Eighth Army PIR 176, Incl 2, 4 Jan 51, PIR 177,
5 Jan 51, PIR 178, Incl 2, 6 Jan 51, and PIR 179, 7 Jan 32Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; X Corps
51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Hq, FEC, His- Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 180, Incl 2,
tory of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52. 8 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0240
mile farther, they discovered North Ko- make a two-battalion advance. For the
reans asleep in buildings. Finding them Wonju mission Freeman organized a
was like bumping a beehive. Some of: task force with the 2d Battalion of the
the first to awaken gave an alarm that 23d Infantry and 2d Battalion of the
stirred a swarm of soldiers out of other 38th Infantry, placing Lt. Col. James
buildings and carried to troops located H. Skeldon, commander of the latter
in nearby heights. The 2d Battalion battalion, in charge. In snow that can-
killed two hundred during the melee. celed close air support, Task Force
But Colonel Edwards at the same time Skeldon started over the road toward
discovered that he was being flanked Wonju at 1000 on the 9th.39
on both the east and west by what he As Skeldons column approached Hill
estimated to be a regiment and pulled 247 at noon, fire struck the task force
his battalion out of range to a position from that peak and heights to the west.
south of Hill 247. To the west, in the Skeldon deployed a battalion on each
meantime, the North Korean 12th Divi- side of the road and attacked, but by
sion again hit the 10th ROK Regiment late afternoon his forces bogged down
and forced it back almost on line with part way up the near slopes of the en-
the 38th Infantry at Michon. Since this emy position. Colonel Freeman consid-
left the west flank of the 23d Infantry, ered Skeldons position unsound, espe-
above Michon, wide open, General Mc- cially after learning that North Korean
Clure instructed Colonel Freeman to 12th Division forces to his west again
pull the 2d Battalion all the way back to had hit the ROK 8th Division and ad-
the regimental line and emplace it on vanced deep to his left rear before the
the exposed flank.37 South Koreans contained them. But,
Convinced by reports of heavy en- under pressure to clear Wonju and oc-
emy losses and moderate enemy resist- cupy positions just below the town, he
ance that a successful attack on Wonju held Skeldon where he was for the
could be made, General Almond or- night, reinforced him with the bulk of
dered McClure to resume his effort to the French battalion, and planned to
clear the town and airstrip by noon on resume the attack on the 10th.40
the 9th. Almond directed that two bat- Frequent snowstorms on the 10th
talions with air and artillery support again eliminated close air support, and
make the renewed advance and re- the ground troops suffered also from
peated his previous instruction that. far lower temperatures caused by a
four battalions occupy positions just northerly wind shift. Freeman, person-
south of Wonju.38 ally taking charge of the attack, pushed
McClure attached two battalions of his forces another half mile into the
the 38th Infantry to the 23d to provide 247 mass but met. increasing opposi-
Colonel Freeman sufficient forces to tion and faced a repeated need to
hold a defensive position as well as spread forces farther west and east to
meet North Korean counterattacks.
37 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf Comd
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf Opn O 19, 8 Jan 51; 23d Inf
S3 Jnl, 8 Jan 51; Rad, X 17092, X Corps to Eighth 39 Ibid.; 2d Div LOI, 9 Jan 51; 2d Div G3 Jnl. Entry
Army, 8 Jan 51; Rad, X 17095, X Corps to Eighth J-43, 9 Jan 51; 23d Inf Opn O 20, 9 Jan 51; 23d Inf
Army, 8 Jan 51: Eighth Army PIR 180, 8 Jan 51. Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
38 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 40 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0242
Around noon he notified General Mc- Regardless of this stand at Hill 247,
Clure of the growing resistance and of General Almond was dissatisfied with
the constant danger of being out- the 2d Divisions performance. Largely
flanked, and he advised against contin- as a result of the initial withdrawal so
uing the attack. McClure agreed but far south of Wonju and what Almond
instructed Freeman to hold his position. considered to be inefficient staff work,
Freeman could adjust the disposition poor employment of weapons (espe-
of his troops, but he was to do nothing cially artillery), improper organization
that would appear to be a withdrawal.41 of defenses, and an exhorbitant rate of
Freemans change to a defensive non-battle casualties (mostly from
stance was followed by hard North Ko- trench foot, frostbite, and respiratory
rean attacks that did not subside until diseases), Almond on the 13th asked
well after dark and after Freemans General Ridgway for authority to re-
forces had inflicted, in their estimate, lieve General McClure. Ridgway was
two thousand enemy casualties. Al- not fully convinced that a relief was
though control of Hill 247 vacillated warranted. His own impression of
through the afternoon, Freeman still McClure, formed in part after a visit to
commanded a good defensive position Wonju on 2 January, was of a hard-
at the close of the engagement.42 hitting, aggressive commander. He also
Continuing North Korean attempts considered McClures assignment at
to shove Freemans forces out of the Wonju to be a hot potato that could
247 mass on the 11th and 12th had burn a person no matter how he han-
similar results. Reinforced by more of dled it. But he felt more strongly that
the French battalion and part of the he had to back his corps commander in
Netherlands battalion and helped by this instance and gave Almond the au-
strong air support (including a B-29 at- thority he asked for. He pointed out to
tack on Wonju) after the sky cleared Almond, however, that one of his own
around noon on the 11th, Freemans guidelines in a decision to relieve an
forces broke up the assaults and killed officer was that he had to have a better
more than eleven hundred North man available.44
Koreans. Two weak and failing at- Almond believed he had a better man
tempts against Freemans position early in the X Corps chief of staff, Maj. Gen.
on the 13th ended the V Corpseffort to Clark L. Ruffner, and on 14 January
drive south of Wonju.43 sent him to take command of the 2d
Division. Ridgway returned General
McClure to the United States a few days
later with the official status of relieved
41 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf Comd without prejudice but was well aware
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, 10 Jan 51; Eighth
Army PIR 182, 10 Jan 51; Technical Report, Weather
that the prejudice would be there
Effect on Army Operations: Weather in the Korean Conflict, anyway.45
vol. I (Department of Physics, Oregon State College,
1956), pp. VII-12-VII-13, copy in CMH.
42 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf Comd 44 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Interv, Apple-
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 10 Jan man with Ridgway, 2 Nov 51; Interv, Mossman,
51. Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56.
43 Ibid.; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, 11 and 12 Jan 51; Eighth 45 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Interv, Moss-
Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 21 Jan 51. man, Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56.
KWP-EBB-0243
sion in the heights immediately north- Yongwol was now the area through
east of Yongwol and deployed the ROK which General Choe could most easily
9th Division in the vicinity of its Chong- pass his units. Judging the movement
son assembly. To strengthen the ROK of North Korean forces through this
III Corps, Ridgway gave Yu the ROK gap to be the major threat to the X
3d Division, which also had assembled Corps, not the V Corps effort then in
near Yongwol while moving toward the progress at Wonju, Ridgway ordered
ROK I Corps sector. Yu placed the ad- Almond to close the gap and to elimi-
ditional division in reserve at Chuny- nate all enemy forces who had gotten
ang, thirty miles southeast of Yongwol.50 behind Route 60 between Chechon and
Although there were openings in the Yongwol.51
line, the ROK III Corps by the 10th To assist Almond, Ridgway moved
finally had a position from which to the 187th Airborne Regimental Com-
oppose North Korean II Corps move- bat Team to Andong and attached it to
ments through the steeper heights east the X Corps. To hedge any deep
of Route 29. A fifteen-mile gap in the enemy penetration below the lateral
X Corps sector between Chechon and Andong-Yongdok road, Route 48,
51 Ibid., 9 and 10 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-751 KGOO,
50 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 8 and 9 Jan 51. CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 10 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0245
Ridgway also ordered the 1st Marine, ROK 5th Division and a regiment of
Division to make the move for which the ROK 2d Division covered the lat-
he earlier had alerted it, from Masan eral road leading west from Tanyang
to the Pohang-dong-Kyongju-Yong- to Chungju, joining hands with the 5th
chon area.52 Cavalry patrolling Route 13 south from
Almond initially ordered the ROK Chungju through the Mungyong pass.
5th Division, so far not involved in the Almond concentrated the bulk of the
Wonju fight, to move east and fill the ROK 2d Division at the lower end of
Chechon-Yongwol gap, leaving the the Mungyong pass, where it could
ROK 8th Division to occupy the 5ths help bottle guerrillas massed in the
old sector. Since the shift of the 5th mountains to the northeast around
from corps left to corps right would Tanyang. Already operating against
take time, Almond instructed General these guerrillas was part of the X Corps
Barr in the meantime to send a battal- special activities group, a small provi-
ion of the 17th Infantry eastward from sional force recently formed by X Corps
Chechon to make physical contact with headquarters around its special opera-
the ROK III Corps at Yongwol and to tions company for raids and other mis-
clear all enemy forces between the sions behind enemy lines. The group
towns while en route.53 so far had been fully committed to secu-
Almond already had ordered all rity missions in the X Corps rear area.54
corps units up and down Route 29 to Deciding on the 14th that getting ad-
institute day and night patrolling to ditional troops into the Tanyang area
clear enemy troops from the bordering was more immediately important than
mountains. Judging that an expansion clearing Wonju, Almond pulled the 2d
of this patrolling in the rear would and ROK 8th Divisions out of their po-
prove more profitable than a linear de- sitions above Chechon and instructed
fense between Chechon and Yongwol, General Ruffner to occupy the entire
he reassigned the bulk of the ROK 5th west corps sector, a front of some
Division to clear the region above twenty-two miles, on a line extending
Yongju at the corps right rear. Similar almost due west of Chechon to the Han
rear area assignments to other units by River. This move freed the ROK 8th
14 January spread a network of patrols Division, which Almond dispatched to
and blocking positions over an area Tan yang.55
forty miles square. The 7th Division General Choe, aided by the wild ter-
continued to patrol from Chechon to- rain and night movements, seemed to
ward Yongwol and, with the 187th Air- stay a half step ahead of Almonds at-
borne Regimental Combat Team, along tempt to blanket the corps area. At the
both sides of Route 29 from Chechon II Corps left, the 9th Division ran into
south to Yongju. The remainder of the the ROK 7th Division near Yongwol
and into infantry-tank patrols from the
52 Rad GX-1-637 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG
187th Abn RCT, 8 Jan 51: Rad, GX-1-661 KGOO, 54 X Corps OI 64, 8 Jan 51, and 69, 12 Jan 51; X
CG Eighth Army to CG 1st Marine Div. 9 Jan 51; Corps POR 110, Annex 1, 14 Jan 51; X Corps Comd
Rad, GX-1-860 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Rpt, Nar. Jan 51.
Corps et al., 11 Jan 51. 55X Corps OI 70, 14 Jan 51, 71, 14 Jan 51, and 73,
53 X Corps OI 67, 10 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 15 Jan 51; Ltr, Almond to Ridgway, 15 Jan 51, copy
Sum, 11 Jan 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. in CMH; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0246
stay in the X Corps rear and employ The 2d Division in fact had instituted
his troops as guerrillas.60 a program of patrolling and in the proc-
Lee elected to stay where he was but ess had reoccupied Wonju. Following
made a less than halfhearted attempt the North Korean V Corps withdrawal
to conduct guerrilla operations. When above Hoengsong, a battalion of the 9th
General Smiths marines opened a sys- Infantry on the 23d reentered and set
tematic screening operation in the up a patrol base in Wonju and on the
Pohang-dong-Andong-Yongdok area next day began sending infantry and
on the 18th, they found it harder to armored patrols to the west, north, and
locate Lees forces than to fight them. northeast. At the right, the 17th Infan-
A 10th Division officer captured some try of the 7th Division (the division was
days later explained that General Lee now commanded by Maj. Gen. Claude B.
had fallen victim of acute melancholia, Ferenbaugh) had pursued the North
brooding constantly over his predica- Korean II Corps' withdrawal above
ment and directing his forces in no Pyongchang, sending a battalion of in-
course of action other than one of alter- fantry and artillery far enough forward
nate hiding and flight. After nearly to destroy the town with a heavy shell-
three weeks of combing, General Smith ing on the 27th.63
notified General Ridgway that his The patrolling north of the corps
forces had scattered the remnants of front during the last week of January
the 10th Division. In Smiths judgment, was largely a result of orders from Gen-
Lees forces were not then capable of eral Ridgway on the 20th and 23d call-
any kind of major effort, and the situa- ing for infantry-armor patrolling and
tion was sufficiently in hand to permit for a diversion to prevent enemy move-
the assignment of a new mission to the ment south of the Yoju-Wonju line.
1st Marine Division.61 These instructions were part of an ex-
As contact with enemy forces dimin- panding reconnaissance in force that
ished, General Almond meanwhile had Ridgway had instituted in the west on
begun to organize a solid forward line the 15th.64
from the right bank of the Han oppo-
site Yoju eastward across Route 29 five
miles below Wonju to a point five miles
above Yongwol. As of 30 January the
25 Jan 15; X Corps OI 84, 85, and 86, 28 Jan 51, and
2d Division was moving onto the line 87 and 88, 29 Jan 51; 7th Div Opn O 41, 28 Jan 51;
between the Han and Route 29 on the 2d Div Opn O 21, 29 Jan 51.
west, the ROK 8th Division above 63 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 7th Div Comd
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
Chechon in the middle, and the 7th 64 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-
Division above Yongwol on the east.62 1645 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X
Corps, 20 Jan 51; Rad, GX-l-2270 KGOO, CG Eighth
60 Lynn Montross, Maj. Hubbard D. Kuokka, and Army to CG X Corps, 28 Jan 51 (confirms Ridgways
Maj. Norman W. Hicks, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, instructions delivered orally by the Eighth Army chief
1950-1953 (Washington, D.C., 1962), vol. IV, The East- of staff on 23 Jan 51); X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
Central Front, p. 51. 51: Rad, X 17405, CG X Corps to CG 2d Div, 23 Jan
61 Ibid., pp. 42-44, 48, 53, 56. 51; X Corps OI 79, 25 Jan 51;2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar,
62 Rad, X 17435, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, Jan 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0248
CHAPTER XII
Reconnaissance in Force
Between 7 and 15 January, I and IX that also could serve as an example of
Corps reconnaissance patrols ranging the kind of reconnaissance in force he
north of line D made little contact with wanted both General Milburn and Gen-
enemy forces. IX Corps patrols investi- eral Coulter afterwards to initiate on
gated Ichon and Yoju several times but their own. He ordered the I Corps to
found the towns empty. In the main I investigate the Suwon-Osan area on the
Corps attempt, the 27th Infantry came 15th with a force that included at least
out of its reserve assembly at Chonan one battalion of tanks. General Milburn
to occupy outposts athwart Route 1 gen- was to punish any enemy groupment
erally along the Chinwi River eight located there with infantry, tank, and
miles north of Pyongtaek and five air assaults, then was to withdraw, leav-
miles south of Osan. In extensive ing part of his force in the objective
searches west and east of Route 1 and area to maintain contact.2
north of the Chinwi within three miles
of Osan, Colonel Michaelis forces en-
The Problem of Motivation
countered few Chinese.1
The patrols were numerous and far-
ranging enough to certify the absence Although the I Corps reconnaissance
of any strong enemy force immediately was a step in Ridgways program of
in front of the two corps; yet civilians, building up offensive operations, the
agents, and air observers in the same continuing lack of spirit within the
Eighth Army worked against the pros-
week reported a steady movement of
pects of launching larger attacks. Some
Chinese south from Seoul. The heavi-
est enemy concentrations appeared to indications of recovery and Ridgways
confidence in the Eighth Armys inher-
be forming along Route 1 between
Suwon and Osan and around the junc- ent ability notwithstanding, his forces
tion of Routes 13 and 17 at Kyongan-ni, and staff, in the main, were still not
sixteen miles northeast of Suwon. Gen- offensive-minded.
eral Ridgway considered the nearer
Suwon-Osan concentration to be a suit-
2Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army
able target for an infantry-armor strike G3 Jnl, Sum, 13 and 14 Jan 51; Rad, GX-l-1066
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG IX
Corps, 14 Jan 51; Rad, G-1-1081 KAR, CG Eighth
1Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps Army to CG I Corps, 14 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jnl,
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Sum, 14 Jan 51.
Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 25th Div 3MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli-
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan cies, p. 382; Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, 2 Nov
51. 51; Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0249
In his constant attempt to reshape own freedom, for our own survival, in an
the mood of the Eighth Army, Ridgway honorable, independent national existence.
during the first days of January insti- The sacrifices we have made, and those
tuted a morale survey in which his we shall yet support, are not offered vicari-
troops repeatedly raised two questions: ously for others, but in our own direct
Why are we here? and What are we defense.
fighting for? These questions clearly In the final analysis, the issue now joined
reflected the lack of motivation, and right here in Korea is whether communism
or individual freedom shall prevail.5
both, in Ridgways judgment, required
and deserved well-reasoned replies.4 Ridgway published these replies and
His answer to the first question was distributed them throughout the com-
brief and point-blank: We are here be- mand in January. Whether they would
cause of the decisions of the properly help to improve the attitude of the
constituted authorities of our respec- Eighth Army depended, he believed,
tive governments. . . .The answer is sim- on whether their sincerity was recog-
ple because further comment is un- nized. In any case, the disciplinary tone
necessary. It is conclusive because the of the first reply was unmistakable, and
loyalty we give, and expect, precludes the second was an eloquent statement
the slightest questioning of these orders. of the wars principal issue as Ridgway
He considered the second question believed his command should under-
to have greater significance, and he an- stand it.
swered at length:
To me the issues are clear. It is not a
question of this or that Korean town or Allies From North Korea
village. Real estate is here incidental. It is
not restricted to the issue of freedom for A striking local example of the issue
our South Korean allies . . . though that as Ridgway summarized it was at the
freedom is a symbol of the wider issues, time being set on a string of islands
and included among them. hugging enemy-held Hwanghae Prov-
The real issues are whether the power of ince on the west coast. Giving up every-
Western civilization . . . shall defy and de- thing but individual freedom, literally
feat Communism; whether the rule of men thousands of anti-Communist North
who shoot their prisoners, enslave their
citizens, and deride the dignity of man, shall Koreans were taking refuge on the
displace the rule of those to whom the indi- islands, mainly Cho-do and Paeng-
vidual and his individual rights are sacred; nyong-do, the two largest. Most came
whether we are to survive with Gods hand from western Hwanghae, the region
to guide and lead us, or to perish in the between and west of Chinnampo in the
dead existence of a Godless world.
north and Haeju in the south, where
If these be true, and to me they are, an anti-Communist underground ex-
beyond any possibility of challenge, then
isted even before the war. Some under-
this has long since ceased to be a fight for
freedom for our Korean allies alone and ground members had attacked retreat-
for their national survival. It has become, ing North Korean troops in October
and it continues to be, a fight for our 1950 when the Eighth Army moved
4 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, 5 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli-
The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 369. ties, pp. 370-71.
KWP-EBB-0250
above the 38th parallel, and after UNC partisans were to be organized, equipped,
forces occupied the region a number and trained for guerrilla warfare and
of anti-Communists had joined UNC intelligence missions behind enemy
security units formed to maintain civil lines on the mainland.
order. Others had openly professed Regardless of what the partisans might
their convictions and thus exposed them- accomplish on the mainland, their oc-
selves to retaliation when enemy forces cupation of the offshore islands would
reentered the province on the heels of make the Eighth Armys west flank
the Eighth Armys withdrawal.6 more secure. Their alliance with the
The former UNC security groups re- Eighth Army also would be an ideologi-
inforced by volunteers engaged North cal and psychological thorn in the
Korean troops sent to reoccupy west- enemys side. The partisans themselves,
ern Hwanghae in December. ROK Navy now without status as citizens of either
ships of Task Force 95 in the Yellow North or South Korea, faced an uncer-
Sea, with which the anti-Communists tain postwar future. But they mean-
established sporadic radio contact, pro- while had gained personal security for
vided gunfire and arranged some air themselves and the many families who
support. But this help could not com- had come with them to the islands, and
pensate shortages in weapons and am- they would receive logistical support for
munition among the anti-Communist the fight they seemed eager to rejoin.7
groups which from the start gave the
enemy regulars the deciding edge. Some
The Evacuation Issue Resolved
Hwanghae defenders hid out, hoping
that UNC forces would soon return to To the detriment of Ridgways efforts
the province. Most decided to escape to restore confidence within the Eighth
to the coastal islands protected by Task Army and to increase offensive action,
Force 95. The exodus, aided by the the question raised by the Chinese in-
ROK Navy, which sea lifted many es- tervention of whether the United Na-
capees, continued until late January tions Command could or should stay in
when North Korean troops closed the Korea had not been resolved by mid-
beach exits. January. Ridgway personally believed
After reaching the islands the orga- the forces arrayed against him did not
nized groups of refugees, asking only have the strength to drive the Eighth
for arms and supplies, offered to return Army out of Korea. But as long as the
to their home area and resume the fight
they had been forced to give up. At
Eighth Army headquarters the offer 7 By wars end the United Nations Partisan Force
reached a strength of twenty thousand divided among
stimulated plans for developing these six regiments, one of which had received airborne
allies from North Korea as the United training. Its members at that time included South Ko-
Nations Partisan Force. The islands rean volunteers who were allowed to join the parti-
sans in lieu of conscription into the ROK Army. Parti-
were to become base camps, and the san units eventually occupied island strongholds off
both coasts of North Korea, although the major
strength remained off Hwanghae Province. Beyond
6This section is based on Mono, AFFE Military harassing the enemy rear along the west coast, the
History Detachment, U.N. Partisan Forces in the Ko- value of partisan operations is a matter of specula-
rean Conflict, copy in CMH. tion.
KWP-EBB-0251
special precaution Ridgway had doing answered the Joint Chiefs ques-
applied. tion on timing previously posed to
Some light was shed on the evacua- MacArthur, that he could stay in Ko-
tion issue in Tokyo on 15 January when rea at least two or three months. Col-
General Collins, accompanied by Air lins also heard firsthand that the Chi-
Force Chief of Staff Gen. Hoyt S. nese so far had made no move to push
Vandenberg, arrived from Washington south of the Han, that when counterat-
to confer with General MacArthur. Col- tacked they usually withdrew, that they
lins informed MacArthur that just be- seemed to be having supply and mo-
fore he and General Vandenberg left rale difficulties, and that the North
the United States it was agreed during Korean infiltration in the east was
a conference with President Truman being checked. This information was
that an evacuation of Korea would be encouraging, and quite in contrast to
delayed as long as possible without en- the dismal tone of MacArthurs reports
dangering the Eighth Army or the se- to Washington. 16
curity of Japan. In this decision, Col- On the negative side, Ridgway
lins added, the objective was to permit brought up the need to improve the
the longest time possible for political leadership of some corps and divisions.
action by the United Nations and the Except for allowing General Almond
fullest opportunity to punish the to dismiss General McClure, Ridgway
Chinese. Collins also settled the matter had relieved no one. He had attempted
raised by Ridgway of the disposition of instead to better the performance of
the ROK Army. If an evacuation be- his principal subordinates by exhorta-
came necessary, President Truman tion and example. But after observing
wanted not only the ROK Army but more poor performances during the
also the members of the ROK govern- withdrawals from line B to line D he
ment and the ROK police force, al- was no longer hopeful that encourage-
together more than a million people, ment and admonishment would pro-
taken out of Korea. 15 duce the quality he considered essential.
Further clarification of the issue came Writing to General Collins on 8 Jan-
later on the 15th after Collins and Van- uary, Ridgway had urged the chief of
denberg flew to Korea for a meeting staff and, through him, commander of
with General Ridgway at Taegu. The Army Field Forces General Mark W.
main discussion centered on Ridgways Clark, to insist that all general officers
current operations and plans and on of combat commands attain the high-
their relationship to the Washington est standards for our military traditions.
concept of evacuation. Ridgway urged, Lets pour on the heat in our training,
lest his forces face a difficult with- and above all, lets be ruthless with our
drawal, that any high level decision to general officers if they fail to measure
leave Korea be kept a closely guarded up?
secret until he could get his forces
below South Koreas main mountain 16 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Ridgway,
Aide-Memoire for General J. Lawton Collins, CS,
ridges. Ridgway estimated, and by so USA, 15 Jan 51, sub: Conference at EUSAK Main, 15
Jan 51; Rad, C-53613, Bradley from Collins for JCS,
17 Jan 51.
15 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 313. 17 Ltr,Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0255
Ridgway would soon lose two divi- verely any mass enemy attack.21 Before
sion commanders under a recent De- returning to the United States, Collins,
partment of the Army decision to ro- with Vandenberg, met again with
tate senior commanders from Korea to MacArthur and read this report. Mac-
training posts in the United States, Arthur, who as recently as 10 January
where their recent combat experience had described his military position in
could be put to good use. Later in Janu- Korea as untenable, now agreed that
ary General Barr, commander of the the situation had improved enough to
7th Division, would leave Korea to permit his forces to hold a beachhead
become commandant of The Armor in Korea indefinitely. But he reiterated
School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and his strong belief that the issue of
General Church would relinquish whether to evacuate Korea was a purely
command of the 24th Division to political matter and should not be de-
become commandant of The Infantry cided on military grounds.22 The issue,
School at Fort Benning, Georgia. of course, really had been resolved, and
During his conference with General on a military basis.
Collins Ridgway requested that, in Three days later MacArthur visited
the future, any senior commander re- Eighty Army headquarters for the first
turned to the United States simply be- time since Ridgway had assumed com-
cause he was worn out be protected mand. At a press conference there he
under this rotation policy. Collins confirmed the decision to stay. There
agreed.19 has been a lot of loose talk about the
For all practical purposes, General Chinese driving us into the sea, he told
Collins settled the evacuation issue in reporters. No one is going to drive us
an announcement to the press follow- into the sea.23 The report Collins filed
ing his meeting with Ridgway. Imbued from Tokyo and briefings he and
with the Eighth Army commanders Vandenberg gave upon their return
personal confidence and encouraged by meanwhile reassured officials in Wash-
the report on the Chinese, Collins told ington, including President Truman.
correspondents that as of now, we are They were no longer pessimistic about
going to stay and fight.20 When he re- our being driven out of Korea, Collins
turned to Tokyo on the 17th after a wrote later, and, though it was real-
tour of the front that revealed con- ized that rough times were still ahead
siderable evidence of Ridgways strong
leadership, he sent his views to Wash- 21 Later, after Ridgway saw press reports of Collins
ington. The Eighth Army was improv- views, he radioed MacArthur: May I suggest for such
use as you think it might merit, my firm conviction
ing daily under Ridgways command, that recently reported press statements that members
he reported, and on the whole was in of the JCS had announced 'the Eighth Army has plenty
position and prepared to punish se- of fight left and if attacked will severely punish the
enemy are great understatements. This command, I
am convinced, will do far more. See Rad, G-1-2148
KCG, CG EUSAK to CINCFE, Personal for General
19 Ridgway, Aide-Memoire for Collins, 15 Jan 51, MacArthur, 26 Jan 51.
sub: Conference at EUSAK Main, 15 Jan 51; Eighth 22 Rad, C-53613, Bradley from Collins for JCS, 17
Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Collins, War in Peace- Jan 51; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 327.
time, p. 257. 23 Statement to the Press, General MacArthur, 20
20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. Jan 51, copy in CMH.
KWP-EBB-0257
20 toward Suwon. An exchange of fire fire from a strong Chinese force de-
with some six hundred to eight hun- ployed five hundred yards south of
dred Chinese held the 3d Division force Suwon and from machine gunners atop
in place for the remainder of the day.28 buildings inside town. Michaelis team
WOLFHOUND forces elsewhere met deployed and returned the fire for a
no opposition but were delayed by dam- half hour, then under the cover of air
aged roads and bridges. The bulk of strikes withdrew out of range.31
the reinforced 27th Infantry moving The WOLFHOUND forces developed
over Route 1 in the main effort halted a corps outpost line along the Chinwi
for the night at the northern edge of with a westward extension to the coast
Osan.2g The 1st Battalion of the regi- and pushed patrols back into enemy
ment and tanks following Route 39 near territory. Ridgway commended them,
the coast stopped at Paranjang, ten more for the offensive spirit displayed
miles to the west.30 than for results achieved. But General
As Colonel Michaelis two columns Milburn estimated that the two-day
converged on Suwon over Routes 1 and operation had inflicted 1,380 enemy
39 on the morning of the 16th, Gen- casualties, 1,180 by air strikes, 5 cap-
eral Milburn ordered the WOLFHOUND tured and 195 killed by ground troops.
forces to withdraw to the Chinwi River His own losses were three killed and
at 1400. Having so far met only a few seven wounded. The Chinese captives
Chinese, who appeared to be stragglers, identified three armies, but since the
Michaelis ordered a motorized com- 27th Infantry had taken these prison-
pany of infantry and a company of ers before running into the Chinese po-
tanks from each column to sprint ahead sition at Suwon, the identity of the unit
and inflict as much damage as possible defending the town was obscure. Most
on enemy forces discovered in Suwon pertinent, the reconnaissance revealed
before withdrawing. On the left, after that no large force was located south of
the tank-infantry team moving on the Suwon-Kumnyangjang-ni line but
Route 39 to Route 20 and then turning that organized groups did hold posi-
east came to a destroyed bridge two tions along it.32
miles southwest of Suwon, dismounted Having served up WOLFHOUND as
infantry continued the advance and in- an example, Ridgway on 20 January
vestigated the southwestern edge of instructed his American corps com-
town without finding enemy forces. On manders to devise similar operations.
Route 1 the tanks and infantry received General Milburn responded on the
22d with an infantry-armor strike built
around the 35th Infantry that in
28 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd concept nearly duplicated Operation
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps POR 375, 15 Jan 51, and WOLFHOUND. Two small encounters
377, 16 Jan 51.
29 The 89th Tank Battalion; 8th Field Artillery
Battalion; Battery B, 90th Field Artillery Battalion; 31 I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 Jan 51; I Corps POR
Company A, 65th Engineer Battalion; 25th Recon- 378, 16 Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th
naissance Company; a detachment of the 25th Signal Inf Unit Rpt no. 16, 16 Jan 51.
Company; and two tactical air control parties were 32 I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 and 17 Jan 51; Ltr, CG
attached. 25th Div for general distribution, 19 Jan 51, sub:
30 25th Div OI 46, 14 Jan 51; I Corps POR 375, 15 Commendation. See also various reports on Opera-
Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. tion WOLFHOUNDin the 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0259
estimated at fifteen killed by ground Each corps force was to establish a base
troops and fifty by air strikes. The lack of operations on the night of the 24th
of contact before reaching Yangji-ri along a line of departure ten miles
supported General Coulters conviction ahead of line D, from the coast through
that the area below Route 20 was unoc- Osan to Yoju, then advance to the Han
cupied, while the Yangji-ri exchange in multiple columns through five phase
supplied further evidence that orga- lines about five miles apart. (Map 18)
nized enemy groups were located along To insure a fully coordinated recon-
the road.39 naissance, Ridgway made Milburn re-
sponsible for ordering the advance
Operation Thunderbolt from each phase line in both corps
zones; to guarantee the security of the
Ridgway, however, wanted a clearer advance, he instructed Milburn to or-
picture of enemy dispositions below the der each successive move only after he
Han before committing forces to gen- had clearly determined that no enemy
eral offensive operations. On 23 Janu- group strong enough to endanger any
ary his G-2 reported the bulk of the column had been bypassed. Ridgway
XIII Army Group to be below Seoul in intended that his ground troops would
the area bounded by Route 20 on the have ample air support. He planned to
south and the Han River on the east postpone the operation if for any rea-
and north. Air reconnaissance had been son on the 25th General Partridge
reporting steady troop movements be- could not assure two successive days of
low the Han but did not confirm the maximum close support. Ridgway also
presence of such a large force in that arranged for the I Corps to be able to
region. Nor had recent ground contacts call down gunfire from a heavy cruiser
developed any solid enemy defense at and two destroyers of Task Force 95
the areas lower edge. Resolving the stationed off Inchon.41
ambiguities, Ridgway judged, required The X Corps was to protect the right
a deeper and stronger reconnaissance flank of the THUNDERBOLT advance.
in force, which he scheduled for the On 23 January Ridgway had his dep-
morning of the 25th under the name uty chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Henry I.
Operation THUNDERBOLT.40 Hodes, deliver instructions to General
In the THUNDERBOLT operation Almond requiring the X Corps to main-
General Milburn and General Coulter tain contact with the IX Corps at Yoju
were to reconnoiter as far as the Han, and to prevent enemy movements
each using not more than one Ameri- south of the Yoju-Wonju road.
can division reinforced by armor and, Almond, as he had been instructed
at the discretion of each corps com- three days earlier, also was to send
mander, one South Korean regiment.
oo
KWP-EBB-0262
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT given the 7th Cavalry near Inchon, 26 January 1951.
forces in diversionary forays north of in force would reach the Han, and he
this road.42 also saw possibility of holding the
In a personal effort to develop the ground covered. That night, from a
disposition of enemy forces before Op- forward command post established at I
eration THUNDERBOLT began; Ridg- Corps headquarters in Chonan, he or-
way on the 24th reconnoitered the ob- dered Milburn and Coulter to prepare
jective area from the air with General plans for holding their gains once their
Partridge as his pilot. The two generals forces achieved the fifth phase line
flew low over the territory twenty miles stretching eastward from Inchon. The
ahead of the I and IX Corps fronts for two corps commanders completed these
two hours but saw no indications of plans on the 25th. Thus the THUNDER-
large enemy formations. Although this BOLT reconnaissance tentatively as-
flight did not conclusively disprove the sumed the nature of a general attack
current G-2 estimate, Ridgway was within a few hours after it started.43
more confident that his reconnaissance In the I Corps zone, the first
42 Rad, GX-1-1645 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs 43 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Poli-
I, IX, and X Corps, 20 Jan 51; Rad, GX-l-2270 KGOO, cies, p. 381; Futrell, The United States Air Force in Ko-
CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 28 Jan 51 (confirms rea, p. 263; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I
oral instructions delivered by Gen Hodes on 23 Jan Corps Opn Plan Exploitation, 25 Jan 51; IX Corps
51). Opn Plan 11, 25 Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0263
THUNDERBOLT phase line lay four cated that the XIII Army Group had
miles short of Suwon in territory al- set out a counter-reconnaissance screen
ready well examined. Milburn picked to shield defenses or assembly areas far-
the 25th Division reinforced by the ther north. According to the prisoners,
Turkish brigade to make the advance. some positions would be found between
According to the scheme of moving in two and five miles farther north. This
multiple columns, General Kean sent location would place them generally
the 35th Infantry up Routes 39 and 1 along the second THUNDERBOLT phase
in the west, the Turks over a secondary line, which coincided with Suwon and
road between Routes 1 and 17 and up a stretch of Route 20 in the west, then
17 itself on the east. Out along the coast, tipped northeast to touch the Han ten
a fifth column made up of the recon- miles above Yoju.46
naissance companies of the 25th Divi- On the 26th General Milburn allowed
sion and the 3d Division screened the the I Corps columns to move toward
west flank of the advance.44 the second phase line while the IX
The initial phase line in the IX Corps Corps forces continued to clear the area
zone traced the high ground just above along the first. Again against light, scat-
Route 20 which included the area pre- tered opposition, the two columns of
viously reconnoitered by Task Force the 35th Infantry converged on Suwon
Johnson. Coulter again ordered the 1st and occupied the town and airfield by
Cavalry Division to advance. Choosing 1300. Elsewhere in both corps zones
to start in two columns, General Gay the advance became a plodding affair
sent the 8th Cavalry north on Route 55 as the troop columns searched east and
toward Yangji-ri, where Colonel John- west of their axes while driving north
son had met resistance on the earlier for short gains through tough spots of
mission, and the 7th Cavalry up Route resistance. The Chinese fought back
13 into the territory above Ichon.45 hardest at Kumnyangjang-ni, which the
Screening wide to the flanks of each Turks finally cleared at 1930, and in the
axis lest they bypass an enemy force, heights above Yangji-ri, where the 8th
the THUNDERBOLT columns on the Cavalry lost 28 killed and 141 wounded
25th developed islands of opposition, while managing little more than to
mostly light, along or just below the first hold its position. The inability of the
phase line. Sharp counterattacks hit the 8th Cavalry to move forced the 7th
Turks on the secondary road east of Cavalry to the east to stand fast along
Route 1 and the 8th Cavalry in the the first phase line just above Ichon.47
Yangji-ri area, but in both instances the Gains on the 27th were short every-
Chinese eventually broke contact. Cap- where, more because of the require-
tives identified only two divisions of the ments for close coordination and a
50th Army across the thirty-mile front thorough ground search than enemy
of the advance. This disclosure and the
general pattern of light resistance indi-
46 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth
Army PIR 197, 25 Jan 51: 25th Div Comd Rpt.. Nar.
44 I Corps Opn Dir 40, 23 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 47 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div
45 IX Corps Opn O 11, 23 Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Opn Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 198, 26
O 1-51, 24 Jan 51. Jan 51.
KWP-EBB-0264
resistance. The deepest I Corps ad- Ridgway on the 27th authorized Mil-
vance was on the left, where the 35th burn to add the 3d Division to the I
Infantry moved about two miles above Corps advance. Milburn gave General
Suwon, while the leading Turk troops Soule the Turkish brigade zone east of
on the right got about a mile above Suwon and sent the Turks west to ad-
Route 20 into the Tan-chon River vance along the coast toward Inchon.
valley between Suwon and Kumnyang- On the 28th Soules 65th and 15th Regi-
jang-ni. The heaviest fighting again ments moved north astride Route 55 in
occurred near Yangji-ri when the 5th the Tan-chon valley while the Turks
Cavalry passed through the 8th and at- shifted westward and joined the ad-
tacked west. Killing at least three vance of the 35th Infantry. Against
hundred Chinese before reaching moderate, uneven resistance, the en-
Kumnyangjang-ni, the 5th Cavalry then larged I Corps force reached within two
turned up Route 17 to reach the first miles of the third phase line, which lay
phase line a mile and half to the north. roughly halfway between the line of de-
The 7th Cavalry, in the meantime, con- parture and the Han.50
tinued to hold near Ichon.48 To the east, where resistance in the
Captives taken during the day identi- Yangji-ri-Kumnyangjang-ni area had
fied the third, and last, division of the kept the IX Corps THUNDERBOLT
50th Army. The full deployment of the forces slightly behind the others, the
50th and the absence of contact with 1st Cavalry Division received clearance
any other army on the THUNDERBOLT on the 28th to advance to the second
front supported the previous conclu- phase line. In the slow going imposed
sion that the 50th had a screening mis- by careful screening and moderate op-
sion. The intelligence rationale now tak- position, the 5th Cavalry, moving along
ing shape assumed the Chinese units Route 17, reached the new objective
originally moving south of the Han to while the 7th Cavalry, advancing above
have started a gradual reduction of for- Ichon in a wide zone astride Route 13,
ward forces after determining gener- stopped for the night about a mile
ally the extent of the Eighth Army short. The cavalrymen had encoun-
withdrawal. Behind the 50th Army tered two new regiments, one athwart
screen, the remaining five armies of the each axis of advance. These, as identi-
XIII Army Group and the North Korean fied by Chinese captured later during
I Corps apparently were now grouped sharp night assaults against the 7th
just above and below the Han to rest Cavalry, belonged to the 112th Division,
and refurbish those Chinese who had 38th Army. Previously assembled in a
been in combat longest.49 rest area about seven miles above the
To meet the probability of stronger front, the 112th had received sudden
resistance nearer the Han and to pre- orders to move south and oppose the
pare for holding all ground gained, IX Corps advance.51
line on the 31st, and IX Corps forces When executed, the instructions
reached little farther than the second.56 Ridgway issued at the turn of the month
Ridgway in the meantime converted would set the entire Eighth Army front
his reconnaissance in force to a full- in forward motion. In terms of ground
fledged attack. On the 30th, although to be gained and held, however,
his assault forces were some distance Ridgway intended. that this motion
short of the fifth phase line, where he carry his forces no farther than the
originally had planned to establish the lower bank of the Han in the west and
remainder of the I and IX Corps, he a general line extending eastward from
authorized Milburn and Coulter to the Han River town of Yangpyong
bring their remaining units forward through Hoengsong in the center of
from line D to hold the ground that the peninsula to Kangnung on the
had been gained. He did not release coast. Only if enemy forces elected to
these forces for commitment in the ad- withdraw above the 38th parallel would
vance, but he did take steps to ease the he consider occupying a defense line
progress of the attack by instructing farther north, and in this context he
Milburn to plan a strong armored asked his staff near the end of January
thrust through the coastal lowland on for recommendations on the most ad-
the west flank. Beyond this, he directed vantageous terrain lines for the Eighth
his G-3 to arrange a maximum air effort Army to occupy during the spring and
to isolate the battlefield south of the summer months. Otherwise, his current
Han.57 judgment was that the ground farther
He also began to widen the offensive. north, to and including the 38th paral-
On the 30th he asked General Almond lel, offered no defensible line worthy
and the ROK Army chief of staff, Gen- of the losses risked in attempting to
eral Chung, for recommendations on take it.59
sending the X Corps and the ROK III In limiting the Eighth Armys defense
Corps forward in the fashion of Opera- line in the west to the lower bank of the
tion THUNDERBOLT. The purpose of Han, Ridgway excluded Seoul as an
the advance, he explained, would be to objective. Occupying the capital city, in
disrupt the North Korean II and V his estimation, would provide no mili-
Corps, which were still regrouping east tary advantage but would, rather, pro-
of Route 29. On 2 February he ordered duce the disadvantage of placing a river
the ROK I Corps to join the advance. immediately in rear of the occupying
The South Koreans were to move as forces. He had in fact directed his staff
far north as the east coast town of to prepare plans for crossing the Han
Kangnung.58 and capturing the city. But, in line with
his views, these plans were not to be
carried out unless there arose an op-
56 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div ROKA and CG X Corps, 30 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan Jnl, Sum, 31 Jan 51; Rad, GX-2-118 KGOO, CG Eighth
51; I Corps G3 Sit Overlay, 31 Jan 51; IX Corps G3 Army to CG X Corps and C/S ROKA, 2 Feb 51.
Sit Overlay, 31 Jan 51. 59 Ltr, Ridgway to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51; Eighth
57 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, The
58 Rad, GX-l-2257 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 386.
KWP-EBB-0267
portunity to destroy a major enemy Kimpo airfield and the port of Inchon,
force in which the retaking of Seoul both below the Han, and urged their
was an incidental possibility.60 capture.62 These facilities already
In any event, Ridgway entertained had become objectives of Operation
no thought of a prolonged effort to THUNDERBOLT.
hold any line. Knowing that there To Ridgways larger concept. of hold-
would be no major reinforcement of ing along the Han River-Yangpyong-
the Eighth Army and assuming that en- Hoengsong-Kangnung line unless en-
emy forces would keep trying to drive emy forces voluntarily withdrew above
the Eighth Army out of Korea or de- the 38th parallel, MacArthur re-
stroy it in place, he saw no wisdom in sponded in terms of developing the
accepting the heavy attrition that a static enemys main line of resistance. If
defense seemed certain to entail. In Ridgway developed the line below the
sum, he considered the permanent Han, he should not attempt to break
acquisition of real estate an impractical, through it, but if he reached the Han
if not unachievable, objective. In his without serious resistance, he should
mind, inflicting maximum losses on the continue north until he had defined the
Chinese and North Koreans, delaying enemy line or discovered that no line
them as long as possible if and when existed.63
they attempted to advance, preserving As a general concept, MacArthur had
the strength of his own forces, and in mind to push on until we reached
maintaining his major units intact re- the line where a balance of strength
mained the only sound bases of plan- was achieved which was governed by
ning, both for current operations and the relativity of supply."64 Ridgway, on
at longer range.61 the other hand, was primarily inter-
Ridgway informed General Mac- ested in holding whatever line best
Arthur of these tactical concepts by let- suited his basic plan of punishing the
ter on 3 February. MacArthur agreed enemy as severely as possible at the least
that occupying Seoul would yield little cost to his own forces. The difference
military gain, although he believed that in concept was perhaps subtle but was
seizing the city would produce decided substantial enough to prompt Ridgway
diplomatic and psychological advan- to bring up the matter again when Mac-
tages. On the other hand, he stressed Arthur next visited Korea.
to Ridgway the military worth of nearby
62 Ibid.; Rad, C-54811, CINCUNC to CG Eighth
60 Ltr, Ridgway, to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51; Rad, Army, Personal for Ridgway, 4 Feb 51.
CICOS-14-376, CG Eighth Army to C/S Eighth 63 Rad, C-54811, CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army,
Army, 26 Jan 51. Personal for Ridgway, 4 Feb 51.
61 Ltr,Ridgway to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51. 64 MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 384.
KWP-EBB-0268
CHAPTER XIII
sion, 42d Army. Near dawn on 1 Febru- of a strong enemy force assembling
ary the 375th and 374th Regiments at- around Hongchon, at the intersection
tacked from the north and northeast, of Routes 24 and 29 twenty miles north-
respectively, and after daylight the 373d east of Chipyong-ni and fifteen miles
Regiment assaulted the perimeter from north of Hoengsong. This force, appar-
the northwest and southwest. In hard, ently part of the North Korean V Corps,
close-in fighting lasting all day, the de- could be preparing to advance south-
fending battalions, relying heavily on west on Route 24 through Chipyong-
artillery fire and on more than eighty ni, then down the Han valley toward
air strikes, drew far more blood and Yoju and Chungju. Or the V Corps
finally forced the Chinese to withdraw. might again push forces south on Route
Freemans forces counted 1,300 enemy 29 through Hoengsong toward Wonju.
bodies outside their perimeter and esti- To spoil either move, Almond consid-
mated total enemy casualties at 3,600. ered Hongchon the proper main objec-
Their own losses were 45 killed, 207 tive of a X Corps attack.6
wounded, and 4 missing.4 To disrupt both the V Corps and II
Judging from the two sharp actions Corps, he outlined a coordinated X
at the twin tunnels, the Chinese Corps-ROK III Corps advance, Oper-
were determined to retain control of ation ROUNDUP. (Map 19) The current
Chipyong-ni. They had good reason. corps combat reconnaissance limit, gen-
The town was so situated that the force erally the Chipyong-ni-Hoengsong-
occupying it could control movements Pyongchang line, was to be the line of
over Route 2 to the west, over Route 24 departure for ROUNDUP and was to be
to the northeast, over Routes 24 and occupied in a preliminary advance by
24A below town, and thus through the the 2d Division on the left, the 187th
Yangpyong-Chungju segment of the Airborne Regimental Combat Team in
Han valley stretching to the southeast the center, and the 7th Division on the
behind it. Eighth Army possession of right. This advance would base Ameri-
Chipyong-ni, furthermore, would can units far enough forward to sup-
pose a threat of envelopment to enemy port a thrust at Hongchon, which Al-
forces opposing the I and IX Corps mond planned South Korean forces
below the Han. For these same reasons would make.7
General Almond planned to seize He proposed a flanking operation
Chipyong-ni and incorporated this against Hongchon by the ROK 5th and
plan in his overall recommendations for 8th Divisions accompanied by artillery
an operation styled after THUNDER- and armor drawn from the American
BOLT.5 units on the line of departure. From
Also behind Almonds proposals behind the 2d Division on the left, part
were late January intelligence reports of the ROK 8th Division was to advance
north over Route 29 while the main
4 Ibid.; Ltr, G3 Eighth Army to CG Eighth Army, 3 body moved northwest to cut Route 24
Feb 51, sub: Results of 23d Infantry and French Bat- roughly halfway between Chipyong-ni
talion Action at 010450 February 1951; Study, Col.
Paul Freeman, Wonju Thru Chipyong: An Epic of
Regimental Combat Team Action in Korea, Apr 51, 6 Ibid.
cop y in CMH. 7 Ibid.; X Corps Opn Plan Roundup, 1 Feb 51; X
5 XCorps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. Corps OI 92 and 93, 1 Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0270
KWP-EBB-0271
oC
cZ
KWP-EBB-0274
676, CG Fifth Air Force to CINCFE et al., 31 Jan 51; 20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth
Rad, OPC 709, CG Fifth Air Force to CINCFE et al., Army PIRs 204-208, 1-5 Feb 51; I Corps Comd Rpt,
1 Feb 51; Rad, OPC 730, CG Fifth Air Force to Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
CINCFE et al., 2 Feb 51; Rad, OPC 753, CG Fifth Air 21 The North Korean Peoples Army was officially acti-
Force to CINCFE et al., 3 Feb 51. vated on 8 February 1948.
19 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, G3 Air Briefing Rpts, 2-5 22 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth
Feb 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. Army PIRs 204-208, l-5 Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0275
23 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; I Corps Opn Dir 25 Ibid.; Conference Notes, Conference Between
43, 2 Feb 51. Eighth Army Commander and Corps Commanders
24 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. at Tempest Tac, 8 February 1951, copy in CMH.
KWP-EBB-0276
Inchon waters for a demonstration on the 10th, and Task Force Allen was
the 10th.26 then to advance above the road in
Snow and low-hanging clouds shut multiple columns to clear the Kimpo
down air operations on the 9th but had peninsula.28
little ill effect on the I Corps. The 25th The landing demonstration at
Division captured Kwanak Mountain Inchon scheduled for the 10th now
and, west of Route 1, advanced its in- seemed apt to hinder rather than ease
fantry line within two miles of the the I Corps advance. The 25th Divi-
Inchon-Yongdungpo road. Armored sion armored force that had looked at
forces from the division reconnoitered Inchon during the day had seen no
farther west and north within sight of enemy activity. The enemys abrupt
Inchon and Yongdungpo. On the withdrawal apparently had included the
corps right, the 3d Division moved two Inchon garrison. Since a simulated
to three miles north, and a small landing might prompt the North Ko-
armored column, Task Force Meyer, reans to reoccupy Inchon and in turn
spurted up Route 55 to become the first make the port more difficult for the
corps troops on the Han. Minefields 25th Division to capture, the amphibi-
harassed the advance, but assault forces ous feint was canceled. The naval force
otherwise consistently reported no assembled off Inchon, however, did
resistance.27 plan to investigate the port on the 10th
General Milburn judged that the 50th using a small party of ROK marines
Army forces previously in the 3d Divi- acquired from an offshore security
sions zone had withdrawn above the force on Tokchok-to, an island thirty
Han or out of the I Corps zone to the miles southwest of Inchon.29
east. The North Korean 8th and 47th Snow showers through the morning
Divisions, on the other hand, might have of the 10th again canceled most of the
moved northwest to join the North Ko- I Corps air support, but again with no
rean 17th Division just above the Inchon- ill effect. A total absence of resistance
Yongdungpo road to defend the except for more antitank mines allowed
Kimpo peninsula. As part of a plan to the 25th Division to seize the Inchon-
spoil any such effort, Milburn on the Yongdungpo road an hour ahead of
night of the 9th called for Task Force schedule. Under clearing skies, Task
Allen to assemble behind the 25th Di- Force Allen moved into the Kimpo pe-
vision. The division was to seize the ninsula in two columns promptly at
Inchon-Yongdungpo road by noon on noon. The column on the east aimed
first for Kimpo airfield due north, then
for the road leading northwest along
26 Ibid: Rad GX-2-621 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to
CINCFE, 6 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-699 KGOO, CG Eighth
Army to CTG 95.1, 7 Feb 51; Rad, MCN 32110,
COMNAVFE to CTF 90 and CTF 95, 6 Feb 51; Rad, 28 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; I Corps Opn Dir
MCN 32674, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 7 Feb 51; 44 (Operation PACEMAKER),9 Feb 51.
Rad, MCN 32587, COMNAVFE to COMSEVENFLT, 29 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth
7 Feb 51; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 10 Feb 51; I Corps Comd Rpt,
p. 324. Nar, Feb 51; Rad, MCN 34233, CTF 95 to CTG 95.1,
27 Eighth Army G3 Air Briefing Rpt, 10 Feb 51; 9 Feb 51; Rad, MCN 34279, CTE 95.14 to CTG 95.1,
Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 9 Feb 51; I Corps Comd 9 Feb 51; Rad, MCN 34332, CTG 95.1 to CTE 95.14,
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. 9 Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0277
MEN OF THE 5TH REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM ADVANCE toward the Han River, 5
February 1951.
the lower bank of the Han. The col- 35th, and attached ROK 15th Regi-
umn on the west pushed up the center ments of the 25th Division moved to
of the peninsula. The east force occu- the Han between Kimpo airfield and
pied the airfield without a contest in the edge of Yongdungpo. In the only
midafternoon, and by nightfall both brush with enemy forces, a South Ko-
columns were well up the peninsula, rean patrol that moved across the ice
eight miles above the Inchon-Yong- into the lower edge of Seoul was chased
dungpo road. One machine gun back by small arms fire. On the corps
position, a short fire fight with the right, the 15th and 7th Infantry Regi-
tail of an enemy column withdrawing ments of the 3d Division joined Task
across the frozen Han, twelve stragglers Force Meyer at the Han, moving onto
captured, and a little long range fire the high ground between Yongdungpo
were the only evidences of the North and Route 55. The only contact was an
Korean I Corps.30 exchange of fire with enemy forces in
Behind Task Force Allen the 24th, position on the north bank of the
river.31
30I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth Army G3
Air Briefing Rpt, 11 Feb 51. 31I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0278
On the opposite corps flank, the 25th less believed his corps could reach the
Divisions reconnaissance company and Han in a reasonable length of time.34
the Eighth Army Ranger company had Under a wet sky on the 9th, Moores
moved westward onto the cape holding forces met decidedly stiffer resistance,
Inchon in company with Task Force including counterattacks that forced
Allens noontime advance above the some corps units into short withdrawals.
Inchon-Yongdungpo road. Neither In sharp contrast to the virtual disap-
the Rangers, moving along the south- pearance of enemy forces before the I
ern shore of the cape, nor the recon- Corps on that date, the Chinese oppo-
naissance troops, heading directly for site the IX Corps apparently planned
Inchon, met resistance. The reconnais- to retain a bridgehead below the Han.
sance company entered the city at 1700, The bridgehead area as defined by
almost simultaneously with eighty ROK Moores forces on the 9th and 10th was
marines sent ashore in three small pow- about fifteen miles wide, its west an-
erboats by Task Force 95. As suspected, chor located on the Han nine miles
the North Korean garrison was gone.32 north of Kyongan-ni, its east anchor
The Rangers found a small spot of on the river four miles below Yang-
resistance on the 11th on a ridge a mile pyong. The U-shaped forward edge
south of Inchon. The Rangers and dipped four to seven miles below the
some of the reconnaissance troops Han across a string of prominent
eliminated it early in the afternoon. heights between those points.35
Task Force Allen meanwhile resumed By holding this position the Chinese
clearing the Kimpo peninsula on the could prevent IX Corps observation of
morning of the 11th, its troops in the the Yangpyong area, already recog-
van reaching the tip before noon. Im- nized as the possible starting point of
mediately after General Allen reported an enemy attack down the Han valley.
the peninsula clear, General Milburn This theory gained support on the 10th
dissolved the task force and returned when in clearing afternoon weather air
its components to their parent units observers sighted large numbers of en-
now consolidating along the Han.33 emy troops moving east on Route 2
along the north bank of the Han imme-
The IX Corps Finds a Bridgehead diately behind the bridgehead area.36
IX Corps gains from 5 through 8
February were slow and short. The re- Operation Roundup
sistance emulated that encountered by
the I Corps, but the terrain was much As THUNDERBOLT forces came
rougher. Methodical coverage of the up to the Han on the 10th, General
ground consumed considerable time. Almonds ROUNDUP operation was in
As of the 8th, General Moore neverthe-
34 Conference Notes, Conf Between Eighth Army
Commander and Corps Commanders at Tempest Tac,
32 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 1600 and 1850, 10 8 Feb 51.
Feb 5 1 ;Eighth Arny Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 5 1; I Corps 35 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps
Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Field, United States Naval Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
Operations, Korea, p. 324. 36 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 10 Feb 51; IX Corps
33 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51. Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0279
son through the upper Han valley for these forces had come out of the ROK
almost twenty miles. Since Yu could get III Corps zone. The North Korean II
help from the U.S. 7th Division, whose Corps apparently was shifting forces
31st Regiment was now following the westward to join the V Corps in oppos-
ROK 7th Division above Pyongchang, ing the X Corps.42
Ridgway agreed to the transfer of the General Almond was obliged to pre-
ROK 3d for the duration of Operation vent further incursion on his right if
ROUNDUP, and Almond instructed the the envelopment of Hongchon was to
division to be in position for an advance succeed. On the 10th he directed the
above Hoengsong on the morning of ROK 5th Division to advance and estab-
the 1lth.40 lish blocking positions facing northeast
While Almond was arranging to as- near the corps boundary generally on
sist the ROK 8th Divisions northwest- the ground held by the ROK 27th Regi-
ward swing, a greater problem arose ment when it was attacked, some thir-
east of Route 29. On 7 February the teen miles northeast of Hoengsong.
ROK 5th Division, then advancing with Along with this move, he ordered the
two regiments forward, had encoun- U.S. 7th Division to send a battalion
tered a North Korean force estimated northwest out of the area above
at four thousand. The division com- Pyongchang toward a ground objec-
mander planned to eliminate the en- tive sixteen miles due east of Hoeng-
emy group on the 8th by bringing up song. This advance, he intended, would
his reserve regiment on the left for an drive enemy forces located near the
attack to the east concurrent with at- corps boundary into the path of the
tacks to the north and west by the cen- ROK 5th Divisions attack. Almond also
ter and right regiments. But his plan ordered a battalion of the 187th Air-
was spoiled when the right regiment, borne Regimental Combat Team to
the ROK 27th, was hit on the 8th by move into position nine miles east of
hard North Korean attacks from the Hoengsong to deepen the east flank
northwest and northeast. One battal- blocking effort at the right rear of the
ion was scattered, and the remainder ROK 5th Division.43
of the regiment was forced to with- The ROK 3d Division, assembling
draw.41 just east of Hoengsong, was now to be-
The regiment continued to receive come the right arm of the maneuver
attacks until the early morning hours against Hongchon. Behind the protec-
of the 9th when the North Koreans tion of the ROK 5th Division to the
pulled away to the northwest. The east, the ROK 3d was to move north in
alarming note was that some or all of two columns through the heights east
of Route 29 to a point due east of
Hongchon. There the right column
40 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Conference
Notes, Conf Between Eighth Army Commander and
Corps Commanders at Tempest Tac, 8 Feb 51; Eighth 42 Ibid.
Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 7 Feb 51; X Corps OI 99, 8 Feb 43 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth
51. Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 8, 9, and 10 Feb 51; Eighth Army
41 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth G3 Jnl, Entry 1305, 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl,
Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 7 and 8 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Briefing for CG, 11 Feb 51; X Corps OI 101 and 102,
Jnl, Briefing for CG, 8 Feb 51. 10 Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0282
Jnl, Briefing for CG, 10 and 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army mony Before the Eighth Army IG by Maj George
G3 Jnl, Entry 2115, 11 Feb 51. Kessler, KMAG Advisor to G1 and G4, ROK 8th Div,
49 Ibid. hereafter cited as Kessler Testimony (with overlays),
50X Corps Comd Rpt, Feb 51, Book of Inclosures, 15 Feb 51.
Incl 2, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, Col Edwin J. 51 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 11 Feb 51; X Corps
Messinger, CO 9th Inf, to CG 2d Div, 16 Feb 51, sub: Comd Rpt, Feb 51, Book of Inclosures, Incl 1, Battle
Report of Investigation, with Incls 1 and 2; Testi- of Chipyong-ni.
KWP-EBB-0284
Route 29 toward Wonju, with both He believed that the Chinese would
paths then turning toward the same not open an offensive until major units
deep objective, Chungju. The advance of IX Army Group moved down from
might include deep sweeps to the south- the Wonsan area within reinforcing
west to envelop the I and IX Corps.58 range. These, he estimated, could reach
Because the enemys problem of re- the central region no sooner than 15
supply would progressively worsen as February.5g
supply lines lengthened during an ad- Fergusson was wrong in considering
vance, Fergusson judged that a sus- the arrival of IX Army Group units as a
tained Chinese drive was unlikely. More necessary condition and so was in error
probable was a series of shallow envel- on the nearest date of a Chinese attack.
oping maneuvers interspersed with But in measuring all other probabilities,
halts for reorganization and resupply. he came remarkably close.
58 Ibid. 59 Ibid.
KWP-EBB-0286
CHAPTER XIV
c't
co
KWP-EBB-0288
support units and Route 29. Below the bers of Keiths own infantry protection,
120th, the 117th Division reinforced its Lt. Col. William P. Kelehers 1st Bat-
frontal attack on the 16th Regiment talion, 38th Infantry, were at the time
and deepened its penetration of the trying to collect the South Koreans and
regiments left flank, sending forces deploy them on the American pe-
eastward through the ground below rimeter, but with little success. Haynes
the mountain road directly toward contacted General Choi, but Choi was
Hoengsong.4 no longer in communication with the
By 0100 on 12 February communica- 21st Regiment and was, besides, under
tions were out between ROK 8th Divi- the impression that the 21st was mak-
sion headquarters and all regiments as ing only the short withdrawal he had
well as between each regiment and its called for earlier. He did nothing.
subordinates. Boxed between frontal Haynes meanwhile hesitated to clear
pressure and Chinese to the rear, the Keiths withdrawal without General
three regiments had started to with- Ruffners approval. When he asked the
draw; but with the main threads of con- division commander, Ruffner told him
trol broken and the better routes of to check with the X Corps artillery
withdrawal blocked, units became commander.6
separated and divided, and most were Ruffners deference to corps empha-
surrounded. The rearward move of sized the command and control ar-
those not trapped steadily disintegrated rangement for which General Ridgway
into individual efforts to escape.5 had expressed concern the day before.
Members of the 21st Regiment strag- As a matter of orders, and as an even-
gled into the Support Force 21 pe- tual matter of practice in controlling
rimeter at Changbong-ni about 0115. the artillery support forces, unity of
The support force commander, Lt. command in Operation ROUNDUP was
Col. John W. Keith, Jr., reported the vested in corps headquarters, no lower.
ROK withdrawal to Brig. Gen. Loyal M. The arrangement worked well enough
Haynes, the 2d Division artillery com- during the advance. But after the Chi-
mander, and asked permission to with- nese engineered the collapse of the
draw a little over three miles to a posi- ROK 8th Division, corps control inhib-
tion he formerly had occupied just ited the American commanders of sup-
above the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, port forces and of units on the line of
at the junction of Route 29 and the departure in reacting rapidly. How
mountain road leading west. He also much this inhibition assisted the Chi-
requested that General Haynes ask the nese is moot. Delays and piecemeal
ROK 8th Division commander to stop movements among the smaller Ameri-
the 21st Regiments withdrawal until can units nevertheless colored the
Keith got Support Force 21 and Sup- course of withdrawal operations.
port Team B in march order. Mem-
6 Ltr, Hq 2d Div Arty to CG 2d Div, 16 Feb 51, sub:
Responsibility for Losses of Personnel and Equipment
4 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Kessler of Support force 21 (hereafter cited as 2d Div Arty
Testimony, 15 Feb 51. Ltr), Incls 1 and 7; Ltr, Maj Warren D. Hodges, S3,
5 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, CG 38th Inf, to CG 2d Div, 17 Feb 51, sub: Report on
Eighth Army to CINCFE, 1 Mar 51, sub: Performance Activities, 12-13 Feb 51 (hereafter cited as Hodges
of the 5th and 8th ROK Divisions, 1l-12 Feb 51. Ltr); Keleher Ltr.
KWP-EBB-0289
THE BATTLE
THE BATTLE
FOR HOENGSONG
FOR HOENGSONG 269
269
In one
In one instance,
instance, Capt. Capt. Sherman
Sherman D. D. Support Force 21
Support Force 21
Jones,
ones, the
the commander
commander of Support
of Support
JTeam A, scorned any need to get per- Earlier,
Earlier, as as the ROK 8th
the ROK 8th Division
Division be- be-
Team A, scorned any need to get per- gan to fall back after midnight on 11
mission
mission to to withdraw
withdraw and and fought
fought east east gan to fall back after midnight on 11
over the blocked mountain road toward February, the 66th Army
February, the 66th Army commander commander
over the blocked mountain road toward widened
the
the 3d3d Battalion,
Battalion, 38th Infantry.
38th Infantry. He He widened his advance below
his advance below Hongch'on,
Hongchon,
withdrew a little after midnight amid sending
sending the 197th
the 197th Division Division south south
withdrew a little after midnight amid through
uncontrolled
uncontrolled ROK ROK vehicles, guns, and
vehicles, guns, and through the the ground
ground five five miles
miles east
east of of
troops and under heavy fire from Chi- Route 29 against the ROK 3d Division.
Route 29 against the ROK 3d Division.
troops and under heavy fire from Chi- In the mold of the attacks along and
nese
nese small
small arms, machine guns,
arms, machine guns, rocket
rocket In the mold of the attacks along and
launchers, and mortars. The last west
west of Route 29,
of Route infiltrating Chinese
29, infiltrating Chinese
launchers, and mortars. The last attacked the command post
A team troops to
A team troops to survive the move survive the move attacked the command post of the of the 23d
23d
reached Regiment and of one battalion of the
reached the the 3d 3d Battalion,
Battalion, 38th 38th Infantry,
Infantry, Regiment and of one battalion of
22d
the
about dawn. Losses included
about dawn. Losses included two tanks. two tanks. 22d after
after engaging
engaging the South Koreans
the South Koreans
Jones, the tanktank platoon
platoon leader, with heavy frontal
frontal assaults. Before the
Jones, the leader, and and fivefive with heavy
Chinese could get
assaults. Before
a trap fully
the
set, the
others
others were were wounded,
wounded, and nearly aa
and nearly Chinese could get a trap fully set, the
hundred fifty men were missing.7 two
two ROK regiments withdrew
ROK regiments withdrew to to aa posi-
posi-
hundred fifty men were missing. tion about three miles
Similarly,
Similarly, few
few ROK ROK 8th 8th Division
Division tion about three miles northeast
northeast of of
troops found their way to safety. MostMost Hoengsong.
Hoengsong.g
9
troops found their way to safety. A finger of the 197th, about three
remained encircled
remained encircled in the mountainsin the mountains A finger of the 197th, about three
and were
were eventually hundred men, thrust southwest toward
and eventually killed killed or captured.
or captured. hundred men, thrust southwest toward
Ch'angbong-ni during
On 13 February, after
On 13 February, after straggler lines straggler lines Changbong-ni during the the attack
attack andand
were set and near 0230 on the 12th hit Company A,
were set and after
after General
General Almond Almond near 0230 on the 12th hit Company A,
38th Infantry, holding the northeast
moved the division
moved the division into into corps reserve
corps reserve 38th Infantry, holding the northeast
at Chup'o-ri, west of Chech'on, the sector of
sector Support Force
of Support Force 21 21's perimeter.
s perimeter.
at Chupo-ri, west of Chechon, the The company stood its ground
division strength stood
division strength stood at 263 officers at 263 officers The company stood its ground but but re-re-
and slightly mained under fire. Though
mained under fire. Though still wait- still
and slightly over 3,000 men,
over 3,000 men, of of whom
whom ing for permission to withdraw,
wait-
about half were division
about half were division service troops. service troops. ing for permission to withdraw, Colo- Colo-
Casualties, either either dead or missing,
missing, nel Keith meanwhile
nel Keith meanwhile began to
began to put puthis
his
Casualties, dead or artillery units in march
march order.
stood at 323 officers (among
stood at 323 officers (among them the them the artillery units in order.10
commander and and entire Keith received clearance to to move
commander entire staffstaff of of the the Keith received clearance
back about 0245, an hour and
move
a half
10th Regiment,
10th Regiment, the the executive
executive officerofficer back about 0245, an hour and a half
of the 16th Regiment, seven battalion after he asked for it-good time
after he asked for it-good consid-
time consid-
of the 16th Regiment, seven battalion
commanders, and
commanders, and thirty thirty company
company
commanders)
commanders) and 7,142
and 7,142 men. Divi- men. Divi- fice of the IG, KMAG, to IG Eighth Army, 22 Feb 51,
fice of the IG, KMAG, to IG Eighth Army, 22 Feb 51,
sion equipment losses sub: Losses Sustained in Action North of Wonju, 11-13
included
sion equipment losses included 14 artil- 14 artil- sub: Losses Sustained in Action North of Wonju, 11-l 3
February 1951.
lery pieces, antitank guns,
lery pieces, 55 antitank guns, 68 68 trucks,
trucks, February 1951.
9 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 12 Feb 51; ibid., En-
9 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 12 Feb 51; ibid., En-
249
249 radios,
radios, 87 mortars, 137
87 mortars, 137 rocket
rocket tries 0600 and 1550, 12 Feb 51; X Corps Rpt, The
tries 0600 and 1550, 12 Feb 51; X Corps Rpt, The
launchers, Battle of Hoengsong, and Incl 4, Action of the Ith
164 machine
launchers, 164 machine guns, 102 auto- guns, 102 auto- Battle of Hoengsong, and Incl 4, Action of the 11th
ROK FA Battalion.
matic rifles, 2,389 carbines,
matic 8rifles, 2,389 carbines, and 4,096 and 4,096 ROK FA Battalion.
'o X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, Lt
rifles. Col10Milton
X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, Lt
G. Norum, Exec Off 38th Inf, to CG 2d
rifles.8 Col Milton G. Norum, Exec Off 38th Inf, to CG 2d
Div, 15 Feb 51, sub: Losses of Materiel and Personnel
Div, 15 Feb 51, sub: Losses of Materiel and Personnel
(hereafter cited as Norum Ltr); Keleher Ltr; Ltr,
(hereafter cited as Norum Ltr); Keleher Ltr; Ltr,
7 Ltr, Col Edwin J. Messinger, CO 9th Inf, to CG 2d 1st Lt George W. Gardner, CO Co A, 38th Inf, to CO
7 Ltr, Col Edwin J. Messinger, CO 9th Inf, to CG 2d 1st Lt George W. Gardner, CO Co A, 38th Inf, to CO
Div, 16 Feb 51, sub: Report of Investigation, with 1st Bn, 38th Inf, 16 Feb 51, sub: Summary of Combat
Div, 16 Feb 51, sub: Report of Investigation, with 1st Bn, 38th Inf, 16 Feb 51, sub: Summary of Combat
Incis I and 2. Action of Company "A," 38th Inf Regiment, During
Incls 1 and 2. Action of Company A, 38th Inf Regiment, During
s X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, Of- 11-12 February 1951 (hereafter cited as Gardner Ltr).
a X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, Of- 11-12 February 1951 (hereafter cited as Gardner Ltr).
KWP-EBB-0290
ering the route his request and its an- the American force. A mile down the
swer had taken. General Haynes, after road, an explosion under the second
General Ruffner instructed him to tank brought 2d Lt. William M. Mace,
check with corps, consulted Col. Wil- the platoon leader, out of the turret
liam P. Ennis, Jr., the corps artillery even as the tank, undamaged, contin-
commander, around 0130. Colonel ued to move. Machine gun fire from
Ennis, in turn, spoke to Col. William J. the left kept Mace from getting back
McCaffrey of the corps chief of staffs inside, and a grenade, apparently
office, who asked General Almond thrown from the ditch on the east side
himself. Almond approved the with- of the road, then blew him off the tank,
drawal, and his word passed back from although without wounding him. His
McCaffrey to Ennis to Haynes to Keith. and the leading tank continued down
Almond was under the impression, the road, neither crew aware that Mace
however, perhaps because of the sev- was no longer with them.13
eral hands through which Keiths re- The two tanks gradually outdistanced
quest had passed, that Support Force the infantry that had started with them
21 would withdraw to Hoengsong, not but moved no more than another mile
just to a position near the 3d Battalion, before the leading tank was hit by a
38th Infantry.11 rocket launcher round and ran off the
Keith started his withdrawal about steep edge of the road and overturned.
0300. Ahead of the main body, two The following tank attempted to pass
tanks and two squads of infantry from but was hit in the engine compartment
Support Team B moved to secure the by a grenade or mortar round and cap-
bridge three miles south, just above the sized off the opposite side of the road.
area to be occupied, unaware that the The two crews fled into the hills to the
Chinese had blocked Route 29 near the west, then turned south toward the 3d
bridge and that they now had organ- Battalion, 38th Infantry. l4
ized additional fire blocks above and To the rear, following the same west-
below the crossing, the latter actually ward drift to escape fire coming in from
in the area Keith intended to occupy. left of the road, Lieutenant Mace, the
Chinese machine gunners overlook- two infantry squads, and a number of
ing route 29 from the east harassed South Koreans took cover in the
the tank-infantry team the moment it ground on the right. The group moved
started south. The infantry hugged the south after daylight toward the 3d Bat-
tanks for protection, as did a group of talion, 38th Infantry, but became scat-
South Korean troops trying to stay with tered during several small skirmishes
with Chinese. The survivors, including
11Ltr, Brig Gen George C. Stewart, ADC 2d Div, to Mace, finally reached the 3d Battalion
CG 2d Div, 19 Feb 51, sub: Investigation of Heavy
near 0930.15
Losses of Material and Personnel in 2d Division Task
Force Operating in Support of 8th ROK Division Behind the scattered tank-infantry
(hereafter cited as Stewart Ltr); Testimony Before team, Colonel Keiths main column re-
Eighth Army IG by Col William P. Ennis, Jr., CG X
ceived heavy small arms and machine
Corps Arty (hereafter cited as Ennis Testimony), 16
Feb 51; Hodges Ltr; X Corps Arty S3 Jnl, Entry, 12
Feb 51. 13Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibit C-11.
12X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; Stewart 14 Ibid., Exhibits C-11 and C-12.
Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibit C-l 1; 2d Div Arty Ltr, Incl 1. 15 Ibid., Exhibits C-11, C-14, C-15, and C-16.
KWP-EBB-0291
gun fire from the heights east of Route ning engagement with Chinese who
29 while it formed and stretched out followed. As the company prepared to
on the road below the support force move, the commander, 1st Lt. George
perimeter. As Battery A of the 503d W. Gardner, sighted three 155-mm.
Field Artillery Battalion, the leading ar- howitzers attached to their M-5 tractors,
tillery unit, started to get its guns in a full ammunition truck, and several
column, a Chinese raiding party dashed jeeps and trailers, all unattached, in a
onto the road from the east, captured roadside paddy southwest of his posi-
the battery commander, first sergeant, tion. Gardners executive officer located
and several men, and took them back at least one more howitzer, still in fir-
into the hills. Chinese gunners mean- ing position. For reasons not clear, Bat-
while concentrated fire on vehicles, tery A, 503d Field Artillery Battalion,
damaging many and killing or wound- to whom the weapons and vehicles
ing several drivers.16 belonged, had withdrawn with only
By 0400 the Chinese had stopped one tube.19
Keiths column, actually before it had Gardner had no men who could
got a full start. Infantry and artillery drive the tractors and had neither time
troops at the head of the column nor explosives to destroy them or the
formed a line facing east along the road howitzers. Company A fought briefly
and returned fire while to the north from the artillery position, Gardners
Company A, assigned to be rear guard, men using the machine guns mounted
redeployed facing northwest, north, on the artillery vehicles until the
and northeast. Enemy forces reengaged ammunition was gone, then left the
the company, but with help from the wealth of weapons, artillery ammuni-
remaining two tanks of Support Team tion, and vehicles to the Chinese.20
B the rear guard troops kept the Chi- Gardner found the fifth weapon of
nese from rolling up the column.17 Battery A, 503d Field Artillery Bat-
Colonel Keith put some artillery talion, on the road where Lieutenant
pieces back in action near dawn and Maces two tanks had been knocked out
laid direct fire on the ridges to the east. and where the main body of the sup-
Colonel Keleher then deployed two ri- port force also had come under heavy
fle companies, one into the heights on mortar and machine gun fire. Among
each side of the road, while troops on several vehicles disabled by the fire was
the road shoved disabled vehicles out the tractor pulling the 155-mm. howit-
of the way and rounded up replace-
ments for missing drivers of others. 19 Gardner Ltr; Ltr, Lt Col William P. Keleher, CO
1st Bn, 38th Inf, to CO 38th Inf, 15 Feb 51, sub:
Stubborn resistance slowed Kelehers Supplement to Summation of Action of the 1st Bn,
infantry east of the road, but the sup- 38th Inf, During the Period 11-12 February 1951.
port force was moving before 0600.18 Gardners executive officer actually reported finding
two howitzers. Since Battery A, 503d Field Artillery
At the tail of the column, Company Battalion, had only five pieces and had taken one
A backed out of position just after the south, the count between Gardner and his executive
skies lightened but had to fight a run- officer was off by one. The 15th Field Artillery Battal-
ion later reported the loss of one 105-mm. howitzer
during the withdrawal from Changbong-ni. Perhaps
16 2d Div Arty Ltr, Incls 1 and 7; Keleher Ltr. this weapon was one of those reported by Gardners
17 Ibid.; Gardner Ltr. executive officer.
18 2d Div Arty Ltr, Incl 7; Keleher Ltr. 20 Gardner Ltr.
KWP-EBB-0292
zer. Gardners men had to manhandle strengthen the perimeter against the
the abandoned gun off the road to per- assaults, which were growing stronger.
mit the two tanks with them to pass.21 Withdrawing the combined force to
The support force received more fire Hoengsong was a logical alternative ex-
at the bridge, another mile south, and cept that the 3d Battalion remained un-
in the area just below the crossing der X Corps orders to hold the Route
where Colonel Keith had intended to 29-mountain road junction.23
redeploy. As Keiths column pushed A second situation now complicated
through each fire block, Chinese closed a withdrawal to Hoengsong. By the time
in on the road behind it and pressed Keith and Keleher joined Maixner,
hard against Gardners rear guard. those forces of the Division mov-
117th
Keith, judging it impossible to establish ing east below the mountain road
positions as planned after coming un- reached Route 29 and blocked it be-
der fire below the bridge, moved on to tween Hoengsong and the road junc-
join the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, not tion three miles north. Colonel Cough-
far beyond, and got the tail of the col- lin discovered the new block when in
umn inside the 3d Battalion perimeter response to a request from division ar-
about 1000. No careful muster was tillery he sent the 38ths headquarters
made after entering, but support force security platoon and a platoon from the
casualties so far appeared to exceed regimental tank company north out of
four hundred. Company A had suf- Hoengsong to help Support Force 21
fered the highest rate, losing two offi- get through the blocks below
cers and around a hundred ten men in Changbong-ni. The two platoons ran
its rearguard action. Keith, after discov- into the Chinese position a mile above
ering that five 155-mm. howitzers and Hoengsong and withdrew after losing
one 105-mm. howitzer had been left a tank and half the infantry. Coughlin
behind, relayed a request to division placed mortar and artillery fire on the
for air strikes on the weapons.22 enemy position and called in air strikes,
the first reaching the target around
1030. He also asked for the return of
From the Road Junction to Hoengsong
the 2d Battalion from division reserve
The 3d Battalion, by the time Sup- in Wonju with a view to sending it for-
port Force 21 arrived, had been under ward to clear the road, but General
fire and periodic assaults from the Ruffner chose not to release it.24
north and northwest for some five Ruffner, at the same time, advised
hours. After clearing with regimental Coughlin to be ready to assume control
commander Coughlin at his headquar- of Support Force 21 and get it back to
ters in Hoengsong (although Coughlin Hoengsong. Coughlin recommended
really had no authority over Support that the 3d Battalion also return when-
Force 2l), 3d Battalion commander Lt. ever he received word to withdraw the
Col. Harold Maixner deployed Keiths
artillery and Kelehers infantry to 23 Maimer Ltr; Hodges Ltr.
24 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong, and Incl
8, After Action Interview, 38th RCT; X Corps Arty
21 Ibid. S3 Jnl, Entry 11, 12 Feb 51; 2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 28,
22 Ibid.; 2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 57, 12 Feb 51. 12 Feb 51; Norum Ltr.
KWP-EBB-0293
Lt. Col. Barney D. White, the Sup- of Colonel Kelehers infantry moving
port Force 7 commander, decided through the high ground on both sides
against withdrawing over the route he of Route 29 to protect the motor col-
had used to reach his current position umn and remaining foot troops on the
since it led west to the bridge on Route road. Both Support Team A and Sup-
29 where Keiths forces had come un- port Team B remained with Colonel
der fire. White had sent a reconnais- Maixner to help defend the perimeter
sance party west to investigate, and it which was still under assault. Mortar
had been ambushed even before it and artillery fire and air strikes ar-
reached the bridge. He notified corps ranged by Colonel Coughlin pounded
headquarters that he would move due the ridges ahead of the support force,
east to the Twinnan-mul River, which but Kelehers men almost immediately
flowed southwest past the northern ran into strong resistance and lost mo-
edge of Hoengsong, then follow a mentum after a mile. Keleher commit-
primitive road through the Twinnan- ted the remainder of his battalion,
mul valley. The little-used road was ice but it was not enough to revitalize
coated and in poor shape, but White his attack.31
had engineers who could make hasty About the time Kelehers attack
repairs. With no interference from the stalled, word reached Colonel Cough-
enemy, White got his column started at lin that the 18th Regiment, ROK 3d
1500 and pulled out his rear guard Division, assembled about three miles
about two hours later.29 east of Hoengsong, would send a battal-
At the same time, the 674th and 96th ion north astride Route 29 at 1400 to
Field Artillery Battalions, which had help open the road. General Almond
been supporting the ROK 5th Division had ordered this attack shortly after in-
from positions six miles east of Hoeng- structing the artillery support forces to
song, moved to new firing positions withdraw. Support Team E (Company
four miles south. At the time, General G, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat
Bowen, the 187th Airborne Regimen- Team, and a platoon from the 72d
tal Combat Team commander and co- Tank Battalion), also assembled nearby,
ordinator of these two artillery bat- was to accompany the South Koreans.
talions, expected the ROK 5th Division The assistant commander of the ROK
to make a stand above the new artillery 3d Division was to head the force, but
positions in defense of Hoengsong. The Almond assigned the corps armored
1st Battalion of the combat team, which officer, Lt. Col. Jack F. Wilhm, to co-
earlier had taken a blocking position ordinate the organization and opening
below the ROK 5th, moved back with of the infantry-armor advance. Cough-
the artillery units.30 lin had no part in it at a11.32
Colonel Keith meanwhile led Sup- The South Korean battalion was late
port Force 21 south from the road junc- getting started, then advanced only a
tion just before noon, two companies half mile north of Hoengsong onto the
29 Interv, Eighth Army IG with Lt Col Barney D. 31 Keleher Ltr; Hodges Ltr; Norum Ltr.
White, CO 49th FA Bn and SF 7; 49th FA Bn Unit 32 Interv, Eighth Army IG with Lt Col lack F. Wilhm.
Rpt no. 134, 12 Feb 51. Actg Armored Off, X Corps; Norum Ltr; Hodges
30 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong. Ltr; Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibit C-l.
KWP-EBB-0295
first hills above the Twinnan-mul. Sup- to the left of the ROK III Corps, whose
port Team E moved only as far as the line now bulged out to the north far
rivers lower bank. Observing the short beyond the X Corps front. To back up
advance and halt, Coughlins operations the South Koreans and secure the corps
officer, Maj. Warren D. Hodges, sought east flank in depth, the 31st Infantry
out the South Korean commander and of General Ferenbaughs 7th Division
argued for continuing the advance. The was to occupy positions at Todon-ni,
ROK officer refused. His orders, he a road junction four miles below
insisted, were to take the hills he now Pyongchang. Ferenbaughs 32d In-
occupied and hold them only until fantry, still holding positions between
dark. His one concession was that he Chechon and Yongwol, would lend
would remain in position until the further depth, and the 17th Infantry,
forces withdrawing from the road junc- now scheduled to assemble in corps re-
tion passed through.33 serve near Wonju, could be committed
Coughlin did not have the authority to help.35
to order the South Korean-American To improve control, Almond during
force farther up Route 29, but he had his talk with Ridgway requested that
finally regained his 3d Battalion to as- the ROK I Corps headquarters be at-
sist the withdrawal from the road junc- tached to the X Corps to take charge of
tion. General Almond released the bat- the ROK 3d and 5th Divisions. General
talion from its blocking assignment Kim and his staff, by virtue of past serv-
at 1430.34 ice under Almond in northeastern
Just before releasing the battalion Al- Korea, were experienced in joint opera-
mond had discussed corps operations tions and were well acquainted with the
with General Ridgway, who flew into X Corps staff. Ridgway approved. He
Almonds Wonju headquarters a little arranged to have General Kim and a
past noon. Almond announced that he partial staff flown into the X Corps sec-
now planned to give up Hoengsong and tor on the 13th and to have Kims re-
defend Wonju. His formal order issued maining staff follow by truck. The ROK
late in the day called for the 2d Division, Capital Division, in the meantime, was
with the 187th Airborne Regimental to pass to ROK III Corps control.36
Combat Team attached, to defend a Colonel Coughlin, after receiving
long line which from an anchor on the word of the 3d Battalions release about
west at Chipyong-ni stretched out to 1600, instructed Colonel Maixner and
the southeast and east, passing two Colonel Keleher to drive through the
miles north of Wonju and continuing roadblock with the 1st Battalion attack-
nine miles beyond the town. In the right ing on the east side of the road, the 3d
portion of the corps sector, the ROK Battalion on the west, and the motor
3d and 5th Divisions were to stand be-
tween Route 29 and the corps east 35 Staff Sec Rpt, Office of the CG Eighth Army, Feb
boundary some seven miles farther 51, Incl 12; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 12 Feb 51;
ibid., Entries 1416 and 1605, 12 Feb 51; X Corps
north. Placing the South Koreans on
Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps OI 104 (confirms
this forward line would tie the X Corps oral instructions), 12 Feb 51.
36 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 5l; Rad, GX-l-1287
33sIbid. KG, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and CG X Corps,
34 Stewart Ltr. 12 Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0296
column between them. Maixner disen- through artillery channels. He had be-
gaged at the road junction and joined lieved Colonel Whites force to be some-
Keleher in the attack by 1800. The two where behind his own on Route 29.39
battalions were able to move, but only Under the corps order placing him
at a costly creep. Chinese mortar, ma- in charge of American troops in
chine gun, and small arms fire mean- Hoengsong, Coughlin now could use
while continued to punish the motor Support Force 7 to help the forces with-
column. Coughlins inability to assist drawing over Route 29. He notified
with an attack north out of Hoengsong Colonel Baker (who was unaware of the
was clearly enfeebling the withdrawal.37 new command arrangement until
A little after 1800 Colonel Wilhm, Coughlin told him) that the support
the corps armored officer, came into force artillery should withdraw to
the 38th Infantry command post to no- Wonju but that Bakers infantry battal-
tify Coughlin to take charge of all ion would be sent north to help clear
American troops in the Hoengsong Route 29. Baker left Coughlin to give
area. Wilhm had got this word from these instructions to Colonel White, still
corps when he called his headquarters northeast of town with the remainder
to report the short South Korean ad- of Support Force 7, and then to return
vance above Hoengsong. The restric- to Coughlins command post for fur-
tion to American forces prevented ther word on the attack north.40
Coughlin from using the South Korean When Baker radioed Coughlins in-
battalion to help his withdrawing forces, structions to Colonel White, he learned
but he at least could employ Support that a 155-mm. howitzer and its tractor
Team E. He placed his regimental tank had slipped off the road about a mile
company commander in charge of the northeast of Hoengsong where the road
support team and ordered him to link was little more than an icy ledge in a
up with the forces coming from the steep ridge bordering the Twinnan-
north. The tank company commander, mul. Considerable road work was
spearheading with two of his own tanks, needed at that point before the re-
started the tank-infantry team up Route mainder of the motor column could
29 within minutes.38 continue.41
Around 1900 Coughlin discovered The ROK 3d and 5th Divisions, the
troops of Support Force 7 to be mov- latter being followed by forces of the
ing through Hoengsong. Lt. Col. Baker, North Korean V Corps, meanwhile were
commanding the 2d Battalion, 17th passing south through the area east of
Infantry, was directing his foot troops Hoengsong en route to their newly as-
and the leading serial of artillery into signed defense line. Ahead of the South
an assembly southeast of town. Up to Koreans, General Bowen was pulling
this moment, Coughlin had not known his infantry battalions and the 674th
of Support Force 7s withdrawal and 96th Field Artillery Battalions back
through the Twinnan-mul valley, which to Wonju. A KMAG officer with the
had been worked out with corps
39 Ibid.; 49th FA Bn Unit Rpt no. 135, 13 Feb 51.
37 Maixner Ltr; Keleher Ltr; Norum Ltr. 40 Ibid.
38 Interv, Eighth Army IG with Wilhm; Stewart Ltr, 41 Ennis Testimony, 16 Feb 51; 49th FA Bn Unit
Incl 2, Exhibit C-l. Rpt no. 134, 12 Feb 51, and no. 135, 13 Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0297
South Koreans passing nearest Hoeng- Colonel Coughlin intended that the
song informed Colonel Baker that the forces coming in from the north con-
enemy forces following the ROK 5th tinue through Hoengsong, reorganize
Division had cut the lateral road stretch- in an assembly area three miles south
ing eastward from Hoengsong which of town, then proceed to the new de-
the leading troops of Support Force 7 fense line at Wonju. Support Force 7
had used to reach their assembly south- was to do likewise as it came in from
east of town. Although the cut was the northeast. Coughlins own head-
beyond the support force assembly, quarters and remaining troops, except
Baker began to pull the leading troops for the Netherlands battalion and part
and trucks back into Hoengsong and of the regimental tank company, were
reassemble them along Route 29 south already on the way out of Hoengsong.
of town. He was still shifting forces The Netherlands battalion was to con-
around 2200 when the remainder of tinue covering the passage of the with-
Support Force 7 began to arrive from drawing forces, then act as rear guard
the northeast, and he had yet to return en route to Wonju. The regimental
to Colonel Coughlins command post tankers were assembled just below
for his attack order.42 town, prepared to attack any roadblock
At that late hour an attack up Route the Chinese might establish between
29 by Baker did not appear necessary. Hoengsong and Wonju.44
Suffering moderate casualties and los- Coughlins plan was interrupted not
ing one tank, Support Team E had long after the leading units coming
fought forward for about a mile and a down Route 29 entered Hoengsong,
half and joined Coughlins forces com- when Chinese forces attacked all along
ing south around 2100. After the E the line of the Netherlands battalion
team tanks turned around and took the and soon afterward began to press hard
lead, the combined force, though still from the flanks and rear on the with-
receiving heavy fire from left and right drawing column still strung out on
and still obliged to attack Chinese posi- Route 29. Had the ROK battalion not
tions bordering the road, was able to withdrawn ahead of schedule, it now
move south at a steady pace. By the would have been of considerable help.45
time the force reached the position One of the first enemy jabs at the
taken by the ROK battalion a half mile Dutch penetrated their line and
above Hoengsong, the South Koreans reached the battalion command post.
already had withdrawn to rejoin their Lt. Col. M. P. A. den Ouden, the battal-
division. But this premature departure ion commander, led headquarters
seemed of no consequence. Before troops in a successful attack to elimi-
2200 the long column began to pass nate the penetration but was killed by a
behind the Netherlands battalion posi- grenade. Members of Colonel den
tions along the upper edge of Hoeng- Oudens staff also were killed or
song.43 wounded. Despite these grave losses at
battalion headquarters, the Dutch line
42 X Corps Rpt, The Battle of Hoengsong; 49th FA
companies held at the edge of town
Bn Unit Rpt no. 135, 13 Feb 51; Stewart Ltr, Incl 2,
Exhibit C--l.
43 Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibit C-l; Norum Ltr; 44 Stewart Ltr, Incl 2, Exhibit C-l; Hodges Ltr.
Hodges Ltr; Maixner Ltr. 45 Norum Ltr; Maixner Ltr.
KWP-EBB-0298
general to investigate all the circum- faulty leadership, and all the facts on
stances attending the loss by X Corps this are not evident yet.56
of artillery pieces and other major items Recalling Ridgways earlier concern
of equipment on or about 12 February for ROUNDUP control arrangements,
1951.54 Almond assured him that the opera-
Almond was equally disturbed by the tion, as conceived and coordinated,
heavy loss of equipment, especially the included the protection of the U.S.
loss of fourteen howitzers by the 15th artillery units involved and was, in my
Field Artillery Battalion and five by the opinion, all that could be desired. It
503d, and by what he considered exces- worked out as planned except for 2
sive personnel casualties among all 2d battalions of infantry and 1 of artillery
Division units that had supported the which became enmeshed in the on-
ROK 8th Division. Late on the 13th he slaught of Chinese who poured through
directed General Ruffner to investigate the ROK formations. There has never
and report the underlying reasons. been any loss of control of the major
He was particularly critical of Support units.57
Force 2ls halt at the road junction po- The 2d Division report, rendered
sition of the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, five days later, absolved Support Force
believing that losses would have been 21 of any command deficiency. Gen-
fewer had the support force continued eral Stewart, the assistant division
directly to Hoengsong. He took this commander who conducted the inquiry
preliminary view from an impression for General Ruffner, concluded that
that Support Force 7, on the other there had been only strong, coura-
hand, had withdrawn immediately af- geous, and aggressive leadership at
ter being ordered back and that this all levels. Support force commander
prompt move accounted for its lighter Colonel Keith had withdrawn from
losses. Pending receipt of Ruffners Changbong-ni as soon as cleared to do
report, Almond presumed that aggres- so, had not yet received orders to pro-
sive leadership on the part of com- ceed to Hoengsong when he stopped
manders concerned was lacking.55 and joined the 3d Battalion of the
If in softer terms, he repeated much 38th Infantry, and had made every ef-
the same view on the 14th when he re- fort to reach Hoengsong as soon as
plied to General Ridgways note of such orders reached him. The cause
admonition. Without being specific, but of the losses in equipment and person-
obviously referring to Support Force nel among 2d Division units, General
21, he told Ridgway that in only one Stewart testified, was the sudden and
instance, now under investigation, have complete defeat of the ROK 8th Divi-
I found loss of U.S. equipment due to sion with little or no warning to the 2d
Division forces. He recommended that
there be no similar intermingling of
54 Memo, Office of the CG Eighth Army for The
Inspector General, Headquarters, Eighth Army, 14
Feb 51. 56 Ltr, Gen Almond to Gen Ridgway, 14 Feb 51,
55 Rad, X 17778, CG X Corps to CG 2d Div, 132321 copy in CMH.
Feb 51. 57 Ibid
KWP-EBB-0301
U.S. and South Korean units in the efforts and to break . . . the roadblocks
future.58 that delayed the withdrawal of the
The Army investigation confirmed friendly units located north. Hence,
Stewarts findings. All losses, in both the heavy toll was a result of enemy
men and materiel, stemmed from the action and not attributable to the
surprise and overwhelming attack of at fault, neglect, incompetence, acts or
least four CCF Divisions and two NK omissions of the U.S. Commanding
Divisions . . . against numerically infe- Officers concerned.59
rior and widely spread forces of the Ridgway accepted this explanation
8th and 3d ROK Divisions. In chain but did not withdraw a warning he had
reaction, the rapid disintegration of the issued on the 14th. The loss or aban-
ROK 8th Division exposed the left donment to enemy of arms and equip-
flank of the [X Corps] salient and per- ment in usable condition, he notified
mitted the enemy forces in strength to all corps commanders and the KMAG
advance rapidly to positions in the rear chief, General Farrell, is a grave of-
and along the MSR, thus blocking the fense against every member of this
only route of withdrawal for the tanks, command. I shall hereafter deal se-
artillery and motor elements caught verely with commanders found re-
north and west of Hoengsong. In this sponsible and shall expect you to do
unexpected situation, there [were] likewise.60
insufficient US or other UN forces
available to the X Corps Commander 59 Ltr, Eighth Army IG to CG Eighth Army, 12 Mar
or the 2d U.S. Infantry Division Com- 51, sub: Report of Investigation Concerning the Loss
of Equipment by X Corps.
mander to form a task force of suffi- 60 Check Slip, Eighth Army Chief of Staff to IG, 22
cient strength to defeat the enemys Mar 51, sub: Investigation Concerning the Loss of
Equipment by X Corps; Rad, GX TAC 7 KCG, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps, IX Corps, X Corps, and
58 Stewart Ltr. KMAG, 14 Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0302
CHAPTER XV
pass to X Corps control and be de- 503d Field Artillery Battalion; Battery
ployed in the gap. B, 82d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic
Chipyong-ni in the meantime was Weapons Battalion; and Company B,
likely to become an isolated post under 2d Engineer Combat Battalion. He de-
siege. Route 24A appeared to be veloped a perimeter based on the
blocked at Koksu-ri and Route 24 about Pongmi mass and Mangmi foothills and
to be cut at Chuam-ni, and 23d Regi- otherwise tracing lower hills inside the
mental Combat Team patrols ranging dominating heights. So locating his
up to three miles beyond Chipyong-ni main position facilitated the organiza-
through the day reported enemy forces tion of defensive fires, construction of
approaching from the north, east, and obstacles, and resupply. Furthermore,
west. Should Colonel Freemans force Chinese occupying the distant higher
be cut off, Ridgway directed, Almond ground around the position would not
was to attack north to relieve it.12 be able to deliver effective small arms
fire on the perimeter but would them-
selves be vulnerable to the combat
The West Shoulder, 13-14 February
teams supporting fires.13
Chipyong-ni straddles a stream in Freeman deployed the bulk of the
the lower end of a small valley hugged 1st Battalion on the northern arc of the
on the northeast by a low mountain perimeter, the 3d on the east, the 2d
mass, Pongmi-san, and by the foothills on the south, and the French battalion
of Mangmi-san, a higher ridge to the on the west. Company B and the
south. (Map 23) From a mile out, the Ranger company were in reserve close
peak of Mangmi-san, Hill 397, domi- behind the 1st Battalion line. Gaps in
nates Chipyong-ni from the south. the perimeter were mined, blocked by
Elsewhere, from one to two miles out, barbed wire, or covered by fire. Twin
Hill 248 dominates from the southwest, 40s, quad 50s and regimental tanks
345 from the northwest, 348 from the were in position to add their direct fire
north, 506 from the northeast, and 319 to the defense, prearranged artillery
from the southeast. Colonel Freeman and mortar concentrations ringed the
considered the terrain well suited for perimeter to the maximum range of
defense by a force the size of the 23d the weapons, and a tactical air control
Regimental Combat Team, which was party was present to direct air strikes.
made up of the 23d Infantry; French All day on the 13th Freeman kept
battalion; 1st Ranger Company; 37th enemy formations approaching his po-
Field Artillery Battalion; Battery B, sition under artillery fire and air at-
tacks. Against the probability that the
MAP 23
KWP-EBB-0307
different divisions, the 115th, 119th, ner position of the 1st Battalion, 9th
120th, and 126th, and, in turn, three dif- Infantry, Chinese coming out of the
ferent armies, the 39th, 40th, and 42d, Hoengsong area meanwhile hit the 38th
the renewal predicted by the prisoners Infantry. (Map 24) The assaults forced
might be considerably stronger than the a short withdrawal by the attached
first attack. Netherlands battalion on the 38ths left
At Chuam-ni, a regiment of the 116th and penetrated the 3d Battalion on the
Division, 39th Army, opened an attack regimental right, but counterattacks re-
around 0500 on the 14th against the stored the lost ground before noon.17
2d Division reconnaissance company Captives identified the force moving
and Company L, 9th Infantry. After on Wonju to be in division strength and
about half its troops the day before had to comprise two regiments of the 120th
attacked the two companies at their Division and one of the 117th. The bulk
blocking position two miles farther east, of this force was sighted from the air
this regiment apparently swung its full moving in several columns across the
strength around the Chuam-ni perime- Som River northwest of Wonju. Taken
ter during the night.15 and kept under air and massed artil-
At midmorning, after suffering con- lery attack, the Chinese at first ignored
siderable losses to small arms, machine losses and continued toward Wonju.
gun, and mortar fire and to assaults But as casualties mounted the Chinese
from almost all directions, the two com- faltered, and most turned southwest be-
panies withdrew south over Route 24. fore reaching the Wonju defenses. By
Apparently anticipating such a move, 1500 the air strikes and artillery fire
the Chinese had set fire blocks along stopped the enemy movement alto-
the road below Chuam-ni and had gether.18
blown a bridge two miles below town. Chinese losses at Chipyong-ni,
Running the gauntlet and getting Chuam-ni and Wonju between mid-
around the destroyed crossing cost the night on the 13th and nightfall on the
two companies several vehicles as well 14th appeared heavy. Six hundred
as additional casualties that brought the forty-eight bodies were counted; the
total to 212, of whom at least 114 were estimate of additional casualties was
dead.16 thirty-two hundred killed and twenty-
Along the northwestern portion of live hundred wounded. But in view of
the Wonju defenses, just inside the cor- nearby Chinese reserves, the XIII Army
Group commander might continue an
15The Chuam-ni account is based on Williamson, advance on the twenty-mile front
Chipyong-ni; Ltr, Eighth Army IG to CG Eighth between Chipyong-ni and Wonju with
Army, 13 Mar 51, sub: Investigation of 2d Infantry no delay for regroupment and in even
Division Incident at Chuam-ni, Korea; Rad, X 17826,
CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 Feb 51.
16 The Chuam-ni episode led to a report by a Cana-
dian Press correspondent that 68 soldiers were 17Eighth Army PORs 650, 651, and 652, 14 Feb 51;
slaughtered in a village they had captured because Eighth Army G3 Briefing for CG, 15 Feb 51; Eighth
they posted only a single sentry and then went to Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0415, 0730, and 0830, 14 Feb
sleep. The report drew a sharp question from Wash- 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps PIR
ington and prompted an investigation by the Eighth 141, 14 Feb 51.
Army inspector general. The implied charge of negli- 18Rad, X 17826, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army,
gence proved unfounded. 16 Feb 51; X Corps PIR 141, 14 Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0309
C\l
KWP-EBB-0310
The British 27th Brigade conse- mander of the 5th Cavalry, to move
quently received orders to open the 23d the attack force immediately. Moore
Regimental Combat Teams main sup- meanwhile coordinated the movement
ply route before moving into position of ambulances and loaded supply
in the gap. Continuing north, the Brit- trucks, most of them from the 2d Divi-
ish met the 2d Division reconnaissance sion, so they could follow Colonel
company and Company L, 9th In- Crombez column into Chipyong-ni.
fantry, about five miles south of Crombez got his units across the Han
Chuam-ni. North of that point, the bri- and onto Route 24A before midnight
gade could push only slowly through but was forced to halt at Hupo-ri, more
Chinese rimming the road; the 27th than eight miles below Chipyong-ni,
stopped for the night over a mile short while his troops built a bypass around a
of Chuam-ni and some seven miles demolished bridge. This development
short of Chipyong-ni.23 destined the 23d Regimental Combat
After meeting with Almond, Ridgway Team to remain isolated at least
briefed the IX Corps commander on through the remainder of the night.25
the concept of holding the shoulders
of the enemy penetration in the X
The East Shoulder, 14-18 February
Corps sector and opening Route 24 to
Chipyong-ni. Two days earlier General Amid the attempts to fill and hold
Moore had assembled the 5th Cavalry the Chipyong-ni-Wonju line on the
at Changhowon-ni, the site of IX Corps west, stabilizing the east shoulder in
headquarters twelve miles below Yoju, both the X Corps and ROK III Corps
in case it became necessary to counter- sectors was proving another problem.
attack enemy forces east of the Han. In The ROK 3d and 5th Divisions, or-
light of the priority Ridgway had given dered by General Almond on the 13th
to opening the 23d Regimental Com- to withdraw into positions between
bat Teams supply road, Moore devel- Wonju and Pyongchang, continued to
oped a plan for using the 5th Cavalry withdraw on the 14th somewhat below
to clear Route 24A into Chipyong-ni. that line. North Korean V Corps forces
Moores plan called for the 5th Cavalry, caught up with both divisions during
two companies of tanks, two artillery the afternoon of the 14th and briefly
battalions, and a platoon of engineers engaged each. The ROK 3d, missing
to clear 24A and to set up at Koksu-ri its 18th Regiment and otherwise hurt
a base of operations from which to by casualties, nevertheless managed to
keep the road open.24 put up fair defenses slightly southeast
Late in the afternoon, after learning of Wonju and twelve miles above
that the British 27th Brigade was ad- Chechon. But the ROK 5th, next east,
vancing very slowly up Route 24, Moore became even more disorganized as it
ordered Col. Marcel G. Crombez, com- withdrew and at dark on the 14th was
still assembling around Chuchon-ni,
23 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 14 Feb 51; Eighth ten miles above Chechon. Its artillery
Army POR 652, 14 Feb 51.
24 Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, was intact, but it had lost half its other
Incl 14; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps
POR 427, 14 Feb 51; Mono, 1st Lt. Martin Blumenson,
Task Force Crombez, copy in CMH. 25 Blumenson, Task Force Crombez.
KWP-EBB-0312
The ostensible aim of the North Ko- its ground. With no serious results, a
reans moving on Pyongchang was to few North Koreans reached Chuchon-
drive Yus forces out of the town and ni to the southeast and briefly fired on
back from Route 60, thereby opening the ROK 5th Division, which was still
the road for a strike south against assembling straggling forces and fee-
Yongwol. From late afternoon on 15 bly attempting to establish defenses cen-
February through early morning on tered on the town.31
the 18th, the 9th and 27th Divisions Under the arrangements made on 12
launched repeated company and battal- February by General Almond and Gen-
ion assaults, seized Pyongchang itself, eral Ridgway, the ROK I Corps head-
and, in their best effort, drove down quarters took control of the ROK 3d,
Route 60 within eight miles of Yongwol. 5th, and 8th Divisions at 1400 on the
On the 16th, after it was clear that Yu 15th. Almond directed General Kim,
would not be able to return the ROK the ROK I Corps commander, to de-
7th Division and 30th Regiment to their fend the Wonju-Pyongchang line, a
former positions to the north, General large order given the debilitated condi-
Ridgway allowed him to pull the re- tion of the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions
maining ROK III Corps units to the and the presence of North Korean
Pyongchang-Kangnung line and gave forces below that line. Because of the
him specific instructions to stand fast current threat to Chechon, Kims ini-
in the Pyongchang area and hold the tial act was to form a provisional battal-
North Koreans out of Yongwol. Yu ion from remnants of the ROK 8th Di-
consequently placed a second regiment vision as corps reserve, which he
in the Pyongchang area as he brought assembled north of Chupo-ri behind a
the rest of his forces south. The North two-mile gapbetween the two forward
Korean units, still worn from previous divisions.32
operations, could not sustain their drive Additional V Corps forces from the
against the strong South Korean posi- 6th, 7th, and 12th Divisions meanwhile
tion, lost most of their gains to ROK massed in front of the ROK I Corps
counterattacks, and finally withdrew. and early on the 16th opened strong
By evening of the 18th Yus line units assaults against both forward divisions.
were reporting no contact.30 The ROK 3d Division, after the 22d
In the adjacent X Corps sector North Regiment on the right lost some
Korean V Corps forces pushed toward ground, contained the attack in its
Chechon on 15 February, hitting hard sector; but the ROK 5th Division,
at the 22d Regiment in the right half of having been able to organize only frag-
the ROK 3d Divisions sector. The regi- ile positions at Chuchon-ni, withdrew
ment gave way some on the east but after North Koreans penetrated the
with fire support from 7th Division ar- 36th Regiment on the division left.
tillery near Chechon otherwise stood
KMAG advisors with the 5th Division An even wider gap of about seven
and ROK I Corps headquarters noti- miles had opened between the right of
fied General Almond that the divisions the ROK 5th Division and the nearest
units were not being hit especially hard ROK III Corps position to the north-
but were being outmaneuvered and in east. Although General Yus left flank
the process were disintegrating. Before forces were handling the North Korean
the North Korean attack diminished in II Corps units attempting to push down
the evening, the division had fallen back Route 60 into Yongwol, the gap offered
five miles and, in the judgment of the the North Koreans opposite the ROK
KMAG advisors, was no longer to be 5th Division an opportunity to sweep
counted as an effective force.33 around Yus flank. Yu, his leftmost
To ease the danger to Chechon, only forces well occupied and anyway
five miles behind the ROK 5th Division, obliged by General Ridgways orders of
Almond directed General Ferenbaughs the 16th to stand fast in the
U.S. 7th Division to move the 31st In- Pyongchang area, could do nothing
fantry from the Pyongchang area, about filling the gap; neither could any
where the ROK 7th Division was hold- of the weak ROK divisions in the X
ing its own, to a position behind the Corps sector. Ridgway on 17 February
ROK 5th. While the enemy threat re- consequently directed Almond to push
mained potentially serious, the 31st American troops northeast to clear out
Regiment in its new position and the the North Koreans and establish firm
32d Infantry in and around Chechon contact with the ROK III Corps.35
itself considerably increased Almonds As Ridgway acted to cover the gap
chances of holding the North Koreans between corps, it began to appear that
out of the town and off the main X the hard assaults on the ROK 3d and
Corps supply route. Further improv- 5th Divisions on the 16th had spent the
ing the defense of Chechon, the tail- North Korean V Corps. Infiltration and
end battalion of the 17th Infantry, assaults harassed both South Korean di-
which had been moving up Route 29 to visions on the 17th and 18th but failed
the regimental assembly at Wonju, to yield any permanent gain, and on
halted along the road behind the ROK the 18th even the weak ROK 5th Divi-
3d Division. In addition, General Kim sion was able to make one short ad-
shaped another provisional battalion vance. As contact diminished on the
from ROK 8th Division remnants and 18th, a battalion from the 31st Infan-
started it forward to assemble with the try patrolled five miles ahead of ROK
one he had formed the day before be- lines before encountering a North Ko-
low the gap between the two forward rean position. The North Koreans may
divisions. That gap had opened to three have backed off only to reorganize for
miles when the ROK 5th withdrew.34 new attacks; but. in light of what had
taken place in the meantime along the
33 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth X Corps west shoulder, their move was
Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0230, 1000, 1710, 1905, and
2340, 16 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 Feb
51; Eighth Army G3 Briefing for CG, 17 Feb 51.
34 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth 35 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth
Army G3 Jnl, Entries 1000 and 2340, 16 Feb 51; Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 17 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-1767 KGOO,
Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 Feb 51. CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 17 Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0315
Lt. Col. James W. Edwards, the 2d could fire east onto the southern slopes.
Battalion commander, organized a After mines previously placed on the
stronger counterattack, reinforcing road were removed and several Chinese
Company G with a platoon of Com- armed with rocket launchers killed or
pany F, the total of his own reserve, driven off, Edwards tanks reached a
and a platoon of Rangers obtained from point on the road from where they
regiment. Attacking around 0400, the could hit the Chinese. About 1630, as
composite force regained part of the the tank fire in combination with artil-
lost ground but then was driven back lery fire and air strikes began to break
and heavy casualties. By daylight Com- up the Chinese position, Company B
pany G occupied positions on a low regained the rest of the objective. Al-
ridge a quartermile behind the former most at the same time, the head of a
Company G position, as did members tank column came into view on Route
of Battery B, 503d Field Artillery Bat- 24A to the south. After a moment of
talion. The batterys guns remained surprise, Edwards men realized the
near the center of the quarter-mile no- tanks were part of the 5th Cavalry re-
mans-land. Immediately west of Com- lief force which had started toward
pany G, French troops, who had at- Chipyong-ni the day before.
tempted unsuccessfully to assist the Colonel Crombez had renewed his
counterattack, also pulled back to re- advance up Route 24A at 0700 on the
fuse the French battalions left flank. 15th, about an hour after his engineers
Colonel Freeman, who remained at completed the bypass around the de-
Chipyong-ni and in command until fi- stroyed bridge at Hupo-ri. The 1st
nally evacuated at midmorning on the Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and two platoons
15th, released Company B and the re- of tanks in the lead first encountered
mainder of the Ranger company resistance about two miles below
around 0800 for a stronger effort. This Koksu-ri where Chinese had dug in on
release committed all available troops Hill 152 bordering Route 24A on the
save the company of engineers, al- east. Crombez deployed the 1st Battal-
though by that hour action elsewhere ion against 152 and sent the 2d Battal-
on the perimeter had ceased. At 1000, ion up Hill 14-3 edging the road on the
behind a mortar barrage and supported west just opposite. Hill 143 fell easily,
by fire from tanks and antiaircraft but the 1st Battalion cleared the 152
weapons, Company B tried to retake mass only in midafternoon.
the Company G position alone but was Suspecting that the remainder of the
kept off the crest by fire from Chinese road north would be just as stoutly
on the southern slopes where the pre- defended, Crombez doubted an infan-
liminary and supporting fires had try attack could carry to Chipyong-ni
chased them. by dark but believed an armored task
Air strikes requested by Colonel Ed- force could. For the armored thrust he
wards during the morning began some- assembled twenty-three tanks, which in-
what tardily at noon. Edwards mean- cluded all of Company D, 6th Tank
while ordered tanks accompanied by Battalion, and a platoon of Company
Rangers south on Route 24A beyond A, 70th Tank Battalion. Needing infan-
the attack objective so the tank gunners try protection for the armor but hav-
KWP-EBB-0317
ing no armored personnel carriers, he lead tank approached the town, again
instructed the hundred sixty members just after the task force passed through.
of Company L, 5th Cavalry, to ride the No tanks were lost in heavy exchanges
tanks. As agreed between the Company of fire during the halts, but Crombez
L commander and the commander of lost about ninety of his infantrymen
the tanks, the infantrymen were to dis- who, according to plan, dismounted at
mount and deploy to protect the tanks each stop. Some were hit in the fire-
during any halt and were to remount fight; the bulk simply were stranded
on signal from the tankers when the when Crombez, believing the success
column was ready to proceed. Four of his task force depended on keeping
members of the engineer company the tanks moving, ordered his column
with Crombez also were to ride a tank forward and the tankers responded
near the head of the column to lift any without allowing time for all members
mines on the road. of Company L to remount. The able-
At midafternoon, as Crombez com- bodied cavalrymen left behind returned
pleted preparations for the armored south to the regimental line, most of
thrust, not all the supply trucks and them moving through the ground west
ambulances scheduled to follow the 5th of Route 24A where resistance had
Cavalry into Chipyong-ni had reached been lightest. Men in a 2 -ton truck,
the regiments location. Doubting any- dispatched by the 3d Battalion com-
way that wheeled vehicles could safely mander on his own volition to trail the
accompany the tank column, Crombez task force (Colonel Crombez had made
decided to call the supply train forward no provision for evacuating casualties),
after he had opened the road. The new picked up some of the wounded. Oth-
23d Regimental. Combat Team com- ers were recovered later by tankers of
mander, Colonel Chiles, whom Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, not
Crombez contacted by radio before taking part in the thrust toward
leading the task force forward, did not Chipyong-ni.
object. Since the 23d at the time was Proceeding above Koksu-ri with
having trouble reestablishing the Com- fewer than seventy infantrymen
pany G positions on the south, Chiles aboard, Crombez column received al-
wanted Crombez to come, trains or no most constant but lighter fire as far as a
trains. cut through the western slopes of Hill
Ahead of Task Force Crombez de- 397 a mile below Chipyong-ni. To that
parture from behind the 1st and 2d point no tank had been damaged, but
Battalions at 1545, artillery fire and air more infantrymen were lost, some shot
strikes pounded the hills bordering off the tanks, a few pushed off as tank
Koksu-ri. Lest the infantry aboard the gunners swung turrets and tubes to re-
tanks be hit, Crombez sacrificed any turn fire, others stranded as before af-
further supporting artillery fire on the ter brief halts.
high ground edging Route 24A. Heavy small arms and mortar fire
Despite the heavy preliminary fire, a struck the column as it reached the road
strong Chinese force remained on the cut; as the tanks started through, Chi-
Koksu-ri heights and twice forced nese atop the steep embankments on
Crombez column to halt, once as the either side fired rocket launchers and
KWP-EBB-0318
threw down satchel charges. A rocket slopes of Hill 397 to the east, already
that struck the turret of the lead tank loosened from their position by
wounded the gunner and loader, and Edwards counterattack and demoral-
the road wheels of the second tank were ized by the appearance of Crombez
damaged, but both got through. The column, meanwhile began to run. Ed-
third tank was not touched, but the wards had never seen a sight like
fourth, carrying Capt. Johnnie M. that and never expect to see another
Hiers, commanding Company D of the like it. There were more targets than
6th Tank Battalion, took a turret hit we had weapons.
from a rocket, apparently a 3.5-inch After helping Edwards clean the Chi-
round, that penetrated and exploded nese from the slopes east of the road
ammunition in the racks. The men in with high explosive fire from the 90-
the fighting compartment, including mm. guns, Crombez led his column in-
Captain Hiers, were killed, and the tank side the 23d Regimental Combat Team
caught fire. The driver, though severely perimeter about 1715. In covering the
burned, raced the tank through the cut six miles from below Koksu-ri into
and off the road so as not to block the Chipyong-ni the task force had had
remainder of the column. three tanks and the 2 -ton truck
As each of the following tanks damaged. Casualties among the ar-
rammed into the cut, crews of tanks mored troops were three killed and
still to enter and of those already four wounded. Still with Crombez were
through delivered heavy cannon fire all four engineers but just twenty-three
on the embankments. They dampened members of Company L, many of them
enemy fire enough to permit all re- wounded. Altogether, the rifle com-
maining tanks to pass safely. The Chi- pany lost twelve killed, forty wounded,
nese, however, further thinned the and nineteen missing-almost half
infantry riding the tanks, and the 2 - its strength.
ton truck at the tail of the column, its Because so little daylight remained,
driver wounded and one of its tires Crombez elected to remain in
flat, rolled to a stop in the cut. Most of Chipyong-ni overnight. He also consid-
the wounded who had been riding the ered it advisable to hold the supply
truck hobbled through the cut and got trucks and ambulances below Koksu-ri
aboard one of the last tanks. until after he made the return trip and
The leading forces of Task Force rechecked the road. Air observers
Crombez and the 23d Regimental Com- meanwhile reported the Chinese to be
bat Team tankers earlier sent south on moving away from Chipyong-ni not
Route 24A by Colonel Edwards sighted only from the slopes of Hill 397 in the
each other as the task force reached south but from all around the perim-
the north side of the cut. In the mutual eter. Colonel Chiles nevertheless anti-
moment of surprise before recogni- cipated an attack during the night.
tion-a result of not being in radio con- Against this possibility, Crombez placed
tact with each other-the commander some of his tanks on the perimeter,
of Crombez second tank began calling most of them on the north and north-
out an order to fire on the armor up west to help cover the valley approaches
the road. The Chinese on the upper to Chipyong-ni.
KWP-EBB-0319
beyond the cut. The wrecker mean- Eighth Army had reached a turning
while towed in the truck and tank that point, that it had substantially regained
had been damaged at the cut. the confidence lost during the distress-
Colonel Chiles, having been fairly re- ing withdrawals of December and early
supplied with ammunition by airdrop, January. In his judgment, the success-
was not so anxious for the arrival of ful defense of Chipyong-ni by an iso-
Stewarts supply trucks as he was for lated combat team without grievous
the ambulances. Casualties in the 23d losses against a force far superior in
Regimental Combat Team now totaled strength symbolized the revitalization.
52 killed, 259 wounded, and 42 missing. Task Force Crombez, in its relief role,
Chiles had been able to evacuate only a epitomized the offensive spirit. Al-
few of the wounded by helicopter after though being forced to place infantry
daybreak on the 16th before fog and aboard the tanks had proved costly,
snow grounded the aircraft. He was Ridgway judged Colonel Crombez de-
now able to load all remaining wounded cision to advance with armor when his
on a few emptied supply trucks as well infantry moved too slowly to be one
as the ambulances, and Stewart deliv- of the best local decisions of the war.
ered them to the 5th Cavalry clearing With renewed spirit, as evidenced at
station at Koksu-ri before dark. Chipyong-ni, Ridgway considered his
forces quite capable of further offen-
sive operations, which he immediately
A Turning Point proceeded to design.40
CHAPTER XVI
CL
KWP-EBB-0324
ported to be in North Korea had suc- an operation.12 Ridgway met him at the
ceeded. Thus, while he proceeded to X Corps forward command post in
open Operation KILLER, he was forced Wonju, where he gave MacArthur
to do so without a full picture of the fuller details. At a following press con-
possible opposition and with the real- ference, which customarily ended each
ization that the entry of enemy reserves of MacArthurs visits to Korea, Ridgway
in the battle might compel him to can- was disturbed to hear MacArthur an-
cel his attack.10 nounce that he had just ordered a re-
Adopting the prudent course, Ridg- sumption of the offensive. MacArthur,
way credited enemy reserves with the of course, had had no part in conceiv-
capability of appearing at the front ing or ordering the operation. More to
within any 24-hour period. In so ad- the point, the incident drew Ridgways
vising his corps commanders and the attention to the possibility that the pre-
South Korean chief of staff on 20 dictable pattern of MacArthurs visits
February, he frankly admitted that he to Korea and the open ceremony al-
did not know when or whether a rein- ways attending the excursions would
forcement of enemy forward units alert the Chinese and North Koreans
would occur. This uncertainty was all to future operations. Here was enough
the more reason, he told them, for tak- danger, Ridgway decided, to risk reper-
ing proper precautions while advanc- cussions and try to discourage MacAr-
ing in Operation KILLER. They must thur from appearing in the future to
maintain major units intact, make prop- sound the starting signal.13
er use of terrain, and carefully coordi-
nate movements within and between The Plans
corps. With the recent experience
above Hoengsong in mind, he warned When the code name Ridgway had
them against being sucked in and de- chosen for the coming attack was heard
stroyed piecemeal, whether by ruse, or in Washington, he received a courte-
the temptation to your own aggressive- ous but immediate protest from the
ness to pursue beyond your capability Army chief of staff. The word killer,
of providing powerful support, or General Collins indicated, was difficult
of timely disengagement and local to deal with in public relations. Ridgway
withdrawal."11 nevertheless kept the name, which fully
Ridgways wariness over possible en-
emy moves increased on 20 February
when General MacArthur, after learn/-
12General Mark W. Clark, chief of Army Field
ing of the KILLER plan, came to Korea. Forces, also was in Korea at this time. He was after a
MacArthur characteristically appeared firsthand view that would help him improve the train-
on the scene at or near the beginning of ing of recruits. He talked with commanders at all levels,
and they emphasized the Chinese and North Korean
preference to attack at night and in heavy weather.
10Eighth Army G2 Estimate, 16 Feb 51; Rad, G-2- Clark thus saw a need to increase training for night-
1760 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, Personal time operations, and he did so immediately after re-
for Gen Hickey, 17 Feb 51; Eyes Only Memo, Ridgway turning to the United States. See Mark W. Clark From
for All Corps Commanders and C/S ROKA, 20 Feb the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper, 1954), pp.
51. 25-28.
11E yesOnly Memo, Ridgway for All Corps Com- 13Eighth Army, SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51,
manders and C/S ROKA, 20 Feb 51. Incl 20; Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 108-09.
KWP-EBB-0326
CHINESETAKEN CAPTIVEby men of the 1st Cavalry Division during Operation Killer.
seled the IX Corps staff and the com- Laboring forward through the re-
manders of the Army divisions in the mainder of February, Ridgways cen-
corps to cooperate fully with General tral forces largely eliminated the
Smith.27 The interim command ar- enemys recent ground gains. From
rangement, Ridgway believed, offered west to east, the IX and X Corps front
an excellent opportunity to bring on the last day of the month traced a
the Arm and Marine Corps closer shallow concave arc from positions five
together. 28 miles above Chipyong-ni, along high
ground overlooking Hoengsong and
27 In other instances of marines commanding major Route 20 from the south, to the high
Army units, Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune led the 2d hills four miles north of the Routes 20-
Infantry Division in World War I and Maj. Gen. Roy S.
60 junction. The two corps thus were on
Geiger commanded the Tenth Army during the
closing days of the battle for Okinawa in World War or above line Arizona on the extreme
II. west and east but somewhat short of it
28 Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51,
elsewhere.29
Incls 24 and 26. In other command changes in Febru-
ary under the Department of the Army rotation policy,
General Gay relinquished command of the 1st Cav- 29 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth
alry Division to Brig. Gen. Charles D. Palmer, and Army G3 SS Rpt, Situation Overlay, 28 Feb 53; IX
G e n e r a lKean relinquished command of the 25th In- Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt,
fantry Division to Brig. Gen. J. Sladen Bradley. Nar, Feb 51.
KWP-EBB-0330
Meanwhile, in the ROK III Corps the most part in full possession of their
zone General Yu opened a lateral at- Arizona objectives.31
tack, sending two regiments of the Over the fourteen days the two corps
Capital Division from the Kangnung took to reach and consolidate positions
area westward over Route 20 across the along line Arizona, each reported hav-
fronts of his other two divisions as a ing inflicted substantial enemy casual-
preliminary to establishing defenses ties. The IX Corps alone reported 7,819
above the road. The regiments, mov- enemy killed, 1,469 wounded, and 208
ing in column, advanced easily until late captured. But from the outset it had
in the afternoon of 3 March when the become steadily clearer that the pri-
leading regiment ran headlong into an mary KILLERobjective of destroying all
ambush near Soksa-ri, some twenty-five enemy forces below the Arizona line
miles west of Kangnung. Hit from both would be only partially achieved. The
north and south by a regiment of the enemy forces head start in with-
North Korean 2d Division, the South Ko- drawing, their disinclination. to take a
rean regiment lost almost a thousand defensive stand below the objective line
men-59 killed, 119 wounded, and 802 other than in spotty delaying actions,
missing. The damaged regiment re- and Eighth Army difficulties in negoti-
turned to the Kangnung area to reor- ating the ground had prevented any
ganize and Yu canceled what from the other result.32
outset had been a decidedly risky move-
ment.30
The Ripper Concept
To the west, in the meantime, those
IX and X Corps units not yet on line As the KILLERoperation had entered
Arizona continued their advances to its final week with limited results al-
reach it. In the IX Corps zone, the 1st ready predictable, General Ridgway
Marine Division cleared Hoengsong published plans for another attack,
against little opposition on 2 March en again with the main effort in his cen-
route to Arizona objectives three miles tral zone but with all units on the Eighth
north of town. By evening of 6 March Army front involved. As in KILLER,the
all IX Corps assault units had estab- primary purposes of the attack, which
lished positions near or slightly above Ridgway called Operation RIPPER,were
the Arizona line, the final advances en- to destroy enemy forces and equipment
countering no resistance at all. The X and to interdict enemy attempts to or-
Corps units met stiff opposition over ganize an offensive. A secondary pur-
the first five days of March, particu- pose was to outflank Seoul and the area
larly the 2d Division as it attempted to north of the city as far as the Imjin
occupy the high ground just above River. Aware of General MacArthurs
Route 20. But during the night of the interest in recapturing Seoul but pre-
5th the North Korean defenders va-
cated their positions, and by 7 March
General Almonds forces were for far 31 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth
Army G3 Jnl, Sum, Mar 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt,
Nar, Mar 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
32 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51;
30 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, Mar 51; Eighth Army IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51; X Corps
G3 Jnl, 6 Mar 51; Eighth Army PIR 237, 6 Mar 51. Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0331
two Chinese armies, the 24th and 26th, ing to launch an offensive in the Eighth
had moved south from the Hungnam- Armys central zone early in March.37
Wonsan region to a central assembly It also now appeared that the North
just above the 38th parallel north of Korean VI Corps, one of the units that
Chunchon. Thus three reserve armies had withdrawn into Manchuria the past
might be immediately available for of- autumn, had returned to Korea and
fensive operations in the central region. was moving toward the front in the
To add substance to this possibility, west. At last report the corps, or a part
agents recently returning from behind of it, was approaching the 38th parallel
enemy lines brought back reports that northwest of Seoul and thus was near
the enemy high command at one time enough to join an enemy offensive.
had planned to open an offensive on 1 Tarkenton concluded, however, that al-
March, then had postponed the open- though the enemy high command was
ing date to the 15th. During interro-
gation, recently taken prisoners of war
37 Operation Ripper, Annex A (Intelligence), 1
partially substantiated the agent reports Mar 51; Conference Notes, Eighth Army CG with
by stating that their forces were prepar- Corps Comdrs, 1 Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0333
CHAPTER XVII
Operation RIPPER
The Plan Airborne Regimental Combat Team,
currently undergoing refresher train-
The final objective line of the RIPPER ing at Taegu, was to assist the IX Corps
operation, line Idaho, was anchored in attack should an opportunity arise to
the west on the Han River eight miles employ airborne tactics profitably.3
east of Seoul. From that point it looped To General Hoges right, the X
steeply northeastward through the east- Corps was to move to a segment of line
ern third of the I Corps zone and al- Idaho whose most northerly point lay
most to the 38th parallel in the IX about twenty miles above the present
Corps central zone, then fell off gently corps front. (Map 27) In clearing
southeastward across the X Corps and enemy forces from this territory, Gen-
South Korean zones to Hapyong-dong, eral Almond was to pay particular at-
an east coast town six miles north of tention to the two principal north-
Kangnung. Since line Idaho traced a south corridors in his zone, one traced
deep salient into enemy territory, a by the Soksa-ri-Pangnim-ni segment of
successful advance to it would carry Route 20 at the corps right, the other
the Eighth Army, in particular the IX by a lesser road running south out of
Corps in the center, into an area be- Pungam-ni in the left third of the corps
lieved to hold a large concentration of zone.4
enemy forces and supplies.1 Responsibility for the remaining
Prize terrain objectives in the central ground to the east was once again di-
zone were the towns of Hongchon and vided between the ROK III and ROK I
Chunchon. (Map 26) Both were roads Corps. Believing that the South Korean
hubs, and Chunchon, nearer the 38th sector needed to be strengthened, par-
parallel, appeared to be an important
enemy supply center. In the major commandant of the Army War College. General Hoge,
RIPPEReffort, the IX Corps, now com- Ridgways next choice, relinquished command of U.S.
manded by Maj. Gen. William M. Hoge, Army forces in Trieste to take command of the IX
Corps on 5 March. Hoge was noted for a World War
was to seize the two towns as it moved II exploit in which forces under his direct command
some thirty miles north to the deepest seized the Remagen bridge over the Rhine. See Eighth
point of the Idaho salient.2 The 187th Army GO 118, 5 Mar 51. See also Ltr, Gen Mark W.
Clark to Gen Ridgway, 26 Feb 51, and Ltr, Gen Swing
to Gen Ridgway, 38 Feb 51, both in private papers of
1 Rad, GX-3-134 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, General Ridgway held by the Military History Institute,
IX, and X Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and C/S ROKA, 1 Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
Mar 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 3 Rad, GX-134 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I,
2 General Collins, Army chief of staff, preferred
1 IX, and X Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and C/S ROKA, 1
not to release General Swing, whom Ridgway had re- Mar 51.
quested to take the IX Corps, from his assignment as 4 Ibid.
KWP-EBB-0336
KWP-EBB-0337
ticularly after the Capital Division the southward flowing Pukhan River.
lost almost a thousand men in the am- Above the Han, General Bradleys divi-
bush at Soksa-ri on 3 March, General sion was to clear the high ground bor-
Ridgway had detached the ROK I dering the Pukhan to protect the left
Corps headquarters and the ROK 3d flank of the IX Corps and to threaten
Division from the X Corps, sending the envelopment of enemy forces defend-
division to rejoin the ROK III Corps ing Seoul.7
and reestablishing the ROK I Corps Except in the South Korean corps
with the ROK 9th and Capital Divisions zone in the east, where the shortest ad-
in the coastal zone. The ROK 5th Divi- vances were scheduled, the RIPPER at-
sion, having reorganized after being tack was to be made through a succes-
hurt in the enemys mid-February of- sion of phase lines. The first of these,
fensive, meanwhile rejoined the X line Albany, lay five to twelve miles
Corps.5 ahead of the I, IX, and X Corps. This
During the RIPPER advance the two line traced commanding ground that
South Korean corps were to secure in the IX Corps zone dominated
Route 20. In the coastal area, ROK I Hongchon, six miles farther north.
Corps forces already were well above The second line, Buffalo, lay ahead of
this lateral road-in fact, were already the I and IX Corps only. A 25th Divi-
on or above line Idaho. Inland, the sion advance to this line in the I Corps
ROK III Corps would have to move zone would enlarge the envelopment
about ten miles north through the threat to enemy forces defending the
higher Taebaek ridges to get onto Seoul area. In the IX Corps zone, the
the Idaho trace some five miles above main objective would be Hongchon.
Route 20.6 The last phase line, Cairo, applied
In the I Corps zone at the west end only to the IX Corps. Its seizure would
of the army front, General Milburn give General Hoge the approaches to
was to retain two divisions, the ROK Chunchon, and Chunchon itself
1st and U.S. 3d, in his western and would be Hoges objective in the final
central positions along the lower bank drive to line Idaho.
of the Han to secure the army flank General Ridgway made a strong bid
and protect Inchon, where five hun- to secure preparations for the advance.
dred to six hundred tons of supplies He began by restricting access to plans
were being unloaded daily thanks to and orders within his command. To
Task Force 90 and the 2d Engineer forestall a premature press release, he
Special Brigade. East of Seoul on the personally briefed newsmen on the
corps right, the 25th Division, now RIPPER concept on 6 March, then
commanded by Brig. Gen. J. Sladen pressed them not to disclose anything
Bradley, was to attack across the Han about the operation for forty-eight
on both sides of its confluence with
MAP 27
KWP-EBB-0339
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION TANKS CROSS THE HAN RIVER in Operation Ripper,
7 March 1951.
the Eighth Army had driven enemy would be a tremendous victory for
forces above the 38th parallel.15 the Eighth Army. It would mean that
Concerned that MacArthurs predic- the encroachment of communism in
tion of a stalemate might hurt opera- Korea had been stopped-exactly what
tions by giving Eighth Army forces the the U.N. Command had set out to
impression that their best efforts would accomplish. (In January he had made
nevertheless be futile, General Ridgway this same point in his What Are We
put his own, and somewhat different, Fighting For statement to his troops.)
view on public record on 12 March. Conversely, if the Chinese failed to
Calling a press conference at his new drive the U.N. Command out of Korea,
tactical command post, established on they would have failed monumen-
the 10th in Yoju so that it would be tally. In any case, he emphasized, we
more centrally located, he told news- didnt set out to conquer China.16
men that regaining the 38th parallel
16 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Middleton, The
Compact History of the Korean War, p. 173; Rees, Korea:
15 See Schnabel, Policy and Direction, ch. XIX. The Limited War, p. 208.
KWP-EBB-0341
damaged trucks that were of value at area, the division had maintained a for-
least for spare parts.21 mal organization of a headquarters and
In the X Corps zone, the 2d, ROK three regiments and with a surviving
5th, and 7th Divisions advanced strength of about two thousand had
abreast, the 2d moving through the managed by the opening of Operation
Pungam-ni corridor on the left, the 7th RIPPER to slip north through the Tae-
along Route 20 on the right, and the baeks to the Irwol Mountain region,
ROK 5th over the ridges in the center. thirty miles northeast of Andong. Eas-
In a well fought delaying action, North ily withstanding further efforts of the
Korean forces kept gains short until 11 ROK 2d Division to eliminate it, the
March, when they began to withdraw division by 13 March reached the
above the Albany line. Against the di- Chungbong Mountain area, about
minishing resistance, the 2d and 7th twenty-five miles south of Kangnung.
Divisions each placed a regiment on As the North Korean unit approached
the phase line on 13 March. At corps the ROK I Corps rear, General Kim
center, the ROK 5th Division reached sent two regiments of the ROK 9th Di-
the line on the following day.22 vision and a battalion of the Capital Di-
Immediately east, the ROK III Corps vision south to intercept it. The two
reached and at some points passed forces clashed briefly in the Chungbong
above Route 20 by dark on 13 March. heights on the morning of the 13th to
With forces already well above line open what would become a cat-and-
Idaho in the coastal zone, the ROK I mouse affair lasting ten days.24
Corps meanwhile made only minor ad-
justments to consolidate its forward
The Enemy Buildup
positions. As of the 13th, a regiment of
the ROK 9th Division and two regi- During the evening of the 13th Gen-
ments of the Capital Division occupied eral Ridgway ordered the next phase
a line reaching northeastward from the of the RIPPER advance to begin the fol-
Hwangbyong Mountain area to the lowing morning. On the west, the 25th
coast near the town of Chumunjin.23 Division was to advance toward a seg-
A problem meanwhile had arisen in ment of line Buffalo bulging four miles
rear of the ROK I Corps when the above the Seoul-Chunchon road in a
North Korean 10th Division, isolated be- zone confined to the west side of the
hind Eighth Army lines since January, Pukhan River. In the main attack, the
opened a bid to return to its own lines. IX Corps was to make its major effort
Though much reduced by attempts of in the right half of the corps zone, send-
the 1st Marine Division until mid- ing the 1st Cavalry and 1st Marine Divi-
February and the ROK 2d Division sions to clear Hongchon and then to
thereafter to destroy the enemy unit in occupy line Buffalo above town to
the Pohang-dong-Andong-Yongdok block Route 29 leading northwest to
Chunchon and Route 24 running
21 2d Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
through the Hongchon River valley to
22 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 2d Inf Div
Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 7th Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar,
Mar 51. 24 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth
23 Eighth Army G3 Jnls, 7-15 Mar 51. Army PIRs 236246, 5-15 Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0343
36 USAFFE Intel Dig, vol. 1, no. 3, 16-31 Jan 53, 37 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 99, 2 Feb 53, and no. 115,
and no. 99, 2 Feb 53; Eighth Army PIRs 232, 1 Mar 17 Feb 53.
51, and 245, 14 Mar 51. 38 Ibid., no. 115, 17 Feb 53.
KWP-EBB-0347
struct airfields at Sunan, Sunchon, and In line with the doctrine of elastic, or
Namyang-ni, respectively. Coming into mobile, defense, small forces mean-
Korea at the same time was the 5th Artil- while would continue to employ delay-
lery Division, which because of its means ing tactics against the RIPPER advance.
of transportation was known also as the With some exceptions, the delaying
Mule Division. This unit, too, was as- forces would give ground even more
signed to the XIII Army Group.39 easily than they had during the open-
Following these units into Korea was ing phase of the operation as they fell
a far larger force, the III Army Group, back toward the concentrations of ma-
with the 12th, 15th, and 60th Armies. At jor units above the 38th parallel.
mid-March this group was still in the
process of entering the peninsula and Hongchon Cleared
assembling in the Koksan-Singgye-
Ichon region north of the area occu- In ordering the second phase of
pied by the newly arrived XIX Army RIPPER to begin, General Ridgway al-
Group. The final force due to enter Ko- lowed for the possibility that the Chi-
rea in March made up the bulk of the nese would set up stout defenses in the
2d Motorized Artillery Division. Entering ground immediately below Hongchon
late in the month, the division would and instructed the IX Corps com-
join its 29th Regiment already in Korea.40 mander to take the town by double
When all Chinese movements in envelopment, not by frontal assault.
March were completed, the strength of Accordingly, General Hoge directed
the Chinese Peoples Volunteers would the 1st Cavalry Division to envelope it
have risen to four army groups with on the west and the 1st Marine Divi-
fourteen armies and forty-two divisions, sion to move around it on the east.
these supported by four artillery divi- Hongchon actually lay in the Marine
sions and two separate artillery regi- zone near the boundary between the
ments. As sensed by Eighth Army intel- two divisions.41
ligence, the buildup was in preparation As Hoges forces attacked north on
for an offensive. But the offensive the morning of the 14th, it became
would not originate in the Hongchon steadily clearer that they would meet
area, as Colonel Tarkenton thought little resistance in the ground below
possible, nor was it imminent. The their objectives. Long range small arms
movement and positioning of reinforce- fire and small, scattered groups of Chi-
ments from Manchuria would continue nese who made no genuine attempt to
through most of March; the remainder delay the advance toward Hongchon
of the IX Army Group would not be fully were the extent of the opposition the
ready to move south until the turn of 1st Cavalry and 1st Marine Divisions
the month; and the refurbishing of encountered during the morning. The
other units, both North Korean and 24th Division and the ROK 6th Divi-
Chinese, would require even more time. sion, which had rejoined the advance
in a new zone on the right of the 24th,
39 Ibid., vol. 1, no. 4, 1-15 Feb 53, and no. 26, 16-30
Jun 52.
40 Ibid., vol. 1, no. 1, l-31 Dec 52, and no. 26, 16-30 41 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; IX Corps Opn
Jun 52. Dir 27, 12 Mar 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0348
met no enemy at all in making their Seoul-Chunchon road at the left and
short advances in the western half of center of the division zone while the
the corps zone.42 attached Turkish brigade, having taken
Prompted by the easy morning gains, over a zone bordering the Pukhan at
General Hoge recommended to Gen- the far right, moved about two miles
eral Ridgway that the 24th and ROK above the road adjacent to the newly
6th Divisions extend their advances to won positions of the 24th Division.44
the lower bank of the Hongchon River In the Hongchon area, the cavalry
and to the Chongpyong Reservoir, lo- division stood fast along the Hongchon
cated within a double bend of the Puk- River on the 15th to wait for the ma-
han just west of the mouth of the rines to come up on its right. Strong
Hongchon. Ridgway approved, and enemy positions on a ridge due east of
through the afternoon the two divisions Hongchon stalled the marines in that
continued to advance, still unopposed, area, but at the far left of the Marine
within two to four miles of the river zone the town itself fell to the 1st Bat-
line. In continuing the attack on talion, 7th Marines, at noon. A motor-
Hongchon, the 1st Cavalry Division ad- ized patrol, first to enter, found the
vanced against scant resistance and town ruined and undefended. On the
reached the Hongchon River west of return trip, following an explosion that
town late in the afternoon. The 1st Ma- damaged a truck, the patrol discovered
rine Division, moving more slowly in that Far East Air Forces bombers had
descending the Oum Mountain mass liberally sprinkled the eastern half of
on the eastern approach, advanced the town with small bombs set to ex-
within three miles of Hongchon before plode when disturbed.45 A company of
organizing perimeters for the night.43 Marine engineers began the uncomfort-
On 15 March the 24th Division at able task of clearing these explosives
the far left of the corps advance moved while the 1st Battalion passed through
without opposition to the lower bank and occupied high ground immediately
of the Chongpyong Reservoir while the northeast of town. 46
ROK 6th Division in the zone between
the 24th and 1st Cavalry Divisions also
Seoul Retaken
advanced against no resistance to high
ground overlooking the Hongchon By the time Hongchon fell, General
River. The 25th Division at the right of Ridgway discerned that the enemy high
the I Corps zone moved just as easily command had decided to hand over a
through the ground west of the Puk-
han. By dark on the 15th the 24th In- 44 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 15 Mar 51; IX Corps Comd
fantry and 27th Infantry reached the Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 24th Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar
51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 25th lnf Div
Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
42 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Cav Div 45 M83 fragmentation, or butterfly, bombs, so
Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, called because of whirling vanes that controlled their
Mar 51: 24th lnf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. drop and armed them.
43 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Comd Jnl, Mar 51; Rad, 46 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 15 Mar 51; IX Corps Comd
G-3-2599 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I and IX Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar
Corps, 14 Mar 51; IX Corps Opn Dir 28, 14 Mar 51; 51; 24th Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 1st Marine
IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 Div Hist Diary, Mar 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks,
Jnl, 14 Mar 51. Marine Operations in Korea, vol. IV, p. 88.
KWP-EBB-0349
far bigger prize, Seoul. The first sign battalion, recently attached to the 3d
appeared on 12 March when aerial ob- Division, checked the ground along the
servers flying over the enemys Han eastern edge of the city without mak-
River positions between Seoul and the ing contact; two companies of ROK
25th Divisions bridgehead saw a large troops moved unopposed through the
number of troops moving northwest ground just west of the city; and still
out of that area. Patrols from the 3d farther west, a South Korean patrol
Division, which held positions along the crossed the Han and moved more than
Han opposite, crossed the river on the five miles north before running into
night of the 12th and found shoreline enemy fire. 49 Aerial observers saw no
positions vacant. On the following night enemy activity immediately above the
3d Division patrols moved more than a northern limits of Seoul but observed
half mile above the Han without mak- extensive defensive preparations and
ing contact.47 troops disposed in depth east and west
Patrols from both the 3d Division and of Route 3 beginning at a point five
ROK 1st Division crossed the Han dur- miles to the north, roughly halfway be-
ing the afternoon of 14 March. One tween Seoul and Uijongbu.50
from the 3d Division discovered that Assured that the North Koreans had
enemy forces had vacated an impor- withdrawn from Seoul and adjacent
tant defensive position on Hill 348, the ground, General Ridgway late on the
peak of a prominent north-south ridge 15th instructed General Milburn to oc-
three miles east of Seoul. Nearer the cupy the nearest commanding ground
city, another moved as far north as the above the capital city. The general line
Seoul-Chunchon road without con- to be occupied, which Milburn later des-
tact; a third found that Hill 175, one of ignated Lincoln, arched across heights
the lower peaks of South Mountain two miles to the west and north of
hugging Seoul at its southeast edge, also Seoul, then angled northeast across the
was vacant. Five patrols from the ROK ridge holding Hill 348 to join line Buf-
1st Division entered Seoul itself. One falo in the 25th Divisions zone.
moved all the way through the western Ridgway left it to Milburn to decide the
portion of the city to the gate on Route strength of the forces who would cross
1 while another reached the capitol the river but restricted their forward
building near city center and raised the movement, once they were on line
ROK flag from the dome. None of the Lincoln, to patrolling to the north and
patrols received fire or sighted enemy northwest to regain contact. The restric-
troops.48 tion on further advances applied to the
In continuing to search the city on 25th Division as well. The principal ob-
the 15th, the South Koreans discovered jective at the moment, Ridgway ex-
only a few North Korean deserters who plained to Milburn, was not to attack
had been away from their units too long
to provide information of value. Out-
side Seoul, a patrol from the Belgian 49 The Belgian battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. A.
Crahay, arrived in Korea on 31 January 1951.
47 3d Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 50 EighthArmy G3 Jnl, 15 Mar 51; I Corps Comd
48 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 14 Mar 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; I Corps PIR 74, 15 Mar 51; 3d Inf
14 Mar 51; 3d Inf Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0350
The Courageous Concept was in the west above the I Corps. Ac-
cording to patrol results and intelli-
The inability of South Korean forces gence sources, the North Korean I Corps
to eliminate the North Korean 10th Divi- and the Chinese 26th Army occupied
sion reflected the total result of Opera- that area, generally along and above a
tion RIPPER to date. For although the line through Uijongbu. Appearing
Eighth Army had taken its principal ter- most vulnerable were the three divi-
ritorial objectives, it had had far less sions of the I Corps in the region west
success in destroying enemy forces and of Uijongbu with the lower stretch of
materiel. Through the period 1-15 the Imjin River at their backs. Any with-
March, which included most of the drawal by these forces would require
harder fighting, known enemy dead primarily the use of Route 1 and its
totaled 7,151; as the Chinese and crossing over the Imjin near the town
North Koreans accelerated their with- of Munsan-ni; thus, if this withdrawal
drawal after the 15th, that figure had route could be blocked in the vicinity
not increased to any great extent.64 of its Imjin crossing, the North Koreans
Chunchon, the suspected enemy below the river would find it extremely
supply center, had been bare when difficult to escape attacks from the
entered; although numerous caches of south. With this in mind, General
materiel had been captured elsewhere, Ridgway enlarged Operation RIPPER
these had been relatively small. In sum, with plans for an airborne landing at
the enemy high command so far had Munsan-ni by the 187th Airborne Regi-
succeeded in keeping the bulk of front- mental Combat Team in concert with
line forces and supplies out of range of overland attacks by the I Corps. He
the RIPPER advance.65 called the supplemental squeeze play
As Chunchon fell, one area in which Operation COURAGEOUS. 66
there appeared to be an opportunity to
destroy an enemy force of some size
66 Eighth Army PIRs 247-251, 16-20 Mar 51; I Corps
64 Ltr, Maj Gen Leven C. Allen, Eighth Army Chief PIR 80, 21 Mar 51; I Corps G3 Jnl, 20 Mar 51; Eighth
of Staff, to Maj Gen Doyle O. Hickey, UNC Acting Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Rad, GX-3-4040 KGOO,
Chief of Staff, 19 Mar 51. CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 22 Mar 51;
65 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 115.
KWP-EBB-0355
CHAPTER XVIII
MAP 28
line to protect the I Corps flank. Mean- Korean corps had moved that deeply
while, in concert with Milburns drive into enemy territory.3
to lines Cairo and Aspen, Hoge was to The three divisions of the I Corps
complete the occupation of his sector started toward line Cairo at 0800 on 22
of line Cairo. Elsewhere along the army March. The ROK 1st Division, advanc-
front, the X Corps and the ROK III ing astride Route 1 in the west, over-
and I Corps remained under Ridgways came very light resistance and had
order of 18 March to reconnoiter the
area between the Hwachon Reservoir
3 Rads, GX-3-3813 KGOO, GX-3-4040 KGOO, and
and the east coast. As yet, neither GX-34-4149 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et
Almonds patrols nor those of the South al., first one 21 Mar and last two, 22 Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0357
troops on the phase line by noon. The sion of the IX Corps, he added the 2d
3d Division astride Route 3 in the cen- Battalion, 7th Infantry, and all but
ter and the 25th Division on the right one battery of the 58th Armored Field
also met sporadic opposition but moved Artillery Battalion from the 3d Divi-
slowly and ended the day considerably sion; from corps troops he supplied a
short of the line.4 battery of the 999th Armored Field
General Milburn meanwhile assem- Artillery Battalion and Company A,
bled an armored task force in Seoul for 14th Engineer Combat Battalion.
a drive up Route 1 to make the initial He also included two bridge-laying
contact with the 187th Airborne Regi- Churchill tanks from the 29th British
mental Combat Team if and after it Brigade, recently attached to the I
dropped on Munsan-ni. Building the Corps. Lt. Col. John S. Growdon, com-
force around the 6th Medium Tank mander of the 6th Medium Tank Bat-
Battalion borrowed from the 24th Divi- talion, was to lead the task force.5
4 I Corps Opn Dir 50, 21 Mar 51; I Corps Comd 5 I Corps Opn Dir 51, 22 Mar 51; I Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Mar 5 1; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Task Force
51. Growdon, in CMH.
KWP-EBB-0358
Ridgway made the final decision on it moved ahead of the South Koreans,
the airborne operation late in the after- but within minutes the third tank in
noon of the 22d during a conference at column hit a mine while bypassing a
Eighth Army main headquarters in destroyed bridge at the small Chang-
Taegu. General Partridge, the Fifth Air nung River. The task force was held
Force commander, assured him that the up while engineers removed a dozen
weather would be satisfactory on the other mines from the bypass. Proceed-
23d; Col. Gilman C. Mudgett, the new ing slowly from that point with a mine
Eighth Army G-3, predicted not only detector team leading the way afoot,
that contact with the airborne unit Colonel Growdons column moved only
would be made within a days time, as a mile to the village of Sinwon-ni be-
Ridgway required, but that the entire fore encountering more mines. As the
I Corps should be able to advance 187th Airborne Regimental Combat
rapidly.6 Given these reports, Ridgway Team began landing at Munsan-ni at
ordered the airborne landing to take 0900, Growdons task force was at a halt
place at 0900 on the following day.7 some fifteen miles to the south.9
On hearing the final word on the C46s and C-119s of the 315th Air
Munsan-ni drop, General Milburn di- Division had begun lifting the airborne
rected Task Force Growdon to pass troops from the Taegu airfield shortly
through the ROK 1st Division on line after 0700, all heading initially for a
Cairo early on 23 March and proceed rendezvous point over the Yellow Sea
via Route 1 to reach the airborne west of the objective area. The sec-
troops. His three divisions meanwhile ond serial of aircraft, with the 1st Bat-
were to resume their advance with the talion of the 187th aboard, was in flight
objective of reaching line Aspen. The only briefly before engine trouble in
ROK 1st Division, which would be fol- the lead plane forced the pilot to re-
lowing Task Force Growdon, was to re- turn to Taegu for a replacement air-
lieve the 187th Airborne Regimental craft. The combat team landed before
Combat Team upon reaching Munsan- the new lead plane, whose passengers
ni, and the airborne unit then was to included the 1st Battalion commander,
prepare to move south and revert to could reach Munsan-ni. The drop, as a
Eighth Army reserve.8 result, did not come off entirely as
Task Force Growdon, completely planned. 11
motorized, passed through the ROK 1st General Bowen, commander of the
Division shortly after 0700. No enemy 187th, had designated two drop zones,
forces opposed the armored column as one about a mile northeast of Munsan-
6 Colonel Mudgett replaced Dabney, now a briga- 9 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army
dier general, on 21 March 1951. Study, Task Force Growdon.
7 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Eighth Army 10 The provisional Combat Cargo Command had
G3 Jnl, Sum, 21 Mar 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, been discontinued and the 315th Air Division acti-
Nar, Mar 51; Rad, GX-3-4097 KGOO, CG Eighth vated to replace it on 25 January 1951. Brig. Gen.
Army to CG I Corps et al., 22 Mar 51. John P. Henebry had replaced General Tunner as
8 Rad, GX-3-4040 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I commander of the 315th on 8 February 1951.
Corps et al., 22 Mar 51; Rad, CIACT 3-30, CG I 11 Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk, in
Corps to CO 6th Med Tk Bn, 23 Mar 51; I Corps Opn CMH; 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51;
Dir 52, 23 Mar 51. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 353-55.
KWP-EBB-0359
ni, another about three miles southeast small groups of North Koreans and a
of town. The 1st Battalion was to land meager amount of fire from mortars
in the lower zone, the remainder of the located somewhere to the north. Over-
combat team in the one to the north.12 crowding caused by the 1st Battalions
As planned, the 3d Battalion with the misdirected drop complicated the 3d
4th Ranger Company attached jumped Battalions assembly, but units managed
first, Bowen having given it the mis- to sort themselves out and secure the
sion of securing the northern drop borders of the drop zone. An unex-
zone. Bowens plan went awry when the pected annoyance was created by civil-
leaderless second serial of planes mis- ians who appeared in the drop zone
takenly followed the first and dropped and began carrying away parachutes.
the 1st Battalion also in the northern Shots fired over their heads ended the
zone. The 2d Battalion with the 2d attempted theft. Against moderate but
Ranger Company attached followed not scattered opposition the 2d Battalion
long after, then the 674th Airborne Field proceeded to occupy heights northeast
Artillery Battalion, and at 1000 the ar- of the drop zone, and under the com-
tillery heavy drop. 13 mand of its executive officer the 1st
In the brief interval between the Battalion, less Company B, moved into
drops of the 1st and 2d Battalions, the ground to the north and north-
General Ridgway arrived by L-19, land- west, clearing Munsan-ni itself in the
ing on a road between Munsan-ni and process.15
the northern drop zone. En route, he Company B went on a rescue mis-
had flown over Task Force Growdon sion to the southern drop zone after
then held up at Sinwon-ni, a fact he learning that the command group of
passed to General Bowen. Airborne the 1st Battalion had come under fire
again shortly after 1000, Ridgway saw from enemy forces on Hill 216 over-
a single stick of paratroops jump from looking the drop zone from the north-
a plane over the lower drop zone. The west. Company B forced the enemy
replacement plane carrying the 1st Bat- group off the hill, allowing its survi-
talion commander and party had finally vors to withdraw to the southwest, and
reached Munsan-ni, and its passengers reached the drop zone by 1500. The
had jumped in the correct zone not rescue force and the battalion com-
knowing that they would be the only mand group arrived at the regimental
troops in the area.14 position to the north about two hours
To the north, resistance in and im- later. By that time Bowens forces had
mediately around the drop zone was secured all assigned objectives.16
minor and sporadic, amounting to a few Battle casualties among the airborne
troops were light, totaling nineteen.
12 Accompanying the 187th to provide additional
Jump casualties were higher-eighty-
medical support was a para-surgical team from the four-but almost half of these returned
Indian 60th Field Ambulance and Surgical Company. to duty immediately after treatment.
13 187th Abn RCT Opn O 2, 22 Mar 51; 187th Abn
RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study,
Operation Tomahawk. 15 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth
14 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk; I Corps POR 576,
Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Opera- 23 Mar 51.
tion Tomahawk. 16 Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk.
KWP-EBB-0360
Enemy casualties included 136 dead an earthen road running east from
counted on the field and 149 taken Munsan-ni, as far as the village of
captive. Estimated enemy losses raised Sinchon, ten miles away. One patrol
the total considerably higher. Prisoner made contact while checking an Imjin
interrogation indicated that the enemy ferry site and ford ten miles northeast
forces who had been in the objective of Munsan-ni. Six enemy were killed
area were from the 36th Regiment of and twenty-two captured. The patrol
the North Korean 19th Division and had suffered no casualties, but a tank had
numbered between three hundred and to be destroyed after it bogged down at
five hundred. Most of the remainder a stream crossing while approaching the
of the North Korean Z Corps apparently Imjin. A few rounds of artillery fire
had withdrawn above the Imjin well be- meanwhile fell in the northern drop
fore the airborne landing.17 zone but caused no casualties.19
The point of Task Force Growdon The ROK 1st Division in the mean-
reached Munsan-ni at 1830 on the 23d, time had advanced steadily toward
but the remainder of the extended col- Munsan-ni without enemy contact.
umn took several hours longer. The Early on the 24th Task Force Boone, a
force encountered no enemy positions division armored column consisting of
along Route 1 but was kept to an inter- Company C, 64th Tank Battalion (on
mittent crawl by having to lift or ex- loan to General Paik from the 3d Divi-
plode over a hundred fifty live mines, sion), Paiks tank destroyer battalion
some of them booby-trapped, and al- (organized as an infantry unit), and two
most as many dummy mines, including a of his engineer platoons, stepped ahead
five-mile stretch of buried C-ration and of the division and reached the 187th
beer cans. Casualties were few, but four Airborne Regimental Combat Team at
tanks were disabled by mines. As the midmorning. By days end the remain-
last of these tanks hit a mine a mile der of the division occupied a line ex-
below Munsan-ni, the explosion at- tending from positions athwart Route
tracted enemy artillery fire that dam- 1 about three miles below Munsan-ni
aged two more. The tail of the task northeastward to Pobwon-ni, a village
force finally arrived at the airborne po- on lateral Route 2Y six miles east of
sition at 0700 on 24 March.18 Munsan-ni area. General Paik relieved
General Milburns orders to the General Bowen of responsibility for the
187th for operations on the 24th called Munsan-ni area at 1700 and placed
only for patrolling. Having been given Task Force Boone in position just above
control of Task Force Growdon by the town.20
Milburn, General Bowen built his prin- The lack of resistance to the wider
cipal patrols around Growdons tanks sweep of the ROK 1st Divisions ad-
and sent them to investigate ferry sites vance confirmed that the bid to block
on the Imjin and to check Route 2Y,
19 I Corps Opn Dir 52, 23 Mar 51; Eighth Army
Study, Operation Tomahawk; ibid., Task Force
17 Rad, GX (TAC) 124 KCG, CG Eighth Army to Growdon.
CINCFE, 23 Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Operation 20 I Corps POR 576, 23 Mar 51; Eighth Army G3
Tomahawk. Consolidated Opn Rpt, 24 Mar 51; Rad, CIACT 3-35,
18 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army CG I Corps to CG 1st ROK Div, 24 Mar 51; I Corps
Study, Task Force Growdon. Comd, Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0361
and attack the North Korean I Corps had these positions they were in fair condi-
been futile. To the east, that the Chi- tion to block advance on the Route 33
nese 26th Army still had forces deployed axis to the north and over Route 3 lead-
to delay the advance of the 3d and 25th ing out of Uijongbu to the northeast.
Divisions had become equally clear. On On the divisions right, the 15th Infan-
the I Corps right, the 25th Division on try eventually managed to clear Hill 337
23 and 24 March had run into a large on the 24th, but the 65th Infantry on
number of minefields and small but the left failed in an all-day attempt to
well entrenched enemy groups employ- force the Chinese from the 468 mass.23
ing small arms, machine gun, and mor- General Milburn viewed the situation
tar fire. At nightfall on the 24th Gen- at corps center as an opportunity to trap
eral Bradleys forces held positions and destroy the Chinese holding up the
almost due west of Uijongbu in the 3d 3d Division. After General Soules
Divisions zone at corps center.21 forces encountered the strong enemy
Somewhat unexpectedly, the 3d Divi- positions on the morning of the 24th,
sion had come up against unusually he ordered General Bowen to pull in
strong Chinese positions. On 23 March his patrols and prepare the 187th Air-
General Soules forces had occupied the borne Regimental Combat Team for an
Uijongbu area with little difficulty. First eastward attack on the Route 2Y, axis.
to enter the town itself was Task Force The objective was high ground abut-
Hawkins, built around the bulk of the ting Route 33 about ten miles north of
64th Tank Battalion and two platoons Uijongbu, thus just above the trace of
of tanks from each of the 15th and 65th line Aspen, whence Bowen was to pre-
Infantry Regiments. Reaching Uijong- vent the Chinese in front of the 3d Divi-
bu about 0900 and finding it unde- sion from withdrawing over Route 33.
fended, the task force reconnoitered The 3d Division was to continue its
north several miles on Route 33 before northward attack in the meantime and
returning to the division position. Mines eventually drive the Chinese against
disabled two tanks, but otherwise the Bowens position.24
task force made no contact.22 General Bowen started east at 1800,
Though it thus appeared that the 3d intending to march as far as Sinchon
Division could continue to move for- during the night and open his attack
ward with relative ease, General Soules the following morning. From Task
forces came under heavy fire when they Force Growdon, Company C was the
resumed their attack on the morning only unit of the 6th Tank Battalion able
of the 24th. The Chinese had orga- to move at 1800; all other companies
nized strong positions in the Hill 468 of the battalion had too little fuel after
mass rising three miles northwest of patrolling and were to catch up with
Uijongbu and the 337 mass about a mile Bowens column after being resupplied
north and slightly east of town. From from Seoul. The Growdon force now
21 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 25th Div Comd 23 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 24 Rad, CIACT 3-37, CG I Corps to CG 1st ROK
22 I Corps G3 Jnl, 23 Mar 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, 23 Mar Div et al., 24 Mar 51; 187th Abn RCT S3 Jnl, 24 Mar
51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. 51, and Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0362
also was short the 2d Battalion, 7th dered the tanks back to Munsan-ni. Af-
Infantry, which had been sent back to ter the engineers had cleared the road
the 3d Division.25 sufficiently, his remaining forces pro-
A force shaped around the tanks ceeded to Sinchon, arriving about 0600
of Company C led the way toward on the 25th.26
Sinchon. But after seven miles, as A half hour later Bowen ordered the
Bowens column moved through a sys- 2d Battalion, with the 3d Battalion fol-
tem of ridges, landslides in defiles twice lowing in support, to seize Hill 228 ris-
trapped the leading tanks, and in the ing on the west side of Route 33. Run-
second instance no bypass could be ning into small arms, machine gun, and
found. As engineers tried to open the mortar fire from enemy positions on
road, rain began to fall and became several nearer heights and hampered
steadily heavier. With the rain making by a continuing driving rain, the two
a poor road even worse, Bowen or- battalions at days end were some two
miles short of Hill 228, and Route 33
remained available to the Chinese in
25 187th Abn RCT S3 Jnl, 24 Mar 51, and Comd
Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Task Force 26 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth
Growdon. Army Study, Task Force Growdon.
KWP-EBB-0363
front of the 3d Division if they chose to Bowen attacked the heights on the east
withdraw over it.27 side of Route 33 early on 28 March
Withdrawal seemed to be the Chi- and occupied them after an all-day bat-
nese intention. The 3d Division met tle to eliminate stiff enemy resistance.30
only light resistance when it resumed The 15th and 65th Infantry Regi-
its attack from the south on the 25th ments of the 3d Division meanwhile
and advanced two miles beyond the hill reached the airborne forces, the 1st Bat-
masses where strong Chinese positions talion of the 15th Infantry making first
had delayed it the day before. The tank contact late in the afternoon of the
company of the 65th Infantry mean- 27th. Despite General Milburns hopes
while moved ahead on Route 3X, a sec- for the operation, the two regiments
ondary road angling northwest off drove no enemy forces into the guns of
Route 33 to Sinchon, in an attempt to the airborne unit. Either the Chinese
contact the 187th Airborne Regimen- resisting the eastward attack of the
tal Combat Team. Mines along the road 187th had kept Route 33 open long
disabled four tanks and kept the com- enough for the forces withdrawing be-
pany from reaching its destination, but fore the 3d Division to pass north, or
it encountered no enemy positions. The the withdrawing enemy units had used
withdrawal of the Chinese delaying another road, perhaps Route 3. Moving
forces was confirmed on the 26th when through spotty resistance, the 25th
the 3d Division and the 25th Division Division on the right had kept pace with
as well moved forward against little or the 3d Division, and by nightfall on 28
no opposition.28 March both were on or above line
To the north, the Chinese continued Aspen.31
to oppose the efforts of the 187th Air-
Ripper Concluded
borne Regimental Combat Team to
capture Hill 228. Using Route 33 and a Late on 26 March, as it became obvi-
lesser road to the west, two tank col- ous that the Chinese were backing away
umns from the 3d Division joined from the 3d and 25th Divisions, Gen-
Bowens forces during the afternoon eral Ridgway had ordered the I and IX
of the 26th, but, even with armored Corps to continue to line Benton. As
support, it was 0900 the following day originally conceived, the IX Corps ad-
before the 187th captured Hill 228.29 vance to Benton was limited to General
Using the remainder of the 27th for Hoges western forces and was intended
reorganization and resupply, General simply to protect the I Corps right
flank. But Ridgway had since modified
27 187th Abn RCT S3 Jnl, 25 Mar 51; Eighth Army his plan of operations, widening the ad-
Study, Operation Tomahawk. vance to include the entire IX Corps
28 Eighth Army G3 Consol Opn Rpt, 25 Mar 51; I
Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, and all other forces to the east.32
Nar, Mar 5 1.
29 On the 26th General Soule reported to General 30 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 3d Div
Ridgway that one of his tanks had knocked out a T34. Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
This piece was the first enemy armor destroyed by 31 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 25th Div Comd
ground action since Ridgway had taken command of Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
the Eighth Army. The T34 may have belonged to the 32 Rad, GX-3-4877 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs
17th Mechanized Division of the North Korean I Corps. I and IX Corps, 26 Mar 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt,
See Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Nar, Mar 51. Nar, Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0364
On 23 March he had lengthened line ing its main forces beyond the reach of
Benton eastward through the 1st Cav- the RIPPER operation. Equally obvious
alry Divisions patrol base at Chunchon was that only advances above the 38th
and as far as the 1st Marine Divisions parallel could attack these main forces.34
zone on the IX Corps right, where it
joined the last few miles of line Cairo.
On the following day he had extended The Parallel Question
line Cairo from its original terminus in
the Marine zone northeastward across Earlier, as General Ridgway was about
the remainder of the army front to the to open Operation COURAGEOUS, the
town of Chosan-ni on the east coast.33 gains he already had registered in his
The final objective line of the RIPPER KILLER and RIPPER advances had in-
operation thus had become a combina- fluenced a decision in Washington by
tion of the Benton and Cairo lines fol- which operations above the parallel as-
lowing the upstream trace of the Imjin sumed new importance as a political
virtually to the 38th parallel in the west, question. The decision centered on how
hanging slack a few miles below the par- and when to approach the desired cease-
allel for almost all of its remaining fire. Notwithstanding the building evi-
length to the east, then rising to an east dence of enemy offensive preparations,
coast anchor some eight mile above the officials of the Departments of State
parallel. (See Maps 26 and 27.) and Defense believed that Ridgways
Ridgways forces achieved the ad- recent successes might have convinced
justed line by the end of March, en- the Chinese and North Koreans that
countering no more than the sporadic they could not. win a military victory
delaying action that had characterized and, if this was the case, that they might
the opposition to Operation RIPPER agree to negotiate an end to hostilities.
from the outset. Thus, since 7 March On the advice of these officials, Presi-
Eighth Army forces had made impres- dent Truman planned to make a public
sive territorial gains, recapturing the statement suggesting the United Na-
South Korean capital and moving be- tions willingness to end the fighting.
tween twenty-five and thirty miles north The statement was carefully worded to
to reach-or all but reach-the 38th avoid a threatening tone and so to en-
parallel. Estimates of enemy killed and courage a favorable reply. Truman in-
wounded during the month were high, tended to deliver the appeal as soon as
and some forty-eight hundred Chinese his statement had been approved by
and North Koreans had been captured. officials of all nations that had contrib-
Nevertheless, the results in terms of en- uted forces to the U.N. Command.35
emy troops and supplies destroyed were The timing of the presidential an-
considerably less than anticipated. The nouncement was tied also to the fact
clear fact was that the enemy high com- that Ridgways forces were fast ap-
mand had been and still was marshal-
34 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth
Army G3 and G2 SS Rpts, Mar 51.
33 Rad, GX-3-4228 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 35 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 266; Truman, Years of
I Corps et al., 23 Mar 51; Rad, GX (TAC) 128 KCG, Trial and Hope, p. 440; Acheson, Present at the Creation,
CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 24 Mar 51. pp. 517-18; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 357-58.
KWP-EBB-0365
GENERAL MACARTHUR AND GENERAL RIDGWAY meet on the east coast, 3 April
1951.
Ridgway had revised his concept for Yesong and also warned that the attack
advancing above the parallel since force would be vulnerable to envelop-
meeting with MacArthur on 24 March. ment by a fresh Chinese unit located
He originally had intended to direct a off the right flank of the advance. (The
strong attack northwestward across the unit was the XIX Army Group, which in-
Imjin, expecting that in moving as far telligence had not yet fully identified.)
as the Yesong River the attack force Ridgway, as a result, elected to limit
would find the elusive North Korean I operations northwest of the Imjin to
Corps. His intelligence staff later discov- reconnaissance and combat patrols.51
ered that the bulk of the North Korean He planned now to point his main
corps had withdrawn behind the attack toward the centrally located road
and rail complex marked out by the
towns of Pyonggang in the north and
Chorwon and Kumhwa in the south.
the ROK I Corps, to Kangnung crashed in the Tae-
baeks, killing the general and his pilot. General Paik,
the excellent leader of the ROK 1st Division, became 51 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I
the new commander of the ROK I Corps early in Corps et al., 29 Mar 51; Ridgway, The Korean War, pp.
April, and Brig. Gen. Kang Moon Bong took com- 120-21; Eighth Army PIR 954, 23 Mar 51, and PIR
mand of the 1st Division. 259, 28 Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0369
This complex, eventually named the take the section between Route 24 and
Iron Triangle by newsmen searching Yangyang. 52
for a dramatic term, lay twenty to thirty In anticipation of enemy offensive
miles above the 38th parallel in the di- operations, Ridgway planned to pull
agonal corridor dividing the Taebaek substantial forces off the line immedi-
Mountains into northern and southern ately after reaching Kansas and pre-
ranges and containing the major road pare them for counterattacks. The IX
and rail links between the port of Corps was to release the 1st Cavalry
Wonsan in the northeast and Seoul in Division. Under army control, the divi-
the southwest. Other routes emanating sion was to assemble at Kyongan-ni, be-
from the triangle of towns connected low the Han southeast of Seoul, and
with Pyongyang to the northwest and prepare to meet enemy attacks aimed
with the western and eastern halves of at the capital city via Route 1 from the
the present front. A unique center of northwest, over Routes 33 and 3 from
communications, the complex was of the north, or through the Pukhan River
obvious importance to the ability of the valley from the northeast. In the X
enemy high command to move troops Corps zone, the bulk of the 2d Division
and supplies within the forward areas was to assemble at Hongchon ready to
and to coordinate operations laterally. counter an attack following the Route
Ridgways first concern was to occupy 29 axis, and a division yet to be selected
ground that could serve as a base both from one of the two ROK corps in the
for continuing the advance toward the east was to assemble at Yuchon-ni on
complex and, in view of the enemys Route 20 and prepare to operate against
evident offensive preparations, for de- enemy attacks in either corps sector.
veloping a defensive position. The base The 187th Airborne Regimental Com-
selected, line Kansas, traced the lower bat Team, which on 29 March left the
bank of the Imjin in the west. From the I Corps zone for Taegu, meanwhile
Imjin eastward as far as the Hwachon was to be ready to return north to re-
Reservoir the line lay two to six miles inforce operations wherever needed.53
above the 38th parallel across the While these forces established them-
approaches to the Iron Triangle. Fol- selves in reserve, Ridgway planned to
lowing the lower shoreline of the reser- launch Operation DAUNTLESS, a lim-
voir, it then turned slightly north to a ited advance toward the Iron Triangle
depth of ten miles above the parallel by the I and IX Corps. With the objec-
before falling off southeastward to the tive only of menacing the triangle,
Yangyang area on the coast. In the ad- not of investing it, the two corps were
vance to line Kansas, designated Opera- to attack in succession to lines Utah
tion RUGGED, the I and IX Corps were and Wyoming. They would create, in
to seize the segment of the line between
the Imjin and the western edge of the
Hwachon Reservoir. To the east, the 52 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I
X Corps was to occupy the portion trac- Corps et al., 29 Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum,
ing the reservoir shore and reaching Apr 51.
53 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I
Route 24 in the Soyang River valley, Corps et al., 29 Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 29
and the ROK III and I Corps were to Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0370
effect, a broad salient bulging above ROK I Corps zone on the east coast,
line Kansas between the Imjin and Ridgway brought him up to date on
Hwachon Reservoir and reaching plans. MacArthur agreed with the
prominent heights commanding the RUGGEDand DAUNTLESS concept, urg-
Chorwon-Kumhwa base of the commu- ing in particular that Ridgway make a
nications complex. If struck by strong strong effort to hold the Kansas line.
enemy attacks during or after the ad- At the same time, MacArthur believed
vance, the two corps were to return to that the two operations would move the
the Kansas line.54 battlefront to that point of theoretical
To maintain, and in some areas stalemate he had predicted in early
regain, contact with enemy forces, March. He intended to limit offensive
Ridgway allowed each corps to start to- operations, once Ridgways forces
ward line Kansas as it completed reached their Kansas-Wyoming objec-
preparations. The RUGGED advance, as tives, to reconnaissance and combat
a result, staggered to a full start be- patrols, none larger than a battalion.55
tween 2 and 5 April. When General
MacArthur made his customary ap-
55 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 2 and 3 Apr 51; Rad,
pearance on the 3d, this time in the GX-4-979 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et
al., 4 Apr 51; Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Apr 51; MS,
Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp.
54 Rad GX-4-805 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I 419-20; Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 121; Rad, C
Corps etal., 3 Apr 51. 59397, CINCFE to DA, 5 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0371
CHAPTER XIX
Operation RUGGED
The Enemy Situation turned favorable in the spring. In a
show of force aimed at discouraging
Whether the expected enemy offen- such an operation, Seventh Fleet com-
sive would occur before all RUGGED and mander Admiral Martin would take
DAUNTLESS objectives could be taken Task Force 77 south on 8 April to con-
was difficult for the Eighth Army intel- duct air parades over Taiwan and along
ligence staff to estimate. Some evidence a course three miles off the mainland
came from recently taken prisoners coast. No invasion would take place.
who gave dates between 1 and 15 April Whether the naval air demonstration
for the start of the offensive. From an discouraged the Chinese was unclear;
involved analysis of enemy logistical re- what was clear was that by the time
quirements and observed southbound Task Force 77 returned to Korea and
traffic, intelligence officers concluded resumed its interdictory attacks on 16
that the enemy high command had April, much of the earlier damage to
completed the necessary supply buildup the enemy'seastern rail net had been
despite the Far East Air Forces long- repaired.1
term and continuing interdiction of In contrast to the evidence of the
North Koreas transportation system. enemys logistical readiness and the
The attacks had destroyed important opening dates reported by captives, air
bridges and, in particular, had inter- observers and agents had reported en-
rupted the enemys use of the rail emy forces to be developing and in
system. But even after Task Force 77 some areas occupying fortified positions
joined and intensified the air campaign along and immediately above the 38th
early in March, the enemy had been parallel. On the basis of these reports
able to make rapid, if crude, repairs; the Eighth Army G-2 sensed that the
to develop. alternate, if roundabout, enemy offensive was not imminent.
routes; and to combine trains and The pattern of enemy activity, Colo-
trucks to shuttle supplies through the nel Tarkenton observed at the start of
damaged rail and road networks. More- the RUGGED operation, continues to
over, Task Force 77 was about to be reflect a defensive attitude with over-
pulled out of northeastern Korea to go tones of preparation for an offensive.2
to the Formosa Strait.
Since the turn of the year, intelligence 1Eighth Army PIR 258, 27 Mar 51, and PIR 264, 2
reports of Peoples Liberation Army troop Apr 51; Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea,
pp. 289-93; Field, United States Naval Operations, Ko-
and shipping concentrations in main-
rea, pp. 343-44; Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in
land China ports had indicated a pos- Korea, p. 236. -
sible invasion of Taiwan when weather 2Eighth Army PIR 266, 4 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0372
OPERATION RUGGED
353
two hundred forty porters, to assist the dug in on the crest behind barbed wire
RUGGED advance.6 and antipersonnel mines. The battal-
ion finally cleared the position after air
strikes and artillery fire had softened it
The Advance to Line Kansas
on the morning of the 5th. The 5th
In organizing the RUGGED operation, Infantry occupied the Kwanum Moun-
General Ridgway had widened the I tain mass that same day; slowed by the
Corps zone eastward to pass control of Kungmang battle, the 21st Infantry
the 24th Division, which had been oper- reached line Kansas on the 6th.8
ating on the IX Corps left, to General The adjoining British 27th Brigade
Milburn. (Map 29) While Milburns following the Kapyong River valley on
forces along the Imjin stood fast, the the IX Corps left was stopped by Chi-
25th and 24th Divisions in the eastern nese fire from Kungmang Mountain
half of the I Corps zone attacked north until the 21st Infantry reduced that
on either side of Route 3 on the morn- position; then the British marched un-
ing of 3 April. East of the road, opposed to line Kansas on 6 April.
the 24th Division moved astride the Flushing scattered Chinese out of the
Yongpyong River valley, the 5th Infan- IX Corps central zone, the ROK 6th
try on the left advancing into the Kwa- Division reached its Kansas objectives
num Mountain mass abutting Route 3, the same day. On the corps right, where
the 21st Infantry striking for Kung- the 1st Cavalry Division advanced
mang Mountain just inside the right astride the Pukhan River, the attached
corps boundary. West of Route 3, the 7th Marine Regiment moved easily up
27th Infantry and 35th Infantry of the the west side of the river, but the 7th
25th Division advanced toward high and 8th Regiments attacking through
ground rising between a lateral stretch cut-up, virtually roadless ground east
of the Yongpyong River and the of the Pukhan were slowed by strong
Hantan River farther north.7 delaying forces of the 39th Army. On 6
Pushing scattered 26th Army forces April the two cavalry regiments were
out of position byfire and occasionally still some three miles short of their
by assault, and turning back a few light line Kansas objectives adjacent to the
counterattacks, the 25th Division took Hwachon Reservoir.9
the heights overlooking the Hantan General Ridgway suspected that the
River on 5 April. Resistance to the 24th stiff resistance to the 1st Cavalry Divi-
Division was desultory except at the far sion was related to enemy plans to ob-
right where the 2d Battalion, 21st In- struct IX Corps movement by releas-
fantry, stalled on the western slopes of ing the reservoirs water through the
Kungmang Mountain on 4 April un- Hwachon Dam and flooding the Puk-
der fire from a strong 40th Army force han. The water was far from its maxi-
mum level, but air observers recently
6 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51: Eighth
Army, Logistical Problems and Their Solutions; 8 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 24th Div Comd
Eighth Army CG SS Rpt. Mar 51. Rpt, Nar, Apr 51: 24th Div G3 Inl. 4-6 Am 51.
7 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I 9 IX Corps Opn O 15, 30 Mar 51; IX Corps Comd
Corps et al., 29 Mar 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 51.
KWP-EBB-0374
c'
KWP-EBB-0375
had noted that the dams eighteen sluice destruction. The most the enemy could
gates were closed. The Chinese were do, according to Strong, would be to
intent on keeping the cavalrymen away destroy or open the sluice gates and
from the reservoir to give the water produce a minor flood. Given this ap-
time to rise before releasing it.10 praisal, Ridgway had let the matter
Earlier, near the beginning of Opera- drop and did not include the dam when
tion RIPPER, Ridgway had thought to drawing objective lines for the RUGGED
prevent enemy forces from so using the and DAUNTLESS operations. 11
reservoir by bombing the dam, releas- As the RUGGED advance got under
ing the water, and waiting for the Puk- way, the IX Corps engineer contra-
han to recede before starting forward. dicted Strongs appraisal. He calculated
His engineer, Col. Paschal N. Strong, that simultaneously opening all sluice
had advised him at the time that the gates and penstocks when the reservoir
structure probably could not be demol- was full would raise the Pukhan ten to
ished by conventional bombing and
that the enemy also lacked the means of 11 Rad, GX (TAC) 58 KCG, CG Eighth Army to
Eighth Army Engr, 28 Feb 51; Rad, G2-3871 KEN,
CG Eighth Army Main to CG Eighth Army TAC, 28
10 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 6 Apr 51; IX Corps Feb 51; Rad, GX (TAC) 75 KCG, CG Eighth Army to
Engr Sec, Study of Hwachon Dam, 4 Apr 51. CG I Corps and CG IX Corps, 6 Mar 51.
KWP-EBB-0376
twelve feet in the vicinity of line the dams capture would fall to the 1st
Kansas and would flood much of the Marine Division, scheduled to relieve
Chunchon basin. Although the flood- the 1st Cavalry Division after the latter
ing would not be disastrous, it would reached line Kansas.
temporarily disrupt lateral movement General Hoge elected a different
in the corps zone and north-south course after the 4th Ranger Company,
traffic on Route 17, the IX Corps main recently released from the 187th Air-
supply route; moreover, this harass- borne Regimental Combat Team,
ment could be repeated as long as the joined the IX Corps on 7 April. He
dam remained in enemy hands. Ridg- considered the specially trained com-
way, in light of these prospects, ad- pany the ideal unit to put the dam gates
justed his plans to include the dam as out of commission. Hoge visualized a
an objective. 12 raid in which the Rangers would sneak
The dam stood at the northwest cor- to the dam along the reservoir side of
ner of the reservoir, its spillway slant- the western peninsula, immobilize the
ing north into a deep, narrow gorge gate machinery with all gates closed,
through which the Pukhan at that point and withdraw--all within two to four
coursed north and then turned west hours. Attaching the company to the
and south to form a horseshoe-shaped 1st Cavalry Division, he instructed Gen-
loop. (Map 30) The structure abutted eral Palmer to use the Rangers against
on two narrow-ridge peninsulas, one the dam before the division left line
protruding south into the reservoir on Kansas but did not specifically direct
the east, the other located in the loop or limit the operation to a Ranger
of the Pukhan on the west. The west- raid. 14
ern peninsula, which offered the only Unaware of Hoges concept of a hit-
overland approach to the dam, jutted and-run attack, General Palmer as-
beyond line Kansas at the right of the signed the mission to Colonel Harris
IX Corps; the dam itself rested above 7th Cavalry, then struggling through
Kansas at the X Corps left. Ridgway the rough ground directly below the
shifted the boundary between the two dam, and instructed Harris to immobi-
corps eastward to put both approach lize the sluice gates and occupy the dam
and objective in the IX Corps zone and area. Harris assigned the mission to his
instructed General Hoge to seize the 2d Battalion, then in reserve, and on 8
dam. With the reservoir level well be- April assembled the battalion with the
low maximum, Ridgway attached no ur- 4th Ranger Company attached close to
gency to the seizure; he adjusted line the front almost due south of the pe-
Wyoming to include the dam, making ninsular approach to the dam. He left
it an objective not of the RUGGED ad- detailed planning for later on the as-
vance but of the DAUNTLESS operation sumption that success in achieving the
to follow.13 As a DAUNTLESS objective, Kansas line, and thus the dam opera-
IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; IX Corps Engr 14 Interv, Blumenson with Gen Hoge, 15 Apr 51;
Sec, Study of Hwachon Dam, 4 Apr 51; Eighth Army Palmer, MS review comments, 1985. All interviews
G3 Jn1, Sum, 6 Apr 51. cited in this section are inclosures to Study, 1st Lt.
13 Rad, GX-4-1372 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG Martin Blumenson. CO. 3d Historical Detachment.
IX Corps et al., 6 Apr 51. Hwachon Dam, copy in CMH.
KWP-EBB-0377
MAP 30
KWP-EBB-0378
tion, was some days away. Increasing reach line Kansas well before noon. Ea-
resistance on 7 and 8 April did por- ger to shut down the dam, General
tend a slow advance to the line. In an Hoge ordered General Palmer to open
attempt to accelerate the attack, Gen- the operation immediately. Since Hoge
eral Palmer late on the 8th ordered his also set the 10th as the date the ma-
two assaults regiments to deploy in rines would relieve the cavalry division,
greater strength the following morning. Palmer instructed Colonel Harris to try
Obliged to commit the 2d Battalion, to complete the operation by days
Colonel Harris, with the dam opera- end.17
tion in mind, gave the battalion line Lt. Col. John W. Callaway, the 2d
Kansas objectives that would carry it Battalion commander, opened a hast-
within a mile of the base of the ridge ily planned attack early in the after-
leading to the dam. 15 noon. He opened the attack with inevi-
Although the reservoir was only half tably reduced fire support since the
full, Chinese troops and Korean em- severely convoluted ground for a
ployees of the dam power plant began distance of seven miles below the dam
opening sluice gates at midnight on the prevented tank and artillery move-
8th. With the power plant not in opera- ments. The single road serving the 7th
tion, they were able to open only four Cavalry-actually no more than a nar-
gates fully and raise six slightly. The row mountain track-branched off
released water cost no casualties or Route 29 in the adjoining zone of the
supplies since General Hoge earlier 2d Division to the east, entered the 7ths
had warned his forces away from the area near the southwest corner of the
Pukhan bottomland, but the flow grad- reservoir, ran north along the reser-
ually raised the river as much as seven voir shore to a point beyond line
feet, forcing the removal of floating Kansas, then turned west through a
bridges above and below Chunchon small valley at the base of the ridge lead-
and destroying another far downstream ing to the dam. Rock outcroppings so
before it could be swung into the confined the track at points that jeeps
bank.16 could barely negotiate it. With the divi-
The only Chinese below the Pukhan sion artillery positions as far north as
on the morning of the 9th occupied the terrain allowed, Callaways objec-
the ridge leading to the dam. Else- tives were beyond the range of the
where, those who had opposed the ad- 105-mm. howitzers. After the Chinese
vance of the 7th and 8th Regiments had opened the sluice gates, division artil-
withdrawn behind the river during the lerymen managed to get one 155-mm.
night to avoid being trapped below the howitzer into a position from which
flood. The two regiments were able to it could reach the dam at maximum
range. While the howitzer might dis-
15 Intervs Blumenson with Col William A. Harris, courage the Chinese from further work
CO, 7th Cav, 18 Apr 51, and Maj James H. Webel, S3, on the dam, its fire at extreme range
7th Cav, 16 Apr 51; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 8 Apr 51;
Palmer, MS review comments, 1985.
16 Intervs, Blumenson with Capt Arnold Frank, CO,
Engineer Tech Intel Team, IX Corps, 15 Apr 51, and 17 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; ibid. G3 Jnl,
Capt George Mintz, Engr Intel Officer, IX Corps, 11 9 Apr 51; Intervs, Blumenson with Hoge, 15 Apr 51,
Apr 51. Webel, 16 Apr 51, and Frank, 15 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0379
18 7th Cav POR 296, 9 Apr 51; lntervs, Blumenson 20 Intervs, Blumenson with Hoge, 15 Apr 51, Harris,
with Lt Col John W. Callaway, CO, 2d Bn, 7th Cav, 17 18 Apr 51, Callaway. 17 Apr 51, Lt Col John Carlson,
Apr 51, Maj Russell J. Wilson, CO, 8th Engr Combat G3, 1st Cav Div, 18 Apr 51, and Maj Dayton F. Caple,
Bn, 18 Apr 51, Maj Paul Gray, S3, IX Corps Arty, 15 Asst G4, 1st Cav Div, 18 Apr 51; 1st Cav Div POR
Apr 51, and Capt William W. Cover, Asst S3, IX Corps 297, 10 Apr 51; 7th Cav POR 299, 10 Apr 51;Ltr, Co1
Ar,ty, 14 Apr 51; Palmer, MS review comments, 1985. John W. Callaway to Maj Gen William A. Harris, 16
19 Intervs,Blumenson with Callaway, 17 Apr 51, Oct 78, copy in CMH.
Capt Dorsey B. Anderson, CO, 4th Rgr Co, 13 Apr 21 Intervs, Blumenson with Hoge, 15 Apr 51, Harris,
51, and Webel, 16 Apr 51. 18 Apr 51, Webel, 16 Apr 51, Capt John R. Flynn, S3,
KWP-EBB-0380
ized terrain and the strength and forti- three-way change of command set in
fied position of the defending forces motion a week earlier when Congress-
also contributed. In any case, since Gen- man Martin, believing he owed it to
eral Ridgway meanwhile had ordered the American people to tell them the
the opening of Operation DAUNTLESS, information I had from a great and re-
Hoge elected to wait until then, when liable source, rose in the House and
the dam would be an objective of a full read the 20 March letter in which Gen-
IX Corps advance to line Wyoming. eral MacArthur had reiterated, if mild-
The decision would not prove a great ly, some of his contrary opinions on
gamble. Although the Chinese had how the war should be prosecuted.29
closed some of the sluice gates late on President Truman regarded the letter
10 April, they would not attempt to as one more instance of MacArthurs
flood the Pukhan during the course of willful insubordination, and he reacted
the DAUNTLESS operation.27 immediately. Between 6 and 9 April he
General Ridgway set an opening date met in closed sessions with Secretary of
for the DAUNTLESS advance late on 9 Defense Marshall, Secretary of State
April after all but the X and ROK III Acheson, General Bradley, and special
Corps had reached line Kansas. (Map assistant Averell Harriman to hear their
31) While those two corps continued views on what action should be taken
what had proved a battle more with ter- against MacArthur. Truman had al-
rain than with North Koreans, I and ready decided that MacArthur should
IX Corps forces were to start toward be relieved but wanted the record to
the Iron Triangle on the 11th. Utah, show that he had acted upon the ad-
the initial objective line, arched eleven vice and with the support of his chief
miles above Kansas between the Imjin civilian and military aides. Only after
River and the eastern slopes of Kung- receiving their unanimous recommen-
mang Mountain, its trace resting on the dation of MacArthurs relief did he in-
prominent Kumhak, Kwangdok, and form them of his prior decision. At the
Paegun mountain masses. The open- same time, he accepted the recommen-
ing phase thus would be primarily a I dations of Secretary Marshall and Gen-
Corps operation involving attacks by eral Bradley that, General Ridgway suc-
the 3d, 25th, and 24th Divisions while ceed MacArthur and that Lt. Gen.
requiring only a short advance by the James A. Van Fleet, currently com-
British 27th Brigade at the left of the manding the Second Army, take over
IX Corps.28 the Eighth.30
Plans completed by the president and
Change of Command his advisers on 10 April called for Mac-
The opening of the DAUNTLESS ad- Arthur to be relieved summarily and
vance on the 11th coincided with a for the dismissal to be presented to the
27 Interv, Blumenson with Hoge, 15 Apr 51; Rad, 29 Quoted in Trumball Higgins, Korea and the Fall of
GX-4-1978 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corp et MacArthur (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960),
al., 9 Apr 51; Palmer, MS review comments, 1985.
28 Rads, GX-4-805 KGOP, and GX-4-1978 KGOO, 30 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 445-47;
CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 3 and 9 Apr 51, Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 374-76; Acheson,
respectively; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; X Present at the Creation, pp. 521-22; Collins, War in Peace-
Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. time, pp. 284-85.
KWP-EBB-0383
MAP 31
public as a fait accompli. Behind both the moment was in Korea.31 To pre-
measures apparently was a desire to vent any embarrassments that might re-
avoid taking the action amid outcries sult from a premature disclosure of
against the relief of a popular war hero, MacArthurs relief, the dismissal order
especially in the Congress where the and Ridgways reassignment order were
Republican Party had gained consider- to be sent in diplomatic code by Secre-
able strength in the recent midterm tary Acheson to Ambassador Muccio at
election and where MacArthur had a
dedicated following. The dismissal or-
der was to be delivered to MacArthur 31 There have been other interpretations of Paces
by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, purpose. In With MacArthur in Japan (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1965), William J. Sebald, politi-
Jr., who had arrived in Japan on 9 April cal adviser to MacArthur for the occupation, writes
for a routine tour of the theater and at that he assumed Paces visit was connected with the
KWP-EBB-0384
the embassy in Pusan. Muccio was to change had leaked, or, as General Brad-
pass the orders directly to Secretary ley surmised, earlier press speculation
Pace. Accompanying instructions from and the
and theWhite
WhiteHouse
Housemeetings had led
meetings had led
Secretary Marshall would direct Pace to "jumping at conclusions.33
to return to Tokyo, arrange to meet When Bradley warned the president
MacArthur at 1000 on 12 April (2000 late in the evening of the 10th that the
on 11 April, Washington time) at the Chicago paper might print the story in
generals American Embassy residence, its next edition, Truman instructed him
and deliver the relief order personally to issue new orders immediately, in the
and privately. Pace also was to arrange clear and via the military communica-
a simultaneous delivery of Ridgways tions system, one to General MacAr-
reassignment order by a Department thur relieving him, another to Secre-
of the Army staff member, Lt. Gen. tary Pace in Korea so that General
John E. Hull, who was traveling with Ridgway could be informed of his new
Pace.32 post. 34 Truman also directed his press
The careful plans for delivering the secretary, Joseph Short, to call a new
orders were upset almost immediately. conference at the White House at 0100
Secretary Acheson dispatched the di- on 11 April to announce the command
rectives via commercial cable late in changes.35
the afternoon of the 10th but at mid- As intended, Shorts press conference
night was still waiting for Ambassador virtually coincided with the arrival of
Muccios signal of receipt. Unknown to the relief order in the message center
Acheson or the cable company at the of MacArthurs headquarters shortly
time, a power failure in Pusan had in- before 1500 on 11 April, Japan time.
terrupted transmission of the orders. But a half hour or more before the or-
A Chicago newspaperman meanwhile der was delivered to MacArthur at his
asked Pentagon officials to confirm a residence, where he was entertaining
tip from Japan, apparently from his lunch guests, he learned of his dismissal
papers Tokyo bureau, that an impor- through an aide who had heard the
tant resignation was forthcoming. Ei- news broadcast by a Tokyo radio sta-
ther word of the impending command tion. Although accidental, the public
disclosure in advance of official notice
added an element of rudeness to the
Martin incident. The Welsh writer, Rees, in his Korea: procedure of relief, which MacArthur
The Limited War, states flatly that Pace was sent to viewed in all its aspects as a callous dis-
Tokyo to prevent further provocations by MacArthur
while his dismissal was being organized. In a 1975
interview conducted under the auspices of the U.S. 33 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 523; Schnabel,
Army Military History Research Collection, Pace him- Policy and Direction, p. 377; Quotation is from Testi-
self stated that his Far East tour originally was a mony of General Bradley, MacArthur Hearings, p. 747.
routine inspection trip to Japan and Korea. He did 34 As Truman recalled some years later, Bradley
add that shortly after reaching Tokyo he received a warned him that if MacArthur learned of his relief
cable from Secretary Marshall instructing him to before he received the official notice, he probably
proceed to Korea where you will wait until you hear would resign. The prospect infuriated the president.
from me, but he made clear that he went to Korea MacArthur was not going to resign on me, Truman
unaware of MacArthurs coming relief. responded, I want him fired. See Miller, Plain Speak-
32 Testimony of Secretary Marshall, MacArthur ing p. 305.
Hearings, pp. 348, 422; Acheson, Present at the Cre- 35Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 449-50; Rees,
ation, pp. 522-23; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 376. Korea: The Limited War, p. 218.
KWP-EBB-0385
by his staff the previous day that was to at midday on 14 April. Earlier, in noti-
govern withdrawals if enemy attacks fying General Ridgway of his successor
forced the Eighth Army back from line in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
Kansas. Three defense lines were estab- authorized him to employ Van Fleet in
lished, these patterned much after some other capacity if, because of the
lines B and C and the Seoul bridge- expected enemy offensive, Ridgway
head occupied during the enemy New wanted to retain direct control of the
Years offensive. Delta, the first line to Eighth Army temporarily. Ridgway did
the south, stretched coast to coast, cen- not postpone Van Fleets assumption
tering on and running almost due east of command, but in turning over the
and west from Chunchon. Nevada, the Eighth Army officially at 1700 on the
deepest line, also ran coast to coast, fol- 14th he instructed Van Fleet to inform
lowing the lower bank of the Han in him before sending forces above line
the west, then sloping northeastward Utah and reserved the right to approve
to the Yangyang area. For a defense of any Eighth Army move in strength
Seoul, which if successful would obvi- beyond the Wyoming line. Ridgway
ate a withdrawal to the Nevada line in planned to incorporate the requirement
the west, line Golden looped above the for prior approval of operations above
capital from a point on the Han six line Wyoming in a fuller letter of in-
miles west of the city to a juncture structions after he established himself
with line Nevada near the town of in Tokyo. He planned also to issue let-
Yongpyong to the east.41 ters to General Stratemeyer and Admi-
The officers meeting with Ridgway ral Joy that would formally place limits
could offer little new information about on air and naval operations.43
the enemys readiness to attack. Al- Ridgway arrived in Japan during the
though the I Corps in pushing toward evening of the 14th. General Hickey
line Utah and the X and ROK III Corps and William J. Sebald, Department of
in continuing toward line Kansas had State political adviser for the occupa-
encountered stiffening opposition over tion of Japan, met Ridgway at Haneda
the past two days, the assault forces had Airport and accompanied him to quar-
discovered no indication that the en- ters in Tokyos Imperial Hotel. Ridgway
emy offensive was imminent other than considered it a point of courtesy to
the filling of tank traps previously dug avoid UNC headquarters until General
along axes of Eighth Army advance. In MacArthur left for the United States.
the absence of other evidence, Ridgway Sebald was present primarily to help
and the assembled corps commanders General Ridgway prepare a statement
agreed that enemy forces had no in- concerning U.S. policy on the occupa-
tention of attacking in the immediate tion and on the negotiations toward
future.42
General Van Fleet arrived in Korea
43 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, 14 Apr 51; Rad, JCS
88374, JCS to CINCFE, 12 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-3070
41 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, 13 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4- KDC, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 14 Apr 51
2554 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., (announces change of command); Rad, CX 60388,
12 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 12 Apr 51. CINCFE to EUSAK, 19 Apr 51 (confirms oral instruc-
42 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, 13 Apr 51; MS, Ridgway, tions issued 14 Apr 51); Ridgway, The Korean War, pp.
The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 423-24. 162-65.
KWP-EBB-0387
a U.S.-Japan peace treaty which had Before the month was out Ridgway
opened in January. Apprehensive that issued instructions that defined, and
the Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru confined, the latitude within which his
Yoshida and his cabinet would resign ground, air, and naval commanders
as a gesture of responsibility for Mac- could operate. Written directives to
Arthurs relief, Sebald had met with the General Stratemeyer and Admiral Joy
prime minister late on the 11th to dis- in the main only assigned over Ridg-
courage such a step and to assure him ways signature the missions previously
that the change of command presaged undertaken by UNC air and naval
no alteration of policy. Yoshida had forces. Similarly, Van Fleets instruc-
told Sebald that there would be no tions were largely the guidelines under
resignation. Nevertheless, at the direc- which Ridgway himself had operated:
tion of President Truman, the U.S. the general mission was to repel aggres-
representative in the treaty negotiation, sion against South Korea; Van Fleet
John Foster Dulles, was currently en could operate north of the 38th paral-
route to Tokyo to deliver the presi- lel but not above the combined trace of
dents personal guarantee of no policy the Kansas and Wyoming lines without
change. Ridgways statement to the Ridgways approval; operations were to
same effect was delivered to the press, aim not simply at gaining ground but
Japanese and foreign, late on the at inflicting maximum personnel and
14th.44 materiel losses on enemy forces with-
Ridgway met with his staff for the first out incurring high casualties or risking
time on 16 April after attending early the integrity of major units. Van Fleet
morning departure ceremonies for also was to assume that he would re-
General MacArthur. Ridgways first ceive no major reinforcements and that
order appointed General Hickey Far he might be ordered to hold a defen-
East Command and U.N. Command sive line indefinitely, or to withdraw,
chief of staff, the post Hickey had or even to take his forces out of Korea.46
filled on an acting basis since Septem- Although Ridgway did not alter pre-
ber when General Almond, the offi- vious missions in any material way by
cially designated chief of staff, had these instructions, he did formally at-
taken the X Corps into Inchon. Ridg- tach a rein to each principal sub-
way felt much personal pleasure ordinate. He tightened the reins in a
in rectifying what he regarded as a memorandum accompanying the direc-
marked, if unintentional, slight to Gen- tives. In marked contrast to General
eral Hickey. As Ridgway wrote later, MacArthurs views on how the war
General MacArthurs ways were not should be conducted, Ridgway, aiming
mine.45 primarily at Stratemeyer and Joy since
their forces were inherently more mo-
bile than those of Van Fleet, demanded
44 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, 14 Apr 51; Ridgway,
The Korean War, p. 161; Sebald, With MacArthur in that his commanders avoid taking any
Japan, pp. 228-31; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. action that might widen the war.47
523-24; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 449.
45 Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, p. 236; Ridgway,
The Korean War, pp. 159, 163, 169-70; Interv, Apple- 46 Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 166-68, 267-68.
man with Hickey, 10 Oct 51. 47 Ibid., pp. 165-66.
KWP-EBB-0388
CHAPTER XX
In leading the Eighth Army accord- mander in the European theater. Van
ing to the uncommon prescriptions of Fleet received his third star early in
his instructions from General Ridgway, 1948 along with an unprecedented as-
General Van Fleet would culminate a signment as head of a joint U.S. military
long career already noted for unusual advisory and planning group in Greece,
episodes. Graduating from West Point where he received wide acclaim as he
in 1915 with the class the stars fell on, guided Greek government forces to
he initially matched the rise of class- victory over a Communist-supported
mates such as Dwight D. Eisenhower insurgency. After thirty-six years of ser-
and Omar N. Bradley, commanding a vice and at age fifty-nine, he would re-
machine gun battalion as a very young ceive the additional star of a full gen-
major during World War I and becom- eral in Korea at the end of July 195l.2
ing a colonel in command of the 8th From Normandy to Korea, Van
Infantry, 4th Division, by the time of Fleets career had benefited from the
American entry into World War II. A attention of the current Army chief of
hiatus then developed when Army staff. As commander of the VII Corps
Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, during World War II General Collins
who mistook Van Fleet for a similarly instigated Van Fleets initial rise into
named intemperate officer who had general officer ranks, as deputy chief
served under Marshall years earlier, dis- of staff in 1948 he nominated Van Fleet
approved his promotion to brigadier for the post in Greece, and it was Col-
general. Ironically, Van Fleet was a lins who originally recommended Van
teetotaler.1 Fleet as Ridgways successor. Van, in
Rectification came with remarkable Collins estimation, was cast in the same
swiftness after Van Fleet led the 8th mold as Ridgway as a fighting man,
Infantry ashore at Normandy on 6 June and could take over the Eighth Army
1944. Within five months he rose from without a falter in its high morale and
colonel to major general and within aggressive spirit.3
nine months from regimental to corps Van Fleet showed some variation in
command. General Eisenhower later mold when asked during his first
rated his battle record as the best of press conference on 22 April to explain
any regimental, division, or corps com- the goal of Eighth Army operations
under his direction. Notwithstanding
1 Biog of Gen Van Fleet, prepared by Office of Pub
Info, DOD, 12 Mar 53, in CMH; Time, vol. LVII, no.
20, 14 May 1951, pp. 29-31; Collins, War in Peacetime, 2 Ibid.
pp. 294-95. 3Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 295.
KWP-EBB-0389
responsible for the coastal area, had miles northwest of Yanggu, using boats
yet to deploy forces in contact.) Cur- and rafts that were burned after the
rently moving to join the corps for crossing; the remainder moved to
seasoning- small as that prospect was Yanggu and then north around the
at the time-was the ROK 11th Divi- eastern end of the reservoir. Leading
sion, green to combat except for anti- forces of the 23d Infantry entered
guerrilla operations conducted in Yanggu and reached line Kansas on the
southwestern Korea since October.7 In 15th.
the narrow ROK III Corps zone high The hard spots of North Korean re-
in the Taebaeks, the ROK 3d Division, sistance encountered just above the
despite having to be resupplied entirely Soyang River by the 7th Division at X
by air and carrying parties in the virtu- Corps center and the ROK 5th Divi-
ally roadless mountains, had beaten sion at the right had begun to dissolve
back detachments of the North Korean on 13 April. The 5th Division cleared
45th Division to reach line Kansas on North Korean 45th Division forces out
the 14th, and its patrols since then had of their defenses around Inje on the
encountered few enemy forces above 15th, and after artillery pounded the
the line.8 The scant opposition to the ridges north of town during the night,
South Koreans, and especially the ROK dawn attacks carried the South Koreans
III Corps want of a good supply road, to line Kansas with negligible contact.
would prompt one of Van Fleets first The 17th Infantry, advancing on the 7th
operations orders. Divisions left through decreasing op-
Next to the west, the three divisions position from North Korean 15th Divi-
of the X Corps were just beginning to sion forces, found Route 29 leading into
consolidate positions along the Kansas Yanggu obstructed by booby-trapped
line on 16 April. Since the 10th, after it fallen trees and cleverly placed wooden
became obvious that North Korean 1st box mines but gained line Kansas and
Division forces opposite the corps left made contact with the 2d Division in
were withdrawing hastily eastward from Yanggu on the 15th and 16th. On the
the ground below the Hwachon Reser- divisions right, the 32d Infantry
voir, the 23d Infantry of the 2d Divi- pushed through brief but sharp resist-
sion had swung east along the lower ance to reach the line early on 17
shore in pursuit. Abandoned ammuni- April.10
tion, food supplies, and a fully stocked Beginning on the 17th, X Corps pa-
aid station evidenced the enemys haste. trols ranging above line Kansas found
Ahead of the pursuing forces, the bulk progressively fewer enemy forces. Gen-
of the enemy divisions 1st Regiment (also
known as the 14th Regiment) crossed
9 Rads, X 18473, and X 18493, CG X Corps to CG
the reservoir at a narrow point three Eighth Army, 14 and 15 Apr 51, respectively; 2d Div
Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; the North Korean 1st Regiment's
withdrawal is described in 1st Marine Div Hist Diary,I
7 The 11th'srearareamissionwastakenoverbythe Apr 51.
ROK8th Division,nowrebuiltafter beingshattered 10 See following Rads from CG X Corps to CG
in February. Eighth Army: X 18473, 14 Apr 51, X 18484 and X
8 Eighth ArmyComd Rpt , Nar, Apr 51; Eighth 18493, 15 Air 51, and X 18505 and X 18513, 17 Apr
ArmyCGJnl, 16 Apr 51; Hq, FEC, Historyof the 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; X Corps Comd
NorthKoreanArmy,31 Jul 52. Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0391
era1 Almond attempted to follow the conserve our own power, deplete the
North Korean withdrawal by establish- enemys strength, and secure for us
ing forward patrol bases in all division more favorable conditions for future
zones, whence strong patrols were to victory.12 (This scheme of defense had
advance farther north each day in a pronounced similarity to the tactical
search of enemy positions. As of 20 concepts General Ridgway set for the
April the patrolling had reached a Eighth Army in February.)
depth of about two miles without meet- As General Van Fleet completed an
ing significant resistance.11 east-to-west tour of the front on 17
On the opposite side of the Hwachon April, the first phase of Operation
Reservoir, IX Corps patrols sent for- DAUNTLESSwas a virtual success. On
ward of line Kansas by the ROK 6th the east flank of the advance, the Brit-
and 1st Marine Divisions began to ish 27th Brigade of the IX Corps had
bring back reports of Chinese with- cleared minor 40th Army forces from
drawal when forces engaged in Opera- Paegun Mountain above the headwa-
tion DAUNTLESSto the west drew closer ters of the Kapyong River to reach line
to line Utah. (See Map 29.) By 17 April Utah the day before. The 19th Regi-
the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, ment of the ROK 6th Division was cur-
which had replaced the 7th Cavalry af- rently relieving the brigade, which,
ter the latters unsuccessful effort to except for the New Zealand artillery
capture the Hwachon Dam, established assigned to stay forward in support of
outposts near the dam on the ridge in- the South Koreans, was withdrawing
side the Pukhan loop and on heights into corps reserve near Kapyong town.
above the Pukhan to the west. On The relief in part was in preparation
the 18th a Marine patrol crossing the for the second DAUNTLESSphase in
Pukhan four miles west of the dam which the IX Corps would make a full
found Hwachon town on Route 17 un- advance with the ROK 6th and 1st Ma-
occupied except for eleven Chinese, rine Divisions. While in reserve, the
whom the patrol took captive. Intelli- British brigade also was to begin rotat-
gence officers appraised the voluntary ing units under a British policy calling
withdrawal ahead of the two IX Corps for annual replacement. The 1st Bat-
divisions as a realignment of forces with talion, The Argyll and Sutherland
those dropping back in the DAUNTLESS Highlanders, was to be replaced on 23
sector but did not overlook the possibil- April by the 1st Battalion, Kings Own
ity that the Chinese were coaxing the Scottish Borders; on the 25th, brigade
IX Corps into a vulnerable deployment. headquarters itself was to leave the line
A recently captured document, dated and be replaced by a new staff and com-
17 March, extolled the virtues and mander from Hong Kong. The brigade
explained the purpose of roving de- at that time would become the 28th
fensive warfare, defined as defense British Commonwealth Brigade under
through movement without regard for
the loss or gain of ground which could
12 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1st Marine Div
Hist Diary, Apr 51; 1st Marine Div POR 23, 16 Apr
11 Ibid.: X 18513, 17 Apr 51, X 18523, 18 Apr 51, X 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central
18535, 19 Apr 51, and X 18650, 20 Apr 51. Front, p. 102.
KWP-EBB-0392
was not much evidence that enemy elsewhere. Incoming reports to Van
forces were moving toward the front. Fleet from corps commanders and
During the last three days of the ad- Colonel Tarkentons own daily in-
vance to line Utah the 65th Infantry telligence summaries all described en-
captured a member of the 181st Divi- emy forces as maintaining a defensive
sion, part of the 60th Army of the III attitude.21
Army Group. Two captives taken by the Since all units were on or near their
24th and 25th Divisions were from dif- Utah and Kansas objectives, and since
ferent regiments of the 81st Division, there was no clear sign that the im-
which belonged to the 27th Army of the pending enemy offensive would start
IX Army Group. One of the latter told immediately, Van Fleet elected to open
his captors that his unit would be com- the second phase of DAUNTLESS. In no-
mitted to offensive operations after the tifying General Ridgway that the I and
27th Army finished relieving the 26th. IX Corps would move toward line Wyo-
By 20 April these three prisoners and ming on 21 April, Van Fleet also pro-
the sprinkling of Chinese discovered posed that the X, ROK III, and ROK I
above the Imjin were the only indica- Corps attack to secure the segment of
tions that fresh forces might have Route 24 running northeast ahead of
moved forward under the smoke.20 the ROK III and I Corps to a junction
To give some order of probability to with the coastal highway near the town
the opening of the expected enemy of Kansong, twenty-three miles above
offensive, Eighth Army G-2 Tarkenton Yangyang. This move would give the
advised General Van Fleet on 18 April two South Korean corps a supply route
that a survey of all sources, while fail- in the higher Taebaeks, needed in par-
ing to indicate conclusively any specific ticular by the ROK III Corps. To se-
date or period for the initial attack, cure the road, Van Fleet wanted to
pointed to 20 April through 1 May. hinge an advance at the eastern end of
Tarkenton considered the latter date the Hwachon Reservoir and swing the
especially significant since it was the forces between the reservoir and the
most important day of the year to coast northwestward to line Alabama
International Communism. Having seven to fourteen miles above Route
learned that two fresh army groups (the 24. Ridgway approved a sweep that
XIX and III) were in the general would achieve the same end but with a
Kumchon-Koksan-Ichon area, he be- substantially shorter eastern arc. Van
lieved the greatest enemy potential Fleet set the 24th as the opening date.22
for a major attack to be from the north
and northwest across the Imjin. As of 21 Eighth Army PIRs 276-282, 14-20 Apr 51; Rad,
the 20th, however, I Corps patrols had CICCG 4-7, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 14 Apr
51; Rad, X 18473, CG; X Corps to CG Eighth Army,
seen no signs of offensive preparations 14 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-8, CG I Corps to CG Eighth
in this sector, nor had any evidence that Army, 15 Apr 51; Rad, X 18484, CG X Corps to CG
the enemy was about to attack appeared Eighth Army, 15 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-9, CG I Corps
to CG Eighth Army, 16 Apr 51; Rad, IXCCG 56, CG
IX Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 Apr 51; Rads,
20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth CICCG 4-10, CICCG 4-l1, CICCG 4-12, and CICCG
Army PIRs 280-282, 18-20 Apr 51; I Corps Comd 4-13, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 17, 18, 19, and
Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-12, CG I Corps to 20 Apr 51, respectively.
CG Eighth Army, 19 Apr 51. 22 Rad, GX-4-3900 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG
KWP-EBB-0395
The first indication that the enemy being positioned to support an attack
would repeat this pattern appeared scheduled to start after dark.28
during the night when I Corps patrols For the scheduled advance to line
reconnoitering above the Imjin ran into Alabama east of the Hwachon Reser-
Chinese positions that were stronger voir, the X Corps-ROK III Corps
and nearer the river than those encoun- boundary was to be shifted four miles
tered during past searches. There was west at noon on 23 April to give the
no question that the XIX Army Group ROK III Corps, which had been oper-
was setting out a covering force.27 ating with only the ROK 3d Division
More evidence appeared on the 22d on line, a two-division front. The III
as the I and IX Corps continued their Corps reserve division, the ROK 7th,
DAUNTLESS advance toward line began occupying the added frontage
Wyoming. The progress of the attack on the 22d, its 5th Regiment relieving
resembled that on the previous day, IX the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Di-
Corps forces making easy moves of two vision and the X Corps right early in
to three miles, the two I Corps divi- the evening. On the 23d the incoming
sions being limited to shorter gains by divisions 3d Regiment was to move into
heavier resistance. On the east flank of a two-mile gap directly above Inje be-
the advance, the Hwachon Dam, de- tween the 5th Regiment and the 35th
fended so stoutly by 39th Army forces Regiment, now the right flank unit of
only a few days earlier, fell to the 1st the 5th Division. The latters 36th Regi-
Korean Marine Corps Regiment with- ment meanwhile assembled three miles
out a fight. But a Chinese captive taken below its former position in prepara-
elsewhere in the 1st Marine Division tion for moving west into the redrawn
zone during the afternoon told interro- 5th Division zone the following day as
gators that an attack would be opened the remainder of the ROK 7th Division
before the day was out. In midafter- came into its new area.29
noon the ROK 6th Division captured A similar shifting of North Korean
several members of the Chinese 60th forces above the X and ROK III Corps
Division, and, immediately west, the was indicated -when the ROK 5th Divi-
24th Division took captives from the sion, previously in contact with the 45th
59th Division. These two divisions be- Division of the North Korean III Corps
longed to the fresh 20th Army. The full above Inje, captured a member of the
IX Army Group had reached the front. 12th Division, North Korean V Corps.
In the 25th Division zone on the west Farther east, the ROK 3d Division, which
flank of the advance, six Chinese who had had almost no contact since reach-
blundered into the hands of the
Turkish brigade along Route 33 dur- 28 Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central
Front, p. 103; Ltr, Lt Col Willard Pearson (Sr Advisor
ing the afternoon were members of a
to ROK 6th Div) to Chief, KMAG, 2 May 51, sub: 6th
survey party from the 2d Motorized Artil- ROK Div; Eighth Army PIR 284, 22 Apr 51; I Corps
lery Division. The divisions guns, ac- Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Barth, Tropic Lightning and
Taro Leaf in Korea, pp. 78-79.
cording to the officer in charge, were
29 Rad, GX-4-3847 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S
ROKA et al., 19 Apr 51; X Corps OI 156, 21 Apr 51; X
Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl,
27 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Sum, Entry 2355, and Briefing Notes for CG, 22 Apr
Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 51.
KWP-EBB-0397
CHAPTER XXI
The Opening
Enemy troops and civilian labor employing principally his fresh III, IX
forces meanwhile began rehabilitating and XIX Army Groups, a force of about
airfield runways and constructing re- two hundred seventy thousand men.
vetments for aircraft. Under the MIG From above the Imjin on the west wing
umbrella in the northwest they im- of the main effort, the XIX Army Group
proved fields at Sinuiju, Uiju, and was to attack southeast toward Seoul,
Sinanju. Outside the MIG cover they crossing the river on a twelve-mile front
worked on a cluster of fields in and centered on the Korangpo-ri bend and
around Pyongyang, the fields at Won- advancing on the capital through a nar-
san and Yonpo on the east coast, and rowing zone between Routes 1 and 33.
four forward fields on the Hwanghae (Map 32) The group commander, Yang
peninsula below Pyongyang. Teh-chih, planned to cross the Imjin
Far East Air Forces reconnaissance with two armies, the 64th between
discovered Lius work in February. Route 1 and the town of Korangpo-ri,
Bomber Command prepared plans for the 63d between Korangpo-ri and the
attacks on the fields, but Brig. Gen. confluence of the Imjin and Hantan
James E. Briggs (who had replaced rivers. Yangs deployment would pit the
General ODonnell in January) believed 64th Army against the bulk of the ROK
the fields could not be destroyed once 1st Division and the 63d Army against
and for all because of the large repair the British 29th Brigade occupying the
crews available to the enemy high com- left half of the 3d Infantry Divisions
mand. He elected to withhold B-29 sector.4
strikes until the fields were about to Out of the ground between the Imjin
become operational. He intended to and Chorwon, the III Army Group was
bomb the fields out of action at that to advance south on the Route 33 axis,
time and to keep them neutralized with its three armies attacking abreast in col-
attacks just heavy enough and frequent umns of divisions. Nearest the Imjin,
enough to offset repairs. Aerial photo- the 15th Army had a narrow zone be-
graphs showed the fields almost ready tween the river and Route 33 project-
to receive aircraft near mid-April, and ing through the area occupied by the
Briggs delivered repeated attacks be- 65th Infantry. Along Route 33 and east
tween the 17th and 23d, concentrating of it, the 12th Army and 60th Army at
on the forward fields and those in and group center and left were to attack
around Pyongyang. The strikes sty- through ground held by the Philippine
mied Lius plans and preparations. At 10th Battalion Combat Team on the
least there would be no air support dur- right flank of the 3d Division and
ing the spring offensive. through the Pogae-san ridges occupied
by the Turkish brigade and 24th Infan-
The Ground Plan try in the sector of the 25th Infantry
Division.5
The immediate objective of the
ground attack was Seoul, whose cap- 4 Griffith, The Chinese People Liberation Army, p. 162;
ture Peng Teh-huai reportedly prom- USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 96, 16-28 Feb 53; I Corps Rpt,
The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, April
ised to Mao Tse-tung as a May Day gift. 1951, copy in CMH.
Peng planned to converge on the city, 5 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 1, l-31 Dec 52.
KWP-EBB-0400
KWP-EBB-0401
On the left of the main effort, the IX eastern front except for the coastal area,
Army Group was to advance southwest had sidestepped westward into a nar-
out of the Kumhwa area, guiding on row zone abutting on the reservoir for
Route 3. Sung Shih-lun, the group the attack in the Yanggu area. Moving
commander, set the 27th Army on his south through the upper Soyang River
right for an attack astride Route 3. The valley from its assembly at Komisong,
27th thus initially would be advancing the North Korean V Corps had deployed
in a zone centered on the boundary be- in the vacated ground for the attack
tween the 25th and 24th Divisions. toward Inje. The V Corps commander,
Similarly, the 20th Army on the groups General Pang, chose to attack with his
left would attack athwart the I-IX seasoned, if understrength, 6th and 12th
Corps boundary through portions of Divisions, keeping in reserve the 32d, a
the 24th Division and ROK 6th Divi- nearly full strength but green division
sion sectors.6 that had replaced the 7th while the
Pengs plan included auxiliary attacks corps was in Komisong.8 III Corps com-
along each flank of the main effort and mander General Yu elected a different
another east of the Hwachon Reser- course, committing only the 45th Divi-
voir. In the west, the North Korean I sion in what would be its first offensive
Corps was to move southeast toward of the war, perhaps because it had the
Seoul over Route 1 and through the virtue of eighty-six hundred men, more
ground between the road and the Han than twice the strength of either of Yus
River, but its leading forces displacing other divisions. The deployment of the
forward from behind the Yesong River 45th Division set it against the 23d In-
would not reach the Imjin in time to fantry of the 2d Division at the edge of
participate in the opening attack on the the reservoir above Yanggu and the
ROK 1st Division. In the area adjacent 17th and 32d Infantry Regiments of
to the Hwachon Dam, the somewhat the 7th Division in the adjacent ground
worn 39th and 40th Armies of the XIII to the east. On the opposite wing of the
Army Group were to assist with holding North Korean effort, the 6th Division
attacks on either side of Route 17 in faced the ROK 3d Division. At center,
the eastern portion of the ROK 6th the 12th Division was poised for an at-
Divisions sector and the sector of the tack in a zone straddling the X Corps-
1st Marine Division.7 ROK III Corps boundary and leading
In what would be essentially a sepa- directly to Inje.9
rate effort east of the Hwachon Reser-
voir, North Korean forces were to strike
Panic at the IX Corps Left
for Yanggu and Inje, where break-
throughs could open up Routes 29 and During the afternoon of 22 April, IX
24 leading southwestward to Chun-
chon and Hongchon. The North Ko- 8 The North Korean 7th Division, which had been
rean III Corps, whose 1st, 15th, and 45th reduced to about regimental strength during recent
operations, was transferred to the VII Corps in the
Divisions had been holding the entire Wonsan area.
9 GHO, FEC, Order of Battle Information, North
6 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53. Korean Army, 20 Aug 51 and 16 Sep 51; Hq, FEC,
7 Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52; Eighth
Jul 52; USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 115, 1-15 Feb 53. Army PIR 284, 22 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0402
Corps airborne artillery observers lo- rear area. The 92d Armored Field Ar-
cated and brought down fire on a large tillery Battalion moved up Route 17 and
enemy force concentrated ahead of the out the minor road to the west edge of
ROK 6th Division. Anticipating an the Marine sector from where its 155-
attack, General Chang halted his divi- mm. self-propelled howitzers could
sions advance toward line Wyoming support both the marines and the South
about 1600 and ordered his forward Koreans. The 987th Armored Field Ar-
regiments, the 19th and 2d, to develop tillery Battalion and 2d Rocket Field
defensive positions tied in with each Artillery Battery, both equipped with
other and with the 24th Division and 105-mm. howitzers, used the winding
1st Marine Division on their respective valley road to reach the right half of
outside flanks. Chang moved his re- the ROK sector, where they took posi-
serve 7th Regiment into supporting tion behind the 7th Regiment near the
positions immediately behind the 2d South Korean artillery and American
Regiment, ahead of which more enemy 4.2-inch mortars.11
forces had been observed than ahead For reasons that never became clear,
of the 19th Regiment. Placing reserves the 2d and 19th Regiments failed to
so close to the front went against the develop the defensive positions ordered
recommendation of his KMAG adviser, by General Chang. With numerous
but Chang intended that this show of gaps and open outside flanks, the divi-
support would counter uneasiness that sion front was vulnerable to infiltration,
had begun to spread among his line and the nearby reserves were almost as
forces at word of a probable Chinese subject to attack as were the forward
attack.10 units. Forces of the 60th Division, 20th
General Hoge moved three corps ar- Army, hit Changs lines about 2000.
tillery units forward during the after- Without artillery support and with lit-
noon to help the 1st Marine Division tle other supporting fire, van units of
and, in particular, to reinforce the sup- the 179th Regiment, 60th Division, struck
port being given the ROK 6th Division the inside battalion of the 2d Regiment.
by the New Zealand artillery; Company Forces following punched through a
C, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion; and central gap, some veering west and east
the divisions own 27th Field Artillery behind the 19th and 2d Regiments,
Battalion. The corps latest ground others continuing south toward the 7th
gains had opened Route 17 in the 1st Regiment. Within minutes both line
Marine Divisions sector far enough regiments were in full flight. Caught
north to allow use of a twisting, nar- up in the rush of troops from the 2d
rowly confined valley road branching Regiment, the 7th Regiment joined the
west off Route 17 near the village of wild retreat. Abandoned weapons,
Chichon-ni into the ROK 6th Divisions vehicles, and equipment littered vacated
positions and lines of drift as the South
Koreans streamed south, east, and west,
10 Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951, a special
file of correspondence and reports on the operations
of the ROK Division, 22-24 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman 11 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, IXACT-
with Lt Col Thomas E. Bennett, KMAG Advisor to 1288, CG IX Corps to CG IX Corps Arty, 14 Apr 51;
7th Regt, ROK 6th Div, in CMH; Eighth Army POR, Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951; Gugeler,
22 Apr 51. Combat Actions in Korea, p. 155.
KWP-EBB-0403
rapid1 uncovering the fire support original front. 14 To the same depth,
units.12 the South Korean rout had peeled open
The New Zealand artillery support- the flanks of the 24th Division and 1st
ing the 19th Regiment in the west man- Marine Division to the west and east.
aged to withdraw with guns and equip- At the first indication of the South
ment intact down the Kapyong River Korean retreat, the 1st Marine Division
valley to a position four miles north of commander, General Smith, had begun
the British 27th Brigade assembled to shore up his left flank, drawing a
near Kapyong town. To the east, Chi- battalion from the 1st Marines in re-
nese following the 2d and 7th Regi- serve near Chunchon and sending it
ments caught the ROK 27th Field Ar- out the valley road from Chichon-ni to
tillery Battalion in position. Under establish defenses tied in with the 92d
fire, its members abandoned guns and Armored Field Artillery Battalion. En
joined the southerly surge of infantry- route aboard trucks before midnight,
men. The American support units the 1st Battalion struggled west against
pulled out all weapons and equipment a current of retreating South Koreans
but came under fire as they moved east and scarcely managed to establish a po-
on their narrow access road to join the sition before dawn.15
92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion. Operating in a zone coinciding with
Hampered further by ROK troops, the eastern third of the ROK 6th Divi-
trucks, and paraphernalia cluttering sion sector and the western edge of the
and finally blocking the poor road, Marine sector, the 40th Army of the XIII
Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar Bat- Army Group was well situated to exploit
talion, and the 2d Rocket Field Artil- the exposed Marine flank. The 120th
lery Battery reached the 92d with none Division at the armys left, in particular,
of their principal weapons, the 987th had virtually the entire night to move
Armored Field Artillery Battalion with deep into the vacated ROK sector and
about half its equipment.13 sweep behind the Marine front. But,
Having lost radio and wire com- either unaware of the opportunity to
munications with his regimental com- envelop the marines or, more likely, un-
manders soon after the panic began, able to change course rapidly, the 120th
General Chang was hard pressed to attempted only local frontal assaults on
regain control of his forces, even when the 7th Marines west of Hwachon town,
they outdistanced the Chinese pursuit none of which penetrated or forced a
after midnight. Traveling rear areas withdrawal. Farther east, forces of the
throughout the night, Chang and his 115th Division, 39th Army, penetrated the
staff established a degree of order near 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment
dawn, collecting about twenty-five hun- above the Hwachon Dam and slashed
dred members of his three regiments southwestward to occupy heights com-
some ten miles south of the divisions manding the town of Hwachon in the
5th Marines central sector; American
12 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army
AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951.
13 Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 73-74; Eighth 14 Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951.
Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951; 1st Lt. Martin 15 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, 22-23 Apr 51: Mon-
Blumenson, Artillery in Perimeter Defense, April tress, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, pp.
1951, copy in CMH. 104-05.
KWP-EBB-0404
THE OPENING
385
line while the forces attacking the Along the Imjin
Turkish position penetrated at several
points and so intermingled themselves General Soule considered the 3d
that artillery units supporting the bri- Divisions front along the Imjin between
gade were forced to stop firing lest Korangpo-ri and Route 33 to be partic-
they hit Turks as well as Chinese. ularly vulnerable to attack, not only be-
Further fragmented by persistent cause the line was long and thin with
attacks through the night, the Turkish gaps between defensive positions but
position by morning consisted mainly of also because it lay generally alongside
surrounded or partially surrounded and at no great distance from Route
company perimeters, and Chinese 33, his main axis of communications.
penetrating between the Turks and The 65th Infantry and the attached
the curled-back left flank of the 24th Philippine 10th Battalion Combat
Infantry moved almost two miles be- Team occupied the right half of the
hind the divisions front. Ahead of line, with the Filipinos on the outside
the 27th Infantry on the divisions right, flank athwart Route 33 and the 2d and
enemy forces (apparently the western- 3d Battalions facing northwest and west
most forces of the 27th Army) massed along the Imjin. In regimental reserve,
and began their approach at first light, the 1st Battalion was located along
but heavy defensive fire shattered the Route 33 just above the Hantan River. 22
formation within half an hour, and the The British 29th Brigade with the
Chinese attempted no further attack on Belgian battalion attached held the re-
the regiment.20 mainder of the divisions line. The 1st
Near dawn General Bradley ordered Battalion of The Gloucestershire regi-
the 24th and 27th Infantry Regiments ment (Glosters) anchored the brigades
to withdraw two miles and instructed left flank astride minor Route 5Y near
the Turkish brigade to leave the line the villages of Choksong and Solma-ri.
and reorganize south of the Hantan The right flank of the ROK 12th Regi-
River. The 35th Infantry came out of ment, the nearest position of the ROK
reserve to take over the Turkish sector. 1st Division, was a mile to the southwest.
The Turks fought their way off the Northeast of the Glosters, beyond two
front during the morning and, except miles of unoccupied hills, the 1st Bat-
for one company that had been virtu- talion, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers,
ally wiped out, assembled below the held a central position below the lower
Hantan in better condition than Brad- arm of the right-angle bend in the
ley had expected. The Chinese followed Imjin. At the brigades right, the Bel-
neither the Turks nor the two regi- gian battalion occupied Hill 194, a low
ments, and the division sector quieted mass located above the Imjin inside the
as Bradley developed his new line.21 right-angle bend. Placing the battalion
above the river entailed a risk, at least
20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth to Belgian vehicles. Although the Imjin
Army G3 Jnl, 22 Apr 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, behind Hill 194 was fordable, the east
Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase
Spring Offensive, Apr 51.
bank in that area was almost vertical.
21 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, Vehicular movement to and from the
The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr
51. 22 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0406
position followed secondary Route 11, Vanguards of the 34th Division, 12th
the 29th Brigades supply road to the Army, and 29th Division, 15th Army,
south, and depended on two ponton opened stinging assaults on the 65th
bridges, one crossing the Hantan near Infantry about midnight, driving one
its mouth, the other spanning the Imjin company of the Philippine 10th Battal-
a half mile farther west. The only alter- ion Combat Team off position almost
nate route was a rudimentary track that immediately. Through the remainder
followed the upper bank of the Hantan of the night the two enemy divisions
and connected with Route 33, and its failed to reinforce their attacks beyond
use depended on the Imjin span. Both replacing losses, and they made no fur-
bridges were vulnerable to enemy ther gains. The attacks subsided after
action, resting as they did in a mile- an early morning Filipino counterattack
wide gap between the Belgians and recovered the ground lost in the initial
fusiliers. Reserves available to the 29th assaults. But the withdrawal of the
Brigade included the 1st Battalion, Turkish brigade then under way to the
Royal Ulster Rifles, and the 52-ton Cen- east was uncovering the 65ths right
turion tanks of C Squadron, 8th Kings flank, and the regiments position, as
Royal Irish Hussars. Both units were General Soule had anticipated, was
centrally located along Route 11.23 also threatened by XIX Army Group at-
Looking at the 3d Divisions line as tacks on the British 29th Brigade to the
the Chinese might see it, General Soule southwest.25
believed the most vulnerable point was Patrols of the 187th Division, 63d
the Imjin angle: a penetration there Army, approached the three battalions
could easily cut Route 33 and imperil on the British front near midnight on
the 65th Infantry north of the cut. Be- the 22d. Entering the gap between the
cause of this danger the British had Northumberland Fusiliers and Bel-
set the Belgian battalion above the river gians, a large patrol moved along the
inside the angle. Without the 15th In- Imjin on the Belgian side of the river,
fantry, which was in corps reserve, passed by a Belgian listening post be-
Soule clustered what reserves he had low Hill 194, and continued east toward
behind the Imjin east of the Belgians. the two unguarded bridges on the Bel-
He set the 2d Battalion of the 7th In- gian access route. On receiving the
fantry and the 64th Tank Battalion Belgians report of the patrol at bri-
just above the Hantan, principally to gade headquarters, Brigadier Brodie
thicken the central position, and the re- sent a motorized detachment from the
mainder of the 7th Infantry below the Ulster battalion to secure the bridges,
Hantan for possible employment either but while moving up Route 11 to the
north in the 65th Infantrys sector or Hantan crossing the detachment drove
west in the British sector.24 into an ambush and was all but wiped
out.26
23 Ibid.; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Barclay,
The First Commonwealth Division, p. 62: Crahay, Les Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3
Belges En Coree, pp. 60, 74, 80; Ltr: CG I Corps to CG (reserves).
Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucester- 25 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apt 51,
shire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves). 26 Eighth
Army G3 Jnl, 22 Apr 51; Crahay, Les Belges
24 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps En Coree, pp. 75-76; 3d Div POR 158, 22 Apr 51; 3d
to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Div G3 Jnl, Entries 2 and 24, 23 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0407
A Chinese force following the patrol Infantry, and two platoons of the 7ths
split as it reached Hill 194, some mem- tank company to reclaim the bridges
bers turning to attack the Belgians, and remain in support of the Belgians.
the remainder continuing toward the Reaching the bridge area over the track
bridges. Most of the Belgian front was along the Hantan, the tankers found
under assault by first light. The Chi- no Chinese at the crossings but came
nese who bypassed Hill 194 mean- under mortar and small arms fire from
while reached the bridges, crossed the Hill 257, fire which kept the following
Imjin, and attacked Company Z of the infantry at bay. One tank platoon
Northumberland Fusiliers on Hill 257 moved to Hill 194 to reinforce the Bel-
bordering the river almost due south gians while the other deployed near the
of the crossings.27 bridges and fired on Hill 257. The
Company Z was the right rear unit amount of Chinese return fire raised
of a squarish fusilier position marked doubts that foot troops and wheeled
out by four widely spaced company pe- vehicles could pass safely through the
rimeters at the corners. Well down- bridge area.29
stream from Z, Company X at the left Wary of a strike down Route 11 by
front corner occupied Hill 152, the the Chinese attacking the fusilier bat-
crest of a ridge edging the Imjin. Chi- talion, in particular by those attacking
nese fording the river and attacking Company Z on Hill 257, Brigadier Bro-
Hill 152 forced Company X to with- die after daylight on the 23d organized
draw about the same time that the defenses athwart the road about two
attack out of the Belgian area carried miles below 257. The fusiliers withdrew
Chinese inside Company Zs position to a ridge bordering Route 11 on the
on Hill 257. Thus Company Y at the west while the bulk of the Royal Ulster
right front corner, though not under Rifles battalion occupied positions east
assault, was precariously situated, with of the road. The Chinese, as a result,
Chinese moving past on left and right.28 gained control of a wide expanse of
About daybreak, reinforcements, ap- ground between Brodies new central
parently from the 188th Division, 63d position and the Belgians. There also
Army, doubled the strength of the Chi- remained between the fusiliers and
nese attacking the Belgians on Hill 194. Gloster battalions a two-mile gap, which
A Belgian patrol slipping off the rear aerial observers as early as 0830 re-
of the hill meanwhile confirmed that ported Chinese to be entering. Having
Chinese controlled the two bridges on all but depleted brigade reserves, Bro-
the access route by firing from the die asked for help from General Soule,
near slopes of Hill 257. As the Chinese who agreed to send the 1st Battalion,
stepped up their attack, General Soule 7th Infantry, to establish positions be-
sent a company of the 2d Battalion, 7th
27 Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, p. 76; Barclay, The 29 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl,
First Commonwealth Division, p. 62; 3d Div G3 Jnl, En- Entries 62, 65, 75, 97, 105, and 114, 23 Apr 51; Ltr,
tries 27, 38, 46, 52, and 65, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub:
159, 23 Apr 51. Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51,
28 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 2, 24, 38, 39, 46, and 52, Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of
23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51; Barclay, The 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51);Crahay, Les Belges En
First Commonwealth Division, p. 62. Coree, pp. 76-79.
KWP-EBB-0408
tween Brodies central and left flank Able to see the far bank clearly by
defenses.30 the light of the full moon, the ambush
At the brigades left, the Gloster bat- party watched seven Chinese step into
talion also had had to give ground af- the water about 2200, allowed them to
ter a hard, costly battle lasting the night. reach the near bank, then shot down
The battalions position astride Route all seven with a brief burst of fire. Be-
5Y, as originally developed, was a set fore withdrawing to their company po-
of company perimeters about a mile, sition after exhausting their ammuni-
and half below the Imjin. From Hill tion, the sixteen Glosters defeated
148 west of the road and Hills 182 and three more crossing attempts, killing
144 east, Companies A, D, and B com- altogether some seventy Chinese.
manded long spurs sloping toward the The small force itself suffered no
river. Giving the position some depth casualties.32
was Company C, a mile behind Com- On the heels of the ambush partys
pany D on Hill 314 below the towering withdrawal, a battalion of the 559th
crest of Kamak Mountain (Hill 675), Regiment, 187th Division, forded the
easily the dominant height in the en- river at Gloster Crossing and a mile and
tire brigade area. West of Route 5Y a half west at an underwater bridge that
opposite Hill 314, battalion pioneers past Gloster reconnaissance had some-
secured Hill 235. The battalion com- how failed to reveal. British artillery
mander, Lt. Col. James P. Carne, had bloodied and delayed the forces at
set up headquarters and placed his Gloster Crossing, but the Chinese ap-
mortars along 5Y where it bent through proaching from the northwest were al-
a valley behind Company C and just ready climbing the long spurs toward
above the village of Solma-ri. After Chi- Company A.33
nese patrols were observed on the north Company A turned back repeated
bank of the Imjin during the day, Colo- charges until almost dawn, when its
nel Carne established an additional po- fifty-eight able-bodied men lost the
sition at last light on the 22d. Certain dominant platoon position located
that the Chinese had located Gloster among the ruins of an ancient castle
Crossing, a ford straight ahead of his near the crest of Hill 148. Company D
lines, since his sappers earlier had lost no important ground on Hill 182
marked its course with buoys, Carne to the Chinese attacking out of the
concealed sixteen men of Company C Gloster Crossing area but also suffered
in ambush in ruined buildings at the high casualties. Company B on Hill 144
near end of the crossing.31 was no more than brushed by Chinese
patrols and survived the night intact.34
30 Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51,
sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr
51, Incl 3 (reserves); 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 32 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 2, 23 Apr 51; Farrar-
3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 34 and 81, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 18-22; Robert O.
POR 159, 23 Apr 51. Holles, Now Thrive the Armourers (London: George G.
31 3d Div Sit Ovlay, 22 Apr 51; E. J. Kahn, Jr., A Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1952), p. 150.
Reporter in Korea-No One But the Glosters, New 33 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 22-25;
Yorker, 26 May 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Holles, Now Thrive the Armourers, p. 150.
Sword, pp. 11-13, 16-18. Captain Farrar-Hockley was 34 3d Div POR 159; 23 Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry
the adjutant of the Gloster battalion during the battle 52, 23 Apr 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword,
at the Imjin. pp. 25-31, 36.
KWP-EBB-0409
MAP 33
and 3d Regiments on the line while the refuse the flank and stretch the line
35th Regiment continued to reorga- toward the planned connection with the
nize behind it and the 5th Regiment South Koreans. With all regiments on
continued to withdraw toward it.38 line, the division faced as much to the
As the initial IX Corps step to the west as to the north. The 92d Armored
rear General Hoge let stand his plan to Field Artillery Battalion and the units
pull the 1st Marine Division onto a line that had joined it after scrambling out
curving from the Hwachon Dam south- of the ROK 6th Divisions sector with-
westward along the Pukhan River and drew to the vicinity of Chichon-ni,
to push the ROK 6th Division north where the bulk of the Marine divisions
onto line Kansas. The marines occu- artillery, the 11th Marines, was
pied their arching line, designated clustered. General Hoge directed the
Pendleton, by late afternoon, the 1st 92d, which absorbed the members of
Marines taking up widely separated bat- the weaponless 2d Rocket Field Artil-
talion positions on the divisions left to lery Battery, and the half-equipped
987th Field Artillery Battalion to rein-
38 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army force the fires of the 11th Marines.
PIR 285, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Entries 1405,
1500, 2130, 240905, and 240940, 23 Apr 51, and Brief- Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar Bat-
ing Notes for CG; Eighth Army POR, 23 Apr 51. talion, out of action for lack of weap-
KWP-EBB-0411
ons and equipment, left the division sec- prevent enemy forces from coursing
tor for refurbishing.39 down the valley and cutting Route 17
Since the ROK 6th Division had lost at Kapyong town. Brigadier Burke was
its artillery support during the debacle to establish the blocking position along
of the previous night, General Hoge the trace of line Delta four miles north
directed the British 27th Brigade to re- of town where the Kapyong River
commit the New Zealand artillery and flowing from the northwest was joined
transferred the 213th Field Artillery by the tributary from the northeast
Battalion from a reinforcing mission in just above a large bend turning the
the Marine sector to support the South Kapyong southwest toward the Puk-
Koreans. During the afternoon the New han. From hill masses rising on either
Zealand unit, accompanied by the Mid- side of the junction of the Kapyong
dlesex battalion for protection, moved and its tributary the commonwealth
up the valley of the Kapyong River forces could cover both valley ap-
while the 213th circled out of the Ma- proaches.42
rine sector and moved up the valley of Burke organized the block with the
a Kapyong tributary in the eastern por- 3d Battalion, Royal Australian Regi-
tion of the South Korean sector.40 ment, and 2d Battalion, Princess
Meanwhile, as the day wore on, the Patricias Canadian Light Infantry, set-
move of the ROK 6th Division north to ting the Australians in the Hill 504 mass
line Kansas appeared less and less prob- on the right to block the valley ap-
able. Still reorganizing the division at proach from the northeast, the Canadi-
midday, General Chang informed corps ans on the crest and slopes of Hill 677
headquarters that he would have his to control the Kapyong valley. Four
forces on the line by 1700. But as that American units-all but one platoon of
hour approached, no part of the divi- Company A, 72d Tank Battalion; Com-
sion had yet moved forward.41 pany B, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion;
Wary of another failing performance and Companies B and C, 74th Engi-
by Changs division, General Hoge in neer Combat Battalion-moved up in
midafternoon ordered the British 27th support, the tankers taking position
Brigade to block the Kapyong River with the Australians, the mortarmen
valley behind the South Koreans to setting up in a small lateral valley be-
39 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51; Montross,
hind Hill 504. The engineers biv-
Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, pp. 110-13; ouacked along the Kapyong about a
After Action Intervs, Blumenson, Artillery in Perim- mile in rear of the blocking position.43
eter Defense; 1st Marine Div POR no. 230, 23 Apr
51; Rad, IX ART-68, CG IX Corps to COs 987th FA
The artillery battalions assigned by
Bn, 92d AFA Bn, and 11th Marine Regt, 23 Apr 51.
40 Rads. IX ACT-1338 and IX-ACT 1330, CG IX 42 Rad, IX ACT-1338, CG IX Corps to CG 27th
Corps to CG 27th BCB and CG 1st Marine Div, re- BCB, 23 Apr 51.
spectively, 23 Apr 51; After Action Intervs, 1st Lt. 43 Ibid.; Rad, IX ACT-1340, CG IX Corps to CG
Martin Blumenson, Tanks Above Kapyong, Intervs 27th BCB, 23 Apr 51; After Action Intervs, Blu-
with Maj Don W. Black, Asst S3, IX Corps Arty, and menson, Tanks Above Kapyong, Intervs with 1st
Capt Blaine Johnson, Asst S3, 213th FA Bn. Lt Kenneth W. Koch, CO, Co A, 72d Tank Bn, and
41 Ltr,Brig Gen George B. Peploe, IX Corps CofS, Maj Wade H. Padgett, S3, 74th Engr Cmbt Bn; N.
to CC Eighth Army, 5 May 51, sub: Report on Disinte- Bartlett, ed., With the Australians in Korea (Canberra:
gration of the 6th ROK Division in Military Opera- Australian War Memorial, 1954), pp. 91-92; Wood,
tions During the Period 22-24 April 1951, in Eighth Strange Battleground, pp. 74-75; Barclay, The First Com-
Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951. monwealth Division, p. 68.
KWP-EBB-0412
General Hoge to support the ROK 6th and Middlesex battalion and at dark
Division were still moving into position placed the forces at the blocking posi-
when reports reaching corps headquar- tion on a 50 percent alert.44
ters indicated that General Chang had General Changs failure to place the
given up attempts to move his division 6th Division on line Kansas also left the
to the Kansas line and had deployed in 1st Marine Division vulnerable. Its
the vicinity of his assembly area. Doubt- long front along the Pukhan was pro-
ful that the division was in position or tected on the east by the barrier of the
condition to perform better than it had Hwachon Reservoir, and its west flank
the night before and thus fearful that was no longer wide open as it had been
the supporting battalions were out on a the night before, but the nearest solid
limb, the corps artillery officer author-
ized the 213th Field Artillery Battalion 44 Ltr, Peploe to CG Eighth Army, 5 May 51; sub:
to withdraw behind the 27th Brigades Report on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Division in
Military Operations During the Period 22-24 April
blocking position at the first sign of an- 1951, and Overlay, Disposition of 6th ROK Div,
other ROK rout. Alerted to the possibil- 231800 Apr 51, both in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK
ity of a repeat performance by the Div (1 May), 1951; After Action Intervs, Blumenson,
Tanks Above Kapyong, Intervs with Black and
South Koreans, Brigadier Burke pre- Johnson; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p.
pared to pull out the New Zealanders 67; Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 94.
KWP-EBB-0413
position was that of the 27th Brigade Along the eastern portion of the I
above Kapyong. The intervening Corps line, the 25th Division, whose
seven-mile gap offered the Chinese an front had quieted after daylight on the
open southeastward shot at Chunchon 23d, was on line Kansas by midafter-
and the intersection of Routes 17 and noon. The 35th and 24th Infantry Regi-
29 and thus an opportunity to envelop ments reoccupied the divisions former
the marines or at least cut their lines of positions on the ridges between the
communications. Balancing this risk Hantan and Yongpyong rivers while
against that of a nighttime withdrawal the 27th Infantry and Turkish brigade
that probably would have to be made assembled immediately behind the
while under attack, General Hoge di- Yongpyong. At the far corps right, Chi-
rected the Marine division to withdraw nese maintained pressure against the
to line Kansas the following morning. center of the 24th Division, mainly
This move would shorten the front against the 19th Infantry, and at-
enough for the bulk of one regiment to tempted to follow the divisions with-
be taken off the line and sent south to drawal but gave up after suffering
defend Chunchon.45 heavy casualties to the covering artillery
fire. The division occupied line Kansas
45 Rad, IX ACT-1339, CG IX Corps to CG 1st Ma-
rine Div, 23 Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks,
about 1800, the 19th and 21st Infantry
The East-Central Front, p. 117. Regiments on left and right, the 5th
KWP-EBB-0414
Infantry in reserve about five miles be- Belgian battalion, the 65th Infantry was
hind the line. Later, on receiving word to leapfrog off line Utah, pass through
that the ROK 6th Division would not the 7th Infantry via Route 33, and as-
move north onto line Kansas, the 21st semble in division reserve near Route
Infantry refused its right as far as possi- 33s junction with Route 11. Exactly
ble with its reserve battalion, and Gen- how the Belgians would then get out of
eral Bryan deepened the protection by the Imjin angle was yet to be deter-
moving a battalion of the 5th Infantry mined.47
into blocking positions along the east The battalions of the 65th Infantry
flank.46 began bounding off line Utah about
Under General Soules plan for pull- noon, moving easily as the Chinese op-
ing back the 3d Divisions rightmost posite made no attempt to follow. Ex-
forces, the 7th Infantry was to occupy cept for the tanks supporting the Bel-
the divisions eastern sector of line gian battalion, the division reserves
Kansas. Protected on the west by the stationed earlier above the Hantan
dropped below the river during the
46 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
Offensive, Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 47 3d Div OI 15-12, 23 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0415
65ths leapfrog action. No interference was 1800 before the commander, Lt.
materialized out of the Imjin angle as Col. Fred C. Weyand, could reassem-
the Belgians, though heavily engaged, ble the battalion and open the attack
held their ground with the assistance on Hill 257 to the north. Once above
of air strikes and artillery and tank fire. the fusilier-Ulster lines, the battalion
Bringing up the regimental rear, the came under heavy fire from the flanks
3d Battalion of the 65th, reinforced by and front and had to fight off Chinese
the 3d Reconnaissance Company and groups who attempted to knock out the
64th Tank Battalion, occupied a posi- supporting tanks with grenades and
tion blocking Route 33 just above the shaped charges. By 2000 the battalion
Hantan, which was to be held until the had gained no more than a foothold in
Belgian battalion had withdrawn from the 257 hill mass.50
Hill 194.48 In the Belgian withdrawal, begun as
In considering ways to get the Bel- the attack on Hill 257 opened, the bulk
gian battalion out of the Imjin angle, of the battalion moved off the back side
Brigadier Brodie early in the afternoon of Hill 194 and waded the Imjin under
proposed to General Soule that the Bel- the cover of artillery fire and air strikes.
gians destroy their vehicles and with- Harassed by mortar fire until they as-
draw east across the Imjin off the back cended the steep east bank, the Bel-
side of Hill 194. But Soule believed that gian foot troops by 1830 were out of
the bridge area could be opened for contact and en route east to Route 33
the vehicles by attacking Hill 257 from and then south to an assembly area to
the south. About 1400 he ordered the await the battalions vehicles. In column,
1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, to make the drivers raced the vehicles over the Imjin
attack and instructed the Philippine bridge while the 7th Infantry tankers
10th Battalion Combat Team, then sent to the Belgians during the morn-
leading the 65th Infantry off line Utah, ing fired on the slopes of Hill 257 to
to join the 29th Brigade and take over the south and the 1st Battalion, 7th
the 1st Battalions previously assigned Infantry, moved into the hill mass from
mission of occupying a position in the the opposite direction. Incoming fire
gap between the fusilier and Gloster from 257 destroyed four trucks but was
battalions.49 generally weak. Although it had not
In carrying out its original mission, cleared 257, Colonel Weyands battal-
the 1st Battalion, with a platoon of regi- ion apparently had distracted most of
mental tanks attached, by 1400 had the Chinese holding the hill. Once the
moved up Route 11 behind the fusiliers, last vehicle had crossed the bridge
turned its three rifle companies west about 2000, the motor column followed
on a wide front, and begun sweeping
the slopes rising to Hill 675, the peak 50 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 61, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I
of Kamak Mountain, in the gap area. It Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of
Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (re-
serves) and Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB
48 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 112 and 143, 23 Apr 51; Action, 22-25 Apr 51). See also article by two par-
3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, ticipants in the Hill 257 battle, Capt. William F. Long,
Apr 51. Jr., and Capt. Walter M. Turner, Challenge Ac-
49 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 108, 110, 112, and 114, 23 cepted, in Combat Forces Journal, January 1952, pp.
Apr 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 12-16.
KWP-EBB-0416
the track along the Hantan to reach 7th Infantry, meanwhile disengaged at
Route 33. Troops and vehicles re- Hill 257 and returned to the 7ths sec-
united, the Belgian battalion moved tor of line Kansas, where it went into
south and assembled near the Routes reserve. Ahead of all these movements,
33-11 junction.51 the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat
Behind the Belgians, the 3d Battal- Team, en route to occupy the gap in
ion of the 65th Infantry, 64th Tank the 29th Brigades lines, reached the
Battalion, and 3d Reconnaissance brigade headquarters area along Route
Company left their Hantan blocking 11 about 2000, too late in the day,
position, the 3d Battalion joining the Brigadier Brodie decided, for it to at-
7th Infantry on line Kansas, the tank- tempt to take position between the fu-
ers and reconnaissance troops assem- silier and Gloster battalions.52
bling close to 3d Division headquarters
near the Routes 33-11 junction. With
52 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 139, 141, 148, 157, 180,
considerable difficulty the 1stBattalion, 182, and 189, 23 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG
Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucester-
51 Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, pp. 79-8 1; Ltr, CG I shire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves) and
Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action,
Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 16 (3d 22-25 Apr 51); 3d Div PORs 159 and 160, 23 and 24
Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51). Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0417
The withdrawal to line Kansas and Crossing area, where, despite British
other force adjustments swung the 3d mortar and artillery fire, the 187th Divi-
Division south like a gate hinged on sion, and apparently the 189th Division,
the west at the position of the Gloster pushed additional forces over the
battalion, which, after Colonel Carne Imjin. To the northeast, units of the
consolidated forces in the Solma-ri area, 187th and 188th Divisions continued to
had remained quiet throughout the day enter the gap between the Glosters and
except for meeting engagements be- fusiliers, directing their movement
tween patrols in Company Bs sector at mainly toward Hill 675. Some forces
the far right. Both the 64th and 63d worked through each gap and reached
Armies, however, had built up forces be- Route 5Y early in the afternoon. An
low the Imjin to the front and flanks of attack by these forces on the Gloster
the battalion.53 supply point along the road made clear
To the left of the Glosters, the 192d that the battalion at Solma-ri had been
Division, 64th Army, had begun to surrounded.55
ford the Imjim at three points on Given this penetration and the build-
the Korangpo-ri bend by daybreak. up of Chinese below the Imjin in the
Sighted by air observers, the crossing west and given, in particular, the frail
operation was shut off by 1100 by air central position of the ROK 6th Divi-
strikes and artillery fire, and most of sion and open ground on either side of
the Chinese who had crossed by that it, which invited envelopments both
time hesitated in areas not far below west and east, it was doubtful that the I
the river. A few company-size groups and IX Corps lines as they stood at dark
moved south and tested positions of the on the 23d could be held against the
12th Regiment at the right of the ROK next surge of enemy attacks. Earlier in
1st Division but were turned back by the day a number of officers had rec-
noon. Sorties by two task forces of ommended long withdrawals to Gen-
South Korean infantry and tanks of the eral Van Fleet to gain time to organize
73d Tank Battalion, which was attached stronger defenses. One division com-
to the 1st Division, punished Chinese mander in the I Corps had proposed
forces ahead of ROK lines until dusk. falling back to line Golden just above
One task force estimated that it killed Seoul. But Van Fleet had refused to
three thousand Chinese.54 give ground voluntarily in deep with-
Gloster forces on Hill 235 mean- drawals. While by no means assuming
while caught sight of Chinese on the a stand-or-die position, the enemy, he
near high ground in the gap between insisted, would have to take all he
the battalion and the ROK 12th Regi- gets.56
ment. They had come either from the
Korangpo-ri bend or out of the Gloster
55 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, p. 34;
Holles, Now Thrive the Armourers, pp. 152, 155; Ltr, CG
53 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 30, 36. I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report
54 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 14
PIR 285, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, (Summary of Enemy Operations); Kahn, A Reporter
Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps in Korea-No One But the Glosters.
Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, 56 Interv, Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51, copy
Apr 51. in CMH.
KWP-EBB-0418
CHAPTER XXII
withdrawal to the Kansas line. The ground mounts and armored person-
more persistent forces of the 120th Divi- nel carriers, swept the field and ceme-
sion to the west began to lap around tery with devastating effect. Fire from
one of the covering battalions located tanks the marines sent to join the battle
along the Chichon-ni road shortly be- added to the enemy toll. Within two
fore dawn; two hundred or more hours the artillerymen destroyed the
reached the 92d Armored Field Artil- Chinese force and were in march or-
lery Battalion behind the marines as der for the artillery displacement. The
that unit was preparing to displace. A battalions losses in the engagement
half dozen crews set up machine guns were four killed and eleven wounded.
in hills sloping to the battalions posi- The withdrawal of the rearguard bat-
tion while riflemen and grenadiers talions was a costly running battle with
crept into a field and cemetery close to 120th Division forces who followed the
the artillery pieces. The first round marines the entire distance to line
fired was a roll of toilet paper flung by Kansas. Ample artillery fire and numer-
a startled artilleryman who discovered ous air strikes steadily weakened the
several Chinese crawling toward him pursuit, although at a price in aircraft.
when he walked into the cemetery. Star- Chinese fire downed three Corsairs and
tled themselves by the unusual missile, one observation plane. Much reduced
the Chinese allowed the man to run by the time the marines were back in
back to his battery; but minutes later, old positions on the Kansas line, the
machine gunners and riflemen opened Chinese were unable to mount more
fire while grenadiers tried to reach the than mild assaults, all unsuccessful,
nearest self-propelled howitzers.4 and no reinforcements arrived to
The commander of the 92d, Lt. Col. strengthen them. As indicated when no
Leon F. Lavoie, a stickler for setting up major attack developed anywhere on
an elaborate defensive perimeter that the 1st Marine Division front by day-
required two or three days to develop light on 25 April, neither the 120th Di-
fully, had established the basic positions vision nor the divisions of the 39th Army,
by dark on the 23d. Most positions had whose operations had been minor from
been vacated just before daylight as the the start, would attempt further action
battalion began to get into march order, of any scale.
but Lavoies forces were able to reoc-
cupy them in time to take on the first
Inje Falls
line of Chinese. Enemy grenadiers
reaching a howitzer during the bat- In the X Corps sector to the east of
talions rush to battle stations were shot the marines, an attack opened near
down before they could damage it; di- dawn on the 24th by the North Korean
rect howitzer fire blasted the Chinese 12th Division thoroughly disorganized
machine guns in the hills; and fire from the ROK 5th Division and carried the
the perimeter, which bristled with .30- North Koreans through Inje by mid-
caliber and .50-caliber machine guns on
morning. (See Map 33.) The North Ko- the U.S. 2d Division anchoring the X
rean 6th Division at the same time con- Corps west flank above the eastern tip
tinued to push the left and center units of the Hwachon Reservoir. Opposite
of the ROK III Corps away from Route the 23d Infantry, some four hundred
24. The two enemy divisions reduced troops of the 45th made the mistake of
the pressure of their attacks only after assembling in a steep-sided draw near
their point units had driven two to five the village of Tokko-ri in full view of
miles below Inje. Given some respite, an artillery forward observer with Com-
the South Korean forces were able to pany C. The observer brought down a
organize defenses strong enough to battalion time on target barrage of fif-
hold off the two enemy divisions con- teen volleys using rounds tipped with
tinuing but weaker attempts to deepen variable time fuses. Afterward the ob-
and widen their salient. To the north- server saw just two North Koreans
east, the North Korean 45th Division come out of the draw. The only ground
again displayed its inexperience on the gained by the 44th Division during the
24th in unsuccessful attacks on the 32d day was a gift from the 32d Infantry as
Infantry of the U.S. 7th Division at the the regiment pulled back to ridgetop
immediate left of the ROK 5th Divi- positions that allowed it to tie in with
sion and against the 23d Infantry of the ROK 5th Division below Inje and
KWP-EBB-0421
thus contain the North Korean salient Kansas. As worked out by Almond with
along its southwestern shoulder.7 General Yu, the leftmost units of the
As a result of the 1st Marine Divi- ROK III Corps were to join the ad-
sions withdrawal to line Kansas, Gen- vance. Yus attack-for reasons not
eral Almond late on the 24th ordered clear-did not materialize, and al-
changes in 2d Division dispositions. On though the ROK 5th Division recap-
the morning of 25 April the 23d Infan- tured Inje, enemy pressure forced the
try was to drop back to positions just unit to return to its original positions
below the eastern tip of the Hwachon below the town. Ever aggressive, Gen-
Reservoir, a move that would place the eral Almond planned to attack again
regiment on the exact trace of line on the 26th. But, as he would soon
Kansas; beginning on the 25th General learn, any attempt to retake line Kansas
Ruffner was to make daily physical was for the time being out of the
contact with the Marine divisions question as a result of a second failing
right flank located near the village of performance by the ROK 6th Division
Yuchon-ni at the western tip of the in the left half of the IX Corps sector.9
reservoir. The latter step was a hedge
against the possibility that enemy forces
Repeat Performance
might penetrate the right of the Ma-
rine line and make a flanking or envel- The enemy formations approaching
oping move against the X Corps the ROK 6th Division on the 23d were
through the otherwise unoccupied from the 60th Division, 20th Army, and
ground below the reservoir. To screen 118th Division, 40th Army. The 60th Divi-
this ground and maintain contact with sion, which had stampeded the South
the marines, Ruffner organized Task Koreans the night before, was on a
Force Zebra under the commander of southwesterly course as the 20th Army
the divisions 72d Tank Battalion, Lt. continued to guide on Route 3 in its
Col. Elbridge L. Brubaker. Included in advance toward Seoul. That direction
the task force were a platoon of tanks would take the division into the I Corps
from the 72d, the 2d Reconnaissance sector after no more than a glancing
Company, the divisions attached Neth- blow at the ROK 19th Regiment at the
erlands and French battalions, and, left of the 6th Divisions front. Forces
later, the 1st Ranger C0mpany.s of the 118th Division moved south
General Almond on the morning of through the right half of the South Ko-
the 25th ordered an afternoon attack rean sector on a line of march that
by the ROK 5th Division to retake Inje would carry them to the ROK 2d and
and the high ground immediately above 7th Regiments and, if maintained, to
the town as a first step in regaining line the British 27th Brigades blocking po-
sition above Kapyong.10
When the leading enemy forces
7 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth
Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 24 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 POR,
24 Apr 5 1; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 5 1; 2d Div
Comd Rpt, Nat-, Apr 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 9 X Corps OI 161, 25 Apr 51; Rads, X 18709 and X
51. 18718, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 25 Apr 51.
8 X Corps 01 160, 24.Apr 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, 10 Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51; Barclay, The
Nar, Apr 51. First Commonwealth Division, p. 69.
KWP-EBB-0422
struck the ROK line just after dark, the The 60th Division, keeping to its
South Koreans bolted south almost southwesterly course, had not pursued
immediately, disordered columns of the ROK 19th Regiment after putting
troops and trucks flooding the two val- it to rout in the Kapyong valley. The
leys converging at the British brigades 60th next would be in contact with the
position. The New Zealand artillery, 24th Division in the I Corps sector.
Middlesex battalion, and 213th Field The 118th Division stayed on the heels
Artillery Battalion, which had gone up of the South Koreans racing down the
the valleys to support the 6th Division, northeast valley, its 354th Regiment
had scarcely deployed before South Ko- reaching the Australian battalion about
reans began passing through their 2200 as the din of the South Korean
areas. The three battalions withdrew retreat through the 27th Brigade be-
behind the Australians and Canadians, gan to subside.13
negotiating the cluttered valley roads Intent on pursuing the South Ko-
with no loss of men or equipment ex- reans and probably unaware of the Aus-
cept for a howitzer of the 213th Field tralian position, the van forces of the
Artillery Battalion which had to be run 354th Regiment kept to the valley, split-
off the road to avoid striking a group ting as they approached a long, low
of milling South Koreans.11 north-south ridge rising as an island in
ROK forces began streaming into the the valleys mouth. Company B of the
27th Brigades lines around 2000, the Australians and the 1st Platoon of Com-
heavier flow coming down the north- pany A, 72d Tank Battalion, were atop
east valley into the position of the Aus- the southern end of the ridge overlook-
tralian battalion. After a chaotic and ing the valley road passing by on the
clamorous passage through the block- east. The remaining three companies
ing position, ROK leaders were able to of the Australian battalion were east of
slow the wild flight-getting safely be- the road on the crest and upper slopes
hind the 27th Brigade seemed to have of Hill 504. To the north, the 4th Pla-
a calming effect-and eventually as- toon of tanks was on outpost, two tanks
sembled the forces just off Route 17 on the nose of the island ridge, three
about five miles southwest of Kapyong astride the road in the flat ground just
town. On the morning of the 24th Gen- beyond. In the village of Chuktun-ni
eral Chang notified General Hoge that behind the island ridge, the road
he had collected and was reorganizing ended in a junction with the Kapyong
between four thousand and five thou- valley road coming in from northwest.
sand men, about half the divisions Near Chuktun-ni, the Kapyong road
strength. 12 reached a ford across the Kapyong
11 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 23 Apr 51; IX Corps Ldr, 1st Plat, Co A, 72d Tank Bn; Bartlett, With the
Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Ltr, Peploe to CG Eighth Australians in Korea, p. 94; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar,
Army, 5 May 51, sub: Report on Disintegration of the Apr 51; Ltr, Peploe to CG Eighth Army, 5 May 51,
6th ROK Division in Military Operations During the sub: Report on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Divi-
Period 22-24 Apr 51; Barclay, The First Commonwealth sion in Military Operations During the Period 22-24
Division, p. 67; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, Apr 51.
Tanks Above Kapyong, Interv with Johnson. 13 Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51;Bartlett, With
12 After Action Intervs, Blumenson, Tanks Above the Australians in Korea, p. 94; Wood, Strange Battle-
Kapyong, Interv with 1st Lt Wilfred D. Miller, Plat ground, p. 74.
KWP-EBB-0423
River on the upper arm of the large down to the road from his position on
bend that turns the rivers flow from the island ridge and stopped the tanks
southeast to southwest. The command at the blocking position, but Chinese
group and 2d Platoon of the tank com- appearing from the north forced him
pany were deployed astride the road back up the ridge, and the 4th Platoon
just below the ford, whence the tanks continued toward the river crossing.15
could fire up both the Kapyong and The ragged withdrawal took the pla-
northeast valleys. The Australian bat- toon from one fire fight to another.
talions command post, protected by a Tank company commander 1st. Lt.
small group of pioneer, police, and sig- Kenneth W. Koch, afoot and under
nal troops, was located against some low considerable fire, reorganized the pla-
hills not far to the left rear of the tanks. toon under the command of a sergeant
With the leading Chinese confining and deployed it alongside the 2d Pla-
their march to the valley, one group toon against the Chinese attacking from
following the road, the other swinging the northwest. With the road open as
wide through the undefended valley far as the ford, Chinese entered the
floor west of the island ridge and south- battle from the north, and the two lead-
east along the Kapyong, the American ing groups, now joined, widened their
tankers on outpost and at the ford were assault to include the small force of
first to be engaged. The approaching Australians defending the battalion
Chinese reached the two positions al- command post. Numbers of Chinese in-
most simultaneously.14 filtrating or skirting the ford area set-
Upon a Chinese approach, the 4th tled in the high ground bordering the
Platoon had standing orders to with- Kapyong road on the west. Those mov-
draw from its outpost to a blocking ing deepest reached and exchanged fire
position on the road between the with the Middlesex battalion, which had
forces on the island ridge and those on taken a reserve position athwart the
Hill 504, but the tankers were under road two miles behind the Australians.
fire before they realized that the on- North of the ford, following formations
coming troops were not more retreat- of the 354th Regiment spread out to at-
ing South Koreans. A brief exchange tack the forces on the island ridge and
of fire in which the tank crews fought Hill 504.16
with hatches open for better vision in Lt. Col. I. B. Ferguson, the Austra-
the darkness cost the platoon four lian battalion commander, was hard
wounded (two of them tank com- pressed to direct the defense. South Ko-
manders), and the platoon leader was reans charging through his position had
fatally shot as the tanks turned to with- torn out his wire from command post
draw. The leaderless survivors pulled to companies, and he could communi-
out in disorder toward the 2d Platoon cate with the forward units only inter-
at the Kapyong ford. The 1st Platoon
leader, 1st. Lt. Wilfred D. Miller, ran
15 After Action Intervs, Blumenson, Tanks Above
Kapyong, Narrative and Intervs with Koch, Miller,
Pfc Leroy W. Ritchotte, 4th Plat, and Pvt Robert B.
14 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 92; After Brown, 4th Plat.
Action Intervs, Blumenson, Tanks Above Kapyong, 16 Ibid., Intervs with Koch and Lt A. Argent, Intel
Interv with Koch. Off, 3d Bn, Royal Australian Regt.
KWP-EBB-0424
mittently by radio. Losing all artillery but the two platoons stayed in position,
support put the Australians at further the tankers firing in all directions, even
disadvantage as the Chinese enlarged at each other, to keep Chinese from
their attack. After withdrawing down getting on the tanks. A 3.5-inch rocket
the Kapyong valley, the New Zealand fired from the hill above the Austra-
unit and 213th Field Artillery Bat- lian command post damaged a tank,
talion had established positions be- killed one man, and wounded two. An-
tween the Middlesex and Australian other tanker was wounded when two
battalions; but when the enemy attack crews drove south from the ford and
intensified, Brigadier Burke ordered eliminated a block on the Kapyong
the two units into safety positions be- road that aidmen had discovered while
hind the Middlesex. Dawn came before transporting other casualties to the rear.
they could again answer calls for fire.17 In exchange for these losses, the tank-
Nor was support available from the ers killed more than a hundred Chi-
4.2s of Company B, 2d Chemical Mor- nese before the attack faded out about
tar Battalion. Communications had not daylight.19
yet been established with the mortar Well before dawn the Chinese attack-
position in the valley behind Hill 504 ing the battalion headquarters area
when the Chinese spread out to assault were threatening to overrun the com-
the Australians, and the mortar com- mand post. In answer to Colonel Fer-
pany, in any case, left its position shortly gusons request to Brigadier Burke for
afterward. Fearful of being overrun, reinforcements, a Middlesex company
the mortarmen abandoned thirty-five started forward but, on encountering
vehicles loaded with equipment and re- resistance by Chinese in the hills edg-
treated over a minor road ten miles ing the Kapyong road, inexplicably
east to Chunchon.18 turned east and withdrew over the
During a nightlong series of assaults, route used earlier by the American
the three Australian companies on Hill 4.2-inch mortar company. Compelled
504, in spite of their lack of artillery to withdraw, Ferguson started his head-
and mortar support, lost only two pla- quarters vehicles and troops toward the
toon positions and later regained one Middlesex position, using the two tanks
of these. Company B and the platoon that had cleared out the roadblock to
of tanks on the island ridge had little cover the move. Fire from the hills
trouble holding their ground and took above the road forced sections of the
a high toll of Chinese crowded along column to halt. and take cover from time
the valley road when they were exposed to time but caused no casualties and
in the light of burning buildings set was easily silenced by the tanks. The
ablaze by fire from the tanks. Enemy only loss during the withdrawal was
forces got among the tanks at the ford, Fergusons own jeep, which had a wheel
blown off by a mortar round. The two
17 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 95; After American engineer companies biv-
Action Intervs, Blumenson, Tanks Above Kapyong,
Interv with Johnson.
18 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 95-96; 19 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 96104;
After Action Intervs, Blumenson, Tanks Above After Action Intervs, Blumenson, Tanks Above
Kapyong, Interv with Argent. Kapyong, Intervs with Miller and Koch,
KWP-EBB-0425
ouacked within sight of the road mean- misdirected air strike in which Marine
while mistook the passing headquarters Corsairs dropped napalm on one
forces for the beginning of a general Australian company, killing two, in-
withdrawal and themselves pulled out juring several, and destroying some
in haste and confusion, abandoning weapons and equipment, the situation
tentage, several trucks, kitchens, and a rather resembled sitting in the middle
water point they had installed. of a wheatfield at dawn potting rabbits
From the new battalion command as they dashed hither and thither. 22
post, Colonel Ferguson shortly before The battalion nevertheless was po-
dawn ordered Company B to leave its tentially in danger of encirclement. A
isolated position on the island ridge and three-mile gap between the Australians
join forces with the companies on Hill and the Canadians to the west, whose
504. The company remained engaged position had not yet been seriously
until after daylight, when the Chinese tested, and a far greater expanse of
began withdrawing to the north. Com- open ground to the east gave the Chi-
pany B and the tank platoon whipped nese room to close in. Evacuating Aus-
the withdrawing troops with fire for tralian casualties and replenishing sup-
over an hour. As a sort of finale to the plies also became a problem with most
engagement, a patrol reconnoitering a of the road between Hill 504 and the
route to 504 brought back about forty Middlesex position kept under Chinese
prisoners bagged near the northern guns from the bordering high ground.
edge of Chuktun-ni. Moving round- Wary of losing the battalion if it re-
about to avoid Chinese still attacking mained on 504 another night, Briga-
504, Company B, with prisoners in tow, dier Burke at midmorning ordered
occupied a rear position on the hill Colonel Ferguson to withdraw behind
about midmorning.21 the Middlesex. The American tankers,
In the continuing engagement on who had used the morning respite to
Hill 504, daylight and artillery support refuel and rearm in the company biv-
from the New Zealanders gave the Aus- ouac area, came back into action, one
tralians the advantage. Although the group under Lieutenant Miller initially
Chinese attacked repeatedly, almost at carrying Ferguson and staff members
half-hour intervals, they were now fully over the fire-swept road to 504 to or-
visible, and each dash from cover to ganize the withdrawal. Millers group
cover brought down an assortment of also delivered ammunition and brought
telling Australian fire. Except for a back casualties, making a second trip to
get all the Australian wounded out.
Another group, under Lieutenant
20Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 96, 98-99;
Koch, the company commander, car-
After Action Intervs, Blumenson, Tanks Above
Kapyong, Intervs with Cpl William O. Suiter, Jr., Co ried volunteers from Company B, 74th
A, 72d Tank Bn, Padgett, and Sgt Harold Burros, Sgt Engineer Combat Battalion, to the va-
John L. Mazyck, Cpl Haywood Butler, Cpl Mason F. cated 4.2-inch mortar position and cov-
Scott, Pfc James Jackson, Pfc Johnnie L. Lewis, Pfc
Johnnie Barksdale, Pfc Arthur Lee Gayles, and Pvt ered them while they drove out the
Robert J. Booker, all of Co B, 74th Engr Bn.
21Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 99-100;
After Action Intervs, Blumenson, Tanks Above 22The commander of Company A, quoted in Bart-
Kapyong, Interv with Miller. lett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 101.
KWP-EBB-0426
vehicles abandoned by the mortar com- commander, Lt. Col. J. R. Stone, origi-
pany. On a final round trip, tankers nally had deployed his four companies
protected the engineers while they re- on the crest and northern slopes of 677,
trieved their own equipment left behind but after Chinese began moving into
during their hurried morning with- the hills along the Kapyong road a step
drawal.23 that placed them to the right and right
After completing the evacuation of rear of the Canadians, Stone shifted
casualties and equipment in midafter- Company B to a southeastern slope
noon, the tankers moved north to the against the possibility of an attack via
ford area to ward off any Chinese mov- the battalions back door.25 Mortar and
ing down the Kapyong valley while the long range machine gun fire struck the
Australians were withdrawing from company at 2200, one of the machine
504. The New Zealand artillery blinded guns firing tracer ammunition to di-
the Chinese on the slopes of 504 with rect an assault by two hundred Chinese
smoke and trailed the Australian rear- that followed. A smaller group slipped
guard with high explosive rounds as up a gully from the southeast to attack
the four companies moved one at a the battalions command post and mor-
time down a long ridge sloping south- tars located in rear of Company B. A
east to the Kapyong River. Crossing larger force, clearly visible to the Cana-
the stream a mile and a half behind the dians in the moonlight, meanwhile be-
tanks, the Australians passed through gan fording the Kapyong to the east.
the Middlesex battalion not long after A heavy concentration of New Zealand
dark. The tanks dropped back after the artillery fire broke up the force cross-
rearguard company crossed the river ing the river, and, just as effectively,
but stayed forward of the Middlesex Canadian mortarmen and machine
until it was clear that no Chinese had gunners almost literally blew back the
followed the withdrawal. The night and Chinese attacking up the ravine. Com-
day of battle had cost the Australians pany B beat off the first Chinese
thirty-one killed, fifty-eight wounded, charge, lost a platoon position to the
and three missing, the tank company second, then successfully weathered a
two killed, eleven wounded, and one succession of assaults lasting most of
missing.24 the night.26
Instead of following the Australian A stronger attack about 0200, evi-
withdrawal, the 354th Regiment, much dently by fresh forces coming out of
reduced after its attacks on Hill 504 the Kapyong valley, hit Company D
but apparently being reinforced by at defending the Canadians left flank
least part of another regiment of the from the 677 crest. The first assaults,
118th Division, turned toward the Cana- launched across a saddle from the west
dian battalion on Hill 677. The Prin- and up steep slopes from the south,
cess Patricias Canadian Light Infantry carried Chinese into the companys de-
23 Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 74-76; After Ac-
tion Intervs, Blumenson, Tanks Above Kapyong, 25 American tankers making one of their runs on
Intervs with Koch and Miller.. the Kapyong road as the Canadian company took
24 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, pp. 105-06; position mistakenly opened fire on it and wounded
After Action Intervs, Blumenson, Tanks Above one man.
Kapyong, Interv with Koch. 26 Wood, Strange Battleground,, pp. 76-77.
KWP-EBB-0427
commissioned officers had caused the and on the 23d, following the 6th Divi-
divisions disintegration. With excep- sions first collapse and preceding its
tions that only proved the rule, defi- second by only hours, Rhee had submit-
cient leadership indeed continued to be ted a personal request for the same.
the major weakness of the ROK The request had some appeal in Wash-
Army.31 ington by raising the prospect of even-
The ROK Army chief of staff, Gen- tually using additional South Korean
eral Chung, attempted to explain to formations to replace American units.
General Van Fleet that the 6th Divi- General Ridgway and General Van
sions breakdown and the wider leader- Fleet, however, argued successfully
ship problem came from a lack of train- against any immediate increase in ROK
ing. He was right to the extent that divisions. There was no way, they in-
ROK troops and leaders at every level sisted, that American personnel and
and in every unit suffered from sketchy other resources could be spared to pro-
military schooling. But Van Fleet re- vide the supervision and training for
fused the explanation, pointing out to an expansion as long as heavy fighting
Chung that the 6th Division had con- continued. In any case, a need to de-
ducted itself creditably in past opera- velop competent leadership, not a need
tions and that the making of officers for more men, was the primary prob-
could not be confined to the mastery of lem of the ROK Army and certainly
military skills. A high sense of responsi- was prerequisite to its enlargement.
bility, devotion to duty, physical and The ROK 6th Divisions dissolution il-
moral courage, and the will to fight for lustrated the point. Creating new divi-
homes and families were fundamental sions without able leaders, Van Fleet
to competent military leadership; these said, would be a criminal waste of
were the attributes, he emphasized, badly needed equipment.33
that, along with training in military Ridgway, Van Fleet, and Ambassa-
science, had to be developed among dor Muccio personally delivered the re-
South Korean officers and noncommis- fusal to President Rhee. Their message
sioned officers if the ROK Army was to was blunt: from the minister of defense
be a capable and dependable force.32 to the lowest level of command in the
The rout of the ROK 6th Division ROK Army, leadership was inadequate,
could not have happened at a worse and under this serious weakness was
time for President Rhees attempt to eliminated there would be no more talk
put more men under arms. On 18 April about the United States arming and
the ROK representative to the United equipping additional divisions. Rhee
Nations, Col. Ben C. Limb, had asked nevertheless continued to lobby for sup-
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for arms and port of a larger army, but he would get
equipment for ten additional divisions, no substantial help until improved pro-
CHAPTER XXIII
Chinese who had hemmed in the com- Colonel Carne as the few survivors of
pany and had left only a path down Company B began to trickle in at Hill
wooded slopes to the south, where the 235. By midmorning, however, perhaps
Glosters, breaking away in groups, tried because the Glosters had reported a
to get through the smaller ranks of Chi- large enemy buildup in their area,
nese who had circled behind them. The Brodie changed the concept of the
attempt, if unavoidable, was disastrous. operation. The 10th Battalion Combat
Only twenty men reached the main Team now was to set up a blocking posi-
body of the battalion at Hill 235. tion at a pass about two miles below
Along Route 11 northeast of the Hill 235, and from there only tanks
Glosters, forces of the 188th Division were to move on to join the Gloster
meanwhile had followed the late night battalion. Brodie may not have been
withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 7th aware that the big Centurions, leading
Infantry, out of the Hill 257 mass and the way up Route 5Y at the moment,
engaged the Northumberland Fusiliers would be unable to proceed much far-
and Royal Ulster Rifles standing across ther than the blocking position. As the
the road about two miles to the south. hussars had learned during earlier
Handling the Chinese frontal pressure reconnaissance, the road beyond be-
fully occupied the two battalions and came too narrow at defiles to allow the
left them vulnerable to a flanking or nearly twelve-foot-wide tanks to pass.
enveloping attack out of the gap be- The attempt to reach the Glosters,
tween the fusiliers and Glosters, a gap in any case, could be made only by
that as a result of the Glosters with- the 10th Battalion Combat Teams
drawals to the Hill 235 area had wid- four light tanks. Brodie also gave the
ened to four miles.5 Glosters the choice of fighting their way
In a move to fill the gap at least par- to safety, apparently visualizing a linkup
tially and at the same time to restore of Glosters and Filipinos at the latters
the deteriorating Gloster position, the blocking position. But Colonel Carne,
3d Division commander, General Soule, doubting that his weakened battalion
early in the morning of the 24th di- could make it and remaining under
rected Brigadier Brodie to move a re- the impression that the full tank-
serve battalion into the gap and also to infantry force would attempt to reach
send a tank-infantry force up Route 5Y him, elected to stay in position in the
to clear the road and reinforce the hope that the approaching column
Gloster battalion. For the latter effort would succeed.6
Brodie added six Centurions from C The Belgian battalion, which Brodie
Squadron, 8th Hussars, to the three ri- intended to place in the gap between
fle companies and four light tanks of the Glosters and Northumberland
the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Fusiliers, had made a second march
Team and sent the force toward the
Glosters about 0730. Word that rein- 6 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 48, 52, 60, and 69, 24 Apr
forcements were on the way reached 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51,
sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion. 22-25 Apr
51, Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action,
14 May 51); Interv, Appleman with Maj Henry Huth,
5 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Report CO, C Sqn, 8th Hussars, copy in CMH; 3d Div POR
on Action (Johnson, G3), 3 May 51. 160, 24 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0433
during the night after withdrawing out planned to attack with two battalions of
of the Imjin angle, moving from its ini- the 65th Infantry, the bulk of the 64th
tial assembly along Route 33 to an area Tank Battalion, and the 10th Field Ar-
near the 29th Brigades command post. tillery Battalion to relieve the Glosters
Tired and somewhat disorganized by and clear the Chinese from Hill 675.
the Imjin angle battle and disengage- The 10th Battalion Combat Team, as
ment, the Belgians needed rest and an attachment to the 65th Infantry, was
time to straighten their ranks before to remain in its blocking position until
moving into the gap. The commander, the attack force passed through, then
Colonel Albert Crahay, informed Bro- was to follow the force to its objectives.
die that the battalion would be ready Soule set the attack for 0630 on the
by the start of the afternoon.7 25th after checking with Brodie to ask
General Soule, however, had second if that timing was satisfactory in light
thoughts about committing the Bel- of the Gloster battalions overnight re-
gians. Nine Glosters who had been cap- verses and present condition. Brodie
tured during the Chinese attack on the assured him that the Glosters could
battalions supply point the day before hold out until relieved by the 65th
and who had been taken off to Hill 675 Infantry.9
in the gap escaped their captors during In a midafternoon conference at the
an early morning air strike (Mustangs 3d Division airstrip, Soule briefed Gen-
dropping napalm) and reached the eral Milburn, General Van Fleet, and
29th Brigade command post. They re- General Ridgway (who had arrived in
ported at least a thousand Chinese to Korea at noon) on the attack plan. They
be on Hill 675, an estimate tending to questioned waiting until morning to
confirm other reports that the Chinese attack. But Soule told them that the at-
in the 675 area had reached regimen- tack could not be made in what re-
tal strength. Reluctant to pit the mained of the afternoon: the 1st and
Belgians against that possible enemy 3d Battalions of the 65th Infantry were
strength, Soule about noon informed then only beginning to assemble for the
Brodie that the Belgian battalion was attack a mile west of the 29th Brigades
not to be committed to action without command post and two miles southeast
division approval.8 of Hill 675 and would not complete
Soule did not question Brodies deci- their move until 1730. Soule, in any
sion to stop the 10th Battalion Combat case, had no reason to believe that the
Team short of the Gloster battalion. Be- Gloster battalion could not hold its
cause of the growing enemy strength position; he had Brigadier Brodies
in the Gloster and gap areas, Soule now assurance. According to a noontime
report from the 29th Brigade, the bat-
talions only critical supply need was
7 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 52, 24 Apr 51; Crahay, Les radio batteries, which, along with a
Beiges En Coree, pp. 8l-82.
8 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 80 and 96, 24 Apr 51; Ltr,
CC Eighth Army to CINCFE, 5 May 51, sub: Report 9 3d Div OI 15-13, 24 Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry
of Action Involving the Loss of Gloucestershire Bat- 80. 24 Apr 51: Ltr. CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army,
talion, 29th British Brigade, Tab A, I Corps Report 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion,
on Action of Gloster Battalion, 29th British Brigade, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 13 (Memo to CG fr Brig Gen A. D.
23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3 May 51. Mead, Dept CG, 3d Div, 7 May 51).
KWP-EBB-0434
resupply of other items, were to be air- nese occupying two hills abutting the
dropped before dark. The 10th Battal- road some two hundred yards to the
ion Combat Team meanwhile had bro- rear.11
ken through a spot of resistance about When Maj. Henry Huth, in com-
three miles south of Hill 235 and, with mand of the Centurions, radioed bri-
its light tanks now leading, the Centuri- gade headquarters that the road was
ons next in column, and foot troops blocked and that the wide Centurions
bringing up the rear, was again on the in any case could not get through the
move toward the Glosters.10 defile, he was given authority to with-
By 1530 the tanks leading the 10th draw. Major Huth understood the
Battalion Combat Team were climbing clearance to withdraw to apply to the
into the pass where the Filipino force 10th Battalion Combat Team as well as
was to set up the blocking position. En- his group of tanks, and he gave the
couraged by the columns progress, Filipinos the word to return to their
Brigadier Brodie reverted to his origi- assembly area after the combat team
nal plan and instructed the entire force commander, Lt. Col. Dionisio Ojeda,
to go on to the Glosters. He had scarcely told him that he did not believe his
issued the order when the point tank three rifle companies could move for-
lost a track to a mine or mortar round ward through what appeared to be a
in an extremely narrow, steep-sided battalion of Chinese. If someone at bri-
defile. Chinese strung out atop the hills gade headquarters had allowed the
bordering both sides of the defile swept 10th Battalion Combat Team to with-
the road with fire while others armed draw, it was only afterward that Briga-
with charges worked down the steep dier Brodie sought General Soules ap-
banks toward the disabled tank. The proval of the move.12 At the same time,
M24 crews to the rear, evidently believ- apparently after discussing a breakout
ing the road ahead of them to be with Colonel Carne, who began to pre-
mined, made no attempt to pull or push pare plans, Brodie requested permis-
the damaged tank out of the defile or sion to pull the Gloster battalion out
to rescue the stranded crew. Two less after dark. Soule, however, was certain
cautious Centurion crews squeezed the Glosters would suffer high losses in
their huge tanks past the Filipino ar- a nighttime withdrawal and instructed
mor and went as far forward as the Brodie to hold both battalions in their
narrowing road allowed. Though they present locations until the 65th Infan-
stopped short of the disabled M24, their try reached them the next day. Brodie
covering fire allowed its crew to escape.
Meanwhile, the Filipino infantry be-
came involved in a fire fight with Chi- 113d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 109 and 138, 24 Apr 51;
Interv, Appleman with Huth.
12Later investigation of the withdrawal order came
10 Interv, Appleman with Gen Soule, 8 Sep 51, copy to no clear conclusion. There was no brigade journal
in CMH; Eighth Army CG Jnl, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I record of its issue, and no one at headquarters could
Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of recall its scope or exactly who gave it. Available evi-
Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (re- dence indicates that the order did apply to the entire
serves) and Incl 13 (Memo to CG fr Brig Gen A. D. force. The 3d Division G-3 Journal for 24 April 1951,
Mead, Dept CG, 3d Div, 7 May 51); 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 129, for example, records an evening report
Entry 96, 24 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 160, 24 Apr 51; from the 29th Brigade stating in part that the relief
Interv, Appleman with Huth. force of 10th BCT and Tks have been ordered back.
KWP-EBB-0435
northwest and southeast limited the ap- infantry force--two battalions of his
proaches favoring enemy attacks in reserve 15th ROK Regiment and Com-
strength. To prevent the Chinese from pany A, 73d Heavy Tank Battalion-
observing the change of position, Carne against the penetration. By evening the
waited until after dusk to move his task force drove out the Chinese and
forces. The Glosters were dug in by established defensive positions in the
2100, Company A on the northwest gap that had been opened between the
and west, Company C and the remnants 11th and 12th Regiments. By that time
of Company B on the south and south- the 192d Division had pressed back the
east, and Company D on the north and 12th Regiment roughly three miles to
northeast.15 the southwest of its original positions,
To the left of the Glosters, the 64th widening by the same distance the gap
Army had shown little of the clumsiness between the South Korean division and
with which its 192d Division opened op- the Gloster battalion on Hill 235. The
erations against the ROK 1st Division. 189th Division, after brushing the right
Driving out of its shallow bridgehead flank of the 12th Regiment, meanwhile
inside the Imjin Rivers Korangpo-ri began passing through the widening
bend at midnight on the 23d, the 192d gap between the South Koreans and
slowly, but persistently, forced the 12th Glosters.l7
Regiment at the right of the ROK line As the 12th Regiment gave ground
to give ground. The pressure on the during the afternoon, General Milburn
South Koreans increased around dawn, ordered his lone reserve, the 15th In-
after the 190th Division crossed the fantry of the 3d Division, out of its as-
Imjin at several points southwest of sembly on the northwest outskirts of
Korangpo-ri town and sent van units Seoul into positions six miles behind
down the boundary between the ROK the South Koreans to block a second-
11th and 12th Regiments. Also cross- ary road, Route 1B, which if the Chi-
ing the Imjin during the night in the nese reached would afford them an
Korangpo-ri bend area, the 189th Divi- easy path to Route 1 and Seoul. Milburn
sion of the 63d Army advanced south- shortly diverted the 1st Battalion of the
east on a course taking it into the gap 15th to clear Route 2X, a lateral second-
between the ROK 12th Regiment and ary road connecting Route 1 to Route
the Gloster battalion on Hill 235.16 3 at Uijongbu, after receiving a report
By noon a battalion leading the at- that two hundred fifty infiltrating Chi-
tack of the 190th Division drove a wedge nese had set up a roadblock about seven
more than a mile deep between the miles west of Uijongbu. The 1st Battal-
11th and 12th Regiments. General ion located the enemy force at 1800,
Kang countered by sending a tank- killing twenty before the remaining
Chinese broke away into nearby hills.
With darkness approaching, the battal-
15 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 49-53.
16 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
Offensive, Apr 51, p. 23; Eighth Army PIR 286, 24
Apr 51: Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 0040, 24 Apr 51; 17 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0745 and 1515, 24
3d Div, G2, Summary of Enemy Operations in the Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51; Eighth
29th BIB Sector During the Period 211800 to 251800 Army POR, 24 Apr 51; 1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
Apr 51, 9 May 51. 51.
KWP-EBB-0437
ion commander elected to await morn- nel Carne redeployed the Gloster bat-
ing before attempting to clear the sur- talion on the crest of the hill, Chinese
rounding area. Meanwhile, as General attacked up the more gentle ascents on
Milburn committed his only reserve the northwest and southeast. In re-
unit, air observers and agents working peated rushes, with the lulls between
in the area along Route 1 above the used to bring up reinforcements, the
Imjin reported enemy forces moving Chinese failed to survive heavy Gloster
south toward the river. The North Ko- fire concentrated on the two ap-
rean I Corps appeared ready to open its proaches until daylight, when an assault
supporting attack along the west flank from the northwest carried the 235
of the main enemy drive.18 peak. But so few Chinese survived this
Well before daylight on the 25th assault that a small Gloster counterat-
General Milburn became convinced tack easily restored the peak position.
that the I Corps would have to give up While Chinese gunners and mortarmen
the Kansas line. As suspected, the North kept the Glosters under fire, another
Korean I Corps was joining the offensive, assault force began forming on the
although its initial move ended abruptly northwestern slopes, only to be almost
when its 8th Division attempted to cross totally destroyed by a flight of F-80S
the Imjin over the railroad bridge near answering an earlier Gloster call for air
Munsan-ni and was blown back with support. During what would become a
high losses from artillery fire and air long lull, the Chinese began again to
attacks.19 But the 190th and 192d Divi- bring more men forward.21
sions attacking in strength just after mid- Other Chinese forces-from the
night drove the ROK 1st Division back 187th and 188th Divisions and possibly
another mile before giving respite, wid- from the 189th-meanwhile moved far
ening still more the gap between the enough through the gaps on either side
South Koreans and Glosters. The 189th of the isolated Glosters to deliver small
Division continued, if slowly, to pass arms and mortar fire on the assembly
through the gap.20 areas of the 1st and 3d Battalions of
Before midnight the entire front of the 65th Infantry, the Belgian battalion,
the 3d Division was under assault. On the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat
Hill 235, scarcely an hour after Colo- Team, the British 45th Field Regiment,
and the command post of the 29th Brit-
ish Brigade. Some forces of the 188th
18 15th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, Division coming down from Hill 675
The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr
51, p. 23; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 2330, 24 Apr
reached Route 11 a mile and a half be-
51. hind the Northumberland Fusilier and
19 Heretofore lacking a truly effective capacity for Royal Ulster Rifle Battalions while those
radar-directed night attacks, the Fifth Air Force now
had an MPQ radar detachment in support of each
two units were fully engaged in beating
U.S. corps--one north of Seoul, one near Hongchon, back frontal assaults by other forces of
and one near Wonju-and the system now worked the 188th.22
with B-29s as well as B-26s. See Futrell, The United
States Air Force in Korea, pp. 328-30.
20 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 21 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 52-64.
Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 23-24; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 22 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl,
Apr 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, Entries 158, 159, and 165, 24 Apr 51, and Entries 9,
1952. 20, 28, 30, 33, 40, and 50, 25 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0438
By dark on the 24th there had been midnight. Simultaneous with frontal as-
no enemy action against the 7th Infan- saults on the 35th Infantry at the left,
try deployed athwart Route 33 at the forces of the 29th Division apparently
right of the 3d Division. With the sec- coming out of the adjacent sector of
tor quiet, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, the 7th Infantry to the west drew close
had no difficulty in replacing the 3d enough to place fire on the regimental
Battalion, 65th Infantry, at the center command post and supporting artillery
of the regimental front in midafternoon units. On the right, Chinese penetrated
to allow the latter to join its regiment and scattered the 1st Battalion, 24th
near the 29th British Brigade command Infantry. Unable to restore the position,
post in preparation for the scheduled General Bradley pulled the 24th In-
attack to relieve the Gloster battalion. fantry and 27th Infantry onto a new
But after unproductive opening attacks line about a mile to the south but
on the 65th Infantry and Philippine gained no respite as the Chinese
10th Battalion Combat Team and a followed closely.25
slow approach to line Kansas, the 29th In the 24th Division sector at corps
Division opened more effective assaults right, two companies of Chinese infil-
on the 7th Infantry between 2000 and trated the positions of the 19th Infan-
midnight of the 24th.23 Two regiments try during the night. But a greater dan-
of the division attacking across the ger was posed by the 60th Division,
Hantan River hit all three battalions of which, after again routing the ROK 6th
the regiment. Hardest hit was the 2d Division, reached and attacked the right
Battalion on the right flank, which by flank of the 21st Infantry. The 21st
0230 on the 25th was surrounded. On bent its line and tied it to the position
orders of the regimental commander, of its reserve battalion on the flank. But
Colonel Boswell, the battalion gradually the 60th, if it should shift to the south
infiltrated south in small groups and past the refused flank and the blocking
reassembled some four miles below line position set up by the battalion of the
Kansas around daylight. The 1st and 5th Infantry, could slip into the divi-
3d Battalions held their ground but re- sion and corps rear area through the
mained under pressure throughout the big opening created by the ROK 6th
night.24 Divisions second retreat.26
In the eastern half of the corps sector, Because of this danger on his ex-
the remainder of the 29th Division, the posed right flank, the continuing and
179th Division, and the 81st Division effective heavy pressure on the 25th
opened and steadily intensified attacks Division, and the threat of a major en-
on the 25th Division between dusk and emy penetration through the wide gap
between the ROK 1st Division and 3d
Division, General Milburn at 0500 on
23 The 7th Infantry later estimated that it had been
hit by forces from two divisions. See 7th Inf Comd
Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. If a second division was involved, it 25 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
probably was the 34th which also had participated in Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 20-21; Barth, Tropic Lightning
the initial attacks at line Utah. and Taro Leaf in Korea, pp. 80-81.
24 3d Div G2, Summary of Enemy Operations, 21-25 26 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
Apr 51, 9 May 51; 3d Div POR 160, 24 Apr 51, and Offensive, Apr 51, p. 19; 24th Div PIR 286, 24 Apr
161, 25 Apr 51; 7th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 51.
KWP-EBB-0439
the 25th ordered a withdrawal to line miles below the Yongpyong River. De-
Delta, which, as set out in previously spite the difficulty of withdrawing while
prepared corps plans, lay four to twelve heavily engaged, Bradleys forces suc-
miles, west to east, below line Kansas. ceeded in breaking contact with small
He instructed the 24th and 25th Divi- losses. By early evening the 27th Infan-
sions to begin their withdrawals at 0800 try and 35th Infantry were deployed
but directed the ROK 1st Division and on line Delta, left to right, with the
3d Division not to withdraw until the Turkish brigade and 24th Infantry as-
surrounded Gloster battalion had been sembled close behind the line.28
extricated. He specifically instructed In the 24th Division sector, General
General Soule to get the Glosters out Bryan deployed the 5th Infantry astride
before withdrawing, even if you have secondary Route 3A three miles behind
to counterattack.27 line Kansas to cover the withdrawal of
the 19th and 21st Regiments. Attached
to the 5th in support were its usual
Withdrawal to Line Delta
companion, the 555th Field Artillery
Battalion, and Company D, 6th Me-
East of the Imjin
dium Tank Battalion. Also directed by
With the Yongpyong River at its Bryan to join the covering force was
back, the 25th Division faced a canal- the 8th Ranger Company, which, as an
ized withdrawal over two bridges in the attachment to the 21st Infantry, had
southeastern corner of its sector, one been patrolling to the east in search of
on Route 3, the other at Yongpyong Chinese coming out of the IX Corps
town two miles to the west. Earlier, af- sector and currently was in an isolated
ter the Chinese had captured Hill 664 position atop Hill 1010 about a half mile
three miles directly north of the Route off the right flank of the 21st. But be-
3 crossing, General Bradley had set the fore the Rangers could make their
3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, in a block- move, they were surrounded and at-
ing position above the bridge. For the tacked by forces of the 60th Division.
withdrawal he ordered all of the 27th The 3d Battalion, 5th Infantry, which
Infantry to cover both river crossings Bryan earlier had placed in a blocking
while first the 24th Infantry and then position along his east flank, meanwhile
the 35th Infantry pulled back, the 24th observed Chinese moving south and
using the Route 3 bridge, the 35th us- west past its position.29 The 60th Divi-
ing the crossing at Yongpyong town. sion obviously had found and was mov-
To cover the withdrawing 27th Infan- ing into the open flank.
try, Bradley deployed his attached First the 19th Infantry, then the 21st
Turkish brigade astride Route 3 five Infantry, broke contact and withdrew
27 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 28 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
Offensive, Apr 51, p. 24; I Corps Withdrawal Plan Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 20, 26.
Golden #1, 17 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 29 Ibid., p. 24; 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
0500, 25 Apr 51; Rad, Eighth Army AG In no. 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51; 21st
CX 4329, CG I Corps to CG 3d Div et al., 25 Apr 51 lnf S3 Jnl, Entries 0421, 0650, 0750, and 0820, 25
(confirms oral orders); 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 40, 25 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton),
Apr 51. Quotation is from last source. 3d Bn, 5th RCT.
KWP-EBB-0440
without difficulty. By 1830 both regi- were registration rounds fired by the
ments were in position on line Delta 19th Infantry. Actually, they were the
and were deployed as before, the 19th opening shots of a large Chinese force
on the left, the 21st on the right. Once occupying the ridges along both sides
on Delta, the 21st Infantry was engaged of the road from the defile north for
by Chinese moving in from the north- more than a mile. A crescendo of Chi-
east but turned back these forces with nese small arms, machine gun, recoil-
no loss of ground. Later in the evening less rifle, and mortar fire brought the
the 21st made contact with the ROK remainder of Colonel Wilsons column
6th Division, which General Hoge had to an abrupt halt and began to take a
managed to redeploy at the left of the toll of men, weapons, and vehicles.32
IX Corps sector of the Delta line.30 Hardest hit was the 555th Field Artil-
Lt. Col. Arthur H. Wilson, Jr., who lery Battalion. Its return fire, includ-
had recently replaced Colonel Throck- ing direct fire from its howitzers, si-
morton as the 5th Infantry commander, lenced the Chinese along the west side
was forced to delay his withdrawal un- of the road; but the fire from obviously
til the 8th Ranger Company, which was larger numbers of Chinese on the east
attempting to fight its way out of its side grew in volume and kept most of
encircled position, reached him. To as- Wilsons column pinned down. Three
sist the attempt, Wilson sent five tanks attacks by forces of the 1st Battalion
toward Hill 1010. En route, the tank- were broken up, as was an attempt by
ers met and took aboard sixty-five the 2d Battalion to deploy. An attack
Rangers, most of t.hem wounded. They from the south by Company A, 6th Me-
were all who had survived the break- dium Tank Battalion, and a company
out attempt.31 from the 19th Infantry failed at the nar-
It was late afternoon before the tank- row lower end of the defile at a cost of
ers returned with the Rangers and two tanks and the infantrymen riding
Colonel Wilson got his forces in march them.33
order for withdrawing down Route 3A Searching for a way around the road-
through the positions of the 19th Infan- block, rearguard tankers from Com-
try and into an assembly area four miles pany D meanwhile found a track
behind line Delta. The 3d Battalion led branching west off Route 3A a mile
the way south, followed by the 555th north of the defile and a connecting
Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Battalion, road leading south to be free of
2d Battalion, and, as rear guard, Com- Chinese. Moving out under continuing
pany D, 6th Medium Tank Battalion.
A few mortar rounds exploded around
the 3d Battalion as it cleared a defile
32 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
about a half mile from the Delta front.
Offensive, Apr 51, p. 25: New York Post, 26 May 51;
Battalion members assumed that these Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton); 555th FA
Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd
Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51.
30 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 33 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Interv,
Offensive, Apr 51, p. 25; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Appleman with Lt Col Harry E. Stuart, CO, 555th FA
Apr 51. Bn, 9 Aug 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar,
31 New York Post, 26 May 51; Interv, Appleman Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton);
with S2 (Maj Hamilton). New York Post, 26 May 51.
KWP-EBB-0441
fire, but not pursued by the Chinese, a report that a large Chinese force
Wilsons forces followed the round- (which would have had to be the 189th
about route and escaped without fur- Division) coming through the gap be-
ther losses, reaching the lines of the tween the ROK 1st and 3d Divisions
19th Infantry shortly after dark. Dur- was bypassing the 3d Division on the
ing the night, aircraft and artillery left and moving southeast toward Route
bombarded the weapons, vehicles, and 33, the divisions main line of com-
equipment left behind: seven tanks, five munication. During the early morning
from Company D, 6th Medium Tank Soule dispatched the 1st and 2d Battal-
Battalion, and two from the 5th Infan- ions of the 65th Infantry, the Philip-
trys regimental tank company; eleven pine 10th Battalion Combat Team, and
howitzers from the 555th Field Artillery the 3d Reconnaissance Company to
Battalion; and a host of trucks, more take up positions athwart what ap-
than sixty from the 555th alone. The peared to be the line of march of the
artillerymen also suffered the most per- enemy force to prevent it from reach-
sonnel casualties. The initial count was ing the road. Since the Royal Ulster
one hundred killed, wounded, and Rifle and Northumberland Fusilier Bat-
missing, a figure somewhat reduced talions seemed certain to have diffi-
later as stragglers regained 24th Divi- culty in withdrawing with Route 11 now
sion lines over the next two days.34 interdicted by Chinese behind them,
Soule left the 3d Battalion, 65th In-
Hill 235 fantry, in position west of the 29th
No longer concerned with maintain- Brigades command post to help cover
ing the 3d Divisions line Kansas posi- the two battalions when they came
tions along the Imjin after receiving south. Brigadier Brodie strengthened
General Milburns early morning with- the cover by deploying the Belgian bat-
drawal order, General Soule immedi- talion across Route 11 just north of his
ately canceled the attack by the 65th command post. Except that the 3d Bat-
Infantry originally scheduled to start talion, 65th Infantry, might be diverted
at 0630 to relieve the Gloster battalion from its covering mission, Soule by day-
and clear enemy forces from the Hill light on the 25th had committed all re-
675 area. The latest report from the serves available to him except the divi-
29th Brigade, in any case, indicated that sions 64th Tank Battalion and the 65th
the Glosters were holding their own, Infantrys tank company. Any force
that they had asked for some Arty but formed to rescue the Glosters would
OK.35 To rescue the Glosters, the main have to be from these units. Soule as-
task seemed only to be to clear Route signed that task as a joint venture to
5Y and escort the battalion to the rear. Brigadier Brodie and Colonel Harris,
More worrisome to General Soule was commander of the 65th Infantry.36
34 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51; 363d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Rpt,
Interv, Appleman with Stuart, 9 Aug 51; Interv, Nar of Opns, Apr 51; 65th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
Appleman with Lt Edward P. Crockett, Plat Ldr, 5th 51; Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 198; Rpt,
Inf Regtl Tk Co; 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr CG 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire
51. Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Annex 9, Reserves Available
35 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 28, 25 Apr 51. to CG, 3d Inf Div.
KWP-EBB-0442
Shortly after giving Brodie and Har- which Brodie agreed, was that the task
ris responsibility for organizing the res- called for light tanks only. Capt. Claude
cue mission, Soule allowed the 7th In- Smith, whose 65th Infantry tank com-
fantry, which remained under attack pany thus was assigned the mission,
by the 29th Division and whose right wanted to use his entire company. But
flank would soon be completely uncov- Harris believed that one platoon was
ered by the withdrawal of the 25th all that could be profitably employed.
Division, to begin its withdrawal. The Harris assured General Mead, however,
2d Battalion, already off the line, led that he was prepared to follow up with
the withdrawal, while the 3d Battalion greater strength if necessary.39
pulled out of its left flank position and The tank platoon, short one tank left
followed a trail leading southwest be- behind for maintenance, started up
hind the covering 1st Battalion to reach Route 5Y after 0900. (Map 34) Appar-
Route 33 and continue south. Company ently out of a belated interest in speed,
A fought a difficult but highly effective the tankers moved out before an ob-
rearguard action as the 1st Battalion server from the 10th Field Artillery
disengaged near noon.37. Battalion, which was to have supported
Meanwhile, at 0800 Brigadier Bro- the operation, could join them. Nor
die and Colonel Harris were still con- were the tankers in communication with
ferring at Brodies command post to the regimental command post.40 The
decide the composition of the rescue single source of reports on the platoons
force. Concerned because the force was progress was a division observer peri-
not yet on the way, Brig. Gen. A. D. odically flying overhead.41
Mead, assistant division commander, About the time that Captain Smiths
joined the conference at that time and tanks began advancing toward the
emphasized the need for speed. Colo- Gloster battalion, General Kang, the
nel Harris responded that he under- ROK 1st Division commander, at-
stood his mission perfectly and that, if tempted a similar but somewhat
left alone, he and Brodie would handle stronger move, sending the 2d Bat-
it.38 talion of his 12th Regiment and two
Major Huth, the British tank com- platoons of Company C, 73d Heavy
pany commander who had participated Tank Battalion, north to restore the
in the unsuccessful attempt to reach the right flank position lost by the 12th
Glosters the day before, tried but failed Regiment on the 24th and then to make
to convince Colonel Harris that tanks contact with the Glosters. Under way
would not be able to reach the Glosters
unless accompanied by a strong infan-
try force. Harris final decision, with 39Ibid.; Intervs, Appleman with Huth, Capt Claude
Smith, CO, 65th Inf Tk Co, and 1st Lt Myron Dushkin,
65th Inf Tk Co.
40At the end of the slow planning session, Colonel
37 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div POR 161, Harris explained to General Mead that he had been
25 Apr 51; 7th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Gugeler, unable to dispatch the tanks sooner because of the
Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 144-53 (revised edition, arrangements that had had to be made for communi-
1970). See the last for a detailed account and appraisal cations and supporting fire. See Memo, Brig Gen
of Company As rear-guard action. A. D. Mead for CG, 3d Inf Div, 7 May 51.
38 Memo Brig Gen A. D. Mead for CG, 3d Inf Div, 41 Intervs, Appleman with Smith and Lt Col Alvin
7 May 51. L. Newbury, CO, 10th FA Bn.
KWP-EBB-0443
KWP-EBB-0444
before 0900, the ROK battalion and Brigadier Brodie had taken private
American tanks moved up the valley of steps to get the Glosters out. Though
the small Nullori River for perhaps a he had voiced agreement that the em-
mile before Chinese forces from heights ployment of a tank platoon was the
edging the valley opened fire and practical solution to opening Route 5Y
brought the advance to a halt. As of for the battalion, he apparently was
noon, the fire fight continued, with nei- unconvinced that the small armored
ther side gaining the deciding edge.42 force could succeed and about 0900 had
But although General Kangs attempt ordered the Glosters to fight their way
to reach the Glosters had been stopped, back. Brodie followed with orders to
it would shortly prove not to have failed the Royal Ulster Rifles and Northum-
altogether. berland Fusilier Battalions to withdraw
The air observer following the prog- south over Route 11 through the cover-
ress of the 65th Infantrys tank platoon ing Belgian battalion.43 Once the Glos-
on Route 5Y meanwhile reported that ters, Royal Ulster Rifles, and Northum-
the tanks had reached the Glosters and berland Fusiliers reached the 29th
that they were on the way out. But the Brigade command post area, the bri-
report was incorrect. The tankers had gade was to move back to the Delta line.
got into a fire fight far short of Hill 235, But the withdrawals of all three battal-
had used most of their ammunition, ions would take decidedly different
and, fearing they would be cut off when courses.
they sighted Chinese moving on their From its outset at midmorning the
flanks, had withdrawn, reaching their withdrawal of the Royal Ulster Rifles
company area between noon and 1300. and Northumberland Fusilier Battal-
Colonel Harris ordered another try by ions was a fight to the rear with Chi-
a different platoon, which, accompa- nese storming down on Route 11 from
nied by an artillery observer and tacti- the Hill 675 area. To escape the
cal air control party and escorted over- Chinese, most of the British troops
head by two flights of fighters and an turned east off Route 11 and made
observer, left about 1400. A mile out of their way out over open country. Worse
the company area, the platoon was off were some two hundred wounded
flagged to a halt by Major Huth, the loaded on the backs and sides of eight
British tank company commander, who Centurion tanks, which had no choice
convinced the platoon leader that the but to run the gauntlet. Several tanks
light tanks could not reach Hill 235. As were disabled, and most of their pas-
Colonel Harris decided against any fur- sengers were killed. Caught up in the
ther attempt and withdrew his tanks, fight, the Belgian battalion became scat-
there was, in any case, little reason to tered but held its ground. Late in the
try again. Hours before, almost imme- afternoon Brigadier Brodie finally suc-
diately after the early morning plan- ceeded in breaking contact and started
ning conference with Colonel Harris,
43 Interv, Appleman with Newbury; 3d Div G3 Jnl,
Entries 90 and 128, 25 Apr 51. See also Intervs,
42 I Corps Report on Action of Gloster Battalion, Appleman with Smith; Sgt Young Gladden, Jr., 65th
29th British Brigade, 23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3 May 51; Inf Tk Co; Dushkin; Huth; and Brig Brodie, 10 Sep
73d Hvy Tk Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. 51.
KWP-EBB-0445
MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH 29TH INFANTRY BRIGADE REST following their difficult
withdrawal from Imjin River positions.
his somewhat tangled forces, including attempted its breakout, the course of
the Belgians but not the Glosters, to- which was not yet clear to anyone in
ward line Delta. As the 29th Brigade Brodies headquarters or that of the 3d
cleared, the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, Division.
briefly engaged Chinese near its block- On Hill 235, during the continuing
ing position, then broke away and fol- quiet that had settled over the Gloster
lowed the British brigade.44 The iso- position following the devastating air
lated Gloster battalion meanwhile had strike on the Chinese by the flight of
F-80S, Colonel Carne had issued orders
for the battalions withdrawal about
44 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 52 and 93, 25 Apr 51; 3d 0930. If he knew that the 65th Infan-
Div, G3, Summary of 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51, try tank platoon was then starting up
14 May 51; 3d Div, G2, Summary of Enemy Opera-
tions, 2l-25 Apr 51, 9 May 51; Ely Jacques Kahn, The
Route 5Y toward him, he eschewed any
Gloucesters: An Account of the Epic Stand of the Gloucester- attempt to move south to meet it. Off
shire Regiment in Korea (London: Central Office of the left rear of the battalion was a val-
Information, 1951). p. 11: Holles. Now Thrive the
Armourers, pp. 166-67:Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions
ley leading upslope to a saddle about a
of the Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, An- mile southwest of Hill 235. Carne did
nex 9, Reserves Available to CG, 3d Inf Div. not know the exact location of the 12th
KWP-EBB-0446
ROK Regiments position, nor did he attempt to pass, then turn south
know that the 2d Battalion of the regi- through another valley toward the
ment and the two platoons of Company ROK 1st Divisions lines. As Company
C, 73d Heavy Tank Battalion, were A led the rest of the battalion into the
then attacking generally toward him. valley to the southwest, Captain Harvey
But he believed that moving southwest gave his men, including a dozen mem-
through the valley toward the right bers of the support company who had
flank of the ROK 1st Division would be been operating with Company D, the
the quickest way to reach safety and, if choice of surrendering or going with
the Glosters could make it through the him on the roundabout route. If a man
saddle, that they would have a good went down, Harvey warned, he would
chance of making it all the way. With be left behind. The entire group, about
the 45th Field Regiment providing ar- a hundred men, elected the escape at-
tillery support on call, Company A was tempt. If Colonel Carne knew of
to lead the withdrawal about 1000, Harveys plan, he did not object. All
Company C and battalion headquarters Glosters, in any case, would now be en-
and support troops were to follow, and tirely on their own since, just as they
Company D was to bring up the rear. began their withdrawal, Carne received
When Carne announced that he would word from brigade headquarters-the
remain on Hill 235 with the severely last his feeble radio would pick up-
wounded men (about fifty litter cases), that the 45th Field Regiment was under
the battalion surgeon, chaplain, and too heavy fire to provide support.46
several enlisted medics volunteered to A few minutes after the Glosters
stay with him.45 moving into the valley to the southwest
Since Chinese had been observed in cleared Hill 235, Captain Harvey led
that area during the past two days, his group off the north side of the hill.
Company D commander Capt. M. G. All men had taken off their distinctive
Harvey considered the valley a risky berets to prevent easy identification by
route, particularly for his company, Chinese who might observe them. Mov-
which would be bringing up the rear of ing alternately at a trot and fast walk,
the battalion. Even if Chinese were not they encountered only two Chinese,
on the heights bordering the valley, he whom they killed, on the northern leg
reasoned, they might be near enough of their route and none on the mile-
to spot the Gloster movement and set long stretch to the west. At the point of
up a trap before Company D could turning south, Harvey offered his men
clear the saddle. He preferred to try a breather, but they refused. They were
the unexpected, to move forward off determined, he recalled later, to come
the steep northeast side of Hill 235 out or get bloody killed. Appearing
where the Chinese had attempted no overhead as they turned to enter the
assault, follow Route 5Y for about a valley leading south was a Mosquito
mile, swing west through a lateral val-
ley around the hill mass through which
46 Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucester-
the remainder of the battalion would shire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Interv with Survivors;
Interv, Appleman with Harvey, 10 Sep 51; Kahn, The
Gloucesters, pp. 13-l 5; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the
45 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 64-67. Sword, pp. 64-67.
KWP-EBB-0447
division observer flying over the Hill wounded. Two officers and 24 men
235 area. At CT 182005, the observer would die in captivity.54 The high num-
reported, approximately 225 29th BIB ber of Glosters captured served to em-
soldiers are located. They act. as [if] they phasize how thoroughly entrapped by
are lost. They walked to the end of the Chinese Colonel Carnes forces had
road, found a dead end-returned to become.
their present positions and set [sic] When General Ridgway demanded a
down.52 formal report on the loss of the Gloster
The observer unwittingly had re- battalion, General Van Fleet replied
ported the capture of the Glosters in that in his opinion, all reasonable and
the southwest valley. The road he possible courses of action had been at-
mentioned was a trail leading up to the tempted to save the unit. The failure
saddle, the dead end the saddle itself. of relief efforts he attributed to the
When the head of the Gloster column strength and determination of the Chi-
reached the saddle, Chinese machine nese attacks, the Chinese capability to
gunners cupped around it opened fire, exploit early penetrations by infiltra-
wounding several men but generally tion and enveloping actions, and the
laying off the column. The fire in- limited reserves available to General
formed the Glosters that they were Milburn, General Soule, and Brigadier
trapped. On orders from their officers, Brodie with which to counter enemy
the Glosters laid down arms. Chinese successes.55 While he believed that the
appearing from the heights above Gloster position had had to be held as
them, uncertain about what to do with long as possible lest Chinese pour into
so many captives, initially took the the 3d Division and I Corps rear areas,
Glosters back down the trail and mo- Van Fleet privately faulted General
tioned to them to sit down.53 Soule for tardiness in discovering how
At the beginning of the Chinese of- critical the Glosters situation had be-
fensive the Gloster battalion had num- come and thus for failing to make
bered 28 officers and 671 men. In the timely decisions on when and how to
Solma-ri area to support the battalion relieve the battalion.56
were 6 officers and 22 men of the 70th General Milburn found little fault
Battery, Royal Artillery, and 1 officer with either Soule or Brigadier Brodie,
and 45 men of C Troop, 170th Mortar although in a report to Van Fleet he
Battery, Royal Artillery. In its initial drew particular attention to the confu-
accounting of losses, 29th Brigade sion of instructions surrounding the
headquarters reported that 622 of these
forces were either KIA, WIA, or
missing. Most of the reported casu- 54 Msg,
Maj-Gen Anthony Farrar-Hockley thru Brit-
ish Embassy (Brig-Gen Watson) for author, 10 Aug
alties later proved captured. From the 76; Ltr, Maj-Gen Anthony Farrar-Hockley to author,
Gloster battalion itself, 21 officers and 16 Sep 76; I Corps Report on Action of Gloster
509 men were taken captive, of whom Battalion, 29th British Brigade, 23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3
May 51.
8 officers and 145 men had been 55 Rad,C 61606, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 3
May 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 26 May
51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25
52 3d Div G2 Jnl, Entry 828, 25 Apr 51. Apr 51.
53 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 64-67. 56 Interv,Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51.
KWP-EBB-0449
CHAPTER XXIV
to the existing position of the ROK 5th Pukhan River five miles above its
Division below Inje.3 confluence with the Han, then turned
Although the I Corps withdrawal, steeply northeast, crossing Route 29 ten
and thus the chain reaction eastward, miles below Chunchon and cutting
was prompted by the heavy enemy Route 24 fifteen miles south of Inje.
pressure in the corps western sector, Continuing to angle northeast, the line
there was evidence by 26 April that the touched the east coast just above Yang-
main effort of the enemy offensive was yang. Implicit in Van Fleets insistence
beginning to falter. Enemy killed by on thorough coordination between
infantry and artillery fire and air strikes corps during the withdrawal to the new
on the I Corps front were estimated to line was that its occupation would be
number almost forty-eight thousand governed by the movement of the I
approximately the strength of five di- Corps against the continuing enemy
visions. Intelligence information indi- pressure on its front. Van Fleets assign-
cated that the stand of the Gloster bat- ment of corps sectors along the line
talion against forces of the 63d Army made the IX Corps responsible for de-
and the early fumbling of the 64th Army fending the Pukhan and Han corridors;
had upset the attack schedule of the consequently, the 24th Division, cur-
XIX Army Group and that the group rently located directly above that area,
commander was committing the 65th was to pass to IX Corps control on the
Army in an attempt to save the situation. 27th. When, contrary to custom, Van
But in this and other commitments of Fleet gave the line no name, it became
reserves, according to prisoner of war known as No Name line.5
interrogations, enemy commanders Of concern to Van Fleet after the I
were confused and their orders vague.4 Corps pulled back from the Imjin was
With only the west sector of the army the possibility that enemy forces would
front under any serious threat, and that cross the Han River estuary unseen
beginning to show signs of lessening, west of Munsan-ni and sweep down the
General Van Fleet on the 26th estab- Kimpo peninsula behind Seoul, over-
lished an additional transpeninsular running Inchon, Kimpo Airfield, and
defense line that in the central and the Seoul airport in the process. On 25
eastern sectors lay well north of line April he had asked the commander of
Nevada, the final line set out in the 12 the west coast group of Task Force 95
April withdrawal plan. The new line to keep the possible crossing site under
incorporated the fortifications of line surveillance, and on the 26th planes
Golden arching above the outskirts of from the groups carriers began to fly
Seoul. Eastward, it bulged across the over the area while in transit to and
from close support targets. The cruiser
Toledo meanwhile steamed for the
3 Rad, IXACT-1355, CG IX Corps to CG 1st Ma-
rine Div, 26 Apr 51; Rad IXACT-1356, CG IX Corps
to CGs 28th Brit Brig and ROK 6th Div, 26 Apr 51; X
Corps OI 163, 26 Apr 51.
4 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring 5 Rad, GX-4-5200 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I
Offensive, Apr 51, p. 38; Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig, no. Corps et al., 26 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-5341 KGOO, CG
96, 16-28 Feb 53, p. 27. Eighth Army to CGs I and IX Corps, 26 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0452
Inchon area from the Sea of Japan to der light provided by a flare ship elimi-
provide gunfire support.6 nated the enemy force.7
Enemy forces reaching the I Corps In a repetition of the pattern of en-
phase line after dark on the 26th at- emy attacks on the I Corps Delta front
tacked in each division sector except the previous night, the hardest assaults
that of the 24th on the corps right. On struck the ROK 1st Division and 65th
the front of the 25th Division, Chinese Infantry at the left of the 3d Divisions
concentrated an assault between two position west of Uijongbu. Telling ar-
companies of the 27th Infantry, some tillery fire and air strikes helped con-
reaching as far as a mile behind the tain penetrations of the 65ths line and
line before regimental reserves con- force the Chinese to withdraw. Chinese
tained them. A radar-directed bomb attacking the 15th Regiment at the right
strike brought down at the point of pen- of the ROK 1st Divisions line forced a
etration and ground fire delivered un- two-mile withdrawal before the South
Koreans were able to block the advance.
6 Rad, GX-4-5130 KNLO, CG Eighth Army to CTG North Koreans attacking down Route
95.1, 25 Apr 51; Rad, CTE 95.11 to CTG 95.1, 26
Apr 51; Rad, AG In no. CX-4480, CTG 95.1 to CG
Eighth Army, 26 Apr 51; Field, United States Naval 7 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
Operations, Korea, p. 346. Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 29-30.
KWP-EBB-0453
1 against the 11th Regiment and against On the I Corps right, the two line
the tank destroyer battalion west of the regiments of the 25th Division had
road broke through the lines of both some difficulty in getting off the first
units and took a particularly high toll phase line. The 27th Infantry ran into
of tank destroyer troops before South enemy groups that had got behind the
Korean counterattacks supported by regiment during the night, and Chi-
American tanks stopped the advance.8 nese closely following the 35th Infan-
At 0600 on the 27th, the 24th Divi- try took that regiment under assault
sion passed to IX Corps control, as had when it set up a covering position to
been directed by General Van Fleet, help the 27th Infantry disengage. It was
and what had been the boundary be- well into the afternoon before the two
tween the 24th and 25th Divisions be- regiments could break away. General
came the new corps boundary. Shortly Bradley deployed the same two regi-
afterward, General Milburn ordered his ments on the second phase line. In
remaining forces to withdraw to the preparation for further withdrawal,
next phase line, which would be the Bradley set the Turkish brigade in a
last occupied by the I Corps before it covering position midway between the
moved onto line Golden. West to east, phase line and line Golden and as-
the phase line lay one to seven miles sembled the 24th Infantry behind the
above Golden, touching the Han near Golden fortifications.10
the village of Haengju located almost On the 26th General Milburn had
due north of Kimpo airfield below the reinforced the 3d Division with the
river, cutting Route 1 and a minor 7th Cavalry. In preparation for the
road from the north near the village of withdrawal on the 27th, General Soule
Kupabal-li, crossing Route 3 four miles deployed the cavalry regiment at the
south of Uijongbu, and also intersect- left rear of the division as a pre-
ing a minor road along the new corps caution-which proved fortuitous-
boundary that below the phase line and against a flanking attack by XIX Army
line Golden joined Route 2 reaching Group forces who were continuing to
Seoul from the east. Following suit, press hard against the adjacent 15th
General Hoge ordered back the left of Regiment of the ROK 1st Division.
the IX Corps. The 24th Division, to The cavalrymen fended off a Chinese
which Hoge attached the ROK 6th Divi- attack from the northeast that lasted
sion and British 28th Brigade, was to into the afternoon. Along the second
take position adjoining the new I Corps phase line, General Soule meanwhile
line and stretching along the lower bank deployed his 7th and 15th Regiments
of the Pukhan toward the Chunchon- at center and right and assembled the
Soyang River position of the 1st Ma- 65th Infantry in reserve. He later set
rine Division.9 the 7th Cavalry on line at the left.11
The continuing pressure kept the
8 Ibid., pp. 32, 34. ROK 1st Division pinned in position
9 Rad, GX-4-5341 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs
I and IX Corps, 26 Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, The Commu-
nist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 29; Rad, 10 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
CIACT 4-172, CG I Corps to CG 3d Div et al., 27 Apr Offensive, Apr 51, p. 30.
51; Rad, IXACT-1366, CG IX Corps to CG 24th Div 11 Ibid., p. 32; Rad, CIACT 4-167, CG I Corps to
et al., 27 Apr 51. CGs 1st Cav Div and 3d Div, 26 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0454
until late afternoon, then diminished athwart the Pukhan corridor would im-
enough to allow the South Koreans to prove his chances of holding Seoul and
begin the difficult task of disengaging that the corridor area could be used as
while under attack. Enemy forces, a springboard to recapture the capital
however, failed to follow the with- if the forces defending the city itself
drawal. Along the second phase line, were pushed out.15 In the central and
General Kang deployed the 11th, 15th, eastern sectors, where enemy attacks
and 12th Regiments west to east and had clearly lost their momentum by 26
set out screening forces well to the April, the occupation of No Name
front.12 would obviate relinquishing territory
Enemy forces did not regain contact voluntarily, a cession that would occur
during the night. General Milburn nev- if the forces in those sectors moved back
ertheless expected an eventual follow- to line Nevada as prescribed in the 12
up in strength and ordered his forces April withdrawal plan.
to occupy line Golden on the 28th. Convinced by the morning of the
Again in chain reaction, Milburns with- 28th that the main enemy effort in the
drawal order set in motion the move to west was wearing out, Van Fleet in-
No Name line by forces to the east.13 formed corps commanders that he in-
From the outset of the enemy offen- tended to hold firmly on No Name
sive General Van Fleet had believed line. They were to conduct an active
that a strong effort should be made to defense of the line, making full use of
retain possession of Seoul, not only to artillery in conjunction with armored
gain the tactical advantage in maintain- counterattacks. Though members of his
ing a foothold above the Han River but staff considered it a tactical mistake to
also to prevent psychological damage risk having forces trapped against the
to the Korean people. To give up the north bank of the Han, Van Fleet in-
ROK capital a third time, he believed, sisted that there would be no with-
would ruin the spirit of the nation.14 drawal from the line unless extreme en-
His determination to fight for the city emy pressure clearly imperiled Eighth
lay behind his refusal to allow the Army positions, and then only if he
Eighth Army simply to surrender himself ordered it.16
ground in deep withdrawals and be- In case Van Fleet had to call a with-
hind his order of 23 April directing a drawal from No Name line, the Eighth
strong stand on line Kansas. Defeated Army was to retire to line Waco, a move
in the latter effort, mainly by the fail- which would still hold the bulk of the
ures of the ROK 6th Division, he had army well above line Nevada. In the
laid out No Name line in the belief that west, the new line designated by Van
a successful defense of its segment Fleet followed the Nevada trace along
the lower bank of the Han; in the cen-
12 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring tral and eastern areas, it lay nine to
Offensive, Apr 51, p. 34. eighteen miles below No Name line.
13 Rad,CICCG 4-22, CG I Corps to CG Eighth
Army, 28 Apr 51; Rad, CIACT 4-179, CG I Corps to
For planning purposes only, Van
CG 1st Cav Div et al., 28 Apr 51.
14 Quotation from USAWC Research Paper, A Will 15 Interv,Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51.
to Win, based on Intervs, Col Bruce F. Williams with 16 Ibid.; Rad, GX-4-5638 KGOO, CG Eighth Army
Van Fleet, 6 Apr 73, p. 26. to C/S ROKA et al., 28 Apr 51.
KWP-EBB-0455
ers were issuing only such general in- the 25th Division, but heavy artillery
structions as go to Seoul and go as fire and air attacks delivered after dark
far to the south as possible. On one broke up the enemy force.23 Division
occasion, according to prisoners, re- patrols searching the enemy concentra-
serve forces ordered forward moved tion area after daylight on the 30th
south under the impression that Seoul found an estimated one thousand en-
already had fallen. One factor in the emy dead. Across the corps front, pa-
deterioration was a high casualty rate trols moving as much as six miles above
among political officers-especially line Golden on the 30th made only mi-
at company level-on whom the Chi- nor contacts. On the basis of the patrol
nese Army depended so heavily for findings, General Milburn reported
maintaining troop motivation and to General Van Fleet that the enemy
discipline.21 forces on his front were staying out of
Obviously willing, if growing less artillery range while regrouping and
able, to continue the attack on Seoul, resupplying for further attacks.24 Actu-
the North Korean 8th Division assisted on ally in progress was the beginning of a
its left by Chinese in what appeared to general enemy withdrawal.
be regimental strength struck the out- In dropping back to No Name line,
post line of the ROK 1st Division shortly Eighth Army forces since 22 April had
before midnight on the 28th. Accurate given up about thirty-five miles of terri-
defensive fire, especially from tanks, tory in the I and IX Corps sectors and
artillery, and the guns of the Toledo, about twenty miles in the sectors of the
broke up the attack before enemy as- X and ROK III Corps. Logistical plan-
sault forces could get through the out- ning completed in anticipation of the
post line and reach the main South Ko- enemy offensive had kept line units well
rean positions. Tank-infantry forces furnished with all classes of supplies
sent out by General Kang after day- during the attacks and at the same time
light followed and fired on retreating had prevented any loss of stocks stored
enemy groups for two miles, observing in major supply points during the with-
between nine hundred and a thousand drawal. Gearing removal operations to
enemy dead along the route.22 the phased rearward movements, serv-
The 8th Divisions attack proved to be ice forces had shifted supplies and
the only serious enemy attempt to break equipment southward to predeter-
through the Golden fortifications. An- mined locations from which line units
other effort appeared to be in the off- could be readily resupplied without
ing during the day of the 29th when
patrols and air observers reported a
large enemy buildup on the front of 23 A number of published works on the war report
that six thousand enemy attempted to ferry the Han
and attack down the Kimpo peninsula to outflank
Seoul on 29 April and that air attacks defeated the
21 Ibid., pp. 35, 38; George, The Chinese Communist effort. The official records do not support these
Army in Action, p. 10. accounts. The authors may have been referring to the
22 Rad, CICCG 4-23, CG I Corps to CG Eighth North Korean effort to cross the river at Haengju on
Army, 29 Apr 51; Rad, AG In no. CX 5260, CTF 95 the 28th.
to COMNAVFE et al., 29 Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, The 24 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 36-37; Rad, CICCG 4-24, CG I
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, Corps to CG Eighth Army, 30 Apr 51.
p. 36.
KWP-EBB-0457
CHAPTER XXV
weak and since the terrain barriers of tempt to establish a patrol base up
the higher Taebaeks favored defense.3 Route 1 on 4 May.4
The six ROK divisions in the east
The Search for the Enemy
opened the advance toward line Mis-
souri on the 7th. Along the coast, ROK
Along with his 30 April instructions I Corps forces met almost no opposi-
for the defense of No; Name line, Van tion, and on the 9th the ROK 11th
Fleet ordered intensive patrolling to lo- Divisions tank destroyer battalion
cate and identify enemy formations as scooted some sixteen miles beyond the
they continued to move out of contact. Missouri line to occupy the town of
Patrols searching three to five miles Kansong, where Route 24 ended in a
above the front during the first two junction with the coastal highway.
days of May, however, encountered no Forces of the ROK 5th Division on the
major enemy force except at the I left flank of the advance in the X Corps
Corps left where ROK 1st Division pa- zone reached line Missouri the same
trols found the North Korean 8th Divi- day. The other four divisions, though
sion deployed astride Route 1. To still as much as ten miles short of the
deepen the search in the west and cen- line on the 9th, had made long daily
tral areas, Van Fleet ordered patrol gains against scattered delaying forces.
bases set up five to six miles out along a In the west, the bulk of the ROK 1st
line reaching east as far as Route 24 in Division advancing up Route 1 between
the X Corps sector. Each division 7 and 9 May levered North Korean
fronted by this line was to establish a forces out of successive positions and
regimental combat team in a base posi- finally forced them into a general with-
tion organized for perimeter defense. drawal. Setting the 15th Regiment in a
Patrols operating from the bases could patrol base six miles up Route 1, Gen-
work farther north with full fire sup- eral Kang pulled his remaining forces
port, and the forward positions would back into his No Name fortifications.5
deepen the defense in the sectors where From other bases in the I, IX, and X
Van Fleet expected to be most heavily Corps sectors, patrols doubled the
attacked. While the fortification of No depth of their previous reconnaissance
Name line continued, the front east of but had no more success in making firm
Route 24 was to be advanced six to fif- contact than had patrols working from
teen miles to line Missouri, both to re- No Name line. Available intelligence in-
store contact and to clear a stretch of
Route 24 and a connecting secondary 4 Rad, GX-5-114 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S
road angling east to the coast for use as ROKA et al., 1 May 51; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May
a supply route by the ROK divisions 51; Rads, CICCG 4-26 and CICCG 5-3, CG I Corps to
CG Eighth Army, 2 and 3 May 51, respectively; Rad,
defending the sector. Van Fleet also di- GX-5-340 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and
rected a foray to destroy North Korean X Corps and C/S ROKA, 4 May 51; Rad, GX-5-591
forces in the I Corps west sector after KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 4 May 51.
5 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May 5l; Eighth Army
the 8th Division stopped short the 12th POR, 7 May 51; Rad, X 19577, CG X Corps to CG
Regiment of the ROK 1st Divisions at- Eighth Army, 7 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 8 May
51; Rad, X 19608, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 9
May 5 1; Eighth Army POR, 9 May 51;1 Corps Comd
3 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May 51 Rpt, Nar, May 51.
KWP-EBB-0460
formation indicated that the 64th, 12th, ROK I Corps in the east meanwhile
60th, and 20th Armies were completely were to continue their attack to line
off the west and west central fronts for Missouri, a step which would carry
refurbishing and that each of the four them above the Kansas line.6
armies still in those sectors-the 65th Van Fleet decided against the Tope-
63d, 15th, and 27th-had only one divi- ka advance on the 11th after changes
sion forward as a screen while remain- in the intelligence picture indicated
ing divisions prepared to resume the that enemy forces were within a few
offensive. Since there were no firm in- days of reopening their offensive. Air
dications that the resumption was an observation of enemy troops where
immediate prospect, however, General none previously had been seen sug-
Van Fleet on 9 May issued plans for gested forward movements under cover
returning the Eighth Army to line of darkness, reports told of large en-
Kansas. In the first phase of the return emy reconnaissance patrols, and both
the I, IX, and X Corps were to attack, agents and prisoners alleged an early
tentatively on the 12th, toward line
Topeka running from Munsan-ni east
6 Eighth Army G3 and G2 SS Rpts, May 51; Rad,
through Chunchon, then northeast to- GX-5-1483 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et
ward Inje. The ROK III Corps and al., 9 May 51.
KWP-EBB-0461
resumption of the offensive. Extensive stop the Chinese here and hurt him,
smoke screens rose north of the 38th Van Fleet told Hoge. I welcome his
parallel ahead of the IX Corps and attack and want to be strong enough in
above the Hwachon Reservoir in the X position and fire power to defeat him.7
Corps sector. Drawing Van Fleets par- Lavish artillery fire, in particular, was
ticular notice were reports that five to be used. If gun positions could be
armies-the 60th, 15th, 12th, 27th, and kept supplied with ammunition, Van
20th-were massing west of the Pukhan Fleet wanted five times the normal day
for a major attack in the west central of fire expended against enemy attacks.
sector. In further instructions for de- As calculated by his G-4, Colonel
fense, Van Fleet ordered the No Name Stebbins, the Van Fleet day of fire
fortifications improved and directed could be supported for at least seven
General Hoge to give special attention days, although transportation could
to the Pukhan corridor, where the become a problem since Stebbins could
heaviest enemy buildup was reported. not haul other supplies while handling
Hoge was to place the bulk of the IX
Corps artillery on that flank. I want to 7 Eighth Army CG and C/S Jnl, May 51.
KWP-EBB-0462
that amount of ammunition.8 Rations sion was still to pass to army reserve
and petroleum products already and organize forces capable of reinforc-
stocked in corps sectors, however, ing or counterattacking in the I, IX, or
would last for more than seven days.9 X Corps sectors in at least regimental
Immediate army reserves for the ad- combat team strength on six hours
vance to line Topeka were to have been notice. Beginning on the 11th, the
the 3d Division, to be withdrawn from 15th Regimental Combat Team assem-
the I Corps, and the Canadian 25th In- bled near Ichon, at the intersection
fantry Brigade, which had reached of Routes 13 and 20 thirty-five miles
Korea on 5 May.10 Having undergone southeast of Seoul, ready to move on
extensive training at Fort Lewis, Wash- call into the X Corps sector; for opera-
ington, the brigade would be ready to tions in support of the IX Corps, the
join operations after brief tune-up 65th Regimental Combat Team assem-
exercises in the Pusan area. Though bled near Kyongan-ni, twenty miles
the Topeka advance was off, Van southeast of Seoul and directly below
Fleet ordered the Canadians to move the Pukhan River corridor; and the 7th
north, beginning on 15 May, to Kumn- Regimental Combat Team assembled
yangjang-ni, twenty-five miles southeast in Seoul for missions in the I Corps
of Seoul, and prepare to counter any sector.11
enemy penetration in the Pukhan or The six ROK divisions on the east-
Seoul-Suwon corridors. The 3d Divi- ern front were to stay forward of No
Name line but were not to make fur-
8
Van Fleet Day of Fire per Tube ther attempts to occupy line Missouri.
105-mm. howitzer . . . . . . . 300 rounds In the X Corps sector, the ROK 5th
155-mm. howitzer . . . . . . . 250 rounds and 7th Divisions, whose forces had all
155-mm. gun . . . . . . . . . . 200 rounds but reached the Soyang River south-
8-inch howitzer . . . . . . . . . 200 rounds
75-mm. howitzer . . . . . . . . 250 rounds west of Inje, were to fortify their pres-
9 Rad, GX-5-1776 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs ent positions. The ROK III Corps and
I, IX, and X Corps, 11 May 51; Eighth Army PIR ROK I Corps were to set their four divi-
302, 10 May 51; Eighth Army G2 and G3 SS Rpts,
May 51; X Corps PIRs 226, 10 May 51, and 227, 11 sions in fortified defenses between the
May 51; IX Corps G2 Jnl, Sum, 11 May 51; Eighth lower bank of the Soyang south of Inje
Army CG and C/S Jnl, May 51; Eighth Army Arty SS and the town of Kangson-ni, five miles
Rpt, Jun 51.
10 Arriving on 6 May was the Imperia1 Ethiopian north of Yang-yang on the coast, after
Expeditionary Force to Korea, composed of volun- conducting spoiling attacks on 12
teers from the Ethiopian imperial bodyguard and con- May in the two principal communica-
sisting of an infantry battalion and a superfluous force
headquarters. Also known as the Kagnew battalion, tions centers ahead of them, Inje and
the force had had only rudimentary combat training Yongdae-ri, the latter located on Route
and arrived without weapons and equipment. The 24 fifteen miles northeast of Inje. The
Ethiopians were scheduled to spend eight weeks at
the U.N. center. Another May arrival would be the
1st Battalion, Kings Shropshire Light Infantry, 11 Rad, GX-5-1483 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I
which under the British rotation system would Corps et al., 9 May 51; Fox, Inter-Allied Co-operation
replace the 1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland During Combat Operations, pp. 26, 29-30, 47; Wood,
Highlanders, in the British 28th Brigade. Due to reach Strange Battleground, pp. 94-95; Rad, GX-5-1450
Japan in late May for a month of training with equip- KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps
ment bought from the United States before moving and CG 3d Div, 9 May 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum,
to Korea was the staff of a sixty-bed mobile surgical 9 and 12 May 51; Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in
hospital from Norway. Korea, p. 207.
KWP-EBB-0463
most impossible. The Eighth Army west central sector, probably toward
intelligence staff as of 16 May had no the Han River corridor, and would be
corroborating evidence of the reported made by five armies, the 60th, 15th,
movement east of the Pukhan and even 12th, 27th, and 20th. He also anticipated
had some doubt that the Chinese shift strong attacks toward Seoul over Route
extended as far east as Chunchon.15 1 and through the Uijongbu corridor
According to the consensus of cur- as well as another on the Chunchon-
rent estimates of enemy dispositions as Hongchon axis.16
of the 16th, the North Korean1 Corps on
the west had spread forces eastward to-
The Offensive Resumed
ward Route 33, taking over ground pre-
viously occupied by the XIX Army Group. The actual extent of the Chinese shift
The 65th Army astride Route 33 north from the west had been indicated by
of Uijongbu and the 63d Army in the the few reports of planned and ongo-
adjacent ground to the east formed the ing movements beyond the Pukhan. By
new front of the XIX Army Group. Re- 16 May Peng Teh-huai had moved five
ports placed the 64th Army northwest armies into the area along the Soyang
of the 65th. West to east, the 60th, 15th, River between Chunch'on and Inje be-
and 12th Armies were believed to oc- hind screening forces of the 39th Army
cupy the new front of the III Army Group and the North Korean III Corps. The
from a point above the Pukhan River 60th Army and 15th Army of the III
in the vicinity of Kapyong eastward al- Army Group were in the area between
most to Chunchon. More tentatively Chunchon and Naepyong-ni. At and
located, the 20th and 27th Armies of immediately beyond Naepyong-ni was
the IX Army Group were reported to the 12th Army, organic to the III Army
be off the front in the area north of Group but now attached to the IX Army
Chunchon and the groups 26th Army Group. Farthest east, the 27th Army and
possibly in the same vicinity. The XIII 20th Army of the IX Army Group were
Army Group apparently was still on the clustered in the vicinity of Kwandae-ri
east central front, its 40th Army astride just west of Inje.17
Route 17 just above Chunchon and Peng planned to launch his main at-
the 39th Army next to the east with tack on a southeastward course below
its bulk between the Hwachon Reser- the Naepyong-ni-Kwandae-ri stretch
voir and the Soyang River and light of the Soyang. His reason for shifting
forces occupying a bridgehead below the main effort into the higher Tae-
the Soyang between Chunchon and baeks despite the portended logistical
the river town of Naepyong-ni some problems may have surfaced when Chi-
ten miles upstream to the northeast. On nese captured in March, April, and
the basis of these dispositions, General
Van Fleet continued to believe that the
main enemy effort would come in the 16 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, May 51; Eighth Army
PIR 307, 15 May 51; X Corps PIRs 226, 10 May 51;
227, 11 May 51, and 231, 15 May 51.
15 X Corps G2 Section Rpt, Battle of the Soyang 17 X
Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Map 1B, Enemy Rede-
River, 30 Jun 51; X Corps PIRs 225, 9 May 51, 228, ployment, May 51; Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig no. 1,
12 May 51, and 229, 13 May 51; Eighth Army PIR 1-31 Dec 52, and no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53; Hq, FEC,
307, 15 May 51. History of the North Korean Army.
KWP-EBB-0465
early May were asked about the worth Corps. On the west flank of the main
of Peoples Liberation Army weapons, attack, the 60th Army, less its 181st Divi-
training, and tactics. Almost unani- sion, which had been attached to the
mously the captives considered the 12th Army to reinforce the main effort,
armys armament, preparations, and was to conduct a holding attack against
precepts to be inadequate for the con- the 1st Marine Division. The XIX Army
ditions of battle in Korea. Depreciat- Group, now stretched out from the
ing the man over weapons" doctrine, Kapyong area west to Route 33 above
they conceded that men in superior Uijongbu, and the North Korean I Corps,
numbers could defeat an enemy supe- astride Route 1, were to make similar
rior in other respects only if the enemys attacks in the IX Corps and I Corps
superiority was not too great.18 Such a sectors.20
realization by the enemy high command
could have influenced the decision to ROK Forces Give Way-Again
move the main effort: perhaps Peng
Crossing the Soyang northwest of
chose to attack through some of the
Kwandae-ri with its 81st Division in the
most difficult ground on the front be-
van, the 27th Army opened against the
cause the rugged ridges and sparse
ROK 5th and 7th Divisions with hard
road net would reduce to some degree
blows centered at the seam between the
the U.N. Commands advantage of
two divisions that almost immediately
superior mobility, firepower, and air
began to dislodge the line regiments.
power.
(Map 35) General Almond authorized
As revealed by the captives taken on
the two divisions to withdraw to No
10 and 13 May, the objective of the Name line around midnight. A success-
main effort-to be launched during the ful withdrawal by the artillery of both
evening of the 16th by the 15th, 12th, divisions down Route 24 into the sector
and 27th Armies-was to sever the six of the 2d Division may have caused er-
ROK divisions on the eastern front roneous early morning reports that the
from the remainder of the Eighth two divisions were regrouping on No
Army, to annihilate them, and to de- Name line. Later reports revealed a fa-
stroy the 2d Division.19 In support of miliar story of infantry units scattered
the main effort, the North Korean V by enemy attacks while they were at-
Corps was to attack out of the Inje area tempting to disengage, broken com-
in the ROK III Corps sector, and the munications, loss of control, a search for
North Korean II Corps, which had missing troops, and the reorganization
moved down from Hoeyang where it of those that could be found. Reor-
had been refurbishing since late March, dered forces of the ROK 5th Division
was to attack along the east coast and were set out in echelon to the southeast
atop the Taebaeks against the ROK I along the 2d Divisions right flank. By
noon on the 17th the only infantry units
18See George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action,
pp. 168-75. 20 X Corps Special Rpt, Battle of the Soyang River;
19 Other than the statements of these captives and X Corps G2 Section Rpt, Battle of the Soyang River,
similar statements of others taken during the offensive, 30 Jun 51; X Corps PIR 243, 27 May 51; Hq, USAFFE,
available enemy sources do not disclose the terrain or Intel Dig no. 96, 16-28 Feb 53; Hq, FEC, History of
other tactical objectives set for the main attack. the North Korean Army.
KWP-EBB-0466
MAP 35
KWP-EBB-0467
of the ROK 7th Division that had been the heart of its position, then blanketed
located were two battalions of the re- the artillerymen with fire. In the scram-
serve 3d Regiment which were in posi- ble out of the trap, only the tailend
tion and engaged six miles behind No battery saved its guns and vehicles. By
Name line near the village of Sangam- evening the 11thBattalion and the crip-
ni on the primitive road whose stretch pled 30th Battalion returned north to
northeast to Hyon-ni and then North- firing positions in the Hyon-ni area.
west to Inje was the single route serv- General Yu meanwhile sent the corps
ing the ROK III Corps sector. Engag- reserve, a regiment of the ROK 9th
ing the 3d Regiment were forces of the Division, south from Hyon-ni to deal
81st Division, whose main body had with the block, but its efforts were futile
slashed southeast through the ground against the stronger Chinese force.
abandoned by the ROK 7th Division to With the west flank left open by the
block the road just above Sangam-ni.21 collapse of the ROK 7th Division, the
The 30th Field Artillery Battalion of ROK III Corps was in danger of being
the ROK 9th Division discovered the enveloped, or, with the Chinese 81st
roadblock the hard way while displac- Division continuing to block the road
ing as a result of orders from ROK to the rear and the North Korean 6th
Army forward headquarters calling the and 12th Divisions still pushing in from
ROK III Corps and the ROK I Corps the north, of being caught in a costly
back to No Name line. Though the two squeeze.22
corps had held up well under attacks
by the 6th and 12th Divisions of the
The 2d Division-Again
North Korean V Corps and the 27th and
2d Divisions of the North Korean II With the right flank of the 2d Divi-
Corps, General Almonds midnight sion no more than sketchily protected
action allowing the ROK 5th and 7th by ROK 5th Division units, General
Divisions to retire to No Name line had Ruffners forces also faced the
led the ROK Army headquarters to fol- prospect of being enveloped. Indeed,
low suit on the morning of the 17th. As if any American division seemed des-
the two ROK III Corps divisions drew tined to be repeatedly involved in hard
back to No Name positions centered defensive battles, it was the 2d. And, as
above Hyon-ni, staying scarcely a step in its difficult engagement along the
ahead of pursuing North Korean Chongchon River in late November,
forces, their artillery battalions (the the division was again to be threatened
30th followed in column by the 11thof from the east after ROK forces gave
the ROK 3d Division) moved below way while it contended with strong Chi-
Hyon-ni toward Sangam-ni. The Chi- nese attacks from the north.
nese blocking force waited until the General Ruffner had manned the left
30th, filled a narrow stretch of road and center of the divisions fifteen-mile
twisting through a steep-sided defile in sector south of Naepyong-ni with the
9th and 38th Regiments and had recon- Ivanhoe Security Force (a provisional
stituted Task Force Zebra, the tank- company of South Korean troops origi-
infantry group that had performed well nally organized for division rear area
in late April, to occupy the line at the security missions); and the 3d Battalion,
right. The French battalion, the only ROK 36th Regiment, attached from the
division reserve, was at Hangye on ROK 5th Division. The ROK battalion
Route 24, about five miles behind the occupied a patrol base along the trace
Zebra line, deliberately set there by of the Missouri line and the Ivanhoe
Ruffner to reinforce quickly the some- Security Force a forward blocking posi-
what thin task force position. tion adjacent to the 38th Infantrys
Under earlier orders to send daily ROK rangers on the west flank. On No
patrols to the Soyang in the area imme- Name line, the 2d Battalion of the 23d
diately east of Chunchon, the 9th In- Infantry, Company C of the tank bat-
fantry had deployed one battalion on talion, and the ranger company stood
No Name line and two in patrol bases. athwart both Route 24 angling in from
On the highest ground in the division the northeast through the Hongchon
sector, two battalions of the 38th Infan- River valley and a minor road running
try occupied a string of prominent down a valley from the northwest and
heights along No Name line, the 3d at joining Route 24 just behind the task
the left, the 1st at the right. (Map 36) force position. West to east on ridges
Two miles out on the west, the 2d commanding the two roads were Com-
Battalion manned a patrol base that panies F, E, and G and the rangers.
blocked ridgeline and valley approaches The tanks stood behind barricades of
to the 3d Battalions position. Above wire and minefields blocking both val-
the right flank of the 1st Battalion, a leys, though not the roads, which had
provisional company of South Korean been left free of obstacles to allow pa-
rangers held a blocking position on a trols to pass through. Company B of
ridge offering enemy forces a good ap- the tank battalion, in reserve, and the
proach down the boundary between the trains and command post of the 2d
38th Infantry and Task Force Zebra. Battalion, 23d Infantry, were at the val-
Colonel Coughlin, commander of the ley village of Chaun-ni, on Route 24
38th, had set the attached Netherlands two miles behind the lines. Colonel
battalion on Hills 710 and 975 behind Brubakers command post was farther
the 1st Battalion with instructions to be down Route 24 at the village of
prepared to counterattack anywhere in Putchaetful.24
the 1sts sector.23 Jarring daylight probes of the Zebra
Task Force Zebra, led as before by patrol base and sharp patrol skirmishes
Lt. Col. Elbridge L. Brubaker, com- close to the lines of the 38th Infantry
mander of the 72d Tank Battalion, now were forerunners of attacks by one divi-
included all but one company of the sion of the 15th Army and two divisions
tank battalion; the 2d Battalion, 23d
Infantry; the 1st Ranger Company; the
\0\
KWP-EBB-0470
of the 12th. In the 12th Armys at- effort shortly before dawn, enemy bod-
tack, launched about dusk, the press of ies hanging in the wire, sprawled in the
35th Division forces along the 38th In- minefields, and lying on the road and
fantry-Task Force Zebra boundary high ground to the north numbered
jammed the Ivanhoe Security Force and about four hundred fifty.26
adjacent company of ROK rangers back First to feel the sting of hard attack
against Company F, 23d Infantry, be- in the 38th Infantrys sector was the 2d
fore defensive fires smothered the as- Battalion. Concentrating on Company
sault. On the 12ths east wing, the 92d E on Hill 755 at the center of the patrol
Regiment, 31st Division, attacking the base, a force from the 45th Division, 15th
Zebra patrol base expelled and disor- Army, though delayed and hurt while
ganized the 3d Battalion, ROK 36th breaching minefields and wire en-
Regiment. South Koreans streamed tanglements, drove off the company
through the main Zebra line until mid- with the second wave of its assault.
night, most of them down the north- About 0230, as the attack spread to
west valley defended by the 3d Platoon Company F on the left flank of the split
of Company C, 72d Tank Battalion. position, Colonel Coughlin ordered the
French troops at Hangye collected the patrol base force to withdraw behind
disordered groups as they continued the 3d Battalion. Apparently spent by
down Route 24 and assembled them the effort to take Hill 755 and blan-
for reorganization and screening for keted by covering artillery fire, the Chi-
enemy infiltration.25 nese made no immediate attempt to fol-
Shortly after midnight, fifty or sixty low the withdrawal.27
Chinese leading a column of the 92d At the right of the 1st Battalion, pla-
Regiment in pursuit of the South Ko- toons of Companies A and C occupy-
reans charged through the opening in ing Hills 1051 and 914 and a saddle
the northernmost of two wire aprons between turned back a series of attacks
strung across the valley. Forced off the opened at dusk by small units of the
road by fire from the tankers, the Chi- 35th Division in concert with the assaults
nese deployed to the left and right, that drove back the two provisional
exploding mines and setting off trip ROK companies along the 38th Infan-
flares. The larger body of enemy to the try-Task Force Zebra boundary. But
rear deployed under the light of the following these apparent tests of the
flares, and successive lines of skirmish- defenses, a full attack by the divisions
ers attempted to break the wire and 103d Regiment about 0200 shoved
reach the tanks. The 3d Platoon, rein- Company A forces out of the saddle,
forced by the 2d Platoon, shot down opening the way for a sweep behind
waves of charging troops while artil- the 1st Battalion or for a deep penetra-
lery fire walked up the valley above the tion down a valley leading southeast to
wire. When the Chinese gave up the
1430, Colonel Chiles concentrated the greater strength against the enemy pen-
2d Battalion in the left half of the etration or to set troops along its south-
sector, put in the 3d Battalion on the west shoulder, a move which, with the
right, and placed the 1st Battalion in French battalion blocking the valley in
reserve just above Hangye. Except for the 23d Infantry sector, would, if some-
exchanging fire with Company F on the what thinly, seal off the penetration.
left flank, the Chinese moving onto the He opted for the second course. By eve-
front were inactive throughout the ning he had the Netherlands battalion
afternoon, but their number continued on the way to occupy Hill 975 and thus
to grow as the Netherlands battalion, extend the right flank of Company A,
though Colonel Coughlin on orders 38th Infantry, now on Hill 790 about a
from General Ruffner instructed it to mile below Hill 1051, and had the 2d
attack at 1300, failed to advance.31 Battalion of the 38th moving up to de-
General Ruffner sensed from the fend a ridge curving southeast of Hill
Dutch failure to move that Colonel 975 to Hill 691.33
Coughlin was looking half way over In search of reserves to back up his
the shoulder instead of concentrating hard-pressed central forces, Ruffner
on the essential task of closing the gap.32 at midmorning had asked General
Ruffner again ordered the Dutch to Almonds permission to pull the two
attack, this time at 1500, and started patrol base battalions of the 9th Infan-
forward by helicopter to direct the at- try out of the left sector, which was ob-
tempt himself, but his craft crashed on viously outside the zone of the enemys
a hilltop near the 1st Battalion com- main attack. Almond instructed him to
mand post. Neither Ruffner nor his pi- plan the move but deferred a final deci-
lot was seriously injured, but Ruffner sion until he (Almond) could determine
was stranded well beyond the time set how the removal of the two battalions
for opening the attack. Hiking to the would affect the dispositions of the 1st
battalion command post to meet a res- Marine Division. Almond raised the
cue helicopter sent out by the division matter with General Van Fleet during
surgeon, he returned to his headquar- the afternoon while apprising the army
ters after receiving assurances that the commander of the corps situation and
Dutch had jumped off on time. There bidding for reinforcement. Given the
he learned that Chinese on and around course of enemy attacks and the enemy
Hill 1051 had stymied the Dutch and units so far identified, Almond believed
that Chinese on the far side of the gap that Peng Teh-huai was attempting to
had shoved Company C completely out turn the right flank of the X Corps with
of position and forced its remnants the 27th Army, would wait until the 27th
back to the position of Company F, seriously threatened the flank, then
23d Infantry. Ruffner now considered would make his main effort down the
two courses open to him-to commit Chunchon-Hongchon axis with the III
31 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; X Corps Rpt, 33 Ibid., Entries 67-71, 17 May 51; 2d Div Comd
Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May- Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51;
2 Jun 51; 23d Inf POR 230, 17 May 51; 38th Inf 38th Inf S2 Jnl, Entries 51 and 62, 17 May 51; X
Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. Corps Rpt, Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf
32 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entry 48, 17 May 51. RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun 5 1.
KWP-EBB-0473
tions to relieve the 1st Marines on night, a technique employed only spar-
No Name line at the divisions right, ingly until April, also reached a peak,
then by sidestepping the 1st Marines particularly in guiding B-29 sorties.39
onto the 9th Infantrys front. The 5th On 17 May General Stratemeyer di-
Marines, on the divisions left flank, rected that no fewer than twelve of the
later were to swing roundabout into the medium bombers be committed to the
38th Infantrys sector after being re- nightly support. Typical of one nights
placed by forces of the 7th Division.37 effort was a drop of three hundred fifty
Meanwhile, late on the 17th Almond 500-pound proximity-fuzed general
authorized both divisional and corps purpose bombs on twenty targets se-
artillery units to quintuple their am- lected by X Corps headquarters, all of
munition expenditure (the Van Fleet them enemy troop concentrations,
day of fire) and directed them to con- some within four hundred yards of the
centrate fire on likely avenues of front. Casualty estimates by follow-up
enemy approach within three thousand patrols and the statements of captives
yards of defensive positions. Am- attested to the precision of the radar
munition expenditure would increase guided attacks.40
dramatically, reaching 41,350 rounds In the 2d Division sector, the main
and 1,187 tons on 18 May and even nighttime targets of air and artil-
higher amounts afterward. As had been lery attack-most observed in their ap-
predicted by the Eighth Army G-4, proach well before dark on the 17th-
sufficient ammunition to support the were fresh enemy columns coming in
heavy expenditure was maintained at on the positions of the 38th Infantry,
the army supply point serving the X passing through the gap, and moving
Corps, but not without difficulty. The east across the front of the 23d Infan-
supply point stocks of two days of fire try. Crowding the front of the 3d Bat-
at the Van Fleet rate dwindled to one talion, 38th Infantry, forces of the
and could not be raised above that 135th Regiment, 45th Division, broke the
amount. The high consumption also wire and penetrated the line, but with
strained corps and unit transportation losses too high to be able to withstand
in hauling ammunition from the army counterattacks. Sweeps to clear rear
supply point at Wonju to the base corps areas and a final counterattack to drive
dump at Hongchon, a round trip of out Chinese who had occupied some of
over sixty miles, and from Hongchon the bunkers restored the battalions
to artillery units. But resupply at the position early on the 18th.41
guns did remain adequate.38
The use of MPQ radars to direct
bombers in close support missions at 39 For an account of the development and use of
this technique, see Futrell, The United States Air Force
in Korea, pp. 328-30, 338-40.
40 Rads: AX 9248 OP-OP2 and AX 9249 OP-OP2,
37 X Corps OI 174, 17 May 51; Montross, Kuokka, CG FEAF to CG BOMCOM et al., 17 May 51; Rad,
and Hicks, The East-Central Front, pp. 125-26. AX 7713, CG FEAF to C/S USAF, 20 May 51;Futrell;
38 X Corps OI 174, 17 May 51: X Corps Arty Rpt. The United States Air Force in Korea, p. 340.
Battle of the Soyang River: An Analysis of Artillery 41 2d Div PIR 207, 18 May 51. For a detailed ac-
Support, X Corps Sector, 1 May-29 May 1951, 30 count of the defensive operations of the 3d Battalion,
Jul 51; Eighth Army, Logistical Problems and Their 38th Infantry, especially of Company K, on 18-19 May,
Solutions; X Corps G4 SS Rpt, May 51. see Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pages 166-81.
KWP-EBB-0475
To the east, the course of battle filtrating Chaun-ni about 0330 harassed
meanwhile verged on the calamitous the command posts of the 2d and 3d
and chaotic for Chinese and 2d Divi- Battalions, 23d Infantry, and Company
sion forces alike. From late after- C, 72d Tank Battalion, and blew up a
noon traffic on the artillery net Colo- loaded ammunition truck before pull-
nel Coughlin estimated the strength of ing back into the high ground west of
the new influx of enemy forces in the the village. Of larger moment, the bulk
gap area to be three thousand. Early of the enemy division filled the hills
evening reports from the Netherlands bordering Route 24 on the west be-
battalion on Hill 975 tended higher. tween Chaun-ni and the French bat-
The Dutch reported Chinese in waves talion. Forces on the south reengaged
of a thousand each crossing the saddle the French while detachments slipping
between Hills 1051 and 914 and walk- out of the hills about daylight mined
ing upright through the artillery bom- the road a half mile below Chaun-ni
bardment rather than in the crouch that and at a second point farther south
soldiers tend to assume when moving within view of the French.43
under heavy fire. Those not hit were Along the front of the 23d Infantry,
simply stepping over the fallen to con- Chinese abused Company F on the left
tinue moving down the valley. On the flank with fire and assault until about
receiving end of the Chinese stream, midnight, then broke contact and
the 23d Infantry commander, Colonel moved east. The reach of an apparent
Chiles, reported to General Ruffner general enemy movement east and then
that bombing attacks and artillery bar- south had been indicated earlier when
rages rolling up the valley were carpet- the ROK 5th Division units echeloned
ing the defile with enemy casualties.42 along the right flank of the 23d re-
The estimates of enemy strength and ported heavy pressure and, with Gen-
losses were not far off the mark. Com- eral Almonds approval, withdrew be-
ing through the fire-beaten gap and val- hind a lateral stretch of the Hongchon
ley was the 181st Division, the 60th Army River almost due east of Chaun-ni.
unit now attached to the 12th Army. Its Leading the southeastward swing was
leading units had the French battalion the 31st Division, sliding east onto the
under attack by dark. Sharply hit from front of the 23d Infantry was the 35th
the front and flanked on the left after Division, and approaching from the
two hours under assault, the French northwest to join the move was the 34th
withdrew a mile south to hills edging Division, which, when inserted between
Route 24 just above Putchaetful. The the 31st and 35th Divisions on the 18th,
battalion gained respite from attack for would fully commit the 12th Army. The
the remainder of the night, but its with- 4th Platoon of Company C, 72d Tank
drawal opened the left flank of the 23d Battalion, moved out to the immediate
Infantry and gave the Chinese free ac-
cess to Route 24 between Putchaetful
43 X Corps Rpt, Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th
and Chaun-ni. Small enemy groups in- Inf RCTs, 16 May - 2 Jun 51; 23d Inf ISUM, 172200
May 51; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, Entries 58 and 84, 17 May 51;
23d Inf ISUM 181000 May 51; 2d Div PIR 207, 18
42 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entry 78, 17 May 5 1; 38th Inf S2 May 51; AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, Battle of Soyang, Jun
Jnl, Sum, 17 May 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 51.
KWP-EBB-0476
Out of radio contact with his forces fire. The Chinese pulled back about
since early morning but informed of daylight on the 19th, leaving behind
their southeasterly movement by air some eight hundred dead.61
observers, General Yu air-dropped to The new line of the 2d Division, to
some groups orders assigning them to be occupied on the 19th, cut Route 24
line Waco positions. He also set up just below Hangye on the west and
straggler lines in the Soksa-ri area but reached across lateral ridges eastward,
by nightfall had regained control of into what had become enemy territory,
forces in little more than battalion through Hill 683 to the village of
strength.60 Nuron-ni, three miles above Pungam-
While Yu struggled to reorder his ni. General Ruffner assigned the 23d
two divisions and deploy them on the Infantry to the central sector centered
Waco line, General Almond ordered on Hill 683. Given the 15th Regimen-
additional modifications of the X Corps tal Combat Team of the 3d Division by
front to straighten and shorten the line Almond as a replacement for the 38th
and to shift 2d Division forces farther Infantrys going into corps reserve,
east into the weakly defended sectors Ruffner ordered the 15th initially
of the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions. The to occupy the Pungam-ni area as a
5th Marines, now scheduled to take preliminary to moving forward to the
over the western portion of the 2d Nuron-ni sector of the line. Both the
Divisions sector during the afternoon 9th Infantry and the 15th Regimental
of the 19th, were to occupy positions Combat Team thus faced the prospect
centered some three miles south of Hill of having to fight to gain the line they
800 which would eliminate the bulge were to defend, but, once the two regi-
manned by the 3d Battalion, 38th In- ments were on the line, the 2d Division
fantry, in the Hill 800 mass and the would hold good positions looking
two adjoining battalions of the 9th In- down into the valley of the Naechon
fantry. Unaware that the 800 complex River, a westward flowing tributary of
would be handed over, the 45th Divi- the Hongchon.62
sion meanwhile suffered unnecessarily To help strengthen the X Corps east-
in nightlong attempts to take it. Succes- ern sector, Van Fleet at midnight on
sive assault waves of the fresh 133d the 18th ordered the remainder of the
Regiment were shattered, mainly by 3d Division eastward from the Seoul
heavy concentrations of artillery fire. area, the 7th Regimental Combat Team
On the crest of Hill 800, where the Chi- to move on the 19th, the 65th Regimen-
nese centered most of their charges, the tal Combat Team on the 20th. General
men of Company K, 38th Infantry, in Almond directed the division, less its
fact did little fighting themselves but 15th Regimental Combat Team, which
simply sat inside their bunkers and al- was to remain attached to the 2d Divi-
lowed the Chinese to enter their lines, sion, to protect the X Corps east flank
then called down a blanket of artillery
61 X Corps OI 177, 19 May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt,
Nar, May 51; 38th Inf PIR 117, 20 May 51; Gugeler,
60 Eighth Army G3 SSR, May 51; Eighth Army Arty Combat Actions in Korea, p. 180.
SSR, Jun 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0920, 1030, 62 X Corps OI 177, 19 May 51; 2d Div POR 614, 19
and 1615, 18 May 51. May 51.
KWP-EBB-0482
from enemy attacks out of the sector of two miles to the north. Moving against
the muddled ROK III Corps. General light resistance, the combat team con-
Soule was initially to concentrate forces solidated positions on its objective after
at Pangnim-ni, located on Route 20 fif- dark. As the l5th moved beyond the
teen miles south of Soksa-ri, then re- village, the ROK 3d Regiment and
connoiter and set up blocking positions smaller units of the ROK 7th Division
in the Soksa-ri area.63 in the area advanced through light to
From Hoengsong, where 3d Division moderate opposition to positions north
headquarters had set up on moving and northeast of Pungam-ni, the latter
east with the 15th Regimental Combat along a trail leading to Habae-jae.65
Team, Soule moved a tactical command At the new left of the 2d Division
post group to the Pangnim-ni area early along Route 24, the 181st Division
on the 19th and sent his reconnaissance wheeling out of its roadblock near
company up Route 20 to patrol as far Chaun-ni reengaged the 23d Infantry
as Hajinbu-ri, five miles east of Soksa-ri. just above Hangye shortly before dawn
The company found the road clear and kept the 1st and 3d Battalions
and made contact with ROK III Corps pinned in position until counterattacks,
troops in the Hajinbu-ri area. On its artillery fire, and air strikes called in
return run during the afternoon, the under gradually clearing skies finally
company left a platoon in Soksa-ri to forced a release about noon. The two
watch a mountain road reaching the battalions occupied positions strad-
village from Sangam-ni and Habae-jae dling Route 24 on the new line below
to the northwest, then moved on to Hangye by early evening. While the
Changpyong-ni, six miles southwest of 2d Battalion moved east to a centrally
Soksa-ri. There the 3d Battalion of the located reserve position along the lat-
7th Infantry, first to arrive from the era1 track leading to Hasolchi, the at-
west, blocked Route 20 and mountain tached French battalion attempted to
trails coming in from the northwest. take position on the regimental right
Reaching the area after dark, the and make contact with a unit of the
remainder of the 7th Infantry assem- ROK 36th Regiment located northwest
bled at Ami-dong, five miles south of of Hasolchi in the sector to be occu-
Changpyong-ni.64 pied by the 9th Infantry. But Chinese
At the right of the 2d Division stoutly defending an intervening height
fifteen miles to the northwest, the prevented the French from closing
15th Regimental Combat Team at- ranks with the South Koreans.66
tacked through the ROK 3d Regiment It was well after dark before the 9th
at 1100 to seize Pungam-ni and high Infantry completed its eastward shift
ground a mile and half to the north- into its new sector above Hasolchi.
west along the trail leading to Nuron-ni First to arrive, the 1st Battalion moved
on the modified No Name line another
up on the right of the ROK 35th full IX Army Group stood opposite
Regiment into positions northeast of the X Corps new eastern front be-
Hasolchi looking down into the valley tween Hangye and Soksa-ri. Though
of a small stream that fed the Naechon the group remained generally on a
River. The 2d Battalion took position southeastward course, its attached 12th
behind the forces of the ROK 36th Army was turning more to the south on
Regiment to await daylight before the front of the 2d Division with four
relieving the South Koreans and ex- divisions abreast: the 181st already was
tending westward toward the French in the Hangye area; the 35th was ap-
battalion. With a similar objective the proaching next to the east; the 34th
3d Battalion assembled near Hasolchi was entering the area above Hasolchi,
to await morning before moving up on where its leading forces had stopped
the right of the 1st Battalion to close the French battalion at the right of the
the gap between the 9th Infantry and 23d Infantry; and the bulk of the 31st
the 15th Regimental Combat Team in now was located above Pungam-ni af-
the Pungam-ni area.67 ter being forced out of the village by
The ROK III Corps sector remained the 15th Regimental Combat Team.
a scene of tangled and scattered forces Making a fast march to the southeast
throughout the 19th, troops trickling of Pungam-ni, the 93d Regiment of
into collecting points along Route 20, the 31st Division was nearing Soksa-ri
some of both the 3d and 9th Divisions on Route 20. Using the mountain
taking up random positions. about five road running southeast from Sangam-
miles above the road. None, despite ni through Habae-jae to Soksa-ri as its
General Yus air-dropped orders the axis, the 27th Army also was headed for
day before, stopped on line Waco some the Soksa-ri area, advancing with its
seven miles farther north. The one for- three divisions in column, the 81st still
tunate circumstance was an absence of in the van after helping to rout the
enemy contact. In marked contrast, the ROK III Corps, the 79th and 80th trail-
ROK I Corps all but completed an or- ing in the vicinity of Habae-jae. Behind
derly withdrawal to the Waco line, both the 27th Army, the 20th Army, in group
its divisions moving along the coast, the reserve, was beginning to move south-
Capital in the lead and the 11th, though east from the Kwandae-ri area along
not in contact, prudently bounding the Soyang River. Coming from the
south by regiment in bringing up the Hyon-ni area on a line of march pro-
rear. Leading the way west along line jecting to Hajinbu-ri were the 6th and
Waco, the 26th Regiment of the Capi- 12th Divisions of the North Korean V
tal Division refused the corps inland Corps, and moving toward Hajinbu-ri
flank left open by the ROK III Corps.68 on a parallel course just to the east were
In the array of enemy forces east of the 2d and 27th Divisions of the North
Route 24 by nightfall on the 19th, the Korean II Corps, which, after failing in
frontal attacks against the ROK I Corps,
67 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 9th Inf Comd had shifted west in an apparent attempt
Rpt, Nar, May 51; 9th Inf PORs 152, 19 May 51, and to envelop the South Koreans.69
153, 20 May 51.
68Eighth Army G3 SSR, May 51; Eighth Army G3
Jnl, Sum, 19 May 51; Eighth Army PORs, 19 and 20 69Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, May 51; Eighth Army
May 51. PIR 310, 18 May 51; X Corps G2 SS Rpt, May 51; X
KWP-EBB-0484
Enemy action decidedly had slack- fresh units forward to take over the
ened on the X Corps front during the assault. And though the pell-mell with-
afternoon of the 19th after the 181st drawal of the ROK III Corps had taken
Division gave up its attack on the 23d its scrambled forces out of contact, the
Infantry in the Hangye area. But, with passage of Chinese in strength south-
Chinese continuing to mass ahead of eastward through Habae-jae and be-
the 2d Division, the slack appeared to yond presaged heavy action along
be mostly a result of attempts to move Route 20. It seemed that enemy forces
would not only quickly revive their
Corps G2 Section Rpt, Battle of the Soyang River, drive against the X an ROK III Corps
30 Jun 51; X Corps PIRs 235, 19 May 51, and 237, 21 but, with strong Chinese reserves and
May 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army;
OB Info, North Korean Army, Charts 9 and 15; North Korean divisions on the move,
Eighth Army POR, 19 May 51. that they would increase it.
KWP-EBB-0485
CHAPTER XXVI
The Counteroffensive
On 18 May, after Chinese had Judging enemy forces in the east cen-
reached Pungam-ni, then the deepest tral area to be clearly overextended af-
point of enemy penetration, and as the ter he reconnoitered the front on 19
substantial sweep of Chinese around May, Ridgway enlarged his concept to
the 2d Division into the sectors of the take advantage of their vulnerability
collapsing ROK units had become ap- and ordered Van Fleet to attack across
parent, General Ridgway suggested that the entire front. Agreeing that these
General Van Fleet attempt to relieve forces could be trapped, Van Fleet laid
the pressure on his forces in the east by out an operation that he believed could
attacking in the west to threaten enemy produce decisive results if the attack
lines of communication in the Iron moved fast enough. Though stabiliz-
Triangle. Ridgway recommended a ing the line in the east remained a
two-division attack moving on the problem, he now viewed that task with
Route 33 axis toward Chorwon. He no great alarm even though enemy
thought such an attack would have a forces were deepening and strengthen-
good chance of succeeding since intelli- ing their penetration. If for no other
gence indicated that only four Chinese reason, he expected their logistical dif-
armies occupied the forty-mile sector ficulties in the mountains to slow if not
of the front west of Chunchon and stop their advance within a matter of
since Peng Teh-huai would need at least days; they would have created only a
a week or ten days to shift any material long bag that could closed behind
part of his mass from the east to op- them by rapid drives to block their main
pose the advance. Nor had enemy routes of resupply and withdrawal.
forces on the western front shown Van Fleets plan called for the I Corps,
much aggressiveness. Enemy attacks IX Corps, and part of the 1st Marine
had forced back some patrol base and Division at the left of the X Corps
outpost units and had tested the main to advance on 20 May toward the
line in both the I Corps and IX Corps Munsan-ni-Chunchon segment of line
sectors, but these attacks had been iso- Topeka. Once the Topeka segment was
lated affairs, not coordinated actions in occupied, strikes to start closing the bag
a concerted holding operation.1 were to be made toward the Iron Tri-
angle, one up Route 3 to secure a road
center in the Yongpyong River valley
some twenty miles above Uijongbu, an-
1 Rad, C 62789, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 18
May 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps other up Route 17 beyond Chunchon
Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. to seize the complex of road junctions
KWP-EBB-0486
and entered assembly areas in prepara- Col. Lawrence K. Ladue, the deputy
tion for night attacks. Kept under heavy corps commander.6
artillery fire and precise B-29 bomb The force of enemy attacks declined
runs, none of these forces came in on all across the X Corps front on the 21st
the 2d Division during the night of the but grew stronger in the ROK III Corps
20th.5 sector and at the left of the ROK I
Now confident that the 2d Division Corps. ROK 9th Division forces be-
could occupy and hold the Hangye- tween Soksa-ri and Hajinbu-ri fell be-
Nuron-ni line, General Almond late on low Route 20 under attacks by the Chi-
the 20th canceled his earlier withdrawal nese 81st Division while ROK 3d
order and turned to a greater concern Division units above Route 20 north-
of easing the threat of envelopment east of Hajinbu-ri began to collapse un-
from the east either by a shallow swing der North Korean V Corps assaults. Near
around the ROK 7th Division forces Yuchon-ni, four miles east of Hajinbu-
below Pungam-ni or by a deeper drive ri, the 20th Regiment of the ROK 11th
through the 3d Division sector in the Division holding positions facing north
Soksa-ri area. Reducing the deeper and northwest athwart Route 20 to pre-
threat somewhat was the arrival of the vent an enemy sweep behind the bulk
65th Infantry, which allowed General of the ROK I Corps on line Waco was
Soule to strengthen his blocks and hit hard by forces of the North Korean
recapture Soksa-ri on the 21st. ROK II Corps. The enemy pressure contin-
8th Division forces also had reached ued at all points of attack into the
Chechon, from where they could be evening.7
moved up quickly to reinforce the X Despite the enemy action in the
Corps east flank defenses. In the Hajinbu-ri-Yuchon-ni area and con-
Pungam-ni area, reassembled forces of tinuing reports of reserves moving
the 5th and 7th Regiments of the ROK south, General Van Fleet was con-
7th Division provided additional pro- vinced, as he reported to General
tection against a Chinese strike out of Ridgway, that the enemys initial
the Habae-jae area, protection which punch in the eastern and central east-
Almond further deepened and wid- ern section- is shot.8 To keep enemy
ened with the bulk of the still some- forces from slipping out of the bottom
what decrepit 38th Infantry. To relieve of their long bag in the Hajinbu-ri area,
the threat in both the Pungam-ni and Van Fleet late on the 21st directed the
Soksa-ri areas, Almond ordered an at- ROK III Corps to make no further
tack on the 22d to seize and block en- withdrawals and to restore defensive
emy movement through Habae-jae by
Task Force Yoke, a group of infantry,
tanks, and artillery units that he con- 62d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; X Corps PIRs
236, 20 May 51, and 237, 21 May 51: Dolcater. 3d
stituted under the command of Infantry Division in Korea, p. 211; X Corps POR 237,
21 May 5l; 2d Div POR 616, 21 May 51; X Corps OI
180, 21 May 51.
52d Div POR 615, 20 May 51; 9th Inf POR 153, 20 7 X Corps G3 SS Rpt, May 51 ; X Corps PIR 237, 21
May 51; 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf May 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 21 May 51; Eighth
Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, Entries 83 Army POR, 21 May 51, and PIR 313, 21 May 51.
and 92, 20 May 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 8 Memo, Lt Col Paul F. Smith, Eighth Army Liaison
2d Div PIRs 208, 20 May 51, and 209, 21 May 51. Officer, to Gen Ridgway, 22 May 51.
KWP-EBB-0488
positions north of Route 20. The ROK Hajinbu-ri. Under the direction of the
I Corps meanwhile was to fall back KMAG adviser, troops of the ROK 9th
from line Waco to positions that would Division meanwhile assembled seven
secure Route 20 between Yuchon-ni miles southwest of Hajinbu-ri. With the
and Kangnung on the coast. Anxious commander, Brig. Gen. Choi Suk, still
to close the top of the bag, Van Fleet unlocated, General Yu placed the dep-
enlarged and substantially altered the uty corps commander in charge.
concept of the counterattack opened on Accounting for the chaos as much as
the 20th. The main effort was now to the force of enemy attacks were Gen-
be directed toward seizing the road eral Yus never having regained full
centers, with the front otherwise being charge of the ROK III Corps after his
advanced only as necessary to protect two divisions were scattered at the
the main effort. The I Corps, as under Sangam-ni roadblock and his having
Van Fleets earlier order, was to seize lost all control of them when they were
the road hub in Yongpyong River attacked at Hajinbu-ri. Convinced by
valley. His new order shifted the the continuing failure of the corps that
IX Corps-X Corps boundary east as Yu and his staff could not conduct op-
of 23 May to give the IX Corps erations successfully, General Van Fleet
the Hongchon-Chunchon-Hwachon late on the 22d ordered the ROK III
road and the road center on the west- Corps headquarters inactivated, the
ern side of the Hwachon Reservoir as ROK 3d Division transferred to the
its main objective. The X Corps was to ROK I Corps, the ROK 9th Division
open a general advance on the 23d to given to the X Corps, and the X Corps
seize the road complex in the Yanggu- made responsible for the former ROK
Inje area east of the reservoir.9 III Corps sector. He also ordered the
Even as Van Fleet ordered the ROK ROK Army forward headquarters off
III Corps to regain positions above the front and placed the ROK I Corps
Route 20, the ROK 3d and ROK 9th under his own direct command.11
Divisions again tumbled back under In the Yuchon-ni area, North
enemy attacks that by early afternoon Korean II Corps forces early on the 22d
of the 22d completely dispersed both cut Route 20, turned their attack east,
divisions and overran their command and dispersed the 20th Regiment of
posts. KMAG advisers notified Van the ROK 11th Division. Given the
Fleet that the commanders of both divi- stout enemy effort in the Hajinbu-ri-
sions and the principal staff members Yuchon-ni region over the past two
of the ROK 9th Division had disap-
peared. The ROK 3d Division com- 10 Rad GX-5-3812 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to
mander, Brig. Gen. Kim Jong Oh, at CINCFE, 22 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 22 May 51;
first believed to have been either killed Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 1707, 1735, and 1755,
22 May 51, and Entry 1032, 23 May 51.
or taken captive, was located along with 11 Eighth Army G3 Jnl. Entry 1755, 22 May 51:
many members of the division on the Interv, Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51; Eighth
Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 22 May 51; Rad, GX-5-3849
23d some fifteen miles southeast of
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps and C/S
ROKA, 22 May 51; Rad, GX-5-3910 KGOO, CG
9 Rad, GX-5-3699 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and Chief KMAG, 22
ROKA, 21 May 51; Rad, GX-5-3721 KGOO, CG May 51; Rad GX-5-4404 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to
Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 21 May 51. C/S ROKA and CG ROK I Corps, 25 May 51.
KWP-EBB-0489
days, the approach of reserves, and no dently withdrawal orders had taken
evidence that enemy forces were hav- longer to reach the deeper enemy
ing serious logistical problems, the forces in the Hajinbu-ri-Yuchon-ni
Eighth Army intelligence officer, in area, forces who began moving back
contrast to General Van Fleets sensing after dark on the 22d.14
that the enemy offensive had lost its Crippling losses, particularly in the
momentum, predicted a continuation 12th Army and 15th Army, had forced
in force along and below Route 20. The Peng Teh-huai to abandon his offen-
location and course of enemy forces sive. The inability of these weakening
below Hajinbu-ri convinced Colonel armies to mount effective attacks
Tarkenton that they would attempt a against the adjusted X Corps positions
deep southwestward push toward after 19 May had endangered the
Pyongchang and Yongwol along Route enemy forces farther east since the fail-
20 as a preliminary to the seizure of ure to advance astride Route 24 meant
the Chechon road and rail hub; the that the Chinese and North Koreans
eastward enemy drive appeared to be moving to and below Route 20 in the
aimed at enveloping Kangnung.12 Hajinbu-ri-Yuchon-ni sector were sim-
General Van Fleet countered the ply taking themselves farther and far-
threat to Kangnung with new orders to ther out on a limb.15 Though fresh
the ROK I Corps, then still drawing reserves were available, the casualties
back from line Waco to positions above among the assault echelons had been
Route 20 between Yuchon-ni and the exceptionally heavy, largely as a result
coast under his orders of the 21st. Gen- of the Van Fleet rate of artillery fire
eral Paik was to organize strong posi- and round-the-clock air attacks, and
tions facing west astride Route 20 to Peng apparently decided against sub-
block any eastward enemy drive along jecting his reserves to the same punish-
the road, but if he could not hold a ment and extreme losses.
continuous line above Route 20 with Peng called for a rapid, almost pre-
his west flank refused, he was to set cipitate, withdrawal, with covering
his forces in perimeter around the forces fighting only light delaying ac-
Kangnung road center.13 tions except where strong blocks were
But as Van Fleet dispatched these or- needed to keep withdrawal routes open.
ders near midnight on the 22d, the The previous general disposition of
composite of recent and current reports forces was to be restored, the Hwachon
from the front confirmed a general en- Reservoir again marking the division
emy withdrawal. Now three days into between Chinese and North Korean
their advance, the I Corps and the IX sectors and also marking generally the
Corps had found contact progessively northern limit of the withdrawal.
more difficult. The first indications of
enemy withdrawal on the X Corps front
had appeared late on the 21st. Evi-
14Eighth Army PIR 315, 23 May 51; I Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51;
12Eighth Army POR, 22 May 51, and PIR 314, 22 Rad, X 19780, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 22
Ma 51. May 51.
13Rad, GX-5-3910 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to 15 EighthArmy PIR 315, 23 May 51; X Corps G2
C/S ROKA and Chief KMAG, 22 May 51. Section Rpt, Battle of the Soyang River, 30 Jun 5 1.
KWP-EBB-0490
For the Chinese armies south and ther side of the upper reaches of the
southeast of the reservoir, plans for get- Imjin River and in the Iron Triangle.
ting past the lake were designed to Northwest of Seoul, the North Korean
avoid a jam-up of troops when they Z Corps was initially to withdraw behind
reached that obstacle. The 20th and the lower Imjin and was eventually to
27th Armies of the IX Army Group were move west beyond the Yesong River for
to withdraw around the east end of the rest and rebuilding.
reservoir, then move along its north-
ern bank to the west end. Leading the Counterattack
way, the 20th Army was to set up a block-
ing position between Hwachon town With the objective of reaching the
and the reservoir. The 27th Army, on main bodies of enemy forces, includ-
coming out of the Hajinbu-ri area with ing reserves, before they could orga-
its rear covered by the North Korean II nize for defensive action, General
and V Corps, was to concentrate behind Milburn and General Hoge had made
the 20th. The North Korean rear speed the keynote of the counterattacks
guards were to set up defenses east of opened by the I and IX Corps on 20
the reservoir, the V Corps between the May. In setting his three divisions on
reservoir and the near outskirts of Inje, courses for line Topeka some fifteen
the II Corps from Inje eastward.16 miles above his Seoul defenses, Milburn
The III Army Group, with the 12th aimed the ROK 1st Division toward
Army returned to its control, was to Munsan-ni, the 1st Cavalry Division
withdraw around the west end of the north through Uijongbu and up Route
reservoir. From below Chunchon, the 33, and the 25th Division north along
60th Army, less its 81st Division still with Route 3 toward the road hub in the
the 12th Army, was to fight a delaying Yongpyong River valley. (Map 37)
action along Route 17 to hold the road Hoge had established an intermediate
open for the 15th and 12th Armies line, Georgia, whose central trace lay
as they withdrew northwest, passed just above the lateral stretch of the
through the ground below the reser- Pukhan River dammed on the west to
voir, and moved through Hwachon form the Chongpyong Reservoir and
town into the Iron Triangle. The rear- along the upper bank of the Hongchon
guard 60th Army, on passing behind the River emptying into the reservoir from
20th Army at Hwachon, was to follow.17 the east. A rapid advance to the Geor-
West of the Pukhan River, the three gia line, Hoge had believed, would al-
armies of the XIX Army Group were to low his four divisions (the 24th, ROK
withdraw generally northwestward, 2d, ROK 6th, and 7th, west to east) to
pulling away from the I Corps and the reach enemy reserves.19
IX Corps toward areas located on ei- Milburns forces had gained ground
rapidly, especially the ROK 1st Division,
16 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53; X Corps
G2 Section Rpt, Battle of the Soyang River, 30 Jun 18 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 96, l6-28 Feb 53; Hq,
51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army. FEC, History of the North Korean Army.
17 USAFFE Intel Dig, vol. I, no. 1, l-31 Dec 52; X 19 I Corps OI 5, 19 May 51; Rad, IX ACT 1515 (IX
Corps G2 Section Rpt, Battle of the Soyang River, Corps Opn O 20), CG IX Corps to CG ROK 2d Div ct
30 Jun 51. al., 19 May 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51.
KWP-EBB-0491
rI
KWP-EBB-0492
which entered Munsan-ni at midmorn- advancing in its present zone for most
ing on the 21st, and all three divisions of the day, was to relieve 1st Marine
were on or near the Topeka line by Division forces straddling Route 29 and
evening of the 23d. But the attack had prepare to attack on the Chunchon-
amounted to a futile chase as the North Hwachon axis toward the road com-
Korean I Corps and 63d Army backed plex at the west end of the Hwachon
away far faster than the I Corps ad- Reservoir. On his left, Hoge switched
vanced. Tank and tank-infantry forces the zones of the 24th and ROK 2d Divi-
probing well to the front of the main sions and ordered General Bryan to
body of the 25th Division consistently send a task force northeast. up Route
failed to make solid contact and raised 17 to seize Kapyong while the remain-
doubt that the Yongpyong River val- der of his division followed astride the
ley road hub more than ten miles ahead road. The ROK 2d Division, shifting to
of the division could be taken in time the corps left flank after Bryans forces
to block enemy movements through it.20 passed through it en route to Kapyong,
Despite light resistance, the IX Corps was to attack northwest along second-
attack from the outset had been more ary Route 15 toward Taebo-ri.22
cautious than aggressive. After a short Still trying to animate his forces,
advance on the 20th, General Hoge Hoge again directed pursuit tactics and
sharply reprimanded his division com- authorized them to bypass enemy
manders for failing to push their at- groups up to company in size. His divi-
tacks, but gains on the 21st were even sions advanced easily on the 23d against
shorter. Attempting again to accelerate an accelerating withdrawal by the 64th
the advance, Hoge directed his forces and 63d Armies, but few units gained
to employ pursuit tactics and move no more than five miles. In the deepest
less than six miles on the 22d, a dis- move, General Bryans task force of
tance that would carry them two to tanks and the 1st Battalion of the 21st
three miles beyond the Georgia phase Infantry captured Kapyong after meet-
line-far enough, if done speedily ing only a smattering of opposition
enough, Hoge believed, to break along Route 17. 23 Hoge nevertheless
through covering forces and make con- now had two American divisions posi-
tact with the main bodies of withdraw- tioned for advances over roads converg-
ing Chinese. The attack on the 22d, ing near the lower edge of his road cen-
however, took his four divisions no far- ter objective, the 7th below Chunchon
ther than the Georgia line.21 and the 24th at Kapyong, whence a sec-
In new attack orders for the 23d, ondary valley road left Route 17 and
Hoge made zone adjustments, obliged ran northeast to rejoin it near the vil-
to do so on his right by General Van lage of Chiam-ni.
Fleets orders moving the corps bound- General Almonds plan for the X
ary east as the X Corps joined, the Corps counterattack on the 23d
counterattack. The 7th Division, after
22 IX Corps Opn O 21, 22 May 51.
20 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. 23 Ibid.; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps
21 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; Rads, IXCCG POR 665, 23 May 51; IX Corps G2 Daily Sum, 23 May
103 and IXACT 1527, CG IX Corps to CG 24th Div 51; Rad, IXCCG 106, CG IX Corps to CG Eighth
et al., 20 and 21 May 51, respectively. Army, 23 May 51.
KWP-EBB-0493
Task Force Yoke, the mix of forces two battalions of the 9th Infantry mov-
(the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry; the ing forward on their flanks, had driven
bulk of the ROK 3d Regiment; all but to their objective easily against light
two companies of the 72d Tank Bat- opposition. In the counterattack, the
talion; ,a platoon of the 15th Infantrys main effort was to be made on the
tank company; a battery of the 300th Route 24 axis. The 2d Division, with
Field Artillery Battalion; and a tactical the 187th Airborne Regimental Com-
air control party) organized by General bat Team attached, was to drive on Inje,
Almond under the deputy corps com- the 1st Marine Division to advance on
mander, Colonel Ladue, had attacked Yangugu. Almonds concept was that
through the lines of the ROK 7th Divi- the two spearheads would trap the en-
sion in the Pungam-ni area to seize the emy forces east of Route 24 and lay
Habae-jae road junction. A combina- them open to destruction by corps
tion of mean terrain, heavy, if spotty, forces advancing on the right.27
resistance, and a foot-dragging per- In the drive on Yangugu, the open-
formance by the South Korean troops ing attack of the 1st Marine Division
had stopped Ladue three miles short along the west side of Route 24 carried
of his objective. 25 For the general attack, the 1st and 5th Regiments into the ex-
Almond elected to replace the Yoke tremely rough ground rising toward
forces with Task Force Able, built Hill 1051. In a gain of about four miles,
around the 15th Regimental Combat exhausting climbs and descents felled
Team, which was to be detached from more marines than did encounters with
the 3d Division and operate under rearguard forces of the backpedaling
corps control. Once the Able force had 15th Army. A highlight of the attack was
taken Habaejae and the 3d Division the recovery of eleven wounded men
coming up from the south had cap- of the 2d Division by 5th Marine forces
tured the road junction four miles to advancing within a mile of Hill 1051.28
the east, the task force was to be dis- For the 2d Divisions move on Inje,
solved and the 15th Infantry was to join General Rufner assigned the main ef-
the operations of its own division.26 fort to the 187th Airborne Regimental
In what amounted to the beginning Combat Team. With Company B of the
of one of two major spearheads of the 72d Tank Battalion attached, General
corps counterattack, Almond in the af- Bowens combat team was to take over
ternoon of the 22d had sent the 187th the zone of the 23d Infantry, which
Airborne Regimental Combat Team up General Almond had ordered into
Route 24 to take the high ground corps reserve, and attack up Route 24,
around Hangye. Passing through the initially (as Almond also had directed)
23d Infantry, General Bowens forces, to seize a bridge site on the Soyang at
with a battalion of the 5th Marines and Umyang-ni, six miles southwest of the
Inje road center. On a parallel course
at the divisions right, the 38th Infan- 3d Division control, and adding the
try was to advance along the mountain headquarters and a company of the 2d
road running northeast from Pungam- Divisions 72d Heavy Tank Battalion.
ni to Hyon-ni and then turning north- It was midafternoon before Lt. Col.
west to Inje. The 9th Infantry was to Thomas R. Yancey, the 15th Regi-
sweep the divisions central area.29 mental Combat Team and task force
With the entire 12th Army attempting commander, could organize the Able
to withdraw north between Route 24 force and open the attack. The late start
and the Pungam-ni-Hyon-ni road, 2d and rugged terrain, more than enemy
Division forces advancing in that area opposition, held Yanceys gains on the
on the 23d encountered only feeble de- 23d to little more than a mile, well short
laying actions. Somewhat stouter but of Habae-jae.31
not immovable blocking positions con- In the 3d Division zone, the 1st Bat-
fronted the 38th Infantry on the right, talion, 7th Infantry, occupied the re-
where the 80th Division of the 27th Army mainder of the pass north of Soksa-ri
apparently was trying to hold open the on the 23d while General Soule maneu-
Habae-jae-Sangam-ni segment of the vered other units of his corps for-
road coming up from Soksa-ri. Yet ward for the advance toward the road
Ruffners opening attack was no great junction east of Habae-jae. The 65th
surge forward. Average gains of four Infantry took position west of the 7th
miles matched those of the 1st Marine Infantry while the ROK 9th Division
Division and took the 2d Division only brought up the rear in reserve. All con-
as far as its nearest intermediate ter- tacts during the day were with North
rain objectives in the high ground con- Korean rear guards covering the Chi-
fining the Naechon River on the north nese 81st Division and 93d Regiment,
and northeast.30 31st Division, as they withdrew to
As originally constituted for the at- Habae-jae.32
tack to seize the Habae-jae road junc- It was obvious, especially in the I and
tion, Task Force Able included the 15th IX Corps zones, that a head start and
Regimental Combat Team, the bulk of fast marches so far had allowed the
the ROK 3d Regiment, and a battery main enemy bodies to withdraw well
of the 300th Field Artillery Battalion, out of the reach of the counterattack.
the last two units coming from the dis- General Van Fleet was nevertheless
banded Task Force Yoke. With charac- confident that his forces, because of the
teristic attention to custom making as- light opposition to their advance, still
sault forces, General Almond reshaped had a better than even chance of block-
the force late on the 22d, passing the ing the enemys main withdrawal routes
South Koreans back to the ROK 7th and on the 24th pressed Milburn,
Division, which was to go into corps
reserve, pulling the 3d Battalion of
31X Corps Opn O 22, 22 May 51; X Corps OI 183,
the 15th Infantry and returning it to 22 May 51; 2d Inf Div POR 618, 23 May 51; X Corps
POR 239, 23 May 51.
29 2d Inf Div Opn O 31, 22 May 51; X Corps Opn O 32Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 212; X
22, 22 May 51. Corps Special Rpt, Battle of the Soyang River; X
302d Inf Div PIR 211, 23 May 51; Eighth Army PIR Corps POR 239, 23 May 51; X Corps G2 Section Rpt,
315, 23 May 51; 2d Inf Div POR 618, 23 May 51. Battle of the Soyang River, 30 Jun 51.
KWP-EBB-0496
Hoge, and Almond to quicken the pace ease the divisions attack and thus accel-
of their attacks to seize their road cen- erate its coming move on the Hwachon
ter objectives. Van Fleet saw a particu- road center, General Hoge ordered
larly good opportunity to trap and de- General Ferenbaugh to lead with a
stroy forces of the North Korean II, fifteen-mile armored drive up Route
III, and V Corps and Chinese 12th, 20th, 29 into Chuncbon. Following Feren-
and 27th Armies in the area east of Route baughs instructions that the 32d In-
24 with a squeeze play by the X Corps fantry operating in the area straddling
and the ROK I Corps. Once General the road send a strong tank-infantry
Almond had captured the Yangu-Inje patrol to develop enemy defenses in
area, he was to mount an attack north- Chunchon and check the Soyang River
east along Route 24 to the coast in con- above town for crossing sites, the com-
cert with a northwestward drive by Gen- mander of the 32d shaped a small task
eral Paiks forces. Success would force from the attached 7th Reconnais-
depend on the speed of the two- sance Company, a platoon of the regi-
pronged advance, especially on a rapid mental tank company, and a squad of
attack by the X Corps to block enemy engineers to be led by the recon-
avenues of escape.33 naissance company commander, Capt.
General Milburn attempted to hurry Charles E. Hazel. Hardly the force
the I Corps with orders for a top-speed that General Hoge had envisioned-but
move to line Kansas. Driving up Route then he had not been specific about its
3 ahead of the general advance, the makeup-Task Force Hazel set out un-
89th Heavy Tank Battalion and a bat- der orders simply to reconnoiter the
talion of the 27th Infantry blocked the Chunchon area and return to regi-
road hub on 25 May, and all three of mental lines.35
Milburns divisions reached the Kansas Eight miles below Chunchon the
line on the 27th. But the attack, as from Hazel force came under heavy small
the outset, was a fruitless pursuit. Eas- arms and machine gun fire from hills
ily outstripping Milburns forces, all ma- around the village of Sinjom-ni, where
jor enemy formations on the I Corps Route 29 began climbing to Wonchang
front had withdrawn above the 38th pass cutting through the southern rim
parallel in the east and across the Imjin of the Chunchon basin. The 60th Army
in the west.34 had set a regiment in blocking positions
The IX Corps objective on 24 May along with winding stretch of road from
was the Topeka line, which in the 7th Sinjom-ni through the pass but had not
Divisions new zone on the east wing employed antitank weapons. His battal-
lay just above Chunchon. Aiming to ion not yet displaced far enough for-
ward to be within range, the artillery
33Rad, C 63228, CINCFE to JCS, 24 May 51; Rad, observer with Captain Hazel was un-
GX-5-4206 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, able to adjust fire onto the hills. After
and X Corps, 24 May 51; Rad, GX-54218 KGOO, searching return fire on the hillsides
CG Eighth Army to CGs X Corps and ROK I Corps,
24 May 51. by Hazels gunners found few marks,
34Rad, CIACT 5-285, CG I Corps to CGs 25th and
1st Cav Divs, 24 May 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, 35The account of this task force operation is based
May 51; I Corps G2 Section, Narrative of Enemy on 3d Hist Det, AAR, Task Force Hazel, copy in
Operations, 24-27 May 51. CMH.
KWP-EBB-0497
Hazel ordered back the members of his ing two dead and a third wounded
force riding in thin-skinned jeeps and sprawled in the road, and chased the
half-tracks and continued up the road general, his aide, and driver to cover
with eleven tanks. Once through the and concealment among rocks and fo-
twisting pass under a hard but harm- liage on a hillside to the east. A division
less pelting by rifle and machine gun psychological warfare team en route to
fire, the armored column barreled into Chunchon to broadcast a surrender
the Chunchon basin and drove into appeal came on the scene three hours
the center of town late in the afternoon. later and turned back to the lines of
Fanning out in twos and threes, Hazels the 32d Infantry, where they reported
tankers searched the city and both sides the ambush to 1st Lt. Ivan G. Stanaway,
of the Soyang, killing, capturing, or a platoon leader of the regimental tank
routing about a hundred Chinese and company then lining up his platoon on
punishing a large force discovered run- the road to join Task Force Hazel.
ning off the back side of Hill 302 hug- Taking his tanks forward immediately,
ging Chunchon on the northeast. In a Lieutenant Stanaway picked up the
scramble to get away from the probing wounded escort and determined where
tanks, the Chinese made no attempt to the general was. Stanaways crews
return fire. found space to turn around and parked
As his tank crews cleared Chunchon, as close to the hillside as possible.
Captain Hazel received orders from his There, under a peppering of small
regimental commander to remain in arms and machine gun fire, they but-
town for the night. Two platoons of toned up and waited until full dark,
the regimental tank company were to when Ferenbaugh and the men with
reinforce him and bring along a re- him worked their way one at a time to
supply of rations, gasoline, and am- Stanaways tank and got in through the
munition. Hazel took his force to the escape hatch. The three reached safety
airstrip at the western edge of town behind the 32d Infantrys lines around
where the flat ground allowed good 2100.
fields of fire. While circling his tanks Amid-and perhaps because of-the
into a tight perimeter, he was asked by anxiety caused by the disappearance of
regiment if General Ferenbaugh was General Ferenbaugh, Task Force Ha-
with him. The division commander, his zel shortly before dark received with-
aide, and escorts had started up Route drawal orders relayed from division
29 in two jeeps some time earlier to headquarters. With the Sinjom-ni-
contact Hazels force, but there had Wonchang pass stretch of the road
been no word from the general since bordered by Chinese, the prudent move
late afternoon. Hazel knew nothing of was to pull the force below the enemy
Ferenbaughs whereabouts but could blocking position for resupply. Hazel
have correctly guessed that he had run again worked his column through en-
into trouble at Sinjom-ni. emy fire in the pass without harm ex-
Ferenbaugh and his group had come cept to prisoners riding atop the tanks,
under the guns of the Chinese block- all but one of whom were hit. Hazel
ing force about 1630. Enemy fire swept lost two tanks farther down the road,
the jeep carrying the escorts, leav- one that its crew put out of commission
KWP-EBB-0498
when it ran out of fuel, another that with escape through Hwachon town
tumbled off the road into a deep gully their chief interest.37
in the darkness. At 32d Infantry head- Artillery fire and air strikes flogging
quarters Hazel learned that his force, the Chinese with telling effect from
enlarged as arranged earlier, was to re- midmorning on added to the disorder
turn to Chunchon the next morning of their withdrawal. By 0930 General
with a battalion of the 17th Infantry, Ferenbaugh had the full 17th Infantry
coming out of division reserve, follow- motorized and en route to Chunchon,
ing to clear the Chinese out of the pass whence about noon the regiment at-
and join the task force in town. tacked north as the pursuit force fol-
Though not the operation General lowing the Chinese cramming Route 17
Hoge had in mind, Hazels foray on and as the right arm of an encircling
the 24th had accomplished more than move to bottle the Chinese sighted to
simply run some Chinese out of town: the west and northwest of town. Reach-
Hazels reinforced column returned to ing around these forces on the west
Chunchon early on the 25th without was the 21st Infantry moving up the
encountering Chinese along the road Kapyong-Chiam-ni road in the 24th
or in town. 36 Air observers scanning the Division zone. The juncture of the two
ground above Chunchon after day- regiments in the Chiam-ni area would
light found over ten thousand Chinese place the cork in the bottle, and by dark
jamming Route 17 and the secondary the two forces were within six miles of
roads and trails leading to it. To the doing so. Earlier, at noon, air observ-
west and northwest of town they sighted ers located forces of the 12th and 15th
another large mass of Chinese, which Armies coming out of the X Corps zone.
they estimated in the thousands, mov- The observers reported some ten thou-
ing through the ground between Route sand to twelve thousand troops and nu-
17 and the Kapyong-Chiam-ni road. merous vehicles and artillery pieces
Assuming that the tanks of Task Force moving in long columns through the
Hazel entering Chunchon on the 24th ground below the Hwachon Reser-
were the point of a large attack force voir and heading northwest toward
following, the main Chinese bodies had Hwachon town. Artillery and an
begun to swarm north during the night, entire fighter group lashed these col-
umns while General Hoge moved to
strengthen his attack to seize the
Hwachon town-Hwachon Reservoir
36 As the task force reentered Chunchon, the
road center and block their escape.
pilot of a division observation plane scouting the
ground a short distance southeast of town saw a-sign, Hoges orders, issued early on 26 May,
POW 19, spelled with wallpaper strips and, under- called for the bulk of the ROK 6th
neath, rescue, spelled with shell cases. Dropping a
Division, which was being pinched out
note about the sighting to the Hazel force, the pilot
guided three tanks assembled by Captain Hazel to the of its central zone by the converging at-
sign, where the tankers picked up nineteen Americans,
eighteen enlisted marines and one enlisted Army man.
All had been taken prisoner on 30 November 1950 at 37 3d Hist Det, AAR, Task Force Hazel; IX Corps
the Changjin Reservoir and kept with their captors Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps G2 Hist Rpt for
until being left behind when the Chinese withdrew May 51, 14 Jun 51; Rad, IXCCG 108, CG IX Corps to
from the Chunchon area. CG Eighth Army, 25 May 51.
KWP-EBB-0499
tacks of the 17th and 21st Regiments, service duties than to close combat. As
to move to the corps east flank and ad- the 21st Infantry completed its advance
vance with the 7th Division to seize the to Chiam-ni, the regimental headquar-
road center. Leaving the 19th Regiment ters company and the medical company
in the central zone to attack directly set up a joint perimeter away from any
toward Chiam-ni until pinched out, of the rifle companies three miles
General Chang assembled the remain- southwest of Chiam-ni. Some three
der of his division in the Chunchon hundred Chinese attacking northwest
area in preparation for a move up on after midnight against the arc of the
the right
of the 7th Division on the perimeter manned by the medical com-
27th.38 pany were thrown back with heavy
The spearheading 17th and 21st casualties. Survivors withdrew to nearby
Regiments joined forces near Chiam-ni high ground and sprayed the perime-
early on the 26th while in the general ter with machine gun fire, lifting it from
IX Corps advance the 19th Regiment time to time through the night as more
of the ROK 6th Division pushed north Chinese moved forward to attack. Each
through scattered resistance and assault was turned back in close fight-
reached positions within three miles ing. The 5th Infantry, arriving from
of Chiam-ni. Three regiments thus the south about daylight, broke up the
penned the Chinese between Route 17 last force of Chinese to approach the
and the Kapyong-Chiam-ni road in a perimeter. The defending forces lost
rough triangle formed by the two roads two killed and twenty wounded during
and the South Korean line. Heavy, low- the repeated attacks. Enemy losses were
hanging clouds held aircraft on the three hundred killed, an estimated two
ground all day, but artillery fire pum- hundred fifty wounded, and four hun-
meled the Chinese continuously. While dred fifty taken captive.40
concentrating on pocketing the enemy Other Chinese groups in battalion
group, the 17th Infantry sent a tank- strength attempted to punch their way
infantry patrol up Route 17 toward north out of the trap during the early
Hwachon. Four miles below town the morning of the 27th but were knocked
patrol discovered the rear of the Chi- back by the forces blocking the way in
nese force observed passing through the Chiam-ni area. After these failures
that area the day before. The score for there were no more organized efforts
the day was thus one prize cornered to escape, only confused clumps of Chi-
and another, somewhat larger, lost.3g nese moving around in search of a way
In the first of several attempts to out. While the 17th and 21st Regiments
break out of the trap below Chiam-ni, turned north to join the general corps
Chinese unknowingly attacked troops advance, mop-up operations by the 5th
more accustomed to administrative and Infantry and 19th Regiment of the
ROK 6th Division raised the prisoner
38 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps G2
Daily Activities Rpt, 25 May 51: IX Corps PORs 668
and 669, 25 May 51; 7th Inf Div POR 233, 25 May 40 Dept of the Army GO 77, 5 Sep 51; Interv,
51; IX Corps Opn Plan 20, 24 May 51; Eighth Army Appleman with Col Gines Perez, CO, 21st Inf. For
G3 Jnl, Sum, 26 May 51. their outstanding performance in this action, the
39 IX Corps G2 Hist Rpt, May 51; Eighth Army G3 Headquarters Company and Medical Company were
Jnl, Sum, 26 May 51. awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.
KWP-EBB-0500
toll to around two thousand. During a fronts of the 24th and ROK 2d Divi-
final sweep of the area by the 5th Infan- sions to the west meanwhile showed well
try on 28 May, Chinese taken captive, organized defenses and a determina-
many of whom surrendered in large tion to resist any further IX Corps ad-
groups, brought the total to near thirty- vance toward the Iron Triangle.43
eight thousand.41 Although the IX Corps had gained
Action in the general corps advance its road center objective too late to trap
was concentrated along Route 17 where the Chinese coming from the X Corps
Chinese fought hard to hold open the zone, the overall estimate of enemy
Hwachon town-Hwachon Reservoir casualties during the corps counter-
escape route for the columns moving attack, including the last three days of
northwest out of the ground below the May, exceeded 62,000. Smaller losses
reservoir. Rain and heavy clouds that during the Chinese offensive raised the
had kept aircraft on the ground finally corps estimate to more than 73,000, of
lightened in the afternoon of the 27th, which 44,705 were reported killed,
allowing air strikes along with artillery 19,753 wounded, and 8,749 captured.
fire to take a heavy count of the Chi- During all of May, IX Corps units
nese scurrying to get above Hwachon. themselves suffered 341 killed, 2,011
The 17th Infantry meanwhile fought wounded, and 195 missing.44
up Route 17 through stubborn resist- General Hoges attempt on 24 May
ance and entered Hwachon at 1400, to quicken the IX Corps advance with
but a division of the 20th Army blocked an armored attack into Chunchon was
the regiments attempts to advance matched early the same day by General
north of town and east toward the Almonds order for an armored attack
reservoir. The ROK 6th Division up Route 24 by the 2d Division to seize
moving up on the right out of the the Umyang-ni bridge site on the Soy-
Chunchon area met no opposition but ang. More detailed in his order than
advanced only a few miles through Hoge had been, Almond directed Gen-
the rough ground below the western eral Ruffner to assemble a task force of
reaches of the reservoir. Much of the two tank companies, an infantry bat-
enemys gateway to safety thus re- talion, and engineers at Hangye and
mained open.42 start up the road at noon. He instructed
On 28 May air observers reported Ruffner to place the task force under
the ground below the reservoir all but the commander of the divisions 72d
empty of enemy forces, and the ROK Tank Battalion, Colonel Brubaker, then
6th Divisions move to the lakes west- in the Pungam-ni area where his head-
ern edge confirmed the Chinese escape. quarters and one company had been
The division of the 20th Army deployed with Task Force Yoke and Task Force
north and east of Hwachon town and Able.45
another division encountered on the
Ruffner was pressed for time to open halt. He ordered Newman to forget
the operation within the few hours Al- communications, to move his tanks at
mond allowed. While having Colonel twenty miles an hour, and to keep
Brubaker flown to Hangye, Ruffner going until you hit a mine.17
assigned the mission to the 187th Air- As Newman took his tanks forward
borne Regimental Combat Team, al- in fifth gear, Almond flew south to
ready operating along Route 24, and check on the main body of the task
the two nearest tank companies; B of force, which he found still forming. Ex-
the 72d, already attached to the regi- ploding with impatience, he ordered
ment, and B of the 64th, a 3d Division Colonel Gerhardt to get the tanks mov-
unit given to the 2d Division earlier in ing whether or not they had infantry
one of the many unit shifts made un- support. When getting trucks out of the
der corps orders. General Bowen se- way and getting the last tanks out of
lected his 2d Battalion for the opera- the streambed onto the road took even
tion and placed his executive officer, more time, Almond relieved Brubaker
Col. William Gerhardt, in command of of his battalion command. Despite
the task force.46 pressure from the general, it was mid-
Despite all the haste, it was almost afternoon before the tanks started for-
1100 by the time Colonel Brubaker ward with the rest of the task force
reached General Bowens command following.48
post, half past noon before Colonel During this stir to the south, Major
Gerhardt issued final instructions, and Newmans point force drove rapidly
1300 when Brubaker started the ar- through clumps of Chinese visibly rat-
mored point of the task force up Route tled by the appearance of tanks and
24. The point commander, Maj. came up on the rear of some four thou-
Charles A. Newman of Brubakers staff, sand Chinese scrambling north under
led his tank platoon, engineer platoon, punishing air attacks about a mile be-
and reconnaissance squad up the road low Umyang-ni. Finding room to de-
slowly, as directed by Colonel Gerhardt, ploy in a skirmish line, Newmans tank
with engineers in the lead probing for crews opened fire with all weapons as
mines-a prudent precaution given the Chinese broke for the hills on both sides
recent experience of Brubakers battal- of the road or fled north across the
ion in the Chaun-ni area. Around 1400 Soyang, leaving behind a litter of dead,
Major Newman halted his tanks about supplies, pack animals, and vehicles.
six miles above Hangye while engineers By 1630 Newmans tankers entered
checked the road ahead and while he Umyang-ni and took up positions to
took time to correct faulty radio com- continue firing on enemy groups scur-
munications with the reconnaissance rying for safety both below and above
squad. Arriving over the scene by heli- the river. By the time the main body of
copter, General Almond, already un- Task Force Gerhardt arrived two hours
happy over the tardy start of the opera- later, Newmans point was in full pos-
tion, landed to learn the reason for the session of the bridge site.49
46 8th Hist Det, AAR, Task Force Gerhardt, copy 47 8th Hist Det, AAR, Task Force Gerhardt.
in CMH; 2d Inf Div CofS Jnl, Entries 3 and 4, 24 May 48 Ibid.
51. 49 Ibid.
KWP-EBB-0502
With the Gerhardt force occupying to preventing enemy forces from mov-
the lower bank of the Soyang, General ing above the Inje-Kansong segment
Almond late on the 24th issued instruc- of Route 24. In a further remodeling,
tions for attacks to carry out General Almond dissolved Task Force Able, as
Van Fleets earlier order for the two- previously planned, and reassigned its
pronged trap by the X Corps and ROK zone to the 3d Division, which, with the
I Corps. Coming out of corps reserve, ROK 9th and 8th Divisions still at-
the 23d Infantry moving up Route 24 tached, was to continue clearing its wide
on the morning of the 25th was to pass east flank zone. On the corps opposite
through the Gerhardt force and estab- flank, the 1st Marine Division was to
lish a bridgehead over the Soyang, continue its drive along the west side of
throwing a treadway over the river, Route 24, a drive which again on the
then was to seize Inje to block large 24th had amounted to a plodding short
enemy groups that air observers on the advance, to capture the Yanggu area.51
24th had sighted withdrawing up the As part of the operation to seize the
Pungam-ni-Hyon-ni-Inje road. Be- Umyang-ni bridge site and subse-
hind these groups, the 38th Infantry quently the Yanggu-Inje area, Gen-
was to continue its pursuit. In getting eral Almond had directed the 1st Ma-
within ten miles of Hyon-ni on the 24th, rine Division to have a regiment follow
that regiment had had as much trouble Task Force Gerhardt up Route 24 as
with the roadbed giving way under its far as five miles below Umyang-ni
tanks and with the sharp pitch of the where a lateral trail intersected from
bordering ridges as with knots of North the east and continued northwest to-
Korean delaying forces.50 ward the Soyang. Veering off at the
After the 23d Infantry established intersection, the Marine regiment was
the Soyang bridgehead, Task Force to occupy prominent high ground four
Gerhardt and the remainder of the miles west of Umyang-ni to strengthen
187th Airborne Regimental Combat the hold on the bridge site and to con-
Team were to assemble under corps trol the trail, which Almond believed
control just south of Umyang-ni to form enemy forces would attempt to use as a
Task Force Baker for a rapid drive over withdrawal route. General Thomas
Route 24, beginning on the morning pulled the 7th Marines out of reserve
of the 26th, to seize Kansong on the for the mission, but because of a late
coast. The 2d Division, less the 9th start, a shortage of trucks, and enemy
Infantry, which General Almond or- resistance to the leading battalion on a
dered into corps reserve and replaced hill bordering the road northwest of
in the area between Route 24 and the Chaun-ni, the regiment by nightfall was
Pungam-ni-Hyon-ni-Inje road with still some seven miles short of its ob-
the ROK 5th Division, was to continue jective. Along the east side of the road,
clearing its zone. At the same time, the the 187th Airborne Regimental Com-
23d Infantry, following Task Force bat Team, less its battalion with Task
Baker, was to give particular attention Force Gerhardt, also had made only
short advances against scattered enemy
50 X Corps OI 186, 24 May 51; 2d Inf Div OI 75, 25
May 51, and POR 619, 24 May 51; 38th Inf S2 Jnl, 51 X Corps OI 186, 24 May 51, and Opn O 23, 25
Sum, 24 May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51. May 51.
KWP-EBB-0503
groups during the day. Thus the lat- the 23d Infantry eliminated the enemy
eral trail, now located about halfway regiment and reached the intersection
between the front of the Marine and to stop for the night. Attacking cross-
airborne troops and the Gerhardt force country on the west flank of the 23d
at Umyang-ni, remained open.52 Infantry, the 7th Marines met little re-
Shortly before dark, air observers sistance but moved no farther than to
reported about two thousand enemy come abreast. Behind the roadblock,
troops moving west on the trail onto 12th Army forces meanwhile had contin-
Route 24 and beyond. They were from ued to stream across Route 24 and up
12th Army units, which continued to the trail to the northwest until the 106th
cross the road during the night, their Regiment was all but wiped out. Then
movement not again picked up by they avoided Task Force Gerhardt by
observers until noon on the 25th as veering northeast, forded the Soyang,
they entered the ground below the and headed toward Yanggu.54
Hwachon Reservoir in the IX Corps The 38th Infantrys pursuit of
zone. To protect their passage across enemy groups escaping up the road
Route 24, the 106th Regiment of the through Hyon-ni to Inje on the 25th
34th Division organized a deep position was halted by stubborn resistance from
extending over two miles below the two North Korean battalions deployed
roads intersection with the trail to hold at the junction with the road coming
off attacks from the south. With no up from Habae-jae two miles below
position established to the north, the Sangam-ni. Supporting artillery battal-
intersection was open to seizure by Task ions reached out for the enemy with-
Force Gerhardt. But Colonel Gerhardt drawing behind the block, but many of
sent no forces down the road, even af- the groups were already well up the
ter all but one of twenty trucks sent road and out of range. To supply fur-
back for supplies were destroyed and ther evidence that the enemy with-
all but two of the drivers were killed at drawal was outdistancing the pursuit,
the Chinese position.53 the 9th Infantry, moving through its
Alerted by the ambush of the truck central zone until relieved by the 35th
convoy, General Ruffner ordered the Regiment of the ROK 5th Division,
23d Infantry to move forward at day- made almost no contact, and the rein-
light to clear the roadblock. At each forced 3d Division encountered only
position of the deep block, forces of light, scattered resistance as the 7th In-
the 106th Regiment fought a dogged de- fantry came up to the divisions road
fense until virtually annihilated. Regi- junction objectives east of Habae-jae
mental tanks broke through on the road and as attached South Korean forces
and reached Task Force Gerhardt in on the extreme east flank moved into
the afternoon, but darkness fell before the ground above Route 20.55
52 X Corps OI 184 24 May 51; 1st Marine Div Hist 54 2d Inf Div POR 620, 25 May 51; 2d Inf Div
Diary, May 51; X Corps POR 240, 24 May 51. Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar,
53 2d Inf Div CofS Jnl, Entries 21, 23, and 25, 24 May 51; 2d Inf Div PIR 213, 25 May 51; 1st Marine
May 51; X Corps G2 Section Rpt, Battle of the Soyang Div Hist Diary, May 51.
River, 30 Jun 51; 2d Inf Div PIR 213, 25 May 51, 55 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf S2
and POR 620, 25 May 51; 2d Inf Div CofS Jnl, Entry Jnl, Sum, 25 May 51; 2d Inf Div POR 620, 25 May 51;
4, 25 May 51. 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51.
KWP-EBB-0504
Still hopeful of trapping and elimi- moved only four miles toward Yang-
nating sizable enemy groups below yang before minefields and a destroyed
Route 24, General Almond urged Gen- bridge blocked any further advance. To
eral Thomas to accelerate the 1st Ma- the north along Route 24, the attack of
rine Divisions advance on Yanggu and the 23d Infantry also was stopped
pressed General Ruffner to bridge the short. Sweeping one enemy group off
Soyang and seize Inje so that Task high ground bordering Route 24 be-
Force Baker could form and open its low Umyang-ni, the regiment reached
drive on Kansong. Almond also added and crossed the Soyang before noon.
a shallower swing to his attempt to cut Leaving a battalion to protect engineers
off enemy forces ahead of the ROK I while they bridged the river during the
Corps, ordering the 3d Division to or- afternoon, Colonel Chiles sent the re-
ganize a reinforced regimental combat mainder of his regiment toward Inje.
team as Task Force Charlie and send it But the advance ended some five miles
over the road leading northeastward from the town when stubborn North
from the Habae-jae area on the morn- Korean 12th Division forces refused to
ing of 26 May to take Yangyang on the give up blocking positions until well past
coast.56 dark.
There was still one opportunity to A swifter advance was clearly re-
intercept a sizable enemy force. After quired if enemy passage through the
the rain lightened enough to allow air- Inje road center was to be blocked and
craft aloft in the afternoon of the 26th, any substantial part of the enemy
observers scanned the corps zone. The throng on the Hyon-ni-Inje road
Hyon-ni-Inje stretch of road and con- rolled up from the south. The 27th Army
necting roads running north and west was already above Route 24 en route
beyond Inje remained aswarm with en- through the area above the Hwachon
emy troops and vehicles. Artillery Reservoir to take position behind the
supporting the 38th Infantry was far 20th Army along Route 17, and the
enough forward to fire on the road up North Korean V Corps was beginning
to two miles beyond Hyon-ni, and to organize defenses between the reser-
during the remaining hours of day- voir and the outskirts of Inje. The lat-
light fighter-bombers attacked enemy ters 6th Division entering the Yanggu
groups in and around Inje while B-26s area would oppose the 1st Marine Di-
laced the forces between Inje and vision, which on the 26th was still mov-
Hyon-ni with thirteen tons of bombs, ing forces up to the Soyang for its attack
all producing a high score of casualties. on the town. As the 23d Infantry had
The pursuit of the 38th Infantry, how- discovered, the 12th Division was com-
ever, came to an abrupt halt three miles ing in alongside the 6th to defend the
short of Hyon-ni in the face of strong ground reaching east to Inje. Still on
rearguard action by the 19th Regiment, the road below Inje, the 32d Division
North Korean 13th Division. Below the was to move into a corps reserve posi-
38th, the 3d Divisions Task Force
Charlie built around the 7th Infantry 57 X Corps POR 242, 26 May 51; 2d Inf Div POR
621, 26 May 51, and PIR 214, 26 May 51; 38th Inf
56 X Corps OI 187, 25 May 51; 2d Inf Div Cofs Jnl, Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar,
Entries 22, 23, and 25, 25 May 51. May 51.
KWP-EBB-0505
THE PUNCHBOWL
the I Corps. Reinforced by the 3d Divi- East of the reservoir, after complet-
sion and its attached ROK 9th Division, ing operations to capture the Yanggu-
to be transferred from the X Corps, Inje area and reach Kansong on the
and backed up by the 187th Airborne east coast, the X Corps and ROK I
Regimental Combat Team, also to be Corps were to seize and establish defen-
taken from the X Corps and placed in sive positions along a newly drawn seg-
army reserve in Seoul, General Milburn ment of line Kansas running northeast
was to seize the Chorwon-Kumhwa from the reservoir across the southern
area. In a narrowed IX Corps zone, rim of a hollow circle of mountains
General Hoges forces were to oc- aptly called the Punchbowl to the
cupy commanding ground beyond coastal town of Kojin-ni, five miles
Hwachon town to block the roads above Kansong. Following generally the
reaching southeast out of Kumhwa.63 same prominent ridge traced by earlier
phase lines in the sector, the new Kan-
63 LOI, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X
Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and 2d Inf Div, 27 May 51; Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps and 187th
Rads, GX-5-5055 KGOP and GX-5-5 152 KGOP, CG Abn RCT, 27 and 28 May 51, respectively.
KWP-EBB-0507
CHAPTER XXVII
ming without prior approval. He could were) required that they themselves
go farther north on his own, but only control any withdrawal from Korea,
in limited operations designed to keep. that Ridgways instructions were in
enemy forces off balance, to maintain keeping with existing national objec-
contact, to insure the safety of his com- tives, and that, consequently, the in-
mand. Ridgway himself had similarly structions would not be altered. The
restricted general advances in his ini- Joint Chiefs did emphasize, though,
tial instructions to General Van Fleet. that these objectives were currently un-
But the Joint Chiefs preferred to as- der review and that Ridgways mission
sume control, in part because their rec- would be made to accord with Presi-
ommendations were still under study dent Trumans action on forthcoming
and in part because they believed that recommendations of the National Secu-
potential armistice negotiations could rity Council.3
develop more easily if the general The security council first met to con-
Eighth Army drive into North Korea sider the Joint Chiefs April recommen-
was kept so shallow that Chinese and dations on 2 May. On the following day
North Korean authorities could see ad- the Senate Committees on Armed
vantages in accepting a line of demarca- Services and on Foreign Relations con-
tion along the main line of contact.2 vened jointly to inquire into the mili-
Ridgway complained to the Joint tary situation in the Far East and the
Chiefs that their instructions seriously relief of General MacArthur. Invited
abridged the authority and freedom earlier to speak to a joint session of the
of action I believe you intend me to Congress, MacArthur had made an elo-
have in order to discharge assigned quent and dramatic statement of his
responsibilities. Since his military ob- convictions. He again had proposed the
jective in Korea as stated in the 1 May retaliatory measures-now softened
directive was to destroy the Chinese and somewhat-against China first recom-
North Korean forces operating within mended to the Joint Chiefs in Decem-
the geographic boundaries of Korea ber and again had insisted, as in his
and waters adjacent thereto, he be- March letter to Congressman Martin,
lieved he should be the one who held that there was no substitute for vic-
authority over a general advance above tory. First to speak at the Senate hear-
the Kansas-Wyoming trace. And since ings, he forcefully elaborated on the
his mission as Commander in Chief, Far points he had made before the full
East, of defending Japan had priority Congress, and, in urging decisive steps
over his objective as Commander in to end the war, he explained that there
Chief, U.N. Command, in Korea, he was at the present no policy-there is
believed he should be the one who de- nothing, I tell you, no plan, or any-
cided when his forces would withdraw thing. 4
from Korea to take up the defense of Media reports of MacArthurs speech
Japan. The Joint Chiefs replied that and testimony generated considerable
strategic considerations (without stating
precisely what these considerations
3 Rad, C 62088, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 9 May 51;
Rad, JCS 90999, JCS to CINCFE, 12 May 51.
2 Rads, JCS 88950 and JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE, 4 MacArthur Hearings, p. 68.
19 Apr and 1 May 51, respectively.
KWP-EBB-0510
public interest in the issues involved. b. Establish authority of the ROK over
That interest, in turn, spurred the Na- all Korea south of a northern boundary so
located as to facilitate, to the maximum ex-
tional Security Council to develop a tent possible, both administration and mili-
clear and practicable statement of mili- tary defense, and in no case south of the
tary and political policy in Korea. Con- 38th Parallel.
cluding its deliberations on 16 May, the
c. Provide for withdrawal by stages of
security council produced a statement non-Korean armed forces from Korea.
evolved from the recommendations of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other advi- d. Permit the building of sufficient ROK
military power to deter or repel a renewed
sory bodies, including allies. On the North Korean aggression.5
following day President Truman ap-
proved the statement, which introduced Retaining the authority they had as-
no new concepts but did at last firmly sumed over general Eighth Army ad-
and officially declare that the United vances, the Joint Chiefs further in-
States would seek to conclude the fight- structed Ridgway:
ing in Korea under suitable armistice ar- With regard to ground operations you will
rangements. General MacArthurs pro- obtain approval of JCS prior to undertak-
tests notwithstanding, there was to be ing any general advance beyond some line
at least an attempt to produce a substi- passing through the Hwachon Reservoir
area. You are, however, authorized to con-
tute for victory. duct such tactical operations as may be nec-
General Ridgway meanwhile contin- essary or desirable to insure safety of your
ued trying to clarify his directives, send- command, to maintain contact, and to con-
ing two members of his staff to Wash- tinue to harass the enemy. This includes
guerrilla o perations and limited amphibi-
ington to present his views on what he ous and air borne operations in enemy rear
considered to be points of ambiguity areas.6
and conflict. Their consultations coin-
cided with the establishment of the new Although the Joint Chiefs had pre-
policy: While the policy had little effect viously issued similar instructions to
on revisions made to clarify Ridgways govern the operations of the Eighth
responsibilities and authorities as Com- Army after it reached the Kansas and
mander in Chief, Far East, it brought Wyoming lines, the latest directive at
about a major redefinition of his mis- least gave the underlying objective of
sion as Commander in Chief, U.N. those operations more definite shape.
Command. In new instructions sent Their future course, in the main, was
on 1 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be designed to support a negotiated
directed Ridgway: end to hostilities.
Not yet in possession of his new in-
you will, consistent with the security of your structions but informed of their devel-
forces, inflict maximum personnel and ma- opment and essential content by his
teriel losses on the forces of North Korea
and Communist China operating within the staff officers in Washington, General
geographic boundaries of Korea and adja- Ridgway in assessing the results of re-
cent waters, in order to create conditions cent operations for the Joint Chiefs on
favorable to a settlement of the Korean con- 30 May indicated that conditions in Ko-
flict which would as a minimum:
a. Terminate hostilities under appropri- 5 Rad, JCS 92831, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Jun 51.
ate armistice arrangements. 6 Ibid.
KWP-EBB-0511
7 Rad, C 63744, CINCFE for JCS, 30 May 51. 9 I Corps Opn O 7, 28 May 51; IX Corps Opn O 22,
8 Ibid. 28 May 51.
KWP-EBB-0512
fog, limited close air support and both groups. Against declining resistance
air and ground observation. Two clear and in drier weather, the assault divi-
days followed, but as the full attacks sions occupied their line Wyoming ob-
got under way on 3 June rainstorms jectives between 9 and 11 June. In the
returned to hamper operations through I Corps zone., General Milburn sent
the 5th.10 tank-infantry patrols up each side of
Aided by the bad weather, Chinese the Iron Triangle on 13 June to investi-
delaying forces fighting doggedly from gate Pyonggang at its apex. The pa-
dug-in regimental positions arranged trols met no resistance en route and
in depth held the advance to a crawl found Pyonggang deserted. The Chi-
through 8 June, then finally gave way nese defenders of the triangle had
under the pressure and began a phased taken up positions in commanding
withdrawal, moving north in what air ground northeast and northwest of the
observers estimated as battalion-size town. IX Corps forces reconnoitering
northeast of Kumhwa located Chinese
10 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; IX Corps Comd defenses below the town of Kumsong.
Rpt, Nar, May 51; Tech Rpt, Weather Effect on Army
Operations: Weather in the Korean Conflict, vol. II, ch. Rimmed on the north by Chinese and
XIV, Operation Piledriver. on the south by the I and IX Corps, the
KWP-EBB-0513
coveted road complex in the Iron Tri- and descents over and over again. The
angle area now lay largely unusable in two main arterial roads, through the
no-mans-land. 11 Sochon River valley in the west and the
East of the Hwachon Reservoir, Soyang River valley in the east, were
North Korean forces opposing the X heavily mined. Other access roads-the
Corps advance gage ground even more few that existed-winding through the
grudgingly than the Chinese in the Iron mountains were narrow and required
Triangle. It was the end of May before substantial engineering work before
the 1st Marine Division captured Yang- supply trucks could use them. Spates
gu and longer before other corps forces of rain frequently caused landslides that
completed mop-up operations in the blocked the roads or so slickened them
ground east of Inje and Hyon-ni. Two that trucks skidded off at hairpin turns.
regiments of marines moved north of From time to time the rain and fog lim-
Yanggu on 1 June, but only on the 4th ited air support and observation. Most
could General Almond open a coordi- difficult of all were the North Korean
nated attack by the 1st Marine Division defenders. They were in well organized
and ROK 5th Division toward line Kan- fortified positions on every ridge; they
sas and the Punchbowl some six miles gave no ground voluntarily; and, after
above the corps front. By that date the losing a position, they counterattacked
ROK I Corps, advancing three divisions quickly in an attempt to regain it.13
abreast along the east coast, had driven On 8 June General Almond widened
through spotty resistance and occupied his attack, inserting a regiment of the
its line Kansas segment slanting across ROK 7th Division on the left to clear
the first high ridge above Route 24. the ground above the eastern half of
Having far outdistanced the X Corps, the Hwachon Reservoir while the 1st
General Paik was obliged to refuse his Marine Division concentrated on tak-
inland flank in strength against the pos- ing the lower lip of the Punchbowl and
sibility of enemy attacks from the direc- the segment of line Kansas astride the
tion of the Punchbowl.12 Sochon River valley to the southwest.
The six-mile attack to the Punchbowl Accordingly, General Thomas, the Ma-
involved General Almonds forces in rine division commander, committed
some of the most difficult conditions of his reserves on the 9th so that he had
combat. In some areas, sharply pitched four regiments in the attack. First to
axial ridges limited advances to ex- slug through the bitter North Korean
tremely narrow fronts; in others, repe- resistance was the regiment of the ROK
titions of steep transverse ridges forced 7th Division, which reached line Kan-
assault troops to make arduous climbs sas on 10 June. The marines and ROK
5th Division took a week longer to gain
full possession of their objectives.
11 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jun 51; IX Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Jun 51.
12 X Corps Sp ecial Rpt, Battle of the Soyang River;
Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front,
pp. 133, 141; Rad, X 19979, CG X Corps to CG Eighth 13 See Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central
Army. 3 Jun 51; Rads F747 and F521, ROK I Corps Front, ch. VII, Advance to the Punchbowl.
to Eighth Army, 28 May and 4 Jun 51, respectively; 14 Ibid.; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jun 51; Eighth
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jun 51. Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jun 51.
KWP-EBB-0514
With the seizure of line Wyoming arrangements, he and his advisers es-
and the adjusted segment of line Kan- chewed any attempt to open negotia-
sas in the east, the Eighth Army had tions through a direct appeal to Chi-
reached its allowed limit of general ad- nese and North Korean authorities lest
vance in support of efforts to open they interpret the initiative as indicat-
cease-fire negotiations. As yet there had ing weakness and refuse to talk. En-
been no clear sign that Chinese and emy forces, after all, were then on the
North Korean authorities favored that offensive and beginning to make in-
kind of resolution, but there had been roads through Eighth Army lines in the
a search for a way to open armistice east central sector. The chosen ap-
talks, and with some result. proach was to try to draw an offer to
negotiate from the other side by keep-
ing sufficient pressure on enemy forces
Armistice Negotiations
to convince their leaders that they could
The Search for a Beginning
not win and by indicating U.S. and U.N.
When, in mid-May, President Tru- willingness to end hostilities near the
man formalized the policy of ending prewar border between North and
hostilities under appropriate cease-fire South Korea. Secretary of Defense
KWP-EBB-0515
meanwhile cast about like a pack of fire, based not on political implications
hounds searching for a scent.18 but on purely military considerations.20
Contacts with Soviet figures at the When Kennan raised the cease-fire
United Nations and in Paris proved subject at the 31 May meeting, Malik
fruitless. Another official made himself predictably avoided answering but
available for contacts in Hong Kong, agreed to meet again after he had con-
but with no success. Swedens delegate sidered the matter; that is, after he had
to the United Nations announced on 23 checked with Moscow. The two met
May that a Soviet source two weeks ear- again on 5 June. The Soviet govern-
lier had indicated the war might be ment, Malik said, wanted a peaceful so-
ended if the prewar border between lution in Korea as soon as possible but
North and South Korea was reestab- could not appropriately take part in
lished; but Jacob Malik, the Soviet dele- cease-fire negotiations. His personal ad-
gate to the United Nations, declared vice to Kennan was that American au-
that the report was completely ground- thorities should approach their Chinese
less.19 and North Korean counterparts.21
Still, it was Malik who provided the On the day of the second Kennan-
first positive response. At Secretary Malik meeting, representatives of all
Achesons request and with President U.N. countries with forces in Korea met
Trumans approval, George F. Kennan, in Washington to consider the U.S.
a State Department official with a pro- position. Giving some thought to offer-
found background in U.S.-Soviet rela- ing another cease-fire proposal to en-
tions, although at the time on leave of emy authorities, they elected instead to
absence from the department, suc- make the American position known to
ceeded in arranging a private meeting Premier Mao Tse-tung and Foreign
with Malik at the latters summer home Minister Chou En-lai through neutral
on Long Island. Kennans purposes diplomats in Peking. This the diplomats
were to make sure that the U.S. desire did in mid-June, but there was no di-
for a cease-fire as soon as possible was rect response. Reaching London from
absolutely clear to the Soviets and to Peking were reports that Chinese publi-
obtain Moscows views and suggestions. cations were reviving Maos 1937 state-
As Kennan prepared to meet with ment that a true revolutionary leader
Malik on 31 May, Secretary Acheson must be adept at making himself and
sent word of the coming event through his followers advance and change their
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General views according to changing circum-
Ridgway so that he could prepare to stances. Some. Britons interpreted this
advise on relevant military matters and revival as evidence of Chinese prepara-
to take any required action in Korea. tions for a truce in Korea, but no other
In response to both Achesons message Chinese behavior supported such an
and the 1 June directive from the Joint interpretation. For example, when the
Chiefs, Ridgway asked General Van
Fleet to recommend the best location
20 Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 532-33; Ltr,
for the Eighth Army during a cease- Gen Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 9 Jun 51, sub: Location
of EUSAK During a CEASE-FIRE (Military view-
18 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 532. point).
19 Ibid.; Facts on File, 1951, pp. 162, 169. 21 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 533.
KWP-EBB-0517
departing Swedish ambassador to Pe- But within the limits that had been
king made a farewell call on Chou En- imposed on him by General Ridgway,
lai and asked if there was anything he Van Fleet saw distinct advantages in
could report to his government or the conducting future operations along and
United Nations about Korea, the Chi- from the Kansas and Wyoming lines.
nese foreign minister replied with an In a 9 June reply to Ridgways earlier
irrelevancy about the weather. 22 request for an estimate of the situation
Thus, by mid-June, the only positive and recommendations for operations
development in the search for a begin- over the next sixty days, he stated his
ning was Maliks answer to Kennan. belief that, despite the severe punish-
U. S. officials had no doubt that Maliks ment enemy forces had absorbed dur-
statement was authentic, but, in the ing April and May, they would recover
words of Secretary Acheson, it had a sufficiently during the next two months
sibylline quality which left us wonder- to launch at least one major offensive.
ing what portended and what we This probability made a strong defense
should do next. 23 mandatory, and the best place to de-
velop it, in Van Fleets judgment, was
along the Kansas-Wyoming trace. To
The Question of Future Operations
begin with, even if he was authorized
In a different, yet related, context, to occupy a more northern line, the
what to do next had also become a large next terrain permitting a strong line of
question for General Van Fleet as the resistance across the entire peninsula
Eighth Army moved to its limit of ad- and allowing the Eighth Army to man
vance along lines Kansas and Wyoming. it in sufficient strength lay as much as
Although he said nothing publicly un- seventy-five miles above the 38th paral-
til much later, he was particularly dis- lel. Advancing that far could cost the
pleased by General Ridgways disap- Eighth Army considerable casualties.
proval of the Tongchon operation. Using a more northern line also would
Before the Senate Committee on shorten enemy lines of communication,
Armed Services after his return to the robbing U.N. air forces of time and op-
United States for retirement in early portunity to attack enemy supply move-
1953, he testified that enemy forces in ments from distant depots. Further,
June 1951 were badly hurt, out of Van Fleets engineers would face mon-
supplies, and in a panic and that he umental reconstruction work since U.N.
believed he could have won a decisive, air and naval forces had destroyed or
if not complete, victory had he been damaged important bridges, rail lines,
permitted to continue his offensive.24 roads, and communications centers
throughout North Korea. In any case,
the ground along lines Kansas and Wy-
22 Leckie, Conflict: The History of the Korean War, oming was well suited for defense and
1950-1953, p. 293; Poats, Decision in Korea, pp. 200- was backed up by a road net that would
201; Facts on File, 1951, pp. 185, 193-94. allow adequate logistical support.25
23 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 533.
24 U.S. . Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Commit-
tee on Armed Services: Ammunition Supplies in the Far 25 Ltr, Gen Van Fleet to CINCFE, 9 Jun 51, sub:
East, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 5 March 1953, pp. 31-32 EUSAK Operations During Period 10 June-10 Au-
(hereafter cited as Van Fleet Hearings). gust 1951; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Jun 51.
KWP-EBB-0518
favored one posing a three-phase of- increase the effectiveness of enemy air
fensive to occupy the Pyongyang- operations, and how logistics would be
Wonsan line. The first phase called for affected if his lines of communication
an advance on Wonsan in two columns, were lengthened. Ridgway agreed im-
one moving up the east coast road, the mediately to the proposed removal of
other over the Seoul-Wonsan axis. In restrictions but deferred commenting
the second step, an amphibious force on the effects of a general offensive
was to land at Wonsan to assist the over- until General Van Fleet had completed
land advance. In the finale, Eighth plans for advancing to the Pyongyang-
Army forces were to drive northwest- Wonsan line.30
ward and seize Pyongyang. Ridgway
passed the outline to Van Fleet and in-
Negotiations Begin
structed him to submit detailed plans
for the operation by 10 July. 28 On 22 June the U.S. State Depart-
The Joint Chiefs of Staff meanwhile ments Voice of America urged Jacob
had taken Ridgways recent evaluations Malik to heed Trygvy Lies appeal made
of enemy forces as reason to consider in Ottawa at the beginning of the month
revising their 1 June directive. Two and say the one word the whole world
weeks after telling them that the Chi- is waiting for. The next day Malik said
nese and North Koreans over the next the word during a fifteen-minute re-
two months could assemble no force corded speech broadcast on the U.N.
greater than that which the Eighth Price of Peace program. After spend-
Army already had defeated twice, ing most of his time blaming the United
Ridgway on 14 June reported that States for the war, Malik closed with
enemy lines of communications are the announcement that the Soviets be-
overextended [and] his supply situation lieved the conflict could be settled and
is aggravated by heavy rainfall and air that, as a first step, the belligerents
interdiction. These and other encour- should start discussions to arrange a
aging reports convinced the Joint cease-fire and an armistice that pro-
Chiefs that it might be wise to remove vided for the mutual withdrawal of
all restrictions on Ridgways freedom forces from the 38th parallel. He re-
to exploit these conditions.29 fused to elaborate on his speech there-
Wanting further justification before after, even claiming illness on 25 June
taking this step, the Joint Chiefs on 20 when Nasrollah Entezam, the Iranian
June asked Ridgway to inform them president of the U.N. General Assem-
how an advance into North Korea bly, attempted to see him to get more
would affect U.N. Command air opera- details. On 4 July Malik sailed from
tions, whether such an advance would New York for home.31
The immediate American reaction to
28 GHQ, FEC, JCPOG Staff Study, 9 Jun 51; GHQ Maliks statement was largely skeptical.
FEC, Memo, SGS for CofS, 13 Jun 51; Ltr, CINCFE State Department officials advised Gen-
to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jun 51, sub: Planning Direc-
tive; Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen Van Fleet, 22 Jun 51,
sub: Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire. 30 Rad, JCS 94501, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jun 51; Rad,
29 Rads. C 63744 and CX 64976, CINCFE to DA for C 65529, CINCFE to JCS, 22 Jun 51.
JCS, 30 May and 14 Jun 51, respectively; Rad, JCS 31 Poats, Decision in Korea, p. 201; Facts on File, 1951,
94501, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jun 51. pp. 201-02, 218.
KWP-EBB-0520
era1 Ridgway that the proposal might Ridgway went to Korea, where after
be only an attempt to get UNC troops further discussing the matter with Van
away from the 38th parallel and, fur- Fleet he agreed that while a deep ad-
ther, that intelligence reports in Wash- vance was tactically and logistically
ington gave no indication of Chinese feasible, the price would not be worth
and North Korean readiness to stop the results.33
fighting, but quite the contrary. In Moscow, Pravda and Izvestia, the
Ridgway himself reminded his princi- party and government newspapers,
pal subordinates of the well-earned respectively, put an official stamp on
reputation for duplicity and dis- Maliks statement by publishing its full
honesty possessed by the USSR and of text on 24 June. In China, the authori-
the slowness with which deliberative tative Peking paper Jen Min Jih Pao
bodies such as the security council pro- (Peoples Daily) endorsed the proposal
duce positive action and insisted that on the 25th, and Peking radio followed
they ward off any relaxation by their suit the next day, but with conditions.
commands.32 Although the Chinese people fully
Following the joint decision of Gen- endorse the Malik statement, Peking
erals Ridgway and Van Fleet that line radio announced, the United States
Kansas would be the best location for had to accept the peace proposals re-
the Eighth Army during a cease-fire, peatedly made by China and the So-
Ridgway had had his planning staff plot viet Union, proposals which included
an outpost line ten miles above Kansas the withdrawal of all UNC troops from
and a cease-fire line another ten miles Korea, the return of Formosa to Red
forward. By occupying the deeper line China, and the seating of Red China in
the Eighth Army would be able to make the United Nations.34
a ten-mile withdrawal from the line of Malik had included no such demands
contact-a withdrawal that an armistice in his proposal, but the question arose
agreement might require-and still re- whether the Soviet position was indeed
tain its Kansas positions and a suitable the same as that reported by Peking
outpost line of resistance. Although radio. On 27 June, Alan G. Kirk, U.S.
somewhat skeptical of the Malik pro- ambassador to Moscow, sought out
posal, Ridgway on 25 June sent a staff Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A.
officer to Korea to get Van Fleets views Gromyko for an answer. Gromyko as-
on seizing the proposed cease-fire line. serted that the Soviet government had
Van Fleet some two weeks earlier had no knowledge of Pekings view of the
considered such an Eighth Army ad- Malik proposal but advised that the ar-
vance essential, but now, in view of the mistice envisaged by the Soviets would
recent hard fighting to reach the Iron include a cease-fire and would be lim-
Triangle and the Punchbowl, he voted
against the deeper move as potentially
too costly. On the following day 33 Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen Van Fleet, 22 Jun 51,
sub: Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire;
Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 181-82; Collins, War in
Peacetime, p. 309; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 403;
32 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 533; Facts on Van Fleet Hearings, p. 651.
Fib, 1951, p. 202; Rad, CX 65667, CINCFE to CG 34 Facts on File, 1951, pp. 201-02; Leckie, Conflict;
Eighth Army, 24 Jun 51. The History of the Korean War, 1950-53, p. 294.
KWP-EBB-0521
35 Poats, Decision in Korea, p. 202; Acheson, Present 36 Facts On File, 1951, p. 202; Goodrich, Korea: A
at the Creation, p. 533; Facts on File, 1951, p. 202; Dept Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations, pp. 183-84;
of State Bulletin, 9July 1951, p. 45. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 533-34.
KWP-EBB-0522
proposed that the talks begin between and nine separate battalions. Among
10 and 15 July. Ridgway accepted Kae- enemy formations, periodic inactiva-
song as the meeting site but urged an tions of units to obtain replacements
earlier start so as not to prolong the for others had reduced the North
fighting and increase the losses and Korean Army to seven corps, twenty-
offered to send a three-man liaison three divisions, and two brigades, while
team to Kaesong on 5 July or soon reinforcements had raised Chinese
thereafter to arrange for the actual forces to five army groups, seventeen
negotiations. He agreed to a return pro- armies, and fifty-one divisions. As
posal for an 8 July preliminary meeting. Eighth Army intelligence suspected but
Conducting themselves with strict for- had not yet confirmed, the Chinese XX
mality when they met on the 8th, the Army Group with two armies, the 67th
two liaison teams had no serious diffi- and 68th, had entered Korea in May
culty in reaching agreement to open and June and assembled for further
negotiations on 10 July. 37 training at Yangdok, the centrally
located town on the lateral Pyongyang-
Wonsan road. In addition, the 50th
The New Dimensions of Battle
Army, which had returned to Manchu-
As armistice negotiations opened on ria for reorganization in March, reen-
the 10th, the opposing ground forces tered Korea during the first week of
were almost even in numbers, the July. That army, too, remained deep in
Eighth Army totaling about 554,500, North Korea.39
the Chinese Peoples Volunteers and North Chinese and North Korean casual-
Korean Peoples Army some 569,200. New ties by 10 July had reached an enor-
units had recently joined each side. mous figure. Estimates of the total
Now a part of the Eighth Army was an varied, but all were close to 1 million.
infantry battalion from Colombia which Of these, Eighth Army prisoner of war
had arrived in Korea on 15 June and compounds held about 163,000, more
was training at the U.N. Reception than 85 percent of whom were North
Center. Colombia would be the last Koreans. The remaining casualties were
U.N. member nation to contribute almost evenly divided between Chinese
ground combat forces to the U.N. and North Koreans. U.N. Command
Command.38 With the addition of the losses after a year of fighting stood near
Colombian unit, the Eighth Army con- 294,000. South Korean casualties had
sisted of four corps, seventeen divisions, mounted to 212,500, American losses
four brigades, one separate regiment, to around 77,000, and losses among
other U.N. units to about 4,500. Army
forces had suffered by far most of the
37 Facts on File, 1951, pp. 209-10; Goodrich, Korea:
A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations. p. 184: American casualties: 11,327 killed out-
Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 403-04; Hermes,
Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 15-21.
38 Also arriving in June from the United Kingdom 39 Summary, ROK and U.N. Ground Forces
were the headquarters and service units of what would Strength in Korea, 31 Jul 50-31 Jul 53; Eighth Army
be the 1st Commonwealth Division. When eventually G2 Estimate of Enemy Strength and Locations, 1 Jul
formed in late July 1951, the division would include 51; Fox, Inter-Allied Co-operation During Combat
the Canadian 25th, British Commonwealth 28th, and Operations; Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig, no. 96, 16-28
British 29th Brigades. Feb 53, and no. 115, 1-15 Feb 53.
KWP-EBB-0523
right; 42,925 wounded or injured in tinued as the diminished pace that had
action, of whom 1,075 later died; 6,088 set in after the Eighth Army ended its
captured, of whom 2,583 eventually general advance at lines Kansas and
died in captivity; and 3,979 recorded Wyoming. Since that time, Eighth Army
as missing in action, of whom 3,323 forces had conducted only extensive
later were declared dead either on di- patrolling and a few limited attacks, the
rect evidence or under the provisions two largest an unsuccessful attempt in
of the Missing Persons Act of 1942. the X Corps sector to establish an out-
Thus, out of a total of 64,319 Army post on the western rim of the Punch-
casualties chargeable to the first year bowl and a successful attempt in the I
of the war, deaths numbered 18,308.40 Corps sector to clear the Iron Triangle
As the first armistice conference of Chinese who after mid-June had
convened, combat operations con- crept back into the Sobang Hills, an
island of mountains within the triangle.
40Factson File, 1951, pp. 193, 202-03, 218, 234; Otherwise, Eighth Army was preoccu-
Mono, Hq, USARPAC, Military History Office, The pied with developing defenses along the
Handling of Prisoners of War, Jun 60; Battle Casual-
ties of the Army, Office, Asst Chief of Staff, G1, DA, Kansas and Wyoming lines. (See Map
31 Mar 54. 37.) As directed by General Van Fleet
KWP-EBB-0524
on 1 June, line Kansas was being orga- negotiations failed, but he expected a
nized as the main line of resistance with continuation of enemy offensive prep-
defensive positions arranged in depth arations.42
and elaborately fortified. Forces de- The Eighth Army estimate overrated
ployed on the looping Wyoming line the ability of enemy forces to recover
were developing hasty field fortifica- from their recent. defeat. As armistice
tions from which to delay and blunt negotiations began, both the Chinese
the force of enemy attacks before with- and North Koreans-especially the
drawing to assigned main line positions. Chinese-remained occupied with re-
To deepen the defense further, patrol storing units shattered over the past
bases were being established ahead of three months, most of which had
the Kansas-Wyoming front on terrain moved far to the north to reorganize,
features dominating logical enemy ap- and reequip. The immensity of the
proach routes. To prevent enemy problem of refitting them was indicated
agents reconnoitering Eighth Army de- in estimates placing enemy casualties
fenses from mingling with local farm suffered in April, May, and June above
folk, the battle area was being cleared two hundred thousand and in visible
of Korean civilians from five miles be- battlefield evidence of tremendous
hind line Kansas northward to the line losses in weapons and equipment. The
of patrol bases.41 size of the problem was also implicit in
Lending haste to the preparation of the 1 July response of Kim I1 Sung and
defenses was an expectation that the Peng Teh-huai to General Ridgways
Chinese and North Koreans would use offer to negotiate: We agree to sus-
the respite from Eighth Army pressure pend military activities [during the
to rehabilitate their units and reconsti- course of negotiations]. Indeed, the
tute an attack force quickly. Familiar Chinese and North Koreans needed
signs of enemy attack preparations had only to consider the failures and heavy
appeared: main forces were off the line costs of their April and May attacks to
for refitting; screening forces on the realize that they could no longer con-
periphery of the Kansas-Wyoming trace duct offensive operations successfully
vigorously opposed the Eighth Armys against the Eighth Army. This realiza-
ground reconnaissance; supplies were tion became evident when they agreed
moved into forward dumps; and some to enter into armistice negotiations
captives mentioned a forthcoming without mentioning the conditions that
Sixth Phase Offensive. By early July Chinese authorities earlier had insisted
the Eighth Army intelligence officer upon.43
was predicting an enemy offensive any- From a purely tactical standpoint, the
time after midmonth. He revised his cease-fire during negotiations proposed
estimate after armistice negotiations
started, predicting then that there
would be no enemy attack unless the 42 Rad, CX 65365, CINCUNC to DEPTAR, 4 Jul
51; Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Jul 51.
43 Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig, no. 1, 1-31 Dec 52, no.
96, l6-28 Feb 53, no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53, and no. 115,
41 LOI, Gen Van Fleet to CGs I, IX, and X Corps 1-15 Feb 53; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean
and to CG ROK I Corps, both 1 Jun 51; Eighth Army Army, 31 Jul 52; Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 258;
Comd Rpts, Nar, Jun and Jul 51. Rad, CX 66183, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 1 Jul 51.
KWP-EBB-0525
by Kim I1 Sung and Peng Teh-huai was Joy, commander of Naval Forces, Far
unacceptable to General Ridgway be- East, whom Ridgway appointed as chief
cause he would not be able to employ of the U.N. Command armistice dele-
air and ground reconnaissance to check gation, set the matter straight at the
on enemy activity, in particular on any first conference when he announced
preparation for major offensive opera- that hostilities would continue until an
tions. Beyond that, Ridgway had his 1 armistice agreement was reached.
June instructions from the Joint Chiefs, Given the prospect of a unilateral cease-
confirmed on 10 July, to conduct oper- fire, the enemy delegation had no
ations primarily designed to create con- choice but to agree.45
ditions favorable to concluding an In applying pressure, U.N. naval sur-
armistice. As Army Chief of Staff Col- face forces would continue to blockade
lins wrote later, the main purpose of both North Korean coasts and keep en-
U.N. Command operations was to emy shore installations under bom-
keep pressure on the enemy . . . in or- bardment. U.N. air forces already were
der to force an agreement that would
45 Rad, CX 66188, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 2 Jul 51;
end the fighting. 44 Admiral C. Turner Rad, JCS 92831, JCS to CINCUNC, 1 Jun 51; Rad,
JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 JuI 51; Hermes, Truce
44 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 306. Tent and Fighting Front, p. 23.
KWP-EBB-0526
Bibliographical Note
Eighth Army historian. During the last Barclay, C. N. The First Commonwealth
months of the war they were consoli- Division. Aldershot: Gale & Polden
dated as the 8086th Army Unit, a provi- Limited, 1954.
sional organization of Army Forces, Cagle, Malcolm W., and Manson,
Far East, headquartered in Japan, and Frank A. The Sea War in Korea. An-
operated under the control of the his- napolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957.
torian of that command. Detachment Chou Ching-wen. Ten Years of Storm.
reports, based mainly on interviews New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
with participants, centered on small 1960.
unit combat actions, combat support Collins, J. Lawton. War in Peacetime.
operations, and service support activi- Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.
ties. The detachments also produced Crahay, Albert. Les Belges En Coree,
monographs on diverse subjects-per- 1951-1955. Brussels: Imprimerie
sonnel problems, logistical problems, Medicale et Scientifique (S.A.), 1967.
enemy tactics, among others-all of Department of the Army. Handbook
which, as indicated in footnotes, sup- on the Chinese Communist Army, DA Pam
port numerous sections of this book. 30-51. Washington, 1952.
Originals of the detachment products Department of the Army. Handbook
are held by the National Archives and on the Chinese Communist Army, DA Pam
Records Administration. Microfilm 30-51. Washington, 1960.
copies are located in the Army Center Department of State. The Conflict in
of Military History. Korea. Washington, 1951.
Interviews and correspondence with Department of State. The Record on
key commanders and staff officers and Korean Unification, 1943-1960. Wash-
personal accounts written by some of ington, 1960.
them provided important information Department of State. United States
available nowhere else. These tran- Policy in the Korean Conflict, July 1950-
scripts, letters, and accounts are stored February 1951. Washington, 1951.
in the Army Center of Military History. Department of State. United States
Policy in the Korean Crisis. Washington,
Secondary Sources 1950.
Farrar-Hockley, Anthony. The Edge
The following list is by no means
of the Sword. London: Frederick Muller
complete but notes works that were of
Ltd., 1954.
decided usefulness.
Field, James A., Jr. History of U.S.
Naval Operations: Korea. Washington,
Books
1962.
Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. Futrell, R. Frank. The United States
New York: W. W. Norton and Com- Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. New
pany, 1969. York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961.
Appleman, Roy E. South to the Nak- George, Alexander L. The Chinese
tong, North to the Yalu. UNITED Communist Army in Action. New York:
STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN Columbia University Press, 1967.
WAR. Washington, 1961. Gittings, John. The Role of the Chinese
KWP-EBB-0529
Army. New York: Oxford University Sawyer, Maj. Robert K. Military Advi-
Press, 1967. sors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War.
Griffith, Samuel B. II. The Chinese Washington, 1963.
Peoples Liberation Army. New York: Schnabel, James F. Policy and Direc-
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. tion: The First Year. UNITED STATES
Gugeler, Russell A. Combat Actions in ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR.
Korea. Washington: Combat Forces Washington, 1972.
Press, 1954. Tang Tsou. American Failure in China,
Marshall, S. L. A. The River and the 1941-1950. Chicago: University of Chi-
Gauntlet. New York: William Morrow & cago Press, 1963.
co., 1953. Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Years of
Montross, Lynn, and Canzona, Capt. Trial and Hope, Vol. II. New York: Dou-
Nicholas A. U.S. Marine Operations in bleday & Company, Inc., 1956.
Korea, 1950-1953, Vol. III. The Chosin Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the
Reservoir Campaign. Washington, 1957. Yalu. New York: The Macmillan Com-
Montross, Lynn, Kuokka, Maj. pany, 1960.
Hubard D., and Hicks, Maj. Norman Wood, Herbert Fairlie. Strange Battle-
W. U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, ground. Ottawa: Queens Printer and
1950-1953, Vol. IV. The East-Central Controller of Stationery, 1966.
Front. Washington, 1962.
Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War.
New York: St. Martins Press, 1964. Manuscript
Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean
War. Garden City: Doubleday & Com- Ridgway, General Matthew B. The
pany, Inc., 1967. Korean War, Issues and Policies.
KWP-EBB-0530
KWP-EBB-0531
List of Abbreviations
AAA Antiaircraft artillery
AFA Armored field artillery
ASCOM Army Service Command
AW Automatic weapons
FA Field artillery
FAF Fifth Air Force
FEAF Far East Air Forces
FEAM Com Far East Materiel Command
FEC Far East Command
Military Units-Identification
Engineers ......................................... E
Infantry ..........................................
Size Symbols
The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or
above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying
arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:
Squad ..........................................
Section. .........................................
Platoon.. ............................................
Army ............................................
EXAMPLES
The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the
unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent
unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below
boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:
Weapons
Machinegun ......................................
Gun battery
Howitzer or Mortar
Tank
Self-propelled gun
KWP-EBB-0535
Index
Acheson, Dean: 13 Air squadron, South African, 2d SAAF: 36n
ceasefire: 495 Air squadrons, U.S.
and MacArthurs relief: 362, 364 3d Air Rescue: 32
Manchurian border policy: 42, 43 45th Tactical Reconnaissance: 55n
negotiated settlement: 496-97 91st Strategic Reconnaissance: 35
and 38th parallel: 18, 345 Air wings, U.S.
Air bases. See also Airfields and airstrips; Airports. 1st Marine: 36, 39, 148, 167, 410
Kadena: 35 Fleet Air Wing One: 41
McCord: 36n Fleet Air Wing Six: 39
Yokota: 36 Airborne operations: 332. See also Munsan-ni; Opera-
Air detachments, U.S., MPQ radar: 417n tions, TOMAHAWK.
Air division, U.S., 315th: 338n Aircraft, fixed-wing
Air flight, Greece, No. 13: 36n AD Skyraider: 39, 438n
Air forces, U.S. See also Far East Air Forces. B-26: 36, 417n, 484
Fifteenth: 35n B-29: 35, 42n, 55, 111, 222, 379, 417n, 454, 466, 467
Fifth: 32, 34, 36. See also Air operations, UNC; C-119: 36, 287, 338, 407
Close air support, UNC; Interdiction, UNC; C-47: 36, 138, 142
Partridge, Maj. Gen. Earle E. C-54: 36
airfield construction: 410 C-46: 338
control of the air: 128, 378-79 Dakota: 36n
evacuation of Kimpo: 211 F4U Corsair: 39, 399
night-intruder sorties: 252-54 F7F Tigercat: 39
radar detachments: 417n F9F Pantherjet: 39
THUNDERBOLT 252-54 F-51 Mustang: 34, 35, 36, 413
and the withdrawal from the north: 111, 155, 164, F-80: 42n, 417, 425
167 F-80C Shooting Star: 35, 36, 53
Air group, U.S., 98th Bombardment: 42n F-82: 36
Air operations, Communist: 42, 52-53, 313-14, 314n, F-84E Thunderjet: 34, 35, 53
326-27, 378-79 F-86A Sabre: 35, 53
Air operations, UNC, 48-49. See also Close air support, IL-IO: 378
UNC; Interdiction, UNC; Helicopters; L-17: 97
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, L-19: 339
and air power. Mariner: 39
airdrops: 68, 99-100, 141, 287, 299, 308, 370, 407, MIG-15: 42, 42n, 53, 55, 128, 378-79
414-15 Neptune: 39
bombing: 222, 484. See also below radar-directed North Star: 36n
night-bombing. R5D: 36
control of: 36, 39 RB-26: 36
defense of Seoul: 417n, 431 RF-51: 36
destruction of UNC equipment: 272, 321 RF-80: 36
photo reconnaissance: 55, 55n Sunderland: 39
radar-directed night-bombing: 111, 417n, 432, 454, T-6 Mosquito: 36, 55, 123, 426-27
466, 467 Airfields and airstrips: 7, 34, 35, 84, 88. See also Air
reconnaissance and observation: 47, 55, 82, 83, 88, bases; Airports.
101-02, 105, 114, 128, 156, 157, 164, 188, 190, construction/repair, Communist: 378-79
195, 197, 204-05, 208, 228, 240, 248, 252, 258, construction/repair, UNC: 410
283, 288, 290, 298, 299, 329, 331, 333, 353-55, Hagaru-ri: 138
377, 397, 398, 417, 424, 426-27, 428, 436, 440, ltami: 172
443, 478, 478n, 480, 482, 483, 485, 492 Kimpo: 36, 44, 192, 201, 247
and smoke: 373, 373n evacuation of: 210, 211, 212, 378, 410
Air power: 16, 22. See also Air operations, Communist; THUNDERBOLT: 247, 255, 256, 257
Air operations, UNC. Koto-ri: 88, 142
Air squadron, Australian, 77 RAAF: 36n Manchurian: 42, 378
KWP-EBB-0536
INDEX 517
INDEX 519
INDEX 521
INDEX 523
524
524 EBB AND FLOW
EBB AND FLOW
Companies, U.S.-Continued Companies, U.S.-Continued
Companies, U.S.-Continued Companies, U.S.-Continued
60th Field Ambulance and Surgical: 339n G, Ist Marines: 100, 101, 102-03
60th Field Ambulance and Surgical: 339n G, 1st Marines: 100, 101, 102-03
82d Engineer Petroleum Distribution: 211 G, 5th Marines: 94
82d Engineer Petroleum Distribution: 211 G, 5th Marines: 94
8213th Ranger: 26, 63n, 180, 192, 258, 384 G, 7th Cavalry: 359
8213th Ranger: 26, 63n, 180, 192, 258, 384 G, 7th Cavalry: 359
A, 7th Cavalry: 361 G, 7th Marines: 90
A, 7th Cavalry: 361 G, 7th Marines: 90
A, 9th Infantry: 466 G, 23d Infantry: 287, 295-96, 297, 299
A, 9th Infantry: 466 G, 23d Infantry: 287, 295-96, 297, 299
A, 10th Engineer Combat: 140 G, 38th Infantry: 67, 69, 75, 456, 459
A, 10th Engineer Combat: 140 G, 38th Infantry: 67, 69, 75, 456, 459
A, 14th Enrgineer Combat Bn.: 337 G, 65th Infantry: 14'5, 146
A, 14th Engineer Combat Bn.: 337 G, 65th Infantry: 145, 146
A, 23d Infantry: 80, 295 G, 72d Tank Bn.: 448
A, 23d Infantry: 80, 295 G, 72d Tank Bn.: 448
A, 32d Infantry: 96-97 G, 187th Airborne RCT: 274
A, 32d Infantry: 96-97 G, 187th Airborne RCT: 274
A, 38th Infantry: 67, 68, 269, 271-72, 450, 452, H, 7th Marines: 90, 94
Headquarters, 21st Infantry 479, 47 9n
A, 38th Infantry: H, 7th Marines: 90, 94
456, 457, 459 67, 68, 269, 271-72, 450, 452,
Headquarters, 21st Infantry 479, 479n
A, 456,
65th457, 459
Engineer Bn.: 238n 1, 5th Marines: 94
A, 65th Engineer Bn.: 238n I, 5th Marines: 94
A, 70th Tank Bn.: 296-97 I, 7th Cavalry: 361
I, 7th Cavalry: 361
A, 70th Tank Bn.: 296-97
A, 72d Tank Bn.: 391, 402-06, 406n, 407, 407n 1, 9th Infantry: 119
A, 72d Tank Bn.: 391, 402-06, I, 9th Infantry: 119
A, 73d Heavy Tank Bn.: 416 406n, 407, 407n I, 23d Infantry: 113, 295, 456
A, 73d Heavy Tank Bn.: 416 I, 23d Infantry: 113, 295, 456
A, 73d Engineer Combat: 140n I, 31st Infantry: 97
A, 73d Engineer Combat: I, 31st Infantry: 97
B, 2d Chemical Mortar Bn.:140n
391, 404, 406 I, 38th Infantry: 68
B, 2d Chemical Mortar Bn.: 391, 404, 406 I, 38th Infantry: 68
B, 2d Engineer Combat Bn.: 285, 287, 296 K, 23d Infantry: 113, 295
B, 2d Engineer K, 23d Infantry: 113, 295
B, 5th Marines: Combat
96
Bn.: 285, 287, 296 K, 27th Infantry: 207-08
B, 5th Marines: 96 K, 27th Infantry: 207-08
B, 23d Infantry: 296 K, 31st Infantry: 97, 99
B, 23d Infantry: 296 K, 31st Infantry: 97, 99
B, 31st Infantry: 98, 102-03 K, 38th Infantry: 68, 461
B, 31st Infantry: 98, 102-03 K, 38th Infantry: 68, 461
B, 32d Infantry: 96-97, 99 L, 5th Cavalry: 297
B, 32d Infantry: L, 5th Cavalry: 297
B, 35th Infantry: 96-97,
63n
99
L, 9th Infantry: 283. 288, 290, 291
B, 35th Infantry: 63n L, 9th Infantry:
B, 38th Infantry: 456, 457, 459 L, 23d Infantry: 283, 112, 288, 290, 291
113, 299
B, 38th Infantry: 456, 457, 459 L, 23d Infantry: 112, 113, 299
B, 64th Tank Bn.: 481 L, 31st Infantry: 99
B, 64th Tank Bn.: 481 L, 31st Infantry: 99
B, 72d Tank Bn.: 448, 457, 481 L, 38th Infantry: 67, 75
B, 72d Tank Bn.: 448, 457, 481 L, 38th Infantry: 67, 75
B, 74th Engineer Combat: 391, 404-06 M, 7th Cavalry: 360
B, 74th Engineer Combat: 391, 404-06 M, 7th Cavalry: 360
B, 89th Tank Bn.: 117 medical, 21st Infantry: 479, 479n
B, 89th Tank Bn.: 117 medical, 21st Infantry: 479, 479n
B, 187th Airborne RCT: 339 tank, 15th Infantry: 474. See also Task forces, Yoke.
B, 187th Airborne RCT: 339 tank, 15th Infantry: 474. See also Task forces, Yoke.
C, 2d Chemical Mortar Bn.: 382, 390-91, 407 tank, 65th Infantry: 421, 422, 424, 425
C, 2d Chemical Mortar Bn.: 382, 390-91, 407 tank, 65th Infantry: 421, 422, 424, 425
C, 2d Engineer Combat: 68 Congress, U.S.: 363. See also Martin, Joseph W.;
C, 2d Engineer Congress, U.S.: 363. See also Martin, Joseph W.;
C, 6th Tank Bn.:Combat:341, 34268 Senate, U.S.
C, 6th Tank Bn.: 341, 342 Senate, U.S.
C, 7th Marines: 92-94, 96 Containment: 10
C, 7th Marines: 92-94, 96 Containment: 10
C, 9th Infantry: 466 Corley, Col. John T.: 113. See also Regiments, U.S.,
C, 9th Infantry: 466 Corley, Col. John T.: 113. See also Regiments, U.S.,
C, 23d Infantry: 287, 295, 400 24th Infantry.
C, 23d Infantry: 287, 295, 400 24th Infantry.
C, 32d Infantry: 96-97 Corps, North Korean. See also Divisions, North
C, 32d Infantry:
C, 38th Infantry: 96-9775, 111, 115, 450, 451, 452 Corps, North Korean. See also Divisions, North
Korean; North Korean People's Army.
C, 38th Infantry: 75, 111, 115, 450, 451, 452 Korean; North Korean People's Army.
C, 64th Tank Bn.: 340 I: 52, 239, 244, 304, 314, 325, 373
C, 64th Tank Bn.: 340 I: 52, 239, 244, 304, 314, 325, 373
C, 72d Tank Bn.: 121,448,450,455-56,457-59,474 Communist Spring offensive: 381, 417, 430,
C, 72d Tank Bn.: 121, 448, 450, 455-56, 457-59, 474 Communist Spring offensive: 381, 417, 430,
C, 73d Heavy Tank Bn.: 422-24, 426, 427 444, 445, 4,70
C, 73d Heavy Tank Bn.: 422-24, 426, 427 444, 445, 470
C, 74th Engineer Combat Bn.: 391, 404-05 New Year's offensive: 187, 190
C, 74th Engineer Combat Bn.: 391, 404-05 New Years offensive: 187, 190
D, Ist Marines: 101-02 and RIPPER/COURAC;EOUS: 334, 335, 340, 341,
D, 1st Marines: 101-02 and RIPPER/COURAGEOUS:334, 335, 340, 341,
D, 6th Medium Tank Bn.: 419, 420-21 348
D, 6th Medium Tank Bn.: 419, 420-21 348
D, 6th Tank Bn.: 296, 298 and THUNDERBOLT: 254, 257
D, 6th Tank Bn.: 296, 298 and THUNDERBOLT: 254, 257
D, 7th Marines: 94 UNC Spring counteroffensive: 472
D, 7th Marines: 94 UNC Spring counteroffensive: 472
D, 10th Engineer Bn.: 100, 101 11: 52, 164, 165, 184, 304, 314. See also Choe Hyon,
D, 10th Engineer
E, 5th Marines: 94Bn.: 100, 101 II: 52, 164, 165, 184, 304, 314.
Lt. Gen. See also Choe Hyon,
E, 5th Marines: 94 Lt. Gen.
E, 7th Cavalry: 94, 359, 361 Communist Spring offensive: 445, 447, 463,
E, 7th Cavalry: 94, 359, 361 Communist Spring offensive: 445, 447, 463,
E, 23d Infantry: 220 467, 468, 470
E, 23d Infantry:
E, 27th Infantry: 220 63n 467, 468, 470
Malta-ri: 292
E, 27th Infantry: 63n Malta-ri: 292
E, 38th Infantry: 450, 456 New Year's offensive: 187, 199. See also below
E, 38th Infantry: 450, 456 New Years offensive: 187, 199. See also below
E, 72d Tank Bn.: 448 Wonju.
E, 72d Tank Bn.: 448 Wonju.
Eighth Army Ranger. See above 8213th Ranger. and RIPPER: 333
Eighth Army Ranger. See above 8213th Ranger. and RIPPER: 333
F, 5th Marines: 94 and ROUNDUP: 246,248,249,251,252,261,262
F, 5th Marines: 94 and ROUNDUP:246, 248, 249, 251, 252, 261, 262
F, 7th Cavalry: 359 UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 476, 485
F, 7th Cavalry: 359 UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 476, 485
F, 7th Marines: 92-94, 96, 98 Wonju: 219, 223-27
F, 7th Marines: 92-94, 96, 98 Wonju: 219, 223-27
F, 23d Infantry: 74,287,295-96,450,452,455,456 Yongwol: 294
F, 23d Infantry: 74, 287, 295-96, 450, 452, 455, 456 Yongwol: 294
F, 27th Infantry: 117 111: 52, 262, 304, 324
F, 27th Infantry: 117 III: 52, 262, 304, 324
F, 38th Infantry: 67, 75, 450, 456, 457, 459 Communist Spring offensive: 381, 444
F, 38th Infantry: 67, 75, 450, 456, 457, 459 Communist Spring offensive: 381, 444
F, 72d Tank Bn.: 448
F, 72d Tank Bn.: 448
KWP-EBB-0545
INDEX 525
INDEX 527
Defense minister, ROK. See Sing Sung MO. Divisions, North Korean-Continued
den Ouden, Lt. Col. M. P. A.: 277-78. See also Bat- 6th: 219, 220, 293, 304, 381, 389, 400, 447, 460,
talion, Netherlands 460n, 463, 484
Denmark, personnel in Korea: 501 7th: 219, 293, 304, 381, 381n
Distinguished Service Cross: 407n 8th: 239, 245, 254, 255, 304, 372-73, 417, 436, 439
Division, Commonwealth, 1st: 502n 9th: 219, 223, 225-26, 292, 293, 304
Divisions, Chinese 10th: 219, 223, 226-27, 304, 322, 323, 324, 333, 334
2d Motorized Artillery: 327, 376, 384 12th: 199, 219, 220, 221, 293, 304, 376
5th Artillery: 327 Communist Spring offensive: 381, 389, 399-
7th Motorized Artillery: 325 400, 447, 460, 463
29th: 386, 418, 422 UNC Spring counteroffensive: 484
31st: 450, 455, 463, 466, 475 13th: 324, 484, 485
34th: 377, 386, 418n, 455, 460, 463, 466, 483 15th: 352, 370, 381
35th: 450, 455, 463 17th: 254, 255, 304
44th: 456 17th Mechanized: 343n
45th: 450, 454, 461 18th: 323
58th: 89, 90, 92, 96, 100-101, 102, 137-38 19th: 323, 340
59th: 89, 90, 92, 96, 98, 376, 384, 411 24th: 324
60th: 89, 90-92, 101-02, 376, 382, 401-02, 418, 419 27th: 219, 220, 223, 226, 292, 293, 304, 447, 463, 485
76th: 140 28th: 219
77th: 140 31st: 219, 226, 262, 304
79th: 92, 94, 96, 98, 172, 463 32d: 324, 381, 484-85
80th: 92, 96, 98-100, 172, 411, 443, 463, 475 36th: 323
81st: 171, 172, 374, 418, 445-47, 460, 463, 466, 467, 37th: 324
470, 475 38th: 304
89th: 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 98, 101, 140 41st: 324
112th: 244, 245 42d: 324
113th: 83, 122, 188-89, 245 43d: 219, 304
114th: 188, 190, 254 45th: 324, 353, 370, 381, 389, 400
115th: 73, 288, 299, 383-84, 398 46th: 324
116th: 73, 188-89, 288, 299, 398 47th: 254, 255, 304
117th: 73, 266, 268, 272, 273, 288 105th Tank: 324
118th: 194, 401-02 Divisions, ROK
119th: 288, 299 1st: 27, 208, 369, See also Kang Moon Bong, Brig.
120th: 266-68, 288, 299, 383, 398, 399 Gen.; Paik Sun Yup, Maj. Gen.
124th: 88, 89, 90 battle of the Chongchon: 61, 63, 64, 71, 72,
125th: 105-07, 114, 248-49 74, 76, 77, 79
126th: 88, 288, 299 Chinese New Years offensive: 188, 189-90, 194
139th: 326-27 Communist Spring offensive: 372-73, 379, 381,
140th: 326-27 397, 410-11, 416, 417, 418-19, 421, 426,
141st: 326-27 430, 432-34, 435, 436, 438, 439
148th: 245 COURAGEOUS/TOMAHAWK: 336-37, 338, 340-41
149th: 245 line B: 193-94
150th: 245 line C: 201
179th: 384-85, 411, 418 line D: 212-13, 214, 216
181st: 374, 445, 455, 456, 462, 463, 464, 466 Seoul bridgehead: 192
187th: 373, 386, 397, 411, 417 RIPPEK: 317, 329, 330
188th: 387, 397, 412, 417 UNC force withdrawal south: 109, 113, 116-
189th: 397, 416, 417, 421 17, 149, See also above line B, line C, line D,
190th: 416, 417, 427 Seoul bridgehead.
192d: 397, 416, 417, 427 UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470-72
197th: 269, 273 WOLFHOUND: 237-38
198th: 266 2d: 27, 306n
Divisions, North Korean battle of the Chongchon: 62
1st: 173, 352, 370, 381 Chinese New Years offensive: 188, 190-91
2d: 88, 199, 219, 223, 226, 304, 310, 369-70, 447, Communist Spring offensive: 438
463, 485 PILEDRIVER:491
3d: 172, 311, 324 ROUNDUP: 259
4th: 324 UNC force withdrawal south: 116, 150 180,
5th: 88, 324 197, 200, 217, 225
KWP-EBB-0548
INDEX 529
INDEX 531
Field armies, Chinese Growdon, Lt. Col. John S.: 337. See also Task forces,
First: 325n Growdon.
Fourth: 53, 55-56 Guerrilla forces, Communist: 52, 60n, 62, 84, 105,
Third: 53, 56 149, 150, 156, 164, 199, 219, 227, 333, 333n
Fisher, Col. Henry G.: 78. See also Regiments, U.S., Guerrilla operations, anti-Communist. See Partisans,
35th Infantry. anti-Communist.
Flamethrowers: 438n Guns, 155-mm.: 442n, 453
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, commanding general. See
Shepherd, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Habae-jae
Fleets, U.S. See Seventh Fleet. Communist Spring offensive: 453, 457, 462, 463,
Foreign Minister, Peoples Republic of China. See 464, 466, 467
Chou En-lai. UNC Spring counteroffensive: 473, 474, 475, 483,
Formosa: 41, 500. See also Taiwan. 484
Formosa patrol: 41 Haeju: 153, 229, 323
Formosa Strait: 351 Haeju-Kumhwa line: 156, 157, 161
Forney, Col. Edward H.: 167 Haeju-Sineve-Ichon line: 153, 156
Fort Lewis, WA: 442 Haengju: 335, 433, 435, 436n
Fougasses: 438n Hagaru-ri: 47
Fox Hill: 98, 137. See also Companies, U.S., F, 7th battle of the Changjin Reservoir: 88, 89, 92, 96,
Marines. 97, 98, 100-103
France, forces of in Korea: 24, 27. See also Battalion, readjustments/withdrawal: 129, 130, 131-32, 136,
French. 137-39, 140, 141, 147
Freeman, Col. Paul L. See also Regiments, U.S., 23d Hajin: 301, 302
Infantry. Hajinbu-ri: 369n
battle of the Chongchon: 65, 74 Communist Spring offensive: 462, 463, 467, 468,
Chipyong-ni: 283, 285-87, 296 469
Chipyong-ni railroad tunnels: 248-49 UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470, 473
ROUNDUP: 263 Hamhung, and UNC force withdrawal to: 28, 84, 87n.
UNC force withdrawal south: 80-81, 111-12, 113, 92, 98, 101, 128, 130-31, 139, 140, 143, 156
120, 121, 124, 125-26 Han River: 290, 308, 366, 381
Wonju: 220-22 Communist Spring offensive: 433, 435, 436n
Front Headquarters: 52, 325 enemy movement south of: 210, 213, 240
Funchilin Pass: 88, 140, 142 frozen: 196, 199, 257
Fusiliers: 167. See also Battalions, British, 1st, Royal RIPPER: 317, 321, 329
Northumberland Fusiliers. THUNDERBOLT: 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 252
UNC force withdrawal south: 160, 161, 162, 163,
Gardner, 1st Lt. George W.: 271-72 192, 193, 201, 217, 223, 225, 227
Garvin, Brig. Gen. Crump: 27, 160, 185 Han River bridges: 186, 198, 199
Gay. Maj. Gen. Hobart M.: 309n. See also Divisions, destruction of: 201, 202, 204, 207-08
U.S., 1st Cavalry. traffic control: 200, 201, 202, 203
battle of the Chongchon: 71, 77, 105 Han River corridor: 431, 444
line C: 195 Han River estuary: 180
Task Force Johnson: 239 Han River line: 284
THUNDERBOLT 243 Han River valley, control over: 249, 301-02. See also
UNC force withdrawal south: 81-82, 107, 1I7 Operations, ROUNDUP.
Geiger, Maj. Gen. Roy S.: 309n Han River-Yangpyong-Hoengsong-Kangnung line:
General Assembly, U.N.: 18, 495, 501. See also 246-47
Entezam, Nasrollah; United Nations. Haneda Airport, Tokyo: 38n, 178, 366
General Headquarters: 52, 325 Hangye
Geneva Conventions, 1949: 28, 28n Communist Spring offensive: 450, 452, 457, 460,
Gerhardt, Col. William. See Task forces, Gerhardt. 461, 462, 463, 466
Gloster Crossing: 288, 397. See also Battalions, UNC Spring counteroffensive: 474, 481
British, 1st, Gloucestershire Rgt. Hangye-Nuron-ni line: 466-67
Glosters. See Battalions, British, 1st, Gloucestershire Hangye: 456
Rgt. Hantan River: 353, 372, 373, 379, 385, 386, 393, 394,
Greece 395, 396, 418
army of and Van Fleet: 368, 369 Hantan River valley: 372
forces of in Korea: 36n, 180 Hapsu: 47, 48, 86
Gromyko, Andrei A.: 500-501 Hapyong-dong: 315
KWP-EBB-0552
INDEX 533
INDEX 535
INDEX 537
McCaffrey, Cal. William J.: 270 Milburn, Maj. Gen. Frank W.-Continued
McClure, Maj. Gen. Robert B.: 163, 184, 200, 217, and the Gloucestershire Bn.: 419, 428-29
219-22. See also Divisions, U.S., 2d Infantry. line B: 186-87
McCord Air Force Base: 36n line D: 212-13, 214, 215-16
Mace, 2d Lt. William M.: 270, 271, 278 PILEDRIVER: 491-93
Machine guns. See also Antiaircraft artillery; Sub- and reconnaissance in force: 237, 238-39, 240. See
machine guns. also Operations, THUNDERBOLT.
.30-caliber Browning, heavy: 30 and Ridgway: 228
.30-caliber Browning, light: 30 RIPPER: 317, 329-30
.50-caliber Browning: 30 RUGGED: 353
McLaughlin, Maj. John N.: 103 Seoul bridgehead: 191, 192-94, 200-201, 202
MacLean, Col. Allan D.: 87, 88, 90, 92, 96, 97, 98, Task Force Allen: 255, 256, 258
99. See also Regiments, U.S., 31st Infantry. temporary command, Eighth Army: 177
Maengsan: 70 traffic control, Han bridges: 201
Maixner, Lt. Col. Harold: 272, 274, 275-76. See also UNC force withdrawal south: 109, 113, 116-17,
Battalions, U.S., 3d, 38th Infantry. 153-54, 156. See also above line B, line D, Seoul
Majon-dong: 100, 130, 132, 140, 143, 145, 147 bridgehead.
Malik, Jacob: 496-97, 499 UNC Spring counteroffensive: 470-72, 475-76
Malta-ri: 282, 292 Military police: 122, 123
Manchuria: 3, 18, 20, 21, 42, 43, 52, 284, 312, 323, Miller, Maj. Crosby P.: 132
325, 326, 502 Miller, 1st Lt. Wilfred D.: 403, 405, 407n
Mangmi-san: 285 Min Ki Shik, Col.: 389-90
Manpojin: 43, 45, 47, 53, 55, 324 Minefields, Communist: 255, 256, 338, 340, 343,
Mao Tse-tung, and On the Protracted War: 58, 60n, 370, 458, 484, 485, 493
379, 496 Minesweeping, naval: 40, 44, 313
Marshall, George C. Miryang: 182, 302
crossing the 38th parallel: 18 Missing Persons Act of 1942: 503
and MacArthurs relief: 362, 364, 364n, 365 Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) units
Manchurian border policy: 42, 43 8055th: 33
on a negotiated settlement: 495 Norwegian: 442n
and Van Fleet: 368 Moore, Maj. Gen. Bryant E.: 252n, 308. See also
Martin, Vice Adm. Harold M.: 313n. See also Corps, U.S., IX.
Seventh Fleet. Chipyong-ni: 284-85, 291
Martin, Joseph W.: 345, 362, 489 Han River valley: 301
Masan: 160, 170, 186, 225 THUNDERBOLT: 252, 258
Mead, Brig. Gen. A. D.: 129, 130, 140, 145, 422, Moore, Col. Ned D.: 114, 306-07. See also Regiments,
422n. See also Task forces, C, Dog. U.S., 19th Infantry.
Medals Morale, UNC: 150, 180, 183, 190, 192, 198, 201,
Medal of Honor: 136n, 147n 228, 456. See also Ridgway, General Matthew B.,
Navy Cross: 147n morale and confidence.
Presidential Unit Citation: 407n, 479n Mortars
Silver Star: 97 4.2-inch: 30, 382, 404, 407
Medical units: 27n, 28, 33, 442n, 501 60-mm.: 30
Michon: 220 81-mm.: 30
Michaelis, Col. John H.: 68, 74, 205-07, 228, 238. Mount McKinley, USS: 167, 172
See also Regiments, U.S., 27th Infantry. Muccio, John I.: 179, 184, 364, 365, 408
Middlesex Battalion. See Battalions, British, Mudgett, Col. Gilman C.: 338
Middlesex. Mukden, Manchuria: 56, 378
MIG Alley: 314n, 378 Mule Division: 327
Milburn, Maj. Gen. Frank W.: 62, 71. See also Corps, Mungyong: 215
U.S., I. Mungyong pass: 225
battle of the Chongchon: 71, 76, 79, 82 Munsan-ni: 151, 162
Chinese New Years offensive: 190 airborne landing at: 337, 338-40. See also
Communist Spring offensive: 389, 410, 413, Operations, COURAGEOUS.
416-17, 418-19, 421, 427, 430, 433-34, 435, Communist Spring offensive: 417, 440
436 UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465, 470, 472
COURAGEOUS/TOMAHAWK: 335, 337-38, 340, 341, Mupyongni: 48, 84, 88-90, 92
343 Murray, Lt. Col. Arthur B.: 167
demolition at Inchon: 211 Murray, Lt. Col. Raymond L.: 88, 90, 92, 96, 98,
and enemy intentions: 375 131, 137, 141. See also Regiments, U.S., 5th
Marine.
KWP-EBB-0558
Musan: 86 North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA): 16, 43, 20, 51-52,
Myers, Maj. Reginald R.: 101 223, 254, 290, 304, 323-25, 502. See also Corps,
North Korean; Divisions, North Korean.
Naechon River: 463, 475 Communist Spring offensive: 376-77, 381, 469-70
Naechon River valley: 461, 466 Front Headquarters: 52, 325
Naepyong-ni: 444, 447 General Headquarters: 52, 325
Naktong River, and defense line: 16, 159, 160, 161, Hwanghae: 230
233 and line B: 184-85
Nam 11, Lt. Gen.: 325 and line C: 199-200
Namchonjom: 323 and line D: 217
Namsan-ni: 43 PILEDRIVER: 493
Napalm: 413, 438 pursuit of U.N. forces: 156, 161, 164, 171, 172,
Napchongjong: 64, 72 239
National defense, minister of, North Korea. See Pyongchang: 292-293
Choe Yong Gun, Marshal. resistance to advances to line Kansas: 369-71
National Guard: 313 RIPPER: 321, 322, 327, 333
National Guard, ROK: 352, 352n RUGGED: 352
National Security Council: 14, 22, 488, 489, 490 tactics and strategy: 305n, 327, 352
National Youth Corps: 352n use of American arms: 223n
Nationalist China: 231. See also Formosa. withdrawal after Chipyong-ni: 302, 308
Naval Forces, Far East: 15, 16, 39, 89n. See also Joy, withdrawal from Seoul: 329
Vice Adm. C. Turner. Northumberland Fusiliers. See Battalions, British,
Naval gunfire support: 40, 262, 313. See also Naval 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers.
task forces, 95. Norway, medical team in Korea: 442n
Hungnam evacuation: 168, 173-74 Nullori River: 424
THUNDERBOLT-: 240,252 Nullori River valley: 427
Naval task forces Nuron-ni: 461, 462, 466
72: 41
77: 41-42, 48, 128, 313, 351, 410, 438n ODonnell, Maj. Gen. Emmett, Jr.: 35, 379
79: 42 Ofstie, Rear Adm. Ralph A.: 313n
90: 40, 40n, 128, 147, 165-66, 167, 313n, 317. Ojeda, Lt. Col. Dionisio: 414. See also Battalions,
See also Amphibious operations; Doyle, Rear Philippine, 10th BCT.
Adm. James H. Okinawa: 35, 41
95: 40-41, 41n, 230, 240, 258, 262, 313, 410, On the Protracted War (Mao Tse-tung): 60n
431-32. See also Smith, Rear Adm. Allen E. Onjong: 62
96: 39-40. See also Joy, Vice Adm. C. Turner. Operations
Navigational aids: 111 COURAGEOUS: 334, 335-43
Negotiated settlement: 319, 344, 500-502. See also DAUNTLESS: 347-50, 355, 356, 363, 365, 371-73,
Armistice conferences; Cease-fire. 374-76
Netherlands, forces of in Korea: 24, 26. See also KILLER: 301-02, 304, 305-10, 311. See also below
Battalion, Netherlands. RIPPER.
Netherlands Detachment, U.N.: 26 OVERWHELMING: 506
New Years offensive. See Chinese New Years PILEDRIVER: 485-87, 491-94
offensive RIPPER: 310-14, 315-19, 321-22, 327-34, 343-44.
New Zealand, forces in Korea: 24, 182, 371, 382, See also Chunchon; Hongchon; Seoul.
383, 391. See also Battalion. New Zealand. RUGGED: 347-50, 352-53. See also Hwachon Dam.
Newman, Maj. Charles A.: 481 ROUNDUP: 246, 248, 249-52, 254-55, 258-63, 292,
Nieh Feng-chin: 92. See also Armies, Chinese, 27th. 306, 321. See also Hoengsong.
No Name, line: 431, 434-35, 436, 438-39, 440, 441, command and control: 264, 268-70, 273, 275,
442, 445, 447, 448, 453-54, 462. See also Line 279-81. See also Coughlin, Col. John G.,
Waco. Hoengsong.
Noel, Frank: 102, 103 terminated: 290
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 232 STRANGLE: 505-06
North Korea THUNDERBOLT: 240-46, 247, 248, 249, 251,
air forces: 16, 51. See also Air operations, 252-58, 283
Communist. TOMAHAWK: 334, 335. See also above COURAGEOUS.
ground forces. See Guerrilla forces, Communist; WOLFHOUND: 237-39
North Korean People's Army. Oro-ri: 131, 166, 171
invasion of ROK: 10 Osan: 216, 228, 237, 238, 240
naval forces: 16, 51 Oum Mountain: 328
and a negotiated settlement: 489, 494, 496, 501-02 Ottawa: 499
KWP-EBB-0559
INDEX 539
INDEX 541
INDEX
543
Ridgway, General Matthew B.-Continued Roads: 5, 7, 311. See also Routes, numbered
and leadership and confidence-Continued Anju-Sunchon: 114
198, 206, 215-16, 234-36, 279-80, 281, 320. See and bridging: 140-41, 145-46
also above and Coulter; and the Gloucestershire Changjin Reservoir road: 129, 130, 166
Bn.; below and Milburn; morale. Chechon-Pyongchang: 252
line Alabama: 374 Chongchotrvalley road: 80, 107, 108, 112, 113
line C: 197-98, 200 Chunchon-Seoul: 180, 188, 200
line D: 200-201, 216-17, 223-25, 227 Habae-jae-Sangam-ni: 475
and MacArthur: 247, 305, 320, 345-46, 347, 350, Hagaru-ri-Koto-ri. See Hagaru-ri; Koto-ri; Task
365, 366. See also below relieves MacArthur. forces, Drysdale.
and McClure: 222 Hamhung-Hungnam: 171
and Milburn: 193, 198, 215-16, 228, 237 Hongchon-Chunchon-Hwachon: 468
and misinformation: 255, 313 hubs: 315, 348-49, 465-66, 468. See also Chechon;
mission and duties of: 488-89, 490 Chungchon; Hongchon; Ichon; Iron Tri-
morale: 180, 193, 198, 201, 228-231, 236n, 302. angle; Kumhwa; Pyongyang; Wonju.
See also above and leadership and confidence. Hudong-ni-Hagaru-ri. See Faith, Lt. Col. Don C.,
and a negotiated settlement: 490-491, 494, 501 Jr.; Hagaru-ri.
operations in support of: 497-99, 505-06 See Hyesanjin-Pukchong: 131
also above and cease-fire positions. Hyon-ni-Inje: 447, 484-85
North Korean pressure in the east: 199 Inchon-Yongdungpo: 255, 256, 258
and North Korean 10th Division: 333 Iron Triangle: 348-49
and the press: 317, 367 Kapyong-Chiam-ni: 478, 479
and reconnaissance: 209, 209n, 227, 228, 237-46, Kumnyangjang-ni-Ichon-Yoju: 239
333, 348 Kunu-ri-Anju: 113
and refugees: 196 Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukchon: 117-18, 120, 124,
relieves MacArthur: 362, 363-64, 365, 366-67 125-26
RIPPER: 310-11, 313, 314, 317-19, 322-23, 327, Kunu-ri-Sinchon: 126
328, 329-30, 331, 332, 333, 343-44 Kunu-ri-Sunchon: 76-77, 80, 107, 114-16, 118,
and ROK forces: 190, 223-24, 232-33, 246, 292, 120-25
333, 369n, 408 Pujon Reservoir: 166
and rotation: 236, 365 Pukchang-ni-Sunchon: 70-71
ROUNDUP: 251, 252, 259-60, 263-64, 268 Pukchong-Hyesanjin: 43, 87
RUGGED: 353-56 Pungam-ni-Hyon-ni-Inje: 482
and Seoul: 186-88, 246-47, 307, 310-11, 328-29 Pyongyang-Wonsan: 84
bridgehead: 186-87, 191, 192, 193, 196, 198 Sachang-ni-Hamhung: 129
evacuation of: 198-99, 200-201, 202-03 Seoul-Chunchon: 321, 322, 328, 329
and Smith: 308-09 Soksa-ri-Habae-jae: 473
strategy and tactics: 237, 246-48, 311, 371 Songchon-Pyongyang: 116
and Stratemeyer: 366 Taebaek Mountains: 45
and Swing: 308 Tanyang-Chungju: 225
on X Corps OPLAN: 47n Tokchon-Hamhung: 129
on terrain as an objective: 311 Tokchon-Kunu-ri: 70-71, 108, 109-11
and the 38th parallel: 320, 344-46, 347-50 Tokchon-Sunchon: 116
and THUNDERBOLT: 246-47, 251, 252, 255, 263-64 Wawon-Kunu-ri: 77, 80
U.N. victory: 495 withdrawal planning: 159
UNC Spring counteroffensive: 465 Wonju-Mokkye-dong: 220
and U.S.-Japan policy: 366-67 You-Wonju: 240, 245
and Van Fleet: 366, 367, 487, 489, 496, 497-99 Yongwol-P'yongchang: 252
and widening the war: 366, 367 Yudam-ni-Hagaru-ri: 89, 90. See also Hagaru-ri;
withdrawal policy: 198, 201, 206. See also United Toktong Pass; Yudam-ni.
Nations Command (UNC), evacuation question. Yudam-ni-Mupyong-ni: 90
WOLFHOUND: 238 Yudam-ni-Sinhung-ni: 89
Wonju: 224 Rocket launchers
Wonju-Pyongchang-Kangnung line: 292, 293, 294 2.36-inch: 30
and Yu: 292, 293, 294 3.5-inch: 30
Rifles ROK Army zone: 369n
.30-caliber Browning automatic: 30 ROUNDUP. See Operations, ROUNDUP
.30-caliber carbine: 30 Routes, numbered. See also Roads.
.30-caliber MI: 30 1:45, 349
RIPPER. See Operations, RIPPER. avoided by NKPA: 323
KWP-EBB-0565
INDEX 545
Roving defensive warfare: 371 Sinanju: 45, 109, 112, 117, 153, 304, 324
Royal Air Force: 39 Sinchang-ni: 77, 82, 107, 109, 113-14
Royal Australian Air Force: 36n Sinchon: 340, 341, 342, 343
Royal Canadian Air Force: 36n Sing Sung Mo: 369
Royal Hellenic Air Force: 36n Singye: 150, 153, 327
Royal Marines. See Commando, 41st Independent, Sinhung: 129
Royal Marines. Sinhung-ni: 89
Royal Northumberland Fusiliers. See Battalions, Sinjom-ni: 476, 477
British, 1st, Royal Northumber-land Fusiliers. Sinnim-ni: 81, 108
Royal Ulster Rifles. See Battalions, British, 1st, Royal Sinuiju: 43, 45, 49, 51, 53, 55, 323, 324, 325
Ulster Rifles. Sinwon-ni: 339
Ruffner, Maj. Gen. Clark L. See also Divisions, U.S., Skeldon, Lt. Col. James H.: 221
2d Infantry. Sloane, Col. Charles C. See also Regiments, U.S., 9th
battle for Hoengsong: 268, 270, 272-73, 280 Infantry.
Communist Spring offensive: 401, 447-48, 451-52, battle of the Chongchon: 68, 74
455, 456-57 withdrawal south: 80, 107, 116, 119, 120, 121,
Chipyong-ni-Wonju line: 290 122-23
defense of Wonju: 282, 283 Smith, Rear Adm. Allen E.: 40, 313n. See also Naval
KILLER: 307 task forces, 95.
line D: 225 Smith, Capt. Claude: 422
RUGGED. See Operations, RUGGED. Smith, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. See also Divisions, U.S.,
1st Marine.
Sachang-ni: 84, 88, 92, 101, 140 advance on Mupyong-ni: 89
Samchok: 161, 172, 217 Changjin Reservoir: 88, 96, 97, 98, 102
Samso-ri: 81, 83, 108, 115 Communist Spring offensive: 383, 384, 398
Sangam-ni: 447, 453, 460, 462, 463, 468, 483 withdrawal to Hamhung-Hungnam: 129, 130,
Sangju: 239 131-32, 137, 138-41, 142-45, 147
Sasebo, Japan: 255 and IX Corps: 308-09
Sebald, William J.: 363-64n, 366-67 and North Korean 10th Division: 227
Secretary General, U.N. See Lie, Trygve. Smoke screens. See Peoples Liberation Army, strategy
Security Council. See United Nations (U.N.), Security and tactics.
Council. Sobang Hills: 503
Senate, U.S. Sochon River valley: 493
Armed Services Committee: 489, 497 Sohojin: 171
cease-fire: 495 Soksa-ri: 310
Foreign Relations Committee: 489 Communist Spring offensive: 460, 462, 463, 466,
Seoul: 16, 27, 36, 150, 151, 155, 180, 228, 254, 304, 467
337, 341, 417n, 486 RIPPER: 310, 315
bridgehead UNC Spring counteroffensive: 467, 473, 475
civilian evacuation: 202-04 Solma-ri: 385, 388, 389, 397, 411, 428
collapse of: 198-202, 204-08 Som River: 288, 290, 301
established: 186-87 Somin-dong: 70, 75
strengthened: 196 Song Hyo Chan, Brig. Gem: 84-86. See also Divi-
withdrawal to: 188, 191, 192-95 sions, ROK, Capital.
Communist Spring offensive: 379, 381, 397, 401, Songchon: 82, 107, 109, 116
416, 431, 434-38 Songchon River: 168, 171, 172
defense of: 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165. See also Songjin: 131, 165-66, 167
above bridgehead. See also Line Golden. Soule, Maj. Gen. Robert H.: 343n. See also Divisions,
and Fifth Air Force: 252 U.S., 3d Infantry.
reoccupation of: 246-47, 323, 328-30 Changjin Reservoir: 84
RIPPER: 317, 328-30 Communist Spring offensive: 385-86, 387, 394-95,
Seventh Fleet: 41. See also Martin, Vice Adm. 412, 413, 414-15, 419, 421-22, 427, 428-29,
Harold M.; Struble, Vice Adm. Arthur D. 433, 435, 462, 467
Shepherd, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C.: 159 COURAGEOUS: 341
Sherman, Admiral Forrest P.: 14n. force withdrawal to Hamhung-Hungnam: 129,
Shipping Control Administration, Japan: 40 131, 140, 145
Short, Joseph: 364 and the Gloucestershire Bn.: 428-29
Sibyon-ni: 150, 157, 346 Hungnam evacuation: 169, 171, 172, 173
Sikorsky: 32 line B: 185, 186
KWP-EBB-0567
INDEX
547
INDEX 549
INDEX 551
* U.S. GOVERNMENT
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