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IndiaandPakistanhaveremainedinastateofrivalryforalmost63yearsmorethanthehistoricrivalrythatexistedbetween
theUSandUSSR.Furthermorethetransformationintheirrespectivewardoctrineshavealsoremainedlockedinthehistoric
traditionsofBritishwarfighting,battleplansandstrategicoutcomes.Theforcedifferentialbetweenthestatesincaseofthe
armyisalmost3:1.ThelatentconflictbetweennucleararmedrivalsIndiaandPakistanmakescontinuedstrategicstabilityin
SouthAsiauncertain.Abreakdownofdeterrencebetweenthetwowouldhaveseriousconsequences,includingthepotential
useofnuclearweapons.

Since1999therehavebeentwomilitarycrisesinvolvingIndiaandPakistanthatescalatedtothepointwhereoutsideactors
felttheneedtointervenetheoutbreakofwar.FirstinKargilandthenDecember2001attackonIndianParliamentbuildingin
NewDelhibyPakistanbackedKashmirimilitantsandthesubsequentmilitarystandoffwithPakistanknownasoperation
Parakram(OperationVictory),theIndianArmyannouncedanewlimitedwardoctrineinApril2004thatwouldallowitto
mobilizequicklyandundertakeretaliatoryattacksinresponsetoPakistanspecificchallengesposedbyPakistan'sProxyWarin
Kashmir.ThisColdStartDoctrine(CSD)markedabreakfromthefundamentallydefensiveorientationthattheIndianMilitary
hasadoptedsinceindependencein1947.

WhenwetrytodefinetheconceptofCSDitdatesbacktoApril2004whenthethenIndianchiefofArmystaffdivulgedthe
newconceptof'ColdStart'whichrevolvesaround'theemploymentofintegratedbattlegroupsforoffensiveoperations.The
ultimategoalofthislimitedwardoctrineistoestablishthecapacitytolauncharetaliatoryconventionalstrikeagainstPakistan
thatwouldwreakconsiderablemessuponthePakistanArmybeforetheInternationalcommunitycouldactasmediator,and
atthesametime,pursuenarrowenoughaimstodenyIslamabadajustificationtoescalatetheclashtothenuclearlevel.

ThemainchartersticsofCSDare
ElementofSurprise
Integrationamongthearmedforces
QuickandswiftDay/Nightoperations
Combineoperationasmechanizedinfantryselfpropelledartilleryandarmour
Closeairpower/massivefirepower
Aimswouldbelimited
Majoroffensivetobelaunchedinthefirst72/96hoursforIBG'S(InfantryBrigades)toenterPakistanterritoryandachieved
primaryobjective
Robustcommand&control
StrikesbelowPakistan'snuclearthreshold

WhiletalkingabouttheSouthAsianregionanditsStrategicStabilityitwillbeimperativetodefinewhatstrategicstabilityis.In
truesenseStrategicStabilitymeanstheabsenceofconflict,war,andbalancederivesfromtheborderneeds,desires,concerns
andnationalinterestsofstatepartiesvisvistheirmilitaryobjectives.TherearethreeapproachesthatareleadingtoStrategic
5/25/2016 jworldtimes.com/Article/112011_Cold_Start_and_South_Asian_Stability
Stabilityare:First,toexerciseandmanipulatethreatthroughdeterrencesecond,themanagementofvulnerabilitythrough
theassuranceofsafety,securityandcommand&controlandthethird,themanagementofthreatthrougharmscontroland
Confidencebuildingandthreatreductionmeasures.Theseareallthechallengesonthestabilityoftheregionbythenewly
draftedColdStartdoctrine(CSD)byIndia.

WhenwelookatthedraftofCSDbyIndiaithaslargelyjeopardizedthesecurityissuesintheregionandinternational
environment.Thepossibilityofgrowingprospectofanarmsraceinregionisfurtherexacerbatedbytheexistingnuclear
relationship.TheintroductionofthedoctrinehassolicitedaPakistaniresponseandwouldbefollowedbythePakistanicounter
measuresasitwouldaimforstrategicequivalence.

AlthoughthecurrentPakistaniresponseandconventionalreconfigurationunderAzmeNouissolid,nonetheless,giventhefact
thatthemilitarybudgetofthetwocountriesis35billionvs.4billionandistohave80percentoperationalisedbyyear2010.
ThereisaneedtodrawfurtherintowhatareresponseoptionsavailabletoPakistanintherealmofthenucleardeterrence
theoryandwhethertheCSDhastheabilitytocreateagapbetweenconventionalandnucleardeterrence.Thebattle
effectivenessofthePakistanicapabilityisonesuchaspect.Thecontentionisthatitwillerodenucleardeterrenceasmaymake
theuseofstrategicnuclearweaponsirremediableduringconflict,therefore,thereisneedtoreconsiderPakistan'sdeterrence
posture.

TodatethePakistanideterrencepostureisbasedonminimumcredibledeterrenceandcentralisedcommandandcontroland
strategyvaluetargeting.Withtheshiftintheconventionalmilitarydoctrinetosmalleroffensiveunitstheproblemisfourfold,
andrequiresarevisitonallissuesregardingdeterrencestabilitythroughcredibility,communicabilityandcapability.

Nationalresolveplaysacriticalroleinthefinaloutcomeofanywar,however,thenuclearcapabilityaffordsthatthenextwars
maynotbefoughtontherationaleofthefourthgenerationwarfare.Asthisisneither1965nor1971wherethecessationof
warwouldleadtocessationofhostilityatalllevels.Theendofwarmayseethebeginningofwar.

Attheendwecaneasilydrawsomeconcludingpointsas:
ColdStartisadoctrineofpreventionandpunishment.
Itisastrategyforahighintensitylimitedconflict.
Thedoctrineismeanttoaverttheriskofanuclearconfrontationorescalation.
WhenwetalkabouttheregionitiseasytosaythattheoutcomeofCSDisatrighttime,whenwetalkaboutInternational
environmenttheoutcomeiswrong.
IfthePakistanarmyisproposedthefightaconventionalwarwithIndia,itisreadytofaceColdStart.

AtpresentCSDremainsmoreofaconceptthanareality.Recentmilitaryexercisesandassociatedorganizationalchanges
indicatethateventhoughtheIndianarmyhasmadeprogresstowarddevelopingandoperationalColdStartcapability,much
workremains.Nevertheless,thisisadevelopmentthatshouldcontinuetobestudied.Relativeconventionalparityhasbeena
cornerstoneoftheuglystabilitythatexistsonthesubcontinent.Notonlydoesenhancedwarfightingabilitythreatenthat
stability,butastheIndianarmyprogressestowardsaColdStartcapability,thepoliticalpressuretoemploysuchastrategyina
timeofcrisisonlyincreases.

MoazamBashirTarar
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5/25/2016 jworldtimes.com/Article/112011_Cold_Start_and_South_Asian_Stability

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