The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for
three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JENNIFER
B. CAGANDAHAN, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision 1 dated January
12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna,
which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by
Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries
in Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed
to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male".
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate 2 before the RTC, Branch
33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up,
she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged
that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at
age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small
ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as
in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that
her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female
to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. cHaCAS
sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony
of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH. He explained
that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex
organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that
respondent's uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones,
and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent's
condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because
respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and
the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated January 12,
2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed
[for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very
clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It
was medically proven that petitioner's body produces male
hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings
are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal
person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a
male. DHSEcI
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil
Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of
Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to
JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school
records, voter's registry, baptismal certificate, and other
pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED. 3
 Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking
a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF
THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH;
AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES
NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE". 4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff", under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court. DHECac
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the
local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondent's petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
registrar. 5 The OSG further contends respondent's petition is fatally defective
since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such
filing as mandated under Section 2 (b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 6The
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
certificate and respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does
not make her a male. 7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil
Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for
Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was
furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003
and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings, 8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth
certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, 9change of sex or
gender is allowed under Rule 108, 10 and respondent substantially complied
with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. 11 ICTacD
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SEC. 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his
name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of
the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change
of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring
his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and
shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition is filed for at least
three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's
name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is
sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order
reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place
for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the
order be published before the hearing at least once a week
for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem
best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty
(30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after
the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may
appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on
behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open
court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been
published as directed and that the allegations of the petition
are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause
appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge
that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of
the petition. AcISTE
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders
rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the
civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court
issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the
same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE
CIVIL REGISTRY
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the
civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
(m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. TcHEaI
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of
the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. AaHTIE
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which
the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his
record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent's
petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise,
the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the
correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without
whom no final determination of the case can be had. 12 Unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be
considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. 13 The
corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar
and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby. 14 Respondent, however, invokes Section
6, 15 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the
Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree
that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished
a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is
a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article
412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 16 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048 17 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048removed from the ambit of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 18 DAEIHT
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving
the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408
of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural
children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination
of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent,
with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn
who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris
with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing
more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female
reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child
grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the
voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to
18,000 children are born with CAH. DcIHSa
CAH is one of many conditions 21 that involve intersex anatomy.
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to
apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female. 22 The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined
to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures.
In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either
a male or female gender role. 23 Since the rise of modern medical science in
Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia
have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female
genitals. 24 More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering
from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether
by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual
as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle
ground between the sexes, a 'no-man's land' for those individuals who are
neither truly 'male' nor truly 'female'." 25 The current state of Philippine
statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature
itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then
there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing
the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subject's birth
certificate entry is in order. IaSAHC
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondent's body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
 Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not SO ORDERED.
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could
have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong ||| (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, [September 12, 2008], 586 PHIL 637-
medication, 26 to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he 653)
did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondent's development to reveal more fully his male characteristics. TCacIE
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the
mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the
human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of SECOND DIVISION
health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of
action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" 27 and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm
other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of Leonides S. Respicio & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In
other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature Galileo P. Brion for private respondent.
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We
cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus
help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case. SYLLABUS

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to
be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow. 28 The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer
to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering
the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his
preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. TcSHaD
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE; A PERSON BY
CONTRACTING MARRIAGE, DOES NOT SHED HIS/HER INTEGRITY OR HIS RIGHT
TO PRIVACY AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IS
EVER AVAILABLE TO HIM OR TO HER. Indeed the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is
to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband
and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or
to her.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner
to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic
without the latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On
March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine,
and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting ofprivate correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and
for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional
Trial Court ofManila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further
described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin
and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs ofthe suit. The writ of preliminary injunction
earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence"
the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the
trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined
her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's
only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in
that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's
attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For
this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for
disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as
complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty.
Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive
order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr.,
this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be
"impressed with merit:" 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent
[Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation
before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an
order of the Manila Regional Trial Courtprohibiting Cecilia from
using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6,
1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on
aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the
order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for
petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the
subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice.
Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in time,
would it have been malpractice for respondent to use
petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal
separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his
counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified
admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in
evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his
 admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's SO ORDERED.
admission and use the same in her action for legal separation
cannot be treated as malpractice. Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more ||| (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, [February 20, 1996], 324 PHIL 63-69)
than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the
purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuineness and authenticity
did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means
does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and
papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the
charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was SECOND DIVISION
only because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the
order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by [G.R. No. 162994. September 17, 2004.]
this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against
the further use of the documents and papers became effective again. DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and
PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners, vs. GLAXO WELLCOME
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to RESOLUTION
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." 4 Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any TINGA, J p:
purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with constitutional
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any overtones, involving the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company.
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated May 19, 2003
protection is ever available to him or to her. and the Resolution dated March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by 62434. 2
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication Tecson had undergone training and orientation.
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. 7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among
is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with
co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to
resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is
expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict
between such relationship and the employees employment with the company, the
management and the employee will explore the possibility of a transfer to another
department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment
outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area. SHADcT
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals 3 (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was
Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and
medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for
Astra in that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District
Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might
engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecsons superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave
rise to a conflict of interest. Tecsons superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy
should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs, although they told
him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was performing
his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into
a relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra,
Bettsys employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company;
and Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra.
With Bettsys separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest would
be eliminated. At the same time, they would be able to avail of the attractive
redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In
September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk division, thinking
that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would
be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos least-movement-
possible policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-
Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his
request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the
matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its
decision and gave Tecson until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order.
Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in
the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but
was not issued samples of products which were competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product conferences regarding
such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level,
they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a
separation pay of one-half () month pay for every year of service, or a total of
P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid
Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with
competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another
sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing the
NCMB Decision. EHSTcC
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying
the Petition for Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering
its Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees
from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a
valid exercise of its management prerogatives. 4
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts Decision, but the
motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004. 5
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the NCMBs finding that the Glaxos policy prohibiting its
employees from marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid; and (ii)
the Court of Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred to a new sales territory, and deprived of the
opportunity to attend products seminars and training sessions. 6
Petitioners contend that Glaxos policy against employees marrying employees of
competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because it creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of
marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees right to marry. 7
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the
following circumstances: (1) he was transferred from the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he suffered a
diminution in pay, (3) he was excluded from attending seminars and training
sessions for medical representatives, and (4) he was prohibited from promoting
respondents products which were competing with Astras products. 8
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting
its employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does
not violate the equal protection clause; and that Tecsons reassignment from the
Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and
Agusan del Sur sales area does not amount to constructive dismissal. 9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of
pharmaceutical products, it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its employees
avoid any activity, relationship or interest that may conflict with their
responsibilities to the company. Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having
personal or family interests in any competitor company which may influence their
actions and decisions and consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The
policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its
secrets, procedures and policies. 10
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only
proscribes existing or future relationships with employees of competitor
companies, and is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause. It
maintains that considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based on
valid grounds. 11
According to Glaxo, Tecsons marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed a
real and potential conflict of interest. Astras products were in direct competition
with 67% of the products sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxos enforcement of the
foregoing policy in Tecsons case was a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives. 12 In any case, Tecson was given several months to remedy the
situation, and was even encouraged not to resign but to ask his wife to resign from
Astra instead. 13
Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company
policy because when he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that
such policy was stipulated therein. In said contract, he also agreed to resign from
respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an employee of a
competitor company would be detrimental to the interests of Glaxo. 14
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecsons reassignment to another sales area and his
exclusion from seminars regarding respondents new products did not amount to
constructive dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecsons refusal to resign, he was relocated from the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and
Agusan del Sur sales area. Glaxo asserts that in effecting the reassignment, it also
considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Since Tecsons hometown was in
Agusan del Sur and his wife traces her roots to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his
transfer from the Bicol region to the Butuan City sales area would be favorable to
him and his family as he would be relocating to a familiar territory and minimizing
his travel expenses. 15
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecsons exclusion from the seminar concerning the
new anti-asthma drug was due to the fact that said product was in direct
competition with a drug which was soon to be sold by Astra, and hence, would
pose a potential conflict of interest for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecsons receipt of
his sales paraphernalia was due to the mix-up created by his refusal to transfer to
the Butuan City sales area (his paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales area
instead of Naga City because the supplier thought he already transferred to
Butuan). 16
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos policy against its employees marrying
employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether Tecson was
constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecsons contract of employment with Glaxo being questioned
by petitioners provides: ScaEIT
xxx xxx xxx
10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future
relationship you may have, either by consanguinity or affinity
with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies. Should it pose a possible conflict of interest in
management discretion, you agree to resign voluntarily from
the Company as a matter of Company policy.
xxx xxx xxx 17
The same contract also stipulates that Tecson agrees to abide by the existing
company rules of Glaxo, and to study and become acquainted with such
policies. 18 In this regard, the Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs its
employees of its rules regarding conflict of interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
 Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship,
or interest that may run counter to the responsibilities which
they owe Glaxo Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:
a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial
or otherwise, in any competitor supplier or
other businesses which may consciously or
unconsciously influence their actions or
decisions and thus deprive Glaxo Wellcome of
legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo
Wellcome or knowledge of Company plans to
advance their outside personal interests, that
of their relatives, friends and other
businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for
income which would impair their effective job
performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or
relationships that may lead to conflict of
interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees of competing drug
companies are expected to disclose such relationship to the
Management. If management perceives a conflict or potential
conflict of interest, every effort shall be made, together by
management and the employee, to arrive at a solution within
six (6) months, either by transfer to another department in a
non-counter checking position, or by career preparation toward
outside employment after Glaxo Wellcome. Employees must
be prepared for possible resignation within six (6) months, if no
other solution is feasible. 19
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that
Glaxos policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an
employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors,
especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only
aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will
gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and
enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and
to expansion and growth. 20 Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean
that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also
recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of fair play. 21
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case, 22 it is a legitimate business practice to guard
business confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-handedly
disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or employees who are married
to a competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an employer that discharged
an employee who was married to an employee of an active competitor did not
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 23 The Court pointed out that the
policy was applied to men and women equally, and noted that the employers
business was highly competitive and that gaining inside information would
constitute a competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the
commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those
acting under color of its authority. 24 Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. 25 The only
exception occurs when the state 26 in any of its manifestations or actions has been
found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private
conduct. 27 Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case.
Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to
the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was
made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the
employee. ITDHSE
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its
employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition
against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies.
Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their
own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest
between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.
As succinctly explained by the appellate court, thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage.
An employee of the company remains free to marry anyone of
his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a
personal prerogative that belongs only to the individual.
However, an employees personal decision does not detract the
employer from exercising management prerogatives to ensure
maximum profit and business success . . . 28
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which
forms part of respondents Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its
employees, such as that signed by Tecson, was made known to him prior to his
employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his
employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since
Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with
Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus,
should be complied with in good faith. 29 He is therefore estopped from
questioning said policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners contention that Tecson was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales
area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was
excluded from attending the companys seminar on new products which were
directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive
dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when
continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there
is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. 30 None of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record
does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason
of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its
management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:
. . . In this case, petitioners transfer to another place of
assignment was merely in keeping with the policy of the
company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus valid . . .
Note that [Tecsons] wife holds a sensitive supervisory position
as Branch Coordinator in her employer-company which
requires her to work in close coordination with District
Managers and Medical Representatives. Her duties include
monitoring sales of Astra products, conducting sales drives,
establishing and furthering relationship with customers,
collection, monitoring and managing Astras inventory . . . she
therefore takes an active participation in the market war
characterized as it is by stiff competition among
pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this is significant,
petitioners sales territory covers Camarines Sur and Camarines
Norte while his wife is supervising a branch of her employer in
Albay. The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all in the
same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of interest not only
possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the others
market strategies in the region would be inevitable.
[Managements] appreciation of a conflict of interest is
therefore not merely illusory and wanting in factual basis . . . 31
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 32 which
involved a complaint filed by a medical representative against his employer drug
company for illegal dismissal for allegedly terminating his employment when he
refused to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court upheld the right of the
drug company to transfer or reassign its employee in accordance with its
operational demands and requirements. The ruling of the Court therein, quoted
hereunder, also finds application in the instant case: STaCcA
By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or
medical representative is expected to travel. He should
anticipate reassignment according to the demands of their
business. It would be a poor drug corporation which cannot
even assign its representatives or detail men to new markets
calling for opening or expansion or to areas where the need for
pushing its products is great. More so if such reassignments are
part of the employment contract. 33
As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially
and disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at bar, the record shows
that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest
brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was still in
its initial stage, Tecsons supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded him about its
effects on his employment with the company and on the companys interests.
After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict by either
resigning from the company or asking his wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even
expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory
performance and suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from her company
instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve
the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several years
of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from
that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson
from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home
province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecsons transfer, Glaxo even
considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any
suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo. 34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ ., concur.
Puno, J ., concurs in the result.
Chico-Nazario, J ., is on leave.
||| (Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 162994, [September 17, 2004], 481 PHIL 687-705)