REPUBLIC ACT No.

8049

AN ACT REGULATING HAZING AND OTHER FORMS OF INITIATION RITES IN

FRATERNITIES, SORORITIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES THEREFOR

Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical
or psychological suffering or injury.

The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the
Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological
testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and
psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police as approved ny the Secretary of National Defense and the National
Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be considered as hazing for
the purposes of this Act.

Section 2. No hazing or initiation rites in any form or manner by a fraternity, sorority or

organization shall be allowed without prior written notice to the school authorities or head of
organization seven (7) days before the conduct of such initiation. The written notice shall
indicate the period of the initiation activities which shall not exceed three (3) days, shall include
the names of those to be subjected to such activities, and shall further contain an undertaking that
no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation rites.

Section 3. The head of the school or organization or their representatives must assign at least two
(2) representatives of the school or organization, as the case may be, to be present during the
initiation. It is the duty of such representative to see to it that no physical harm of any kind shall
be inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.

Section 4. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical
injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or
organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as
principals. The person or persons who participated in the hazing shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) if death, rape, sodomy or

mutilation results there from.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become insane, imbecile,
impotent or blind.

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 3. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years, 8 months and one
day to 17 years and 4 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have lost
the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a
foot, an arm or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member shall have become
incapacitated for the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years and one day to 14
years and 8 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become deformed or
shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have
been ill or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was
habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety (90) days.

5. The penalty of prison mayor in its maximum period (10 years and one day to 12 years)
if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of
more than thirty (30) days.

6. The penalty of prison mayor in its medium period (8 years and one day to 10 years) if
in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of
ten (10) days or more, or that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the
same period.

7. The penalty of prison mayor in its minimum period (6 years and one day to 8 years) if
in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged from one (1) to
nine (9) days, or that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same
period.

8. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months and one
day to 6 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim sustained physical injuries
which do not prevent him from engaging in his habitual activity or work nor require
medical attendance.

The responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army training
organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the person or the persons
charged under this provision even before their conviction. The maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed in any of the following instances:

(a) when the recruitment is accompanied by force, violence, threat, intimidation or deceit
on the person of the recruit who refuses to join;

(b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant initially consents to join but upon learning
that hazing will be committed on his person, is prevented from quitting;

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 (c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant having undergone hazing is prevented from
reporting the unlawful act to his parents or guardians, to the proper school authorities, or
to the police authorities, through force, violence, threat or intimidation;

(d) when the hazing is committed outside of the school or institution; or

(e) when the victim is below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the hazing.

The owner of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable as an accomplice, when he has
actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the
same from occurring. If the hazing is held in the home of one of the officers or members of the
fraternity, group, or organization, the parents shall be held liable as principals when they have
actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the
same from occurring.

The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual
knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be
punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.

The officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who
actually planned the hazing although not present when the acts constituting the hazing were
committed shall be liable as principals. A fraternity or sorority's adviser who is present when the
acts constituting the hazing were committed and failed to take action to prevent the same from
occurring shall be liable as principal.

The presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as
principal unless he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein.

Any person charged under this provision shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that
there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.

This section shall apply to the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a
corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment in the manner provided herein.

Section 5. If any provision or part of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other
parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 6. All laws, orders, rules or regulations which are inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this Act are hereby amended or repealed accordingly.

Section 7. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) calendar days after its publication in at least two
(2) national newspapers of general circulation.

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Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference. According to Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the inference is based on proven facts; and
(3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the accused.

Eddie questioned the TPO on the ground, among others, that RA 9262 on which it is based is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Was he
correct?

No. The equal protection of the laws clause allows for valid classification. This means: (1) that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; (2)
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) that it must apply equally to each member of the class.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women
all make for for real differences justifying classification under the law as it is based on
substantial distinctions.

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The distinction between men and women is likewise germane to the purpose of the law which is
to address violence committed against women and children spelled in the Declaration of Policy
where the “State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human
rights” as well as “recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women
and children, from violence and threats in their personal safety and security” (Sec. 2).

The application of RA 9262 is also not limited to existing conditions when it was promulgated
but to future conditions as well for as long as the safety and security of women and children are
threatened by violence and abuse. It also applies equally to all women and children who suffer
violence and abuse (Garcia vs. Drilon, G.R. 179267, June 25, 2013. 699 SCRA 352).

The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,

function

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal
killing or enforced disappearance; and

2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the
business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.

First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

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Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation
of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and
protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy
tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.

The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any
setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this
case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their
classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their
classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it
appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.

STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely
delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline
their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents
agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

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A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her
to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of
intimate relationship with men.

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of
violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur:
(1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has
been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a

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condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

FUNCTIONS

The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:

1. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
2. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
3. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
4. Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
5. Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance
respect for the primacy of human rights;
6. Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

7. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on

human rights;
8. Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
9. Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of
its functions;
10. Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
11. Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

THE AGE OF PLEA BARGAINING

WHEN we were in law school, we were asked by our Criminal Law professor what were the
salient features of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 or Republic Act 9165. Of
course, one of our usual answers was that this special law does not grant plea-bargaining.

Plea bargaining is defined in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It
states that: “At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may

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still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.”

Plea bargaining is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. In this process, the defendant pleads
guilty to a lesser offense or to one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for
a lighter sentence than that for the grave charge.

However, this salient feature is now declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as
enunciated in the case of Estipona vs. Hon. Lobrigo and People (GR No. 226679, August 15,
2017).

There were three reasons why this is “invalid, unconstitutional and repugnant to the 1987
Constitution.” First, the said feature is violative of the equal protection clause. Second, it being
contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court in Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the
1987 Constitution. Lastly, there will be early resolution of the cases that will lessen court
dockets, especially when the prosecution does not object and both the prosecution and defense
are open to the possibility of plea bargaining.

I strongly agree with this because it brings positive effects, especially in declogging of court
dockets and the cooperation of small-time users or couriers to pin down drug lords. Also, there
will be less jail congestion. In this way, allowing plea bargaining will also minimize the budget
allotted for the drug offenders.

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ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific
cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only
investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot
and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then
barred from proceeding with the trial.
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libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause
the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.

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Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act as
unconstitutional.

Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic communications,

commonly known as spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale of products and services
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unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of the communication is for
service or administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users, or “when the
following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a
simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic
messages (opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does
not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in
order to induce the recipients to read the message.”

The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount to both nuisance
and trespass because they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of using online services and that
they enter the recipient’s domain without prior permission.
The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech, which does not receive the
same level of protection as other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression ,”but is
nonetheless entitled to protection.” It ruled that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited
communications “would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial
ads addressed to him.” Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional.
Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant “to collect or
record traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means
of a computer system.” Traffic data under this Section includes the origin, destination, route,
size, date, and duration of the communication, but not its content nor the identity of users.

The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails their civil liberties and set the
stage for abuse of discretion by the government. They also claimed that this provision
violates the right to privacy and protection from the government’s intrusion into online
communications.
According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private communications, it
must survive the rational basis standard of whether it is narrowly tailored towards serving a
government’s compelling interest. The Court found that the government did have a compelling
interest in preventing cyber crimes by monitoring real-time traffic data.
As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first recognized that the right at
stake concerned informational privacy, defined as “the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.” In determining
whether a communication is entitled to the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1)
Whether the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the
communication, and (2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively
reasonable in the society.

The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of privacy over their
communications transmitted online. However, it did not find the expectation as objectively
reasonable because traffic data sent through internet “does not disclose the actual names and
addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses.”

Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy the
objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the

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personal information of its sender or recipient, against which the Section fails to provide
sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the law as “virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement
authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified communication they
want.”

Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and definiteness as to
ensure respect for the right to privacy.

Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data
found to be in violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right
to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property, entitled to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the Philippines’ Constitution
requires the government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal
property or to block a form of expression. Because Section 19 precluded any judicial
intervention, the Court found it unconstitutional.

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Restriction on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access

restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a
showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of
control inadequate to maintain order.

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ISSUES/GROUNDS:

Respondents’ orders directives to remove or cause the removal of the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for infringing on petitioners’ right to freedom of
expression on their own private property.
Respondents’ orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of Church and
State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:

The assailed Orders/Directives to remove or cause the removal of the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulin are not electoral campaign materials and that the mention of the candidates in the
infringes on the petitioners’ right to freedom of expression on their own private property:
the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins “are not electoral campaign materials,” stressing that the
mentioning of candidates’ name in the second tarpaulin was merely incidental to the petitioners’

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campaign against the RH Law, which they have firmly campaigned against even when it was just
a bill being deliberated in Congress;
subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are “covered by the broader constitutional guaranty of freedom of
expression and of conscience and not by the more narrow and limited election laws, rules, and
regulations”;
petitioners “have the constitutional right to communicate their views and beliefs by posting the
subject Team Patay Tarpaulins on the Bacolod Cathedral, a private property owned by the
Diocese of Bacolod”;
the RH Law and the candidates and party-lists running in the 2013 National Elections who
supported and who opposed its passage into a law are matters of public concern and a legitimate
subject of general interest and of discussion;
citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Chavez v. PCGG (G. R. No. 130716, December 9,
1998), the petitioners’ argued that that public concern “…embraces a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know…”
citing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Adiong v. COMELEC ( G. R. No. 103956, March
31, 1992), the petitioners’ further argued that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open.”
the content and the message of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin “plainly relates to broad issues
of interest to the community especially to the members of the Catholic community” and that the
subject tarpaulin “simply conveys the position of the petitioners on the RH bill and the public
officials who supported or opposed it as it gains relevance in the exercise of the people’s right of
suffrage” in the advent of the 2013 polls;
considering the petitioners’ message, through the Team Patay Tarpaulin, was a matter of public
concern, the message being conveyed and the mode used for its communication and expression
to the public is entitled to protection under the Free Expression clause of the Bill of Rights of the
1987 Constitution;
not being candidates or political parties, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned
prohibition, using the logic of the Supreme Court in Adiong v. COMELEC, is not so much that
of the candidate or the political party;
there is no compelling and substantial State interest that is endangered or which will be
endangered by the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin which would justify the
infringement of the preferred right of freedom of expression.
The assailed orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subject Team Patay
Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of Church and
State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
petitioners’ petition against the RH Law “is not only a matter of exercise of its freedom of
expression and of conscience but is also a matter of Catholic faith, morals, belief, and of duty”;
the Diocese of Bacolod has taken on the issue of the RH Law as part of her mission as part of its
continued advocacy and obedience to the Catholic Church’s teachings;
in line with what they believe to be their duty in the faith, the petitioners have declared the RH
Law as being anti-life, anti-morals, anti-family, anti-marriage, and contrary to the teachings of
the Catholic Church. Consequently, petitioners have called on its members and followers not to
support any candidate who is anti-life, and to support those who are pro-life;
considering that the views and position of the petitioners on the RH Bill is inextricably
connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings, the posting of the subject Team
Patay Tarpaulin has already gone beyond mere exercise of freedom of expression and of

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conscience, but also of the right and privilege of the Church to propagate and spread its teachings
which should be insulated from any form of encroachment and intrusion on the part of the State,
and its agencies and officials;
section 6 of the Article II of the 1987 Constitution monumentalizes the principle of separation of
Church and State;
at the core of its advocacy against the RH Bill is the Gospel of Life which is a matter of Catholic
doctrine, creed and dogma;
the petitioners believe, as a matter of faith, that in these times when there is a great conflict
between a culture of death and a culture of life, the Church should have the courage to proclaim
the culture of life for the common good of society;
the questioned orders are unpardonable intrusion into the affairs of the Church and constitute
serious violations of the principle of separation of Church and State which the State and its
officials, including the herein respondents, are bound to respect, observe, and hold sacred.
PRAYER:

Petition be given due course;

Issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining
respondents from further proceedings in enforcing their orders for the removal of the subject
Team Patay Tarpaulin;
Declare the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void and permanently
restrain the respondents from enforcing them or any other similar orders; and
Issue other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises.
THE ISSUES TO BE ARGUED:

Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer Majarucon and the 27
February 2013 Order by the COMELEC Law Department are considered judgments/final
orders/resolutions of the COMELEC which would warrant a review of this Court via a Rule 65
Petition.
(a) Whether or not petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine and jurisprudential rules
governing appeals from COMELEC decisions;

(b) Assuming arguendo that the aforementioned Orders are not considered judgments/final
orders/resolutions of the COMELEC, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would
allow this Court to take cognizance of the case.

Whether or not it is relevant to determine whether the tarpaulins are “political advertisement” or
“election propaganda” considering that petitioner is not a political candidate.
Whether or not the tarpaulins are a form of expression (protected speech), or election
propaganda/political advertisement.
(a) Assuming arguendo that the tarpaulins are a form of expression, whether or not the
COMELEC possesses the authority to regulate the same.

(b) Whether or not this form of expression may be regulated.

Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer Majarucon and the 27
February 2013 Order by the COMELEC Law

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Department violate the Constitutional principle of separation of church and state.
Whether or not the action of the petitioners in posting its tarpaulin violates the Constitutional
principle of separation of church and state.

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Issue:

Whether or not the Department Order 1, series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment valid.

Held:

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not
inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society."

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in
particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department
of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is
unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right
itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it
does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the
Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the
enforcement whereof.

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Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected

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as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of
the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate
donations from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing
or family distress. (174a)

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Republic Act No. 9344 took 13 years to pass. This was legislated to fulfill (1) its
constitutional obligation to protect children (especially the poor Filipino children who
have less in life and whose infractions are mostly theft; clearly they commit crimes as
a desperate measure to survive), and (2) the nation’s commitment to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child.
We would like to emphasize: The law does not allow children who are 15 years old
and below and who commit crimes to go “scot-free.” What the law provides is a
different process for them to be made accountable. They are not “released” simply
because they cannot be criminally charged; they can be “institutionalized,” a form of
deprivation of liberty, for a more focused intervention and reformation.

RA 9344 is not only for the benefit of children. The safety of society is its foremost
interest. That is why it prioritizes rehabilitation and not imprisonment.
Thus, if we want to protect children from drug trafficking, for instance, we should
prioritize the crackdown on drug syndicates.
Children in conflict with the law are victims of circumstances beyond their control.
Dysfunctional families, lack of discipline by responsible persons and society’s myriad
of decisions that perpetuate poverty can push them to bad behavior. We are actually
the ones who set them up to fail. But instead of helping them, we punish them for how
they have become?
Experience has shown that the formal criminal justice system can be harmful to
children and likely lead them deeper into criminality. Instead of putting these children
in jail together with hardened criminals, thus jeopardizing their physical and
psychological well-being and development, we should provide them the proper
intervention and facilities for their rehabilitation. RA 9344 was enacted precisely for
this purpose.
If we really want to prevent children from getting into crime, RA 9344 should be fully
and properly implemented. This milestone law has been nominated for the 2015
World Future Policy Awards which recognize best laws and policies in the world,
which secure child rights.

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