Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research EGON G. GUBA YVONNA S. LINCOLN AN this chapter we analyze four paradigms that ‘currently are competing, or have until recently com- peted, for acceptance as the paradigm of choice in Informing and viding inquiry, especially qualitative inguity: positivism, posipesitivism, critical theory and related ideological postions, and constructiv- jam. We acknowledge at once our own commitment to constructivism (which we esiier called “natural istic inquiry"; Lincoln 8 Guba, 1985): the reader may wish (o take that fact into account in judging the appropriateness and usefulness of our analysis. ‘Although the title ofthis volume, Handbook of ‘Qualitative Research, implies thatthe term quaita- tive is an umbrella term superior to the term para- ‘dignt (and, indeed, that usage is not uncommon), it {sour position that itis a term that ought to be recerved fora deseription of types of methods. From ‘ar perspective, both qualitative and quantitative methods may be used appropriately with any ro- earch paradigm. Questions of method are secon- Gary to questions of paradigm, which we define as the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but ia ‘ontologcaly and pistemologically fundamental ways. Tis certainly the case tht interest in alternative paradigms has boon stimulated by a growing dissat [faction with the patent overemphasis on quantita- tive methods, But as efforis were made to build a «case fora renewed interest in qualitative approaches, it became clear that the metaphysical assumptions tundergirding the conventional paradigm (the “te ceived view") must be seriously questioned. Thus the emphasis ofthis chapter is on paradigms, their assumptions, and the implications of those assump: tions for a variety of research issues, not on the relative utility of qualitative versus quantitative imethods. Nevertheless, as discussions of para- tdigms/methods over the past decade have often be- fgan with a consideration of problems associated twith everquantification, we will also tegia there, shifting only Inter to our predominant interest ‘The Quantitative/Qualitative Distinction Historically, there has been a heavy emphasis fon quantification in science, Mathematics is often termed the “queen of sciences,” and those sci- fences, suck as physics-and chemistry, that lend themselves especially well to quantification are generally known as “hard.” Less quantifiable are- fas, such as biclogy (although that is rapidly Changing) end particularly the sacial sciences, are TUTHORS? NOTE: We ace grateful to Henry Giroux and Robert Stake for thei very help crtgues ofan earierteferred to as “soft,” loss with pejorative intent than to signal their (putative) imprecision and lack of dependability. Scientific maturit monly believed to emerge as the degree of quan- tification found within a given field increases, ‘That this is the case is hacdly surprising. The “recsived view" of science (positivism, transformed ‘ver the course of this century into postpositiv- fsm; see below) focuses on efforts to verify (posi- tivism) or falsify (postpositivism) a priort hy- potheses, mast usefully stated as mathematical (quantitative) propositions or propositions that ‘can be easily converted into precise mathematical formulas expressing functional relationships. For. mulaic precision has enormous utility when the of science is the prediction and control of ‘natural phenomena, Further, there is already 2 abjea powerful array of statistical and mathemati- cal models. Finally, there exists a widespread conviction that only quantitative data are ult: ‘mately valid or of high quality (Sechrest, 1992) John Stuart Mill (1843/1906) is said to have been the first to urge social scientists to emulate their ‘older, harder” cousins, promising that if his advice were followed, rapid maturation of these fields, as wall as their emancipation from the philosephical and theological strictures that limited them, would follow. Social scientists took this counsel to heart {probably to a degree that would greatly surprise Millit he were alive today) for other reasons as wel ‘They were the “new kids on te block"; if quantifi- cation could lead to the fulfillment of Mill's prom- ise, status and political leverage would acerue that would enormously profit the new practitioners. Ini {ation might thus lead both to greater acceptance and tomore valid knowledge. Critiques of the Re ved View Inrecent years, however, strong counterpressures against quantification have emerged. Two estques, ‘one internal to the conventional paradigm (that is, in terms of those metaphysical assumptions that Gefine the nature of positivist inquiry) and one ex- femal to it (that i, in exms of those assumptions Gefining alternative paradigms), have been mounted that seem not only to warrant a reconsideration of the utlty of qualitative data but to question the very assumptions on which the patative superiosty of ‘quantification has been based. Internal (Intraparadigm) Critiques A variety of implicit problems have surfaced to Contex stripping. Precise quantitative approaches that focus on selected subsets of variables neces- sarily “strip” from consideration, through appro- pfiate controls or randomization, other variables that exist in the context that might, if allowed to exert their effects, greatly alter findings. Further, such exclusionary designs, while increasing the theoretical rigor of a study, detract from its rele. vance, thats, its applicability or generalizability, because their outcomes een be properly applied only in other similarly truncated or contextually stripped situations (another laboratory, for exam- ple). Qualitative data itis argued, can redress that {Imbalance by providing contextual information, Exclusion of meaning and purpose, Human be- havior, unlike that of physical objects, cannot be “understood without reference tothe meanings and purposes attached by human actors to thei acti ties. Qualitative data, it is asserted, can provide rich insight into humen behavior Disjunction of grand theories with local con texts: The eticfemic dilemma. The etic (outsides) theory brought to bear on an inquiry by an inves tigator (or the hypotheses proposed to be tested) may have litle ar no meaning within the emic (insider) view of studied individuals, groups, so- Cieties, or cultures. Qualitative data, itis affirmed, ate useful for uncovering cmic views; theories, to be valid, should be qualitatively grounded (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Such ‘grounding is particularly erucial in view of the ‘mounting criticism of social science as failing to provide adequate accounts of nonmaiastream lives (he other”) of to provide the material for a criticism of our own Western culture (Marcus & Fischer, 1986). Inapplicability of general data to individual cases. This problem is sometimes described as the ‘nomothetic/idiographic disjunction. Generaliza- tions, although perhaps statistically meaningful, have no applicability in the individual case (the fact, say, that 80% of individuals presenting given symptoms have lung cancer is at best incomplete evidence that a particular patient presenting Wi such symptoms has lung cancer). Qualitative data, itis held, can help to avoid such ambiguities. Exclusion of te discovery dimension in inguiry. Conventional emphasis on the verification of spe- cific, a priori hypotheses glosses over the source of those hypotheses, usually arrived at by whatis com. ‘monly termed the discovery process. Inthe received view only empirical inquiry deserves to be called “science” Quantitative normative methodology is thus peivileped over the insights of creative andExternal (Exiraparadigm) Critiques ‘The intraparadigm problems noted above offer ‘a weighty challenge to conventional methodol- ‘ogy, but could be eliminated, oF at least amelio- fated, by greater use of qualitative data, Many Critics of the received view are content t0 stop at that point; hence many of the calls for more quali- talive inputs have been limited to this methods evel accommodation, But an even weightier chal- Tenge bas been mounted by critics who have proposed alternative paradigms that involve not aly qualification of approaches but fundamental fgjustments in the baste assumptions that guide Jnquiry altogether, Their rejection ofthe received view ean be justified on a number of grounds (Bernstein, 1988; Gubs, 1990, Hesse, 1980; Li toln & Guba, 1985; Reason & Rowan, 1981), but Chief among them are the Following.! ‘The theory-ladenness of facts. Conventional approaches to research invoiving the verification Of falsification of hypotheses assume the inde- pendence of theoretical and observational Ian~ Guages. If an inquiry is to be objective, hypotheses must be stated in ways that are independent of the ‘way in which the facts needed to test them are Collected. But it wow seems established beyond ob- jection that theories and facts are quite interdepend- Ent—that is that facts ae facts only within some theoretical framework. Thusa fundamental assomp: tion of the teceived view is exposed as dubious. If hypotheses and observations are not independent “fats” can be viewed only through a theoretical ‘syindow” and objectivity is undermined. ‘The underdetermination of theory. This prob- lem is also known as the problem of induction. Not only ate facts determined by the theory win dow through which one looks for them, but dif- ferent theory windows might be equally well sup- ported by the same set of “Cacts" Although itmay be possible, given a coherent theory to derive by eduction what facts ought to exist, it is never possible, given a coherent set of facts, to arrive by induction at a single, ineluctable theory. Ine eed, it is this difficulty that led philosophers ‘uch as Popper (1968) to reject the notion of theory verification in favor ofthe notion of theory falsification. Whereas a million white swans can Mover establish, with complete confidence, the proposition that all swans are white, one black Ewan ean completely falsify it.The historical po- ‘ition of science that it cam, by its methods, wit mately converge on the “real” truth is thus brought sharply into question. The value-ladenness of facts. Just as theories eee cce a ey vot independent, neither are values} are themselves value statements. Thus putative “facts” are viewed not only through a theory win- ddow bat through a value window as well. The value~ free posture ofthe received view is compromised. ‘The interactive nature ofthe inquirer-inguired into dyad. The received view of science pictures the inguiter as standing behind a one-way mirror, ‘Viewing natural phenomena as they happen and recording them objectively. ‘The inquirer (when "using proper methodology) does not influence the phenomena or vice versa, But evidence such 2s the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Boht ‘complementarity principle have shatered that ideal Inthe hard sciences (Lincoln & Guba, 1985); even greater skepticism must exist for the social sci neces. Indeed, the notion that findings are created through the interaction of inguirer and phenome ron (which, inthe social sciences, is usually peo- ple) is often a more plausible description of the Jguiry process than isthe notion that findings are discovered through objective observation “as they really are, and as they really work.” “The intraparadigm critiques, although expos- ing many inherent problems in the received view and, indeed, proposing some useful responses 19 them, are nevertheless of much less interest—or ‘weight--than the extraparadigm critiques, wt raise problems of such consequence that the re Ceived view is being widely questioned. Several alternative paradigms have been proposed, some Of which rest on quite unconventional assump~ tions. It is useful, therefore, to inquire about the nature of paradigms and what itis that distin- guishes one inquiry paradigm from another. ‘The Nature of Paradigms Paradigms as Basic Belief Systems Based on Ontological, Epistemological, ‘and Methodological Assumptions ‘A paradigm may be viewed as a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with ultimates or first principles. It represents a worldview that Gefines, for its holder, the nature of the “world,” the individeal’s place in it, and the range of pos- sible relationships to that World and its pats, a. forexample, cosmologies and theologies do.? The beliets are basic in the sense that they must be ecepted simply on faith (however well argued); there is no svay to establish their utimate truth- fulness. If there were, the philosophical debates reflected in these pages would have been resolveda TY Oe ee eS eee nee aad ont. they are about, and what falls within and out- fide the limits of legitimate ingulry. The basic beliefs that dafine inguiry paradigms canbe so marized by the responses given by proponents of fry given paradigm to three fundamental ques- tions, which re interconnected in such a way that the answer given to any one question, taken in any ‘order, constrains how tho others may be answered ‘We have selected an order that we believe reflects 2 logical GF not necessary) primacy: 1. The ontological question. What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there that canbe knawn aboutit? For example, if a“real” world is assumed, then what.can be ssown about itis “hove things really are” and how things really work.” ‘Then only those questions that relate to matters of “ral” exist- ‘ence and “reat” action are admissible; other ‘questions, such as those concerning maters of aesthetic of moral significance, fall ouside the realm of legitimate scientific inquiry 2. The epistemological question. What is the nature ofthe relaonship between the knower ‘or would-be knower and what can be known? "The answer that can be given to this ques tion is constrained by the answer already given to the ontologicsl question; thats, not just any relationship can now be postulated. So if, for example, a “real” reality is as- sumed, then the posture of the knower must be one of objective detachment or value Freedom in order to beable to discover “how things really are” and “how things really work.” (Conversely, assumption of an ob- jectivist posture implies the existence of a ‘eal” world to be objective about.) 3. The methodological question How can the ‘nguirer (would-be knower) go about finding ‘out whatever he or she believes can be known? ‘Again, the answer that can be given to this {question is constrained by answers already fivento the ftsttwo questions; thats, not just ‘any methodology is appropriate, For example, ‘a “real” reality pursued by an “objective” in- {quiver mandates control of possible confound. ing factors, whether the methods are qualita: tive (say, observational) or quantitative (s9y. analysis of covariance). (Conversely selection fof a manipulative methodology—the expeti- ment, say--implies the ability tobe objective ‘and a real world to be objective about) The methodological question cannot be reduced to ere ee ee ee ted to a predetermined methodology. ‘These three questions serve as the major foci around which we will analyze each of the four paradigms to be considered. Paradigms as Human Constructions We have already noted that paradigms, as sets of basic beliefs, are not open to proof in any ‘conventional sense; there is no way to elevate one Over another on the basis of ullimate, founda. tional criteria, (We should note, however, that that state of affairs does not doom us to a radical telativist posture: see Gubs, 1992.) In our opin- ion, any given paracigm represents simply the most informed and sophisticated view that its proponents have been able to devise, given the fray they have chosen to respond to the three defining questions. And, we argue, the sets of answers given are in all cases human construc tons; thats, they arc all inventions of the human mind and hence subject to human error. No co Sruetion is or can be incontrovertibly right; ad Yoeates of any particular construction must rely om persuasiveness and usilty rather than proof in arguing their position. ‘What is tre of paradigms is true of our enalyses ‘as well, Everything that we shall say subsequently js also a human construction: outs. The reader can not be compelled to accept our analyses, oF Our lrguments, on the basis of incontestable logic or indisputable evidence; we can only hope to be per- suasive and to demonstrate the wility of our position for, say, the public policy arena (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, House, 1977), We do ask the reader to sos- pend his or er disbelief until ous argument is com- plete and can be judged as a whole, ‘The Basic Beliefs of Received and Alternative Inquiry Paradigms ‘We begin our analysis with descriptions of the responses that we believe proponents of each paradigm would make to the three questions ovt= Tined above. These responses (as constructed by us) are displayed in Table 6.1, which consists of three rows corcesponding to the ontological, epis~ temological, and methodological questions, and four columns cortesponding to the four paradigms to be discussed. The term positivism denotes the “received view" that has dominated the formal discourse in the physical and social sciences for some 400 years, Whereas posipositivism repreTABLE 6.1 Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms fem Positivism Ponpostviom Critical Theory etat,___Constructviom Ontology vealiom— itical atom Wistoicalcealiem— relativism local and saeccaiy bat “eal selty But only viral reality shaped specific constricted Giiuchendable—imgerfecly andy sci pliical, —_ealtet robsbiistially _clteral, economic, fppreendable ste, and gender ‘aloes; erystalized Eputemology dvalevebjectivit; —mofed dua’ | wanachnall ‘ransactonall findings trae hjectivist erica subjectvistwalue- —_subjetivie created tadition/eommunity: mediated fiedings findings findings probably Methodology experimental’ Tmodifiea eaped: __alogie/dalectical_heemeneutcaiialecte manipulative: smentalimanipulaives Wecificaion of efitial moliplism: hypotheses; chiefly falsification of ‘quanticative hypotheses: may tnethods incu qualitative rethods sents efforts ofthe past fow decades to respond in wlimited way (that is, while remaining within Essentially the same set of basic beliefs) to the fost problematic criticisms of positivism. The term critical theory is (for us) a blanket term Uenoting a set of several alternative paradigms, {including additionally (but not limited to) neo- Marxism, feminism, materialism, and participa. tory inguiry. Indeed, critical theory may itself Usetully be divided into three substrands: post Structuralism, postmodernism, and a blending of these two, Whatever their differences, the com- non breakaway assumption of all these variants fs that ofthe value-determined nature of inquiry — {in epistemological difference. Our grouping of these positions into a single category is @ judg nent eall; we will not try to do justice to the individual points of view. The term construct qm denotes an alternative paradigm whose break way assumption is the move from ontological realism to ontological celativism. These positions ‘will become clear in the subsequent exposition. “Two important caveats need to be mentioned. First although we are inclined to believe thatthe paradigms we are about to describe can have Preaning even in the roelm of the physical sci- fences, we will not defend thet belief here, Accord- {ngly, our subsequent comments should be und stood to be limited (0 the social sciences only. Second, we note that except for positivism, the paradigins discussed areal stills formative stages: eran E ms casei re have boon reached even among their proponents about their definitions, mean- ings, or implications. Thus our discussion should be considered tentative and subject to further re vision and reformulation. ‘We will first look down the columas of Table 6.1 10 ilusirate the positions of each paradigm Wilh respect to the three questions, following with 2B look across rows to compare and contrast the positions of the paradigms.* Limitations of space rake it impossible for us to develop our esse Tiong in any depth. The reader will beable to Find bther evidence, pro and con, in other chapters of this volume, particularly in Chapters 7-11 Intraparadigm Analyses (Columns of Table 6.1) Column 1: Positivism Ontology: realism (commonly called “naive ce lism”). An apprehendable reality is assured to ‘exist, driven by immutable natural laws and mocha isms. Knowledge of the “way things are” is con: Jontionally summarized in the form of time- and Tontext-free generalizations, some of which take the form of cause-effect laws, Research can, it principle, converge on the “tue” state of affairs Aipe basic posture of the paradigm i argued to be both reductionist and deterministic (Hesse, 1980).Epistemology: Dualst and objectivist. The inves- tigator and the investigated “object” are assumed to tbe independent entities, and the investigator to be capable of stadying the object without influencing it for being influenced by it. When influence in either Sisection (threats to validity) is recognized, or even ‘Suspected, various strategies are followed to redvee for eliminate it, Inguiry takes place as through a fone-way mirror. Values and biases are prevented from influencing outcomes, so long as the pre scribed procedures are rigorously followed. Repli- ‘cable indings are, in fact, “true” Methodology: Experimental and manipulative ‘Questions andlor hypotheses are stated in propo: sitional form and subjected to empirical test to ‘verity them, possible confounding conditions must be carefully controlled (manipulated) to prevent ‘outeomes from being improperly influenced, Column 2: Postpositivism ‘Ontology: Critical realism. Reality is assumed to ‘exist but to be only imperfectly apprehendable be- cause of basically awed human intellectual mecha- ms and the fundamentally inraciable nature of ‘phenomena, The ontology ig labeled as critical real~ Tom (Cook & Campbell, 1979) because of the pos- ture of proponents that claims about reaty must be Subjected to the widest possible critical examination to facilitate apprehending reality as closely 8s pos- sible (ut never perfectly) Rpistemology: Modified dualisvobjectivist, Dual isms largely abandoned 2s not possible to main- tain, but objectivity remains a “tegulatory ideal”: special emphasis is placed on external “goardi- fans” of objectivity such as critical traditions (Do the findings "fie" with preexisting knowledge?) and the extical community (such a8 editors, referers, ‘and professional peors). Replicated findings are probably true (but always subject to falsification. Methodology: Modified experimenta/manipy lative, Exmphass is placed on “critical mltipism (@ refurbished version of triangulation) as a way of falsifying (eather than verifying) hypotheses. ‘The methodology aims to redress some of the problems noted above (intraparadigm critiques) by doing inquiry in more natural settings, collect 'g more situations} information, and reintroduc- 2 discovery as an clement in inquiry, and, in the social sciences particularly, soliciting emic view- points to assist in determining the meanings and Purposes that people ascribe to their actions, as ‘wells to contribute to “grounded theory” (Glaser Peo ues, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). All Column 3: Critical Theory and Related Ideological Positions Ontology: Historical realism. A realty is as sumed to be apprehendable that was once pla bat that was, over time, shaped by a congeries of social, politica, cultural, economic, ethnic, and sender factors, and then crystallized (retied) into series of structures that are now (inapprop fxely) taken as “real,” that is, natural and immu. table, For all practical purposes the structures are “real” a vireual or historical realty Epistemology: Transactional and subjectvis, ‘The investigator and the investigated object are asvumed to be interactively linked, withthe vale tes of the investigator (and of situated “others”) inevitably influencing the inquiry. Findings are therefore value mediated. Note that this posture effectively challenges the traditional distinction between ontology and epistemology; what can be Known is inexteicably intertwined with the inter- action between a particular investigator and a particular object or group. The dashed line sepa- fating the ontological and epistemological rows ff Table 6.1 is intended to reflect this fusion. Methodology: Dialogic and dialectical. The rans- setional nature of inquiry requires « dialogue be- tween the investigator and the subjects of the inquiry; tht dialogue must be dialectical in nature to transform igaorance and misappreensions (ac- ‘cepling historically mediated structures as immo- table) into more informed consciousness (seeing hhow the structures might be changed and compre- ending the ations requlred to effect change), of, a8 Giroux (1988) puts it, "as transformative intel Tectuals,... fo uncover and excavate those forms of historical and subjugated knowledges that point to experiences of suffering, conflict, and collec. to link the notion of historical ‘understanding to elements of critique and hope” (p.213). Transformational inquirers demonstrate transformational leadership” (Burns, 1978). (For more discussion of critical theory, see the ‘contributions in this volume by Olesen, Chapter 9; Stanfield, Cpl 10;and Kincheloe & McLaren, Chapter 8) Column 4: Constructivism ‘Ontology: Relativist. Realities are apprehend- able in the form of multiple, intangible mental ‘constructions, socially and experientially based, focal and specific in natuce (although elements ‘among many individuals and ne ee eee edgroups holding the constructions. -onstruchons: fre not more or less “true,” in any absolute sense, ‘but simply more of loss informed and/or sophis- Heated. Constructions are allerable, as are theit ‘associated “realities.” This position should be dis tinguished from both nomi lalism {sce Reose, 1980, for an explication of these sev- eral ideas) Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist ‘The investigator and the object of investigation are assumed to be interactively linked so thatthe “findings” ace literally created as the invest tion proceeds. The conventional distinction be. tween ontology and epistemology disappears, as in the ease of critical theory. Again, the dashed ne of Table 6.1 reflects this fat Methodology: Hermeneutical and dialectical. “The variable and personal (intramental) nature of social constructions suggests that individual con- ‘tructions can be elicited and refined only through interaction between and among investigator and respondents. These varying constructions are in- ferpreted using conventional hermeneutical tech- rniques, and are compared and contrasted through ‘a dialeotical interchange. The final aim isto distill f consensus construction that is more informed fand sophisticated than any of the predecessor Constructions (including, of course, the etic con- ‘struction of the investigator. (For more about constructivism, be also Schwandt, Chapter 7, this volume.) Cross-Paradigm Analyses (Rows of Table 6.1) Having noted briefly the positions that propo nents of each paradigm might take with respect to the three paradigm-defining questions, itis uscful to look across rows to compare and contrast those positions among the several paradigms. Ontology ‘Moving from left to sight across Tabie 6.1, we note the move from 1. positivism’s position of naive realism, as- suming aa objective external reality upon which inquiry can converge; to 2. postpositivism’s critical realism, which still ee ecenes an objective reality but grants thal eee probabilisticaly; to 3, etitical theory's historical realism, which assumes an apprehendable reality consist- ing of historically situated structures that are, in the absence of insight, as limiting and ‘confining as if they were real; 0 4. constructivism's relativism, which assumes ‘mubiple, apprehendable, and sometimes con- ficting social realities that are the products ‘of human intellects, but that may change as their constructors become more informed and sophisticated Itis the ontological position that most different ‘constructivism from the other three paradigms. Epistemology ‘We note the move from 1. positivism’s dualist, objectivist assumption thal enables the investigator to determine “how things telly are” and “how things really work"; 10 2. postpositivism’s modified dualisvobjectivist assumption that itis possible to approximate {but never fully know) reality; © 3, eritical theory's transactionaVsubjectivistas- sumption that knowledge is value mediated and hence value dependent; (0 4. constructivism’s somewhat similarbut broader ‘transactional subjectivst assumption that sees knowledge as created in interaction among investigator and responde Itis their epistemological positions that most dif- ferentiae critical theory and constructivism from the other two paredigms. Methodology ‘We note the move from 1. positivism’s experimentalimanipulative meth- ‘odology that focuses on verification of hy- potheses: 10 2. postpositivism's modified experimental! ‘maniptlative methodology invested initial ‘muliplism focusing on falsification of hy- potheses; to‘TABLE 6.2 Paradigm Positions on Selected Practical Issues desue Positivism Posposiivism Critical Theory ea, Constructivism Tnquicy aim explanation: prediction and control eritique and formation; and emancipation ‘understanding: Nature of —vetfied hypotheses nonfalsified hypoth~ strcturahistorcal individual eeonstrvtony knowledge estblihed as facts ses that are probable insights coalescing aroun orlawe facts oF lows consensus Knowledge secretion —"ilding locks" adding historical revisionism; more informed and accumulation “edifice of knowledge”; generalizations genetalizaion by sophisticated ‘and cause-effect Hinkages Similarity reconstructions; vicarious experience Goodness oF ‘conventional benchmarks of rigor": historical situatedness; trustworthiness and ‘quality eiteria internal and external validity, reliability, erosion of ignorance authenticity and objectivity and misapprekensions; scton stems Values exeluded—influence denied inluded formative Bihies xtinsic; it toward deception intense; moral ult toward revelation intense; process Hit toward revelation special problems Voice agents jsinereted scientist” as informer of decision makers, policy makers, and change “twansformative “passionate participant” iniliecaal” a8 facilitator of mult- advocate and ttivist voice reconstruction resociaizaion; qualitative and quantitative; Aistory; values of stem and empowerment ncommensurable Training technical and {echical; quantitative ‘quantitative; and qualitative sbetanive theocies _ substantive theories Aceommodion ‘commensurable Hegemoay in control of publication, funding, promotion, and tere seoking ecogeiton and input 5, critical theory's dialogic/dialectical meth: ‘odology aimed at the reconstruction of pre viously held constructions; to 4, constructivism's hermeneutic/dalectic meth ‘odology aimed at the reconstruction of pre viously held constructions. Implications of Each Paradigm’s Position on Selected Practical Issues (Rows of Table 6.2) sadigm assumptions cennot be implicitly or explicitly, these positions have im- portant consequences fo the practical conduct of inquiry, as well as for the interpretation of find- ‘ngs and policy choices. We have elected to dis ‘cuss these consequences for ten salient issues. ‘The entries in Table 6.2, which consists of four ‘columas corresponding to the four paradigms and ten rows corresponding tothe ten issues, summa- fize our interpretation of the major impiications. ‘The eader will note that the first four issues Gnquity aim, nature of knowledge, knowledge accumulation, and quality erieria) are among those deemed especially important by positivists anc postpositivists: they arc therefore the issues on ‘which alternative paradigms are most frequently attacked. The fifth and sixth (values and ethics) fare issues taken seriously by all paradigms, al-quite different. Finaly, the last four issues (voice, ‘ining, accommodation, and hegemony) ae those eemed especially important by alternative pro- ponents; they represent areas op which the re- Pejved view is considered particularly volnerable. ‘The entries inthe table are based only in part on public positions, given that not all issues have Been addressed by all paradigms’ proponents. In some cases, therefore, we have supplied entries that we believe follow logically from the basic metaphysical (ontological, epistemological, and methodological) postures of the paradigms. To fake one example, the issue of voice is rarely Nddvessed directly by positivist or postpositivists, ‘ut we believe the entry “disinterested scientist” ts one that would be given by those proponents ‘were they to be challenged on this matter. “An immediately apparent difference between Ta ble 6.1 and Table 6.2 is that whereas in the former tase jt was possibleto make adistinet entry forevery tell, in the case of Table 6:2 there is considerable ‘veilap within rows, particularly forthe positivist and postpositivist colurnns. Indeed, even for those {sues in which the entries in those (wo columns are different, the differences appear to be minor, In ‘contrast, one may note the major differences found ‘etween these two paradigms and te critica theory fand constructivist paradigms, which tend also t0 differ among themselves. ‘We have formulated the issues as questions, which follow. Row ts What is the aim or purpose of inquiry? Positivism and postpositivism. For both these paradigms the aim of inquiry i explanation (von Wright, 1971), vkimately enabling the prediction ‘and control of phenomena, whether physical or fhuman. As Hesse (1980) has suggested, theultimate ctiterion for progress in these paradigms is thatthe Capability of “scientists” (o predict and control Should improve over time. The reductionism and Setecminism implied by this position should be ‘noted, The inquirer is cast in the role of “expert,” Sitoation thet seems to award special, perhaps even. ‘onmerted, privilege tothe investigator. Critical theory. The aim of inquiry is the cri= igus and transformation ofthe social, political, Caltural, economic, ethnic, and gender structures that constrain and exploit humankind, by engege- ment in confrontation, even conflict. The crite rion for progress is that overtime, restitution and femancipation should occur end persist. Advocacy ‘ind activism are key concepts. The inquirer is cast in the role of instigator and facilitator, implying eae the inquirer understands a priori what t some of the more radical stances In the critica 19 ‘amp hold that judgment about needed transfor tations should be reserved t0 those whose lives fre most affected by transformations: the inquiry patticipants themselves (Lincoln, in press). Constructivism. The aim of inquity is under standing and reconstruction ofthe constructions that people (including the inquirer initially hold aiming {Toward consenstis bat still open to new interpreta- tions as information and sophistication improve. The ‘titerion for progress is that over time, everyone formulates more informed and sophisticated con- rvetions and becomes more aware of the content tnd meaning of competing constructions. Advocacy and activism ate also key concept is this view. The {quite iscastin he ole of participant and facilitator in this process, a position that some exitics have faulted on the grounds that it expands the inquirer’s tole beyond reasonable expectations of expertise and ‘compotence (Corr & Kemmis, 1986). Row 2: What is the nature of knowledge? Positivism. Knowledge consists of verified hy- potheses that can be accepted as facts or laws. Postpositivism. Knowledge consists of nonfal- sified hypotheses that canbe regarded 2s probable facts or laws: Critical theory. Knowledge consists of aseries ‘of structuralfaistorical insights that wll be trans formed as time passes. Transformations occut ‘when ignorance and misapprehensions give way to more informed insights by means of a dialec~ tical interaction. Consiructivism. Knowledge consists of those constructions about which there is relative con- Sensvs (or at least some movement toward con. ‘senaus) among those competent and, inthe case fof more arcane méterial, trusted) to interpret the Substance of the construction. Multiple “knowl: edges" can coexist when equally competent (ot trusted) intergreters disagree, and/or depending fon social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, land gender factors that differentiate the interpret: rs. These constructions are subject to continuous fevision, with changes most likely to occur when relatively different constructions are brought into juxtaposition ina dialectical context, Row 3: How does knowledge accumulate? Positivism and postpositivism, Knowledge ac- See ett a elfact (or probable fact) serving as a kind of build- ing block that, when placed into its proper niche, adds to the growing “edifice of knowledge.” When the facts take the form of generalizations or cause effect linkages, they may be used most efficiently for prediction and control. Generalizations may then be made, with predictable confidence, to a population of settings. Critical theory. Knowledge docs not accumu late in an absoiute sense; rather, it grows and changes through a dialectical process of historical revision that continuously erodes ignorance and imisapprehensions aad enlarges more informed insights, Generalization can occur when the mix of social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, ‘nd gender circumstances and values is similar across settings. Consiructiviom. Knowiedge accumulates only in ‘relative sense through the formation of ever more informed and sophisticated constructions via the hhermencutical/dialectical process, a8 varying con- structions are brought into juxtaposition. One im- portant mechenism for transfer of knowledge from fone setting to another isthe provision of vicarious ‘experience, often supplied by case study reports (see Stake, Chapter 14, this volume). Row 4: What criteria are \ appropriate for judging the oodiess or quality of an inquiry? Positive and posipositivism. The appropriate criteria are the conventional benchmarks of rigor”: internal validity (isomorphism of findings with realty), external validity (generalizability), reli- ability Gin the sense of stability), and objectivity Gistanced and neuteal observer), These criteria depend on the realist ontological position; with- ‘out the assumption, isomorphism of findings with reality can have no meaning, strict generalizabil- ity to-a parent population is impossibt, stability ‘cannot be assessed for inquiry into aphenomenon if the phenomenon itself can change, and objec- tivity cannot be achieved because there is nothing. from which one can be “distant, Critical theory. The appropriate criteria are his- torical situatedness ofthe inquiry (ie, that it takes account ofthe social, politcal, cultural, economic, elbnic, and gender antecedents ofthe studied situ- ation), the extent to which the inquiry acts to erode ‘ignorance and misapprehensions, and the extent to whieh it provides a stimulus to ation, that i, tothe teansformation of the existing structure Constructivism. Two sets of criteria have been ity (paralleling internal validity), transferability (paralleling external validity), dependability (paral. leling reliability), and confirmability (paralleling objectivity) (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985), and the authenticity criteria of fairness, ontologi ‘eal authenticity (enlarges personal constructions), ‘edueative authenticity (leads to improved under- standing of constructions of others), catalyticauthen- ticity (stimulates to action), and tactical authenticity (empowers action) (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The former set represents an early effort to resolve the {quality issue for constructivism; although these criteria have been well received, their parallelism to positivist criteria makes them suspect. The latter set overlaps to some oxtent those of critical theory but goes beyond them, particularly the two ‘of ontological authenticity and educative authen- ticity. The issue of quality criteria in constructiv- ‘sm is nevertheless not well resolved, and further cctitiqu is needed. Row 5: What is the role of values in inquiry? Positivism and postpositivism. In both these ppatadigms values are specifically excluded; in- deed, the paradigm is claimed to be “value free” by virtue of its epistemological posture. Values are seen as confounding variables that cannot be allowed a role in a putatively objective inquiry (even when objectivity is, inthe case of postpo- sitivism, but a regulatory ideal). Critical theory and constructivism. In both these paradigms values have pride of place; they are seen a8 ineluctable in shaping (in the case of constructivism, creating) inquity outcomes. Fur- thermore, even if it were possible, excluding val- tues would not be countenanced. To do so would be inimical to the interests of the powerless and of “at-risk” audiences, whose original (emic) con- structions deserve equal consideration with those of other, more powerful audiences and of the ing ism, which sees the inquirer as orchestrator and facilitator of thei uiry process, is more likely to stress this point than i rtical theory, which tends to cast the inquirer in a more authoritative role. Row 6: What is the place of ethics in inquiry? Positivism and postpositivism. In both these paradigms ethies is an important consideration, tnd it Is taken very seriously by inguirers, but it is extrinsic to the inguity process itself. Hence ethical behavior is formally policed by extemala eee realist ontology undergirding these paradigms pro- tides a tilt toward the use of deception, which, it js argued in certain cases, is warranted to deter tine how “things really are and work" or for the ake of some “higher social good" or some “clearer truth” (Bok, 1978, 1982; Diener & Crandall, 1978). Critical theory. Bthies is more nearly intrinsic to this paradigm, as implied by the intent to erode ignorance and misapprehensions, and to take full account of values and historical situatedness in the inquiry process. Thus there is a mora tilt that the inquirer be revelatory (in the rigorous mean- ig of "fall informed consent”) rather than de- Ceptive. OF course, these considerations do not prevent unethical behavior, but they do provide Lome process barriers that make it more difficult. Constructivism. Ethies is intrinsic to this para digm also beceuse of the inclusion of participant values in the inquiry (Starting with respondents” existing constructions and working toward in- ‘reased information and sophistication in thei Constructions as well asin the inquirer’s construc- tion), There is en ineentive—a process silt—for revelation; hiding the inquirer intent is destruc tive of the aim of uncovering and improving eon- structions. In addition, the hermeneuticaldialec~ tical methodology itself provides a strong but not infallible safeguard against deception. However, the close personal interactions required by the methodology may produce special and often sticky problems of confidentiality end anonymity, as fvell as other interpersonal difficulties (Guba & Lincoln, 1985). Row 7; What “voics” is mirrored in the inguirer's activities, ‘especially those directed at change? Positivism and postpositivism. The inguirer's voice is that of the “disinterested scientist’ Torming decision makers, policy makers, and change agents, who independently use this scientific in- formation, at least ia part, to form, explain, and justify actions, polices, and change proposal. Critical theory. The ioquirer’s voice is that of the “transformative intellectual” (Giroux, 1988) ‘who has expanded consciousness and so is in a position to confront ignorance and misapprehen- Sions. Change is facilitated as individuals develop [greater Insight into the existing state of affairs (ihe nature and extent of their exploitation) and are stimulated to act on it. Constructivism. The inquirer’s voice is that of the "passionate participant” (Lincaln, 1991) ac- reconstruction of his or her own construction as ‘well as those ofall other participants. Change is facilitated as reconstructions are formed and in- dividuals are stimulated to act on them, Row 8: What are the implications ‘of each paradigm for the training of novice inquiters? Positivism, Novices are trained primarily in technical Knowledge about measurement, desiga, ‘and quantitative methods, with less but substan tial emphasis on formal theories of the phenom- cena in their substantive specialties. Postpositivism. Novices ate trained in ways paralleling the positivist mode, but with the add fion of qualitative methods, often for the purpose fof ameliorating the problems noted inthe opening pacagraphs of this chapter. Grtical theory and constructivism. Noviess must fest be resocilized from their early and usually intense exposure to the received view of science. "That socialization cannot be accomplished without thorough schooling in the postures and techniques of positivism and postpositivism. Students must ome to appreciate paradigm differences (summa- raed in Table 6.1) and, in that context, to master both qualitative and quantitative methods. The former are essential because of their role in cat~ tying out the dialogic/dialectical or hermeneatical/ ilectical methodologies; the latter because they ‘can play avseful informational role inall paradigms. ‘They must also be helped to understand the social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender his {ory and structure that serve asthe surround for their inquisies, and to incorporate the values of alteuism ‘and empowerment in their work. Row 9: Are these paradigms necessarily in conflict? Is it possible to accommodate these several views within 4 single conceptual framework? Positivism and postpositivism. Proponents of these two paradigms, given their foundational orientation, take the position that all paradigms ‘can be aceommodated—that is, that there exists, ‘or will be found to exist, some common rational Structure to which all questions of difference can be referred for resolution. The posture is reduc tionist and assumes the possibility of point-by- point comparisons (commensurability), an issue bout which there continues fo be a great deal of disagreement,M6 Critical theory and constructivism. Proponents of these two paradigms join in affirming the basic (ncommensurability of the paradigms (althoug® they would agree that positivism and postpostiy- {sm are commensurable, and would probably agree that critical theory and constructivism are com= hensurable). The basic beliefs of the paradigms tte belfeved to be essentially contradictory. For SGasuructivists either there is a “real” reality oF there 38 not (although one might wish fo resolve this problem differently n considering the phys al versus the human realms), and thus cOnstruc> fivism and positivism/postpositivism cannot be Togieally accommodated anymore than, say, the ideas of flat versus ound earth can be logically Secommodated. For critical theorists and con: Struct vists, inguiry is either value free or itis aot; gain, logical accommodation seems impossible. Realism and relativism, value freedom and value boundedness, cannot coexist in any internally €on- stent mctephysical system, which condition of SSnsistency, iis stipulated, is essentially met by ‘cach of the candidate paradigms. Resolution of his diemena will necessarily await the emes- gence of a metaparadigm that renders the okt, Secommodated paradigoss not fess teuc, Dut si ply relevant. Row 10: Which of the paradigms exercises hegemony over the others? That is, ‘which is predominantly influential? Positivism and postposiivism. Proponents of positivism gained hegemony over the past several penturies as eatlicr Aristotelin and theological paradigms were abandoned. But the mantle of Hegemony has in recent decades gradvally fallen pte shoulders of the postpostivists, the “natu al” heirs of positivism. Postpositivists (and in- eed many residual positivsts) tend to control publication outlets, funding sources, promotion id tenure mechanisms, dissertation committees, and other sources of power and influence, They rere a eastuntil about 1980, the “in” group, and Rontaue to represent the slrongest voice in pro- fessional decision making. Critical sheory and constructivism, Proponents of ertial theory and constructivism are stil eek- fg recognition and avenves for input. Over the past decade, it has become more and more possi- Bie for them to achieve acceptance, as attested by tnereusing inclusion of relevant papers in journals iid professional meetings, the development of anny journal outlets, the growing acceptability of u 6 BFOWING ICC amy cal theory and constructivism will continue to play secondary, although important and progres, ively more influential, oles in the near future, Conclusion “The metaphor of the “paradigm wars” described by Gage (1989) is undoubtedly overdrawa. De- eribing the discussions and altercations of the past decade or two as wars paints the matter as Trore confrontational than necessary. A. resolv Ton of paradigm differences can occur only when fnew paradigm emerges that is more informed find sophisticated than any existing one. That is thost likely to occur if and when proponents of these several points of view come together to discuss theit differences, not to argue the sanctity Of their views. Continuing dialogue among para- dig proponents ofall stripes will afford the best venue for moving toward a responsive and con- genial relations ‘Wehope that in this chapter we have illustrated the need for such a discussion by clearly deline- thing the differences that currently exist, and by Showing that those differences have significant implications at the practical level. Paradigm is sues are erucial no inquiter, we maintain, ought to go about the business of inguiry without being Hye about just what paradigm informs and guides his or ber approach. Notes 1. Many ofthe objections listed here were first oman ciated by positvists themselves: indeed, we might a {ge ha the postpostvst position represents an allept Be penton positivism in ways that take account of hece sare objections. The naive postvist postion oF the sixtecahthrovgh the nineteenth centuries is 1 Tages held by anyone even casvally scquained with thens problems. Altiough we would concede that the pesipontivis position, as enunciated, for example PY Prone Philips (1987, 19902, 1990b), represents a coh~ ‘erable improvement over cassie positivism, it fils fo make a clean break, [Crepresents 2 kind of “damage wer eaher than a reformulation of basic principles. ‘The notion that these problems required a paradigm Jhan was poorly recognized until the publication of Thomas Kabn's landmark work, The Structure of Sc nije Revolutions (1962, 1970), and even then pAO- cried but slowly. Nevertheless, the contibutions of fre Kuhnian rite shouldbe recogized and applauded async reminded by Robert Stake (personal comeae | ene ree eee eee paradigms, Ttinitesimals have theirown cosmologes. 3. Ieis unlikely tht practitioner of any paradigm: would agtee that ove summaries closely describe what he or she thinks or docs. Workaday scientists rarely have either the time or te inclination to assess what they do in philosophical terms. 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