PART I

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON vs. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS and JA

HOON KU

G.R. No. 210759 June 23, 2015

Doctrine:
The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances.

Facts:

Republic of Korea sent a Letter-Request to petitioner Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson

of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for the immediate arrest and deportation of a Korean national,
Ja Hoon Ku, respondent. Ku was alleged to had arbitrarily spent the money allotted as reserve
fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Special Prosecutor Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a
risk to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2771. This finding paved way to the issuance
of a Summary Deportation Order for the respondent. Thereafter, respondent was arrested and
was detained in the BI detention center.

Thus, Ku filed for a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies
which was issued by the respondent Judge Gallego. On February 4, 2014, petitioner verbally
moved for the dismissal of the amparo petition, however, Judge Gallegos denied the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. Finally, on March 14, 2014, Judge Gallegos granted the privilege of the
writ of amparo and ordered for the immediate release of Ku without prejudice to the institution
of the proper remedy to extradition.

Issue: Whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted

Ruling:

No. The grant of privilege of the writ of amparo was improper.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) provides:

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.

The Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearance. It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power
to promulgate rules to protect our people s constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime.
 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these
two instances "Extralegal killings" are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances"
are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or where about s of
the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law."

In application to the present case, Kus circumstance does not come under the statutory
definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the
BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any
refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any
intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.
PART II

Doctrine: The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances.

Citation: CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON vs. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS and

JA HOON KU, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015
PART I

EMELITA BASILIO GAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 207147 September 14, 2016

Doctrine: A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable
cause must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. What is involved is not
a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.

Facts:
Petitioner was born on December 21, 1956 out of wedlock to Pia Gan, her father who is a
Chinese national, and Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is a Filipino citizen. The petitioner's
birth certificate indicates that her full name is Emelita Basilio. She filed a Petition for correction
of name and sought to change the full name indicated in her birth certificate from "Emelita
Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." She claimed that she had been using the name "Emelita
Basilio Gan" in her school records from elementary until college, employment records, marriage
contract, and other government records.
RTC denied the petition and ruled that the case was not merely a correction of entry in
the birth certificate but rather a change of name. Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Petition
containing substantially the same allegations as in the petition for correction of entry in the birth
certificate. After due proceedings, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition for change of
name. On appeal, the Court of Appeals opined that pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, the petitioner, as an illegitimate child, may only use the
surname of her mother; she may only use the surname of her father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by her father. It pointed out that the petitioner has not adduced any
evidence showing that her father had recognized her as his illegitimate child and, thus, she may
not use the surname of her father.
Issue: Whether or not the case involves a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 or a
petition for change of name under Rule 103

Ruling:
The case involves a petition for change of name under Rule 103.
A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause
must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. What is involved is not a mere
matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency
and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results
in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being
lodged in the courts.
 After a judicious review of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the CA that the
reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e. that she has been
using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records, is not a sufficient or proper
justification to allow her petition. When the petitioner was born in 1956, prior to the enactment
and effectivity of the Family Code, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code then regarding the
petitioner's use of surname provide:
Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use
the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural
child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.
Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the
surname of the mother.
In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was born
out of wedlock; she did not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural child
pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner's birth, either of her
parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of her mother
pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father
provided that she was acknowledged by her father.
However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she indeed was
duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's evidence consisted only of her birth certificate
signed by her mother, school records, employment records, marriage contract, certificate of
baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she is a natural child pursuant to
Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not insist on using her father's surname. It was, thus,
a blatant error on the part of the RTC to have allowed the petitioner to change her name from
"Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan."
PART II

Doctrine: A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable
cause must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. What is involved is not
a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.

Citation: EMELITA BASILIO GAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
207147, September 14, 2016