Rosales v Rosales
The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
FACTS:
On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived
by her husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales
Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased
her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C.
Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The trial court
ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to
share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other hand, insisted in getting
a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.
RULING:
No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right
of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a
widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has
already meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court
held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because the
provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a
parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as
regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
Dizon- Rivera v Dizon
FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven
compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is
the appellee while the others were the appellants
1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango.
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed
at P1.8 million) which included real and personal properties and shares
of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the
executor of the deceaseds estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in
accordance with her testamentary disposition where she devised and
bequeathed specific real properties comprising almost her entire estate
among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and Tomas were to
receive more than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the
estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96,
which was comprised of cash and/or properties specifically given to
them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they
received in the will less the cash/properties to complete their
respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition
on the estate where Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably
less
7. The lower court approved the executors project of partition citing that
Art 906 and 907 NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is
impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed. The court cited
that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will substantially
result in a distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC
ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this
case
HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition
admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which
the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are
to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes
of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In
Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the testator,
when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation,
and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment,
must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention
was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the
matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court
of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only
law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by
his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested
parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will.
Thus, the oppositors proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the
nature of a partition. In her will, the decedent noted that after commanding that
upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and
funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the administration
of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it
is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with
the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified
each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among
her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC,
providing that "Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act
inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executors project of partition as the
oppositors were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned
to them by the decedent in her will and the differential to complete their legitimes
were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who were
obviously favored by the decedent in her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the
executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than
the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they
would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to
one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises and
legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the
other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and
pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.
EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him", from the death of her
ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be
deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law
DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific
properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appears
from the whole context of the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole
estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate
through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her testamentary
dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as
mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth
paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the
third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of
those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his
forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased."
COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution
and partition of the entire estate was made by the testatrix, without her having
made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will
which would call for the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on
collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their
right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the
Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition,
and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the
estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-
appellee.
OTHERS:
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submitted by the
contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the
testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix
enumerated the specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir and
the testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean
a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an attempt on
her part to give such properties as devises to the designated beneficiaries.
Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were
deemed to be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in
the nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision
of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is that part of the testator's property which
he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are,
therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative
prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix
disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each
property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion of
the estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article
1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as
Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.
FACTS:
1. Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma
and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and
administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was
appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This
was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier
donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.
2. The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth
P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties
cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private
respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil
Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to
collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was
not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor
should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the
inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.
3. The trial court resolved the issue in favor of the petitioner. The donation did
not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters and such donation was
imputed to the free portion of Candelarias estate. The CA reversed the
decision holding that the deed of donation contained no express prohibition to
collate as an exception to Art. 1962. It ordered the collation and the equal
division of the net estate of the decedent, including the donated property
between Buhay and Rosalinda.
4. The deed of donation stated:
 ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa
kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di
na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa
ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng
mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng
mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay
nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion
sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa
sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang
legitimate ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang
sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na ako ay may layang
ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion.
ISSUE: WON there was an express prohibition to collate
HELD: No express prohibition to collate.
1. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and
equivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Art. 1962.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Art. 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition
because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the
decedents estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question
here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious.
2. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the
subject thereof from the collation required under Art. 1061. We surmise that
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above
provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the
said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na
di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and
should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact
that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof
from the collation required under Article 1061.
3. We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in
the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also
presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made.
It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that
he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had
been the donor's intention.
4. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and
unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062.
Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but
the rule, which is categorical enough.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Locsin v CA
Facts:
Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife,
Catalina Jaucian Locsin, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties.
The spouses being childless, had agreed that their properties, after both of
them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e.,
Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian
relatives."
Don Mariano died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness.
In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay
without any opposition from both sides of the family. Don Mariano relied on
Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years
after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully
cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began
transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her
own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She made the
following sales and donation of properties which she had received from her
husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 she
had made a will affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her
lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of
her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court
for probate because the properties devised to them under the will had already
been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some
legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes,
proceeded to distribute.
In 1989, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received
their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the RTC-
Legaspi to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins
during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without
consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession.
Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Jaucian, and against the
Locsin. The CA affirmed the said decion,hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin,
are entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more
than ten (10) years before her death.
Held: NO
They are not entitled since those properties did not form part of her hereditary
estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at
the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since
the opening of the succession."
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time.
Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons
during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death
to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that
remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs.
Even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising
under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation
of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither
they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.
Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that
she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be
impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the
respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to
dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art.
750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not
invoke: Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of
the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct,
sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time
of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the
donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of
any person affected. Petition for review is granted.
Milagros Manongsong v. FelomenaJumaquio Estimo
G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003
FACTS:
Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from Justina
Navarro, which is now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra
had six children, one of them is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros
Lopez Manongsong (Manongsong). The respondents, the Jumaquio sisters
and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was actually sold to them by
Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents presented deed of sale
dated October 11, 1957. Milagros and CarlitoManongsong (petitioners) filed
a Complaint on June 19, 1992 praying for the partition and award to them of
an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by right of representation. The RTC ruled
that the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the
property conveyed had a conjugal character and that AgatonaGuevarra as her
compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution
of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did
not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no
force and effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should be declared a nullity ab
initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the alleged
sale of the property by Justina.
RULING:
No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public,
is a public document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due
execution. There is no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale
embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their
legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title,
a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the
seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution
of the estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is
replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in
1957 for P250.00.
The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is
void ab initio was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property
was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is
an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. There was no evidence presented to establish that
Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage.
Spouses Joaquin v. CA
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Doctrine: The legitime of a compulsory heir is merely inchoate and vests only
upon the death of the parents. While still alive, the parents are free to dispose
of their properties, provided such dispositions are not made in fraud of
creditors.
Facts:
Spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents
of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad, as well as of
defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe and Gavino.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale
of real property executed by defendant parents in favour of their co-
defendant children.
The plaintiff children are claiming that no actual valid consideration
for the deeds of sale were made and that the purported sale was the
result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest
of the compulsory heirs of their legitime.
Issue: Were the deeds of sale by the parents to their co-defendant children
valid? Yes.
Ruling:
The right of children to the properties of their parents, as compulsory
heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only upon the parents death.
While still alive, parents are free to dispose of their properties,
provided such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
Compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is
contingent since said right commences only from the moment of
death of the decedent.
There can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their
parents. In determining the legitime, the value of the property left at
the death of the testator shall be considered.
The legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the
death of the decedent. Plaintiffs cannot claim an impairment of their
legitime while their parents live.
 The testimony of the defendants particularly that of the father will
show that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
consideration. operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary
absolutely simulated. estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his
lifetime. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the
compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion,
Arellano vs. Pascual after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.
G.R. No. 189776: December 15, 2010
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
FACTS: concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of
namely: petitioner Amelia who is represented by her daughters Agnes and the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has
Nona, and respondents Francisco and Miguel. reserved it for compulsory heirs. The decedent not having left any compulsory
heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties,
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
of Administration, , respondents alleged that a parcel of land (donated donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made
property) located in Makati, , transferred by the decedent to petitioner, "may to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being
be considered as an advancelegitime" of petitioner. no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

The probate court provisionally passed upon the validity of the donation then CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; DETERMINATION OF ESTATE
further held that the land in contention is subject to collation following Art. 1061
of the New Civil Code. On appeal, the CA sustained the probate courts ruling Second Issue; The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned
that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation. equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and
respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code (Arts. 1003 & 1004).
Hence, this petition.
CA Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to Amelia, to the
ISSUE: estate of the deceased is SET ASIDE and the records of the cases is
I. Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation. REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings in the case for the
II. Whether or not the property of the estate should have been ordered equally purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to
distributed among the parties. divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. ROLANDO SANTOS vs. CONSTANCIA SANTOS ALANA

CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; COLLATION G.R. No. 154942. August 16, 2005

First Issue; Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its
purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. FACTS:
Rolando Santos and Constancia Santos Alana are half-blood siblings both
asserting their claim over a 39-square meter lot in Manila. It was registered in
the name of their father who died intestate in 1986. During his lifetime,
Gregorio donated the lot to Rolando which the latter accepted. By virtue of the
deed of donation annotated on Gregorio's title, a transfer certificate of title was
issued in Rolando's name. In 1991 Constancia Santos filed with the RTC of
Manila a complaint for partition and reconveyance against Rolando alleging
that during the lifetime of their father, he denied having sold the subject lot to
petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the donation is
inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime. Rolando countered that
respondent's suit is barred by prescription considering that she is aware of his
possession of the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that the lot
was sold to him by Gregorio. Hence, respondent can no longer claim her
legitime. Affirmed on appeal are the findings of the trial court which declared
as invalid contract the Deed of Absolute Sale since it was not signed by the
parties nor registered in the Registry of Deeds and sustained as valid the deed
of donation as it was duly executed by the parties and registered.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the donation is inofficious
(2) Whether or not action of respondent is barred by prescription
RULING:
(1) Yes. Pursuant to Article 752 of the Civil Code, a donation is inofficious if it
exceeds this limitation - no person may give or receive, by way of donation,
more than he may give or receive by will. Gregorio could not donate more
than he may give by will. At the time of his death, he left no property other than
the entire lot he donated to petitioner and that the deceased made no
reservation for the legitime of respondent, his daughter and compulsory heir.
The donation is therefore inofficious as it impairs respondent's legitime which,
under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary
estate of the father and the mother. Since the parents of both parties are
already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to one-half (1/2)
thereof.
(2) No. "Donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of
impairment of legitime (as in this case), are not controlled by a particular
prescriptive period, as held in Imperial vs. Court of Appeals but by ordinary
rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the
obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the
Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. The
case of Mateo vs. Lagua, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a
donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a
legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent, since it is only then
that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may
be determined. Since Gregorio died in 1986, respondent had until 1996 within
which to file the action. She filed her suit in 1992, well within the prescriptive
period.
VIZCONDE vs CA
FACTS:
Lauro Vizconde and his wife Estrellita has 2 daughters. On May 22, 1979,
Estrellita purchased from her father a parcel of land (Valenzuela property).
Later on, she sold the Valenzuela property Lim.
On June 1990, she bought from Premier Homes a parcel of land with
improvements (Paranaque property) using the proceeds from the sale of the
Valenzuela property. On June 1991, the Vizconde massacre happened.
Estrellita and her daughters were killed thereafter leaving Lauro as t sole heir
of their estate. Later on, Rafael (Estrellitas father) died intestate. The heirs of
Rafael averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the
properties distributed by Nicolas to his children during his lifetime, including
the Paranaque property. The trial court in its decision did not include the
Paranaque property as part of the estate of Rafael. Ramon, one of the heirs of
Rafael, filed his objection against the order of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the collation is proper.
RULING:
NO. The probate court made a reversible error in ordering collation of the
Paraaque property. It was the Valenzuela property that was transferred to
Estrellita, by way of deed of sale. The Paraaque property which Estrellita
acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does
not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the
Paraaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court
presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously conveyed by
Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque property
was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00, by Premier Homes,
Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and Lauro
who inherited and is now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not
one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation against Lauro
is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir,
and not to herein Lauro who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As
it stands, collation of the Paraaque property is improper for, to repeat,
collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his
lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer
of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument,
voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and participation
as heir" in the Paraaque property.
DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I.
SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN SUAREZ-DE LEON AND REGINIO I. SUAREZ,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VALENTE RAYMUNDO,
VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO AND VIRGINIA BANTA
RESPONDENTS.
The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can validly
acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and registered
in the name of petitioner's deceased father, Marcelo Suarez, whose estate has
not been partitioned or liquidated, after the said properties were levied and
publicly sold en masse to private respondents to satisfy the personal judgment
debt of Teofista Suarez, the surviving spouse of Marcelo Suarez, mother of
herein petitioners.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since
then his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro
Manila has not been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners widowed
mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for
rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay,
jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of
about P70,000 as damages.[1]
The judgment against petitioner's mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having
become final and executory, five (5) valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro
Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on execution on June
24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder for the
amount of P94,170.00. Private respondents were then issued a certificate of
sale which was subsequently registered on August 1, 1983.
On June 21, 1984, before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners
filed a reinvindicatory action[2] against private respondents and the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment
of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of
property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case
decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the
five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor
sold on execution.
On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents
a final deed of sale[3] over the properties.
On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with
Branch 151 a Motion for Reconsideration[4] of the Order dated October 10,
1984, claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by them and further
informing the Court the filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction
sale (Civil Case No. 51203), which motion however, was denied.
On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining
private respondents from transferring to third parties the levied parcels of land
based on the finding that the auctioned lands are co-owned by petitioners.
On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case
No. 51203 a Motion to Dismiss for failure on the part of the petitioners to
prosecute, however, such motion was later denied by Branch 155, Regional
Trial Court, Pasig.
On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte
Motion to Dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute. This was granted by
Branch 155 through an Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding petitioner's
pending motion for the issuance of alias summons to be served upon the other
defendants in the said case. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of
later denied. illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.
On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739 Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:
an Order directing Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to
If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving
vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating
spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the
improvements thereon; and to surrender to private respondents the owner's legitimate children or descendants.
duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the
Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
legitime of each child.
to annul the Orders of Branch 151 dated October 10, 1984 and October 14,
1986 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-
On December 4, 1986, petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for
owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right
reconsideration of the Order[5] dated September 24, 1986. In an Order dated
as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in
June 10, 1987,[6] Branch 155 lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed
any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their
the issuance of alias summons. own interest.
Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as
orders dated February 25, 1985,[7] May 19, 1989[8] and February 26, 1990[9]
well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set
issued in Civil Case No. 51203 and further ordering respondent judge to
aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion
dismiss Civil Case. No. 51203. The appellate court rendered its decision on which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.
July 27, 1990,[10] the dispositive portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned
orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990 issued
in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled; further respondent judge is
ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203.[11]
END LEGITIME/COLLATION
Hence, this appeal.
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner
and private respondents and the developments subsequent to the filing of the

complaint. We cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.
It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the
execution and the manner of publicly selling en masse subject properties for
auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have been
the subject of the auction sale.
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time
of the institution of the case: Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI,
ET AL. vs.
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN (May 23, 1943)
the decedent.
Article 888 further provides: Cast:
The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half Agripino Neri- deceased father
of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. Ignacia Akutin- wife from 2nd marriage
Kids from 1st marriage- 6 (Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and
Celerina)
Kids from 2nd marriage- 5 (Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and
Emma)
*Preterition definition from June 1941 case (including this para clearer):
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession.
Facts:
Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had by his first
marriage six children, and by his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five
children. Getulia, daughter in the first marriage, died on October 2, 1923, a
little less than eight years before the death of said Agripino Neri y Chavez, and
was survived by her seven children.
The trial court found that Agapito, Rosario and the children of Getulia had
received from the testator no property whatsoever, personal, real or in cash.
But clause 8 of the will is invoked wherein the testator made the statement that
the children by his first marriage had already received their shares in his
property, excluding what he had given them as aid during their financial
troubles and the money they had borrowed from him which he condoned in
the will. Since, however, this is an issue of fact tried by the CFI and the SC is
reviewing the CAs decision upon a question of law, the SC can rely only upon
the CAs findings of fact:
Since all the parcels that corresponded to Agripino Neri y Chaves are now in
the administrator's possession, as appears in the inventory filed in court, it is
clear that the property of the deceased has remained intact and that no portion
thereof has been given to the children of the first marriage.
Thus, this is a case where the testator in his will left all his property by universal
title to the children by his second marriage, the respondents, with preterition
of the children by his first marriage, the petitioner. This Court annulled the
institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy.
The children of the second marriage filed an MR on the ground (1) that there
is no preterition as to the children of the first marriage who have received their
shares in the property left by the testator, and (2) that, even assuming that
there has been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of the
institution of heirs but simply the reduction of the bequest made to them.
Issues: 1. WoN there is preterition.
2. WoN the institution of heirs should be annulled and intestate
succession declared open.
Held: 1. Yes
According to the courts findings, none of the children by the first
marriage received their respective shares from the testators property. The
Court can rely only on the findings of the trial court that the inventory indicates
that the property of Neri has remained intact and that no portion has been
given to the children of the first marriage. Neri left his property by universal title
to the children by his second marriage, and did not expressly disinherit his
children by his first marriage but did not leave anything to them, either. This
fits the case of preterition according to Article 814:
The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments shall be valid,
in so far as they are not inofficious.
2. Yes.
Article 814 refers to two different things which are the two different
objects of its two different provisions. One of these objects cannot be made to
merge in the other without mutilating the whole article. It should be borne in
mind, further, that although article 814 contains two different provisions, its
special purpose is to establish a specific rule concerning a specific
testamentary provision, namely, the institution of heirs in a case of preterition.
Its other provision regarding the validity of legacies and betterments if not
inofficious is a mere reiteration of the general rule contained in other provisions
and signifies merely that it also applies in cases of preterition. As regards
testamentary dispositions in general, the general rule is that all "testamentary
disposition which diminish the legitime of the forced heirs shall be reduced on
petition of the same in so far as they are inofficous or excessive" (article 817).
But this general rule does not apply to the specific instance of a testamentary
disposition containing an institution of heirs in a case of preterition, which is
made the main and specific subject of article 814. In such instance,
according to article 814, the testamentary disposition containing the
institution of heirs should be not only reduced but annulled in its entirety
and all the forced heirs, including the omitted ones, are entitled to inherit
in accordance with the law of intestate succession.
The SC notes the case of Escuin vs. Escuin (11 Phil., 332). In the Escuin case,
the deceased left all his property to his natural father (not a forced heir) and
his wife with total preterition of his father and wife. Without reconsidering the
correctness of the ruling laid down in these two cases, we will note that the
doctrine stands on facts which are different from the facts in the present case.
There is certainly a difference between a case of preterition in which the whole
property is left to a mere friend and a case of preterition in which the whole
property is left to one or some forced heirs. If the testamentary disposition be
annulled totally in the first case, the effect would be a total deprivation of the
friend of his share in the inheritance. And this is contrary to the manifest
intention of the testator. It may fairly be presumed that, under such
circumstances, the testator would at leave give his friend the portion of free
disposal. In the second case, the total nullity of the testamentary
disposition would have the effect, not of depriving totally the instituted
heir of his share in the inheritance, but of placing him and the other
forced heirs upon the basis of equality. This is also in consonance with
the presumptive intention of the testator. Preterition, generally speaking,
is due merely to mistake or inadvertence without which the testator may
be presumed to treat alike all his children.
And specially is this true in the instant case where the testator omitted the
children by his first marriage upon the erroneous belief that he had given them
already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his
second marriage. It was, therefore, the thought of the testator that the children
by his first marriage should not receive less than the children by his second
marriage, and to that effect is the decision of this Court sought to be
reconsidered. Motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
19 SCRA 85
FACTS:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died
he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a
small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto
and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his
widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of
partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares
delivered.
Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she
executed two wills, in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both
surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same
and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was
allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso
Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that Salud
was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano
Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a
legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of
the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his
widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion,
thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of
ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other
properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and
not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly
attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of
the court based thereon as well.
ISSUE:
W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and
Salud did not acquire valid title to it.
HELD:
NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano
Barrettos last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the
partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was
believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void. The
legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of
heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the
fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude
her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano
Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever
he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of
Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of
Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her fathers will a share smaller
than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was
here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.
Nuguid v. Nuguid
GR L-23445, June 23, 1966
FACTS:
Rosario died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving
were her legitimate parents, Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. One of
the siblings filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years
before her death and prayed that she be admitted to the probate and be
appointed administrator. The parents opposed saying that they are the
compulsory heirs of the decedent in the direct ascending line and that the will
should be void on the ground of absolute preterition.
ISSUE:
Is the will void on the ground of preterition?
RULING:
YES. The decedent left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. And, the will completely
omits both of them; thus receiving nothing by the testament, depriving them of
their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition. Note that A. 854 of the NCC merely nullifies the institution of heir.
Considering that the will presented solely provides for the institution of the
petitioner as universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same. The will
is null and void.
Solano vs. CA, Bienvenido/Emeteria Garcia
GR L 41971 November 29, 1983
FACTS:
Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano
Meliton died during the pendency of the petition and his daughter substituted
him while asking for the probate of the will of the decedent. RTC specified the
legal issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the
hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated will. In deciding, RTC
declared Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the institution of Sonia
as sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share equally the estate
CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution
of sole heir from decedents will.
RULING:
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Melitons will,
and as a result, Sonias institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art.
854
The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises and
legacies shall be valid
The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his
property which the testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld as
to the one-half portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of
Sonias share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6 each.
The usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all together.
Acain v. IAC (1987)
Facts:
On May 1984, Constantino Acain (petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on the
RTC of Cebu City, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio
Acain and for the issuance to Acain of letters testamentary. When Nemesio
died, he left a will in which Acain and his siblings were instituted as heirs. The
will allegedly executed by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner without
objection raised by private respondents. Segundo, the brother of Nemesio,
was initially instituted as the heir, in case Segundo pre-deceases Nemesio,
Segundos childrenwould then succeed.
After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents (Virginia Fernandez,
legally adopted daughter of Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed
a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: for the petitioner has no legal
capacity to institute these proceedings; he is merely a universal heir and the
Rosa and Fernandez have been pretirited. Motion was denied. After the
denial, respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the IAC. The
IAC granted the private respondents' petition and ordered the TC to dismiss
the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio. His MR having been denied,
Acain filed this present petition for the review of IACs decision.
Issues:
1. Whether private respondents have been preterited.
No for the widow, yes for Fernandez.
2. Whether Acain has legal standing to intervene in the probate proceedings.
No.
**3. Whether the probate court went beyond its authority.
No.
Ratio/Held:
1. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, there is no preterition, for she is not in the
direct line. However, the same cannot be said for Fernandez. It cannot be
denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator.
Neither can it be denied that she was not expressly disinherited. Hence, this
is a clear case of preterition of the Fernandez. The universal institution of Acain
and his siblings to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally
abrogating the will.
2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding
he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested
party is one who would be benefited by the estate. Acain, at the outset,
appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy having
resulted from the preterition of Fernandez and the universal institution of heirs,
Acain is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition
for the probate of the will left by the deceased and must then be dismissed.
**3. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after
the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the will. Where circumstances demand that
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the
extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue.
The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private
respondents. The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SEANGIO vs HON. REYES
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
Facts:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement
of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng,
Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in
favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and
supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo
because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a
holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic
will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a
will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced
by the proceedings for the probate of the will. On April 7, 1999, a petition for
the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, was filed by petitioners before
the RTC.
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is entitled
as: Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Issue:
Whether or not there is preterition in the case at bar
Ruling:
The Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not
preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression
to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other
compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir.
Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between
Segundo and his son, Alfredo. Considering that the questioned document is
Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the
will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.Adjudication: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED