SERMONIA, vs. CA G.R. No.

109454 June 14, 1994

Presicription - - Bigamy

FACTS:
On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the
RTC of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February
1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for
bigamy has been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27
October 1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was
dismissed for lack of merit.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been
obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly
registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it
a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended
party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage
as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was
registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been
filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not
begin from the commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant
which was in July 1991.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy has already
prescribed.

HELD:
No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive
notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed
liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of
bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof
for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be
open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as
he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his
previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person.
He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he
contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married
person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of
the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only
from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agency.

MARIN V. ADIL G.R. NO.47986

Facts:
The Armadas were expecting to inherit some lots from their uncle. Marin had
hereditary rights in the estates of her parents. A deed of exchange was executed wherein
it was stipulated that both parties acknowledge that the exchange operates to their
individual and mutual benefit and advantage, for the reason that the property being ceded,
transferred, conveyed and unclaimed by one party to the other is situated in the place
where either is a resident resulting in better administration of the properties. But the
expected land was adjudicated to Soledad, sister of Marin. So, the Armadas and other
heirs sued Soledad for claiming to be the sole heir of their uncle, but ended in a
compromise where the Armadas were awarded two lots. Marin waived, renounced and
quitclaimed her share in her parents estate in favour of her another sister Aurora. She
cannot anymore fulfil her obligations in her signed deed of exchange with the Armadas.
The Armadas filed a rescisorry action against Marin.

Issue:
WON Armadas action has prescribed
Held:
No. The action to declare contracts void and inexistent does not prescribe. It is
evident from the deed of exchange that the intention of the parties relative to the lots
cannot be definitely ascertained. This circumstance renders the exchange void.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN II G.R. No.

152662 June 13, 2012

FACTS:
Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg.22 against the respondent, Pangilinan on September 16, 1997 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
On December 5, 1997, a civil case was commenced by Pangilinan against Malolos
for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of
contract and specific performance before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City.
Five days thereafter or on December 10, 1997, Pangilinan filed a Petition to
Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed
with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The City Prosecutor approved the petition upon the
recommendation of the assistant City Prosecutor on March 2, 1998.
Malolos appealed the decision of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice.
On January 5, 1999, reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing
of informations on violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22. Said cases were filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on November 18, 1999.
Pangilinan filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that
her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.

HELD:
No, the action has not prescribed.
Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as
amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years
for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting jeopardy. Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for
its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited
law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the
institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALS II G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

FACTS:
A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property and slight physical injuries was filed before
the Fiscals office on October 20, 1987.
On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati charging the petitioner for the abovementioned offense. The Regional Trial Court
found the victim guilty as charged, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court.
On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.

HELD:
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that
in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6
months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary
examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities,
said cases may be commenced only by information. However, this Section cannot be
taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint
or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive
law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise
of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated
by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails. In the instant case, as the
offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the
rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply.
Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the
filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the vehicular mishap and
remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold
petitioners defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.

EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS II G.R. No. L-4567 May 30, 1983

FACTS:

A complaint for intriguing against honor was filed against petitioners, Francisco and
Bernardino on February 6, 1966 before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. The
acts constituting the complaint was allegedly perpetrated against Dr. Patrocinio Angeles
on December 26, 1965.
On May 3, 1966, an information charging the petitioners with the crime of grave oral
defamation was filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The information was
amended upon the order of the court on October 8, 1966 amending the offense charged to
slander.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted the petitioners with the offense
charged, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction finding the petitioners only guilty
of simple slander.
On appeal, the petitioners raised the defense of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime has prescribed.

HELD:
No, the crime has not prescribed.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him."
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco held that the
complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court
and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office.
This is so, according to the court, because under this rule it is so provided that the period
shall commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint
or information terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that
the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal or conviction
of the accused.

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIO TAN
G.R. No. 89741 March 13, 1991

Facts:
Private respondent Emilio Tan took from petitioner a P300,000.00 property insurance
policy to cover his interest in the electrical supply store of his brother housed in a
building in Iloilo City. Four days after the issuance of the policy, the building was burned
including the insured store. Tan filed his claim for fire loss with petitioner, but on
February 29, 1984, petitioner wrote Tan denying the latter's claim. On April 3, 1984, Tan
wrote petitioner, seeking reconsideration of the denial of his claim. Tan filed a case but
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the alleged ground that the action had already
prescribed and said motion was denied; and petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
also denied.

Issue:
WON the court the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the 12 months
prescription period to contest the denial of the insurance claim
Held:
NO. The SC held that Condition 27 of the Insurance policy is very clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity. It has to be taken in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense.
The rejection letter of February 29, 1984 was clear and plain. The Court noted that the
one year period is likewise in accord with Section 23 of the Insurance Code which states
that any condition which limits the time for commencing an action to a period of less than
one year when the cause of action accrues is void. The right of action, according to the
SC, accrues at the time that the claim is rejected at the first instance. A request for
reconsideration of the denial cannot suspend the running of the prescriptive period. The
Court noted that the rationale for the one year period is to ensure that the evidence as to
the origin and cause of the destruction have not yet disappeared.

JACQUELINE JIMENEZ VDA. DE GABRIEL vs. CA and FORTUNE

INSURANCE & SURETY COMPANY, INC. G.R. No. 103883 November 14, 1996

Facts:
Marcelino Gabriel was employed by Emerald Construction & Development
Corporation (Emerald Construction for brevity) at its construction project in Iraq. He was
covered by a personal accident insurance in the amount of P100,000.00 under a group
policy procured from Fortune Insurance & Surety Company (Fortune Insurance for
brevity) by Emerald Construction for its overseas workers. The insured risk was for
bodily injury caused by violent accidental external and visible means which injury would
solely and independently of any other cause result in death or disability.
On 22 May 1982, within the life of the policy, Gabriel died in Iraq. On 12 July 1983,
Emerald Construction reported Gabriels death to Fortune Insurance by telephone.
Among the documents thereafter submitted to Fortune Insurance were a copy of the death
certificate issued by the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Iraq which stated that an
autopsy report by the National Bureau of Investigation was conducted to the effect that
due to advanced state of post mortem decomposition, the cause of death of Gabriel could
not be determined
Because of this development Fortune Insurance ultimately denied the claim of
Emerald Construction on the ground of prescription. Gabriels widow, Jacqueline
Jimenez, went to the lower court. In her complaint against Emerald Construction and
Fortune Insurance, she averred that her husband died of electrocution while in the
performance of his work.
Fortune Insurance alleged that since both the death certificate issued by the Iraqi
Ministry of Health and the autopsy report of the NBI failed to disclose the cause of
Gabriels death, it denied liability under the policy. In addition, private respondent raised
the defense of prescription, invoking Section 384 of the Insurance Code.

Issue:
WON Jacqueline Jimenez Vda. De Gabriels claim against Fortune Insurance should
be denied on the ground of prescription

Held:
Yes. Section 384 of the Insurance Code provides:
Sec. 384. Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to this
chapter shall, without any unnecessary delay, present to the insurance company
concerned a written notice of claim setting forth the nature, extent and duration of the
injuries sustained as certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice of claim must be filed
within six months from date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall be deemed
waived. Action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be brought, in
proper cases, with the Commissioner or the Courts within one year from denial of the
claim, otherwise, the claimants right of action shall prescribe.
The notice of death was given to Fortune Insurance, concededly, more than a year
after the death of Vda. De Gabriels husband. Fortune Insurance, in invoking prescription,
was not referring to the one-year period from the denial of the claim within which to file
an action against an insurer but obviously to the written notice of claim that had to be
submitted within six months from the time of the accident.
Vda. De Gabriel argues that Fortune Insurance must be deemed to have waived its
right to show that the cause of death is an excepted peril, by failing to have its answers
duly verified. It is true that a matter of which a written request for admission is made
shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless, within a period designated in the request,
which shall not be less than 10 days after service thereof, or within such further time as
the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed
serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters; however, the
verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters
which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere
speculation. When circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that
the ends of justice may thereby be served. In the case of answers to written requests for
admission particularly, the court can allow the party making the admission, whether made
expressly or deemed to have been made impliedly, to withdraw or amend it upon such
terms as may be just.
The insurance policy expressly provided that to be compensable, the injury or death
should be caused by violent accidental external and visible means. In attempting to prove
the cause of her husbands death, all that Vda. De Gabriel could submit were a letter sent
to her by her husbands co-worker, stating that Gabriel died when he tried to haul water
out of a tank while its submerged motor was still functioning, and Vda. De Gabriels
sworn affidavit. The said affidavit, however, suffers from procedural infirmity as it was
not even testified to or identified by Vda. De Gabriel herself. This affidavit therefore is a
mere hearsay under the law.
In like manner, the letter allegedly written by the deceaseds co-worker which was
never identified to in court by the supposed author, suffers from the same defect as the
affidavit of Vda. De Gabriel. Not one of the other documents submitted, to wit, the POEA
decision, the death certificate issued by the Ministry of Health of Iraq and the NBI
autopsy report, could give any probative value to Vda. De Gabriels claim. The POEA
decision did not make any categorical holding on the specific cause of Gabriels death.
In summary, evidence is utterly wanting to establish that the insured suffered from an
accidental death, the risk covered by the policy.

People of the Philippines vs Arturo F. Pacificador GR 139405 March 13, 2001

FACTS:
On October 27, 1988, Arturo Pacificador, the Chairman of the Board of the National
Shipyard and Steel Corporation, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
violation of RA 3019 aka Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. During the period of
December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, together with Jose Marcelo, the President of
Philippine Smelters Corporation, he caused the sale, transfer and conveyance of the
rights, titles and interests over parcels of land owned by National Shipyard and Steel
Corporation to Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where Jose Panganiban Plant is
located. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation is a government-owned corporation and
received only P85,144.50 as consideration for the sale. This caused injury to the
Government because real fair market value of the lands were P862,150.00. The Deed of
Sale for was executed on December 29, 1975. Pacificador stated that the prosecution of
the crime has already prescribed since counting from the registration of the Deed of Sale
(or execution of such), the filing of action against him should have prescribed. He further
contends that during December 29, 1975, there was a constructive notice to the world of
such registration and this should be tantamount to concealing his crime during that day
and not on May 13, 1988 when the complaint was filed by the Solicitor General with the
PCGG.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prescription of the offense committed by Pacificador shall run
from the date the Deed of Sale was executed.
RULING:
YES. The date of prescription shall run from the day the crime was committed and if
that date is unknown, the date of discovery should be used as the reckoning point. In this
case, since the land was transferred and presumably registered on December 29, 1975
when the perpetrators are already aware of their own crimes, the reckoning point should
be that day. The Deed of Sale when registered constitutes a notice to the whole world,
including the petitioner, of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable. All
persons are charged with the constructive knowledge of what it contains despite no actual
knowledge on their part.

People vs Moran, 44 Phil 431

Facts:
The accused violated the election code and was sentenced by the lowercourt. He was
asking for reconsideration and filed a special motion alleging that the crime complained
of had prescribed under the provision of section 71 of Act 3030, enacted by the
Legislature on March 9, 1922.
Issue:
W/N penal laws provide for not only penalty but also prescription.
Held:
Yes. The court found the crime to have prescribed (in accordance with the new law)
and set aside the decision. The Election law contained in the Administrative Code and
Act 3030 which amended and modified the former, it is evident that the provision
declaring that offenses resulting from the violations of said Act shall prescribe one year
after their commission must have retroactive effect, the same being favorable to the
accused. An exception- to give them retroactive effect when favorable to accused. The
exception applies to a law dealing with prescription of crime: Art 22 applies to a law
dealing with prescription of an offense which is intimately connected with that of the
penalty, for the length of time for prescription depends upon the gravity of the offense.
Penal laws not only provide for penalties but also prescriptions.

CAPITLE VS VDA DE GABAN [G.R. No. 146890. June 8, 2004]

Facts:
Julians brother Zacarias died in 1984. He was survived by the other petitioners
herein, Aurora P. vda. de Correjado, Lilia Capitle, Artemio Correjado, Cecilia Correjado,
Rogelia Correjado (Rogelia), Sofronio Correjado, Vicente Correjado and Gloria vda. de
Beduna.
On November 26, 1986, petitioners filed a complaint[1] for partition of the property
and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Carlota City against
respondents, alleging that Fabian contracted two marriages, the first with Brigida Salenda
who was the mother of Julian, and the subsequent one with Maria Catahay (Maria) who
was the mother of Zacarias, Manuel and Francisco; that the property remained undivided
even after the death of Julian in 1950, his children-herein respondents having arrogated
unto themselves the use and enjoyment of the property, to the exclusion of petitioners;
and that respondents refused to deliver petitioners share in the property despite demands
therefor and for partition.
To the Complaint respondents countered in their Answer[2] that in the proceedings in
the intestate estate of their great grandfather Santos Correjado, petitioners were not
adjudicated any share in the property, for Maria, the mother of petitioners respective
fathers Francisco and Zacarias, was just a mistress of Fabian, hence, Francisco and
Zacarias (as well as Manuel) were illegitimate who were not entitled to inherit under the
old Civil
RTC dismissed the complaint upon the grounds of prescription and laches.
Issue:
W/N the action has already prescribed
Held:
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137, New Civil Code provides that: ART. 1137. Ownership and other real
rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners respective fathers Francisco and Zacarias were
legitimate and, therefore, were co-owners of the property: From the moment co-owner
Julian occupied in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute and exclusive owner of the
property and denied his brothers any share therein up to the time of his death in 1950, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership in which case
imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked. The adverse
possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest- herein respondents as exclusive
owner of the property having entailed a period of about 67 years at the time of the filing
of the case at bar in 1986, ownership by prescription had vested in them.
As for estoppel by laches which is a creation of equity,[13] since laches cannot
interfere with the running of the period of prescription, absent any conduct of the parties
operating as estoppel,[14] in light of the prescription of petitioners action, discussion
thereof is dispensed with. Suffice it to state that while laches may not be strictly applied
between near relatives, under the facts and circumstances of the case, especially the
uncontroverted claim of respondents that their father Julian, and the documented claim of
respondent Julieta, had paid realty taxes on the property as exclusive owner, as well as
the admission of petitioner Rogelia that, as quoted above, she and her co-petitioners
never benefited or were deprived of any benefits from the property since 1919 up to
the time of the filing of the case in 1986 before the RTC or for a period of 67 years,
despite demands therefor, even an extremely liberal application of laches would bar the
filing of the case.

DIOCOSA PAULAN v. ZACARIAS SARABIA GR No. L-10542 July 31, 1958

Facts:
On July 25, 1951, a truck owned and operated by Zacarias Sarabia and driven by
Emilio Celeste fell into a creek after it collided with another truck of the Mary Lim Line.
As a result of the collision, Gaudencio Basco who was one of the passengers of Sarabias
Truck died. On April 19, 1955, Bascos widow and heirs filed a complaint against
Zacarias Sarabia and Emilio Celeste for compensation and damages. On July 11, 1955
Sarabia filed a third-party complaint against driver of the truck of Mary Lim Line and a
certain Quintin Lim. The third-party complaint was amended on December 20, 1955
replacing Quintin Lim with the name of Maria M. Lim. Maria Lim filed a motion to
dismiss contending among others that the action has already prescribed. Sarabia argued
that the computation of the presriptive period should be counted from April 19, 1955 the
date when the main action was filed against them.
Issue:
Whether or not the action already prescribed
Held:
Yes. The action which appellants(Sarabia) desire to press against appellee (Lim) is
really one based on quasi-delict which prescribes in four years, and this period having
already expired when the action was taken, it is obvious that the action has prescribed.
Thus, in the third-party complaint against the appelle it is alleged that the collision was
the exclusive, direct and immediate result of the felonious, negligent, careless, reckless
and imprudent driving of the TPU truck of Mary Lim Line No. 108 by Juan Cadungon
xxx without any regard for traffic laws, and regulations and vehicle laws as to speed,
blowing of horn, right of way and other rules, which truck is owned and operated by
appellee. And Article 1146 of the New Civil Code provides that an action based upon a
quasi-delictprescribes in four years.
The law ordinarily provides that the period during which an action may be brought
shall be computed from the time the right of action accrues (Articles 1144 & 1149, New
Civil Code), but nothing is provided in this respect with regard to an action based on a
quasi-delict, Article 1146 (New Civil Code) simply provides that the action shall be
instituted within four years. There being no provision as to when shall the period of four
years commence to run, the provision of Article 1150 shall apply, which reads: The time
for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains
otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. Evidently, the day therein
referred to is that of the collision, for an action based on a quasi-delict can be brought
now independently of the criminal action and even regardless of the outcome of the latter
(Article 31, New Civil Code). There can therefore be no dispute that the action of
appellants against the appellee should have been brought within the period of four years
counted from July 25, 1951.