G.R. No.

150920 November 25, 2005

CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. VS. TIMOTHY TAGARIO

FACTS:

During the school year, Timothy (Respondent) was a student at Marymount School
maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (Petitioner). When he entered the boys comfort room,
he found himself locked inside and unable to get out. He decided to open the window to call for
help but he went right through and fell down. He was hospitalized for serious multiple physical
injuries.

Therefore, a torts case under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed against the CLC.
CLC maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to
ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.

ISSUE:

WON the Petitioner is responsible for the Respondents injuries.

HELD:

YES.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence
of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the
inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the
door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies
where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with
the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

Hence, Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their
school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the
window, instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door. The injuries
respondent sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated from CLCs own negligence.
 G.R. No. 156109. November 18, 2004

REGINO VS. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (PCST)

FACTS:

Petitioner was a student at Respondent PCST. PCST held a fund raising campaign
dubbed the Rave Party and Dance Revolution and each student was required to pay for tickets.
The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with
additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to
take the final examinations. Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending
dance parties and celebrations, petitioner refused to pay for the tickets. As a consequence, she
was disallowed from taking the tests.

Therefore, petitioner filed a complaint for damages against PCST. Respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies, where
the case should have been initiated before the the Commission of Higher Education (CHED) first
then to the court.

ISSUES:

1. WON the respondent is liable to petitioner for violations of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the
Civil Code
2. WON the revenue-raising measure by the respondent was valid pursuant to the Rule on
Reciprocity of Student-School Contract

HELD:

1. YES.

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

 (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An
academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with
its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort.

2. NO.

The contractual relationship between the school and the student is not only semestral in
duration, but for the entire period the latter are expected to complete it. The school-student
relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all
contracts of such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school
undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the academic
requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations.

The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception --
upon enrolment of the student. Standards of academic performance and the code of behavior and
discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new students at the start of every school
year. Further, schools inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of payment.

In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the
middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students taking the
final examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee,
however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year.
Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.
 G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002

ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. WILLIAM CARPITANOS, ET.AL

FACTS:

Petitioner conducted an enrollment drive. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student, Respondents
son, Sherwin Carpitanos, was part of the campaigning group. They were riding in a Mitsubishi
jeep driven by his classmate in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.

Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, respondents filed a case.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos

HELD:

NO.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority
over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This
special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility
applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school
premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Likewise, Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor,
those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision,
instruction, or custody.

However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence
must have a causal connection to the accident. The proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim. The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of
the driver but the mechanical defect in the jeep according to the report and testimony of the
traffic investigator. Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor to
drive the jeep.
 Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of
the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner had
no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable
for the death resulting from such accident.
 G.R. No. 183572 April 13, 2010

MERCADO, ET. AL VS. AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE-PARAAQUE CITY, INC.

FACTS:

The petitioners are all former faculty members of Respondent (AMACC). They executed
individual Teachers Contracts for each of the trimesters that they were engaged to teach, with the
following common stipulation:

POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to accept a non-tenured appointment to work in

the College of xxx effective xxx to xxx or for the duration of the last term that the
TEACHER is given a teaching load based on the assignment duly approved by the
DEAN/SAVP-COO.

For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty screening guidelines
where teachers were to be hired or maintained based on extensive teaching experience,
capability, potential, high academic qualifications and research background. The performance
standards under the new screening guidelines were also used to determine the present faculty
members entitlement to salary increases.

The petitioners failed to obtain a passing rating based on the performance standards;
hence AMACC did not give them any salary increase. Because of AMACCs action, the
petitioners filed a complaint with the for underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and
overload compensation, 13th month pay, and for discriminatory practices.

The petitioners then individually received a memorandum from AMACC, informing

them that with the expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would no longer be
renewed for failure to pass the Performance Appraisal System for Teachers (PAST).

ISSUE:

WON the respondent is liable for illegal dismissal of the petitioners

HELD:

YES.

The use of employment for fixed periods during the teachers probationary period is an
accepted practice in the teaching profession. It is important that the contract of probationary
employment specify the period or term of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its precise
duration could lead to the inference that the contract is binding for the full three-year
probationary period.

Employment on probationary status affords management the chance to fully scrutinize

the true worth of hired personnel before the full force of the security of tenure guarantee of the
Constitution comes into play. Based on the standards set at the start of the probationary period,
management is given the widest opportunity during the probationary period to reject hirees who
fail to meet its own adopted but reasonable standards.

Labor, for its part, is given the protection during the probationary period of knowing the
company standards the new hires have to meet during the probationary period, and to be judged
on the basis of these standards, aside from the usual standards applicable to employees after they
achieve permanent status. Under the terms of the Labor Code, these standards should be made
known to the teachers on probationary status at the start of their probationary period, or at the
very least under the circumstances of the present case, at the start of the semester or the trimester
during which the probationary standards are to be applied.

The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a just cause when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be
considered a regular employee.

Under the given facts where the school year is divided into trimesters, the school
apparently utilizes its fixed-term contracts as a convenient arrangement dictated by the trimestral
system and not because the workplace parties really intended to limit the period of their
relationship to any fixed term and to finish this relationship at the end of that term. If we pierce
the veil, so to speak, of the parties so-called fixed-term employment contracts, what undeniably
comes out at the core is a fixed-term contract conveniently used by the school to define and
regulate its relations with its teachers during their probationary period.

Hence, it can be concluded that in a situation where the probationary status overlaps with
a fixed-term contract not specifically used for the fixed term it offers, Article 281 should assume
primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give way. This conclusion is
immeasurably strengthened by the petitioners and the AMACCs hardly concealed expectation
that the employment on probation could lead to permanent status, and that the contracts are
renewable unless the petitioners fail to pass the schools standards.

Here, the exact terms of the standards were never introduced as evidence; neither does
the evidence show how these standards were applied to the petitioners. Without these pieces of
evidence (effectively, the finding of just cause for the non-renewal of the petitioners contracts),
we have nothing to consider and pass upon as valid or invalid for each of the petitioners.
Inevitably, the non-renewal (or effectively, the termination of employment of employees on
probationary status) lacks the supporting finding of just cause that the law requires and, hence, is
illegal.
 G.R. Nos. 123562-65. November 25, 2004

GESITE, ET. AL VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioners are public school teachers of the E. de los Santos Elementary School in
Manila. They pressed for the immediate payment of their allowances, 13thmonth pay for arising
from the implementation of the Salary Standardization Law. When their demands were not
granted, the dissatisfied teachers resolved to take direct mass actions.

On a regular school day, about 800 teachers in Metro Manila did not conduct classes.
Instead, they assembled in front of the DECS offices to air their grievances. DECS Secretary
brushed aside their complaints, warning them they would lose their jobs for taking illegal mass
actions. He then ordered the teachers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours, otherwise
they will be dismissed from the service.

The action of the DECS Secretary caused more teachers to join the protest action. These
included the above-named four petitioners who did not report for work.

Hence, the DECS Secretary filed administrative complaints against them for defying his
return-to-work order. They were charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross
violation of the Civil Service Law and Regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence without
official leave.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners are liable for conduct prejudicial tlo the best interest of the service
when they only exercised their constitutional right to assemble peacebly to air their grievances

HELD:

YES.

It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners purpose was to
realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term strike
was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.

Actually, petitioners here were not charged administratively because they engaged in
strike. Administrative complaints were filed against them because they were absent from classes
in violation of his return-to-work order. Their unauthorized absences disrupted classes and
prejudiced the welfare of the school children. They absented themselves without proper
authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass
protest. Their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation
of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of
their free time recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one could have held them liable
for the valid exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action that will lead in the
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to
organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to
strike.

Here, petitioners, in joining the mass actions, failed to hold classes to the prejudice of
their students. While petitioners have the right to assemble peaceably to air their grievances,
however, they should have exercised such right in a lawful manner.
 G.R. No. 155831-40

DOMINGO VS. RAYALA

FACTS:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced superiority which is enough to dampen
an employees spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it
changes her life.
Petitioner, then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual
harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE). It is alleged that respondent took advantage of his position as the
superior of the complainant. Respondent occupies the highest position in the NLRC, being its
Chairman.
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that petitioner has failed to allege and establish
any sexual favor, demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment
or for her promotion. Hence, the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents act constitute sexual harassment
HELD:
YES.
Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the following forms: a) Overt sexual
advances; b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection; c) Request or demand for sexual
favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for the same purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is
generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof
defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager,
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement
for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.
But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in
a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of
the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck
and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for
school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable
sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for
a sexual favor.
It is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for
continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondents
acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.
Moreover, Respondent holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank
equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be
demanded of him.
Therefore, the actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one
of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive
judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and
lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees,
respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.