ENRILE vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST AND COMMENTS

G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin

Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in

Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.

FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported
involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for
Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary
surrender.
 Senator Enrile
(Source: wikifilipinas.org)

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix

Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that:
(a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt
was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus
allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and
physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless
the crime charged is punishable byreclusion perpetua where the
evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner
would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is

strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight

risk.

HELD:
1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of

innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused

at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than
what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution
and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal

offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with

reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his
guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong.Where evidence of guilt is not
strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the
court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an

offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the
same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded

sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or

conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in
either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life

imprisonment, or reclusion perpetuasubject to judicial discretion.
In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is
indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily
determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs.

Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the

prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application

for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.

2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the
international community arising from its commitment to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. Quoting fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the
SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article
II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on
the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of

discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced
age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail.It acted whimsically and
capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

G.R. Nos. 183152-54, January 21, 2015

REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO G.

HABALO, Petitioners, v.SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO MANGUERA, Respondents.

Facts:

In a Decision dated 17 April 2007, the Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, and Habalo guilty
of homicide. During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayans judgment on 17 April 2007, none of the
accused appeared despite notice.38 The court promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment
was entered in the criminal docket. The bail bonds of the accused were cancelled, and warrants for their
arrest issued.

Issues:

1. WON Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court cannot diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights like the filing of a motion for reconsideration provided under Presidential
Decree No. (P.D.) 1606.44
2. WON The conditions under Section 6 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court do not obtain in the instant
case.

Ruling:
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused
may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice. (6a) (Emphasis supplied)

The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused despite notice. The
promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a
copy thereof to the accused at their last known address or through counsel. The court shall also order the
arrest of the accused if the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable
cause.45chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall
lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
accused to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their
possible remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or
reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule
122).46chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they
are considered to have lost their standing in court.47 Without any standing in court, the accused cannot
invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief.48chanRoble

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to
avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on
the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail
themselves of the remedies against the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. 57 This provision
protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases delay arising from the simple
expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.

For the failure of petitioners to regain their standing in court and avail themselves of the remedies against
the judgment of conviction, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan attained finality 15 days reckoned from 17
April 2007.

In view thereof, this Court no longer has the power to conduct a review of the findings and conclusions in
the Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The Decision is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment, or
reversal.63 Thus, there is no need to pass upon the issues raised by petitioners assailing it.chanrobleslaw
Gamboa vs Chan
July 14,2012

Facts:

Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zearosa Commission
which was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups in the country in view of
eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of its investigation, the
Commission submitted a confidential report to the office of the President.

Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine
National Police Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides and classified
her as PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the Reports
enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs.

Gamboas association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of media,
publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed a
petition before the RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the unverified reports from
the PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless reports against her. The RTC ruled that
the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to privacy. However, the RTC dismissed
Gamboas petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source of the
information.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP to the
Commission was an unlawful act that violated petitioners right to privacy
2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper

HELD:

Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is

NOT an intrusion of petitioners right to privacy

It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to investigate the
existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state
interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions accorded to the Commission and the
PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.

This court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the
report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however,
the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Commission was not unlawful act that violated or
threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward
and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating
the existence of these notorious group. Moreover, the Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize
the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance
from the latter.
Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT PROPER

In this case, Chan and Fang admitted the existence of report, but