A Defence of (Deliberative) Democracy in

the Anthropocene
Simon Niemeyer
Australian National University
ABSTRACT. Environmentally focussed scepticism of democracy is often founded
on distrust in the public to choose outcomes consistent with green imperatives.
The spectre of the Anthropocene, with large scale and complex environmental
impacts, increases the stakes. It not only renders the task of governance more
difficult in a technical sense, relating to the ability to deliver outcomes; it also
renders more problematic the task of mobilising citizen support for appropriate
action that serves their best long-term interests. The call to suspend certain
democratic processes to deal with the environmental crisis is intuitively appeal-
ing, but doomed to failure. While eco-authoritarianism is a blunt instrument
that assumes too much on the part of eco-elites, liberal paternalism is sophis-
ticated and empirically robust, yet assumes too little on the part of citizens as
well as being parasitic on the same kind of manipulatory political processes that
have contributed to poor environmental outcomes in the first place. If the
response to the Anthropocene is to reflect the nature of the challenge, then I
argue that governance should involve the active support of citizens who are
attuned to both the urgency and complexity of the task. Such an environmen-
tal citizen is possible when we take into account the democratic context in
which judgements are made and deliberative capacities formed. But this can
only be achieved if democracies develop as a whole in a more deliberative
direction. In the short term, where environmental concern is easily crowded-
out in political debate, deliberation helps to make salient less tangible and
complex dimensions associated with the issue. Over the longer term, the effect
is to transform the polity as a whole, improving deliberative capacity. The pos-
sibilities for achieving these benefits of deliberation in practice, such as enhanc-
ing existing deliberative systems, are considered.

KEYWORDS. Deliberative democracy, environmental governance, democratic

systems

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 21, no. 1(2014): 15-45.

2014 by Centre for Ethics, KU Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.21.1.3017285

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I. INTRODUCTION

T he activities of humans have now reached a scale relative to the size

of earths available resources that the term Anthropocene has been
coined to describe the transition into a new geological epoch in which
human activities have global consequences (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000).
The phenomenon is usually associated with climate change, although it
covers all human activities that impact on features of natural systems,
some of which such as biodiversity are also reaching a critical juncture
(Zalasiewicz et al. 2008). In geological terms, it implies that the human era
is one that will leave a distinctive lithographic trace. Whether or not we
are technically entering such an era is open to debate, particularly from a
geological perspective (e.g. Crutzen 2002). However, while recognising
this debate, the term Anthropocene is a very useful device for communi-
cating both the scale of human activities and their implications for the
earth systems that make them possible. The term is not supposed to
invoke a sense of triumphalism, celebrating the arrival of humans as mas-
ters of their own global commons. Quite the opposite: it is intended to
highlight the scale of the challenges that humans now face (e.g. Crutzen
2002). And those who invoke the term tend to emphasise just how poorly
prepared we are to deal with the consequences.
These challenges overturn the idea that human and environmental
systems can be thought about independently. In the case of climate
change, the challenge involves not only attempting to mitigate the rate of
change, it also involves responding and adapting to its impacts. Whatever
the solution either via technology or reorganising social relationships in
order to live within real or implied limits it will always require deep
political commitment to support definitive action (Karlsson 2013). That
is certainly the case when it comes to democracies, which are supposed
to govern via the consent of citizens, at least in theory. And here is the
catch. Global environmental challenges such as climate change have
emerged during an era in which liberal democratic values are supposed

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 SIMON NIEMEYER A DEFENCE OF ( DELIBERATIVE ) DEMOCRACY

to have triumphed over the alternatives famously and controversially

expressed as the end of history (Fukuyama 1992). The failure to antic-
ipate and address the anthropocenic challenge is, then, viewed as a failure
of democracy.
But is democracy the cause? And are democracies really incapable of
adequately anticipating and responding to the challenge? Although it is
true enough that complex modern democracies have produced a weaker
response to environmental pressures than might be expected, the causes
are complex (Burnell 2012) and the solution does not necessarily lie in
simply abandoning or constraining democratic principles. Specific democ-
racies may have failed to realise and address global environmental chal-
lenges such as climate change, but it may reflect particular features of
democratic systems that are not thoroughly democratic rather than the
idea of democracy per se.
Moreover, if democracy is the problem, it is also the solution; or is
the least-worst form of solution from among a range of alternatives, each
involving their own significant weaknesses. In particular, I advocate delib-
erative democracy as a vehicle for taking seriously the way in which citi-
zens form their views and determine collective outcomes. At the heart of
the argument is a more optimistic model of the (environmental) citizen,
at least in deliberative contexts.
When considering the challenge of environmental governance, the
common refrain within eco-political theory has tended to involve a call
for some kind of change in political values which has historically
meant a call for a different kind of environmental ethic, often emphasis-
ing eco-centrism (Hayward 1997). Here I argue that appropriate environ-
mental values already exist, at least to some degree in a latent form that
is crowded-out in contemporary polity. Democracy can meet the chal-
lenge posed by the Anthropocene under the right circumstances. The
solution to the problem is not to give in to an authoritarian impulse and
bypass public debate altogether, but to democratise public discourse along
deliberative democratic lines. There are certainly challenges in doing so,

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but possibilities emerge when we understand the nature of the delibera-

tive citizen and how their positions are formed via authentic deliberation.
The present contribution begins by outlining the nature of the chal-
lenge of governing in the face of the Anthropocene, which involves large-
scale, complex and cross-boundary environmental issues such as climate
change. It then assesses two different types of response (eco-authoritari-
anism, liberal paternalism) that are discussed in the literature that involves
constraining more idealised forms of democracy. The article then moves
on to advocate a move in the opposite direction in favour of deepening
the democratic process along deliberative lines. After considering the
theoretical arguments for deliberation and empirical evidence I then con-
sider the possibilities for achieving deliberative democracy in the real
world of the Anthropocene.

II. THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNING IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

Contemporary anthropogenic impacts on the biosphere such as climate

change threaten the environmental functions that underpin many human
activities. And according to scientific consensus they are set to proceed
at an increasingly dramatic rate. These events pose serious challenges to
any system of governance for the climate challenged society (Dryzek et al.
2013). According to some, the most pressing and immediate issue involves
basic problem recognition (Biermann 2007, 328), but even here there
appears to be a level of systemic failure. In some constituencies, support
for taking action on climate change, among other environmental issues,
is softening even as the problem is increasing in urgency (Hansen 2010;
Coorey 2010; GlobeScan Radar 2013).
Here we run into the classic tension in green political theory: environ-
mentalists support substantive outcomes, but democrats support legit-
imate political procedures that cannot guarantee those outcomes (Goodin
1992). If citizens decide that issues such as climate change are not impor-
tant, then there is no democratic case for action, even if there is a strong

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moral argument.1 The public might reject action for a number of rea-
sons, including optimism that it will be possible to deal with the conse-
quences in the future. Recently this kind of problem has been described
as a kind of confidence trap: democracies are very good at dealing with
crises, but almost incapable of avoiding them (Runciman 2013). The
kind of optimism this breeds contributes to trapping democracy on the
path of disaster.
The spectre of the Anthropocene increases the challenge of gover-
nance considerably, impacting not only on future generations, but also
across national boundaries. Recognising the real nature of this challenge
is enormous, particularly where the scale and complexity of human
induced perturbations to global environmental systems exceed not only
the knowledge and comprehension of any given individual, but also the
boundaries of knowledge systems as well as the capabilities of individual
nation states. And even if the problem is recognised and there is a deter-
mination for action, there is a question of what course of action should
be taken, which will also require support. The need for large scale mobil-
isation is irrespective of whether one places faith in the prospect of
technological solutions or not, which will, in turn, require the invest-
ments in future outcomes that democracies have thus far failed to achieve
(Karlsson 2013).
Failure to mobilise to address anthropocenic challenges such as cli-
mate change may also undermine the prospect of public mobilisation.
It is possible that intensifying climate change might cause citizens to lose
faith and withdraw even further from collective action aimed at address-
ing the consequences (Niemeyer et al. 2005; Hobson and Niemeyer 2011).
In the face of these challenges, some scholars look for solutions that
circumvent perceived democratic weaknesses. The cause for pessimism
often revolves around the longstanding scepticism about the capacities of
citizens to choose the right course of collective action (e.g. Somin 1998;
Schumpeter 1943 [1976]). The question here, from a democratic point of
view, concerns whether there are any circumstances under which ordinary

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citizens might recognise the moral imperative to address the challenges

inherent in the Anthropocene and articulate support for the kind of col-
lective action that is required. It invokes the age-old question about
whether citizens have the right stuff when it comes to identifying and
realising their (and, in this case, future generations) interests as part of
the democratic process (Tetlock 1998). Those who are not optimistic
about this prospect tend to seek alternative approaches to the democratic
ideal.

Constraining Democracy: The Eco-authoritarian Impulse

There have been a number of prescriptions to the challenge of governing

in the Anthropocene, many of which involve modifying political institu-
tions in ways that bypass the tension between substantive outcome and
democratic process (Goodin 1992). In many ways, this re-emergence of
eco-authoritarianism resonates with the Neo-Malthusian debates that
began in the 1970s (e.g. Ophuls 1973) as growing environmentalism raised
the question about how we could best govern the environmental com-
mons. The contemporary debate differs in that it now models itself on
the example of China, rather than the central state planning of the Soviet
Union; and there is a much greater level of sympathy with the ideal of
democracy (Shahar forthcoming).
Those who would constrain the democratic process are not necessarily
advocating wholesale authoritarianism. But they do advocate intervention-
ist instruments to improve environmental outcomes that are undermined
by the operation of individual democratic rights (Shahar forthcoming).
Giddens (2009), for example, suggests suspending certain types of demo-
cratic process and firewalling decision making specific to climate change.
Others, such as Shearman and Smith (2007), would go further than merely
constraining certain democratic functions and place decision-making in
respect to climate entirely at the hands of enlightened scientists, or eco-
elites.2 Beeson (2010) takes a more prognostic than prescriptive view,

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asserting that the impacts of climate change are likely to contribute to a

movement away from democracy and toward authoritarianism, which is
better placed to achieve environmental outcomes. He cites examples within
Southeast Asia, and China in particular, which are associated with authori-
tarian forms of governance that permit more decisive action and in Chinas
case has been successful in achieving developmental goals.
However appealing, authoritarianism provides a poor foundation for
motivating and coordinating collective action in order to meet ecological
imperatives (Shahar forthcoming). Authoritarian approaches cannot deal
with the complexity of feedbacks that are associated with the Anthro-
pocene (Dryzek 1987).3 But even leaving these technical problems aside,
the most significant problem with eco-authoritarianism is similar to that
of eco-authoritarians distrust of citizens: there is simply no guarantee that
elites will continue to act in the interests of good environmental out-
comes in the long term. The record of authoritarianism is not strong, and
where there have been recent examples identified as environmental suc-
cess, such as Chinas move to curtail greenhouse emissions growth, the
underlying reasons tend to be in the economic interests of the state,
which happen to fortuitously align with the environment (Shahar forth-
coming).
Shearman and Smith (2007) are aware of these problems, but remain
optimistic that an eco-elite can be trained to pursue environmental objec-
tives. In the long run, however, political elites are actually unlikely to
support environmental causes on their own terms, not least because the
logic of the state is skewed toward the functions of accumulation, even
before we take into account the effect of lobbying by well-resourced
interests. There is simply no assurance that elites in an eco-authoritarian
state would continue to act in ways that would meet the challenges posed
by the Anthropocene (Gilley 2012).
Moreover, authoritarianism does not appear to work on its own
terms. The argument that Asia is inclined toward authoritarianism is more
nuanced upon closer inspection. China, for example, might be arguably

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authoritarian at the national level (Gilley 2012), but when we move to

regional and local governance the picture is indeed more nuanced. Local
elections are increasingly occurring at village level, along with experimen-
tation with deliberative methods such as deliberative polls (Leib and He
2006; He and Warren 2011). He and Warren (2011) argue that even at
the national level there is an increasing recognition of the limits of author-
itarianism in governing complex social systems. The result is a transition
toward authoritarian deliberation, which potentially marks a turning
point toward greater democracy albeit in a different form that would
be recognised by liberal democrats.
These examples of a democratic fabric on an authoritarian super-
structure illustrate what Shahar (forthcoming) argues is the chimeric
nature of eco-authoritarianism. The administrative effectiveness of the
state requires that it must, on some level, be responsive to its citizens.
Citizens might not be enfranchised to vote, but the forces of legitimacy
are still present, albeit in a different form. The idea that in practice the
state can dictate environmental outcomes beyond the express will of its
citizens is both theoretically and historically problematic.

Liberal Paternalism and Nudge Theory

One possibility for explicitly maintaining a democratic superstructure

while improving the prospect for environmental outcomes is to find ways
to encourage citizens to behave more ecologically. Liberal paternalism in
the form of nudge theory (John et al. 2009; Hansen and Jespersen 2013)
is a different kind of top-down mechanism for producing collective out-
comes that dovetails more neatly with liberal democratic ideals. Inspired
by insights from behavioural economics, nudging involves setting up con-
ditions that lead to behavioural changes by citizens in ways that are pre-
sumed to produce outcomes that the citizens themselves would want, but
for muddled thinking in everyday contexts (John et al. 2009; Hansen and
Jespersen 2013).

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In short, nudge works by altering the choice architecture to encour-

age citizens to behave in ways that improve collective outcomes or
individual decisions (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Coming as it does from
the field of behavioural economics, the idea of nudge is consistent with
the assumption from economics that individual preferences are fixed,
or at least the mechanisms whereby individuals arrive at their decisions
(John et al. 2009). What is then needed is a corrective mechanism to make
the right decisions.
In practice there are many different forms of nudge, and it can
sometimes be hard to pin down the precise boundaries of the approach.
Some nudges directly steer individuals toward certain specific kinds of
behaviour, such as changing an opt in scheme to an opt out to increase
participation the use of green energy, for example. Others encourage
them to think about a common issue in different ways, such as associat-
ing nature conservation with more charismatic forms of wildlife such
as pandas (Akerlof and Kennedy 2013).
Some forms of nudge are more consistent with democratic ideals
and citizen autonomy than others (John et al. 2009, 366). However, the
idea is still deeply problematic to the extent that it is divorced from
deeper forms of democratic principle. To begin with, the use of nudge
theory begs the question regarding who makes the decision with respect
to who is nudged, when and how. Nudge may indeed work when it comes
to improving environmental behaviour, but it still requires an arbiter for
what constitutes the right decision. According to John et al. (2009), in
the case of nudge it is the state that is the expert and teacher on the
part of citizens. This then returns us to the problem associated with the
eco-authoritarian impulse because the approach would presumably only
be effective to the extent that there is some form of eco-elite devising
nudges to push citizens in the right direction.
Moreover, such a prescription does not take into account the fact that
citizens are already constantly nudged. Although the science behind nudge
has emerged relatively recently, the practice of nudging the population

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using various mechanisms is very old. This is achieved via a number of

mechanisms, not least by the use of emotive and symbolic arguments to
induce an emotional response and manipulate political choices (Blatter
2009; Niemeyer 2004). Strategies consistent with nudge have been used
for some time to influence public policy, usually to the benefit of a com-
mercial entity. For example, the strategies used by merchants of doubt
to discredit the science demonstrating the health effects of smoking have
been adopted in the case of climate change to good effect (Oreskes and
Conway 2010).
Advocates of nudge theory appear to presume that those who believe
themselves to be arbiters of what the public really wants can out-nudge
those who are not driven by such civic-mindedness. This, it seems, is a
very heroic assumption, particularly given the resources that can be
mobilised by particular interests who are negatively impacted by any move
to address an issue like climate change.

III. DEMOCRACY AND THE ANTHROPOCENE

Despite the concerns of eco-authoritarians, in theory, a democracy is sup-

posed to produce better environmental outcomes than its alternatives it
also tentatively appears to be the case in practice (Ward 2008). Burnell
(2012) argues that democracy has the advantage of being capable of being
inclusive of a wide range of values in the decision making process that
also lend themselves to improving environmental values. In addition,
democracies are supposed to be more responsive, with built-in account-
ability and sensitivity to legitimacy, ensuring that the system responds to
environmental concern. But in practice, democratic systems often fail to
adequately realize and translate demand for action on climate change into
working policy.
According to the critics of democracy the problem is that, in practice,
citizens as political agents fail to adequately synthesise information and
translate this into demand for accountability on complex issues such as

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climate change. The problem is not necessarily linked to lack of knowl-

edge, as is often assumed (Ungar 2000). It can owe its origins to a num-
ber of reasons, including that of motivation. Citizens simply fail to care
enough about the issue, taking the cognitively least demanding path in
decision-making (Winkielman and Berridge 2003). Or they can believe
what they want to, engaging in motivated reasoning to justify their initially
preferred outcome (Redlawsk 2002).
The classic remedy to the problem of environmental inaction has
been to prescribe improved environmental values along eco-centric lines
explicitly recognising the intrinsic value of nature or recognising the
importance of the environment for human needs (for a criticism see,
for example, Weale 1993). However, as Hobson (2013) points out, the
path to the environmental citizen is not so clear-cut. The values of eco-
centrism and anthropocentrism turn out to be at least partly contextual
and differentially expressed, in part with different kinds of environmental
issue.
The real problem, however, might not lie in the domain of values per
se. There is evidence that the public is not inherently anti-environment.
The situation is more aptly characterised as ambivalence than opposition.
The phenomenon is well captured by the idea of an environmental value-
action gap, where environmental concern does not translate directly into
behaviour change (e.g. Blake 1999; Gill et al. 1986). The main problem
is that environmental issues are relatively easily crowded-out in view of
non-salience and issue complexity. And climate change in particular
exhibits these features, rendering it easy to obfuscate and confuse the
issue. While some deep climate sceptics absolutely refuse to countenance
human induced climate change, many hold positions that open up spaces
for causing doubt rather than intractable opposition to action to address
the issue that may not reflect what they actually want when there is an
opportunity to thoroughly consider it (Hobson and Niemeyer 2013).
Thus, in not adequately addressing climate change, democracies may
be acting responsively to their constituents expressed preferences, but

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not necessarily their underlying will (Manin 1987). Or at least they are
responding in a very particular kind of way, since the prevailing democratic
process cultivates preferences that support short-term outcomes, or at
least fails to induce reflection on longer-term consequences. Giddens
(2009) recognises this phenomenon when he speaks of a paradox where
straightforward concern for the abstract idea of climate change translates
into inaction in the face of intangible, distant and invisible impacts. The
result is that when concrete actions to address climate change are pro-
posed as opposed to vague commitments the intangibility of climate
change competes directly with tangible impacts, such as the direct cost of
increased taxation.
Nudge theory also implicitly recognises the environmental ambiva-
lence of citizens, but only insofar as they remain ambivalent. It is not
possible to nudge individuals in directions that they clearly do not wish
to go. It is merely a way of realising outcomes that individuals would
wish for when they engage with their theoretically better selves which
is determined by elites. The historical lessons contained in the confi-
dence trap (Runciman 2013) suggest that once issues are fully recognised
(i.e. when there is a crisis that cannot be denied), democracies are very
good at resolving them. The problem with the Anthropocene is that a
crisis might come too late for action, or at least herald extraordinary
costs due to feedbacks built into the socio-environmental system.4 What
is needed are mechanisms for harnessing the capacity to deal with crisis
before it occurs a deeper form of problem recognition, particularly
among citizens.

IV. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Here I argue that the possibility for enhancing awareness of anthropocenic

challenges in a democratic context to the extent that it is demonstrably
undeniable is best served by seeking democratic reform consistent with
deliberative democracy. Emerging around 1990, deliberative democracy

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is unified by a central belief that democracy ought to involve more than

voting and decision making by elected representatives.
While there is considerable variation among deliberative scholars on
the specifics, deliberative capacity of a democratic polity can be captured
by the conditions deliberativeness, inclusiveness and consequentiality
(Dryzek 2009). A polity is deliberative insofar as the political debate involves
the exchange of reasons under conditions of fairness and equality among
citizens who are open to competing arguments and, where necessary,
accommodating alternative views. In this sense, deliberative democracy
takes seriously the idea that preferences are formed as part of the political
process (e.g. Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Dryzek 1990) in contrast
to nudge theory, which borrows from economic assumptions that prefer-
ences reflect fixed inner states (John et al. 2009). A polity is inclusive to the
extent that all those individuals who are affected by a decision have the
opportunity to deliberate and provide input into the decision making
process. And it is consequential to the extent that the deliberations of citi-
zens are reflected in the decision being made.
It is notable that the features of democracies that are supposed to be
beneficial to the environment (inclusiveness and responsiveness) cited ear-
lier (Burnell 2012) correspond closely to the features of a deliberative sys-
tem (inclusivity and consequentiality; Dryzek 2009). To these dimensions,
deliberative democracy adds deliberativeness to a democratic system.
For the argument here it is the deliberative dimension that holds the
key to realising the full potential to respond the environmental challenges.
This is because deliberation makes salient the environment, represented
by arguments or discourses (Goodin 1996; Dryzek 1995; Dryzek and
Niemeyer 2008). It also has the potential to attune citizens to environ-
mental complexities (Niemeyer 2004; Baber and Bartlett 2005; Smith
2003). Ideally, deliberation produces reflection by citizens approaching
the kind that Shearman and Smith (2007) prize in advocating rule by eco-
elites and avoids Giddens (2009) paradox, such that citizens come to
reflect on the issue with a view to the long-term.

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This effect of deliberation is different to the idea of nudge theory,

which involves the use of social marketing and behavioural economics to
nudge behaviour without inducing reflection (Rowson 2011). Delibera-
tion, on the other hand, involves a far more conscious process, which
results in deeper and more enduring solutions (Smith 2001; Fung 2003;
Chambers 2003). It is thus not only more democratic, it is also much
more effective than the alternatives, at least to the extent that ideal delib-
erative outcomes are possible.
The evidence to date on the possibilities for deliberation is cause for
qualified optimism, mainly drawn from examples of group deliberation in
the form of mini-publics, which have also been extensively conducted
on environmental issues (see, for example, Gunderson 1995; Ojala and
Lidskog 2011; Pretty 1995; Niemeyer 2004). Mini-publics are the most
practical expression of deliberative democracy (e.g. Goodin and Niemeyer
2003; Niemeyer 2004, 2011a; Setl et al. 2010), which typically involve
the random selection of citizens to participate in a forum that is (ideally)
held over multiple days where discussion is facilitated to achieve the ideals
of deliberation and information is provided, usually in the form of expert
presentation.
Results thus far suggest that citizen preferences become more sensi-
tive to the environment when they engage in deliberation, and in the case
of climate change, demand stronger global action (Besdted and Klver
2009). However, even if we accept whether preference change should be
the gold standard for measuring deliberative success which is question-
able (Niemeyer 2011a; Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007) environmental con-
cern alone is not sufficient to deal with the complexities and uncertainties
associated with the Anthropocene. Citizens need to be able to evaluate
proposals on their own terms, rather than engage in symbolic expression
of environmental concern.
In short, the Anthropocene requires the kind of cognitive processes
that is captured by the idea of enlarged thinking (Arendt 1961) writ large.
Fortunately, there is also evidence to suggest that following deliberation

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citizens often (though not always) exhibit increased awareness of multiple

value positions (Smith 2003) and can engage in integrated inter-subjective
reasoning on complex subjects, dealing with diversity in positions while
finding a way to move forward (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006).
Hobson and Niemeyer (2011) demonstrate this ability in relation to
climate change adaptation as part of a deliberative experiment comparing
public responses to climate change under business as usual and delib-
erative settings. While exposure to information about climate change
invoked a strong response, they find that these tended to involve a short-
term reflex rather than any deep or lasting consideration of the issue.
By contrast, engaging in deliberation led to a transformation in the way
in which the issue was conceptualised. There was greater appreciation
for the nuance and complexity surrounding climate change, as well as
greater appreciation for different positions. Following deliberation, not
only was there a greater willingness to cooperate, there was also a greater
level of acceptance of individual and community responsibility for mitiga-
tion and adaptation to climate change (Hobson and Niemeyer 2011).
While these results are promising, they are not yet conclusive. The
evidence is mixed when it comes to specific benefits ascribed to delibera-
tion, such as political efficacy (Morrell 2005). There is also scepticism
regarding whether meaningful deliberation on a widespread scale is pos-
sible in practice (Rosenberg 2005), with evidence to suggest that thorough-
going deliberation including ordinary citizens is relatively rare (Rosen-
berg 2007; Mendelberg 2002). However, this is not to say that citizens
are simply incapable of behaving deliberatively engaging with alternative
arguments with an open mind (e.g. Offe 1997; Offe and Preuss 1991).
It appears that the settings in which political discussion is conducted and
the norms operating within the group play an important role in shaping
the behaviour of interlocutors, and in turn their ability to deal with com-
plex issues (Batalha et al. 2012; Niemeyer et al. 2013).
Moreover, when researchers produce findings that speak against the
possibility of deliberation, the results are often obtained in settings that

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are not actually designed to be deliberative, in some cases stretching the

concept considerably (Steiner 2008). The same also appears to apply to
citizens willingness to participate in political deliberation (Curato and
Niemeyer 2013). In short, there is often a good deal of confusion about
what deliberation looks like and how it should be measured (Steiner
2008). To resolve this there is a need for empirical deliberative research
to inform theory and vice versa (Thompson 2008).
Thus, although overall there is promise in the evidence collected
to date, there is still a good deal of work to be done in understanding
what really happens during deliberation, what constitutes authentic
deliberation and when it actually occurs (Bchtiger et al. 2010). In light
of this, deliberative democrats need to proceed with caution, under-
standing the considerable potential in deliberation for improving global
environmental governance, while also being realistic about the limita-
tions in the state of the field (Arias-Maldonado 2007). They also need
to be aware of how deliberation works in the real world (Parkinson
2006) and be aware of the perverse consequences that this can herald
when deliberative methods are embraced, particularly where there are
high stakes (Boswell et al. 2013).

The Deliberative Democratic Person as an Environmental Citizen

Understanding the feasibility of deliberative democracy brings us back

to the key question about the capabilities of citizens from the perspective
of deliberative theory. In other words, we need to understand the delib-
erative citizen and what happens during the deliberative moment.
It turns out that the theories that underlie nudge can also explain
deliberatively induced changes, but with a different conclusion. Authen-
tic and intensive forms of deliberation appear to improve the ability of
citizens to better deal with complex issues such as climate change. This
occurs because deliberative settings not only provide the environment
in which information can be acquired, they also provide the incentive

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 SIMON NIEMEYER A DEFENCE OF ( DELIBERATIVE ) DEMOCRACY

structure to engage with that information (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003).

The result is a shift from the primitive citizen, or, less uncharitably,
a cognitive miser, who is prone to drawing conclusions based on
intuitive modes of thinking (referred to as system I or peripheral
processing) toward deeper forms of cognition (system II or cognitive
processing).5
Here marks the important difference between deliberative democracy
and nudge theory. Deliberation ideally involves a shift from system I
to system II thinking, working through various perspectives and dealing
with the value pluralities that compete in relation to environmental issues
(Smith 2003). Nudge, on the other hand, seeks to continue to work with
system I, working with the grain of inherent flaws in everyday human
cognition and steering them in a more desirable direction (Thaler and
Sunstein 2008; John et al. 2009, 363).6
The level of cognition displayed by citizens in deliberative contexts
might not quite achieve the same standard sought by Shearman and
Smith (2007), but it is clearly possible to raise the bar in their assess-
ment of complex issues such as climate change. Deliberation does not
fundamentally change the citizen; they still have roughly the same set of
capabilities after as before (Barabas 2004). The value set of citizens is
also roughly the same, although certain values, such as concern for the
environment, have become activated as part of the process.7 What the
deliberative context appears to do is engender a set of capabilities that
are incipient, but not commonly exercised in everyday politics.
Moreover, in contrast to the alternatives discussed here, deliberation
not only has the capacity to bring to bear citizens capabilities that improve
outcomes in specific instances, it also has the potential to improve the
capacity among citizens to continue to improve the way in which they
continue to process political information. Nudge, for example, assumes
that citizens have more or less fixed preferences and will always and
inevitably remain plagued by biases and heuristics in their choices. The
experiments in deliberative democracy outlined above demonstrate that

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 ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES MARCH 2014

this need not always be the case. And the effects are not only short-
term. Participants in deliberation experience longer-term improvements
in political efficacy and civic mindedness (Hall et al. 2011; Doheny and
ONeill 2010; Gastil et al. 2008).
Thus, it is just possible that a polity that is more deliberative not
only responds to environmental challenges more constructively, in ways
that reflect the inner desires of its citizens; it may also be able to recreate
the conditions required for proper democratic functioning. In other
words, deliberation may in turn improve the capacity for deliberative
capacity (Dryzek 2009), particularly when it comes to deliberativeness at
the level of the citizen. Authoritarian and paternalistic approaches will not
develop this capacity, perhaps even undermining the very conditions in
which citizens as passive subjects can constructively respond to complex
anthropocenic challenges, relying ever more on a fortuitously enlightened
governing elite.

V. THE PROSPECT OF DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE

So much for theory, and the observation of deliberation in small-scale

and highly structured settings: real world politics, of course, poses a much
more complex and problematic test for deliberative ideals (Shapiro 1999).
Deliberative democracy is beset by a number of practical problems.
There is still a good deal of work to be done by deliberative democrats
to articulate how deliberation can be achieved beyond specialised mini-
publics (Niemeyer 2014 [forthcoming]) and how public deliberation can
best be articulated with liberal democratic institutions to arrive at timely
decisions (Smith 2003). And even if these questions can be addressed,
it will take time to develop the capacity for democratic systems to develop
the deliberative capacity to deal with complex and diffuse anthropocenic
issues.
If deliberative democracy is to provide real and practical solutions
to problems of governance related to climate change, it is necessary to

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 SIMON NIEMEYER A DEFENCE OF ( DELIBERATIVE ) DEMOCRACY

ascertain if and how it might be possible to coax polities in a more delib-

erative direction. It is simply not possible to simulate the workings of a
deliberative mini-public in ways that involve everyone affected by a deci-
sion deliberating together. For Goodin (2000), the solution is to encour-
age greater internal reflection within a deliberative system by individuals.
But this is not straightforward. As previously mentioned, exposure to the
information about climate change alone (e.g. via scenarios) certainly fails
to induce deep reflection (Hobson and Niemeyer 2011). It may be that
deliberation properly takes place in groups for a reason we are simply
hard-wired to deliberate via discussion (Mercier and Landemore 2012).
Deliberation by individuals is indeed possible (via internal discus-
sion); even desirable. But it is harder to achieve. And it may not be rea-
sonable to expect citizens to devote the cognitive resources to deliberate
deeply on every political issue they encounter. Even the most diligent
citizen cannot exhaustively consider every facet of every issue (Taylor
1981). As Offe (1997) points out, there is an opportunity cost for the
effort applied. Moreover, there is a strong question mark concerning how
easy it is to achieve deliberative modes of behaviour in anything but very
specific settings (Rosenberg 2007).
However, improving environmental outcomes may not require
achieving ideal deliberation in all sites in the public sphere, as much as
developing the capacity to avoid the distortion of public opinion by
entrenched interests who seek to nudge citizens in directions that suit
particular ends (Niemeyer 2011a). Achieving this likely involves the steady
building of deliberative capacity and development of deliberative cultures
(Rosenberg 2007; Griffin 2011), so that citizens can develop reflective
capacities and improve their resistance to political manipulation using
methods such as symbolic politics (Edelman 1985) and issue framing
(Slothuus and de Vreese 2010).
In contrast to the short time scales associated with mini-publics, the
process of developing deliberative capacity on a wider scale requires a
long-term view, involving a moral learning process (Doheny and ONeill

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 ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES MARCH 2014

2010).8 Rosenberg (2007) argues that any such long-term strategy would
necessarily involve the use of exemplary forms of deliberation to provide
a vehicle for learning how to deliberate. The most obvious deliberative
institution in western democracies is that of parliament (Steiner et al. 2004),
but there is a question about just how deliberative these institutions are
in contemporary practice.
Where parliament fails, another possible exemplar for public delibera-
tion could be that of the mini-public (Rosenberg 2007). From a transfor-
mative perspective, it could be possible to scale up specific transformative
features of mini-publics to the polity as a whole. This can involve mini-
publics acting in a number of capacities. They can act as information
regulators. This is something that the mass media is supposed to do, by
checking different sides of the argument, synthesising and providing the
results of the analysis for public consideration, as well as exposing argu-
ments that are deceptive, against the public interest or downright untrue
at task in which it increasingly fails (Page 1996). Mini-public participants
could act to filter and synthesise the issues into a series of arguments that
are communicative (as opposed to strategic), and reflective of community
norms (Niemeyer 2014 [forthcoming]). In other words, mini-publics can
act as a trusted arbiter of public reason where mini-public deliberators
are trusted because they are people like us, rather than products of polit-
ical party machinery or journalists responding to the logic of mass media
or the directives of activist editors (MacKenzie and Warren 2012).
Beyond the use of mini-publics for scaling up deliberation, there
are potentially many ways that democratic decision making could be
democratised along deliberative lines. Smith (2003) considers a number
of options in addition to mini-publics, including mediation and stake-
holder engagement and referendums. Baber and Bartlett (2005) consider
a number of existing legal and administrative instruments such as envi-
ronmental impact assessment for their contribution to deliberativeness.
I do not have the space here to suggest options for institutional reform
extensively. In any case it is a question that remains to be thoroughly

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 SIMON NIEMEYER A DEFENCE OF ( DELIBERATIVE ) DEMOCRACY

resolved. Where assessments have been conducted on specific institu-

tional reforms, none of these real world innovations constitute delibera-
tive capacity building in a complete sense (e.g. Smith 2003).
However, the latest turn in deliberative democracy in the form
of deliberative systems offers tantalizingly promising possibilities for
enhancing the deliberativeness of political systems. From a deliberative
systems perspective, it may not be necessary to think of deliberative
democracy in terms of single settings, institutions or innovations, but
as a whole involving specific sites that work together (Parkinson and
Mansbridge 2012).
Many of the sites that have been assessed as part of systems thinking
are more commonly associated with liberal democratic than deliberative
systems although this is not particularly new, since deliberative dem-
ocrats tend to assume liberal democratic institutions at the same time
in which they critique them (Squires 2002). In other words, it is not
necessary to think of deliberative democracy as a wholesale rethinking
of democratic institutions, but a concerted assessment of features of
the democratic system that contribute to, or undermine deliberative
capacity with the judicial deployment of methods to nudge the
system as a whole in a deliberative direction rather than individual citizens
toward particular outcomes. A deliberative system can also work in tandem
with knowledge systems, such as those that coalesce around ques-
tions involving the Anthropocene, with improved sites for transferring
knowledge in both directions (Christiano 2012) and possibly, again, via
mini-publics, among other mechanisms.
The idea of deliberative systems is at the very early stage of advance-
ment, but it brings considerable opportunity. The concept of deliberative
systems can be used as a framework for understanding the sources and
generators of deliberative capacity and the relationship between them
and democratic institutions (Niemeyer 2014 [forthcoming]). And, like the
economics that ultimately informed nudge theory, it can be used to
develop research on the nature of the deliberative person, which builds a

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 ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES MARCH 2014

comprehensive picture of the deliberative capabilities of citizens within the

deliberative system as a whole (Niemeyer 2011b, 2014 [forthcoming]).9
However, doing so will take time, which might be problematic in terms
of governing in the face of the Anthropocene.

VI. ANTHROPOCENIC URGENCY AND DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE

The term Anthropocene connotes a time frame of human activities on

a geological scale, but those who identify its challenges also tend to
emphasise the need for quick and decisive action to forestall future
impacts in the light of positive environmental feedback (with strongly
negative consequences).
In light of the need for more development of green deliberative
theory, advocating more deliberative forms of governance in the Anthro-
pocene could seem at best ineffective and, at worst, a dangerous luxury.
However, if we are to take seriously the long-term challenge of living in
a global environmental system involving complex feedback and connec-
tions with economic and socio-political systems, then there is a strong
case for finding mechanisms that improve anticipation and response
within those systems along democratic lines to avoid the confidence trap
of democracy alluded to above (Runciman 2013).
In this contribution I have tended to focus on the public and their
capacity to understand the nature of the challenge posed by the Anthro-
pocene. This is based on the premise that citizens, irrespective of the
overarching system of governance, must support meaningful action.
Whether or not this understanding via deliberative mechanisms would
lead directly to behaviour change by citizens is a relatively open ques-
tion although there is promising evidence to support the possibility
of improved pro-environmental behaviours associated with deliberation
(e.g. Hobson 2003).
And although it seems that deliberation improves political choices
in an environmental sense, I would also stress that such support is not

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 SIMON NIEMEYER A DEFENCE OF ( DELIBERATIVE ) DEMOCRACY

unqualified, as good deliberation means that citizens consider compet-

ing values (Smith 2003). However, rather than being a weakness, this
is the strength of the approach. It involves a more measured approach
to public issues and adopting a wider view. And the understanding that
is developed may not (and perhaps should not) lead to consensus per
se, it does produce a situation where mutual understanding renders
political issues more tractable (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006; Gutmann
and Thompson 1996).
A deliberative polity might even endorse strategies that borrow
from nudge theory to facilitate behavioural change. Thus citizens can
consent to the use of nudge in ways that may actually improve its efficacy
perhaps where endorsement improves buy-in, although this is some-
thing that would require empirical clarification. At the very least, the
public debate regarding the use of nudge will make salient the reasons for
implementing such strategies.
Building deliberative capacity in democratic systems, including among
citizens, will take time, but it is also possible to incrementally improve
the deliberativeness of existing institutions, capture the opportunities
provided by specifically deliberative innovations such as mini-publics,
and identify those features of democratic systems that impede delibera-
tiveness. This is something that can begin immediately.

VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Deliberative democracy, which began as a normative theory, has the

potential to transform the public response to challenges posed by the
Anthropocene, which are large in scale, crossing political boundaries and
complex, involving multiple feedback mechanisms and often temporally
displaced.
The approach is not without its weaknesses, but it is the least-worst
among the alternatives, particularly from a longer-term point of view.
Although the evidence is mixed, many studies suggest that improving the

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 ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES MARCH 2014

deliberativeness of decision making in respect to challenges posed by

Anthropocene brings considerable potential benefits in producing citizens
that are responsive to the complexity of the task, inclusive of competing
considerations and attuned to the temporal dimension of environmental
challenges.
Certainly, achieving deliberation in real world politics is exceedingly
challenging, at least in prevailing political settings. But, arguably, it is not
impossible. Although there is more that needs to be done to understand
the nature of deliberation and the institutions that facilitate it, a delibera-
tive systems point of view opens up possibilities for incremental changes
that could help nudge the system as a whole in a deliberative direction.
Although deliberative democracy might be difficult to achieve perhaps
even elusive in any ideal sense there is potential for feedback within the
deliberative system where good examples of deliberation contribute to
further improvement in deliberative capacity.

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NOTES
1. Baber and Bartlett invoke Rawls original position to suggest that there may be an
argument for a normative pre-commitment to preserve that ability of future generations to enjoy
the same rights and privileges that we are afforded by environmental amenity in the present.

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Rawls himself cites the life sustaining properties of natural systems for future generations (inter
alia) as justification for environmental policies based on the original position (2007).
2. An idea that resonates with that of Ophuls, who advocates decision making by [] a
class of ecological mandarins who possess the esoteric knowledge needed to run it well (1977,
163) which goes too far for Giddens (2009) and which Ophuls no longer advocates (Ophuls
1992; see Shahar [forthcoming]).
3. Although the idea of the Anthropocene predates Dryzek (1987), his description of the
challenge of environmental governance (articulated via social choice mechanisms) resonates heav-
ily with the challenge of global environmental governance.
4. This includes environmental feedback as well as negative socio-political feedback of the
kind identified above where citizens behave less cooperatively once climate change exceeds a
particular threshold (Niemeyer et al. 2005).
5. For a discussion of type I versus type II systems of cognition, see Stanovich and West
(2000). For a discussion of the overlapping concept of cognitive and peripheral processing, see
Petty and Cacioppo (1986).
6. This is not to say that deliberation should avoid the use of type I systems of cognition
in all cases. However, it should certainly avoid invoking those systems in ways that confound what
would be considered the individuals own judgment and best interests as they themselves under-
stand it.
7. A similar mechanism can be found in Schwartz (1977).
8. For a similar argument from the perspective of neuroscience, see Rowson (2011).
9. I do not wish to suggest that the theories that underlie nudge theory and deliberative
democracy and the psychological foundations on which they are based are substitutes.
They can in fact be compliments that are activated in different, or even the same situation (see,
for example, Niemeyer 2014 [forthcoming]). The argument here is that deliberative democracy is
a necessary condition for governing in the Anthropocene, whereas nudge is a potentially useful
tool under the right (democratic) conditions.

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