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Pinlac
Pinlac
As specifically stated above, the said lands are not public lands in the sense in which those words are used in the 5. Dona Patrona Subdivision
Public Land Act Numbered Nine Hundred and twenty-six and cannot be acquired or leased under the provisions
thereof. In the case of Jacinto vs. Director of Lands (1926) 49 Phil. 853, the Supreme Court held that the so-called 6. Far Eastern University (43 has.)
friar lands, to which the government of the Philippines holds title, are not public lands but private or patrimonial
property of the government. 7. Luis Reyes (Psd-19419)
As held in Lorenzo vs. Nicolas, No. L-4085, 30 July 1952, 91 Phil. 686, from the provisions of sections 11, 12 and By virtue of subsequent changes in political boundaries, Piedad Estate is now within Quezon City. It is located on
16 of Act No. 1120, it is apparent that the pervading legislative intent is to sell the friar lands acquired by the both sides of Luzon Avenue and is bounded on the North by the Republic Avenue; on the East by private
government to actual settlers and occupants of the same.[6] residential subdivisions which includes the B.F. Homes (LRC) Psd-133236, the Villa Ligaya Subdivision (Psd-
65729), the Kapalaran Subdivision (Pcs-47850), the Kasiyahan Subdivision (LRC) Pcs-12091, Zuzuarregui
Claiming that their individual transfer certificates of title were derived from subsequent subdivisions and Property (Psd-34912) and the Doa Beartiz Subdivision under Psd-39351; on the South by the Don Mariano
transfers of the lots within the Piedad Estate, the defaulted registered owners invoked the Comments and Marcos Avenue; and on the South-West and West by the U.P. Sites Nos. 1 and 2.
Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee created by the then Ministry of Natural Resources, tasked to
investigate the historical background of the Piedad and Payatas Estates in Quezon City, containing evidence which COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATION
they would have substantiated had they been given their day in court. The Ad Hoc Committee reported, to wit:
There is no doubt that Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the mass of the public domain and have
FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS become private lands duly registered under the Torrens System following the procedure for the confirmation of
private lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the public
The Piedad Estate, situated in the Municipality of San Mateo and Caloocan during the time of registration in 1910, domain. Neither are these lands forest lands, in the classification of lands for forest purposes, the main criterion
covers an area of 3850.7226 hectares. The Registration of Title under Case No. 5975 was published in the January prescribed in Section 15 of P.D. 705, the Forestry Code, is its slope. Those beyond 18% are to be preserved for
21, 1910 issue of the Official Gazette. forest purposes while those below are to be released as not needed for forest purposes, hence, as alienable and
disposable. By its physical nature, location and historical use, the land in question can hardly be considered and
After the Piedad Estate was registered in Original Certificate of Title No. 614 in the name of the Government in classified as forest land. Physically, it is first, level and at most slightly rolling land. Location wise, it used to be
1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area was subdivided originally into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent within the periphery and now in the heart of a metropolis. While originally it was used for agricultural purposes, it
surveys executed in the course of disposition, the number of lots increased to 1,305. Disposition of these lots was has later become urban due to population pressure and rapid urbanization in the Metro Manila area. It is devoid of
made by the Bureau of Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and records show that even any timber land, more so if we talk of forest of commercial value. In fact, the Composite Land Classification
before the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed of. Owing perhaps to the scarcity Committee of the MNR composed of the Directors of BFD, BL, BFAR and BMGS, has already signed a land
of land applicants at the time, it will be observed that a number of applicants have acquired several lots totalling classification map and recommended for its release because it has absolutely no forest value.
On the basis of existing records of the Bureau of Lands and the area of the Piedad Estate as contained in the SO ORDERED.[9]
Technical Descriptions of the said Estate published in the January 21, 1910 issue of the Official Gazette, there is
no expansion or enlargement of the area, hence, it is recommended that existing titles within the area should be On November 15, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [10] granting the petition and annulling the
respected and their validity upheld. Partial Decision in Civil Case No. Q-35762 based on its finding that the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the
persons of respondents ---
xxxxxxxxx
x x x becomes all the more apparent when petitioners claim or asseverate that the assailed Partial Decision can not
In view of all the foregoing, the committee recommends that all existing titles validly issued within the area bind Vilar-Maloles (VILMA), the umbrella name, for the simple reason that said PARTNERSHIP was dissolved
be respected and their validity upheld.[7] (Emphasis supplied) on January 26, 1976, for it can no longer be sued as it had no more juridical personality.
Accordingly, the defaulted titled owners prayed that judgment be rendered: xxxxxxxxx
1. Declaring the aforesaid Partial Decision on defaulted private respondents as null and void; Furthermore, petitioners contend that the summons and the Partial Decision were published in a local newspaper
edited in Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan known as METROPOLITAN NEWSWEEK implying that said
2. Declaring all Residential Use Permits issued by the Director of Forest Management Bureau as null and void; summons and Partial Decision were not published in a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City as
required by PD 1079, Sec. 1 thereof. Petitioners not having been duly notified of the hearing/proceedings, the
Partial Decision being assailed is without significance to them or as far as petitioners are concerned said Partial
3. Declaring all Transfer of Certificates of Titles of the petitioners (respondents herein) emanating from OCT 614 Decision is null and void.[11]
and TCT 3548 (1713) as valid;
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated December 21, 1989. [12]
4. Ordering private respondents (petitioners herein), their agents or representatives and all other persons claiming
right under them to vacate the respective titled lands of the petitioners squatted by the former; Hence, the instant petition for certiorari which raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS QUESTIONED DECISION HAS
5. Ordering the dismissal of Hon. Judge Reynaldo Roura from the Regional Trial Court, Macabebe, Pampanga on VIOLATED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY IGNORING AND LEAVING
the grounds of gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law (Adm. Circular No. 4 of the Supreme Court, UNDECIDED ALL THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE ANSWER OF PETITIONERS IN CA-G.R.
dated January 27, 1988). NO. SP-17596.
6. Making the preliminary injunction as permanent; and II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A-QUO HAS ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
RESPONDENT VILMA MALOLES SUBDIVISION BY THE PUBLICATION OF THE
SUMMONS AND PETITION AS ORDERED BY THE COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-35672
7. Ordering the private respondents (petitioners herein) to pay jointly and solidarily to the petitioners the sum of AND SO THE PARTIAL DECISION (ANNEX B) WAS LEGAL, VALID AND PROPER.
P200,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, plus the sum of P5,000.00 per lot of the petitioners as attorneys
fee, aside from cost of suit, and for any other relief just and proper. [8] III. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PER THEIR PETITION BEFORE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION CONSIDERING
On June 23, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted respondents (petitioners therein) application for writ of THEY ADOPTED CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS OR THEORIES OF THE CASE, AND
preliminary injunction, ruling that: THAT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION (ANNEX G) IS VOID.[13]
We find no merit in the instant petition.
When this case was called for hearing on June 21, 1989 on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the parties and their respective counsel appeared and orally argued their respective stand on the The case before the Court of Appeals was one for annulment of judgment, certiorari, prohibition and
matter. It is admitted that the herein petitioners, indispensable parties in the case, were not individually served mandamus. In resolving the same, the Court of Appeals need not retry the facts. An action for annulment of
with summons. judgment is grounded only on two justifications: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process.[14] All that herein private respondents had to prove was that the trial court had no jurisdiction; that they
were prevented from having a trial or presenting their case to the trial court by some act or conduct of
We believe and so hold that there is merit in the instant application for preliminary injunction, hence, the same is petitioners;[15] or that they had been denied due process of law. Thus, the Court of Appeals need only to resolve
hereby GRANTED. Upon the posting by the petitioners of a bond in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos the issues of lack of jurisdiction, existence of extrinsic fraud, and denial of due process of law.
(P100,000.00), subject to Our approval, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the respondents
(petitioners herein), and all persons acting for and in their behalf, to desist and refrain from enforcing or The action for annulment of judgment cannot and was not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The
implementing, or from attempting to enforce and implement, the questioned writ of execution of the partial very purpose of the action for annulment of judgment was to have the final and executory judgment set aside so
judgment, dated March 21, 1988, rendered in Civil Case No. Q-35672, entitled: Teofilo M. Gariando, et al., that there will be a renewal of litigation.[16] Whether or not the assailed Partial Decision based solely on facts and
petitioners versus Gregorio Dizon, et al., respondents, until further orders from this Court. evidence presented by the petitioners is meritorious is irrelevant and immaterial. Thus, the Court of Appeals did
not err, nor did it violate the petitioners right to due process of law, when it refused to consider all the factual amount to a positive and considerable injustice to private respondents. Hence, justice and equity demand that this
issues raised by petitioners. case be litigated anew.[27] It is evident that the reopening of the case would not amount to an exercise in futility nor
is it intended to further delay the final resolution of this controversy. The court a quo should give all the necessary
We also agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the Partial Decision is null and void insofar as parties every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without resort to technicalities. [28]
private respondents are concerned since the latter were not duly served summons or notified of the proceedings
against them. The summons and the Partial Decision were published in a local newspaper edited and published in Finally, the conclusion that the Partial Decision of the court a quo is void finds support in Rule 10, Section
Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan. However, the Court of Appeals found the publication in said newspaper, 5(c) of the then Rules of Court, which provides:
namely the Metropolitan Newsweek, to be invalid because the said periodical is not considered a newspaper of
general circulation in Quezon City where the subject property is located, as required by Presidential Decree No. (c) Effect of partial default. - When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several
1079, Section 1. defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon
Petitioners, however, contend that the service of summons by publication was legal and in accordance with the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
the requirements of Rule 14, Section 14 of the Rules of Court. The service by publication was done pursuant to the
orders of the trial court dated May 5, 1993 and September 29, 1983.[17] In fact, the court a quo enumerated in the Partial Decision those who filed responsive pleadings. Considering
that petitioners in their complaint stated a common cause of action against all the named respondents, the court a
While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the approval of the trial court, it quo should have heard the case as against all respondents, the defaulted respondents included. However, the trial
does not cure the fatal defect that the Metropolitan Newsweek is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon court, unmindful of the above-quoted rule, proceeded to receive evidence ex parte only against the defaulted
City. The Rules strictly require that publication must be in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places respondents. The trial courts disposition is not only violative of the rules but also a clear negation of the defaulted
and for such time as the court may order.[18] The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place respondents limited rights.
and the length of time that the summons was to be published. In the absence of such specification, publication in
just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of the rules. The incomplete directive of the court a Whatever defense and evidence the non-defaulted respondents may present which would be applicable to the
quo coupled with the defective publication of the summons rendered the service by publication ineffective. The situation of the defaulted respondents should inure to the benefit of the latter. The nullification of OCT 614
modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the adversely affected the answering respondents for they all share the same mother title. In effect, the court a
respondents,[19] and failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its quo pre-judged the case even against the answering respondents, for how could OCT 614, the mother title, be valid
publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.[20] It cannot be overemphasized that the statutory for one set of respondents and null and void for the other respondents? In fine, the Partial Decision was
requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service, or by publication, must be procedurally flawed.
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other than that prescribed by the statute is
considered ineffective.[21] WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
17596 is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the rules, the service of summons
would still be ineffective insofar as private respondents are concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of SO ORDERED.
Title was filed on November 2, 1983, Vilma Maloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical entity. Vilma Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Maloles Subdivision, a partnership, was dissolved more than six (6) years earlier, as evidenced by a Certificate of Puno, J., no part.
Dissolution issued by the SEC dated January 26, 1976.[22] Consequently, it could no longer be sued having lost its
juridical personality.
It was also established that all the lots within the subdivision had been disposed of to private individuals,
herein private respondents. As the titled owners, they should have been impleaded as party-respondents before the
court a quo. They were not made respondents, neither were they informed of the adverse proceedings that would
result in the nullification of their duly registered titles. Clearly, there was a blatant disregard for their rights as
registered owners. Private respondents titles and rights as owners have been unjustly violated. Hence, the Court of
Appeals did not err in granting private respondents petition by annulling and setting aside the Partial Decision
rendered by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction and for denial of due process of law.
Petitioners failed to show that they were the aggrieved parties. If ever there was denial of due process, it was
private respondents who suffered therefrom. Whether by petitioners failure to effectively serve summons or by
omitting to name private respondents as respondents, the trial courts Partial Decision declaring private respondents
titles null and void was clearly violative of the due process requirement of the Constitution. It is elementary that
before a person can be deprived of his right or property he should first be informed of the claim against him and
the theory on which such claim is premised.[23] The courts will not countenance a denial of the fundamental right
to due process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system.[24]
The Partial Decision was a judgment by default, which is generally looked upon with disfavor,[25] for it
cannot pretend to be based on the merits of the controversy. [26] As in this case, the judgment by default may