16. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS v. HON.

VICENTE ECHAVES
Facts
In 1974, the accused, unlawfully occupied and possessed (squatted) a portion of a
grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna Jr.
thereby depriving him of the whole area and caused damage and prejudice to the atty.

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus
order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it
was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas
under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat,
or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the
rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and
strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the
ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal
order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted. However, the
lower court denied the motion and insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in
the decree does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention
the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.

Issue
Whether or not PD 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural
lands

Ruling
No. The lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands
because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-
to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. On
the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the
grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it
unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public
agricultural lands. The trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed.

Principle
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does
not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. The rule of ejusdem
generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative
intent is uncertain.

17. AISPORNA v. COURT OF APPEALS & PEOPLE OF THE

PHILS.
Facts
Since 03/07/1969, and as of 06/21/1969, petitioners husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was
a duly licensed insurance agent authorized by the Insurance Commission to Perla
Compania de Seguros, said license was to expire on June 30, 1970. In Cabanatuan City,
a Personal Accident Policy, was issued by Perla through its authorized representative,
Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with Ana M. Isidro as beneficiary for
P5,000. Eugenio S. Isidro, the Insured, died during the lifetime of the policy. For reasons
not explained in the records, the present information was filed by the Fiscal, with the
assistance of the private prosecutor, charging the wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec.
189 of the Insurance Law for having, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously acted, as agent
in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the application of one Eugenio S.
Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compana de Seguros,without said accused having first
secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the Insurance
Commission.

Trial Court
Found her guilty. During trial, Aisporna presented evidence that the aforementioned policy
was issued with the active participation of the wife of Rodolfo, Mapalad Aisporna against
which petitioner in her defense sought to show that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally
helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued
because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo
was absent and so she left a note on top of her husbands desk to renew said policy.

Appellate Court
Affirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner is prosecuted not under the Section
189 (2) of the Insurance Act but by Sec. 189 (1). The appellate court concluded that the
definition if an insurance agent under Sec. 189(2) is not applicable to the insurance agent
mentioned in Sec. 189(1). In Sec. 189 (2), a person is an insurance agent if he solicits
and obtains an insurance for compensation, but, in its Sec. 189 (1), there is no necessity
that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an insurance
agent.

Issue
WON the receipt of compensation is an essential element of the crime defined by Sec.
189 (1) of the Insurance Act

Ruling
Yes. A careful perusal of Sec.189 of the Insurance Act shows that the 1 st paragraph
thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent in the solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority from the
Insurance Commissioner, while its 2nd paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within
the intent of this section and finally, the 3rd paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be
imposed.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the 2nd paragraph to the agent mentioned
in the 1st and 2nd paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid 3 paragraphs of Sec.
189. Considering that the definition of an insurance agent is also applicable to the agent
mentioned in the 1st paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential
element for a violation of the 1st paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court
already established that Aisporna did not receive any compensation for the issuance of
the insurance policy. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is
acquitted of the crime charged.

Principle
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be
so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. The
meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part,
portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a
general consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment, not separately and independently.

More importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that
where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company in which it is found or with which it is

18. VERA (CIR) v. CUEVAS (Judge + Corporations)

Facts
CIR ordered the plaintiff-respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk
products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within
15 days from the receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiff-
respondents to comply with said orders will result in the institution of the necessary action
against any violation of the said order.

Respondent Court
1. Perpetually restrained the CIR and his agents from requiring plaintiffs to print on
the labels of their filled milk products the words: This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than 1 year of age or similar words and declaring as
null and void and without authority of law the order of the CIR.
2. Perpetually ordered the Fair Trade Board and its agents or employees from
continuing in the investigation of the complaints against petitioners or any charges
related to the manufacture/sale of the petitioners (corps.) of their filled milk
products

Issue
Whether or not filled milk was within the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code

Ruling
No. Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. The difference between skimmed milk and
filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty
part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It
cannot be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milks and
filled milk. With the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has lost
its tax purpose, CIR necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same.

The BIR may claim police power only when necessary in the enforcement of its principal
powers and duties. The enforcement of Sextion 169 entails the promotion of the health of
the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose because it is under the exclusive
function of the FDA of the DOH.

Principle
The use of the specific and qualifying terms skimmed milk and condensed skimmed
milk ins Section 169 of the Tax Code would restrict the scope of the general clause all
milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part. In
other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term skimmed milk under
the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and
limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.

19. DE VILLA VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts
De Villa got charged issued a bouncing check to a certain Roberto Lorayez in RTC Makati.
De Villa assailed the decision of the RTC to the CA saying that the Court had no
jurisdiction over cases where the questioned check was drawn against the dollar acct of
the petitioner (outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines) and that the questioned
check was null and void in the Philippines therefore its dishonor cannot have violated B.P.
22.

Issue
1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case
2. Whether or not a check drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign
bank is covered by Bouncing Checks Law (B.P, Blg. 22)

Ruling
1. Yes. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the
accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a
criminal action.
2. Yes. The law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. It was clear
during the legislative deliberations that any check may be involved in whatever
currency, which could be French francs, Japanese yen or deutschnorhs.

Principle
Where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule
is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something
unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.
It is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning.
Thus, where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to
provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted.

20. ARIS PHILS. v. NLRC et al.

Facts
Private respondents who are employees of Aris Phils. are aggrieved due to the
managements failure to improve their work surroundings that they claim to be detrimental
and hazardous. They formed a group and marched to the management office to protest.
The next day, the participants were issued a memo by their supervisors requiring them to
explain why they should not be terminated. Despite the explanations, they were still
dismissed from duty. Respondents didnt waste time and filed a complaint against illegal
dismissal against Aris Phils and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC
at the NCR.

Labor Arbiter
Ordered Aris Phils. Inc to reinstate private respondents to their former posts.

08/29/1989 Aris filed an opposition to the motion for execution alleging that the law does
not expressly provide that it shall be given retroactive effect and to give retroactive effect
to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of an addtl obligation on petitioner
but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened w/ the consequence
of reinstatement w/o the benefit of a final judgment.

Labor arbiter issued an Order granting the motion for execution as far as reinstatement
of herein complainants is concerned in consonance with the law
Hence, Aris Phils filed an instant petition with this Court.

Issue
WON Sec. 223 of the Labor Code, introduced by Sec. 12 of RA 6715 is unconstitutional
and can it be given retroactive effect

Ruling
No. The law is not unconstitutional. Since it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality
and since the interim rules of the NLRC are procedural or remedial in character, they can
be given retroactive effect. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Principle
Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication;
a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the-constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt. The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive
authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other basis
that can be used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law
will not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other available grounds

21. ALONZO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Facts
5 brothers and sisters in equal pro diviso shares a parcel of land registered in the mane
of their deceased parents in the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. Celestino Padua sold his
undivided share. 1 year later, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own shares to the
same people. Petitioners then occupied the area consisting 2/5 of the said lot. Mariano
Padua (1 of the 5) sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo but his complaint
was dismissed because he was an American citizen. Tecla Padua (1 of the 5) also filed
her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption.

Trial Court
Dismissed the complaint because the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within
30 days from notice of sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it
was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of
law. In truth, actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The
other co-heirs lived in the same lot and whose children went to school together. It is highly
improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales that they alleged to be
occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. Trial
court ruled in favor of the spouses Alonzo.

Respondent Court
Reversed the decision of the trial court. Declared that the notice required by the article
(1088 of the CC) was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a
substitute. According to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the
deed of sale of the property (in writing) subject to redemption would satisfy the
requirement for written notice and that would be the time from when to start the counting
the 30 days. Ruled in favor of the co-heirs.

Issue
WON the co-heirs may be able to redeem the property

Ruling
No. The Court determined that the co-heirs erred in not inquiring or not even ascertaining
the fact available when the spouses Alonzo started exhibiting acts of ownership
(enclosing a portion of the inherited lot) and it had to take them all 13 years to choose to
claim the right of redemption which was already too late. The purpose of the rule was to
make sure that the redemptioners were duly notified of the possible sale of the land. By
requiring written proof of such notice, the Court would be closing their eyes to the obvious
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law
over its purpose. When the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs
were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30 day period started running
and ultimately expired.

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged
right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his
claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means
of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to
make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as he had known the facts.

The decision of the respondent court is reversed and that of the trial court is reinstated.

Principle
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. The law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative
intent because we presume good motive of the legislature to render justice.

Thus, when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.

22. BERCES SR. v. GUINGONA JR.

Facts
Berces filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the Orders (from the Office
of the President) to stay the execution of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
in suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay.

Berces filed 2 admin cases against Naomi Corral, incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with
the Sannguniang Panlalawigan of Albay because of non-payment of accrued leave
benefits and for installing a water pipeline which is operated, maintained and paid for by
the municipality for the respondents private residence and medical clinic.

SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN
Sangguniang Panlalawigan ruled in favor of Berces, Sr. and compelled the respondent
to pay the accrued leave benefits plus interest, suspended the mayor from office for 2
months for the 1st offense, suspended again for 3 months after the 1st suspension and
ordered to reimburse the municipality for the electric and water bills

Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and prayed for the stay of execution (delay in carrying out
the court order)

Office of the President issued an order on 07/28/1993 that in the light of the Petition for
Review filed before the Office a stay (delay) of execution pending appeal would be just
and reasonable for the judgment of the 2 admin cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the order but was denied.

Petitioner claims that the governing law in the case is RA7160 which contains a
mandatory provision that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and
executory, and not Administrative Order No. 18 (Prescribing the Rules and Regulations
Governing Appeals to the Office of the President) because it has been repealed.

Sec. 68 of RA 7160: An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or
executory. XXXXX

Sec. 6 of AO No. 18: Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the execution of the
decision/resolution/order appealed from us stayed upon the filing of the appeal in within
the period prescribed herein. However, in all cases, at any time during the pendency of
the appeal, the Office of the President may direct or stay the execution of the
decision/resolution/order appealed from upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
just and reasonable.

Issue
WON there has been an implied repeal of Sec. 6 of AO No. 18

SC Ruling
No. There is no express repeal of Sec. 6 of A.O. No. 18 because it failed to identify or
designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed.

Provisions of Section 68 of RA 7160 and Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant and the 2 laws must be read together.

Petition is dismissed.

Presumption against Implied Repeal

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of express repeal,
a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old law. The 2 laws
must be absolutely incompatible and they cannot be made to stand together.

23. MECANO v. COA

Facts
Mecano is a Director II of the NBI and hospitalized for a service-connected disease
(cholecytitis) from 03/26/1990-04/07/1990 on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses

Mecano sent a memo to Dir. Lim requesting for reimbursement of his expenses on the
ground that he is entitled based on Sec. 699 of the RAC. The claim was indorsed to the
Sec. of Justice recommending favorable action. Undersec. Of Justice Bello in a 4th
indorsement returned the claim to Dir. Lim, having considered the statements of the
Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 09/19/1990 to the effect that the RAC
was repealed by Admin Code of 1987

Mecano resubmitted his claimstating that the issuance of the Admin Code did not operate
to repeal/abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. COA Chairman E.
Domingo denied claim on the ground that Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed by the
Admin Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated/re-
enacted in the Admin Code of 1987. Mecano, in his comment, may however file a claim
with the Employees Compensation Commission, considering that his illness occurred
after the effectivity of Admin Code of 1987.

Petitioners claim was returned by USec Montenegro with the advice that Mecano elevate
the matter to the SC if he so desires.

Issue
WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed/abrogated Sec. 699 of the RAC

SC Ruling
No. The Admin Code did not repeal the RAC because several matters treated in the old
Code are not found in the new Code. There can be no conflict because the provision on
sickness benefits has not been restated in the Admin Code of 1987. Mecano is also not
barred from recovering benefits under Employees Compensation Program.

The Court resolved to grant the petition.

Principle
WON a particular law has been repealed or not by subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent
A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and
specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all
others are implied repeals.
Repeal by implication
Proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention
on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must
be given effect. Otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed
as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far
as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.

2 Categories:
1. Where provisions in the 2 acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable
conflict. The later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of
the earlier one. Takes place when:
a. 2 statutes cover the same subject matter
b. Clearly inconsistent
c. Incompatible w/ each other and cannot be reconciled/harmonized
d. Both cannot be given effect w/o nullifying the other
2. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law
a. Clear intent of legislature that the later act be the substitute of the old
b. When both intent and scope are clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all
parts and the provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act
are deemed repealed