Module PE.PAS.U14.

5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 1

Module PE.PAS.U14.5
Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of

non-repairable components

U14.1 Introduction
We have looked at evaluating reliability of an individual
component
Non-repairable
Repairable
This module addresses reliability of systems comprised of multiple
components. There are 2 broad classes of approaches.
Approaches assuming all system components are non-repairable
Markov modeling for systems having repairable components
We focus on the non-repairable case in Modules U14 and U15,
reserving Markov modeling, the repairable case, for module U16.
The arrangement of material in your text is as follows:
Chapter 4: Network modeling and evaluation of simple systems
(series/parallel systems using reliability block diagrams)
Chapter 5: Network modeling and evaluation of complex systems
(methods for non-series/parallel systems including meshed
systems, partially redundant (majority vote or r out of n), standby)
Conditional probability approach
Cut set method
Tie set method
Connection matrix method
Event trees
Fault trees
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 2

The above methods provide the ability to decompose non-

series/parallel systems into series/parallel systems.
Chapter 7: System reliability evaluation using probability
distributions (Chapters 4 & 5 assume failure/success probabilities
are constant, single valued. Chapter 7 relieves this assumption by
considering that component time to failures are described by a pdf)
Series and parallel systems
Partially redundant systems
Standby
We follow a different approach by treating the material of chapters
4 and 7 first, within Module U14, and then move to the material of
chapter 6 in Module U15.

U14.2 Logic Diagrams

Physical diagram: Describes physical connections between
components
Reliability block diagram (logic or network diagram): indicates
which combinations of the components result in system failure.
The system is in its working state when there is a continuous path
between the network endpoints; it is in its failed state when there is
no path between the network endpoints.
Illustration: 4 identical parallel transmission lines, capacity 100
MW each [1].

Fig U14.1: Physical Connection; Also Logical Connection for Total Flow of 100 MW
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 3

Fig U14.2: Logical Connection for Total Flow of 400 MW

What is the logical connection for total flow of 300 MW?

Fig U14.3: Logic Diagram for Total Flow of 300 MW

This problem can be handled as an r/n configuration - see Section U14.6.

U14.3 Series systems

U14.3.1 Basic concepts
Define:
Si: Event that component i is working
Fi: Event that component i is failed
RS: probability of series system working (success)
QS: probability of series system failure
Note: We previously used
R(t): probability the component fails after T
Q(t): probability the component fails before T
We assume RS and QS are given for a specified time interval.

Consider the general series system below:

Fig U14.4: Series System

Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 4

Its reliability may be expressed as a function of event probability:

RS=P(S1S2S3Sn)=P(S1)P(S2|S1)P(S3|(S1S2)P(Sn|S1S2Sn-1)

For example, if n=4 (see Fig. U14.4a):

RS=P(S1S2S3S4) =P(S1S2S3)P(S4|S1S2S3)
=P(S1S2)P(S3| S1S2)P(S4|S1S2S3)
=P(S1)P(S2|S1) P(S3| S1S2)P(S4|S1S2S3)

Fig U14.4a: Series System

The conditional probabilities reflect the case where dependencies
exist in the system, i.e.,
reliability of one component influences
multiple system failure modes.
Examples:
Different system failure modes are caused by different
combinations of line outages - Figure U14.3 illustrates one
example of such a case. For example, with a 300 MW flow, the
probability of line 3 failing, given lines 1 and 2 fail, is 1.
Failure of a component affects other components failure rates
as when a component (e.g., a motor) failure creates additional
heat in the system
If all components work or fail independently, then
RS=P(S1S2S3Sn)=P(S1)P(S2)P(S3)P(Sn)
n
R R
S i
i 1

Once we obtain RS, it is very easy to obtain QS from

Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 5

Q 1 R
S S

Can we get QS (probability of system failure) without getting RS?

Try the case of just 2 series components:
Failure occurs when component 1 fails or component 2 fails:
QS=P(F1F2)=P(F1)+P(F2)-P(F1F2)
QS=Q1+Q2-Q1Q2
Is this the same as 1-RS? Use Qi=1-Ri to obtain
QS=1-R1+1-R2-(1-R1)(1-R2)=2-R1-R2-1+R2+R1-R1R2=1-R1R2=1-RS

In general,
QS= P(F1F2Fn)
which can be evaluated using repeated application of the 2-
component case, but it is easier to just obtain RS first.
U14.3.2 Time dependent probabilities for the series case
If we characterize the reliability of each component using the time-
dependent survivor function, R(t)=Pr(T>t), Q(t)=Pr(T<t), then all
of what we have said for series systems still applies, i.e.,
n
R (t ) R (t )
S i
i 1

Q (t ) 1 R (t )
S S

Recalling that each component i is non-repairable, we refer to

Module 11 to retrieve the following:
Hazard function: hi(t)
pdf on time to failure: fi(t)
Mean time to failure: MTTFi
Can we express corresponding system hazard h S(t), pdf fS(t), and
MTTFS? We assume component independence.
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 6

Probability density function for series case:

The system pdf on time to failure is given by (see module 11):

dR (t )
f (t ) S

dt
S

The two-component case is: RS(t)=R1(t)R2(t), so that:

dR (t ) dR (t )
f (t ) R (t ) R (t ) f (t ) R (t ) f (t ) R (t )
1 2

dt dt
S 2 1 1 2 2 1

The three-component case is: RS(t)=R1(t)R2(t)R3(t), so that:

dR (t ) dR (t ) dR (t )
f (t ) R (t ) R (t ) R (t ) R (t ) R (t )
1

2 3

dt dt dt
S 2 3 1 3 2

f (t ) R (t ) R (t ) f (t ) R (t ) R (t ) f (t ) R (t ) R (t )
1 2 3 2 1 3 3 2 3

In general, for n-components in series, we can get the pdf on

system time to failure from:

n n
f (t) f (t) R (t)
S i j
i1 j1,
j i

Hazard function for series case:

The system hazard function is given by (see module 11):
f (t )
h (t ) S

R (t )
S
S

Then
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 7

f (t ) R (t )
n n n

f (t ) R (t )
f (t )
i j i j

h (t )
i 1 j 1, n j 1 , n n

R (t ) h (t )

j i j i i
S n n i

R (t ) R (t )
j

i 1
j
i 1
i
i 1

j 1
j 1

Comment: Billintons text indicates that the above relation holds

only when all components have exponentially distributed failure
times. The statement in the text, pg. 223, is:
No simple analytical relationship between e(t) and i(t) can be
deduced from equation 7.7. Here, e(t) and i(t) are the same as
hs(t) and hi(t), respectively. Equation 7.7 is given as:
t t

hS ( t ) dt n
hi ( t ) dt

R (t ) e
S
0
e 0

i 1
But note that the right hand side may be re-written as:
t n t

hS ( t ) dt hi ( t ) dt
R (t ) e
S
0
e i 1 0

t n
hi ( t ) dt

e 0i 1

from which it follows that

n
h (t ) h (t )
S i
i 1
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 8

So I disagree with Billintons text on this issue (as do a number of

other texts, including [3, 4]). I believe the above relation holds
independent of what kind of failure time distributions the
components have. In addition, the component failure time
distributions do not have to be identical.
Interesting conclusion: Since, for a series system, the system
hazard is just the sum of the component hazards, a series system
comprised of components having constant hazards will also have a
constant hazard.
Series connection of components with exponentially distributed
failure times results in a system with exponentially distributed
failure times.
Mean time to failure for series case:
The system MTTF is given by (see module 11):

MTTF R ( )d f ( ) d
S S S
0 0

Substitution for fS(t) results in:

n n
MTTF f ( )d f ( ) R ( )d
S S i j
0
0 i 1 j 1,
j i

We would like to be able to get an expression on the right-hand-

t

f ( )d i
side containing 0 , as then we could express MTTFS in
terms of the component MTTFi. It is unclear how to do this given
the presence of Rj() in the RHS of the above expression.
Lets try using the expression for MTTF in terms of RS(t):
n
MTTF R ( )d
S i
0 i 1

Now replace Ri(t) with

Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 9

t
h ( t ) dt
R (t ) e
i
0

and you get:

t
n hi ( t ) dt
MTTF e S
0
d
0 i 1
n t
0 hi ( t ) dt
e i 1
d
0
t
n
i 1
hi ( t ) dt

e 0
d
0
We can say no more about the above expression unless we make
assumptions about the form of the hi(t). Implication:
MTTFS are generally NOT expressible in terms of MTTFi
So assume a form for the hi(t), that they are constant (implying that
failure times are exponentially distributed), i.e., hi(t)=i. Then:
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 10

t n
n
i 1
i dt it
MTTF e S
0
d e i 1
d
0 0
n
t i
e i 1
d
0

t
1
n
t i 1
n e i 1
n

i 1
i t 0
i 1
i

So what does this say? Billinton says it well at the top of pg 230:
This could be intuitively deduced since it was established in
Chapter 6 that the MTTF of an exponential distribution was the
reciprocal of the failure rate. Since a series system of components
having exponentially distributed reliabilities has an equivalent
failure rate of i and the distribution is itself exponential, it would
follow that the MTTF of such a series system would be the
reciprocal of its equivalent failure rate.
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 11

Example:
A system consists of three units whose logic diagram is in series.
The failure rate for each unit is constant as follows: 1=4.010-6
/hr, 2=3.210-6 /hr, 3=9.810-6 /hr. Determine the system failure
rate, the system reliability at 1000 hours, and the mean time to
failure.
S= 1+ 2+ 3=4.010-6+3.210-6+9.810-6=1.710-5 /hr.
t t

hS ( t ) dt
s dt

R (t ) e
S
0
e 0
e s t
e ( 1.7 10 5 ) t

R (1000) e 1.710 2
0.983
MTTFS=1/(1.710-5/hr)=58,823.5 hrs.
It is interesting to compare system and component MTTF:
MTTF1=1/(4.010-6/hr)=250,000 hrs.
MTTF2=1/(3.210-6/hr)=312,500 hrs.
MTTF3=1/(9.810-6/hr)=102,041 hrs.

U14.4 Parallel systems

U14.4.1 Basic concepts
Define:
Si: Event that component i is working
Fi: Event that component i is failed
RP: probability of parallel system working (success)
QP: probability of parallel system failure
Note: We previously used
R(t): probability the component fails after T
Q(t): probability the component fails before T
We assume RP and QP are given for a specified time interval.
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 12

Consider the general series system below:

Fig U14.5: Parallel System

Its unreliability may be expressed as a function of event
probability.
QP=P(F1F2F3Fn)=P(F1)P(F2|F1)P(F3|(F1F2)P(Fn|F1F2Fn-1)
For example, if n=4 (see Fig. U14.5a):
QP=P(F1F2F3F4) =P(F1F2F3)P(F4|F1F2F3)
=P(F1F2)P(F3| F1F2)P(F4|F1F2F3)
=P(F1)P(F2|F1) P(F3| F1F2)P(F4|F1F2F3)

Fig U14.5a: Series System

If all components work or fail independently, then

Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 13

QP=P(F1F2F3Fn)=P(F1)P(F2)P(F3)P(Fn)
n
Q Q
P i
i 1

Once we obtain QP, it is very easy to obtain RP from

R 1 Q
P P

Can we obtain RP (probability of system success) without

obtaining QP?
Try the case of just 2 components:
Success occurs when component 1 works or component 2 works:
RP=P(S1S2)=P(S1)+P(S2)-P(S1S2)
RP=R1+R2-R1R2
Is this the same as 1-QP? Use Ri=1-Qi to obtain
RP=1-Q1+1-Q2-(1-Q1)(1-Q2)=2-Q1-Q2-1+Q2+Q1-Q1Q2=1-Q1Q2=1-QP
In general,
RP= P(S1S2Sn)
which can be evaluated using repeated application of the 2-
component case, but it is easier to just obtain QP first.
U14.4.2 Time dependent probabilities for the parallel case
If we characterize the reliability of each component using the time-
dependent survivor function, R(t)=Pr(T>t), Q(t)=Pr(T<t), then all
of what we have said for parallel systems still applies, i.e.,
n
Q (t ) Q (t )
P i
i 1

R (t ) 1 Q (t )
P P

Recalling that each component i is non-repairable, we refer to

Module 11 to retrieve the following:
Hazard function: hi(t)
pdf on time to failure: fi(t)
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 14

Mean time to failure: MTTFi

Can we express corresponding system hazard h P(t), pdf fP(t), and
MTTFP? We assume component independence.
Probability density function for parallel case:
The system pdf on time to failure is given by (see module 11):

dR (t )
f (t ) P

dt
P

But RP(t)=1-QP(t), therefore,

dQ (t )
f (t ) P

dt
P

The two-component case is: QS(t)=Q1(t)Q2(t), so that:

dQ (t ) dQ (t )
f (t ) Q (t ) 1
Q (t ) f (t )Q (t ) f (t )Q (t )
2

dt dt
P 2 1 1 2 2 1

The three-component case is: QS(t)=Q1(t)Q2(t)Q3(t), so that:

dQ (t ) dQ (t ) dQ (t )
f (t ) Q (t )Q (t ) Q (t ) Q (t ) Q (t ) 1

2 3

dt
P 2 3 1 3 2
dt dt
f (t )Q (t )Q (t ) f (t )Q (t )Q (t ) f (t )Q (t )Q (t )
1 2 3 2 1 3 3 2 3

In general, for n-components in series, we can get the pdf on

system time to failure from:
n n
f (t ) f (t ) Q (t )
P i j
i 1
j 1 ,
j i

Hazard function for parallel case:

The system hazard function is given by (see module 11):
f (t ) f (t )
h (t ) P
P

R (t ) 1 Q (t )
P
P P

Then
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 15

f (t ) Q (t ) f (t ) Q (t )
n n n

i j i j

h (t ) i 1

j 1,
j i
n j 1,
j i
P n n
1 Q (t ) 1 Q (t ) j
i 1
j
j 1
j 1

Comment: The above expression on the right does not simplify

into a function of only the individual failure rates as it did for the
series connection. The conclusion is then, for a general parallel
connection, a single equivalent hazard function cannot be derived
to represent the complete parallel system.
Question: Can we do better if we take a simpler case?
Lets try to derive a single equivalent hazard function for a 2
component system both of which have exponentially distributed
failure times.

This means that

f (t ) e
1 1
1t
f (t ) e
2 2
2t

R (t ) f ( )d e d e
1 1 1
1 1t

t t

R (t ) f ( )d e d e
2 2 2
2 2t

t t

Q (t ) 1 R (t ) 1 e
1 1
1t

Q (t ) 1 R (t ) 1 e
2 2
2t

Recall that:
n n
f (t ) f (t ) Q (t ) n
P
i 1

i
j 1 ,
j i
j
Q (t ) Q (t )
P i
i 1
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 16

Substitution yields:
f (t ) f (t )Q (t ) f (t )Q (t ) e (1 e ) e (1 e )
P 1 2 2 1 1
1t 2t
2
2t 1t

Q (t ) Q (t )Q (t ) (1 e )(1 e ) 1 e
P 1 2
1t 2t 1t
e 2 t
e ( 1 2 )

f (t ) e (1 e ) e (1 e )
1t 2t 2t 1t

h (t ) P
1 2

1 Q (t ) e e e
P 1t 2t ( 1 2 )t
P

e e ( )e
1t 2 t ( 1 2 ) t

1 2 1 1

e e e 1t 2t ( 1 2 ) t

Even for the simple case of only 2 exponentially distributed

components, this hazard function expression offers no simple
conclusion regarding the relationship between the system and
component hazards.
Interesting conclusion: Unlike the series case, the failure time
distribution of a parallel system is not exponential even if all the
component failure time distributions are exponential.

There is one more thing that we can do: assume the components
are identical so that =1= 2. In this case, we have:
2 e 2 e
t 2 t

h (t )
2e e
P t 2 t

This still offers no conclusion regarding the component and system

hazard functions.
An exercise: Consider the survivor function for this case of 2
identically exponentially distributed parallel components, which is
just the denominator of the hazard function.
Recall e-x = 1 x + x2/2! - x3/3! + ; for x very small, e -x1x.
Application of this approximation to the survivor function.
for only 1 component (which is R=e-t) results in R=1- t.
for 2 parallel components results in RP=1. Thus, we take
another term in the series: e-x = 1 x + x2/2!. Applying this to
the survivor function results in RP=1-(t)2.
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 17

Conclusion: The addition of the second component significantly

improves the system reliability, as RP=1-(t)2 is much closer to 1
than R=1-t.
Mean time to failure for parallel case:
The system MTTF is given by (see module 11):

MTTF R ( )d f ( )d
P P P
0 0

Lets try the expression with RP(t) for the general case, which is
n n

Q (t ) Q (t )
P i
R (t ) 1 Q (t ) 1 Q (t )
P P i
i 1 i 1

n
MTTF 1 Q (t )dt
P i
0 i 1

So lets go back to our 2-component system, with each component

having exponentially distributed failure time. In this case:
1-QP(t)= e
1t
e 2 t
e ( 1 2 ) t

MTTF e P
1t
e 2t
e ( 1 2 ) t
dt
0

e 1t
e e
2t ( 1 2 )t

1
( )
2 1 2 0

1 1 1

( )
1 2 1 2

The above expression may be interpreted as the MTTF1 (term 1)

plus the MTTF2 (term 2) minus the MTTFS (term 3), where the
MTTFS is the MTTF of the two components if they were
connected in series. It is necessary to subtract MTTF S to account
for the fact that MTTF1 and MTTF2 included in each the time that
both components will survive (so it is included twice), and so we
need to subtract it off once.
Ref. [5] derives the following for the n-component parallel case,
with exponentially distributed failure times for all components.
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 18

n 1 1 n 1 n 1 1 n 2 n 1 n
MTTF ... (1) n 1

P n
i 1
i
i 1 j i 1
i j
i 1 j i 1 k j 1
i j k
If all i 1
i

components are identical and each component has a failure rate of

, then RP(t) has a nice form:
n
R (t ) 1 Q (t ) 1 Q (t ) 1 (1 e )
P P i
t n

i 1

The MTTF is given by:

MTTF R ( )d 1 (1 e ) d
P P
t n

0 0

If we expand the term in parenthesis, we will find that the result

has a nice structure which easily admits integration, resulting in:
1 1 1
MTTF 1 ...
P
2 n

Ref [5] says:

This expression implies that in active redundancy where each
component exhibits one type of failure mode, the MTTF of the
system exceeds the MTTF of the individual component and the
contribution of the second component and other additional
components would have a diminishing return on the systems
MTTF as n increases. In other words, there is an optimum n at
which the cost of adding a component in parallel far exceeds the
gained benefit in the MTTF.
Example: [4]
A system consists of 3 units whose logic diagram is in parallel. The
failure rate for each unit is constant as follows:
1=4.010-6 /hr, 2=3.210-6 /hr, 3=9.810-6 /hr.
Determine the system reliability at 1000 hours and the MTTF.
R (t ) 1 (1 e )(1 e )(1 e )
P
1t 2t 3t

R (1000) 1 1.25 10 0.999999875

P
7
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 19

1 1 1 1 1 1
MTTF

P
1 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 3

1
435,000hours

1 2 3

Compare to series case: RS=0.983 and MTTFS=58,823.5 hours.

U14.5 Combined series/parallel systems

Reduce sequentially the configuration by combining appropriate
series and parallel branches of logic diagram until single
equivalent element remains.

For each parallel subsystem encountered:

n

Compute Q Q P
i 1
i

Compute RP=1-QP
For each series subsystem encountered:
n

Compute RS Ri
i 1

Compute QS=1-RS
See examples 4.7 and 4.8 in Billintons text.
Example: Express system reliability in terms of component R, Q:
Q34=Q3Q4R34=1- Q3Q4; Q56=Q5Q6R56=1- Q5Q6
R134=R1R34=R1(1- Q3Q4); R256=R2R56=R2(1- Q5Q6)

Q123456=Q134Q256=(1-R134)(1-R256)
=(1- R1(1- Q3Q4))(1- R2(1- Q5Q6))
R123456=1-Q123456=1-(1- R1(1- Q3Q4))(1- R2(1- Q5Q6))
Rsystem=R123456R7=
(1-(1- R1(1- Q3Q4))(1- R2(1- Q5Q6)))R7

Special note on dependencies:

Consider the diagram below:
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 20

Following our procedure, we obtain QP=Q1Q2 RP=1-Q1Q2

RS=R1(1-Q1Q2)=R1-R1Q1Q2
However, if 1 works, the system works (also, if 1 fails, the system
fails). Therefore, we should obtain: RS=R1. What is wrong?
The problem is that we have the same block appearing twice in our
logic diagram. This means that there is dependency among these
two blocks, and it is a very strong dependency: the second block in
the parallel configuration does exactly what the first block in the
series configuration does.
We could account for this using conditional probabilities, as
follows.
P(SS)=P(S1(S1S2))= P(S1SA) where SA=(S1S2).
Then, P(SS)=P(S1)P(SA|S1)=R1(1)=R1
This can get very complicated, and other methods are preferable if
dependencies are present. Thus, in general, we restrict the type of
block diagrams to include only those in which each component is
represented by only a single block.

U14.6 Special Cases

14.6.1 Partially redundant configurations
Redundancy is functional duplication.
In a logic diagram,
the parallel connection of components indicates redundancy,
i.e., if one component fails, the system does not because other
components can act on behalf of the failed component.
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 21

the series connection of components indicates non-redundancy,

i.e., the system fails if one component fails.
See Fig 5 in [2] and Fig 3.10 in [1].
Full redundancy:
A fully redundant parallel configuration means that only one
component among all the components in the configuration must be
working in order for the system to be working.
Partial redundancy:
A partially redundant parallel configuration is one involving n
components in parallel out of which r must be working for the
system to be working. Such a configuration is also called r out of
n, r/n, or majority vote configuration. Such configurations are
typically illustrated as below, which illustrates the 2 out of 3
configuration.

For this systems, QPQ1Q2Q3 since:

failure of just 2 components (rather than all 3) will fail the
system, and there are several ways that this can happen (1 and 2,
2 and 3, or 1 and 3 can fail; or all 3 can fail)
success of 2 components (rather than just 1) is required for
system success, and there are several ways that this can happen
(1 and 2, 1 and 3, 2 or 3, or all 3 can be working).
(We enumerated all possible outcomes for this arrangement and
can see the probability of failure is 4/8).
So we want the probability of exactly r successes out of n trials.
There are two possibilities: the components are identical, or not.
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 22

Identical components:
If the components are identical, the probability of exactly r
successes out of n trials is:
the probability that we observe X=r successes and n-r failures,
which is RrQn-r multiplied by
the number of combinations of n distinguishable elements taken
r at a time, which is n!/(r!(n-r)!)
as indicated by the binomial theorem (see Section U10.2 in module
10). Denote X as the random variable for the number of working
components.
n!
P Pr[ X r , n, p ] RQ r ( nr )

r!( n r )!
X r

The success probability for the r/n branch is then:

n n!
R P P P RQ k ( n k )

k!( n k )!
r/n Xr X r 1 X n
k r

The failure probability for the r/n branch is Qr/n=1-Rr/n, or:

r 1 n!
Q P P P RQ k ( n k )

k!( n k )!
r/n X 0 X 1 X r -1
k 0

Example:
Compute the probability of success for identical components in a
2/3 configuration if the failure probability of a component is 0.05:
3 3! 6 6
R 0.95 0.05 k ( 3 k )
0.95 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.9927
2 1 3 0

k!(3 k )! 2(1) 6
r/n
k 2

1 3! 6 6
Q 0.95 0.05 k ( 3 k )
0.95 0.05 0.95 0.05 0.0073 Note
0 3 1 2

k!(3 k )! 6 2
r/n
k 0

that the 2/3 configuration is somewhat less reliable than a fully

redundant system having 3 components each of R=0.95, which
would have Qsystem=0.053=0.000125, Rsystem=0.999875.
Non-identical components:
If the components are not identical, i.e., if they have different
failure probabilities Qi, i=1,,n, then each term in the sum
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 23

r 1 n!
Q P P P RQ k ( n k )

k!( n k )!
r/n X 0 X 1 X r -1
k 0

must be expanded to account for the different probabilities

associated with the various ways its corresponding event can occur.
For example, in a 2/3 branch, consider the event that r-1
components (or in this case, 2-1=1 component) works. For the case
of identical components, the term would be
n!
P R Q r 1 ( n r 1 )
3RQ 2

( r 1)!(n r 1)!
X r -1

The interpretation is that there are 3 possible ways that the event 1
component works can occur, with each way having probability of
RQ2.
In the case of non-identical components, there are still 3 possible
ways that the event 1 component works can occur, but each way
has a unique probability. In this case, the term PX=r-1 becomes:
PX r -1
RQ Q Q R Q QQ R
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3

Other terms in the above summation must be similarly treated.

Three comments:
Once Rr/n and Qr/n are determined, then the r/n block may be
treated as any other block within a logic diagram.
In the case of time-dependent probabilities (chapter 7), the
component success and failure probabilities used above become
Ri(t) and Qi(t), respectively.
As we have seen, partially redundant systems have a lower
reliability than fully redundant systems. So why use it?
o In some cases, partially redundant systems are a good way
to analyze some systems that that have operating
Module PE.PAS.U14.5 Analysis of series/parallel systems comprised of non-repairable components 24

conditions which reflect r/n behavior (e.g., transmission

line illustration at the beginning of this module).
o The dependency (ability to work when needed and avoid
fail-dangerous failure modes), which we have referred
to as the reliability, is certainly lower, but the security
(ability to avoid inadvertent operation and avoid fail-
safe failure modes) improves, since we need r
components to operate inadvertently rather than just 1.
This is why the r/n configuration is also called a majority
vote system. It is heavily used in special protection
systems. This points to the fact that fail-dangerous
modes of redundancy are analyzed using parallel logic,
and fail-safe modes of redundancy are analyzed using
series logic. See [6].
14.6.2 Standby systems
A system is called a standby redundant system when some of its
units remain idle until they are called for service by a sensing and
switching device. The system reliability of a redundant standby
system is heavily influenced by the reliability of the sensing device
and the switch.
Good treatment of this system is found in Billinton, Sections 4.6
and 7.6, and also in [5], pg. 203-205.

References
[1] J. Endrenyi, Reliability Modeling in Electric Power Systems, John Wiley, New York, 1978.
[2] Power System Reliability Evaluation, paper 1 by R. Allan, IEEE Tutorial Course 82 EHO 195-8-
PWR, 1982, IEEE.
[3] L. Bain and M. Engelhardt, Introduction to Probability and Mathematical Statistics, Duxbury Press,
Belmont, California, 1992.
[4] M. Modarres, M. Kaminskiy, and V. Krivsov, Reliability Engineering and Risk Analysis, A Practical
Guide, Marcel Dekker, Inc. New York, 1999.
[5] E. Elsayed, Reliability Engineering, Addison Wesley Longman, 1996.
[6] P. Anderson, Power system protection, volume III.