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Uson v. Del Rosario
Law in force at time of decedents death determines who
the heirs should be. - Maria Unson was the legal wife of
Faustino Nebrada. Faustino died in 1945 leaving 5 parcels
of land with no other heir except his legal wife.
- However, it was the common-life, Maria del Rosario who
took possession of the lands, depriving Unson the
enjoyment and possession of the same.
- Thus, the legal wife filed a case for recovery of ownership
and possession of the said parcels of land against del
Rosario.
- Maria de Rosario contended that Unson and Faustino
agreed to separate some time in 1931. Unson was given a
parcel of land as alimony on the condition that the latter will Under Art. 776, inheritance includes all the property, rights,
renounce her right to inherit any property that may be left by and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
the husband upon his death.
- Whether or not Unson is entitled to recover the parcels of
land in question.
- The SC held for Maria Unson.
- The Civil Code provides that the inheritance of a person is on the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to another at the moment of his death.
- Accordingly, the Supreme Court said that the parcels of
land of Faustino passed from the moment of his death to
his only heir, Maria Unson.
- The contention that Unson and Faustino agreed that the
former would NOT inherit anything from the latter cannot
be made effectual. Future inheritance cannot be validly
made the subject of any contract nor can it be renounced.
- Del Rosario also argued that her illegitimate children with
Faustino have the right to inherit by virtue of the provision
of the new Civil Code granting successional rights to
illegitimate children.
- Said argument is untenable. It is true that the new Civil
Code grants successional rights to illegitimate children and After the death of Lorenza, Feliciano Sr. cohabited with Paz
that this right shall be given retroactive effect even though
the event which gave rise to said right may have occurred
under the former legislation. (Faustino died in 1945, The
NCC took effect in 1950).
- However, according to the NCC, this new right must not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right.
- In this case, and as already explained, the right over the
parcels of land vested upon Unson from the moment of
death of Faustino. Thus, the new right cannot be enforced
w/out prejudice to Unsons vested right over the properties.
- Rights over the inheritance of a person are transmitted
upon his death to another.
- The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death
of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death.
Ledesma v. McLachlin
FACTS: A has a child B who has a child C. B is indebted
to a stranger, but dies before he pays the same. A then
died, leaving C as heir. In As intestate proceedings, the
stranger presents his claim for the credit. Question: Is C
bound to pay for the debt, or will As estate answer, or will
no one be held responsible?
HELD: Neither As estate nor C is liable, for neither
contracted the debt, nor may it be said that C is inheriting
from B for the truth is, C in the case presented, is
inheriting only from A. Therefore, the creditor-stranger must
shoulder the loss himself.
Rabadilla v. CA
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by
virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs,
at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent, corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
COJA VS CA
Facts: Luz Aquillo Victor (hereafter Luz) and Feliciano
Aquillo, Jr. (hereafter Feliciano Jr.), both deceased, were
the legitimate children of the late spouses Feliciano Aquillo,
Sr. (hereafter Feliciano Sr.) and Lorenza Mangarin Aquillo
(hereafter Lorenza). During their marriage, Feliciano Sr.
and Lorenza acquired a 120-square meter lot located at
Poblacion, Mandaon, Masbate, upon which they built their
conjugal home. The subject lot was covered by Tax
Declaration issued in the name of Feliciano Sr.
Lachica and lived at the aforesaid house. However, after
Lorenzas death, her heirs failed to partition their hereditary
shares in their inheritance.
On February 27, 1960, while Lorenza was cohabiting with
Feliciano Sr., Paz Lachica purchased a 192-square meter
lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 02115 from the heirs of
Juan Rivas. She later sold 40.10 square meters of the
property to Isabel L. de Real leaving her with only 151.9
square meters.
On July 7, 1965, or two (2) days before he died, Feliciano
Sr. married Paz Lachica. After Feliciano Sr. died, his heirs
also failed to partition among themselves their hereditary
shares in their inheritance.
On December 18, 1986, Paz Lachica and herein
petitioners, Spouses Charlito Coja and Annie Mesa Coja,

executed a Deed of Absolute Sale wherein the former sold
the 336-square meter parcel of land to the latter. Charlito
Coja filed an application for the issuance of title with the
Regional Trial Court Luz, being one of the heirs of Feliciano
Sr., opposed the application for registration. During the
pendency of the case, Luz died. She was substituted by her
spouse, Quinciano Victor, Sr., and her children, Lorna,
Antonio, Quinciano Jr., and Susana, all surnamed Victor.
On November 3, 1989, respondents filed an action for
recovery of possession and ownership with damages
against the petitioners and Paz Lachica.
Issue: WON TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY OF THE
COUPLE, THE LATE SPOUSES FELICIANO AQUILLO
AND LORENZA MANGARIN.
Ruling: Article 160 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
All properties acquired during the marriage are thus
disputably presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
As a condition for the operation of above article, in favor of
the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the
presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage.
Under Article 996 of the Civil Code, upon the death of
Lorenza Mangarin, one-half of said property, or 60 square
meters, is transmitted to her heirs, namely: Feliciano
Aquillo, Sr., Feliciano Aquillo, Jr., and Luz Aquillo, at 20
square meters each, while the remaining one-half is
transmitted to Feliciano Aquillo, Sr. Upon the death of
Feliciano Aquillo, Sr., his rights over the property, consisting
of the 20 square meter-inheritance from his late wife and
his 60 square meter-share in the conjugal partnership, or a
total of 80 square meters were transmitted to his heirs,
namely: Feliciano Aquillo, Jr., Luz Aquillo, and his widow,
Paz Lachica. The surviving spouse is entitled to the same
share as that of the legitimate children, to the portion of
one-third each or 26.6666 square meters each x x x. Thus,
as a result of the death of Feliciano Aquillo, Sr., a regime of
co-ownership exists among Feliciano, Jr., Luz Aquillo, and
Paz Lachica, with respect to the undivided 80 square
meters of the property covered by Tax Declaration No.
1151.
The 120 square meters less the hereditary share of Paz
Lachica which is 26.6666 square meters, or the 93.3333
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square meters of the property covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1151, belong to the appellants, being the heirs of the
late Feliciano Aquillo, Jr. and Luz Aquillo. Considering that
Paz Lachica owns only 26.6666 square meters of the 120-
square meter property and the remaining 93.3333-square
meter portion thereof is owned by the respondents, the
former could only validly sell the portion which rightfully
belonged to her. However, considering that Paz Lachica,
the predecessor-in-interest of the Spouses Coja, was a co-
owner of the subject 120-square meter property; and
considering further that partition of the property is wanting,
this Court is precluded from directing the Spouses Coja to
return specific portions of the property to respondents.
REYES ET AL VS CA
Facts: On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his
last will and testament declaring therein in part, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion "Oning" R.
Reyes the following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting
among others of jewelries, coins, antiques, statues,
tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all
the real estates I own in common with my brother Jose,
situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog,
Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camigiun; real estates in Lunao,
Gingoog, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc,
Kinoguitan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Talisay, all in the province
of Misamis Oriental.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private
respondent filed a petition for probate of the will. On July
21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato
Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and
Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceased's natural
children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape,
filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the
last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and
attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b)
that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper
influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of
the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was
never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes,
the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the
latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then
alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus,
Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open
cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.

Issue: WON the testators invalid marriage which was not
expressly provided in the will, will affect the validity of his
last will.
Ruling: In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written
decades ago, he
said A will is the testator speaking after death. Its
provisions have substantially the same force and effect in
the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in
full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they
appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law
in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and
the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them
to do so. . . . All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
testator's having meant just what he said. (Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he
was bequeathing some of his personal and real properties
to his wife, Asuncion "Oning" Reyes. There was never an
open admission of any illicit relationship. The trial court
relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that
Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time
she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the
witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to
the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed
husband of Asuncion.
8. NEPOMUCENO VS CA
Facts: Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein
he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only
executor. It was also provided therein that he was married
to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.
Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal
wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was
procured through improper and undue influence and that
there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.
The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the
testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will
invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held
that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the
petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and
1028.
Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic
validity of a will
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RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that
the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This
general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself
admitted on its face the relationship between the testator
and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the
court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the
nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only
since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily
look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a
donation made between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under
Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.
9. ENRIQUEZ VS ABADIA
Facts: Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of
Father Sancho Abadia, which was executed on September
6, 1923, filed a petition for its probate. Some cousins and
nephews of the deceased, who would inherit his estate if he
left no will, filed opposition. The trial court ruled in favor of
Enriquez, stating that even if the said document is a
holographic will, one which is not permitted by law at the
time it was executed and at the time of the testators death,
such form of a will is already allowed at the time of the
hearing of the case since the new Civil Code is already
enforced, and that to carry out the intention of the testator
which according to the trial court is the controlling factor
and may override any defect in form. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity
of the holographic will of Rev. Sanchio, the time of the
hearing of the case shall be considered and not the time of
its execution.
Ruling: No. The validity of a will is to be judged not by the
law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time
the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when
the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was execute, as supported by Art. 795 of the
new Civil Code. One reason in support of the rule is that
although the will operates upon and after the death of the
testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of
his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given

solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed
act. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its
execution then upon his death he should be regarded and
declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then
inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with
more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate
a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested
rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general
rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills. Hence,
the trial courts decision was reversed.
10. JIMENEZ VS FERNANDEZ
Facts: The land in question (2, 932 sqm) formerly belonged
to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez had 2 sons, Carlos and
Fortunato. Fortunato predeceased Fermin leaving behind a
daughter, Sulpicia. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the
entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the
name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and
niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. Carlos Jimenez died on
July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia
Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took
possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting
of 436 square meters. Melecia Jimenez sold said 436
square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto Cagampan
and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled
"Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former
transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who
has been in occupation since August 1969 -- PET executed
an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the
property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon
manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased
uncle. A TCT was then issued in petitioner's name alone
over the entire 2,932 square meter property. PET, joined by
her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery
of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436
square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and
her son.
Issue: WON Melecia Cayabyab had any right over the
eastern part of the property she took possession of and
later sold.
Ruling: Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in
question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence
to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the daughter of
Carlos Jimenez. Assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was the
illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no
question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to
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the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly
acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that
portion of the property subject of this petition.
AZNAR VS GARCIA
Facts:
Helen Christensen Garcia filed a petition for review to the
Supreme Court the decision of the lower court in Davao
declaring that Maria Lucy Christensen is the sole heir of
testator Edward Christensen. Facts of the case are as
follows:
1. Edward Christensen was born in New York but he
migrated to California where he resided for a period
of 9 years.
2. He came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death.
3. In his will, he declared to have only one child
(natural daughter) Maria Lucy Christensen as his
only heir
4. However, he left a sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia, an acknowledged natural child,
though not in any way related to the deceased.
5. Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of
the Civil Code, California law should be applied;
that under California law, the matter is referred
back to the law of the domicile.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be
applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs.
HELD:
Yes. Article 16 of the Civil Code states that succesional
rights are determined by the national law of the country
where the deceased is a citizen hence the internal law of
California since it was ruled that Edward Christensen is a
citizen of California.
Said internal law distinguishes the rule to be applied to
Californians domiciled in California and for Californians
domiciled outside of California. For Californians residing in
other jurisdiction, the law of said country must apply.
Edward Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the
law of his domicile must be followed. The case was
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine
law only.
MICIANO V. BRIMO
- The subject of this case is the partition of the estate of the
late Joseph Brimo.
- Miciano, the appointed judicial administrator, filed a
partition scheme.
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- Andre Brimo, one of Josephs borthers, opposed stating counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce
that the partition was not in accordance with Turkish laws, became final.
Jospeh being a Turkish citizen.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo
- Andre contends that this was void because the Civil Code
married Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.
states that legal and testamentary successions shall be
governed by the national law of the person whose In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where
succession is in question. he left all his estate to Alicia and their children (nothing for
Paula). In 1983, he went to court for the wills probate and
- Andre was excluded from as a legatee because of a to have Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985,
clause in the will where Joseph wished that his property be before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo
distributed in accordance with Philippine laws, and any died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration
legatee who fails to comply with this would be prevented over Lorenzos estate.
from receiving his legacy. The trial court ruled that Lorenzos marriage with Alicia is
void because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The
- Since the institution of legatees was conditioned upon trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence
Josephs wish, it is claimed that Andre is excluded by divorce is not applicable to him. The Court of Appeals
questioning the validity of applying Philippine laws in the affirmed the trial court.
partition of the estate (which was against his brothers
wish). ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzos divorce abroad should
be recognized.
WON Andre Brimo can be validly excluded as a legatee. HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo
became an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when he
- NO. The condition imposed by the will of the testator is obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an
contrary to law because it ignores the testators national American citizen. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
law, when according to the Civil Code, such national law of
the testator is to govern his testamentary dispositions. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
- As such, the condition is considered unwritten and the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
institution of legatees in the will is unconditional and Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws
consequently valid and effective even as to Andre. relating to family rights, duties, or status are no longer
applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he
- The remaining clauses of the will are valid despite the obtained abroad must be respected. The rule is: aliens may
nullity of the clause stating that the testators testamentary obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
dispositions be governed by Philippine laws. their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so
- Art. 792, (Old) Civil Code: Impossible conditions and those
as for the latter to determine the effects of the divorce as to
contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise Anent the issue on Lorenzos last will and testament, it must
provide. be respected. He is an alien and is not covered by our laws
on succession. However, since the will was submitted to
LLORENTE VS CA our courts for probate, then the case was remanded to the
lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in to prove the validity of the will.
the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente got married
in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American
citizen. Nepomuceno v. CA
In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. FACTS:
He discovered that Paula was already living illicitly with Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last
Ceferino Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula Will and Testament before he died. Petitioner was named
even had a son. as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had
give her monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula two legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his
agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the
if the latter agrees to waive all monetary support from petitioner were married despite the subsisting first marriage.
Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the United States. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to
petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula
for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her
in California. Paula was represented by an American
children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper

influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the
execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and
that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage
with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on
the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to
cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On
June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of
the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and
void.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after
declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.
HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its
jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn,
it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and
declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of
the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v.
Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following
donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons
who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned
in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply
to testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the
fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed
his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
Reyes v. CA
281 SCRA 277 | Tan
FACTS:
This case involves a 383 sq.m. parcel of land
owned by pettitioners and respondents father. Petitioner
alleges that a Deed of Exrajudicial Partition (Deed) was
entered into between him and the respondents. Petitioner
managed to register 335 sq.m. of the land under his name;
while 50 sq.m. of the land was registered under the name of
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his sister, Paula (one of the respondents). After discovering
the registration of the Deed, respondents denied having
knowledge of its execution and disclaimed having signed
the same; nor did they ever waive their rights, shares and
interest in the subject parcel of land. According to
respondents, subject Deed was fraudulently prepared by
petitioner and that their signatures thereon were forged.
They also assert that one Atty. Jose Villena, the Notary
Public who notarized the said Deed was not even
registered in the list of accredited Notaries Public of Pasay
City.
Thereafter, petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale selling 240 square meters of the land to his children.
After the property was partitioned, petitioner, his children
and private respondent Paula allegedly executed a Deed of
Co-owners' Partition dividing the property among
themselves. This led the respondents to file a Complaint for
"Annulment of Sale and Damages With Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order" before the RTC,
which ruled that private respondents' signatures on the
questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement
were indeed forged and simulated. The CA affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Deed was forged.
2. Whether petitioner(s) had become absolute owners of
the subject property by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
RULING:
1. YES. Petitioner(s) cast doubt on the findings of the
lower court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
regarding the existence of forgery. Factual findings of
the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal. Petitioners' ludicrous claim that
private respondents imputed no deception on his part
but only forgery of the subject Deed and the simulation
of their signatures is nothing short of being oxymoronic.
For what is forgery and simulation of signatures if not
arrant deception! The allegation made by petitioner that
the execution of a public document ratified before a
notary public cannot be impugned by the mere denial of
the signatory is baseless. It should be noted that there
was a finding that the subject Deed was notarized by
one Atty. Villena who at that time was not
commissioned as a notary in Pasay City.
2. NO. Petitioners cannot justify their ownership and
possession of the subject parcel of land since they
could not ave been possessors in good faith of the
subject parcel of land considering the finding that at the
very inception they forged the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Settlement which they claim to be the
basis for their just title. Having forged the Deed and
simulated the signatures of private respondents,
petitioners, in fact, are in bad faith. The forged Deed
containing private respondents' simulated signatures is
a nullity and cannot serve as a just title. There can be
no acquisitive prescription considering that the parcel of
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land in dispute is titled property, i.e., titled in the name Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired
of the late Bernardino Reyes, the father of both Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which,
petitioner Florentino and the private respondents. Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and testament.
Dorotheo v. CA She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1,
FACTS: 2 and 4 thereof.
Private respondents were the legitimate children of
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia
1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa
thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and
petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she
before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know
the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued and treated Paciencia as his own mother.
an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they
filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981),
trial court granted the motion and issued an order. Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the
she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they
were not married to each other.
More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr.
Later on, Judge Zain B. Angas set aside the final
27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua,
and executory Order, as well as the Order directing the
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for
issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the
the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in
character.
On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed
ISSUE: an opposition to Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that the
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but properties subject of Paciencias Will belong to Nicomeda
declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia
and executory still be given effect? had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the
petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the
HELD: state of being mangulyan or forgetful making her unfit for
No. A final and executory decision or order can no executing a will and that the execution of the will had been
longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.
may be. In setting aside the Order that has attained finality,
the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made
by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of
cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was
superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and
of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of
ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.
erroneous, is binding on the whole world.

Dorotheo v. CA
Due execution of a will includes a determination of whether
the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time
of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and
was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue
influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that
he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
Baltazar vs. Laxa
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made
her last will and testament in the Pampango dialect on
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and
concluded that when Paciencia signed the will, she was no
longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of
mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate
of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for
review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the
will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for
probate.

HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will
shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by
law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all
present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of
one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the
signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although
they question of her state of mind when she signed the
same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at
the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of
the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA
that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: To be
of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in
full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind
be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was
able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty,
and the character of the testamentary act.
AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and CASTILLO
FACTS: On 10 April 1984, petitioner Felix Azuela (son of
the cousin of the decedent) fi led a petition to probate the
notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila. The will, consisting of two (2) pages
and written in the vernacular Pilipino, was witnessed by
three witnesses who affi xed their signatures on the left-
hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom
of the attestation clause. The petition was opposed by
Geralda Castillo who represented herself as the attorney-in-
fact of the 12 legitimate heirs of the decedent.
Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that
the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be
utilized as a defense in the case fi led by oppositor against
petitioner for forcible entry and usurpation of real property,
all centering on petitioners right to occupy the properties of
the decedent. Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that
the will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not
appear on the second page of the will, and the will was
not properly acknowledged.
ISSUE: Was the will fatally defective since the attestation
clause did not state the number of pages of the will and that
is was signed by the witnesses on the left margin?
HELD: Yes, the will is fatally defective. Re Number of
Pages: The attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages of the will. As held in Uy Coque v. Navas L.
8
Sioca (43 Phil., 405), the Court noted that among the
defects of the will in question was the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in
the will. In ruling that the will could not be admitted to
probate, the Court said: The purpose of requiring the
number of sheets to be stated in the attestation
clause is obvious; the document might easily be so
prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely
change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the
absence of a statement of the total number of sheets, such
removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and
changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or
pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets
is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the
document will involve the inserting of new pages and the
forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the
margin, a matter attended with much greater diffi culty.
The case of Taboada v. Hon. Rosal wherein the Court
allowed the will to probate despite the fact that the
attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the
will is not applicable. This is so because although the
attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of
pages used in the will, the same was found in the last part
of the body of the Will. The attestation clause must
contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages
composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it
will have the effect of invalidating the will if the defi ciency
cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself.
The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the
number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard
against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of
its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates
with the absence of an averment on the part of the
instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted
the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just
witnessed and subscribed to.
Re Signature of Witnesses: While the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of
the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation
clause. Cagro v. Cagro is applicable in this case. While
three (3) Justices considered the signature requirement had
been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6),
speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the
attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering
the will fatally defective. There is no question that the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear
at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-
hand margin. The attestation clause is a memorandum of
the facts attending the execution of the will required by law
to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signatures. The string of mortal
defects which the will in question suffers from makes the
probate denial inexorable.

ORTEGA V. VALMONTE
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the
United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who
was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last
will and testament written in English and consisting of 2
pages, and dated 15 June 1983but acknowledged only on
9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of this will was
opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister. According to the notary
public who notarized the testators will, after the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on
the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15
August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and
his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary
public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to
come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was
actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer
changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he
did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioners argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido
was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound
mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3
attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it.
Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of
the execution and the attestation of the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he
allegedly executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by
fraud or trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to
identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the
extent of his shares in them and even their location. As
regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was
sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary.
The omission of some relatives from the will did not
affect its formal validity. There being no showing of
fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or
pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may
be of such character that the testator is misled or
deceived as to the nature or contents of the document
which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic
fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which
the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for
fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of
proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
9
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible
evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the
dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the
document, because the law does not even require
that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged
on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of
the will as to its supposed execution and attestation
was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the
notary public and instrumental witnesses.
JABONETA VS. GUSTILO
In these proceedings, the will of Mario Jaboneta was
denied probate by the lower court on the ground that
Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his
signature thereto in the presence of Jena, another of the
witnesses. It is admitted that after the testator and the
witnesses Jalbuena and Jena had signed the will and all
of the pages thereof, the latter stood up and left the room
just as the third witness Javellana was signing the will
and all of the pages thereof. The question now is did
Javellana sign his name in the presence of Jena as
Required by law?
According to the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Carson:
We cannot agree with so much of the above fi nding of
the facts as holds that the signature of Javellana was not
signed in the presence of Jena. The fact that Jena was
still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand
and pen in the act of affi xing his signature to the will,
taken together with the testimony of the remaining
witnesses, which shows that Javellana did in fact there
and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the
signature was affi xed in the presence of Jena. The fact
that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was
turned, while a portion of the name of the witness was
being written is of no importance. He, with the other
witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the
purpose of executing the testament, and were together in
the same room for that purpose and at the moment
when the witness, Javellana signed the document he was
actually and physically present and in such position with
relation to Javellana that he could see everything which
took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper
direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent
his doing so, therefore, we are of the opinion that the
document was in fact signed before he fi nally left the
room. This conclusion is in accordance with American
authorities which hold that the true test of presence of the
testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not
whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether
they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to
do so, considering their mental and physical condition
and position with relation to each other at the moment of
inscription of each signature.

CANEDA V. CA
- On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower
without any children and already in the twilight years of his
life, executed a last will and testament at his residence
before 3 witnesses.
- He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
- In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by
way of legacies and devises his real and personal
properties to several people all of whom do not appear to
be related to the testator.
- 4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case
seeking the probate of his last will and testament, but
numerous postponements pushed back the initial hearing
of the probate court regarding the will.
- On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his
petition could finally be heard by the probate court.
- Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought
his appointment as special administrator of the testators
estate.
- Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and
nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition for
intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of
the testators will and the appointment of a special
administrator for his estate.
- Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William
Cabrera as special administrator and gave an order that the
testate proceedings for the probate of the will had to be
heard and resolved first.
- In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to
the allowance of the testators will on the ground that on
the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already
in poor state of health such that he could not have possibly
executed the same. Also the genuineness of the signature
of the testator is in doubt.
- On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the
notary public testified that the testator executed the will in
question in their presence while he was of sound and
disposing mind and that the testator was in good health
and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution
of his will.
- Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will
in question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo
Caballero.
- CA affirmed the probate courts decision stating that it
substantially complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.
WON, the attestation clause in the will of the testator is
fatally defective or can be cured under the art. 809.
- No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.
10
- Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to
809. The will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the attesting witnesses. The attestation
clause need not be written in a language known to the
testator or even to the attesting witnesses.
- It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts
surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by
the witnesses it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law
has been observed.
- The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal
guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the
authenticity thereof.
- It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in
the will failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its
pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses,
likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other. And the Court
agrees.
- The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
- The phrase, and he has signed the same and every page
thereof, on the space provided for his signature and on the
left hand margin, obviously refers to the testator and not
the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded
by the words as his last will and testament.
- Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. That the absence of the
statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection
which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will
that is here sought to be probated.
- Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because
the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will
in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
defect in this case is not only with respect to the form or
the language of the attestation clause. The defects must
be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself
which is clearly lacking in this case.
- Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case
for the intestate proceedings shall be revived.
- Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will
when it does not pertain to the form or language of the will.
This is because there is not substantial compliance with
Article 805.

ECHAVEZ VS DOZEN CONSTRUCTION
FACTS
Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of the
subject lots donated to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel)
through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa, sans attestation
clause, acknowledged before a notary public. Manuel
accepted the donation. Vicente sold the same lots in favor
of Dozen Construction and Development Corporation
(Dozen Corporation). Manuel filed a petition to approve
Vicentes donation mortis causa in his favor and an action
to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of
Dozen Corporation.
ISSUE Whether or not the donation mortis causa is valid
despite the non-conformity with the formalities of a will.
RULING
NO. A donation mortis causa must comply with the
formalities prescribed by law for the validity of
wills, otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no
effect. Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have
been applied. Although the witnesses in the present case
acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis
Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the
law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the
execution of a decedents will. Hence, the donation is void,
while the sale to Dozen Construction is valid.
CRUZ V. VILLASOR
FACTS:
The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z.
Cruzs last will and testament. His surviving spouse,
Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of the will alleging it
was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and
undue influence; that the said instrument was execute
without the testator having been fully informed of the
content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was
disposing and that the supposed last will and testament
was not executed in accordance with law. Agapita appealed
the allowance of the will by certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was executed in accordance with law
(particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the NCC, the first
requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and
subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator
and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary
public.).
HELD:
NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will,
one of them (Atty. Teves) is at the same time the Notary
Public before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will was
11
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before
means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to
own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in
front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if
the third witness were the notary public himself, he would
have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in
front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot
split his personality into two so that one will appear before
the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of
the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be
sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the function of
a notary public is, among others, to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That
function would defeated if the notary public were one of the
attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in
inconsistent position and the very purpose of
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be
thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding
that notary public may, in addition, act as a witness to the
executive of the document he has notarized. There are
others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will
nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these
authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this
jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because
the notaries public and witnesses referred to in these cases
merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting
witnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses. Here, the
notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also
acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article
805-06. Probate of will set aside.
Alvarado v. Gaviola
226 SCRA 347 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER
FACTS:
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado
executed a notarial will entitled Huling Habilin wherein he
disinherited an illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and
expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the
time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna.
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he
was present when the said notarial will was executed, together
with three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where
the testator did not read the will himself, suffering as he did
from glaucoma.
Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and
read the same aloud before the testator, the three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, the latter four following the
reading with their own respective copies previously furnished
them.
Thereafter, a codicil entitled Kasulatan ng Pagbabago
ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa
Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado was executed changing
 12

some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the
testators eye operation.
Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado
and was read in the same manner as with the previously
executed will.
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for
probate, Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the
will was not executed and attested as required by law; that the
testator was insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and
old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of
fear or threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature of
the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the
will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will
to himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they
are not in accordance with his wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which,
when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.

ISSUE:
W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to
probate despite allegations of defects in the execution and
attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of
execution and the double-reading requirement under Art. 808 of
the NCC was not complied with.

HELD:
YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the
letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with
the substantial requirements of law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which,
when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father
was not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will
and codicil were executed, but he can be so considered for
purposes of Art. 808.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial
compliance where the purpose of the law has been satisfied:
that of making the provisions known to the testator who is blind
or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate)
and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his wishes.
Rino read the testators will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and
the notary public.
Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed,
upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his
instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take
place.
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and
the codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated
to the testator.
With four persons, mostly known to the testator,
following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can
be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured
that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on
the typewritten documents.