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Consti Ch6 Separation of Powers
Consti Ch6 Separation of Powers
Consti Ch6 Separation of Powers
Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court
challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The
Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(DENR Administrative Order No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the FTAA dated
March 30, 1995,6 executed by the government with Western Mining
Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On January 27, 2004, the Court en
banc promulgated its Decision granting the Petition and declaring the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as
of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly
on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987
Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar
to service contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution,
were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of
sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign
control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the
Filipino nation. The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors
who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign
contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including
operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of
production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the
disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective
ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial
ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987
Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service
contracts. Subsequently, respondents filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated March 9, 2004, the Court required
petitioners to comment thereon. In the Resolution of June 8, 2004, it set the
case for Oral Argument on June 29, 2004.
Held: Yes. The notion that the deliberations reflect only the views of those
members who spoke out and not the views of the majority who remained
In any event, each and every one of the commissioners had the opportunity
to speak out and to vote on the matter. Moreover, the individual
explanations of votes are on record, and they show where each delegate
stood on the issues. In sum, we cannot completely denigrate the value or
usefulness of the record of the ConCom, simply because certain members
chose not to speak out.
Neither were they so nave as to believe that these entities would provide
assistance without conditionalities or some quid pro quo. Definitely, as
business persons well know and as a matter of judicial notice, this matter is
not just a question of signing a promissory note or executing a technology
transfer agreement. Foreign corporations usually require that they be given
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court
with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for
the 1st district of Tayabas province.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit
the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He
contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said
Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the
Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear
the case.
RULING: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935
Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the
Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the
special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a
lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of
the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer
its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
Facts of the Case: The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946
to the President and the Congress a report regarding the national elections
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved
referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
E. Romero who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator
receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the
Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of
the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their
election.
Issues of the Case: Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the
jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are
valid.
Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera,
Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and
decision on the protests lodged against their elections.
FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against
the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a
resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose
the name of a person with whom he transacted business in relation to a
government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The
circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion
case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to
hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply with an order in
a legislative inquiry.
Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos
in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the
Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted
Resolution No. 114. The title of the resolution states:
xxx
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean
L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was committed to prison for
contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in
a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the
Senate to hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and
confinement, said power and authority having been held to be coercive
rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should
have given the information which he had withheld and continues
contumaciously to withhold;
xxx
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault and ordered
his release.
1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the Senate.
1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review the
findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating
that petitioner has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to
reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000 and that the
situation of petitioner has not materially charged since he was committed
to prison, clearly shows that the Senate believes that Arnault was still
trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself to
review such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the
questions of the Senate in its investigation of the Buenavista and
Tambobong deal.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower
court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings
of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or
The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This power
is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied
or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate
said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and
information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and
compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent
to punish a defiance of its power and authority? The legislative department
should not be constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of
refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and
contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to judicial
interference, except when there
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited
constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate
his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as
acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in
intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They
have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the
election is clean, fair and honest.
HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the
issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not
issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question
(from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the
act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which
can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the
scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election.
The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their
ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a
new president.
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada invoked his right to speak
on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President
Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949).
On the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of the
session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Mariano
Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open
session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and
delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being
raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and
they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order.
Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder.
Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be
placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his
chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas
Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made
that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it
incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to
paralyze the functions of the Senate. Taada was subsequently recognized
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the
resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a
continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators
(Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al)
twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous
endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital
while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take
cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the
decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there
is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are
24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the
other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it
change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case
12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when
Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.
Marcos v. Manglapus
Issue: WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines, in the exercise of the powers granted in her by the Constitution.
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Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court
to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a
"travel documents "to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of
his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the
Marcoses "to return "in the Philippines is guaranteed by "the Bill of Rights,
specifically "Sections "1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court
may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under "international law, their right "to return "to the
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on "Civil "and Political
Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Held:"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
right to "travel from "the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right "to return "to
The Bill of rights "treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but
it is a well considered view that the right "to return "may be considered, as
a generally accepted principle of "International Law "and under our
Constitution as part of the law of the land. "
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his
family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President
Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the
Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years
after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting
their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest
case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the
National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may
not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining
a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term,
salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party.
Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who
lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members.
It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of
the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority
party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one
minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the
minority were filled in by the NP. Taada assailed this process before the
Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET
would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the
Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator
Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court
cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question.
Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested
in the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to
raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of
public opinion.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is
a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means
in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court
is not being asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate.
The issue being raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5
NP members to the SET are valid which is a judicial question. Note that
the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does
not perform legislative acts.
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed
seat of the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In
this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members
that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the
majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET
(referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the
SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply
with the Constitution.
Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator
Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of
20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was
assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had
voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that
Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition,
regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light
of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction
over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.
FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in
filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the
petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes
against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel
the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms
of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
and other international tribunals.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine
government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and
welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five
years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions,
and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties
and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in
time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will
not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes
committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the
time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and
custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that
they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by
general international norms of equivalent authority
Facts: The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines
since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several
legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel
is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40
million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings,
schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants,
medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment is approved or
concurred by the legislator concerned.
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy,
exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission
on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the
pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
HELD:
a. Separation of Powers
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of
the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate
funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it)
collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in
the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to
the individual member of Congress.
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But
with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass
or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel
system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part
of legislators.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel
is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of
the Constitution which provides:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected
from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article
VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not
have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as
in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.