Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.

Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or caused to be
slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal
treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No.
1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.

It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act
No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.
Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:

SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon
permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the original
certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for
unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which
permit to slaughter has been requested.

SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless such
animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be given to
slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption.

SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him, and such
record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age, brands, knots of radiated
hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the animal for the
slaughter of which permit is issued and the date on which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be
alphabetically arranged in the record, together with date of permit.

A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial treasurer,
who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner, together with date of permit.

SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for food at
the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment,
in the discretion of the court.

It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained in
section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in
a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large
cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is
urged that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition
nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.

We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and
specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the
penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere,
without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a
municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.

It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and examined apart from
the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be
taken as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the
words "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section
33; and the other whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting
merely the words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole
Act, and keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the
latter construction is that which should be adopted.

The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the
recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it provides an
elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout
the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all
transfers of large cattle unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality
where the contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in
possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order to make it difficult for any one
but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others. But the
usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the
brands and marks on each separate animal throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally
destroyed, if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates of registry by the
person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately
or in a clandestine manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30 and 33
prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such
animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed
records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.

If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it will readily be
seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the brands and marks of
identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully
in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of
municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger
of detection incident to the bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other
identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which
the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions
of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion,
therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for
human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.

It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the "killing for food at a
municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition is clearly included in the general
prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable that the
requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was expressly and specifically mentioned out of
superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the
municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the passage of local
ordinances or regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouse.

Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same conclusion. One of the
secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos fit for
agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human consumption. A construction which would limit the
prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses,
leaving unprohibited and unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat
the purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it should
be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction
which we have placed upon it, which tends to make effective the provisions of this as well as all the other sections of
the Act.

It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him on
the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes." Counsel for appellant contends
that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as food,
without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural
work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of
Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law."

It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the statute
constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the
compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But
whatever may be the basis of his contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications
understood, the language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55,
where the question involved was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying
away by any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the town of
Chesea,) that the law in question "is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such
particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or
greatly impair the public rights and interest of the community."

It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao owners in these
Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute; and that, without inquiring what
quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts
from their right and authority, and in some degree interferes with their exclusive possession and control of their
property, so that if the regulations in question were enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these
regulations are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we
are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the right and title of the owners, as is involved in
the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is
no more than "a just restrain of an injurious private use of the property, which the legislature had authority to
impose."

In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was
reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the
right of eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:

We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of
it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to
the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights of property, like all
other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think
necessary and expedient.

This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and appropriate
private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition
of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude to is rather the police power, the
power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same.

It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its boundaries
or prescribe limits to its exercise.

Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human
consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a
"public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It
is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be determental to the
public welfare. And we think that an examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public
interest which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that
the limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the particular provisions of the
statute under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general
welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign police power which every State possesses for the
general public welfare and which "reaches to every species of property within the commonwealth."

For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had threatened the
total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy, eighty, and in some cases as
much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the principal occupation of the
people, and the carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes,
the ravages of the disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the
country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of the
inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to spend many
millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the
arable rice lands of the country could easily be made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The
drain upon the resources of the Islands was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast
of the people, and in many provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently
hopeless struggle for existence with which they were confronted.

To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the immediate
needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the United States as a relief or
famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the provinces where the need was most
pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the crops throughout
the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.

Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural community material
progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of the work animals upon which such a
community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the products of the fields to
market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to increase the supply of these animals by importation,
but, as appears from the official reports on this subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of
those animals which had been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout the
Islands where the need for them was greatest.

At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and applications of preventive
and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have proved in some degree successful in protecting
the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the gradual increase and redistribution of these animals
throughout the Archipelago, in response to the operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in
practically relieving those sections which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.

As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three to five fold or
more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted prove entirely successful,
the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall have more nearly
equalized the supply to the demand.

Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of cattle
stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a special law penalizing
with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property by roving bands; and it must be
assumed from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of
special and somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and
restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the
branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were
enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the
circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of
carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the
exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming
disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.

It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and records of the
administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the material welfare and future
prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept away the work
animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law under consideration, but that the very life and existence of
the inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of
large cattle by disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the
Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and
penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of
ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of
self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, we think that the
reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to
be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.

As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):

The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the
appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential
to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary
proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the
State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by;
the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction
of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and
other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable
trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those
afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the
suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and
places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public
interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to
determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify
the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second,
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily
interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In
 other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive,
but is subject to the supervision of the court.

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration
was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work
or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of
momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of
the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general
police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no
question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are
concerned."

And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:

It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may be exercised,
because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict with a similar
exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety.
And there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public authorities to interfere with the control
by individuals of their property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have fully observed all
their duties to their fellows and to the State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity
demands the interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it becomes necessary
to take, use, or destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a
pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity. Here the individual is in no
degree in fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The establishment of
limits within the denser portions of cities and villages within which buildings constructed of inflammable
materials shall not be erected or repaired may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private
property; but regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may
also be established for the general good, even though they prevent the owners of water-fronts from building
out on soil which constitutes private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the
protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish
regulations to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with
other persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the legislature
have authority" to impose.

So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances, and
without the fault of the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now become a
public nuisance, endangering the public health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon
this grounds; and churchyards which prove, in the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the
public health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery purposes.

These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States clearly indicate the
wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of the statute
in question being a proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill,
which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law," a provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United States, and is found in
substance in the constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-27489. April 30, 1970.]

LEONORA TANTOY VDA. DE MACABENTA, for herself and in behalf of her minor child, RAQUEL MACABENTA,
claimants-appellees, v. DAVAO STEVEDORE TERMINAL COMPANY, Respondent-Appellant.

Peregrino M. Andres for Claimants-Appellees.

H. A. Cabarroguis & Associates for Respondent-Appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT; DEPENDENTS OF INJURED EMPLOYER. From the
express language of the Workmens Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him
totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried,
whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased, are considered dependents.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the
marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his death she was marked to him.

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY OF COURT TO APPLY THE LAW TO FACTS AS FOUND.
Where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. What is more, we have taken pains
to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely
to attach to it a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrases of an aphorism from Holmes is not
inappropriate. there can always occur to intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may, without due
reflection, be considered not too far-fetched.

4. ID.; ID.; SETTLED RULE. The Court has constantly held from the early cases of Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485, a 1909
decision, in United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 and again in Riera v. Palmori, 40 Phil. 105 (1919) that , assuming a choice is
necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should
prevail and that no construction is to be adopted that would "tend to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

5. ID.; ID.; WHERE POLICY OF LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY COURT TO GIVE EFFECT. Once the policy of purpose of the law has
been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefor, as to the
meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao
Stevedore Terminal Company.

6. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT; INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION, TO BE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE. "To state the constructions sought to be fastened on the clear and
explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It comes into collision with the constitutional command pursuant to the social
justice principle that the government extend protection to labor." How could such an intent then be imputed to the legislative
body. No such suspicious ought to be entertained that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any provision of the
Workmens Compensation Act could be so worded as to deny protection to the laboring elements and their dependents and
thus frustrate the constitutional objective of social justice.

7. ID.; ID.; WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION; FINDINGS OF FACT IT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, NOT
DISTURBED ON APPEAL; INSTANT CASE. The alleged error that the accident resulting in the death of Condrado Macabenta
could not be considered as having arisen out of and in the course of employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts
as set forth in the decision, which must be accepted by us in view of their being based on substantial evidence argue against
the condensation of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.

8. ID.; ID.; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION TO SUPREME COURT
ASCERTAINTMENT OF CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF CONFLICTING EVIDENCE, BEYOND AUTHORITY IN APPEALS BY
CERTIORARI. The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight of conflicting evidence is, however, beyond the province
of our authority in appeals by certiorari. Even if the possibility that the Commissions conclusions were erroneous could not
be ruled out, still, to borrow the language of justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation
Commission, such errors would constitute mere errors of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse of discretion on its
part.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

The success of the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company in imparting plausibility to the novel question raised as to
whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as the posthumous
child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmens Compensation Act may be gauged by the fact
that we gave due course to the petition for the review of a decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission answering
the question in the affirmative and sustaining the right to compensation of the claimant Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta
for herself and in behalf of her minor child, Raquel Macabenta. After hearing the parties and in the right of the language of
the law, its manifest purpose, and the constitutional provisions on social justice and protection to labor, we answer the
question similarly. We affirm the appealed decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission.

In the decision rendered by the then Chairman of the Commission, Nieves Baens del Rosario, dated September 27, 1966, it is
stated that there is no dispute "that at the time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which
led to his death on September 29, 1961, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already
been living together as husband and wife for the past three months. However. on the day following the accident, they were
lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital in Davao City where the deceased was
hospitalized up to his death. It is noteworthy that the marriage was facilitated through the intercession of the general
manager of the respondent company." 1 The decision likewise noted that the claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to
the posthumous daughter of the deceased who was given the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta.

As to how the deceased Conrado Macabenta met his accident, the decision, after stating that the deceased was a laborer in
the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company at Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in
Davao City, went on as follows: "Although some sort of quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the
sawmill, many of them apparently preferred to commute, and the deceased in particular went home about three times a
week. While the respondent, through its lone witness and at the same time production manager, Sergio Dalisay, disclaimed
the claimants declarations that the company provided a service pickup to transport its employees to and from work, the
synthesis of the very same testimonial evidence does not support this denial, but on the contrary tends to bring out the fact
that the respondent did furnish transportation." 2 As a result, it reversed the finding of the then acting referee of its regional
office in Davao City and awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount of P2,708.00
as compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorneys fees.

Hence, this petition for review, which, as noted, was given due course primarily due to the question raised being one of first
impression. As announced at the opening of this opinion, we uphold the Workmens Compensation Commission.

1. From the express language of the Workmens Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent
upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and
unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered dependents. 3 Claimant here is clearly the
widow of the deceased Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no
question that at the time of his death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the letter of the law. Nor
can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel Macabenta, also falls within the words the Act employs. As set forth in the
decision, while the marriage took place on Sept. 14, 1961, the widow and the deceased had already been living together as
husband and wife the preceding three months. The child born of such relationship, later legalized, is, as made clear in the
decision, the posthumous daughter of the deceased. What the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company seems bent in
ignoring is that our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived child born for all purposes that are favorable to
her provided the birth is attended with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at the time she is completely
delivered from the mothers womb. 4 Here, fortunately, the child has survived the ordeal of the loss of the one called upon to
support her, her father, who, unfortunately however, met his death before her birth.

Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as
found. 5 What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an interpretation, even
if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A
paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. There can always occur to an intelligence hostile to a piece of
legislation a misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched. The employer in this case,
without impugning its motives, must have succumbed to such a temptation, quite understandable but certainly far from
justifiable. It is quite obvious then why we find its stand devoid of merit.

2. Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been
ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. 6 Even if honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the
meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao
Stevedore Terminal Company. We have never deviated from our constant holding from Ty Sue v. Hord, 7 a 1909 decision,
that, assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the statute
and its purpose should prevail. Again, as far back as United States v. Toribio, 8 decided the next year, we made
unmistakable our view that no construction is to be adopted that would bend "to defeat the purpose and object of the
legislator." We made use of an expression almost identical in Riera v. Palmaroli 9 with our warning against so narrowly
interpreting a statute "as to defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator." The employer in this case should have been well
advised to take into consideration the teachings of the above cases before it sought to press upon us the desirability of
imparting to the applicable statutory language a meaning that would render fruitless the purpose so clearly evident on the
face of the Workmens Compensation Act.

3. There is still another avenue of approach that similarly calls for the affirmance of the decision of the Workmens
Compensation Commission now on appeal. This is apparent from an excerpt from a recent case of Automotive Parts &
Equipment Company, Incorporated v. Lingad: 10 "To state the construction sought to be fastened on the clear and explicit
language of the statute is to reject it. It comes into collision with the constitutional command pursuant to the social justice
principle that the government extend protection to labor." How could such an intent then be imputed to the legislative body.
No such suspicion ought to be entertained that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any provision of the Workmens
Compensation Act could be so worded as to deny protection to the laboring elements and their dependents and thus frustrate
the constitutional objective of social justice. To quote from the Lingad case anew: "For it is undeniable that every statute,
much more so one arising from a legislative implementation of a constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no
question as to its conformity with what the fundamental law requires need arise.

4. The basic question in this petition for review thus disposed of, there is nothing to stand in the way of the affirmance of the
decision now on appeal. The alleged error that the accident resulting in the death of Conrado Macabenta could not be
considered as having arisen out of and in the course of employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts as set forth in
the decision, which must be accepted by us in view of their being based on substantial evidence argue against the contention
of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. As we had occasion to state only last month in B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v.
Acebedo: 11 "Nor can the conclusion reached by respondent Commission be repudiated unless on a clear showing of failure
to consider the evidence on record or failure to consider fundamental and patent logical relationships in the evidence,
amounting to a clear travesty of justice or grave abuse of discretion. What was said by us in Basaysay v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, through the present Chief Justice, bears repeating: The task of ascertaining the credibility and
weight of conflicting evidence, is, however, beyond the province of our authority in appeals by certiorari. Even if the
possibility that the Commissions conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow the language of Justice
Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation Commission.such errors would constitute mere errors
of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse of discretion on its part."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission of September 27, 1966 is affirmed. With costs
against respondent Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Castro, Zaldivar, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

Endnotes:

1. Petition, Decision, Annex A, p. 1.

2. Ibid, p. 3.

3. Section 9 of the Workmens Compensation Act, Republic Act No. 3428 (1927) as amended, reads as follows: "Dependents
of the injured person. The following persons, and no others shall be considered as dependents and entitled to compensation
under the provisions of this Act; A son or daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and
unmarried, whether actually dependent upon the deceased or not; The widow, only if she was living with the deceased or
was actually dependent upon him, totally or partly." cralaw virt ua1aw lib rary

4. According to the Civil Code:" [Art.] 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. [Art.] 41.
For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mothers womb.
However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four
hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

5. Cf. People v. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, L-21881,
March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 917; Dequito v. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1352; Padilla v. City of Pasay, L-24039,
June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1349; Garcia v. Vasquez, L-26808, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 505; La Perla Cigar & Cigarette
Factory v. Capapas. L-27948 & 28001-11, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1085; Mobil Oil Philippines v. Diocares, L-26371, Sept. 30,
1969, 29 SCRA 656; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, L-25659, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111.

6. Cf. Sarcos v. Castillo, L-29755, Jan. 31, 1959, 26 SCRA 853.

7. 12 Phil. 485.

8. 15 Phil. 85.

9. 40 Phil. 105 (1919).

10. L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248.

11. L-29551, March 25, 1970, citing Batangas Transportation Co. v. Rivera, L-14427, Aug. 29, 1960; Basaysay v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-16438, Nov. 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 530 and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-20614 and L-21517, May 25, 1964, 11 SCRA 60. Cf. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-25640, March 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 1215 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, L-25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 123779. April 17, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN SURIAGA y

CHAVEZ, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

It is always a distressing task to impose the death penalty on an accused. However, it is the bounden duty of
this Court to apply the law imposing such penalty when justified. Dura lex, sed lex.
On February 22, 1995, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 78, Quezon
City, charging Ruben Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz and Joel Isidera with kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention committed as follows:

That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of January 22, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RUBEN SURIAGA and ROSITA DELA
CRUZ, being private individuals, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away NICOLE
RAMOS, a 2-year old female child, without the consent of her parents, for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the latter, and immediately thereafter, the said accused still conspiring together,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously detain her and deprive her of her freedom and liberty up to and until about 4:30 oclock
in the afternoon of the following day.

That accused JOEL ISIDERA, having learned of the kidnapping and without having participated
therein either as principal or accomplice, take part subsequent to its commission by assisting the
principal accused, RUBEN SURIAGA and ROSITA DELA CRUZ, to profit by the effects of the
crime by accompanying and driving for accused RUBEN SURIAGA to the place where the pay-off
was made and receiving the ransom money in the amount of P100,000.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the parents of NICOLE RAMOS, spouses Johnny and Mercedita Ramos in the said
amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

No bail was recommended for Ruben Suriaga.

During the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial conference on March 8, 1995, accused Suriaga, through his
counsel de parte manifested that he was willing to enter a plea of guilty to the offense charged provided that the
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
Upon arraignment, however, Suriaga and his co-accused entered a plea of Not guilty.
The relevant facts established by the prosecution are:
On January 22, 1995, at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, Edwin Ramos, a prosecution witness, was
cleaning the car of his older brother, Johnny Ramos at Sangangdaan, Caloocan City. The latter was taking care
of his 2-year old daughter, Nicole, who was then playing inside the car.[1]
Suriaga, a cousin of the Ramos brothers, arrived. He was accompanied by his live-in-partner and co-accused
Rosita dela Cruz.[2] Suriaga requested Edwin if he could drive the car, but the latter declined, saying he did not
have the keys.[3] Meanwhile, Johnny returned to his house because a visitor arrived. At this instance, Rosita held
Nicole and cajoled her. Rosita asked Edwin if she could take Nicole with her to buy barbeque at Monumento,
Caloocan City. Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long time and because he trusted her, Edwin
acceded. When Rosita and the child left, Suriaga joined them.[4]
But after the lapse of more than one hour, they failed to return. Worried, Edwin rushed inside the house and
after being told by Johnny that Nicole has not yet arrived, he (Edwin) searched for her at the Sangangdaan Market,
Caloocan City, but there was no trace of the child, nor of her companions.[5]
At the same time, Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, began their search in the entire vicinity of their
barangay.[6] Then they proceeded to Ever Gotesco along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, but they could
not find their daughter and Rosita.
At the Ramos residence, Nicoles grandfather received a phone call asking for ransom in the amount
of P100,000. 00. He recognized that the caller was Suriaga.
When Johnny came to know of such telephone call, he immediately reported it to the PACC Task Force
Habagat in Camp Crame, Quezon City. It was 11:30 in the evening of January 22, 1995.[7]
The next day, January 23, at around 7:00 oclock in the morning, Suriaga called Mercedita, introduced himself
and asked her if she and her husband would give the amount. She gave a positive answer and said, kahit
ipangutang namin.[8] Suriaga warned her that if she will not deliver the money, her daughter would be placed in a
plastic bag or thrown in a garbage can.[9]
Thereafter, the Task Force Habagat gave Mercedita instructions on the delivery of the ransom money. The
pay-off site would be in front of the Fairview General Hospital, Quezon City on that same day, January 23, 1995.
Meantime, surveillance teams from PACC were being organized to rescue Nicole and to apprehend the
suspects.[10]
At 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, also of that same day, Mercedita, with the cash money, and while being
tailed by the PACC agents, proceeded in a jeepney to the Fairview General Hospital. She reached the place at
around 4:35 oclock in the afternoon and waited for Suriaga. At around 5:00, Suriaga, accompanied by Joel Isidera,
arrived. Then the three of them boarded a jeepney and disembarked on Regalado Street. It was then that Suriaga
asked Mercedita for the money. Since Joel Isidera was beside her, Mercedita gave him the money. Subsequently,
they boarded a tricycle. After travelling a short distance, the PACC agents suddenly appeared and arrested Suriaga
and Isidera.
Prior thereto, Inspector Jose Duenas Team was able to rescue Nicole in a shanty where Rositas sister lived
located at the NAWASA Squatters Area, Ideal Subdivision, Quezon City.[11] Upon being informed thereof,
Mercedita and the PACC agents proceeded to that place.
Forthwith, the ransom money was properly recovered and returned to spouses Johnny and Mercedita
Ramos. It was photocopied for identification purposes.[12] At the same time, accused Suriaga, Rosita dela Cruz
and Joel Isidera were investigated at the PACC Headquarters, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
On February 15, 1995, an Information for kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention was filed
against Ruben Suriaga and Rosita dela Cruz, as principal, and Joel Isidera, as accessory.
 In his defense, accused Suriaga denied the charges. He claimed that on January 22, 1995, he only borrowed
Nicole for a stroll with Rosita Dela Cruz along Monumento. After thirty minutes, Suriaga decided to go to Rositas
house to get something. Since the traffic was heavy, he did not return the child but instead called her
grandfather.[13] They slept at Rositas house, the accused being convinced that Nicoles parents would not worry
because he always took care of the child.
The next day, at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, before Suriaga left for B.F. Quezon City to butcher a
pig, he instructed Rosita to call Nicoles parents and inform them that the child would be returned in the
afternoon. When he came back the following day, January 24, at 10:00 in the morning, Rosita informed him that
they have been charged with the police headquarters for kidnapping Nicole. Forthwith, he immediately called his
uncle (the childs grandfather) denying the imputation, promising he would return her immediately. His uncle told
him that since Mercedita would go to Fairview General Hospital that afternoon, it would be best if they would
just meet there. But he was not able to bring Nicole to the place because the child was then sleeping.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment finding Suriaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping
for ransom as charged, while acquitting the other accused, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Ruben Suriaga GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom defined and penalized under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH. For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused Rosita Dela Cruz and Joel
Isidera beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby ACQUITTED. Accused Rosita Dela Cruz may
now be released from detention unless she is being held for some other legal cause.

SO ORDERED.

In his appeal, Suriaga attributes to the trial court the following errors:
I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE

AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II

THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[14]

which shall be discussed jointly being interrelated.

Appellant laments that he was convicted despite the infirmity of the prosecutions evidence. He points out
that the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses did not inspire belief, stressing that if Nicole Ramos was indeed
kidnapped for ransom, her parents should not have delayed the payment of the ransom money until late in the
afternoon of January 23, 1995, the day agreed upon. Their reaction was contrary to normal human
behavior. Moreover, Merceditas claim that she and her husband were still raising the amount contradicts the latters
testimony that they had the money at that time, having recently sold a lot in GAO, Quezon City.[15]
Appellants contention obviously lacks merit.
A review of the records shows that the prosecution was able to establish by its evidence, absent any scintilla
of doubt, that appellant is guilty, as charged.
Mercedita Ramos, Nicoles mother, narrated how appellant committed the crime, thus:
6. TANONG: Maari mo na bang sabihin mo ngayon sa akin ang buot tunay na pangyayari hinggil sa pagkakadukot sa
iyong anak na si Nicole Ramos?
6. 10 SAGOT: Noong ika-22 ng Enero 1995 sa ganap na oras humigit kumulang sa mga alas 5:00 o 5:30 ng hapon
habang ako ay nasa aming bahay aking nakita na pumunta ang kapatid ng aking asawa at tinanong sa akin ang bata
kung nakita ko. At sabi ko naman sa kanya hindi ba ikaw yon ang kasama ng bata, at ang sagot naman niya sa akin
na kinuha daw ni Rosita at Ruben para isama na ibibili ng barbeque. At hinanap namin kasama ang aking asawa sa
buong barangay, at nang hindi namin makita naghintay pa rin po kami sa Ever Gotesco Commonwealth Avenue
kong saan aming tinanong kung nasan nakatira sa Rosita. Nang wala kaming makuha na impormasyon tumawag po
kami sa bahay kung saan nalaman namin na ipinatubos sa halagang ISANG DAANG LIBONG PESO
(P100,000.00) upang maibalik ang aking anak.
 xxx
11. TANONG: Noong ikaw ay umuwi sa inyong bahay at ang iyo namang asawa ay tumuloy sa PACC Task Force
Habagat, ano naman ang mga sumusunod na pangyayari habang ikaw ay nasa inyong bahay?
1. SAGOT: Hinintay ko po ang muling pagtawag noon kumidnap sa aking anak nang walang tumawag ay hinintay ko
na lang ang pag-uwi ng aking asawa at doon nalaman ko na siya ay nakipag-coordinate sa PACC Task Force
Habagat. At kinabukasan ng umaga ng ika-23 ng Enero 1995 sa mga oras ng bandang alas 7:00 o 7:30 ng umaga
humigit kumulang ay muling tumawag si Ruben at tinanong sa akin kung magkano ang hinihingi ni JHUN na
pantubos sa bata. At sinagot ko sa halagang ISANG DAANG LIBONG PISO (P100,000.00). At sinabi ko sa kanya,
Oo, magbibigay kami kahit ipangutang namin basta lang matubos ang aming anak, at pagkatapos noon ay binaba
na ang telepono.[16]
ON DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q: In the same Affidavit, in answer to Question No. 11, you testified and I quote: At kinabukasan ng umaga ng ika-23
ng Enero 1995 sa mga oras na bandang alas 7:00 o 7:30 ng umaga humigit kumulang ay muling tumawag sa aming
bahay at hinanap ako at aking nakausap si Ruben. My question is how did you know that the person who called you
between 7:00 and 7:30 in the morning was Ruben?
A: He introduced himself, Sir.
Q: And by Ruben you are referring to the accused, Ruben Suriaga?
A: Yes, sir.[17]
ON CROSS EXAMINATION
Atty. Mijares: You said you also received the 4th call. What time was the same made?
A: Around 11:30, sir.
Q: And who was on the other end of the line?
A: Again Rosita, sir.
Q: And what was the conversation between you and Rosita?
A: That the money should be brought there immediately otherwise they will put the child in a plastic bag, sir.
Q: You also mentioned that you received the 5th call. When was the same made?
A: Around 1:00 oclock, sir.
Q: And who was on the other end of the line?
A: Ruben Suriaga, sir.
Q: And what was the conversation between you and Ruben Suriaga?
A: He asked me if we could bring the money to them, and I said we could, except that my husband is not yet home and
so I begged him to give me more time until 3:00 oclock to be able to deliver the money, sir.
Q: Let me get this straight. You asked for time to deliver the money because your husband was not around at the time,
right? But the money was only with you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you asked for time up to 3:00 oclock?
A: Yes, sir.[18]
Appellant argues that if Nicoles parents really believed that he kidnapped their child and that her life was in
danger, they should have delivered to him the ransom money at an earlier time, i.e., in the morning of January 23,
1995 (the day after the child was kidnapped), and not in the afternoon. We agree with the Solicitor General that
such an argument is merely an attempt to deviate from the main issue on why Nicole, who was just two years old,
stayed with him overnight without any permission from her parents.[19] Even if appellant is Nicoles uncle, he
should have brought her back to her parents whose house is just a few steps away, or inform the latter that she
was spending the night with them, rather than kept her indefinitely. Besides, Mercedita testified that she and her
husband would still raise the amount, even to the extent of securing a loan. But what demolished appellants
posture is the indisputable fact that he called the Ramoses asking for ransom. He even met with Mercedita to
claim the same.
Thus, we state anew, what this Court said in a long line of cases, that the trial courts determination on the
issue of the credibility of witnesses and its consequent findings of fact must be given great weight and respect in
appeal, unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case.[20] This is so because of the judicial experience that the trial courts are in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. It can thus more easily detect whether a witness is telling the truth or not.[21]
Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his
assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate courts. [22] The exceptions being
absent in this case, this Court is not disposed to disturb the findings of the trial court.
The chain of events as narrated by the prosecutions witnesses could only lead to the conclusion that appellant
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom, a continuing crime, defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, thus:

Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained;
or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of he circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same.[23] And if the person detained is a child, the question
that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show that in taking the child, there was deprivation of
the childs liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the childs custody.[24]
Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established by the prosecution
considering the following circumstances: 1) appellant, a private individual, took the young Nicole without
personally seeking permission from her father; 2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rositas
sister lived, located at the NAWASA Squatters Area, Ideal Subdivision, Quezon City, without informing her
parents of their whereabouts; 3) he detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to
her parents overnight and the following day; and 4) he demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through telephone
calls and gave instructions where and how it should be delivered.
Under the above provision, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the victim is a minor. In this
case, the minority of Nicole Ramos was alleged in the Information and was never disputed.[25] Even assuming that
the minority was not proved, still under the law, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory where, as here,
the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victims parents or any other
person.[26] It bears emphasis that the minority of the victim and appellants demand for ransom, both specifically
alleged in the Information, were clearly established by the evidence for the prosecution free from any scintilla of
doubt.[27] We thus sustain the appealed decision convicting the appellant and imposing upon him the supreme
penalty of death.
Three (3) members of the court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in
People vs. Echegaray that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death is unconstitutional,
nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should
accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial court convicting RUBEN SURIAGA of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and sentencing him to suffer the DEATH penalty is hereby AFFIRMED.
 In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. 7659, upon the
finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to her Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, for the possible exercise of her pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., on official leave.
Corona, J., no part - did not participate in the deliberation.

[1]
Exhibit A (Sinumpaang Salaysay of Edwin Ramos, May 16, 1995, par. 3.), Folder of Prosecution Exhibits.
[2]
TSN, May 22, 1995, p. 16; May 29, 1995, p. 6.
[3]
Ibid., May 29, 1995, p. 9.
[4]
Exhibit A, supra, par. 4.
[5]
Ibid., par. 5.
[6]
Exhibit H (Sinumpaang Salaysay of Mercedita Ramos, date January 23, 1995, par. 6), Folder of Prosecution Exhibits.
[7]
Ibid..
[8]
Exhibit H, supra, p. 2.
[9]
TSN, May 31, 1995, p. 9; June 7, 1995, p. 11; September 15, 1995, p. 12.
[10]
Exhibit I (Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Ronaldo R. Mendoza, dated May 30, 1995, pars. 2 and 4), Folder of Prosecution
Exhibits; TSN, July 3, 1995, p. 9; July 24, 1995, pp. 18-19; July 31, 1995, p. 8.
[11]
TSN, July 24, 1995, p. 24.
[12]
Records, pp. 34-54.
[13]
TSN, August 10, 1995, pp. 27-28.
[14]
Brief for Accused-Appellant, rollo, p. 106.
[15]
Ibid., p. 9; rollo, p. 107.
[16]
Exhibit H, Folder of Exhibits, Sinumpaang salaysay ni Mercedita Ramos.
[17]
TSN, May 31, 1995, p. 8.
[18]
TSN, June 7, 1995, pp. 11-12.
[19]
Brief for Appellee, p. 17; Rollo, p. 139.
[20]
People vs. Bigcas, et al., 211 SCRA 631 (1992); People vs. Deunida, 231 SCRA 520 (1994); People vs. Acua, 248 SCRA 668 (1995).
[21]
People vs. Acua, supra; People vs. Deunida, supra.
[22]
People vs. Mercado, 346 SCRA 256 (2000); see also People vs. Mittu, 33 SCRA 121 (2000).
[23]
People vs. Borromeo, 323 SCRA 547, 554 (2000), citing People vs. Ramos, 297 SCRA 618 (1998); People vs. Villanueva, 253
SCRA 155, 159 (1996).
[24]
Ibid..
[25]
Ibid..
[26]
Ibid..
[27]
Ibid..

FIRST DIVISION

WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
 AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected thereon located
at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio
Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the
units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a
complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of
the 5th District of Manila[4] where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation

meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel
for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of
Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task
with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however,
were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It
was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of
a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating
the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.[7]

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided

over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against
Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the
ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and
signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice
of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section

7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach

of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF

THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis
supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the
practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.[9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors.[10]
 We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY
TO FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government
service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG
v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service.

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA

6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF
ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise
of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who
are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government
unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the
local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
 (c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work
only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive
monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective
local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective
local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on
engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus
derogat generalibus.[13]

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the
members of the sangguniang bayanfor municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise
of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time
service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their
official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city
mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a
week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to
secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription
to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on
the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.[15]Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to
serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice
a month.[16]

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT

PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR
AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at
the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted
outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way
the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary
in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become
an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance
as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the
law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote
respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first
canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent
not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is
a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
 Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of
the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics
and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19]

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for
violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall
furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

[1]
Particularly described as lot no. 19, block no. 3, Pas-14849.
[2]
Complainants sister-in-law.
[3]
Hereafter, Elizabeth and Pastor.
[4]
Hereafter, Barangay 723.
[5]
These were scheduled on March 15, 2001, March 26, 2001 and April 3, 2001.
[6]
Dated July 5, 2002. Rollo, pp. 2-23.
[7]
Report and Recommendation dated October 15, 2004 of Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila of the IBP-CBD. Id., pp. 103-106.
[8]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
[9]
Supra note 7.
[10]
CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-476 dated November 4, 2004. Rollo, p. 102.
[11]
G.R. Nos. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 526. (emphasis in the original)
[12]
The Local Government Code of 1992.
[13]
This rule of statutory construction means that a special law repeals a general law on the same matter.
[14]
Section 52(a), RA 7160. They may also hold special sessions upon the call of the local chief executive or a majority of the members
of the sanggunian when public interest so demands. (Section 52[b], id.)
[15]
This rule of statutory construction means that the express mention of one thing excludes other things not mentioned.
[16]
Id.
[17]
See Ramos v. Rada, A.M. No. P-202, 22 July 1975, 65 SCRA 179; Zeta v. Malinao, A.M. No. P-220, 20 December 1978, 87 SCRA
303.
[18]
Ducat v. Villalon, 392 Phil. 394 (2000).
[19]
Id.
[20]
See Section 27, Rule 138, RULES OF COURT.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 144104. June 29, 2004]

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. QUEZON CITY and

CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS, in his capacity as City Assessor of Quezon
City, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, of the
Decision[1] dated July 17, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57014 which affirmed the
decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals holding that the lot owned by the petitioner and
its hospital building constructed thereon are subject to assessment for purposes of real property tax.

The Antecedents

The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established
on January 16, 1981 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823.[2] It is the registered owner of a parcel
of land, particularly described as Lot No. RP-3-B-3A-1-B-1, SWO-04-000495, located at Quezon
Avenue corner Elliptical Road, Central District, Quezon City. The lot has an area of 121,463 square
meters and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261320 of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of
the Philippines. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small
store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for
their patients whom they charge for their professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on
the left side of the building along Quezon Avenue is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right
side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical Road, is being leased for commercial purposes to
a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-
patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner
receives annual subsidies from the government.
On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real
property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of Quezon City.[3] Accordingly, Tax
Declaration Nos. C-021-01226 (16-2518) and C-021-01231 (15-2518-A) were issued for the land and
the hospital building, respectively.[4] On August 25, 1993, the petitioner filed a Claim for
Exemption[5] from real property taxes with the City Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable
institution. The petitioners request was denied, and a petition was, thereafter, filed before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA, for brevity) for the reversal of the resolution
of the City Assessor. The petitioner alleged that under Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution,
the property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred that a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds
are exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve
charity patients. The petitioner contends that it is a charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from
real property taxes. The QC-LBAA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and holding the petitioner
liable for real property taxes.[6]
The QC-LBAAs decision was, likewise, affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals of Quezon City (CBAA, for brevity) [7] which ruled that the petitioner was not a charitable
institution and that its real properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purposes; hence, it was not entitled to real property tax exemption under the constitution and the
law. The petitioner sought relief from the Court of Appeals, which rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the CBAA.[8]
Undaunted, the petitioner filed its petition in this Court contending that:
A. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONER AS NOT ENTITLED TO REALTY TAX
EXEMPTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT ITS LAND, BUILDING AND IMPROVEMENTS, SUBJECT
OF ASSESSMENT, ARE NOT ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY DEVOTED FOR
CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
B. WHILE PETITIONER IS NOT DECLARED AS REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPT UNDER ITS
CHARTER, PD 1823, SAID EXEMPTION MAY NEVERTHELESS BE EXTENDED UPON PROPER
APPLICATION.
The petitioner avers that it is a charitable institution within the context of Section 28(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. It asserts that its character as a charitable institution is not altered by the fact
that it admits paying patients and renders medical services to them, leases portions of the land to
private parties, and rents out portions of the hospital to private medical practitioners from which it
derives income to be used for operational expenses. The petitioner points out that for the years 1995
to 1999, 100% of its out-patients were charity patients and of the hospitals 282-bed capacity, 60%
thereof, or 170 beds, is allotted to charity patients. It asserts that the fact that it receives subsidies from
the government attests to its character as a charitable institution. It contends that the exclusivity
required in the Constitution does not necessarily mean solely. Hence, even if a portion of its real estate
is leased out to private individuals from whom it derives income, it does not lose its character as a
charitable institution, and its exemption from the payment of real estate taxes on its real property. The
petitioner cited our ruling in Herrera v. QC-BAA[9] to bolster its pose. The petitioner further contends
that even if P.D. No. 1823 does not exempt it from the payment of real estate taxes, it is not precluded
from seeking tax exemption under the 1987 Constitution.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner is not a charitable
entity. The petitioners real property is not exempt from the payment of real estate taxes under P.D. No.
1823 and even under the 1987 Constitution because it failed to prove that it is a charitable institution
and that the said property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. The
respondents noted that in a newspaper report, it appears that graft charges were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against the director of the petitioner, its administrative officer, and Zenaida Rivera, the
proprietress of the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center, for entering into a lease contract over 7,663.13
square meters of the property in 1990 for only P20,000 a month, when the monthly rental should
be P357,000 a month as determined by the Commission on Audit; and that instead of complying with
the directive of the COA for the cancellation of the contract for being grossly prejudicial to the
government, the petitioner renewed the same on March 13, 1995 for a monthly rental of
only P24,000. They assert that the petitioner uses the subsidies granted by the government for charity
patients and uses the rest of its income from the property for the benefit of paying patients, among
other purposes. They aver that the petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence that 100% of its out-
patients and 170 beds in the hospital are reserved for indigent patients. The respondents further assert,
thus:

13. That the claims/allegations of the Petitioner LCP do not speak well of its record of service. That
before a patient is admitted for treatment in the Center, first impression is that it is pay-patient and
required to pay a certain amount as deposit. That even if a patient is living below the poverty line,
he is charged with high hospital bills. And, without these bills being first settled, the poor patient
cannot be allowed to leave the hospital or be discharged without first paying the hospital bills or
issue a promissory note guaranteed and indorsed by an influential agency or person known only to
the Center; that even the remains of deceased poor patients suffered the same fate. Moreover,
before a patient is admitted for treatment as free or charity patient, one must undergo a series of
interviews and must submit all the requirements needed by the Center, usually accompanied by
endorsement by an influential agency or person known only to the Center. These facts were heard
and admitted by the Petitioner LCP during the hearings before the Honorable QC-BAA and
Honorable CBAA. These are the reasons of indigent patients, instead of seeking treatment with the
Center, they prefer to be treated at the Quezon Institute. Can such practice by the Center be called
charitable?[10]

The Issues

The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is a charitable institution within
the context of Presidential Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section 234(b)
of Republic Act No. 7160; and (b) whether the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real
property taxes.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is partially granted.

On the first issue, we hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the
elements which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate
purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work
performed, the character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use
and occupation of the properties.[11]
In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing
laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and hearts under
the influence of education or religion, by assisting them to establish themselves in life or otherwise
lessening the burden of government.[12] It may be applied to almost anything that tend to promote the
well-doing and well-being of social man. It embraces the improvement and promotion of the happiness
of man.[13] The word charitable is not restricted to relief of the poor or sick. [14] The test of a charity and
a charitable organization are in law the same. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is
whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for
gain, profit, or private advantage.
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the
provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President of the Philippines with the
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. It was organized for the welfare and benefit
of the Filipino people principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in
the Philippines. The raison detre for the creation of the petitioner is stated in the decree, viz:

Whereas, for decades, respiratory diseases have been a priority concern, having been the leading
cause of illness and death in the Philippines, comprising more than 45% of the total annual deaths
from all causes, thus, exacting a tremendous toll on human resources, which ailments are likely to
increase and degenerate into serious lung diseases on account of unabated pollution,
industrialization and unchecked cigarette smoking in the country;

Whereas, the more common lung diseases are, to a great extent, preventable, and curable with early
and adequate medical care, immunization and through prompt and intensive prevention and health
education programs;

Whereas, there is an urgent need to consolidate and reinforce existing programs, strategies and
efforts at preventing, treating and rehabilitating people affected by lung diseases, and to undertake
research and training on the cure and prevention of lung diseases, through a Lung Center which
will house and nurture the above and related activities and provide tertiary-level care for more
difficult and problematical cases;

Whereas, to achieve this purpose, the Government intends to provide material and financial support
towards the establishment and maintenance of a Lung Center for the welfare and benefit of the
Filipino people.[15]

The purposes for which the petitioner was created are spelled out in its Articles of Incorporation,
thus:

SECOND: That the purposes for which such corporation is formed are as follows:

1. To construct, establish, equip, maintain, administer and conduct an integrated medical institution
which shall specialize in the treatment, care, rehabilitation and/or relief of lung and allied diseases
in line with the concern of the government to assist and provide material and financial support in
the establishment and maintenance of a lung center primarily to benefit the people of the
Philippines and in pursuance of the policy of the State to secure the well-being of the people by
providing them specialized health and medical services and by minimizing the incidence of lung
diseases in the country and elsewhere.

2. To promote the noble undertaking of scientific research related to the prevention of lung or
pulmonary ailments and the care of lung patients, including the holding of a series of relevant
congresses, conventions, seminars and conferences;

3. To stimulate and, whenever possible, underwrite scientific researches on the biological,

demographic, social, economic, eugenic and physiological aspects of lung or pulmonary diseases
and their control; and to collect and publish the findings of such research for public consumption;

4. To facilitate the dissemination of ideas and public acceptance of information on lung

consciousness or awareness, and the development of fact-finding, information and reporting
facilities for and in aid of the general purposes or objects aforesaid, especially in human lung
requirements, general health and physical fitness, and other relevant or related fields;
5. To encourage the training of physicians, nurses, health officers, social workers and medical and
technical personnel in the practical and scientific implementation of services to lung patients;

6. To assist universities and research institutions in their studies about lung diseases, to encourage
advanced training in matters of the lung and related fields and to support educational programs of
value to general health;

7. To encourage the formation of other organizations on the national, provincial and/or city and
local levels; and to coordinate their various efforts and activities for the purpose of achieving a
more effective programmatic approach on the common problems relative to the objectives
enumerated herein;

8. To seek and obtain assistance in any form from both international and local foundations and
organizations; and to administer grants and funds that may be given to the organization;

9. To extend, whenever possible and expedient, medical services to the public and, in general, to
promote and protect the health of the masses of our people, which has long been recognized as an
economic asset and a social blessing;

10. To help prevent, relieve and alleviate the lung or pulmonary afflictions and maladies of the
people in any and all walks of life, including those who are poor and needy, all without regard to or
discrimination, because of race, creed, color or political belief of the persons helped; and to enable
them to obtain treatment when such disorders occur;

11. To participate, as circumstances may warrant, in any activity designed and carried on to
promote the general health of the community;

12. To acquire and/or borrow funds and to own all funds or equipment, educational materials and
supplies by purchase, donation, or otherwise and to dispose of and distribute the same in such
manner, and, on such basis as the Center shall, from time to time, deem proper and best, under the
particular circumstances, to serve its general and non-profit purposes and objectives;

13. To buy, purchase, acquire, own, lease, hold, sell, exchange, transfer and dispose of properties,
whether real or personal, for purposes herein mentioned; and

14. To do everything necessary, proper, advisable or convenient for the accomplishment of any of
the powers herein set forth and to do every other act and thing incidental thereto or connected
therewith.[16]

Hence, the medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any and
all walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination. After all, any person,
the rich as well as the poor, may fall sick or be injured or wounded and become a subject of charity.[17]
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption
from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in
the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or
used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the
private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. [18] In Congregational Sunday
School, etc. v. Board of Review,[19] the State Supreme Court of Illinois held, thus:

[A]n institution does not lose its charitable character, and consequent exemption from taxation, by
reason of the fact that those recipients of its benefits who are able to pay are required to do so,
where no profit is made by the institution and the amounts so received are applied in furthering its
charitable purposes, and those benefits are refused to none on account of inability to pay
therefor. The fundamental ground upon which all exemptions in favor of charitable institutions are
based is the benefit conferred upon the public by them, and a consequent relief, to some extent, of
the burden upon the state to care for and advance the interests of its citizens.[20]
 As aptly stated by the State Supreme Court of South Dakota in Lutheran Hospital Association of
South Dakota v. Baker:[21]

[T]he fact that paying patients are taken, the profits derived from attendance upon these patients
being exclusively devoted to the maintenance of the charity, seems rather to enhance the usefulness
of the institution to the poor; for it is a matter of common observation amongst those who have
gone about at all amongst the suffering classes, that the deserving poor can with difficulty be
persuaded to enter an asylum of any kind confined to the reception of objects of charity; and that
their honest pride is much less wounded by being placed in an institution in which paying patients
are also received. The fact of receiving money from some of the patients does not, we think, at all
impair the character of the charity, so long as the money thus received is devoted altogether to the
charitable object which the institution is intended to further.[22]

The money received by the petitioner becomes a part of the trust fund and must be devoted to
public trust purposes and cannot be diverted to private profit or benefit.[23]
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive donations. The petitioner does not lose its
character as a charitable institution simply because the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies
granted by the government. As held by the State Supreme Court of Utah in Yorgason v. County Board
of Equalization of Salt Lake County:[24]

Second, the government subsidy payments are provided to the project. Thus, those payments are
like a gift or donation of any other kind except they come from the government. In
both Intermountain Health Care and the present case, the crux is the presence or absence of
material reciprocity. It is entirely irrelevant to this analysis that the government, rather than a
private benefactor, chose to make up the deficit resulting from the exchange between St. Marks
Tower and the tenants by making a contribution to the landlord, just as it would have been
irrelevant in Intermountain Health Care if the patients income supplements had come from private
individuals rather than the government.

Therefore, the fact that subsidization of part of the cost of furnishing such housing is by the
government rather than private charitable contributions does not dictate the denial of a charitable
exemption if the facts otherwise support such an exemption, as they do here. [25]

In this case, the petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income, including the
subsidies from the government for 1991 and 1992 for its patients and for the operation of the hospital. It
even incurred a net loss in 1991 and 1992 from its operations.
Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold, anent the second issue, that
those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property
taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption
is the exception. The effect of an exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a claim for
exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be
mistaken.[26] As held in Salvation Army v. Hoehn:[27]

An intention on the part of the legislature to grant an exemption from the taxing power of the state
will never be implied from language which will admit of any other reasonable construction. Such
an intention must be expressed in clear and unmistakable terms, or must appear by necessary
implication from the language used, for it is a well settled principle that, when a special privilege or
exemption is claimed under a statute, charter or act of incorporation, it is to be construed strictly
against the property owner and in favor of the public. This principle applies with peculiar force to a
claim of exemption from taxation . [28]

Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1823, relied upon by the petitioner, specifically provides that
the petitioner shall enjoy the tax exemptions and privileges:
SEC. 2. TAX EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES. Being a non-profit, non-stock corporation
organized primarily to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the
Philippines, all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported
by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the
Philippines, Inc., for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center, shall be exempt from income
and gift taxes, the same further deductible in full for the purpose of determining the maximum
deductible amount under Section 30, paragraph (h), of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended.

The Lung Center of the Philippines shall be exempt from the payment of taxes, charges and fees
imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to
equipment purchases made by, or for the Lung Center.[29]

It is plain as day that under the decree, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. If the intentions were
otherwise, the same should have been among the enumeration of tax exempt privileges under Section
2:

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation
of the rule is principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit
cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.

...

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive
interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human
mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had
the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[30]

The exemption must not be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable presumption is that
the State has granted in express terms all it intended to grant at all, and that unless the privilege is
limited to the very terms of the statute the favor would be intended beyond what was meant. [31]
Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides, thus:

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-
profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.[32]

The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only.[33] As Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, explained: . . .
what is exempted is not the institution itself . . .; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands,
buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.[34]
Consequently, the constitutional provision is implemented by Section 234(b) of Republic Act No.
7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) as follows:

SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of
the real property tax:

...
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-
profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.[35]

We note that under the 1935 Constitution, ... all lands, buildings, and improvements used
exclusively for charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation. [36] However, under the 1973 and the
present Constitutions, for lands, buildings, and improvements of the charitable institution to be
considered exempt, the same should not only be exclusively used for charitable purposes; it is required
that such property be used actually and directly for such purposes.[37]
In light of the foregoing substantial changes in the Constitution, the petitioner cannot rely on our
ruling in Herrera v. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals which was promulgated on September
30, 1961 before the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions took effect. [38] As this Court held in Province of Abra
v. Hernando:[39]

Under the 1935 Constitution: Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. The present Constitution added charitable
institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries and required that for the exemption of lands,
buildings, and improvements, they should not only be exclusively but also actually and directly
used for religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change
should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Reliance on past decisions would
have sufficed were the words actually as well as directly not added. There must be proof therefore
of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable
purposes to be exempt from taxation.

Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable
institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for
charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others;
debarred from participation or enjoyment; and exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude;
as enjoying a privilege exclusively.[40] If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it
is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. [41] The words dominant
use or principal use cannot be substituted for the words used exclusively without doing violence to the
Constitutions and the law.[42] Solely is synonymous with exclusively.[43]
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the
direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable
institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of
whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.[44]
The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually,
directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for the
treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying,
other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen. Further, a
portion of the land is being leased to a private individual for her business enterprise under the business
name Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. Indeed, the petitioners evidence shows that it
collected P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and P1,679,999.28 for 1992 from the said lessees.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts
of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. [45] On the other hand, the
portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether
paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The respondent
Quezon City Assessor is hereby DIRECTED to determine, after due hearing, the precise portions of
the land and the area thereof which are leased to private persons, and to compute the real property
taxes due thereon as provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official leave.
 Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., on leave.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Fermin A. Martin, Jr.
and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. concurring.
[2] SECTION 1. CREATION OF THE LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES. There is hereby created a trust, under the
name and style of Lung Center of the Philippines, which, subject to the provisions of this Decree, shall be
administered, according to the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws and Objectives of the Lung Center of the
Philippines, Inc., duly registered (reg. No. 85886) with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Republic of
the Philippines, by the Office of the President, in coordination with the Ministry of Human Settlements and the
Ministry of Health.
[3] Annex C, Rollo, p. 49.
[4] Annexes 2 & 2-A, id. at 93-94.
[5] Annex D, id. at 50-52.
[6] Annex E, id. at 53-55.
[7] Annexes 4 & 5, id. at 100-109.
[8] Annex A, id. at 33-41.
[9] 3 SCRA 187 (1961).
[10] Rollo, pp. 83-84.
[11] See Workmens Circle Educational Center of Springfield v. Board of Assessors of City of Springfield, 51 N.E.2d 313
(1943).
[12] Congregational Sunday School & Publishing Society v. Board of Review, 125 N.E. 7 (1919), citing Jackson v. Philipps,
14 Allen (Mass.) 539.
[13] Bader Realty & Investment Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 217 S.W.2d 489 (1949).
[14] Board of Assessors of Boston v. Garland School of Homemaking, 6 N.E.2d 379.
[15] Rollo, pp. 119-120.
[16] Id. at 123-125.
[17] Scripps Memorial Hospital v. California Employment Commission, 24 Cal.2d 669, 151 P.2d 109 (1944).
[18] Sisters of Third Order of St. Frances v. Board of Review of Peoria County, 83 N.E. 272.
[19] See note 12.
[20] Id. at 10.
[21] 167 N.W. 148 (1918), citing State v. Powers, 10 Mo. App. 263, 74 Mo. 476.
[22] Id. at 149.
[23] See Obrien v. Physicians Hospital Association, 116 N.E. 975 (1917).
[24] 714 P.2d 653 (1986).
[25] Id. at 660-661.
[26] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 83 (1998).
[27] 188 S.W.2d. 826 (1945).
[28] Id. at 829.
[29] Rollo, p. 120. (Underscoring supplied.)
[30] Malinias v. COMELEC, 390 SCRA 480 (2002).
[31] St. Louis Young Mens Christian Association v. Gehner, 47 S.W.2d 776 (1932).
[32] Underscoring supplied.
[33] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[34] Ibid. Citing II RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 90.
[35] Underscoring supplied.
[36] Article VI, Section 22, par. (3) of the 1935 Constitution provides that, Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
[37] Article VIII, Section 17, par. (3) of the 1973 Constitution provides that, Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
[38] 3 SCRA 186 (1961).
[39] 107 SCRA 105 (1981).
[40] Young Mens Christian Association of Omaha v. Douglas County, 83 N.W. 924 (1900).
[41] St. Louis Young Mens Christian Association v. Gehner, supra.
[42] See State ex rel Koeln v. St. Louis Y.M.C.A., 168 S.W. 589 (1914).
[43] Lodge v. Nashville, 154 S.W. 141.
[44] Christian Business College v. Kalamanzoo, 131 N.W. 553.
[45] See Young Mens Christian Association of Omaha v. Douglas County, supra; Martin v. City of New Orleans, 58 Am. 194
(1886).

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 130332. May 31, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MODESTO MAMAC y

CAMINERO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

In two informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, [1] Modesto C. Mamac
was accused of raping Bernadette U. Enguito on two separate occasions. The informations were
respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 35,662-95 and Criminal Case No. 35,663-95.

After a joint trial, the trial court found Mamac guilty beyond reasonable doubt on both
indictments.[2] Accordingly, it sentenced him as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, Modesto Mamac y Caminero is hereby sentenced as follows:

Crim. Case No. 35,662: To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua as the crime was
committed in 1991 and the applicable law is the Penal Code, not RA 7659 which
became a law only in December 1993 and to indemnify Bernadette (Enguito) into (sic)
Forty thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.

Crim. Case No. 35,663: To be put to death as the crime of rape was committed on
August 14, 1995 when RA 7659 was already a law and indemnify Bernadette Enguito
Forty thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Davao City, Philippines, April 28, 1997."

Appellant did not contest his conviction in Criminal Case No. 35,662-95. Only Criminal Case No.
35,663-95 is before this Court on automatic review.

The information in Criminal Case No. 35,663-95 dated August 21, 1995 reads:[3]

"That on or about August 16, 1995, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-mentioned accused did then and there
wilfully unlawfully and feloniously, by means of intimidation, that is by then and there
threatening and intimidating Bernadette Enguito by killing her should she not agree to
submit herself to his criminal design and by his moral ascendancy over said Bernadette
Enguito, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have carnal
knowledge of said Bernadette Enguito against her will and consent.
 Contrary to law."

The records reveal that Bernadette[4] was sleeping inside their house located at Toril, Davao City at 9
o'clock in the evening of August 14, 1995 when appellant came and woke her up. To rouse
Bernadette from her sleep, appellant poked her with a long stick while she was lying alongside her
brother and sister. When she opened the window to check, Bernadette saw appellant outside
brandishing a bolo. Appellant then menacingly ordered Bernadette to go out of the house and brought
her towards the Lipada River. Upon reaching the bank of the river, appellant commanded Bernadette
to take off her clothes while pointing the bolo at her. Bernadette complied in fear. Then with appellant
sticking the bolo at Bernadette's neck, appellant forced himself upon Bernadette despite the latter's
resistance and plea. Bernadette was only sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the sexual attack.

Bernadette's mother, Segunda U. Enguito,[5] noticed Bernadette coming back into the house. When
Segunda asked Bernadette where she had been, Bernadette answered that she just went out to
urinate.

The following day, Bernadette revealed her harrowing experience to her boyfriend. To avoid the
perverse advances of appellant, Bernadette and her boyfriend ran away to Butuan City. Segunda
followed them and Bernadette disclosed to her mother the depraved acts of appellant. Segunda
brought Bernadette back to Toril and accompanied her to the police to file a complaint. In her
affidavit[6] filed before the police, Bernadette referred to appellant as her grandfather.

On August 19, 1995, Dr. Uldarico C. Casquejo[7] examined Bernadette and found a healed wound at
her vaginal opening. Dr. Casquejo also noted that a vaginal speculum easily penetrated her vagina
without any effort. Vaginal smear examination showed the presence of spermatozoa and pus cells.

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the accusation lodged against him. [8] Already 64 years of age at the
time of his examination in court, appellant[9] denied having raped Bernadette on August 14, 1995. He
stated that at his age, he could no longer have sex with his 48-year old common law wife, more so
with a younger woman. During his cross examination, appellant failed to give any reason why
Bernadette would file a rape charge against him.

Appellant himself provided the circumstances of his relationship to Bernadette. He said that Segunda
is the daughter of his common-law wife with another man. Although Bernadette calls him lolo,
appellant declared that he never treated Bernadette as his granddaughter.

In his Brief,[10] appellant asserts that:

"I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF COMPLAINANT,
BERNADETTE ENGUITO; and

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

In support of the above contentions, appellant maintains that there is no reason for Bernadette to be
cowed into going out of their house by his mere act of stabbing her with a stick as she was very much
secure inside the house.

We clarify first that Bernadette categorically stated in open court that she went out of the house
because appellant threatened to kill her family.[11] With the display of the bolo and the utterance of
foreboding Words by appellant, it is easy to understand why Bernadette left the safety of their house.
Fear simply overwhelmed Bernadette. She twice stressed that she was afraid when appellant ordered
her to go out of the house.[12]

There is nothing incomprehensible about Bernadette's reaction. We have long recognized that
different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One
person's spontaneous response may be aggression, while another person's reaction may be cold
indifference.[13]

Appellant also attempts to discredit Bernadette by pointing to an inconsistency in her testimony as

compared to her mother's narration in court. It is emphasized that Bernadette declared that it was
to her boyfriend that she first reported the incident while Segunda stated on the witness stand that
it was to her that Bernadette first reported the crime. It is settled that conflict in testimonies of
witnesses in describing details of an event may be due to differences in observations and memory
which does not necessarily imply falsehood on their part.[14] Such seeming inconsistency does not
detract from the main thrust of Bernadette's testimony that she was raped by appellant. An
inconsistency which pertains only to minor and trivial details not touching on the why's and
wherefore's of the crime strengthens rather than diminishes a witness's credibility as it erases
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[15]

Be that as it may, we do not agree with the trial court's imposition of the penalty of death upon
appellant. It appears that the trial court considered appellant as Bernadette's step-grandfather. On the
other hand, the Solicitor General[16] justifies the imposition of the death penalty because of appellant's
employment of a deadly weapon to consummate the rape.

The different modes of committing rape and the special circumstances qualifying the offense are laid
down in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, viz:

"ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxx

The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. The victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

x x x."

Rape with the use of a deadly weapon was introduced in Article 335 by Republic Act No. 4111 [17] on
June 20, 1964 and the rape of a minor by a relative was introduced by Republic Act No. 7659[18] on
December 31, 1993. Both types of rape were recognized as qualified rape in People vs. Tabugoca.[19]

A reading of the information will reveal that appellant was only charged with simple rape under the
first circumstance provided in Article 335. Unadorned of its auxiliary words, the information accuses
appellant of employing threat and intimidation and of abusing his moral ascendancy over Bernadette
to carry out the rape. The information does not contain any allegation of relationship and minority nor
the use of a deadly weapon. The information therefore does not charge appellant with qualified rape
and he cannot be sentenced to death.

We have held that the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender is
a special qualifying circumstance which should be alleged in the information to warrant imposition of
the death penalty.[20] Minority and relationship are treated as special qualifying circumstances and not
merely as aggravating circumstances because they increase the imposable penalties by degrees. [21]

Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if not alleged, a qualifying
aggravating cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information. [22] It must be properly pleaded
in order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him.[23] Needless to state, appellant will be denied due process if after
being charged with simple rape, he is convicted of its qualified form punishable with death.[24]

We hasten to add that appellant is not a step-grandfather of Bernadette. Appellant himself admitted
that he co-habited and lived with the maternal grandmother of Bernadette without the benefit of
marriage.[25]The word "step", when used as prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, is repugnant
to blood relationship and is indicative of a relationship by affinity.[26] Since no relationship by affinity
can be established between Bernadette and appellant, appellant cannot be considered as. the step-
grandfather of Bernadette.

At the most, appellant can be described as the common law husband of Bernadette's grandmother.
As such, appellant is not a "parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent" of Bernadette. [27] In a
similar case, we ruled that courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not
embraced by it to the end that no person who, is clearly not within the terms of statute can be brought
within them.[28] Expressio unius est exclusio alteruis.

On the other hand, while the employment of a bolo was sufficiently established by the prosecution,
such clear showing cannot justify the imposition of the death penalty in the absence of an aggravating
circumstance.[29] Appellant's crime is only punishable by reclusion perpetua.

Since appellant should only be punished with reclusion perpetua, we decline to raise the indemnity
awarded to Bernadette by the trial court to P75,000.00 as prayed for by the Solicitor General. Such
award is only warranted where the crime of rape is qualified by any of the circumstances under which
the death penalty is imposed by law.[30] The offended party is entitled to P50,000.00 in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.[31] She may also be given moral damages without need of proof.[32]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 35,663-95 is AFFIRMED with
the modification that accused-appellant Modesto Mamac y Caminero is sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim, Bernadette Enguito, the additional amount of P50,000.00 by way of
moral damages. The amount of P40,000.00 awarded to the victim as indemnity is increased to
P50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., on leave.

[1]
Presided over by Judge Jesus V. Quitain.
[2]
Decision, pp. 1-7; Rollo, pp. 14-20.
[3]
Original Record, p. 1.
[4]
TSN, August 22, 1996, pp. 1-11 & November 7, 1996, pp. 21-32 and Exhibit A (Complaint-Affidavit), Original Record, pp. 2-3.
[5]
TSN, December 12, 1996, pp. 33-50.
[6]
Exhibit A, supra.
[7]
TSN, September 13, 1996, pp. 12-20 and Exhibit B (Medical Certificate), Original Record, p. 6.
[8]
Original Record, p. 19.
[9]
TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 51-62.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 62-74.
[11]
TSN, November 7, 1996, p. 30.
[12]
TSN, August 22, 1995, p. 8 and November 7, 1996, p. 29.
[13]
People vs. Perez, 296 SCRA 17 (1998)
[14]
People vs. Briones, 266 SCRA 675 (1993)
[15]
People vs. Tan, 264 SCRA 425 (1996)
[16]
Appellees Brief, p. 11; Rollo, p. 109.
[17]
An Act to Amend Article Three Hundred and Thirty-Five of the Revised Penal Code.
[18]
An Act to Impose the death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, As Amended,
Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes.
[19]
285 SCRA 312 (1998)
[20]
People vs. Cantos, Sr., 305 SCRA 786 (1999). See also People vs. Manggasin, 306 SCRA 228 (1999) and People vs. Nuez, G. R.
No. 128875, July 8, 1999.
[21]
People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559 (1998)
[22]
People vs. Dimapilis, 300 SCRA 279 (1998)
[23]
People vs. Ambray, 303 SCRA 697.
[24]
People vs. Bayya, G. R. No. 127845, March 10, 2000.
[25]
TSN, February 19, 1997, p. 52.
[26]
Blacks Law Dictionary 4th Edition, citing Grossenbacher vs. State, 197 N.E. 382.
[27]
See People vs. Atop, 286 SCRA 157 (1998)
[28]
Ibid.
[29]
People vs. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265 (1999)
[30]
People vs. Ambray, supra.
[31]
People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 (1996); People vs. Caballero, 258 SCRA 541 (1996); People vs. Abordo, 258 SCRA 571 (1996)
[32]
People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998)

THIRD DIVISION

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, G.R. No. 189122

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- v e r s u s - NACHURA,
PERALTA and
MENDOZA, JJ.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
March 17, 2010

x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee
his appearance before any court as may be required,[1] is the answer of the criminal justice
system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been
proven, in the dubious interval, often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?[2] Bail
acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty
and societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.[3]

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by

death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison
must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail.[4] An
accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his
conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his
liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed.[5] Even if the conviction is subsequently
affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending
judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships
of prison.[6] On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious
enough to warrant prison time.[7] Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail
pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from court custody, the protection
of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. [8] Under
what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance
between the interests of society and those of the accused.[9]

Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal
to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper
courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal
should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.[10]

THE FACTS

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.[11]

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.[12] Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.[13] It invoked the bedrock principle
in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal
should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Citing well-established
jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner

failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical
condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in
prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.[14]

For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed
pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made
a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination that there was
no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[15]

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.

THE ISSUE

The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by
an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years,
does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

 Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of
the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by
the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically
be granted.

Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive

rules.

BASIC PROCEDURAL CONCERNS

FORBID GRANT OF PETITION

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail
the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
While the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper
only where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[16]
 Other than the sweeping averment that [t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of
the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less
proven by the prosecution,[17] however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of
Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court
of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by
denying his application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital
offense was strong.
We disagree.

It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of
its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly
declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a
case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature
of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate
court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal.

Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not
simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.[18] Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The
abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility.[19] It must be so patent and gross as to amount to
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a
clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.[20]

Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court
of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any
such implication or imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals
exercised grave caution in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioners application for
bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of
petitioners claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the
purpose of granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or
whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a
careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and interpretation
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will
not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.[21] In this
connection, Lee v. People[22] is apropos:

Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute
errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors
of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed
by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as
regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of
review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the
courts.[23](emphasis supplied)

WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5,

RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS
INTERPRETATION

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed
on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals
with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his
bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue
risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the
said circumstances.

The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of
retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be
summarized in the following rules:

xxxxxxxxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated
in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec. 5);

f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any
other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5);
x x x[24] (emphasis supplied)
 Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is
of the same thinking:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand,
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then
bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.[25] (emphasis supplied)

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none
of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the
appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal
may be denied even if the bail-negating[26] circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of
the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent
discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact
exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending
appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion
will thereby be committed.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound
discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice;[27] on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate
courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the
determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the
allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself
sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is
present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize
the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that
are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a
simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the
established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.

In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial
court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the
grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the
determination of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication
of this position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise,
bail will be granted pending appeal.

Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into merely filling
out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the
appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-
negating circumstances is present.

However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice.[28] Choice occurs where, between
two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options), there is more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker. [29] On the other hand, the
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. [30] Thus, by severely
clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in
applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court
on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders
nugatory the provision that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary.

The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on
applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part
of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case,
its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter. [31] In view
of the grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all
circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is
affirmed.[32] It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the
particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the applicant, [33] among other
things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending
appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not
frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be determined by the appellate
court.[34] In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal
is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue. [35] This must
be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals
made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more
significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower courts
exercise of discretionary power was sound,[36]specially since the rules on criminal procedure
require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for
substantial error.[37]

Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those
expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius[38] rule in
statutory construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive.
The provision categorically refers to the following or other similar circumstances. Hence,
under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal.

Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation
that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought
to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending
appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more
lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or
revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must
be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases
where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without
those conditions.

Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be
more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less
serious crimes?

PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY

AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL

Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the
provisions on bail pending appeal.

The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of
the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
 Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. After
judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the defendant
shall be admitted to bail as of right.

Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. After
conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the
discretion of the court.

Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a capital
offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964
Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were
modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an
offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for
bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)

The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92
dated January 20, 1992 as follows:

The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or
an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong.

Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases
before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity of
the bail of the accused, to wit:

1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he may be allowed to
remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court directs
otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
 2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetuaand
is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the
complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;

3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and
is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be
cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.

As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal
before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:

1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice
to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after
which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;

2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the
Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;

3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days,
his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by
the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he
shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August
16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:

SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)

SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit
the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the
same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than
twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled,
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
 (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with
notice to the adverse party. (n)

SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application to
be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)

SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)

The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter
amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive
approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that
is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for
strong reasons.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital
offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary.
The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-
applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not
punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter
of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not
punished by reclusion perpetua.[39]

The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending
appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusionperpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No.
12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
 A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying
which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions
and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the tough on bail pending appeal
configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the
1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before
final conviction.[40] Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the presence of bail-
negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those
circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.

Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal?
What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a
rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due
consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?

The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal
parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and
procedural provisions on bail emanated.[41] While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it
nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other
democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending
appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending
bail should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.[42] In fact, it
has even been pointed out that grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion
in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5.[43]

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should
be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit
to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may
be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show
error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability
of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to
attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.[44] (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court
declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals[45] (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already
effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion.
A FINAL WORD

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.[46] From then on, the grant of bail is subject to
judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the
trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards
approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules
on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent
with the trial courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore,
letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our
criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often
separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction
stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless
of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction
invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice
system and court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the

above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of

the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Section 1, Rule 114, RULES OF COURT.
[2]
Verilli, Donald, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 Columbia L.Rev. 328 (1982).
[3]
Id.
[4]
See Section 5, Rule 114, RULES OF COURT.
[5]
Keller, Doug, Resolving A Substantial Question: Just Who Is Entitled to Bail Pending Appeal Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984?, 60
Fla. L. Rev. 825 (2008).
[6]
Leibowitz, Debra, Release Pending Appeal: A Narrow Definition of Substantial Question Under the Bail Reform Act, 54 FDMLR
1081 (1986).
[7]
Keller, supra.
[8]
Leibowitz, supra note 6.
[9]
Keller, supra.
[10]
Yap v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 190, 202 (2001).
[11]
Decision dated January 14, 2009 in Criminal Case No. 07-179 penned by Judge Elmo M. Alameda. Rollo, pp. 198-235.
[12]
Notice of Appeal dated January 14, 2009. Id., p. 238-241.
[13]
Resolution dated April 8, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32159 penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of
this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Normandie B. Pizarro of the third Division of the
Court of Appeals. Id., pp. 36-45.
[14]
Id., p. 43.
[15]
Id., p. 47.
[16]
See Section 1, Rule 65, RULES OF COURT.
[17]
See Petition, p. 14. Rollo, p. 16.
[18]
Dueas, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 185401, 21 July 2009, 593 SCRA 316, 344.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Id, p. 345.
[21]
Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461 (1998).
[22]
441 Phil. 705 (2002).
[23]
Id.
[24]
Regalado, Florenz, II REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 417 (Tenth Revised Edition [2004]).
Justice Regalado was Vice-Chairman and, later, Co-Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
which proposed the present (2000) rules on criminal procedure (Rules 110-127 of the Rules of Court).
It should be noted, however, that Justice Regalado speaks of application for bail pending appeal in cases wherein a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed. (Emphasis supplied) A careful reading of
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 does not impose the limit of not more than 20 years.
[25]
Herrera, Oscar, IV REMEDIAL LAW 455-456 (2007).
Justice Herrera was Consultant to the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which proposed the present (2000)
rules on criminal procedure (Rules 110-127 of the Rules of Court).
[26]
These circumstances are herein referred to as bail-negating because the presence of any of them will negate the allowance of bail.
[27]
Discretion implies that, in the absence of a positive law or fixed rule, the judge is to decide by his view of expediency or by the
demands of equity and justice. (Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental,
Branch 52, Bacolod City , G.R. No. 179878, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 575 and Luna v. Arcenas, 34 Phil. 80 [1916] both
citing Goodwin v. Prime [92 Me., 355]).
[28]
Rosenberg, Maurice, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 659 (1971) cited in Painter,
Mark and Welker, Paula, Abuse of Discretion: What Should It Mean in Ohio Law?, 29 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 209 (2002).
[29]
Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis, 2 Standards of Review 15.8, at 296 (1986) cited in Painter and Welker, supra.
[30]
Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City, supra note 21.
[31]
Morada v. Tayao, A.M. No. RTJ-93-978, 07 February 1994, 229 SCRA 723.
[32]
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 83 Phil. 658 (1949).
[33]
Id.
[34]
United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (1926) (Butler, Circuit Justice).
[35]
See D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (1959) (Douglas, Circuit Justice).

Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court, in his capacity as a Circuit Justice, was one of the first judges to
discuss the definition of substantial question. He equated the phrase with an issue that is fairly debatable. Later, he provided
additional guidance to district courts trying to determine whether a defendant's appeal would raise a fairly debatable issue:

[T]he first consideration is the soundness of the errors alleged. Are they, or any of them, likely to
command the respect of the appellate judges? It is not enough that I am unimpressed. I must decide whether
there is a school of thought, a philosophical view, a technical argument, an analogy, an appeal to precedent
or to reason commanding respect that might possibly prevail.(Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351
(1955) (Douglas, Circuit Justice)
See also United States v. Barbeau, 92 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 193 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 968 (1952); Warring v. United States, 16 F.R.D. 524, 526 (D. Md. 1954); United States v. Goo, 10 F.R.D. 337, 338 (D.
Hawaii 1950).
[36]
Luna v. Arcenas, supra note 21 quoting 2 Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice 416, 418.
Thus, the general rule and one of the fundamental rules of appellate procedure is that decisions of a trial court which lie in discretion
will not be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or criminal, at law or in equity (Cuan v. Chiang Kai Shek College,
Inc, G.R. No. 175936, 03 September 2007, 532 SCRA 172, 187-188).
[37]
Section 10, Rule 114, RULES OF COURT.
[38]
The express mention of one implies the exclusion of all others not mentioned.
[39]
Regalado, Florenz, II REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 273 (Fifth Revised Edition [1988]).
[40]
See Herrera, supra note 19, p. 457.
[41]
In particular, in the United States, the history of bail pending appeal has been divided by one scholar on the matter into four distinct
periods: (1st period) 1879 to 1934, (2nd period) 1934 to 1956, (third period) 1956 to 1984 and (post-1984 period) 1984 to
present. The first period, during which the rules on the matter were just being developed, showed liberality in the grant of bail
pending appeal. The second period produced a more restrictive rule, one which limited bail to defendants who could prove that
their appeal would raise a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate court. The third period saw the
enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 establishing a standard wherein bail may be allowed pending appeal unless it appears
that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay. Under that standard, the court could deny bail if the defendant was a flight risk
or a danger to the community. Hence, bail pending appeal was again favored. The post-1984 period is determined by the
enactment and implementation of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The law was purposely designed to make restrictive the
allowance of bail pending appeal. As the Acts legislative history explains, prior law had a presumption in favor of bail even
after conviction and Congress wanted to eliminate that presumption. (Keller, supra note 5.)
[42]
Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 281.
[43]
Id.
[44]
Id. See also Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.
[45]
Id.
[46]
See Obosa v. Court of Appeals and Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra. See also Bernas, Joaquin, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, p. 492 (2009).
FIRST DIVISION

SULPICIO LINES, INC., G.R. No. 157009

Petitioner,
Present:

-versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
DOMINGO E. CURSO,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
LUCIA E. CURSO,
MELECIO E. CURSO,
SEGUNDO E. CURSO,
Promulgated:
VIRGILIO E. CURSO,
DIOSDADA E. CURSO, and
March 17, 2010
CECILIA E. CURSO,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Are the surviving brothers and sisters of a passenger of a vessel that sinks during a voyage
entitled to recover moral damages from the vessel owner as common carrier?

This is the question presented in the appeal taken by the common carrier from the reversal by
the Court of Appeals (CA) of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the
complaint for various damages filed by the surviving brothers and sisters of the late
Dr. Cenon E. Curso upon a finding that force majeure had caused the sinking. The CA awarded
moral and other damages to the surviving brothers and sisters.

Antecedents

On October 23, 1988, Dr. Curso boarded at the port of Manila the MV Doa Marilyn, an inter-
island vessel owned and operated by petitioner Sulpicio Lines, Inc., bound for Tacloban City.
Unfortunately, the MV Doa Marilyn sank in the afternoon of October 24, 1988 while at sea due
to the inclement sea and weather conditions brought about by Typhoon Unsang. The body of
Dr. Curso was not recovered, along with hundreds of other passengers of the ill-fated vessel. At
the time of his death, Dr. Curso was 48 years old, and employed as a resident physician at
the NavalDistrict Hospital in Naval, Biliran. He had a basic monthly salary of P3,940.00, and
would have retired from government service by December 20, 2004 at the age of 65.

On January 21, 1993, the respondents, allegedly the surviving brothers and sisters of Dr. Curso,
sued the petitioner in the RTC in Naval, Biliran to claim damages based on breach of contract of
carriage by sea, averring that the petitioner had acted negligently in transporting Dr. Curso and
the other passengers. They stated, among others, that their parents had predeceased Dr. Curso,
who died single and without issue; and that, as such, they were Dr. Cursos surviving heirs and
successors in interest entitled to recover moral and other damages.[1] They prayed for judgment,
as follows: (a) compensatory damages of P1,924,809.00; (b) moral damages of P100,000.00; (c)
exemplary or corrective damages in the amount deemed proper and just; (d) expenses of litigation
of at least P50,000.00; (e) attorneys fees of P50,000.00; and (f) costs of suit.

The petitioner denied liability, insisting that the sinking of the vessel was due to force
majeure (i.e., Typhoon Unsang), which exempted a common carrier from liability. It averred that
the MV DoaMarilyn was seaworthy in all respects, and was in fact cleared by the Philippine
Coast Guard for the voyage; and that after the accident it conducted intensive search and rescue
operations and extended assistance and aid to the victims and their families.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 28, 1995, the RTC dismissed the complaint upon its finding that the sinking of the vessel
was due to force majeure. The RTC concluded that the officers of the MV Doa Marilyn had acted
with the diligence required of a common carrier; that the sinking of the vessel and the death of its
passengers, including Dr. Curso, could not have been avoided; that there was no basis to consider
the MV Doa Marilyn not seaworthy at the time of the voyage; that the findings of the Special
Board of Marine Inquiry (SBMI) constituted to investigate the disaster absolved the petitioner,
its officers, and crew of any negligence and administrative liability; and that the respondents
failed to prove their claim for damages.
 Ruling of the CA

The respondents appealed to the CA, contending that the RTC erred: (a) in considering itself
barred from entertaining the case by the findings of fact of the SBMI in SBMI-ADM Case No.
08-88; (b)in not holding that the petitioner was negligent and did not exercise the required
diligence and care in conducting Dr. Curso to his destination; (c) in not finding that
the MV Doa Marilyn was unseaworthy at the time of its sinking; and (d) in not awarding
damages to them.[2]

In its decision dated September 16, 2002,[3] the CA held and disposed:
Based on the events described by the appellees witness, the Court found inadequate proof to show
that Sulpicio Lines, Inc., or its officers and crew, had exercised the required degree of diligence to
acquit the appelleeof liability.

In the first place, the court finds inadequate explanation why the officers of the M.V. Doa Marilyn
had not apprised themselves of the weather reports on the approach of typhoon Unsang which had
the power of a signal no. 3 cyclone, bearing upon the general direction of the path of the
M.V. Doa Marilyn. If the officers and crew of the Doa Marilyn had indeed been adequately
monitoring the strength and direction of the typhoon, and had acted promptly and competently to
avoid the same, then such a mishap would not have occurred.

Furthermore, there was no account of the acts and decision of the crew of the ill-fated ship
from 8:00 PM on October 23, 1988 when the Chief Mate left his post until 4:00 AM the next day
when he resumed duty. It does not appear what occurred during that time, or what weather reports
were received and acted upon by the ship captain. What happened during such time is important
in determining what information about the typhoon was gathered and how the ship officers reached
their decision to just change course, and not take shelter while a strong typhoon was approaching.

Furthermore, the Court doubts the fitness of the ship for the voyage, since at the first sign of bad
weather, the ships hydraulic system failed and had to be repaired mid-voyage, making the vessel
a virtual derelict amidst a raging storm at sea. It is part of the appellees extraordinary diligence as
a common carrier to make sure that its ships can withstand the forces that bear upon them during
a voyage, whether they be the ordinary stress of the sea during a calm voyage or the rage of a
storm. The fact that the stud bolts in the ships hydraulic system gave way while the ship was at sea
discredits the theory that the appellee exercised due diligence in maintaining the seaworthy
condition of the M.V. Doa Marilyn. xxx.[4]
xxx
Aside from these, the defendant must compensate the plaintiffs for moral damages that they
suffered as a result of the negligence attending the loss of the M.V. Doa Marilyn. Plaintiffs, have
established that they took great pains to recover, in vain, the body of their brother, at their own
cost, while suffering great grief due to the loss of a loved one. Furthermore, Plaintiffs were unable
to recover the body of their brother. Moral damages worth P100,000.00 is proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of the RTC of

Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, rendered in Civil Case No. B-0851, is hereby SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the defendant-appellee Sulpicio Lines, Inc, to
have been negligent in transporting the deceased Cenon E. Curso who was on board the ill-
fated M.V. Doa Marilyn, resulting in his untimely death. Defendant-appellee is hereby ordered
to pay the plaintiffs heirs of Cenon E. Curso the following:

(1) Death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00;

(2) Loss of Earning Capacity in the amount of P504,241.20;

(3) Moral Damages in the amount of P100,000.00.

(4) Costs of the suit.[5]

Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioner insists that the CA committed grievous errors in
holding that the respondents were entitled to moral damages as the brothers and sisters of the late
Dr. Curso; that the CA thereby disregarded Article 1764 and Article 2206 of the Civil Code, and
the ruling in Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. v. Ybaez,[6] whereby the Supreme Court
disallowed the award of moral damages in favor of the brothers and sisters of a deceased
passenger in an action upon breach of a contract of carriage.[7]
Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:

ARE THE BROTHERS AND SISTERS OF A DECEASED PASSENGER IN A CASE OF

BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES AGAINST THE CARRIER?

ASSUMING (THAT) THEY ARE ENTITLED TO CLAIM MORAL DAMAGES, SHOULD

THE AWARD BE GRANTED OR GIVEN TO THE BROTHER OR SISTER
NOTWITHSTANDING (THE) LACK OF EVIDENCE AS REGARDS HIS OR HER
PERSONAL SUFFERING?

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach of contract, unless there is fraud or bad faith.[8] As an exception, moral damages may be
awarded in case of breach of contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger, [9] in
accordance with Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206 (3), of the Civil Code, which provide:
Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with
Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a
passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding
five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

The foregoing legal provisions set forth the persons entitled to moral damages. The omission
from Article 2206 (3) of the brothers and sisters of the deceased passenger reveals the legislative
intent to exclude them from the recovery of moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.[10] The solemn power and duty of the
courts to interpret and apply the law do not include the power to correct the law by reading into
it what is not written therein.[11] Thus, the CA erred in awarding moral damages to the
respondents.

The petitioner has correctly relied on the holding in Receiver for North Negros Sugar Company,
Inc. v. Ybaez,[12] to the effect that in case of death caused by quasi-delict, the brother of the
deceased was not entitled to the award of moral damages based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
Essentially, the purpose of moral damages is indemnity or reparation, that is, to enable the injured
party to obtain the means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone by reason of the tragic event. According to Villanueva v.
Salvador,[13] the conditions for awarding moral damages are: (a) there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental, or psychological, clearly substantiated by the claimant; (b) there must be a
culpable act or omission factually established; (c) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant
must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (d) the award of damages
is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

To be entitled to moral damages, the respondents must have a right based upon law. It is
true that under Article 1003[14] of the Civil Code they succeeded to the entire estate of the late
Dr. Curso in the absence of the latters descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, and
surviving spouse. However, they were not included among the persons entitled to recover moral
damages, as enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned
in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

Article 2219 circumscribes the instances in which moral damages may be awarded. The
provision does not include succession in the collateral line as a source of the right to recover
moral damages. The usage of the phrase analogous cases in the provision means simply that the
situation must be held similar to those expressly enumerated in the law in question [15] following
the ejusdem generis rule. Hence, Article 1003 of the Civil Code is not concerned with recovery
of moral damages.

In fine, moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage only
when: (a) where death of a passenger results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud
and bad faith, even if death does not result.[16] Article 2206 of the Civil Code entitles the
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, and surviving spouse of the deceased passenger to
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.[17]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted, and the award made to the
respondents in the decision dated September 16, 2002 of the Court of Appeals of moral damages
amounting to P100,000.00 is deleted and set aside.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE-CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 24-28.
[2]
Id. at 52.
[3]
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Josefina
GuevaraSalonga and Edgardo F. Sundiam concurring, Id. at 49-60.
[4]
Id. at 55-56.
[5]
Id. at 59-60.
[6]
G.R. No. L-22183, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 979.
[7]
Rollo, p. 11.
[8]
Japan Airlines v. Simangan, G.R. No. 170141, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 341, 361.
[9]
Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, G.R. No. 159636, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 355, 356.
[10]
The express inclusion of one implies the exclusion of all others.
[11]
Agote v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 142675, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 60.
[12]
Supra, note 6.
[13]
G.R. No. 139436, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 39.
[14]
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (946a)
[15]
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130030, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 141, 146.
[16]
Morris v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127957, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 428.
[17]
Fores v. Miranda, 105 Phil 266 (1959).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 60225-26 May 8, 1992

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ZAIN B. ANGAS, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, HADJI
DALUMA KINIDAR, EBRA ALI and/or GASNARA ALI (intervenors),
MANGORSI CASAN, CASNANGAN BATUGAN, PUNDAMARUG ATOCAL, PASAYOD PADO, DIMAAMPAO
BAUTE, CASNANGAN BAUTE, DIMAPORO SUBANG, TAMBILAWAN OTE, MANISUN ATOCAL, MASACAL
TOMIARA (In Civil Case No. 2277) and LACSAMAN BATUGAN, and/or GUIMBA SHIPPING & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, MAGANCONG DIGAYAN, MOCTARA LAMPACO, LAMPACO PASANDALAN, DIMAPORO
SUBANG, HADJI DALUMA KINIDAR, DIMAAMPAO BAUTE, PANGONOTAN COSNA TAGOL, SALACOP
DIMACALING, HADJI SITTIE SOHRA LINANG BATARA, BERTUDAN PIMPING and/or CADUROG PIMPING,
BUTUAN TAGOL, DISANGCOPAN MARABONG, and HADJI SALIC SAWA (In Civil Case No.
2248),respondents.

Lucio C. Badelles for petitioner.

Dimnatang Saro for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The basic issue in this original action for certiorari and mandamus filed by the National Power Corporation is
whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law
applicable is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular No.
416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum. Pending consideration of this code on the merits,
petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to restrain or enjoin the
respondent judge of the lower court from enforcing the herein assailed orders and from further acting or proceeding
with Civil Case Nos. 2248 and 2277.

The following are the antecedents of the case:

On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and
controlled corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and
development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private respondents
with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 2248 and
Civil Case No. 2277, respectively. The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots situated at
Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production
of electricity as well as the erection of such subsidiary works and constructions as may be necessarily connected
therewith.
Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. After responsive pleadings were filed and issues joined,
a series of hearings before court-designated commissioners were held.

On June 15, 1979, a consolidated decision in Civil Cases Nos. 2248 and 2277 was rendered by the lower court,
declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully
condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private respondents certain sums
of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest thereon . . . until fully paid."

Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the said consolidated decision were filed by the petitioner. The
same were denied by the respondent court. Petitioner did not appeal the aforesaid consolidated decision, which
became final and executory.

Thus, on May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed an ex-parte motion for the
execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of
P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum. The
said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit with its
Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision dated June 15, 1979. Petitioner complied with
said order and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum.

On February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol), through counsel, filed with the
trial court an ex-parte motion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just
compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by
virtue of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116 and in a decision of
the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall
be computed at 12% per annum." (Brief for Respondents, p. 3)

On February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum. (Annex L,
Petition). Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just
compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued on
March 10, 1981 and August 28, 1981 orders bearing similar import.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated August 28, 1981, alleging that the main
decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of money as just
compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said main decision can no
longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that Presidential Decree No. 116 is not applicable to this case
because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.

On January 25, 1982, the lower court denied petitioner's, motion for reconsideration, stating that the rate of interest
at the time of the promulgation of the June 15, 1981 decision is that prescribed by Central Bank Circular No. 416
issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116, which is 12% per annum, and that it did not modify or change but
merely amplified its order of August 28, 1981 in the determination of the legal interest.

Petitioner brings the case to Us for a determination of which legal interest is applicable to the transaction in
question.

Central Bank Circular No. 416 reads:

By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as the
"Usury Law," the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments,
in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent (12%) per annum.

It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits. This has already been settled in several cases decided by this Court. Private respondents,
however, take exception to the inclusion of the term "judgments" in the said circular, claiming that such term refers
to any judgment directing the payment of legal interest, which term includes the questioned judgment of the lower
court in the case at bar.

Private respondents' contention is bereft of merit. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury Law, as
well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where
general terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be
construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the same nature as those specifically
enumerated (Crawford, Statutory Construction, p. 191; Go Tiaco vs. Union Ins. Society of Canton, 40 Phil. 40;
Mutuc vs. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228)

The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the
particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said class,
although not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body
intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not made an enumeration of
particular subjects but would have used only general terms (2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., pp. 395-
400).

Applying the said rule on statutory construction to Central Bank Circular No. 416, the general term "judgments" can
refer only to judgments in cases involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. As significantly laid
down by this Court in the case of Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260:

The judgments spoken of and referred to are judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits. Any other kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with, nor involving
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law for it is
not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. The Monetary Board may not tread on
forbidden grounds. It cannot rewrite other laws. That function is vested solely with the legislative authority. It
is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that statutes should be construed as a whole and not as a series of
disconnected articles and phrases. In the absence of a clear contrary intention, words and phrases in
statutes should not be interpreted in isolation from one another. A word or phrase in a statute is always used
in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may thus be modified or restricted by the latter.

Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the
case at bar. Said law reads:

Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the
indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest
agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum.

The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving
such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is evident not only from said circular but also from
Presidential Decree No. 116, which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On the other hand,
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection
with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance
of money, goods or credits.

In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but
expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding
interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest
required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of
indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint
judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of
earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.

As for private respondents' argument that Central Bank Circular No. 416 impliedly repealed or modified Art. 2209 of
the Civil Code, suffice it to state that repeals or even amendments by implication are not favored if two laws can be
fairly reconciled. The Courts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another by implication, and they will not
make such an adjudication if they can refrain from doing so, or if they can arrive at another result by any
construction which is just and reasonable. Besides, the courts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in order to
decide that it repeals another by implication, nor will they adopt an interpretation leading to an adjudication of repeal
by implication unless it is inevitable and a clear and explicit reason therefor can be adduced. (82 C.J.S. 479-486). In
this case, Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil Code contemplate different situations and apply
to different transactions. In transactions involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, as well as
judgments relating to such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, the Central Bank circular applies. It is
only in such transactions or judgments where the Presidential Decree allowed the Monetary Board to dip its fingers
into. On the other hand, in cases requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in
the performance of an obligation other than those involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, Art.
2209 of the Civil Code applies. For the Court, this is the most fair, reasonable, and logical interpretation of the two
laws. We do not see any conflict between Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil Code or any
reason to hold that the former has repealed the latter by implication.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders promulgated on February 11, 1981, March 10, 1981, August
28, 1981 and January 25, 1982 (as to the recomputation of interest at 12% per annum) are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. It is hereby declared that the computation of legal interest at 6% per annum is the correct and valid legal
interest allowed in payments of just compensation for lands expropriated for public use to herein private
respondents by the Government through the National Power Corporation. The injunction heretofore granted is
hereby made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.

REGALA, J.:

This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the
information against the defendant.

The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is
complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:

In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of that Province,
defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A
preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime
charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the
defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of
the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to
dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg,
(CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded
from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the
answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court
dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the
defense.

Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a justice the peace
included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?

Section 54 of the said Code reads:

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no
member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or
employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance, justice of the
peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.

When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission
revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.

The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words, justices of the peace were
expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were
specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more
generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to
comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian
Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.

It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because
a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public
officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term
includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the
peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."

A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above conclusion.

The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, and which was
later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has
a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4
amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature,
several amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3
amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the
Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth
Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included
as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code
was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of Congress in 1960,
amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law, the following should be noted:

Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:

No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible during the time that
he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection
to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial
fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under
the penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a
term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any person
otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15,
1907.)

Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:

. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the Bureau
of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner to take
part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall
be deprived of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment
whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to
deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907;
Took effect on September 15, 1907.)

Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the
provisions in question read:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance, justice of the
peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
(Emphasis supplied)

After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:

SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any judge of the First Instance, justice of
the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or employee of any Bureau of the classified
civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in
any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00
nor more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in all
cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years.
(Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section
48:
 SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or
assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of the national, provincial,
municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert
influence in any manner in any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve
public peace, if he is a peace officer.

This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.

It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however,
that in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No.
180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In
other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the
peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.

The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that when the
legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer
from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".

It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which might have
offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated above, has
eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek
deeper and additional clarifications from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the
historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.

Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as
under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last mentioned
phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a province
but of a municipality.

Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any province" necessarily
removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial
officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They
are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals
are not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies
fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said
rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that
rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and
deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when
the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in
partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."

In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites authorities to the
effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes that should be strictly
construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the government since proceedings
under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted
against the state.

Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of
fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends to do,
if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S.,
283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).

The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature,
but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has
only been a substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such
laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the
meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the
legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be
permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may
consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of
Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:

The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive it of the
meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best harmonizes with their intent
and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)

As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes, frequently, has been
narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See
also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)

Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute is to enlarge
the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the
judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in
the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the
legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in
the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:

On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the
peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the
obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges, whether
of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . .
..

The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe the law as to
allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken rather than strengthen the
judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices
of the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges
of the Court of First Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs.
103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and exclusion cases,
and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in
election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)

Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or executive
department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court
did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the
President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note
that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in
electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.

Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on January 25, 1955. In
that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are already expressly included among the officers
enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress
impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.

The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180
as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a
proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment,
until it has become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions,
and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken
into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-
376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.

On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the
injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically
laid down by the legislature.

Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan politics. They
were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so
enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387,
and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio unius, est
exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the
Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est exclusion
alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace
from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."

The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of
Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there
appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been
erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)

Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by
enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have
been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est
exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is
remanded for trial on the merits.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.

EN BANC

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 139930

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
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Respondents. Promulgated:

June 26, 2012

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
 This case, which involves another attempt of the government to recover ill-gotten wealth
acquired during the Marcos era, resolves the issue of prescription.

The Facts and the Case

On April 25, 1977 respondents Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes, Eduardo
U. Escueta and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM)[1] with an
authorized capital stock of P100 million divided into one million shares with a par value of P100
per share. The incorporators subscribed to 200,000 shares worth P20 million and paid P5
million.

On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its capitalization by (1) increasing its authorized
capital stock to three million shares without par value; (2) converting the original subscription
of 200,000 to one million shares without par value and deemed fully paid for and non-assessable
by applying the P5 million already paid; and (3) waiving and abandoning the subscription
receivables of P15 million.[2]
On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat,
Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda,
Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iaki R. Mendezona, and Danilo S. Ursua approved
Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of the Coconut Industry Investment
Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more than P500 million from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for
the benefit of the coconut farmers.[3]

On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10 million shares
without par value. The Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock stated that the incorporators held
one million shares without par value and that UCPB subscribed to 4 million shares worth P495
million.[4]

On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of respondents Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose Concepcion,
Emmanuel M. Almeda, Iaki R. Mendezona, Teodoro D. Regala, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso,
and Jaime Gandiaga, approved another amendment to UNICOMs capitalization. This increased
its authorized capital stock to one billion shares divided into 500 million Class A voting common
shares, 400 million Class B voting common shares, and 100 million Class C non-voting common
shares, all with a par value of P1 per share. The paid-up subscriptions of 5 million shares without
par value (consisting of one million shares for the incorporators and 4 million shares for UCPB)
were then converted to 500 million Class A voting common shares at the ratio of 100 Class A
voting common shares for every one without par value share.[5]

About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019[6] against respondents, the
1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPBs investment in UNICOM was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5 million
and it had no track record of operation. In the process of conversion to voting common shares,
the governments P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which was credited to
UNICOMs incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the
Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810 in line with the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government,[7] which disqualified the PCGG from conducting the
preliminary investigation in the case.

About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a
Memorandum,[8] stating that although it found sufficient basis to indict respondents for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action has already prescribed. Respondents amended
UNICOMs capitalization a third time on September 18, 1979, giving the incorporators
unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1 million shares to 100 million shares without cost to
them. But, since UNICOM filed its Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 8, 1980, making public respondents
acts as board of directors, the period of prescription began to run at that time and ended on
February 8, 1990. Thus, the crime already prescribed when the OSG filed the complaint with the
PCGG for preliminary investigation on March 1, 1990.

In a Memorandum[9] dated May 14, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman approved the OSPs
recommendation for dismissal of the complaint. It additionally ruled that UCPBs subscription to
the shares of stock of UNICOM on September 18, 1979 was the proper point at which the
prescription of the action began to run since respondents act of investing into UNICOM was
consummated on that date. It could not be said that the investment was a continuing act. The
giving of undue benefit to the incorporators prescribed 10 years later on September 18,
1989. Notably, when the crime was committed in 1979 the prescriptive period for it had not yet
been amended. The original provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019 provided for prescription of 10
years. Thus, the OSG filed its complaint out of time.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration on the Office of the Ombudsmans action but the
latter denied the same;[10] hence, this petition.

Meanwhile, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case against respondent Maria Clara L.
Lobregat in view of her death on January 2, 2004.[11]

The Issue Presented

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not respondents alleged violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed.

The Courts Ruling

 Preliminarily, the Court notes that what Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) filed in
this case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. But the remedy from an adverse
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in a preliminary investigation is a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65.[12] Still, the Court will treat this petition as one filed under Rule 65
since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion and
reversible jurisdictional error to the Ombudsman for dismissing the complaint. The Court has
previously treated differently labeled actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65
for acceptable reasons such as justice, equity, and fair play.[13]

As to the main issue, petitioner maintains that, although the charge against respondents
was for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution relates to its efforts
to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos and of his family and
cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees is not barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel.

But the Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto[14] that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution applies only to civil
actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal cases such as the complaint against
respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or
incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution may be barred by prescription.[15]

Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that
law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March
16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10
years.[16] Since the acts complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the
prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally
enacted.[17]

Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be computed
in accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326,[18] which provides:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining when the prescriptive
period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, if such
commission is known; and second, from its discovery, if not then known, and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.[19]
 Petitioner points out that, assuming the offense charged is subject to prescription, the
same began to run only from the date it was discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution. Thus, the charge could be filed as late as 1996.

In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period
from the discovery of such loans. The reason for this is that the government, as aggrieved party,
could not have known that those loans existed when they were made. Both parties to such loans
supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against the government. They could only have been
discovered after the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the people ousted President Marcos from
office. And, prior to that date, no person would have dared question the legality or propriety of
the loans.[20]

Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is questioned here is
not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by
the simple expedient of suppressing their documentations. What is rather involved here is
UCPBs investment in UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco,
supposedly a Marcos crony. That investment does not, however, appear to have been withheld
from the curious or from those who were minded to know like banks or competing
businesses. Indeed, the OSG made no allegation that respondent members of the board of
directors of UCPB connived with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the investment.

Besides, the transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board rooms when
UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible government clearing house for increases
in corporate capitalization, to accommodate UCPBs investment. Changes in shareholdings are
reflected in the General Information Sheets that corporations have been mandated to submit
annually to the SEC. These are available to anyone upon request.

The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPBs investment in
UNICOM during martial law at the Presidents or anyone elses instance. Indeed, no accusation
of this kind has ever been hurled at the SEC with reference to corporate transactions of
whatever kind during martial law since even that regime had a stake in keeping intact the
integrity of the SEC as an instrumentality of investments in the Philippines.

And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the UCPB
investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second elementthat the action could not have
been instituted during the 10-year period because of martial lawdoes not apply to this case. The
last day for filing the action was, at the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after martial
law ended. Petitioner had known of the investment it now questions for a sufficiently long time
yet it let those four years of the remaining period of prescription run its course before bringing
the proper action.

Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the beginning of
organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the plaintiff can postpone the filing of
his action to the point of depriving the defendant, through the passage of time, of access to
defense witnesses who would have died or left to live elsewhere, or to documents that would
have been discarded or could no longer be located. Moreover, the memories of witnesses are
eroded by time. There is an absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar actions that have
taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court.

Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them failed to show probable
cause. They point out that, prior to the third amendment of UNICOMs capitalization, the stated
value of the one million shares without par value, which belonged to its incorporators, was P5
million. When these shares were converted to 5 million shares with par value, the total par value
of such shares remained at P5 million. But, the action having prescribed, there is no point in
discussing the existence of probable cause against the respondents for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Memorandum dated May
14, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman that dismissed on the ground of prescription the
subject charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against respondents Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta,
Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iaki R. Mendezona, Danilo S.
Ursua, Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta, Leo J. Palma,
Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

[1]
Rollo, pp. 51-60. It was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on April 26, 1977.
[2]
Id. at 61-72. It was registered with the SEC on September 28, 1978 as evidenced by the Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of
Incorporation.
[3]
Id. at 73-78.
[4]
Id. at 79-83.
[5]
Id. at 84-102. It was registered with the SEC on February 8, 1980 as evidenced by the Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of
Incorporation.
[6]
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Approved on August 17, 1960.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
[7]
G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, 190 SCRA 226.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 43-47.
[9]
Id. at 39-42.
[10]
Id. at 48-50.
[11]
Id. at 877-879.
[12]
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, G.R. No. 139296, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 207, 212-213.
[13]
Id. at 213.
[14]
375 Phil. 697 (1999).
[15]
Id. at 296.
[16]
People v. Pacificador, 406 Phil. 774, 782 (2001).
[17]
Romualdez v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006, 497 SCRA 89, 100.
[18]
An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances, and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Approved on December 4, 1926.
[19]
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, 484 Phil. 53, 60 (2004).
[20]
Republic of the Philippines v. Desierto, 438 Phil. 201, 212 (2002); see also Republic v. Desierto, 416 Phil. 59, 77-78
(2001); Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265, 294 (2004).

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188315

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
- versus -

Promulgated:

August 25, 2010

ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA,

Accused-Appellant.
x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.
On appeal is the 29 January 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00726 finding appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of rape.

In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for the dates of the commission of
the crime and the age of the complainant, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of MakatiCity, Branch 140, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, appellant was
accused of raping AAA,[2] allegedly committed as follows:

That in or about and sometime during the month of _________, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being the adopting father of complainant who was then _________ years of age,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with [AAA] by
means of force and intimidation and against the will of the complainant.[3]

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the parties
stipulated on the following facts:

1. AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;

2. Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and
3. AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife since AAA was one
and a half years old.[4]

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The following facts are undisputed:

AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB,[5] since she was just a few months old.[6] BBB
is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six (6) years. Appellant came home in 1997
and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00
p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a week.
Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution. They are the victim herself, Marvin Suello
(Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor (PO1 Babor), P/Sr Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz (P/Sr Insp. Ortiz), and
Maximo Duran (Duran).
The prosecutions version of the facts follows

In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping inside the
house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. AAA could see appellants face as there
was a light coming from the altar. AAA was naturally surprised and she asked appellant why the
latter did such a thing. Appellant did not answer but told her not to mention the incident to
anybody. AAA then saw appellant went back to his bed and touch his private part. AAA
immediately went back to sleep.
 The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at work, appellant again
touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist but appellant threatened that he
will kill her and BBB.
Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up
and saw appellant holding a knife. While pointing the knife at AAAs neck, appellant removed his
shorts, as well as AAAs pajamas. He slowly parted AAAs legs and inserted his penis into AAAs
vagina. Meanwhile, AAA struggled and hit appellants shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate
her twice before he got out of the house. Two (2) days after, appellant again raped her by inserting
his organ into AAAs vagina. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least three (3) times a
week at around the same time until 15 October 2002, when she was 14 years old. After the last
rape incident, AAA did not go home after school and instead went to the house of her friend,
Marvin.[7]

On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television with AAA from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00
p.m. Afterwards, AAA refused to go home. She told Marvin that appellant would spank her for
going home late. Marvin asked AAA if there were other things that appellant might have done to
her, aside from spanking. At that point, AAA finally cried and divulged that she has been raped
by appellant.Marvin told AAA to file a complaint.[8]
AAA stayed at her mothers friends house and came back on 18 October 2002. She, together
with Marvin, went to Kagawad Ramon Espena to seek assistance. Marvin went with
the Barangay Tanod in apprehending appellant, who at that time, was trying to escape.[9]

PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Womens and Children Desk of Makati Police
Station on 18 October 2002. She took down the statements of AAA and her friend, Marvin. She
then referred AAA to the PNP Crime Laboratory to undergo medico-legal examination.[10]

P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz confirmed that she conducted the medico-legal examination on
AAA. Results of the examination, as indicated in the medico-legal report, show that the hymen
is with presence of deep healed laceration at 1 oclock and shallow healed laceration at 2
oclock positions at the time of examination. Said report concluded that AAA is in a non-virgin
state physically.[11] P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz opined that the lacerations could have been caused by any
solid object, like the penis inserted at the genitalia.[12]

Duran and another Bantay Bayan member were at the barangay outpost at 2:10 p.m. on 18
October 2002 when they were summoned by Barangay Kagawad Ramon Espena. Acting on the
complaint of AAA, they were directed to proceed to the house of appellant to invite him for
questioning. Duran saw appellant about to board a jeep. They stopped the jeep and asked
appellant to alight therefrom and invited him to the Bantay Bayan outpost. Appellant voluntarily
went with them. Appellant was then brought to the police station.[13]
Only appellant testified in his defense. While appellant admitted that he was a strict father to
AAA in that he would scold and spank her whenever the latter would ran away, he denied raping
AAA.[14] He alleged that AAA has the propensity to make up stories and was even once caught
stealing money from her grandmother. Appellant recalled that on 16 October 2002, AAA asked
permission to go out to buy a project. She never came home.[15]

On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to
03-261, finding accused ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of ONE
HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-ONE (181) counts of RAPE penalized by RA 8353, Chapter 3, Article 266-A, par.
1(a) in relation to Article 266-B par. 1. Taking into account the minority of [AAA], adopted daughter of the
accused, at the time of rape, and the fact the offender is the adoptive father of the minor complainant,
accused, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each count of rape, and to pay [AAA] the
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 150,000.00) for moral damages and FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 50,000.00) for exemplary damages for each count of rape.[16]

The trial court found that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime
of rape through the testimony of the victim, which the trial court deemed straightforward,
consistent and credible. The trial court also established that appellant is the adoptive father of
AAA since 1989 and that AAA was then a minor, as proven by the birth certificate, testimonies
of witnesses, and admission made by AAA.[17] Finally, the trial court dismissed appellants
defense of denial as self-serving and which cannot prevail over AAAs positive testimony.[18]

Upon denial of appellants motion for reconsideration, the case was initially elevated to the Court
of Appeals for its review pursuant to People v. Mateo.[19] However, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the case in 23 August 2005 for failure of appellant to file his appellants brief.[20] When
the case was brought before us on automatic review, we set aside the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals and remanded it back for appropriate action and disposition on the ground that review
by the Court of Appeals of the trial courts judgment imposing the death penalty is automatic and
mandatory.[21]

On 29 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant,
but it did so only on two (2) counts.

The fallo of the Decision reads:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260, inclusive,
is found not guilty on the ground of reasonable doubt and is hereby acquitted;

2. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim
AAA (to be identified through the Information in this case), the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
 indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count.[22]

The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the first and last incidents of rape
in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261, respectively, was proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.[23] With respect to the other incidents, according to the appellate court, the
testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she was raped on the average of
three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. Therefore, the appellate court
concluded that her statement is inadequate and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape. [24]

On 17 February 2009, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court of Appeals

Decision. In a Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Appellant and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) both filed their Manifestations stating that they will no longer file any
Supplemental Briefs, but instead, they will merely adopt their Appellants and Appellee's Briefs,
respectively.[25]

Appellant harps on the failure of AAA to actively defend herself or resist the alleged
assaults. Moreover, considering that the relatives of AAA live only meters away from her and the
frequency of the alleged molestation, appellant proffers that it was impossible for them not to
notice the abuses. Appellant also questions the appreciation of the circumstances of minority and
relationship as basis for the imposition of the death penalty. He contends that an adopting parent
is not included within the purview of qualifying relationships under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code. Assuming arguendo that an adopting parent may be construed as similar to a parent,
appellant argues that the term adopting parent must be given a definite and technical meaning in
that the process of adoption must first be undertaken and a judicial decree to that matter must
have been issued.[26]

The OSG, on the other hand, avers that the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that
appellant sexually abused her, in tandem with the medico-legal report, are more than sufficient to
establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, appellant failed to impute any ill
motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of rape.[27]

The OSG insists that AAAs failure to report promptly the previous incidents of rape does not dent
her credibility. Appellants exercise of moral ascendancy over AAA and that fact that she was
under physical threat during those times, could have instilled fear on AAA from reporting said
incidents.[28]

The OSG moved for modification of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole in light of Republic Act No. 9346.[29]
After an extensive review of the records, we find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

Appellant was charged with 181 counts of rape, all of which were committed within the span of
three (3) years or from February 1999 until 15 October 2002. We are in full accord with the
acquittal of appellant in the 179 counts of rape. Stated otherwise, we agree with appellants
conviction for two (2) counts of rape.

In rape cases, the victims credibility becomes the single most important issue. For when a woman
says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed; thus,
if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. [30]

Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAAs testimony credible. The RTC considered
it straightforward and consistent on material points, while the Court of Appeals described it as
spontaneous, forthright, clear and free-from-serious contradictions. Well-entrenched is the legal
precept that when the culpability or innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of the credibility
of witnesses, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court, when
duly supported by sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even
finality, by this Court and are not to be disturbed on appeal.[31] We see no reason in this case to
depart from the principle. Moreover, we give due deference to the trial courts assessment of
AAAs credibility, having had the opportunity to witnesses firsthand and note her demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.[32]

Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that when the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. When a girl, especially a minor, says that she has been defiled, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was inflicted on her.[33]

Out of the 181 counts of rape charged against appellant, the prosecution was only able to
prove two counts. Applying the ruling in People v. Garcia,[34] the Court of Appeals correctly
declared, thus:

As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260) imputed against
accused-appellant, We find him not guilty beyond reasonable doubt as the testimony of AAA was
merely based on general allegations that she was raped by the accused-appellant on the average of
three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. AAAs bare statement is evidently
inadequate and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape as each and every charge of rape is
a separate and distinct crime and that each of them must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On
that score alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence that the victim was raped three times a week
is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant therefore
with the required quantum of evidence.[35]
As regards to the first incident of rape in 1999, AAA recounted how appellant forced her to have
sexual intercourse with him, thus:

Q: What happened after two (2) weeks?

A: I was sleeping when somebody went on top of my head.
Q: Tell us about what time was this when this happened, when you said you noticed somebody
climbing up your bed?
A: 9:30 in the evening.
Q: At that time again, where was your [BBB]?
A: At work, sir.
Q: What happened after you noticed somebody climbing up your bed?
A: I woke up and I saw him holding a bread knife.
xxxx
Q: Did you know who was this person who climbed your bed and who was holding a knife?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was that person?
A: Papa
Q: When you said Papa, you are referring to the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: Tinusok nya yong kutsilyo sa leeg ko and he removed his shorts.
Q: At that time, what were you then wearing?
A: Pajama, sir.
Q: What if any did the accused do to what you were wearing then?
A: He undressed me.
Q: Which one did he remove?
A: My pajama.
Q: What about your upper garments?
A: He did not remove.
Q: After you said the accused remove his shorts and removed your pajama, what happened?
A: He slowly parted my legs.
Q: And then?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: What were you doing, were you resisting when he was doing that?
A: I was resisting but my strength is no match to him. He was strong.
Q: What sort of resistance were you putting up that time?
A: Hinampas ko po siya sa braso.
Q: What was his response to your act of hitting his arms?
A: Wag daw po akong papalag at bubutasin nya ang leeg ko.[36]

Under Article 266-A(d) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man having carnal
knowledge of a woman who is below 12 years of age. At that time of the commission of the first
incident of rape, AAA was only 11 years old, as evidenced by her birth certificate.[37]

As regards the final incident of rape in 15 October 2002, AAA narrated:

 Q: You said this happened always, approximately three (3) times a week, until when?
A: The last time was in October 15, 2002.
Q: This last incident, describe to us where did it happen again?
A: In our house.
Q: At about what time?
A: 9:30 in the evening.
Q: Narrate to us how did this incident happen?
A: The same. He went to my bed, holding a bread knife, pointing it to me and he removed my
shorts and he also undressed himself.
Q: Then?
A: And he inserted his sexual organ into my vagina and after the incident, he left the house.[38]

Since AAA was already 13 years old at the time of the commission of the last incident of rape,
the applicable rule is Article 266-A(a) which states that rape is committed by a man having carnal
knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation.

AAAs testimony that she was defiled by appellant was corroborated by the medical findings of
the medico-legal expert. The presence of deep healed and shallow healed laceration only confirms
AAAs claim of rape.
In both rape incidents, the trial court applied Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in imposing
the penalty of death, which was later modified by the Court of Appeals to reclusion
perpetuapursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. Article 266-B provides:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim;

xxxx

The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority and

relationship in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It relied on the established fact that
AAA was still a minor when she was raped and on the stipulated fact that appellant is her
guardian. One of the instances wherein the crime of rape may be qualified is when the victim is
a minor AND the accused is her guardian. At this point, we cannot subscribe to this interpretation
and hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of
relationship.
Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of
AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider guardianship as a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of rape. Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to
death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme
penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the
gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution
must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances
of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender.[39]

Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with
his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early
case of People v. De la Cruz.[40] The issue in said case was whether the aunt of a rape victim could
file a criminal complaint on behalf of her niece, when the victims father was still living and
residing in the Philippines. The Solicitor-General contended that the aunt was the legal guardian
of the victim, thus, was competent to sign the information. The Court rejected this contention and
ruled as follow:

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows:

"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud
de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al
ofensor, perdon expreso por dichas partes, segun los casos." Without passing at this time on the question
whether the tutor (legal guardian) may file a complaint in the temporary absence of the parents or
grandparents of the offended party, it suffices to say that we cannot accept the view of the Government
that an aunt who has the temporary custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position
of a tutor (legal guardian). The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article 344, supra, must be given the
same meaning as in section 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a guardian legally appointed
in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure.[41]

Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of when the accused will be considered a
guardian as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. In said case, appellant therein raped a
12-year-old girl. The victim was left to the care of appellant, who is the live-in partner of the
victims aunt. The issue of whether appellant is considered a guardian in the contemplation of the
amendment to the law on rape such that, the victim being a minor, he should be punished with
the higher penalty of death for the nine (9) crimes of rape was answered in the negative by the
Court.The underlying reason behind its ruling was explained in this discourse:

In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
specifically as one who, aside from the offended party, her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file
the sworn written complaint to commence the prosecution for that crime. In People vs. De la Cruz, it was
held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules
on civil procedure.

xxxx
 It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third paragraph of Article 344 which
is mentioned together with parents and grandparents of the offended party would have a concept
different from the "guardian" in the recent amendments of Article 335 where he is also mentioned in the
company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion of the guardian is only to
invest him with the power to sign a sworn written complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes
against chastity, while his inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the
imposition of the death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should the restrictive concept
announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or judicial guardian, be required in the latter article.

The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular point that
the formulators were not definitive on the concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant
circumstances added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of
a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to be
determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification
that he should be a legal or judicial guardian. It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least
be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged
in Article 335 of the Code, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural
guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the
court over the person of the ward.

They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act
No. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of
rape and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that, just
like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the
crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by
producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty of death.

xxxx

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the
solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and
normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or,
for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's property.
The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.

In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit
of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category
of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with
respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a
custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority
for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.[42]

People v. De la Cuesta[43] adhered to Garcia when it ruled that the mere fact that the mother
asked the accused to look after her child while she was away did not constitute the relationship
of guardian-ward as contemplated by law.[44]
 Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar[45] where it was held that the
guardian envisioned in Section 31(c) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a person who has a legal
relationship with a ward. In said case, accused was charged for violation of Section 5, Article III
of Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an 11 year old child to at least two clients. The Court
held that the prosecution failed to establish filiation albeit it considered accused as a de
facto guardian. However, this was not sufficient to justify the imposition of the higher penalty
pursuant to the ruling in Garcia. In addition, the Court construed the term guardian in this
manner:

Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or
phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No.
7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim
which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an
"ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated
in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that
the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This
relationship may be established either by being the wards biological parent (natural guardian) or
by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs adoptive
father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law.[46]

Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned
in the Informations. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the adopting father of AAA,
which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.

For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could
only be convicted for two (2) counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.

We likewise reduce the Court of Appeals award of civil indemnity from P75,000.00
to P50,000.00 and moral damages from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence.[47] The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be
increased to P30,000.00 pursuant to People v. Guillermo.[48] While no aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of rapes, it was established during trial that appellant used a deadly
weapon to perpetrate the crime. Hence, the award of exemplary damages is proper.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 29 January 2009 convicting Isidro Flores y Lagua of the
crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION in that he is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape
only and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. He is also ordered,
for each count of rape, to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos with Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Sesinando E. Villon,
concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-24.
[2]
The victims real name is withheld to protect her privacy, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2000 and People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 425-426.
[3]
Records, pp. 1-341
[4]
Id. at 362.
[5]
Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their
identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed per Cabalquinto.
[6]
TSN, 2 April 2003, p. 5.
[7]
TSN, 24 April 2003, pp. 2-11.
[8]
TSN, 26 February 2003, pp. 6-7.
[9]
Id. at 5-8.
[10]
TSN, 4 June 2003, pp. 4-6.
[11]
Records, p. 350.
[12]
TSN, 4 June 2003, p. 24.
[13]
TSN, 5 June 2003, pp. 5-7.
[14]
TSN, 3 July 2003, pp. 7-8.
[15]
TSN, 17 July 2003, pp. 3-14.
[16]
CA rollo, p. 26.
[17]
Id. at 25.
[18]
Id. at 26.
[19]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[20]
CA rollo, p. 31.
[21]
Id. at 40.
[22]
Rollo, p. 23.
[23]
Id. at 18.
[24]
Id. at 21.
[25]
Id. at 36-37 and 39-40.
[26]
CA rollo, pp. 80-85.
[27]
Id. at 125-128.
[28]
Id. at 128-129.
[29]
Id. at 133-134.
[30]
People v. Paculba, G.R. No. 183453, 9 March 2010 citing People v. Mingming, G.R. No. 174195, 10 December 2008, 573 SCRA
509, 532; People v. Capareda, 473 Phil. 301, 330 (2004); People v. Galido, G.R. Nos. 148689-92, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA
502, 516.
[31]
People v. Guillera, G.R. No. 175829, 20 March 2009, 582 SCRA 160, 168 citing Siccuan v. People, G.R. No. 133709, 28 April
2005, 457 SCRA 458, 463-464.
[32]
People v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 816, 825 citing People v. Bantiling, 420 Phil. 849, 862-863 (2001).
[33]
People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, 5 July 2010 citing Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, 26 April 2006, 488 SCRA 376, 400; People
v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA 435, 448; People v. Bidoc, G.R. No. 169430, 21 October 2006, 506
SCRA 481, 495.
[34]
346 Phil. 475 (1997).
[35]
Rollo, p. 21.
[36]
TSN, 24 April 2003, pp. 5-8.
[37]
Records, p. 351.
[38]
Id. at 11.
[39]
People v. Dalipe, G.R. No. 187154, 23 April 2010 citing People v. Ibarrientos, G.R. Nos. 148063-64, 17 June 2004, 432 SCRA 424,
440.
[40]
59 Phil. 531 (1934).
[41]
Id. at 532.
[42]
People v. Garcia, supra note 34 at 500-503.
[43]
363 Phil. 425 (1999).
[44]
Id. at 433.
[45]
G.R. No. 169143, 2 February 2007, 514 SCRA 115.
[46]
Id. at 139-140.
[47]
People v. Ofemiano, G.R. No. 187155, 1 February 2010; People v. Pabol, G.R. No. 187084, 12 October 2009, 603 SCRA 522,
532; People v. Gragasin, G.R. No. 186496, 25 August 2009, 597 SCRA 214, 233; People v. Arcosiba, G.R. No. 181081, 4
September 2009, 598 SCRA 517, 536.
[48]
G.R. No. 177138, 26 January 2010.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

JUDITH YU, G.R. No. 170979

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, February 9, 2011
Quezon City, Branch 105, and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent Judge
Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Judith Yu, et al.[1]

The Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, gathered from the parties pleadings, are briefly summarized below.
 Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa
against the petitioner was filed with the RTC.

In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It imposed on
her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine of P3,800,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same
amount as the fine.[2]

Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with
the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the
crime for which she was convicted.[3]

In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for new trial
for lack of merit.[4]

On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that
pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[5] she had a fresh period of 15 days from
November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18,
2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.[6]

On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy
of Neypes for his guidance.[7]

On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed
10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.[8]
On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision.[9]

On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution.

On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
RTC from acting on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the
decision.[10]

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions when
she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of
Court, applying the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes.

The Case for the Respondents

The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions
since the evident intention of the fresh period rule was to set a uniform appeal period provided in
the Rules.[11]
 In view of the OSGs manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to comment on the
petition.[12]
In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge
in Neypes to extend the fresh period rule to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case,
and the pronouncement of standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules referred to the
interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure among others; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases,
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned.[13]

Issue

The core issue boils down to whether the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes applies to
appeals in criminal cases.

The Courts Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is a statutory privilege
and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.[14] The period to appeal
is specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),[15] as amended,
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:

SEC. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments,
or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration
shall be allowed.

Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
 reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon
the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period
within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of
a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive
process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court
of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on
justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist
of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or resolution.[16]

The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration
that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

The raison dtre for the fresh period rule is to standardize the appeal period provided in the
Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a
fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes
no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of
BP 129 categorically states that [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice
of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not
to recognize any distinction.[17]

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded,
mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as
legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for
new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason
exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal
cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a
purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for
review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in
criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

xxxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate
jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists
why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in
civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the fresh period rule in Neypes and make it applicable only to
the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation
where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case
a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-
appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property
interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must
emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time,
courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not
allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.[18]

Thus, we agree with the OSGs view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused
on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be
accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the
liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of
liberty cannot be overstated.

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of
appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3,
2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge
Rosa Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising
jurisdiction over the prosecutions motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the
decision. The respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioners appeal
in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals
for review of the appealed decision on the merits.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 3-23.
[2]
Penned by Pairing Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada; id. at 24-40.
[3]
Id. at 41-45.
[4]
Id. at 53-57.
[5]
G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 58-60.
[7]
Id. at 63.
[8]
Id. at 64-71.
[9]
Id. at 85-92.
[10]
Supra note 1.
[11]
Id. at 118-129.
[12]
Per the Courts July 26, 2006 resolution; id. at 131-134.
[13]
Id. at 150-163.
[14]
Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 175787, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 69, 76; de La
Cruz v. Ramiscal, G.R. No. 137882, February 4, 2005, 450 SCRA 449, 457.
[15]
Otherwise Known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
[16]
Supra note 5 at 643-645.
[17]
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 484; Pilar v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995, 245 SCRA 759, 763; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 101976, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 203, 214-215.
[18]
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Commissioner of Customs v. Unimex Micro-Electronics GMBH, G.R. Nos. 166309-
10, March 9, 2007, 518 SCRA 19, 33; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108926, July 12, 1996, 258 SCRA 712, 723.

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164185

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH Promulgated:

DIVISION) and ALEJANDRO A.
VILLAPANDO, July 23, 2008
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
 This petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman through the Office of the
Special Prosecutor assails the May 20, 2004 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division,
in Criminal Case No. 27465, granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapandos Demurrer to
Evidence[2] and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful appointment under Article 244 [3] of the
Revised Penal Code.

The facts culled from the records are as follows:

During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San
Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now deceased), a relative of Villapandos wife, ran for
Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter,
on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of
the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.[4] A Contract of Consultancy[5] dated February 8,
1999 was executed between the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan and Tiape whereby the
former employed the services of Tiape as Municipal Administrative and Development Planning
Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor for a period of six months from January 1, 1999
to June 30, 1999 for a monthly salary of P26,953.80.

On February 4, 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando

and Tiape for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon.[6] The complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and the
following Information[7] dated March 19, 2002 charging the two with violation of Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code was filed with the Sandiganbayan:
xxxx

That on or about 01 July 1998 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

San Vicente, Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, a public
officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, committing the
crime herein charged, in relation to and taking advantage of his official functions,
conspiring and confederating with accused Orlando M. Tiape, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously appoint ORLANDO M. TIAPE as a Municipal
Administrator of San Vicente, Palawan, accused Alejandro A. Villapando knowing
fully well that Orlando Tiape lacks the qualification as he is a losing mayoralty
candidate in the Municipality of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte during the May 1998
elections, hence is ineligible for appointment to a public office within one year (1)
from the date of the elections, to the damage and prejudice of the government and
of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27465 and raffled to the Fourth
Division of the Sandiganbayan.

Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the
case against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved his death which occurred on July
26, 2000.[9]

After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando moved for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied his motion but gave him five days within
which to inform the court in writing whether he will nonetheless submit his Demurrer to Evidence
for resolution without leave of court.[10] Villapando then filed a Manifestation of Intent to File
Demurrer to Evidence,[11] and was given 15 days from receipt to file his Demurrer to
Evidence. He filed his Demurrer to Evidence[12] on October 28, 2003.
 In a Decision dated May 20, 2004, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division found Villapandos
Demurrer to Evidence meritorious, as follows:
The Court found the Demurrer to Evidence impressed with merit.

Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 244. Unlawful appointments.Any public officer who

shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the
legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos. (underscoring supplied)

A dissection of the above-cited provision [yields] the following elements, to wit:

1. the offender was a public officer;

2. accused nominated or appointed a person to a public office;
3. such person did not have the legal qualifications [therefor;] and,
4. the offender knew that his nominee or appointee did not have the legal qualifications
at the time he made the nomination or appointment.

Afore-cited elements are hereunder discussed.

1. Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when
the alleged crime was committed.

2. Accused appointed Orlando Tiape as Municipal Administrator of

the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.

3. There appears to be a dispute. This Court is now called upon to determine whether
Orlando Tiape, at the time of [his] designation as Municipal Administrator, was lacking in legal
qualification. Stated differently, does legal qualification contemplate the one (1) year prohibition
on appointment as provided for in Sec. 6, Art. IX-B of the Constitution and Sec. 94 (b) of the Local
Government Code, mandating that a candidate who lost in any election shall not, within one year
after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government?

The Court answers in the negative.

In ascertaining the legal qualifications of a particular appointee to a public office, there

must be a law providing for the qualifications of a person to be nominated or appointed therein. To
illuminate further, Justice Rodolfo Palattao succinctly discussed in his book that the qualification
of a public officer to hold a particular position in the government is provided for by law, which
may refer to educational attainment, civil service eligibility or experience:

As the title suggests, the offender in this article is a public officer who
nominates or appoints a person to a public office. The person nominated or
appointed is not qualified and his lack of qualification is known to the party making
the nomination or appointment. The qualification of a public officer to hold a
particular position in the government is provided by law. The purpose of the law is
to ensure that the person appointed is competent to perform the duties of the office,
thereby promoting efficiency in rendering public service.

The qualification to hold public office may refer to educational attainment,

civil service eligibility or experience. For instance, for one to be appointed as judge,
he must be a lawyer. So if the Judicial and Bar Council nominates a person for
appointment as judge knowing him to be not a member of the Philippine Bar, such
act constitutes a violation of the law under consideration.

In this case, Orlando Tiape was allegedly appointed to the position of Municipal
Administrator. As such, the law that provides for the legal qualification for the position of
municipal administrator is Section 480, Article X of the Local Government Code, to wit:

Section 480. Qualifications, Terms, Powers and Duties.(a) No person shall

be appointed administrator unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the
local government unit concerned, of good moral character, a holder of a college
 degree preferably in public administration, law, or any other related course from a
recognized college or university, and a first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent. He must have acquired experience in management and administration
work for at least five (5) years in the case of the provincial or city administrator,
and three (3) years in the case of the municipal administrator.

xxx xxx xxx.

It is noteworthy to mention that the prosecution did not allege much less prove that Mayor
Villapandos appointee, Orlando Tiape, lacked any of the qualifications imposed by law on the
position of Municipal Administrator. Prosecutions argument rested on the assertion that since
Tiape lost in the May 11, 1998 election, he necessarily lacked the required legal qualifications.

It bears stressing that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with absence or lack of
legal qualification. A person who possessed the required legal qualifications for a position may be
temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one year prohibition
imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand, one may not be temporarily disqualified for
appointment, but could not be appointed as he lacked any or all of the required legal qualifications
imposed by law.

4. Anent the last element, this Court deems it unnecessary to discuss the same.

WHEREFORE, finding the Demurrer to Evidence filed by Mayor Villapando with merit,
the same is hereby GRANTED. Mayor Villapando is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
representing the People of the Philippines.

Villapando was required by this Court to file his comment to the petition. Despite several
notices, however, he failed to do so and in a Resolution[14] dated June 7, 2006, this Court informed
him that he is deemed to have waived the filing of his comment and the case shall be resolved on
the basis of the pleadings submitted by the petitioner.

Petitioner raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN INTERPRETING THAT
THE LEGAL DISQUALIFICATION IN ARTICLE 244 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
DOES NOT INCLUDE THE ONE YEAR PROHIBITION IMPOSED ON LOSING
CANDIDATES AS ENUNCIATED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE.

II.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING DUE COURSE
TO, AND EVENTUALLY GRANTING, THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.[15]

Simply, the issue is whether or not the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code does not complement the provision on the one-year prohibition found in
the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code, particularly Section 6, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution which states no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year
after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b) of the Local Government
Code of 1991, for its part, states that except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no
candidate who lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any
office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their
subsidiaries. Petitioner argues that the court erred when it ruled that temporary prohibition is not
synonymous with the absence of lack of legal qualification.

The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the qualifications for a position are provided by
law and that it may well be that one who possesses the required legal qualification for a position
may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one-year
prohibition imposed on losing candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so
long as the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.

There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this interpretation. On the contrary, legal
disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code simply means disqualification under
the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such election to be
appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations
or in any of their subsidiaries.

Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or
appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefore, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Section 94 of the Local Government Code provides:

SECTION 94. Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials; Candidates Who
Lost in Election. - (a) No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no elective or
appointive local official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any
election shall, within one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government
or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

Section 6, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

Villapandos contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Divisions interpretation of the term
legal disqualification lack cogency. Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
circumscribed lexically. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Although this Court held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan[16] that once a court grants
the demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy, this Court held in the
same case that such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse
of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[17]

In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory
construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal
disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to
exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should
not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.

Further, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied Villapandos Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence yet accommodated Villapando by giving him five days within which to inform
it in writing whether he will submit his demurrer to evidence for resolution without leave of court.

Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void,
does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.[18]

The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having acted with grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the basic rules of statutory construction resulting in its decision
granting VillapandosDemurrer to Evidence and acquitting the latter, we can do no less but declare
its decision null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2004 of
the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal Case No. 27465, granting private respondent
Alejandro A. Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime of unlawful
appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared NULL and
VOID. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Additional member in place of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion who is on leave.
[1]
Sandiganbayan rollo, pp. 271-280.
[2]
Id. at 246-252.
[3]
Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking
the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
[4]
Sandiganbayan rollo, p. 152.
[5]
Id. at 159.
[6]
Id. at 143-151.
[7]
Id. at 1-3.
[8]
Id. at 1-2.
[9]
Id. at 192-193.
[10]
Id. at 231.
[11]
Id. at 235-236.
[12]
Id. at 246-252.
[13]
Id. at 275-279.
[14]
Rollo, p. 97.
[15]
Id. at 14.
[16]
G.R. No. 140633, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 74.
[17]
People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128986, June 21, 1999, 308 SCRA 687, 698.
[18]
Id. at 690.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27760 May 29, 1974

CRISPIN ABELLANA and FRANCISCO ABELLANA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II; and
GERONIMO CAMPANER, MARCELO LAMASON, MARIA GURREA, PACIENCIOSA FLORES and ESTELITA
NEMEN0, respondents.

Prud. V. Villafuerte for petitioners.

Hon. Geronimo R. Marave in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p

This petition for certiorari is characterized by a rather vigorous insistence on the part of petitioners Crispin Abellana and Francisco Abellana that an order of
respondent Judge was issued with grave abuse of discretion. It is their contention that he ought to have dismissed an independent civil action filed in his court,
considering that the plaintiffs, as offended parties, private respondents here,1 failed to reserve their right to institute it separately in the City Court of Ozamis City,
when the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was commenced. Such a stand of petitioners was sought to be bolstered by a literal
reading of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111.2 It does not take into account, however, the rule as to a trial de novo found in Section 7 of Rule 123.3 What is worse,
petitioners appear to be oblivious of the principle that if such an interpretation were to be accorded the applicable Rules of Court provisions, it would give rise to a
grave constitutional question in view of the constitutional grant of power to this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure being
limited in the sense that they "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."4 It thus appears clear that the petition for certiorari is without merit.

The relevant facts were set forth in the petition and admitted in the answer. The dispute had its origins in a
prosecution of petitioner Francisco Abellana of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving
his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers, namely, private respondents
Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeo. The criminal case was filed with the city
court of Ozamis City, which found the accused Francisco Abellana guilty as charged, damages in favor of the
offended parties likewise being awarded. The accused, now petitioner, Francisco Abellana appealed such decision
to the Court of First Instance.5 At this stage, the private respondents as the offended parties filed with another
branch of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, presided by respondent Judge, a separate and
independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered by them from the reckless driving of the aforesaid Francisco
Abellana.6 In such complaint, the other petitioner, Crispin Abellana, as the alleged employer, was included as
defendant. Both of them then sought the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no
reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued by them that it was not allowable at the
stage where the criminal case was already on appeal.7

Respondent Judge was not persuaded. On April 28, 1967, he issued the following order: "This is a motion to dismiss
this case on the ground that in Criminal Case No. OZ-342 which was decided by the City Court and appealed to this
Court, the offended parties failed to expressly waive the civil action or reserve their right to institute it separately in
said City Court, as required in Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court. From the Records of Criminal Case No. OZ-342,
it appears that the City Court convicted the accused. On appeal to this Court, the judgment of the City Court was
vacated and a trial de novo will have to be conducted. This Court has not as yet begun trying said criminal case. In
the meantime, the offended parties expressly waived in this Court the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, and reserve their right to institute a separate action as in fact, they did file. The Court is of the opinion that at
this stage, the offended parties may still waive the civil action because the judgment of the City Court is vacated and
a trial de novo will have to be had. In view of this waiver and reservation, this Court would be precluded from judging
civil damages against the accused and in favor of the offended parties. [Wherefore], the motion to dismiss is hereby
denied. ..."8 There was a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition.

The only basis of petitioners for the imputation that in the issuance of the challenged order there was a grave abuse
of discretion, is their reading of the cited Rules of Court provision to the effect that upon the institution of a criminal
action "the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party ...reserves his right to institute it
separately."9 Such an interpretation, as noted, ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts.10 It
does likewise, as mentioned, give rise to a constitutional question to the extent that it could yield a meaning to a rule
of court that may trench on a substantive right. Such an interpretation is to be rejected. Certiorari, to repeat, clearly
does not lie.

1. In the language of the petition, this is the legal proposition submitted for the consideration of this Court : "That a
separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the court only at the institution, or the right to file such
separate civil action reserved or waived, at such institution of the criminal action, and never on appeal to the next
higher court."11 It admits of no doubt that an independent civil action was filed by private respondents only at the
stage of appeal. Nor was there any reservation to that effect when the criminal case was instituted in the city court of
Ozamis. Petitioners would then take comfort from the language of the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule 111 for the
unwarranted conclusion that absent such a reservation, an independent civil action is barred. In the first place, such
an inference does not per se arise from the wording of the cited rule. It could be looked upon plausibly as a non-
sequitur. Moreover, it is vitiated by the grievous fault of ignoring what is so explicitly provided in Section 7 of Rule
123: "An appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the Court of First Instance as if it had been originally
instituted in that court."12 Unlike petitioners, respondent Judge was duly mindful of such a norm. This Court has
made clear that its observance in appealed criminal cases is mandatory.13 In a 1962 decision, People v.
Carreon,14Justice Barrera, as ponente, could trace such a rule to a 1905 decision, Andres v. Wolfe.15 Another case
cited by him is Crisostomo v. Director of Prisons,16 where Justice Malcolm emphasized how deeply rooted in Anglo-
American legal history is such a rule. In the latest case in point, People v. Jamisola,17 this Court, through Justice
Dizon, reiterated such a doctrine in these words: "The rule in this jurisdiction is that upon appeal by the defendant
from a judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case 'shall
be tried in all respects anew in the court of first instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court.'"18 So it is
in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40.19 Again, there is a host of decisions attesting to its observance.20 It cannot
be said then that there was an error committed by respondent Judge, much less a grave abuse of discretion, which
is indispensable if this petition were to prosper.

2. Nor is the above the only ground for rejecting the contention of petitioners. The restrictive interpretation they
would place on the applicable rule does not only result in its emasculation but also gives rise to a serious
constitutional question. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear: "In cases of ... physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence."21 That is a substantive right, not to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if
through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. As
referred to earlier, the grant of power to this Court, both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter,
does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right.22 It is a well-settled doctrine that a
court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt.
Unfortunately, petitioners, unlike respondent Judge, appeared to lack awareness of the undesirable consequence of
their submission. Thus is discernible another insuperable obstacle to the success of this suit.

3. Nor is this all that needs to be said. It is understandable for any counsel to invoke legal propositions impressed
with a certain degree of plausibility if thereby the interest of his client would be served. That is though, merely one
aspect of the matter. There is this other consideration. He is not to ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is
to assure parties justice according to law. He is not to fall prey, as admonished by Justice Frankfurter, to the vice of
literalness. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction
sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant
being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.23 The commitment of this Court to such a primordial
objective has been manifested time and time again.24

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed.

Costs against petitioners.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., concurs on the bases of par. nos. 2 & 3 of opinion.

Footnotes

1 The private respondents are: Geronimo Campaner, Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa
Flores and Estelita Nemeo.

2 The aforesaid sections read as follows: "Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives
the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the
cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence." .

3 Section 7 of Rule 123 reads as follows: "An appeal case shall be tried in all respects anew in the
Court of First Instances as if it had been originally instituted in that court."

4 According to Article VIII, Section 13 of the 1935 Constitution: "The Supreme Court shall have the
power to promulgate runs concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to
repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines." The present Constitution, in its Article X, Section
5, paragraph (5), empowers this Court to promulgate "rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which,
however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the National Assembly. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

5 Petition, pars. 2 and 3.

6 Ibid, par. 4.

7 Ibid, par. 5.

8 Ibid, par. 9.

9 Cf. Rules of Court, Section 1 of Rule 111.

10 Cf. Section 7 of Rule 123, Rules of Court.

11 Petition, Ground for Reversal of the Court Order Involved, 4.

12 Cf. Section 7 of Rule 123 (1964).

13 Cf. People v. Jaramilia, 97 Phil. 880 (1955); Escudero v. Lucero, 103 Phil. 672 (1958); People v.
Malayao, L-12103, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 628; People v. Carreon, L-17920, May 30, 1962, 5
SCRA 252; People v. Jamisola, L-27332, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 555.

14 L-17920, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 252.

15 5 Phil. 60.

16 41 Phil. 368 (1921). Cf. People v. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 501 (1935).

17 L-27332, November 28, l969, 30 SCRA 555..

18 Ibid, 556-557.

19 Section 9 of Rule 40 reads: "A perfected appeal shall operate to vacate the judgment of the
justice of the peace or the municipal court, and the action when duly docketed in the Court of First
Instance shall stand for trial de novo upon its merits in accordance with the regular procedure in the
court, as though the same had never been tried before and had been originally there commenced. If
 the appeal is withdrawn, or dismissed for failure to prosecute, the judgment shall be deemed revived
and shall forthwith be remanded to the justice of the peace or municipal court for execution."

20 Cf. Lichauco v. Guash, 76 Phil. 5 (1946); Torres v. Ocampo, 80 Phil. 36 (1948); Ricohermoso v.
Enriquez and Ricohermoso, 85 Phil. 88 (1949); Evangelista v. Soriano, 92 Phil. 190 (1952); Vda. de
Valdez v. Farinas, 94 Phil. 850 (1954); Royal Shirt Factory, Inc. v. Co Bon Tic, 94 Phil. 994 (1954);
Acierto Y. De Laperal, 107 Phil. 1088 (1960); Singh v. Liberty Insurance Corp., L-16860, July 31,
1963, 8 SCRA 517, Florendo, Sr. v. Buyser, L-24316, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1106; Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, L-29766, Nov. 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 332.

21 Article 33 includes the other cases of deformation and fraud.

22 Cf. Article X, Section 5, par. 5 of the Constitution and Article VIII, Section 13 of the 1935
Constitution.

23 Cf. Avila v. Gimenez, L-24615, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 321.

24 Cf. Aguinaldo v. Aguinaldo, L-30362, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 137.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON,
COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC.
TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ.
ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES,
CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY
SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL.
MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ.
ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA
COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.

No. 95020 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL.
WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT PA., respondents.

No. 96948 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL
ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC.
TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN
BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO
VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT.
ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL.
WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND
MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.

No. 97454 August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO,
Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN
REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT.
ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS
GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L.
CANTACO PC, respondents.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio,
Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues
arising from the same incident.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d'
etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of
the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the
General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling
denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed
on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling
denying bail to the private respondents.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a
petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise
raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant
to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The
PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:

You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12
Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your counter-affidavit
and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for
violence of AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.

Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a
waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of
witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI
Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was done through a Motion for
Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.

In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from
notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave
them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990.

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71,
which provides:

Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to military
law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth
therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.

No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation
thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in
said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and
discipline. At such investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses
against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense
or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the
charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance
of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution
witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the motion
for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.

At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were exercising their right to
raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com.
Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under
P.D. No. 39.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14.
He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer
for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed
by the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional
liberty to Ligot.

On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to declare in
contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that
Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this
Court.

After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc
Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino
Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:

(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the
defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the
assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken
assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there
is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14
is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which
may as well include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.

Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court
reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors
Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas
corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after
hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the
trial court ordered their release.
 II

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.

It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their side
at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of
their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On
that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing.
This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that
the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.

The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved
against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the
subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall
be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their
motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting
for the petitioners to submit their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is
1wphi1

deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled
that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We
so held in Arula v. Espino,1 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.

The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way
affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court
said:

We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counter-part is
article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an indispensable pre-
requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve
important functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and does provide safeguards to
an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the
required investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a
court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused.
But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments
wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That
Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that
the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.

xxx xxx xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that
where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But
this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This
later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory,
and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was
pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but
left unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable pre-requisite to the exercise of
Army general court-martial jurisdiction

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of war 71
would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction.
Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that
absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity
of the proceedings.

As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved more than two
years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where we declared:

The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The
amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct
 unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had
investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent
AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets were
sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the
Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application,
the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the
officer administering the oath has personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended
by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit. However, instead
of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That
petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never even
asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory
questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of
War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de
Villa as Chief of Staff.

Article of War No. 8 reads:

Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the commanding officer
of a major command or task force, the commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military
area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of
troops may appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor
of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority. ...

While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it
because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be
spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief
of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that
General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly
have done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No.
93177, he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor
General.

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:

Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or
the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity
thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge
advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall
be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for
cause.

The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro,3 thus:

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act
No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and
graduates of the United States military and naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army,
there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of
the developing army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the
national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges
should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be
allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14,
1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by
either the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the
Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of
the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in military law,
encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of
World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945,
the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great
many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that
Article of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the
sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them.

On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure,
and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:

No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure impartiality
and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a majority of the members
excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the challenged member. A successfully
challenged member shall be immediately replaced.

On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which was a
compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to
the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied
in this decree.

On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law
throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the
military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.

P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With the
termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the
existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante
ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is
its soul.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became
ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a
result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the
right to peremptory challenge.

We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn
under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January
17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out
under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime.

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the present
government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers.

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a
court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers
in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present
circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and
apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political
departments can resolve.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus and
the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is
argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of
War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings.

The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the
case of Yang v. Court of Appeals4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission
are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.

It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies
employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.

In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings of
courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. The single inquiry,
 the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial
may commit such an abuse of discretion what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of
discretion" as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action
suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas
corpusand quo warranto.5 In the absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or
the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold
that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.
This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of
democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their
duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent
elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system.

xxx xxx xxx

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of
respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the
streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail.
The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely
resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities,
including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of
government and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not
acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply
where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they
are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.

On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after more than one
year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and
the right to a speedy trial.

The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was referred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the
respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the private
respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was
created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private
respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their
counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation
and preparation of the charges against the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor
General thus:

... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation only after one
(1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All of
them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took months to
finish. The pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were
dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout
Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had to pass review
and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:

This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation of petitioner
in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be
established and no charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial
 before a military commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now
General) to release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested
pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof
mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and
release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a
final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct.6

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the
government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied,
after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did
not run until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private
respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and executory when the special civil action
in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

III

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the Court in Arula:

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A
petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse
of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or
without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of
by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory
challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should
not have been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is
GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED,
and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny bail
to accused military personnel.

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only exception of "those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong."1 The Charter also states
that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended."2 To deny the military
officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" the coverage
of the right.

I believe that military officers fall within "persons".

The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the
Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number
alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous
activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court,
and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice."3 But would a
scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to bail?
Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements
of society?

We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be granted the
same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I submit, however,
that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not
tradition.

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.

Footnotes

1
28 SCRA 540,

2
168 SCRA 264.

3
32 SCRA 106.

4
186 SCRA 287.

5
Sec. 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; Sec. 9l and Sec. 21(l), B.P. 129.

6
Elepante v. Madayag, G.R. No. 93559, April 26, 1991.

SARMIENTO, J.

1
CONST., art. III, sec. 13.

2
Supra.

3
Decision, 20.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996]

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CONSTRUED WITH REFERENCE TO THE
INTENDED SCOPE AND PURPOSE. - Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be
construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in
construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and
reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
2. ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO REGULATE THE USE OF
ALIASES); PURPOSE IS TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES IN BUSINESS
TRANSACTION. - The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act
No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names,
Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement,
Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14
November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. The enactment
of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese
of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field
of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious
reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed
they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias
name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the
civil register.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT TO REGULATE THE
USE OF ALIASES); ALIAS, DEFINED. - An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended
to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real
name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by
a competent authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly
designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by
several different names and thse are known as aliases.
4. ID.; ID.; USE OF FICTITIOUS NAME IN A SINGLE TRANSACTION WITHOUT INTENDING TO BE
KNOWN BY THIS NAME IN ADDITION TO HIS REAL NAME, NOT A VIOLATION THEREOF.
- The use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance
without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real
name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. - This is so in the case at bench. It is not disputed that petitioner
introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez, which was the name of the
messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead
of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the
complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that Oscar Perez is not
an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use
that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was
made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his
real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman,
petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of
the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence
open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances. While the act of
petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within
the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud
in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not
present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the
legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the
statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition
that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
Wherefore, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A PENAL STATUTE LIKE COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS
AMENDED, CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED. - As C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State
and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights
of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be
safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction
of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as
amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Alliases.[1]
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned
in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of
the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others
in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.[2]
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against
petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the
Ombudsman because his law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal
matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told
him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents
before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez)
name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. [3]
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the
security officer to register in the visitors logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the
name Oscar Perez after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the
complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division,
Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged
by writing the name Oscar Perez.[4]
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo,
who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that
the person who introduced himself as Oscar Perez was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer
of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who
recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence,
petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution
to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was
fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show
the registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of
his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R. A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day
of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as
maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus
costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty
by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a
fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as. he reasserts his innocence. He contends
that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R. A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name;
neither is Oscar Perez his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use
of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as Oscar
Perez and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar
Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R. A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his
supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that
the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong
law.[5]
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to
be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose.[6] The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.[7]
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated
by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent
provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was
approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R. A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to
Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different
from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or
such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise
the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate
proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and
the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been obtained, specifying the
proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of
aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register x x x.

The above law was subsequently amended by R. A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As
amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted
practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth
in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of
an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute
name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have
not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from
the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence.
The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like
those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be
allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set
forth the persons baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if
different, his immigrants name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his
original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority
for the use of alias, the christian name and the alien immigrants name shall be recorded in the
proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real
name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

The objective and purpose of C. A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to
Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties
of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce And Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for
Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended
by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.[8] The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as
amended follow -Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed
receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary
public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used
in connection with his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view
in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing
a firm name or business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or
business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other
person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract agreement, business transaction,
or business x x x.
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the
common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created
tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using
fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese
who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. CA. No. 142 thus
penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial
proceedings and recorded in the civil register.[9]
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic[10] the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill
effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioners use of alias Kheng Chiau Young in addition to his
real name Yu Cheng Chiau would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as
manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its
use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the
Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the
fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which
required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could
easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name Yu Cheng Chiau.

The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having
filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the abovementioned court, argues the more against
the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no
necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and
practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions.And, as the lower court
correctly observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his
name following the Occidental method, he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in
lieu of the name Yu Kheng Chian, he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the
name Kheng Chiau Young.

All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory
proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and
the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him
publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A
mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by
which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are
known as aliases.[11] Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person
in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in
addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No.
142 as amended.This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez,
which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in
the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a
copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that Oscar Perez
is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to
use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was
made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real
identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would
still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could
not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and
examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an
offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion
and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are
not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the
legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the
statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.[12] Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be
construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. [13] The reason for this principle is the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. [14] Indeed, our mind
cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly
penalize the act done by him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged.
 SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 24-37.
[2]
Id., p. 26.
[3]
Records, p. 7.
[4]
Rollo, p. 26.
[5]
Id., p. 12.
[6]
People v. Purisima, Nos. L-42050-66, 28 November 1978, 86 SCRA 524.
[7]
Gregorio, Antonio L., Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1985 Ed., p. 9; People v. Manantan, No. L-14129, 31 July
1962, 5 SCRA 684.
[8]
Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, 1961 Ed., Vol. II, pp. 1008-1009.
[9]
Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1954 Ed., Vol. II, p. 331; Guevarra, Guillermo
B., Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 Ed., p. 359.
[10]
106 Phil. 762 (1959).
[11]
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. III, West Publishing Co., p. 139.
[12]
See Note 6.
[13]
People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil., 679 (1957).
[14]
See Note 6.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997]

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural
Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E.
SALVACION, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y
NORTHCOTT, respondents.

DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:

In our predisposition to discover the original intent of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars
of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises
thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune
and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the
respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the
provision of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order to process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever
 i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant
Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in
petitioners favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg
Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their
wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and
depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank.
The antecedents facts:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner
Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained
Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on
February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after
policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the
Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No.
368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-
8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp., US $/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-
8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash;6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used
in seducing the complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli,
Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805
for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February
24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartellis petition for bail the latter escaped from
jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscals Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y
Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting
the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After
petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount P100,000.00, a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking
Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking
Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. On
March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking
Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the
disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order
which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of
Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated
April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section
has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the
plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of
preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
Central Bank responded as follows:

May 26, 1989

Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino

12 Pres. Osmea Avenue
 South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila

Dear Ms. Carolino:

This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113,
CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has
the same been repealed nor amended.
The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the countrys banking system
which would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention to render futile
the basic rights of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as
some perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director [1]

Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners motion for leave to serve summons
by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled Karen Salvacion. et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y
Northcott.Summons with the complaint was published in the Manila Times once a week for three
consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default
on August 7, 1989.After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners
on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant,
ordering the latter:
1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;
2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E.
Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them;
3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
4. To pay attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of damages
herein awarded;
5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus
6. Costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
The heinous acts of respondents Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in graphic
detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:
The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was
able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to
the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention
(Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel,
summons was served upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of
general circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc.,
the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the
complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence,
upon motion of the plaintiffs through counsel, defendant was declared in default and
plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex parte.
In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witness the minor Karen E. Salvacion,
her father, Federico N. Salacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato
Mandulio, who gave the following testimony:
Karen took her first year high school in St. Marys Academy in Pasay City but has recently
transferred to Arellano University for her second year.

In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with her
friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her
snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She was then alone
because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2
to 5)

The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he
talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in New
York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karens age and who was with him in his
house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5).

The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him its Pilipino. He then
invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave
her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp.5-6)

They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendants house along
Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p.6)

When they reached the apartment house, Karen notices that defendants alleged niece was not
outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see the
alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen
to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)

Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous because
his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karens hands with it, and
then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape and
he covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)

Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the door. He tied her
feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her
sex organ. She felt severe pain.She tried to shout but no sound could come out because there were
tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more
pain after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p.8)

He then got a Johnsons Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her sex
organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing
it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She merely
presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could
not recall how long the defendant was in that position. (Id., pp. 8-9)

After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a shower and
he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she
presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more blood came
out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After
the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired
crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining the exact time
because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food before she went to
sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 oclock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)

The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to
9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and
coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice
for dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it
looks like lugaw. For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night. During those three
times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether the organ was
inserted wholly.

Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and feet
nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be killed;
besides, all those windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help, nobody would
hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call a police, it
was still possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the
defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At nighttime he slept
with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)

On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for thirty minutes
after breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not
know that there was a window because everything was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened
the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was
covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he
put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)

That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but kept the
door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also
spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the hole. She cried:
Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungan nyo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako! Somebody heard
her. It was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was istorbo. Karen
pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep
but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)

She woke up at 6:00 oclock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this time
sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got some food but he always
kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7,
1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30
9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left
but only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for help but he did not
understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the
house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After
shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name and
she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying they
will just call the police. They were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the
bathroom to the room but she did not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call
the police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was
wearing a T-shirt of the American bacause the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)

Afterwards, defendant arrived and opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for help because
there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and she did
change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to tell the police that she left
home and willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people
conversing but she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)

When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she knocked
repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door
was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and the reason why she was
there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and
the defendant was talking to them. Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis, Karen added. The policeman
told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)
They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode the
car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two of her
neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to Sub-
Station I and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived,
followed by her mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the
second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)

At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written statement she
gave to the police was marked Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of
Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-
legal officer, examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in early morning, of the following day
when they reached the NBI, (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer
has been marked as Exhibit B.

She was studying at the St. Marys Academy in Pasay City at the time of the Incident but she
subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue,
because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She first applied for
transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit
Station but she was denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The
reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)

xxx xxx xxx

After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and sister anymore,
and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go out of
the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad. (Id., p. 11) The father
prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she
would always recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this
experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)

Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the
Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the
date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final,
petitioners tried to execute on Bartellis dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the
bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for
declaratory relief rests with the lower court? She Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing
that Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners
to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment
rendered in petitioners favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege n
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals
like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminal could escape civil liability for their
wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign
currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113
of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi- legislative power when it took
away: a.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action
secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of
Court; b.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of
execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule
39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in
issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because the subject
Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was
not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency
deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to be
reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all
members of a class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits
from attachment, garnishment or any other order process of any court, is to assure the development
and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the
Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking
institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans
and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the
country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and
that it applies to all currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the
public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable
segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some measures to
encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to
some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central
Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties
are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is
such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be
exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of
respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman
sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it
is not only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the
sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect to these laws on
petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.
This court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for
declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents
to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declatory relief.[2] However,
exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications
and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus. [3]
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her gesture
of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly
went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said American tourist Greg
Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was
able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a
favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which
amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may
continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the
money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This
questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her
parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision,
Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was indoubtedly a
shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which could haunt her mind for a
long, long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she
 had been actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High
School, Arellano University, where she sought to transfer from another school, simply
because the school authorities of the said High School learned about what happened to her
and allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the case.
xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial
manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention
of his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive
and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national, could not have such a
bestial desire on her nor capable of committing such heinous crime. Being only 12 years old
when that unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that
in every forest there is a snake, xxx.[4]

If Karens sad fate had happened to anybodys own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how
the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than his childs right to said award of
damages; in this case, the victims claim for damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child
of tender years of a country where he is mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned
provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the countrys
economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the
reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has
recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process
of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the inquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality
such as as the case before us.
It has thus been said that-
But I also know, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the
[5]

human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are
made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times We might as
well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to
remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.
In his comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
"The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain
redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation
promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by
the allien. More specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection against
attachment, garnishment or other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits PD
No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or
investor but from a mere transient who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank
for long.
The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are
victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.
xxx
xxx Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to
honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the
following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:
Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment. Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.

Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426:
 Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules and
regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at
least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank
promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules
and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern.
The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426. As
amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. -- All foreign currency deposits
authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as
foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except
upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign
currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any
other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.
The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment and other
court process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.:
WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1035, certain Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign banks are
authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency;
WHEREAS, under provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the
establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore banking
units are also authorized to receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases;
WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines,
certain incentives were provided for under the twoSystems such as confidentiality
subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income of
depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such
foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the
vested right of depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency
deposits into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the
Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel
the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to
the economic development of the country;
Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency deposits
is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system
and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines (3 Whereas).
rd

The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the purposes of PD
No. 1034 are as follows:
WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore banking
system, such as political stability, a growing economy and adequate
communication facilities, among others, exist in the Philippines;
 WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as
possible to the sources of capital funds for economic development;
WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be
advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing our links with foreign
lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the Philippines, creating
employment opportunities and expertise in international finance, and contributing
to the national development effort.
WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other
positive factors provide the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as
another financial center in Asia;
On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD No. 1035. Its
purpose are as follows:
WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines
has been authorized under a separate decree;
WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the
Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial
competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange transactions and
participate in the grant of foreign currency loans to resident corporations and
firms;
WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the
said depository banks under RA 6426 and apply to their transactions the same
taxes as would be applicable to transaction of the proposed offshore banking units;
It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the
Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD
No. 1035). It is these depositors that are induced by the two laws and given protection and
incentives by them.
Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of
deposit encourage by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said
laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will
maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars
with respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay
in the Philippines.
For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court
processes. [6]

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court. Legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil
Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Ninguno non deue enriquecerse
tortizerzmente con damo de otro. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of
those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs.
Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used
as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the
expense of the innocent.
 Call it what it may but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the
final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign
depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a
national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because
of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by
Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg
Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., no part.
Mendoza, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., on leave.

[1]
Annex R, Petition.
[2]
Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1.
[3]
Nationalista Party vs. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil. 101; Aquino vs. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275; and Alliance of Government
Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, supra.
[4]
Decision, Regional Trial Court, Civil Case No. 89-3214, pp. 9 &12; Rollo, pp. 66 & 69.
[5]
Thomas Jefferson, Democracy, ed. Saul K. Padover. (New York, Penguin, 1946) p. 171.
[6]
Comment of the Solicitor General, Rollo, pp. 128 129; 135-136.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio

THIRD DIVISION

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 166199

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
and THE BOARD OF Present:
COMMISSIONERS OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Petitioners, Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

CHRISTOPHER KORUGA, Promulgated:

Respondent. April 24, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] dated September 14, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated November 24, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76578. The assailed Decision set aside the Resolution dated April 1,
2003 of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of
the Board of Commissioners (BOC) of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), and dismissed the deportation case
filed against Christopher Koruga (respondent), an American national, for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940;
while the assailed Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

Sometime in August 2001, then BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo received an anonymous

letter[3] requesting the deportation of respondent as an undesirable alien for having been found guilty of
Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, United States of America
(USA) for attempted possession of cocaine sometime in 1983.

On the basis of a Summary of Information,[4] the Commissioner issued Mission Order No. ADD-01-
162[5] on September 13, 2001 directing Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Lino G. Caligasan, Chief of the
Intelligence Mission and any available BI Special Operations Team Member to conduct verification/
validation of the admission status and activities of respondent and effect his immediate arrest if he is found
to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.

On September 17, 2001, respondent was arrested and charged before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI)
for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The case was
docketed as BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-126. The Charge Sheet reads:
On September 17, 2001, at about 10:00 A.M., respondent was arrested by Intelligence operatives at his
residence, located at 1001 MARBELLA CONDOMINIUM II, Roxas Boulevard, Malate, Manila, pursuant
to Mission Order No. ADD-01-162;

That respondent was convicted and/or sentenced for Uniform Controlled Substance Act in connection with
his being Drug Trafficker and/or Courier of prohibited drugs in the State of Washington, United States of
America, thus, making him an undesirable alien and/or a public burden in violation of Sec. 37(4) [sic] of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

On September 28, 2001, after filing a Petition for Bail[7] and Supplemental Petition for Bail,[8] respondent
was granted bail and provisionally released from the custody of the BI.[9]

Following the submission of respondent's Memorandum[10] and the BI Special Prosecutor's

Memorandum,[11] the BOC rendered a Judgment[12] dated February 11, 2002 ordering the deportation of
respondent under Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.

On February 26, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] but it was denied by the BOC in
a Resolution dated March 19, 2002.
Unaware that the BOC already rendered its Resolution dated March 19, 2002, respondent filed on April 2,
2002, a Manifestation and Notice of Appeal Ex Abundanti Cautelam[14] with the Office of the President,
which referred[15] the appeal to the DOJ.

On April 1, 2003, then DOJ Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong rendered a Resolution[16] dismissing the
appeal. On April 15, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] which he subsequently
withdrew[18] on April 23, 2003.

On April 24, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[19]
with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76578, seeking to set aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of
the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC.

On September 14, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision[20] setting aside the Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of
the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC and dismissing the deportation
case filed against respondent. The CA held that there was no valid and legal ground for the deportation of
respondent since there was no violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, because respondent was not convicted or sentenced for a violation of the law on prohibited drugs
since the U.S. Court dismissed the case for violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State
of Washington, USA filed against respondent; that petitioners further failed to present or attach to their
pleadings any document which would support their allegations that respondent entered into a plea bargain
with the U.S. Prosecutor for deferred sentence nor did they attach to the record the alleged order or
judgment of the U.S. Court which would show the conviction of respondent for violation of the prohibited
drugs law in the USA; that even if respondent was convicted and sentenced for the alleged offense, his
deportation under Section 37(a)(4) is improper, since the prohibited drugs law referred to therein refers not
to a foreign drugs law but to the Philippine drugs law, then Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972; that although the BOC is clothed with exclusive authority to decide as to the right of a
foreigner to enter the country, still, such executive officers must act within the scope of their authority or
their decision is a nullity.

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration[21] was denied by the CA in its presently assailed
Resolution[22] dated November 24, 2004.

Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE SUBJECT

CASE WHICH FALLS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT COULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OVER THE CASE, THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CHARGES AGAINST THE
HEREIN RESPONDENT WERE DROPPED.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIOR CONVICTION IS REQUIRED
BEFORE RESPONDENT COULD BE DEPORTED.[23]
Petitioners contend that the BI has exclusive authority in deportation proceedings and no other tribunal is
at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence presented therein; that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioners when they sought the deportation of respondent since
he was convicted by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington for attempted Violation of the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act and underwent probation in lieu of the imposition of sentence; that the dismissal
of the charge against respondent was only with respect to penalties and liabilities, obtained after fulfilling
the conditions for his probation, and was not an acquittal from the criminal case charged against him; that
there is a valid basis to declare respondent's undesirability and effect his deportation since respondent has
admitted guilt of his involvement in a drug-related case.

On the other hand, respondent submits that the proceedings against him reek of persecution; that the CA
did not commit any error of law; that all the arguments raised in the present petition are mere rehashes of
arguments raised before and ruled upon by the CA; and that, even assuming that Section 37(a)(4) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 does not apply, there is no reason, whether compelling or slight, to
deport respondent.

There are two issues for resolution: (1) whether the exclusive authority of the BOC over deportation
proceedings bars judicial review, and (2) whether there is a valid and legal ground for the deportation of
respondent.

The Court resolves the first issue in the negative.

It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an
alleged alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings.[24] Nonetheless, Article VIII,
Section 1[25] of the Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower
courts such as the CA, as established by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress
or of the President,[26] the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has
been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.[27]

In Domingo v. Scheer,[28] the Court set aside the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC over an alien for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in violation of the alien's constitutional and statutory
rights to due process, since the BOC ordered the deportation of the alien without conducting summary
deportation proceedings and without affording the alien the right to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration and adduce evidence thereon.

In House of Sara Lee v. Rey,[29] the Court held that while, as a general rule, the factual findings of
administrative agencies are not subject to review, it is equally established that the Court will not uphold
erroneous conclusions which are contrary to evidence, because the agency a quo, for that reason, would be
guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.

When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may
be filed in the CA as provided by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended.[30] Clearly, the filing by
respondent of a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to assail the order of deportation on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion is permitted.

This brings us to the second issue.

The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of
grace; such privilege is not absolute or permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled
or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.[31]

Respondent was charged with violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, which provides:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien.

xxxx

(4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent contends that the use of the definite article the immediately preceding the phrase law on
prohibited drugs emphasizes not just any prohibited drugs law but the law applicable in this jurisdiction, at
that time, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[32]

The Court disagrees.

The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent
to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.[33] However, a
literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract
the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole.[34] After all, statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.[35] Indeed, courts are not to give
words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.[36]

Were the Court to follow the letter of Section 37(a)(4) and make it applicable only to convictions under the
Philippine prohibited drugs law, the Court will in effect be paving the way to an absurd situation whereby
aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws may be allowed to enter the country to the detriment of
the public health and safety of its citizens. It suggests a double standard of treatment where only aliens
convicted of Philippine prohibited drugs law would be deported, while aliens convicted of foreign
prohibited drugs laws would be allowed entry in the country. The Court must emphatically reject such
interpretation of the law. Certainly, such a situation was not envisioned by the framers of the law, for to do
so would be contrary to reason and therefore, absurd. Over time, courts have recognized with almost
pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law.

Indubitably, Section 37(a)(4) should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very
purpose for which the law was passed. This Court has, in many cases involving the construction of statutes,
always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and
stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result
of injustice or absurdity, and that therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or
lead to absurd results.[37]
Moreover, since Section 37(a)(4) makes no distinction between a foreign prohibited drugs law and the
Philippine prohibited drugs law, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.[38]Thus, Section 37(a)(4) should apply to those convicted of all prohibited drugs laws, whether
local or foreign.

There is no dispute that respondent was convicted of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
in the State of Washington, USA for attempted possession of cocaine, as shown by the Order Deferring
Imposition of Sentence (Probation).[39] While he may have pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, and was not
imprisoned but applied for and underwent a one-year probation, still, there is no escaping the fact that he
was convicted under a prohibited drugs law, even though it may simply be called a misdemeanor drug
offense.[40] The BOC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the deportation of respondent.

The Court quotes with approval the following acute pronouncements of the BOC:

x x x We note that the respondent admitted in his Memorandum dated 8 October 2001 that he pleaded
guilty to the amended information where he allegedly attempted to have in his possession a certain
controlled substance, and a narcotic drug. Further, he filed a Petition for Leave to Withdraw Plea of Guilty
and Enter Plea of Not Guilty to obtain a favorable release from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the
filing of the said charge.

Evidently, the U.S. Court issued the Order of Dismissal in exchange for the respondent's plea of guilty to the
lesser offense. Though legally allowed in the U.S. Law, We perceive that this strategy afforded the respondent
with a convenient vehicle to avoid conviction and sentencing. Moreover, the plea of guilty is by itself crystal
clear acknowledgment of his involvement in a drug-related offense. Hence, respondent's discharge from
conviction and sentencing cannot hide the fact that he has a prior history of drug-related charge.

This country cannot countenance another alien with a history of a drug-related offense. The crime may
have been committed two decades ago but it cannot erase the fact that the incident actually
happened. This is the very core of his inadmissibility into the Philippines. Apparently, respondent would
like Us to believe that his involvement in this drug case is a petty offense or a mere misdemeanor. However,
the Philippine Government views all drug-related cases with grave concern; hence, the enactment of Republic
Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and the creation of various drug-
enforcement agencies. While We empathize with the innocent portrayal of the respondent as a man of
irreproachable conduct, not to mention the numerous written testimonies of good character submitted in his
behalf, this incomplete and sanitized representation cannot, however, outweigh our commitment and sworn
duty to safeguard public health and public safety. Moreover, while the U.S. Government may not have any
law enforcement interest on respondent, Philippine immigration authorities certainly do in the able and
competent exercise of its police powers. Thus, this case of the respondent is no different from a convicted
felon abroad, who argues that he cannot be removed from the Philippines on the ground that the crime
was committed abroad. Otherwise, it would open the floodgates to other similarly situated aliens
demanding their admission into the country. Indeed, respondent may not be a menace to the U.S. as a
result of his being discharged from criminal liability, but that does not ipso facto mean that the immigration
authorities should unquestionably admit him into the country.

x x x x[41] (Emphasis supplied)

It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted
into the country by the simple passage of time. When an alien, such as respondent, has already physically
gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be
excluded anytime after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.[42] Every
sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may
deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest.[43] The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an
act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power.[44] It is a police measure against undesirable
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic
tranquility of the people.[45]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76578 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Judgment dated February
11, 2002 of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration ordering the deportation of
respondent Christopher Koruga under Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., CA rollo, p. 610.
[2]
Id. at 677.
[3]
CA rollo, p.140.
[4]
Id. at 139.
[5]
Id. at 138.
[6]
CA rollo, p. 141.
[7]
Id. at 144.
[8]
Id. at 154.
[9]
Id. at 157.
[10]
Id. at 159.
[11]
Id. at 187.
[12]
Id. at 243.
[13]
Id. at 72.
[14]
Id. at 103.
[15]
Id. at 124.
[16]
Id. at 74.
[17]
Id. at 126.
[18]
Id. at 133.
[19]
CA rollo, p. 9.
[20]
Supra note 1.
[21]
CA rollo, p. 630.
[22]
Supra note 2.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[24]
Board of Commissioners (CID) v. De la Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95122-23, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 853, 874; Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81798,
December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 756, 761; Miranda v. Deportation Board, 94 Phil 531, 533 (1954).
[25]
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, states:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
[26]
See Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330, 347; Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 656, 681; Taada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18, 48-49.
[27] Republic v. Garcia, G.R No. 167741, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 495, 502; Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 141, 148.
[28]
466 Phil. 235 (2004).
[29]
G.R. No. 149013, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 419.
[30]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 4.
[31]
Supra note 28, at 269-270; 487.
[32]
Repealed by Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 approved on June 7, 2002, or about four (4) months after the
BOC rendered its Judgment on February 11, 2002.
[33]
Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990), p. 131, citing Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 598 (1954); Espino v. Cleofe,
G.R. No. 33410, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 92; Philippine Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, 120 Phil. 829 (1964).
[34]
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 145156-57, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 137, 149; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R.
No. 148191, November 25, 2003, 416 SCRA 436, 460; In Re Allen, 2 Phil. 630, 643 (1903).
[35]
Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) v. Buag, G.R. No. 143784, February 5, 2003, 397 SCRA 27, 37; Cosico, Jr. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 118432, May 23, 1997, 272 SCRA 583, 591; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., G.R.
No. 28502-03, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 364, 370.
[36]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corporation, supra, note 35; People v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 236, 242 (1933).
[37]
Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation, G.R. No. 78309, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 513, 519; Bello v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-38161, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 509, 518; Vda. de Macabanta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company, G.R. No. L 27489, April 30,
1970, 32 SCRA 553, 558; Automotive Parts & Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, G.R. No. L-26406, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248, 256.
[38]
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 484; Pilar v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995, 245 SCRA 759, 763; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 101976,
January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 203, 214-215.
[39]
CA rollo, p. 650.
[40]
Letters dated September 19, 2001 and September 20, 2001 of Michael A. Newbill, Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, CA rollo, pp.
148 and 149.
[41]
CA rollo, p. 245.
[42]
Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, supra note 24, at 896.
[43]
Lao Tan Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 (1948).
[44]
In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918).
[45]
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534 (1910).

FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380

Petitioner,

Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

- versus - (Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and

Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgated:

October 5, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized

as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can
the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
 Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling
on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002,

of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein

respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by
reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently

live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated

between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law
that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of

judicial determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between

two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent,
a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for
relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of

his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply
to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in

the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second

paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her

capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
 Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph

2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce
them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married

to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married.
The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same
year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we

hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse

should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to

mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they

come within its spirit or intent.[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a

valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.

Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment
would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering
that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand,
legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence,

the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is

settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there

would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,

who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that

his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
Chairman

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 20-22.
[2]
Id. at 27-29.
[3]
Id. at 21-22.
[4]
Id. at 105.
[5]
Id. at 106-110.
[6]
Id. at 110.
[7]
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.
[8]
Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, 286, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No.
109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.
[9]
Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
[10]
No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[11]
G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
[12]
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855.
[13]
Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
[14]
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
[15]
Id. at 451.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127718. March 2, 2000]

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, ABELARDO SANGADAN, LUCIANO RAMOS,

NESTOR TILASAN, GREGORIO TILASAN, JOAQUIN GARCIA, ROGELIO SABAITAN,
CASTRO LEONARDO, PILARDO POTENCIANO, RONILLO POTENCIANO,
SANTIAGO SABAITAN, JOVENCIO BARTOLOME, JUANITO CONCERMAN, GEORGE
TUMILAS, PATROCINIO DOMINGO, AVELINO FRANCISCO, MELITON SANGADAN,
ALEXANDER GERONIMO, JOAQUIN GERONIMO, RAMIL MACASO, LAMBERTO
JOVEN, CRISTINO GARINA, SAMMY GANTAAN, NACIAL USTALAN, EDWIN
USTALAN, ROLAND POTENCIANO, RODY CONCERMAN, ELMER DOMINGO,
ARNAGUEZ SANGADAN, UNDING BOLENG, EDUARDO BOLENG, ROBERTO
PANEO and HENRY SANGADAN, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (5th Division), PATALON COCONUT ESTATE and/or CHARLIE REITH
as General Manager and SUSIE GALLE REITH, as owner, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari to set aside and annul two (2) resolutions of the
National Labor Relations Commission[1] promulgated on April 24, 1996[2] and August 29,
1996[3] denying the award of separation pay to petitioners.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioners are bona fide members of the National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. They were employed by
private respondents Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general manager and owner, respectively,
of the 354-hectare Patalon Coconut Estate located at Patalon, Zamboanga City. Patalon Coconut
Estate was engaged in growing agricultural products and in raising livestock.
In 1988, Congress enacted into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which mandated the compulsory acquisition of all
covered agricultural lands for distribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries under the so-called
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP).

Pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, the Patalon Coconut Estate was awarded to the Patalon Estate Agrarian
Reform Association (PEARA), a cooperative accredited by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), of which petitioners are members and co-owners.

As a result of this acquisition, private respondents shut down the operation of the Patalon Coconut
Estate and the employment of the petitioners was severed on July 31, 1994. Petitioners did not
receive any separation pay.

On August 1, 1994, the cooperative took over the estate. A certain Abelardo Sangadan informed
respondents of such takeover via a letter which was received by the respondents on July 26, 1994.
Being beneficiaries of the Patalon Coconut Estate pursuant to the CARP, the petitioners became
part-owners of the land.[4]

On April 25, 1995, petitioners filed individual complaints before the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB)
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Zamboanga City, praying for their
reinstatement with full backwages on the ground that they were illegally dismissed. The petitioners
were represented by their labor organization, the NFL.

On December 12, 1995, the RAB rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which provides:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing

complainants charge for illegal dismissal for lack of merit, but ordering respondents thru
[sic] its owner-manager or its duly authorized representative to pay complainants
separation pay in view of the latters cessation of operations or forced sale, and for 13th
month differential pay in the amount, as follows, for:

Names Separation Pay 13th Mo. Pay Diff. Total

Abelardo Sangadan P23,879.06 N o n e P23,879.06

Luciano Ramos 43,605.24 P711.25 44,316.49

Nestor Tilasan 19,726.18 401.46 20,127.64

Gregorio Tilasan 25,955.50 N o n e 25,955.50

Joaquin Garcia 7,267.54 1,211.25 8,478.79

Rogelio Sabaitan 21,798.00 1,211.25 23,009.25

Castro Leonardo, Jr. 25,955.50 63.10 26,018.60

Pilardo Potenciano 5,191.10 911.25 6,102.35

Ronillo Potenciano 7,267.54 N o n e 7,267.54

Jovencio Bartolome 8,305.76 477.25 8,783.01

Santiago Sabaitan 4,152.88 1,011.25 5,164.13

Juanito Concerman 7,267.54 611.25 7,928.79

George Tumilas 16,611.52 1,011.25 17,622.77

Patrocinio Domingo 2,076.44 1,011.25 3,087.69

Avelino Francisco 3,114.66 1,211.25 4,325.91

 Meliton Sangadan 15,573.30 392.50 15,965.80

Alexander Geronimo 15,573.00 N o n e 15,573.30

Joaquin Geronimo 24,917.28 1,211.25 26,128.53

Ramil Macaso 6,229.32 861.25 7,090.57

Lamberto Joven 16,611.62 1,011.25 17,622.77

Cristino Garina 35,299.48 849.65 36,149.13

Sammy Gantaan 14,535.08 961.25 15,496.33

Nacial Ustalan 38,414.14 79.95 38,494.09

Edwin Ustalan 7,267.54 1,011.25 8,278.79

Roland Potenciano 5,191.10 911.25 6,102.35

Rody Concerman 7,267.54 691.25 7,958.79

Elmer Domingo 3,114.66 1,211.25 4,325.91

Aranquez Sangada 45,681.68 711.25 46,392.93

Unding Boleng 31,146.60 N o n e 31,146.60

Eduardo Boleng 35,299.48 759.30 36,058.78

Roberto Paneo 23,876.06 911.25 24,787.31

Henry Sangadan 16,611.52 1,011.25 17,622.77

Total Benefits P586,774.22

"FURTHER, complainants claim for Muslim Holiday, overtime pay and rest day pay should be
dismissed for lack of merit, too."[5]

Appeal was taken by private respondents to public respondent NLRC. [6]

On April 24, 1996, the NLRC issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which provides:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in favor of the following
findings:

1) Respondents are not guilty of illegally dismissing complainants. Respondents

cessation of operation was not due to a unilateral action on their part resulting in the
cutting off of the employment relationship between the parties. The severance of
employer-employee relationship between the parties came about INVOLUNTARILY, as
a result of an act of the State. Consequently, complainants are not entitled to any
separation pay.

2) The award of 13th month pay differential is, however, Set Aside. Any award of 13th
month pay differentials to complainants should be computed strictly based on their
reduced pay, equivalent to six (6) hours work, Monday to Friday, pursuant to what the
parties agreed in the November 18, 1991 Compromise Agreement."

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution [8] dated
August 29, 1996.
Hence, this petition.

The issue is whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease its operation because of the
compulsory acquisition by the government of its land for purposes of agrarian reform, is liable to pay
separation pay to its affected employees.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners contend that they are entitled to separation pay citing Article 283 of the Labor Code which
reads:

"ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and
the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date
thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent
to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of
closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)
month pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year."

It is clear that Article 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment and
reduction of personnel. The peculiar circumstances in the case at bar, however, involves neither the
closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel as contemplated under the aforesaid article.
When the Patalon Coconut Estate was closed because a large portion of the estate was acquired by
DAR pursuant to CARP, the ownership of that large portion of the estate was precisely transferred to
PEARA and ultimately to the petitioners as members thereof and as agrarian lot beneficiaries. Hence,
Article 283 of the Labor Code is not applicable to the case at bench.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the situation in this case were a closure of the business
establishment called Patalon Coconut Estate of private respondents, still the petitioners/employees
are not entitled to separation pay. The closure contemplated under Article 283 of the Labor Code is a
unilateral and voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment as may
be gleaned from the wording of the said legal provision that "The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to...".[9] The use of the word "may," in a statute, denotes that it is
directory in nature and generally permissive only.[10] The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in
statutory construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[11]

In other words, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of
the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the
employees.

As earlier stated, the Patalon Coconut Estate was closed down because a large portion of the said
estate was acquired by the DAR pursuant to the CARP. Hence, the closure of the Patalon Coconut
Estate was not effected voluntarily by private respondents who even filed a petition to have said
estate exempted from the coverage of RA 6657. Unfortunately, their petition was denied by the
Department of Agrarain Reform. Since the closure was due to the act of the government to benefit the
petitioners, as members of the Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform Association, by making them agrarian
lot beneficiaries of said estate, the petitioners are not entitled to separation pay. The termination of
their employment was not caused by the private respondents. The blame, if any, for the termination of
petitioners employment can even be laid upon the petitioner-employees themselves inasmuch as
they formed themselves into a cooperative, PEARA, ultimately to take over, as agrarian lot
beneficiaries, of private respondents landed estate pursuant to RA 6657. The resulting closure of the
business establishment, Patalon Coconut Estate, when it was placed under CARP, occurred through
no fault of the private respondents.
While the Constitution provides that "the State x x x shall protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare", that constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress
or destroy capital and management. Thus, the capital and management sectors must also be
protected under a regime of justice and the rule of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated April 24, 1996 and August 29, 1996 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena JJ., concur.

[1]
5th Division.
[2]
In NLRC Case No. RAB-09-04-00096-95, Rollo, pp. 23-39.
[3]
In NLRC CA No. M-002823-96, Rollo, pp. 41-51.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[5]
Id, pp. 38-39.
[6]
5th Division, Cagayan de Oro City.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 50-51.
[8]
Id, pp. 61-62.
[9]
Emphasis ours.
[10]
Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, 1995 ed., p. 263.
[11]
Fianza vs. Peoples Law Enforcement Board, 243 SCRA 165, 178 (1995).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.1

Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.

P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.

FERIA, J.:

This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to
continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that
the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that,
furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in
the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And
the same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government established
in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de facto governments.

On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day their
Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army." In
said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in
the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as
in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."

A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine Executive Commission was
organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the
Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate
coordination of the existing central administrative organs and judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore,
with approval of the said Commander in Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.

The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative organization, issued Executive
Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were
continued with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive
Commission by the Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of
February 20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in
exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers. Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the
administration organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders,
ordinances and customs. . . ."

On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial change was
effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine
Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.

On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued a
proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the
Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the
people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control.

On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on
behalf of the Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities under the
Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law."

In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal questions to be resolved in the present
case may be reduced to the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the
Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and
remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces;
(2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of
the United States Army, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings
of the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation,
whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued
during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts
at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.

We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of international law the
judicial acts and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not
the governments established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they
were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that
government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the
Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and
maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British
possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the
United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who
rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not
concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.

Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its
distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be
obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not
become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are
usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, civil authority, supported more
or less directly by military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is found in the case of Castine, in Mine,
reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 . . . U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in the
case of Tampico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . . Fleming vs. Page (9
Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments at war
with the country of which the territory so possessed was part."

The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague
Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of
said Section III provides "the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."

According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with
the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of a de
factogovernment, and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old
as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the
occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and
regulate social and commercial life of the country. On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political
relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the
right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a
country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In
practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial
officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in
their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the
occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and
have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States.

The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The
right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the
incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or
political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated
and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the
of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . .
. The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during
military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws
or make new ones."

And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were later embodied
in the said Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898,
relating to the occupation of the Philippines by United States forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the military
occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the
punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of
things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they
were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the
authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under
the supervision of the American Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President, X, p.
209.)

As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same case of
Thorington vs. Smith, supra, recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as a de factogovernment.
In that case, it was held that "the central government established for the insurgent States differed from the
temporary governments at Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did no originate in lawful acts
of regular war; but it was not, on the account, less actual or less supreme. And we think that it must be classed
among the governments of which these are examples. . . .

In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United States, discussing the validity
of the acts of the Confederate States, said: "The same general form of government, the same general laws for the
administration of justice and protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion,
remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the
supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be
treated as valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 657): "The existence of a
state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property
protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property
regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial
or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and kindered subjects, where they were not hostile in
their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of
citizens under the Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases."

And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That what occured or was done in
respect of such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments should not be
disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those governments were organized in hostility to the Union
established by the national Constitution; this, because the existence of war between the United States and the
Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil
obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government or the regular administration of the
laws, and because transactions in the ordinary course of civil society as organized within the enemy's territory
although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government organized
to effect a dissolution of the Union, were without blame 'except when proved to have been entered into with
actual intent to further invasion or insurrection:'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states
composing the so-called Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their
purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of
citizens under the Constitution."

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No.
1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by
the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from
the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck
says, "The government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the
powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that
code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its
character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws
of war, and so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the
legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not
a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when
Napoleon occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained the existing administration under the general direction of
a french official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the Duke of Willington, on invading
France, authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions, apparently without appointing an
English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.). The Germans, on the other hand, when they invaded France in
1870, appointed their own officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of administration and of
every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent
from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the
belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and
government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been
already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was
established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the
Government of the United States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer
the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military
occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by
a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in
International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hauge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the
population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being
essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de
jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty
Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard,
603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived
by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of
transferring or turning over the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the
mistaken belief that by doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people
in her war against the United States and other allied nations.

Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino who, taking
advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the Japanese
forces of invasion, had organized an independent government under the name with the support and backing of
Japan, such government would have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion
against the parent state or the Unite States. And as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that
organized by the confederate states during the war of secession and recognized as such by the by the Supreme
Court of the United States in numerous cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and
Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in
the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416). According to the facts in the last-named
case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having first appointed a provisional
government, and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took possession of the
Islands and established a republic, governing the Islands until possession thereof was surrendered to the United
States on February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case that "such government was of the class
of de facto governments described in I Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force . . '."
That is to say, that the government of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion
against the parent state, rests upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of an
enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of
the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation
or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been
occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in
a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion,
administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various
acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it
otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and
the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under
duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals
should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.)
And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present
case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own
sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and establishing
the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are
and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the
Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws,
regulations and processes of the governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it
would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.

2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes of any other government" as used
in the above-quoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 that is, whether it was the
intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial
proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.

The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also
to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the
fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial
proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military
occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power
of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of the said
phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court proceedings, for according
to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."

It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an agent of his government, may not
unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory, if and when the exigencies of
the military occupation demand such action. But even assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power
of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by
an enemy, during the military and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in
chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation (although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently
less than those of occupation), it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or
a representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the
United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court
of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later
embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General Douglas
MacArthur, who enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the Philippines
full respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines," should not only reverse the
international policy and practice of his own government, but also disregard in the same breath the provisions of
section 3, Article II, of our Constitution, which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."

Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result, and great public
interests would be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled
accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily become
immune for evidence against them may have already disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that
almost all court records in the Philippines have been destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is
another well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular
construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction
is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law,
unless required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)

The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a
territory occupied by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals which the
belligerent occupant had the right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and safety during military
occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze the social life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be
expected that litigants would not willingly submit their litigation to courts whose judgements or decisions may
afterwards be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes or offenses in the expectancy
that they may escaped the penalty if judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set aside.

That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and proceedings of the courts of justice during the
Japanese regime, is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the
President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him by the
Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said Executive order abolished the Court of
Appeals, and provided "that all case which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of
General MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases which have been duly
appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to March 10,
1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases
pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been
disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all,
appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of
First Instance during the Japanese regime.

The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which say: "Moreover when it is said that an
occupier's acts are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must
be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong
would be committed. What does happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but
the matter can hardly be put further than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p.
245.) And from this quotion the respondent judge "draws the conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant
should be considered valid or not, is a question that is up to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule
of international law that denies to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule of international law that
denies to the restored government the right of exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing upon it in its stead the
obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government."

There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier, such as the
laws, regulations and processes other than judicial of the government established by the belligerent occupant. But in
view of the fact that the proclamation uses the words "processes of any other government" and not "judicial
processes" prisely, it is not necessary to determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul
and set aside all judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to be
determined is whether or not it was his intention, as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid or
nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or by necessary implication, declared null and void the judicial
processes of any other government, it would be necessary for this court to decide in the present case whether or not
General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare them null and void. But the proclamation did not so provide,
undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his powers as Commander in Chief of
Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror.
Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public of conscience,
constitute or from the law of nations. (Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake, International Law, 2d ed., Part
II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in
discussing the first question, imposes upon the occupant the obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h),
section II, of the same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to declare . . . suspended . . . in a
Court of Law the rights and action of the nationals of the hostile party," forbids him to make any declaration
preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of
Appeals of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is
required to establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from
asserting or enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the forces of
liberation or the restored government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said
courts in their litigation during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these precepts of the Hague
Conventions would be thwarted, for to declare them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts
the right and action of the nationals of the territory during the military occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes
without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do something will not at the same time empower another to undo
the same. Although the question whether the President or commanding officer of the United States Army has
violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in
construing and applying limitations imposed on the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the case of Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "arise from general rules of international
law and from fundamental principles known wherever the American flag flies."

In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in command of the forces of
the United States in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree rendered by a court of
chancery in that state in a case within its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the acts approved
respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and
duties of military officers in command of the several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision the
court said; "We have looked carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large
governmental powers to the military commanders designated, within the States committed respectively to their
jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in question. . . . The clearest language would be
necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts should be so exercised. . . . It
was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress could have
conferred the power to do such an act is a question we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of
law that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond
what the exigency requires. (Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67;
Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the
standpoint indicated, we hold that the order was void."

It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not
invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the
Philippines that were continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and now
good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those
existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission
and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions
pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino
forces, and the Commonwealth Government was restored.

Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of
justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which
he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President
McKinley to the Secretary of War on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated
but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before
the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." And
Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the
right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From
the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which
compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor,
International Public Law, p.596.) Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and
business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially
provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.

Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces
proclaimed on January 3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the
territory occupied by the army, and ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as
executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be affective for the time being as in the past," and "all public
officials shall remain in their present post and carry on faithfully their duties as before." When the Philippine
Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942,
the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5,
respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace of
courts, with the same jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial
Japanese Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the
Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no substantial change in organization and
jurisdiction thereof.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been
continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and
conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of
the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then
pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles "a state or other governmental entity,
upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. .
. . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their
original shape upon removal of the external force, and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing
of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.)

The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support in his conclusion that the Court of First
Instance of Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and continue said proceedings (of
this case) to final judgment until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have
provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the
cases commenced and the left pending therein," is "that said courts were a government alien to the Commonwealth
Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation,
but they had become the laws and the courts had become the institutions of Japan by adoption
(U.S. vs.Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws and institutions of the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines."

The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and institutions of the country
occupied if continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by adoption, of the sovereign
nation that is militarily occupying the territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or military occupation is
essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant.
What the court said was that, if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his
and derive their force from him, in the sense that he may continue or set them aside. The laws and institution or
courts so continued remain the laws and institutions or courts of the occupied territory. The laws and the courts of
the Philippines, therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of
Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 which prohibits any compulsion of
the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power, "extends to prohibit everything which
would assert or imply a change made by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to innovate in
the political life of the occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as the
courts of justice are allowed to continue administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their
sentences in the name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to
Wheaton, however, the victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in 1870, the
Germans in France attempted to violate that rule by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of
Nancy to administer justice in the name of the "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," upon the
ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of French people and government was at least an implied
recognition of the Republic, the courts refused to obey and suspended their sitting. Germany originally ordered the
use of the name of "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow use of the
name of the Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)

Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established continues until
changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H.
Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the
same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can no break or
interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people
it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change take place, and
when changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or
colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until
the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change."

As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that of the laws which create and confer upon
them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of
sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation
that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such
proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore,
even assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands, which she had afterwards
transferred to the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands had
become the courts of Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have
continued in force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same
jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until
they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or
transferred to another court, are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary
only in case the former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so change that they can no longer continue taking
cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having
jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands
ceased and the Islands came into the possession of the United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was
continued and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the
cessation of the Spanish sovereignty until the said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme
Court created in Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First Instance of the
Islands during the Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases pending therein upon the change of
sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the present
Courts of First Instance in substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted during the Japanese
occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the courts in the Island were continued.

On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136 was enacted abolishing the civil
jurisdiction of the provost courts created by the military government of occupation in the Philippines during the
Spanish-American War of 1898, the same section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil actions then pending in the
provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is, to the justices of the peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme
Court having jurisdiction over them according to law. And later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in
the City of Manila was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same section provided that criminal cases pending
therein within the jurisdiction of the municipal court created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the latter.

That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime and, therefore,
can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have already quoted in support of our conclusion in
connection with the second question. Said Executive Order provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and
established under Commonwealth Act No. 3 as amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all
cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court
for final decision. . . ." In so providing, the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the same
that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; for, as we have stated
in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or which had theretofore (that
is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have been cases coming from the Courts of First
Instance during the so-called Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive
Order was not the same one which had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the
time of the Japanese occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that
occupation on January 2, 1942, been dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final decision.

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in
cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.

Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of the parties under the
laws of the Commonwealth Government, pending in said court at the time of the restoration of the said Government;
and that the respondent judge of the court, having refused to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his
office as presiding judge of that court, mandamus is the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
especially taking into consideration the fact that the question of jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this
particular case, but many other cases now pending in all the courts of these Islands.

In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DE JOYA, J., concurring:

The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the proceedings held in civil case No. 3012, in the Court
of First Instance of the City of Manila, under the now defunct Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation; and
the effect on said proceedings of the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944. The
decision of this question requires the application of principles of International Law, in connection with the municipal
law in force in this country, before and during Japanese occupation.

Questions of International Law must be decided as matters of general law (Juntington vs. Attril, 146 U.S., 657; 13
Sup. Ct. 224; 36 Law. ed., 1123); and International Law is no alien in this Tribunal, as, under the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is a part of the fundamental law of the land (Article II, section 3).

As International Law is an integral part of our laws, it must be ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever
questions of right depending upon it are presented for our determination, sitting as an international as well as a
domestic Tribunal (Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U.S., 146; 22 Sup. Ct. 552; 46 Law. Ed., 838).

Since International Law is a body of rules actually accepted by nations as regulating their mutual relations, the proof
of the existence of a given rule is to be found in the consent of nations to abide by that rule; and this consent is
evidenced chiefly by the usages and customs of nations, and to ascertain what these usages and customs are, the
universal practice is to turn to the writings of publicists and to the decisions of the highest courts of the different
countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U.S., 677; 20 Sup. Cit., 290; 44 Law. ed., 320).

But while usage is the older and original source of International Law, great international treaties are a later source of
increasing importance, such as The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on land, expressly declares that:

ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile
army.

The occupation applies only to be territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert
itself.

ARTICLE XLIII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant,
the later shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (32 Stat. II, 1821.)

The above provisions of the Hague Convention have been adopted by the nations giving adherence to them, among
which is United States of America (32 Stat. II, 1821).

The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental authority, but only
when in actual possession of the enemy's territory, and this authority will be exercised upon principles of
international Law (New Orleans vs. Steamship Co, [1874], 20 Wall., 387; Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U.S., 441;
MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law Ed., 1260; II Oppenheim of International Law, section
167).

There can be no question that the Philippines was under Japanese military occupation, from January, 1942, up to
the time of the reconquest by the armed forces of the United States of the Island of Luzon, in February, 1945.

It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded State continue in force, in so far as they do not affect the
hostile occupant unfavorably. The regular judicial Tribunals of the occupied territory continue usual for the invader to
take the whole administration into his own hands, partly because it is easier to preserve order through the agency of
the native officials, and partly because it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and
partly because the latter are more competent to administer the laws in force within the territory and the military
occupant generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial and administrative officers as are willing to serve under
him, subjecting them only to supervision by the military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by
him.(Young vs. U.S., 39; 24 Law, ed., 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509; 24 Law ed., 1118;
MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S., 416; 33 Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; Taylor on International Law, sections 576.
578; Wilson on International Law; pp. 331-37; Hall on International Law, 6th Edition [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475, 476;
Lawrence on International Law, 7th ed., pp. 412, 413; Davis, Elements of International Law, 3rd ed., pp. 330-332
335; Holland on International Law pp. 356, 357, 359; Westlake on International Law, 2d ed., pp. 121-23.)

It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the so-called Philippine Republic, during
Japanese occupation, respecting the laws in force in the country, and permitting the local courts to function and
administer such laws, as proclaimed in the City of Manila, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial
Forces, on January 3, 1942, was in accordance with the rules and principles of International Law.

If the military occupant is thus in duly bound to establish in the territory under military occupation governmental
agencies for the preservation of peace and order and for the proper administration of justice, in accordance with the
laws in force within territory it must necessarily follow that the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts
established by the military occupant must be considered legal and valid, even after said government establish by the
military occupant has been displaced by the legitimate government of the territory.
Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the American Civil War, merely settling the rights of
private parties actually within their jurisdiction, not tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States,
nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion had been declared valid and binding (Cock vs. Oliver, 1
Woods, 437; Fed. Cas., No. 3, 164; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U. S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 118; Williams vs. Bruffy,
96 U. S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700;
Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188); and the judgment of a court of Georgia rendered in November, 1861, for
the purchase money of slaves was held valid judgment when entered, and enforceable in 1871(French vs. Tumlin,
10 Am. Law. Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No. 5104).

Said judgments rendered by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of America were
considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil War, because they had
been rendered by the courts of a de facto government. The Confederate States were a de facto government in the
sense that its citizens were bound to render the government obedience in civil matters, and did not become
responsible, as wrong-doers, for such acts of obedience (Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. [U.S.], 9; 19 Law. ed., 361).

In the case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Court held "It is now settled law in this court that
during the late civil war the same general form of government, the same general law for the administration of justice
and the protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its
continuance and afterwards. As far as the acts of the States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the
national authority, or the just and legal rights of the citizens, under the Constitution, they are in general to be treated
as valid and binding." (William vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20
id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700.)

The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem to fall under the following
definition of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States:

But there is another description of government, called also by publicists, a government de facto, but which
might, perhaps, be more aptly denominateda government of paramount force. Its distinguishing
characteristics are (1) that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while it exists it must
necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission
to such force, do not become responsible, as wrong doers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws
of the rightful government. Actual government of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in
extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be
administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. (Macleod vs. United
States [1913] 229 U.S., 416.)

The government established in the Philippines, under the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese
occupation, was and should be considered as a de facto government; and that the judicial proceedings conducted
before the courts which had been established in this country, during said Japanese occupation, are to be considered
legal and valid and enforceable, even after the liberation of this country by the American forces, as long as the said
judicial proceedings had been conducted, under the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer to the settlement of property rights,
under the provisions of the Civil Code, in force in this country under the Commonwealth government, before and
during Japanese occupation.

Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void, under the provisions of the
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944; as said proclamation "nullifies all the
laws, regulations and processes of any other government of the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines."

In other words, petitioner demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur, a contention which, in our opinion, is untenable, as it would inevitably produce judicial chaos and
uncertainties.

When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions, one of which will maintain and the others destroy it, the
courts will always adopt the former (U. S. vs. Coombs [1838], 12 Pet., 72; 9 Law. ed., 1004; Board of Supervisors of
Granada County vs. Brown [1884], 112 U.S., 261; 28 Law. ed., 704; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guarina [1913], 24
Phil., 37; Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons [1924], 46 Phil., 385). The judiciary, always alive to the dictates of national
welfare, can properly incline the scales of its decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote
the public policy (Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All laws should receive a sensible
construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not lead to injustice, oppression or an absurd
consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which
would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter (U.
S. vs.Kirby, 7 Wall. [U.S.], 482; 19 Law. ed., 278; Church of Holy Trinity vs. U. S., 143 U. S. 461; 12 Sup. Ct., 511;
36 Law. ed., 226; Jacobson vs. Massachussetts, 197 U. S., 39; 25 Sup. Ct., 358; 49 Law. ed., 643; 3 Ann. Cas.,
765; In re Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty of the court in construing a statute, which is reasonably susceptible of two
constructions to adopt that which saves is constitutionality, includes the duty of avoiding a construction which raises
grave and doubtful constitutional questions, if it can be avoided (U. S. vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., U.S., 366; 29
Sup. Ct., 527; 53 Law. ed., 836).

According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal doctrines cited above, the judicial
proceedings conducted before the courts of justice, established here during Japanese military occupation, merely
applying the municipal law of the territory, such as the provisions of our Civil Code, which have no political or military
significance, should be considered legal, valid and binding.

It is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur is familiar with said rules and principles, as International Law
is an integral part of the fundamental law of the land, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the
United States. And it is also to be presumed that General MacArthur his acted, in accordance with said rules and
principles of International Law, which have been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, as the
nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted before our courts, during Japanese occupation would lead to
injustice and absurd results, and would be highly detrimental to the public interests.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Law must be obeyed. To keep the bonds of society, it must not be evaded. On its supremacy depends the stability
of states and nations. No government can prevail without it. The preservation of the human race itself hinges in law.

Since time immemorial, man has relied on law as an essential means of attaining his purposes, his objectives, his
mission in life. More than twenty-two centuries before the Christian Era, on orders of the Assyrian King Hammurabi,
the first code was engrave in black diorite with cunie form characters. Nine centuries later Emperor Hung Wu, in the
cradle of the most ancient civilization, compiled the Code of the Great Ming. The laws of Manu were written in the
verdic India. Moses received at Sinai the ten commandments. Draco, Lycurgus, Solon made laws in Greece. Even
ruthless Genghis Khan used laws to keep discipline among the nomad hordes with which he conquered the greater
part of the European and Asiastic continents.

Animal and plants species must follow the mendelian heredity rules and other biological laws to survive. Thanks to
them, the chalk cliffs of the infusoria show the marvel of an animal so tiny as to be imperceptible to the naked eye
creating a whole mountain. Even the inorganic world has to conform the law. Planets and stars follow the laws
discovered by Kepler, known as the law-maker of heavens. If, endowed with rebellious spirit, they should happen to
challenge the law of universal gravity, the immediate result would be cosmic chaos. The tiny and twinkling points of
light set above us on the velvet darkness of the night will cease to inspire us with dreams of more beautiful and
happier worlds.

Again we are called upon to do our duty. Here is a law that we must apply. Shall we shrink? Shall we circumvent it ?
Can we ignore it?

The laws enacted by the legislators shall be useless if courts are not ready to apply them. It is actual application to
real issues which gives laws the breath of life.

In the varied and confused market of human endeavor there are so many things that might induce us to forget the
elementals. There are so many events, so many problem, so many preoccupations that are pushing among
themselves to attract our attention, and we might miss the nearest and most familiar things, like the man who went
around his house to look for a pencil perched on one of his ears.

THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION

In October, 1944, the American Armed Forces of Liberation landed successfully in Leyte.

When victory in islands was accomplished, after the most amazing and spectacular war operations, General of the
Army Douglas MacArthur as a commander in Chief of the American Army, decided to reestablish, in behalf of the
United States, the Commonwealth Government.

Then he was confronted with the question as to what policy to adopt in regards to the official acts of the
governments established in the Philippines by the Japanese regime. He might have thought of recognizing the
validity of some of said acts, but, certainly, there were acts which he should declare null and void, whether against
the policies of the American Government, whether inconsistent with military strategy and operations, whether
detrimental to the interests of the American or Filipino peoples, whether for any other strong or valid reasons.

But, which to recognize, and which not? He was not in a position to gather enough information for a safe basis to
distinguished and classify which acts must be nullified, and which must validated. At the same time he had to take
immediate action. More pressing military matters were requiring his immediate attention. He followed the safe
course: to nullify all the legislative, executive, and judicial acts and processes under the Japanese regime. After all,
when the Commonwealth Government is already functioning, with proper information, he will be in a position to
declare by law, through its Congress, which acts and processes must be revived and validated in the public interest.

So on October 23, 1944, the Commander in Chief issued the following proclamation:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

PROCLAMATION

To the People of the Philippines:

WHEREAS, the military forces under my command have landed in the Philippines soil as a prelude to the
liberation of the entire territory of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, the seat of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines has been re-established in
the Philippines under President Sergio Osmea and the members of his cabinet; and

WHEREAS, under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was
established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the
sanction of the Government of the United States, and is purporting to exercise Executive, Judicial and
Legislative powers of government over the people;

Now, therefore, I, Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army, as Commander in Chief of the military
forces committed to the liberation of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim and declare:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority
of the Government of the United States, the sole and the only government having legal and valid
jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. The laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the
people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
enemy occupation and control; and

I do hereby announce my purpose progressively to restore and extend to the people of the Philippines the
sacred right of government by constitutional process under the regularly constituted Commonwealth
Government as rapidly as the several occupied areas are liberated to the military situation will otherwise
permit;

I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted
government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

October 23, 1944.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General U. S. Army
Commander in Chief

IS THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION LAW?

In times of war the Commander in Chief of an army is vested with extraordinary inherent powers, as a natural result
of the nature of the military operations aimed to achieve the purposes of his country in the war, victory being
paramount among them.

Said Commander in Chief may establish in the occupied or reoccupied territory, under his control, a complete
system of government; he may appoint officers and employees to manage the affairs of said government; he may
issue proclamations, instructions, orders, all with the full force of laws enacted by a duly constituted legislature; he
may set policies that should be followed by the public administration organized by him; he may abolish the said
agencies. In fact, he is the supreme ruler and law-maker of the territory under his control, with powers limited only
by the receipts of the fundamental laws of his country.

California, or the port of San Francisco, had been conquered by the arms of the United States as early as
1846. Shortly afterward the United States had military possession of all upper California. Early in 1847 the
President, as constitutional commander in chief of the army and navy, authorized the military and naval
commander of our forces in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror, and form a civil
government for the conquered country, and to impose duties on imports and tonnage as military
contributions for the support of the government, and of the army which has the conquest in possession. . .
Cross of Harrison, 16 Howard, 164, 189.)

In May, 1862, after the capture of New Orleans by the United States Army, General Butler, then in command
of the army at that place, issued a general order appointing Major J. M. Bell, volunteer aide-de-camp, of the
division staff, provost judge of the city, and directed that he should be obeyed and respected accordingly.
The same order appointed Capt. J. H. French provost marshal of the city, the Capt. Stafford deputy provost
marshal. A few days after this order the Union Bank lent to the plaintiffs the sum of $130,000, and
subsequently, the loan not having been repaid, brought suit before the provost judge to recover the debt.
The defense was taken that the judge had no jurisdiction over the civil cases, but judgement was given
against the borrowers, and they paid the money under protest. To recover it back is the object of the present
suit, and the contention of the plaintiffs is that the judgement was illegal and void, because the Provost Court
had no jurisdiction of the case. The judgement of the District Court was against the plaintiffs, and this
judgement was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. To this affirmance error is now assigned.

The argument of the plaintiffs in error is that the establishment of the Provost Court, the appointment of the
judge, and his action as such in the case brought by the Union Bank against them were invalid, because in
violation of the Constitution of the United States, which vests the judicial power of the General government
in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,
and under this constitutional provision they were entitled to immunity from liability imposed by the judgment
of the Provost Court. Thus, it is claimed, a Federal question is presented, and the highest court of the State
having decided against the immunity claimed, our jurisdiction is invoked.

Assuming that the case is thus brought within our right to review it, the controlling question is whether the
commanding general of the army which captured New Orleans and held it in May 1862, had authority after
the capture of the city to establish a court and appoint a judge with power to try and adjudicate civil causes.
Did the Constitution of the United States prevent the creation of the civil courts in captured districts during
the war of the rebellion, and their creation by military authority?

This cannot be said to be an open question. The subject came under the consideration by this court in The
Grapeshot, where it was decided that when, during the late civil war, portions of the insurgent territory were
occupied by the National forces, it was within the constitutional authority of the President, as commander in
chief, to establish therein provisional courts for the hearing and determination of all causes arising under the
laws of the States or of the United States, and it was ruled that a court instituted by President Lincoln for the
State of Louisiana, with authority to hear, try, and determine civil causes, was lawfully authorized to exercise
such jurisdiction. Its establishment by the military authority was held to be no violation of the constitutional
provision that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as the Congress may form time to time ordain and establish." That clause of the Constitution
has no application to the abnormal condition of conquered territory in the occupancy of the conquering,
army. It refers only to courts of United States, which military courts are not. As was said in the opinion of the
court, delivered by Chief Justice Chase, in The Grapeshot, "It became the duty of the National government,
wherever the insurgent power was overthrown, and the territory which had been dominated by it was
occupied by the National forces, to provide, as far as possible, so long as the war continued, for the security
of the persons and property and for the administration of justice. The duty of the National government in this
respect was no other than that which devolves upon a regular belligerent, occupying during war the territory
of another belligerent. It was a military duty, to be performed by the President, as Commander in Chief, and
instructed as such with the direction of the military force by which the occupation was held."

Thus it has been determined that the power to establish by military authority courts for the administration of
civil as well as criminal justice in portions of the insurgent States occupied by the National forces, is
precisely the same as that which exists when foreign territory has been conquered and is occupied by the
conquerors. What that power is has several times been considered. In Leitensdorfer & Houghton vs. Webb,
may be found a notable illustration. Upon the conquest of New Mexico, in 1846, the commanding officer of
the conquering army, in virtue of the power of conquest and occupancy, and with the sanction and authority
of the President, ordained a provisional government for the country. The ordinance created courts, with both
civil and criminal jurisdiction. It did not undertake to change the municipal laws of the territory, but it
established a judicial system with a superior or appellate court, and with circuit courts, the jurisdiction of
which declared to embrace, first, all criminal causes that should not otherwise provided for by law; and
secondly, original and exclusive cognizance of all civil cases not cognizable before the prefects and alcades.
But though these courts and this judicial system were established by the military authority of the United
States, without any legislation of Congress, this court ruled that they were lawfully established. And there
was no express order for their establishment emanating from the President or the Commander in Chief. The
 ordinance was the act of the General Kearney the commanding officer of the army occupying the conquered
territory.

In view of these decisions it is not to be questioned that the Constitution did not prohibit the creation by the
military authority of court for the trial of civil causes during the civil war in conquered portions of the
insurgent States. The establishment of such courts is but the exercise of the ordinary rights of conquest. The
plaintiffs in error, therefore, had no constitutional immunity against subjection to the judgements of such
courts. They argue, however, that if this be conceded, still General Butler had no authority to establish such
a court; that the President alone, as a Commander in Chief, had such authority. We do not concur in this
view. General Butler was in command of the conquering and the occupying army. He was commissioned to
carry on the war in Louisina. He was, therefore, invested with all the powers of making war, so far as they
were denied to him by the Commander in Chief, and among these powers, as we have seen, was of
establishing courts in conquered territory. It must be presumed that he acted under the orders of his superior
officer, the President, and that his acts, in the prosecution of the war, were the acts of his commander in
chief. (Mechanics' etc. Bank vs. Union Bank, 89 U. S. [22 Wall.], 276-298.)

There is no question, therefore, that when General of the Army Douglas MacArthur issued on October Proclamation,
he did it in the legitimate exercise of his powers. He did it as the official representative of the supreme authority of
the United States of America. Consequently, said proclamation is legal, valid, and binding.

Said proclamation has the full force of a law. In fact, of a paramount law. Having been issued in the exercise of the
American sovereignty, in case of conflict, it can even supersede, not only the ordinary laws of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, but also our Constitution itself while we remain under the American flag.

"PROCESS" IN THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION

In the third section of the dispositive part of the October Proclamation, it is declared that all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth, are null and void.

Does the word "processes" used in the proclamation include judicial processes?

In its broadest sense, process is synonymous with proceedings or procedures and embraces all the steps and
proceedings in a judicial cause from it commencement to its conclusion.

PROCESS. In Practice. The means of compelling a defendant to appear in court after suing out the
original writ, in civil, and after indictment, in criminal cases.

The method taken by law to compel a compliance with the original writ or command as of the court.

A writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority law; also the means of accomplishing
an end, including judicial proceedings; Gollobitch vs. Rainbow, 84 la., 567; 51 N. W., 48; the means or
method pointed out by a statute, or used to acquire jurisdiction of the defendants, whether by writ or notice.
Wilson vs.R. Co. (108 Mo., 588; 18 S. W., 286; 32 Am. St. Rep., 624). (3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 2731.)

A. Process generally. 1. Definition. As a legal term process is a generic word of every comprehensive
signification and many meanings. It is broadest sense it is equivalent to, or synonymous with, "proceedings"
or "procedure," and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a cause from its commencement to its
conclusion. Sometimes the term is also broadly defined as the means whereby a court compels a
compliance with it demands. "Process" and "writ" or "writs" are synonymous in the sense that every writ is a
process, and in a narrow sense of the term "process" is limited to judicial writs in an action, or at least to
writs or writings issued from or out of court, under the seal thereof, and returnable thereto; but it is not
always necessary to construe the term so strictly as to limit it to a writ issued by a court in the exercise of its
ordinary jurisdiction; the term is sometimes defined as a writ or other formal writing issued by authority of law
or by some court, body, or official having authority to issue it; and it is frequently used to designate a means,
by writ or otherwise , of acquiring jurisdiction of defendant or his property, or of bringing defendant into, or
compelling him to appear in, court to answer.

As employed in the statutes the legal meaning of the word "process" varies according to the context, subject
matter, and spirit of the statute in which it occurs. In some jurisdictions codes or statutes variously define
"process" as signifying or including: A writ or summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings; all writs,
warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers; or any writ, declaration, summons,
order, or subpoena whereby any action, suit or proceeding shall be commenced, or which shall be issued in
or upon any action, suit or proceeding. (50 C. J., PP. 441, 442.)

The definition of "process" given by Lord Coke comprehends any lawful warrant, authority, or proceeding by
which a man may be arrested. He says: "Process of law is two fold, namely, by the King's writ, or by
proceeding and warrant, either in deed or in law, without writ." (People vs. Nevins [N. Y.] Hill, 154, 169, 170;
State vs. Shaw, 50 A., 869; 73 Vt., 149.)
 Baron Comyn says that process, in a large acceptance, comprehends the whole proceedings after the
original and before judgement; but generally it imports the writs which issue out of any court to bring the
party to answer, or for doing execution, and all process out of the King's court ought to be in the name of the
King. It is called "process" because it proceeds or goes upon former matter, either original or judicial.
Gilmer, vs.Bird 15 Fla., 410, 421. (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 147.)

In a broad sense the word "process" includes the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the
defendant before it, or a compliance with it demands, and any every writ, rule order, notice, or decree,
including any process of execution that may issue in or upon any action, suit, or legal proceedings, and it is
not restricted to mesne process. In a narrow or restricted sense it is means those mandates of the court
intending to bring parties into court or to require them to answer proceedings there pending. (Colquitt Nat.
Bank vs. Poitivint, 83 S. E., 198, 199; 15 Ga. App., 329. (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940
edition, p. 148.)

A "process" is an instrument in an epistolary from running in the name of the sovereign of a state and issued
out of a court of justice, or by a judge thereof, at the commencement of an action or at any time during its
progress or incident thereto, usually under seal of the court, duly attested and directed to some municipal
officer or to the party to be bound by it, commanding the commission of some act at or within a specified
time, or prohibiting the doing of some act. The cardinal requisites are that the instrument issue from a court
of justice, or a judge thereof; that it run in the name of the sovereign of the state; that it be duly attested, but
not necessarily by the judge, though usually, but not always, under seal; and that it be directed to some one
commanding or prohibiting the commission of an act. Watson vs. Keystone Ironworks Co., 74 P., 272, 273;
70 Kan., 43. (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)

Jacobs in his Law Dictionary says: "Process" has two qualifications: First, it is largely taken for all
proceedings in any action or prosecution, real or personal, civil or criminal, from the beginning to the end;
secondly, that is termed the "process" by which a man is called into any temporal court, because the
beginning or principal part thereof, by which the rest is directed or taken. Strictly, it is a proceeding after the
original, before the judgement. A policy of fire insurance contained the condition that if the property shall be
sold or transferred, or any change takes place in title or possession, whether by legal process or judicial
decree or voluntary transfer or convenience, then and in every such case the policy shall be void. The term
"legal process," as used in the policy, means what is known as a writ; and, as attachment or execution on
the writs are usually employed to effect a change of title to property, they are or are amongst the processes
contemplated by the policy. The words "legal process" mean all the proceedings in an action or proceeding.
They would necessarily embrace the decree, which ordinarily includes the proceedings. Perry vs. Lorillard
Fire Ins. Co., N. Y., 6 Lans., 201, 204. See, also, Tipton vs. Cordova, 1 N. M., 383, 385. (34 Words and
Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)

"Process" in a large acceptation, is nearly synonymous with "proceedings," and means the entire
proceedings in an action, from the beginning to the end. In a stricter sense, it is applied to the several
judicial writs issued in an action. Hanna vs. Russell, 12 Minn., 80, 86 (Gil., 43, 45). (34 Words and Phrases,
permanent edition, 1940, edition 149.)

The term "process" as commonly applied, intends that proceeding by which a party is called into court, but it
has more enlarged signification, and covers all the proceedings in a court, from the beginning to the end of
the suit; and, in this view, all proceedings which may be had to bring testimony into court, whether viva
voceor in writing, may be considered the process of the court. Rich vs. Trimple, Vt., 2 Tyler, 349, 350. Id.

"Process" in its broadest sense comprehends all proceedings to the accomplishment of an end, including
judicial proceedings. Frequently its signification is limited to the means of bringing a party in court. In the
Constitution process which at the common law would have run in the name of the king is intended. In the
Code process issued from a court is meant. McKenna vs. Cooper, 101 P., 662, 663; 79 Kan., 847, quoting
Hanna vs. Russel, 12 Minn., 80. (Gil., 43 ); Black Com. 279; Bou vs. Law. Dict. (34 Words and Phrases,
permanent edition 1940 edition, p. 149.)

"Judicial process" includes the mandate of a court to its officers, and a means whereby courts compel the
appearance of parties, or compliance with its commands, and includes a summons. Ex parte Hill, 51 So.,
786, 787; 165 Ala., 365.

"Judicial process" comprehends all the acts of then court from the beginning of the proceeding to its end,
and in a narrower sense is the means of compelling a defendant to appear in court after suing out the
original writ in civil case and after the indictment in criminal cases, and in every sense is the act of the court
and includes any means of acquiring jurisdiction and includes attachment, garnishment, or execution, and
also a writ. Blair vs. Maxbass Security Bank of Maxbass, 176 N. W., 98, 199; 44 N. D. 12 (23 Words and
Phrases, permanent edition 1940 edition, p. 328.)

There is no question that the word process, as used in the October Proclamation, includes all judicial processes or
proceedings.
The intention of the author of the proclamation of including judicial processes appears clearly in the preamble of the
document.

The second "Whereas," states that so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines," based upon
neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States, and is
purporting to the exercise Executive, Judicial, and Legislative powers of government over the people."

It is evident from the above-mentioned words that it was the purpose of General MacArthur to declare null and void
all acts of government under the Japanese regime, and he used, in section 3 of he dispositive part, the word laws,
as pertaining to the legislative branch, the word regulations, as pertaining to the executive branch, and lastly, the
word processes, as pertaining to the judicial branch of the government which functioned under the Japanese
regime.

It is reasonable to assume that he might include in the word "process." besides those judicial character, those of
executive or administrative character. At any rate, judicial processes cannot be excluded.

THE WORDS OF PROCLAMATION EXPRESS UNMISTAKABLY

THE INTENTION OF THE AUTHOR

The October Proclamation is written in such a way that it is impossible to make a mistake as to the intention of its
author.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, perhaps the wisest man who had ever sat in the Supreme Court of the United States, the
following:

When the words in their literal sense have a plain meaning, courts must be very cautious in allowing their
imagination to give them a different one. Guild vs. Walter, 182 Mass., 225, 226 (1902)

Upon questions of construction when arbitrary rule is involved, it is always more important to consider the
words and the circumstances than even strong analogies decisions. The successive neglect of a series of
small distinctions, in the effort to follow precedent, is very liable to end in perverting instruments from their
plain meaning. In no other branch of the law (trusts) is so much discretion required in dealing with authority. .
. . There is a strong presumption in favor of giving them words their natural meaning, and against reading
them as if they said something else, which they are not fitted to express. (Merrill vs. Preston, 135 Mass.,
451, 455 (1883).

When the words of an instrument are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the
sense of the framer, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to interpret
what needs no interpretation.

Very strong expression have been used by the courts to emphasize the principle that they are to derive their
knowledge of the legislative intention from the words or language of the statute itself which the legislature has used
to express it. The language of a statute is its most natural guide. We are not liberty to imagine an intent and bind the
letter to the intent.

The Supreme Court of the United States said: "The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the
intent of the law-maker is to be found in the language that he has used. He is presumed to know the meaning of the
words and the rules of grammar. The courts have no function of legislation, and simply seek to ascertain the will of
the legislator. It is true that there are cases in which the letter of the statute is not deemed controlling, but the cases
are few and exceptional and only arise where there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter does not fully and
accurately disclose the intent. No mere ommission, no mere failure to provide for contingencies, which it may seem
wise should have specifically provided for will justify any judicial addition to the language of the statute." (United
States vs. Goldenberg, 168 U. S., 95, 102, 103; 18 S. C. Rep., 3; 42 Law. ed., 394.)

That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall be the sole and only government in our country;
that our laws are in full force and effect and legally binding; that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government are null and void and without legal effect", are provisions clearly, distinctly, unmistakably expressed in
the October Proclamation, as to which there is no possibility of error, and there is absolutely no reason in trying to
find different meanings of the plain words employed in the document.

As we have already seen, the annulled processes are precisely judicial processes, procedures and proceedings,
including the one which is under our consideration.

THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHES A CLEAR POLICY

Although, as we have already stated, there is no possible mistakes as to the meaning of the words employed in the
October Proclamation, and the text of the document expresses, in clear-cut sentences, the true purposes of its
author, it might not be amiss to state here what was the policy intended to be established by said proclamation.
It is a matter of judicial knowledge that in the global war just ended on September 2, 1945, by the signatures on the
document of unconditional surrender affixed by representatives of the Japanese government, the belligerents on
both sides resorted to what may call war weapons of psychological character.

So Japan, since its military forces occupied Manila, had waged an intensive campaign propaganda, intended to
destroy the faith of the Filipino people in America, to wipe out all manifestations of American or occidental
civilization, to create interest in all things Japanese, which the imperial officers tried to present as the acme of
oriental culture, and to arouse racial prejudice among orientals and occidentals, to induce the Filipinos to rally to the
cause of Japan, which she tried to make us believe is the cause of the inhabitants of all East Asia.

It is, then, natural that General MacArthur should take counter-measures to neutralize or annul completely all
vestiges of Japanese influence, specially those which might jeopardize in any way his military operations and his
means of achieving the main objective of the campaign of the liberation, that is, to restore in our country
constitutional processes and the high ideals constitute the very essence of democracy.

It was necessary to free, not only our territory, but also our spiritual patrimony. It was necessary, not only to restore
to us the opportunity of enjoying the physical treasures which a beneficent Providence accumulated on this bountiful
land, the true paradise in the western Pacific, but to restore the full play of our ideology, that wonderful admixture of
sensible principles of human conduct, bequeathed to us by our Malayan ancestors, the moral principles of the
Christianity assimilated by our people from teachers of Spain, and the common-sense rules of the American
democratic way of life.

It was necessary to free that ideology from any Japanese impurity.

Undoubtedly, the author of the proclamation thought that the laws, regulations, and processes of all the branches of
the governments established under the Japanese regime, if allowed to continue and to have effect, might be a
means of keeping and spreading in our country the Japanese influence, with the same deadly effects as the mines
planted by the retreating enemy.

The government offices and agencies which functioned during the Japanese occupation represented a sovereignty
and ideology antagonistic to the sovereignty and ideology which MacArthur's forces sought to restore in our country.

Under chapter I of the Japanese Constitution, it is declared that Japan shall reigned and governed by a line
Emperors unbroken for ages eternal (Article 1); that the Emperor is sacred and inviolable (Article 3); that he is the
head of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of the sovereignty (Article 4); that he exercises the legislative
power (Article 5); that he gives sanction to laws, and orders to be promulgated and executed (Article 6);that he has
the supreme command of the Army and Navy (Article 11); that he declares war, makes peace, and concludes
treaties (Article 13).

There is no reason for allowing to remain any vestige of Japanese ideology, the ideology of a people which as
confessed in a book we have at our desk, written by a Japanese, insists in doing many things precisely in a way
opposite to that followed by the rest of the world.

It is the ideology of a people which insists in adopting the policy of self-delusion; that believes that their Emperor is a
direct descendant of gods and he himself is a god, and that the typhoon which occured on August 14, 1281, which
destroyed the fleet with which Kublai Khan tried to invade Japan was the divine wind of Ise; that defies the heinous
crime of the ronin, the 47 assassins who, in order to avenge the death of their master Asano Naganori, on February
3, 1703, entered stealthily into the house of Yoshinaka Kiro and killed him treacherously.

It is an ideology which dignifies harakiri or sepukku, the most bloody and repugnant from suicide, and on September
13, 1912, on the occasion of the funeral of Emperor Meiji, induced General Maresuke Nogi and his wife to practice
the abhorrent "junshi", and example of which is offered to us in the following words of a historian:

When the Emperor's brother Yamato Hiko, died in 2 B. C., we are told that, following the occasion, his
attendants were assembled to from the hito-bashira (pillar-men) to gird the grave. They were buried alive in
circle up to the neck around the thomb and "for several days they died not, but wept and wailed day night. At
last they died not, but wept and wailed day night. At last they did not rotted. Dogs and cows gathered and
ate them." (Gowen, an Outline of History of Japan, p. 50.)

The practice shows that the Japanese are the spiritual descendants of the Sumerians, the ferocious inhabitants of
Babylonia who, 3500 years B. C., appeared in history as the first human beings to honor their patesis by killing and
entombing with him his window, his ministers, and notable men and women of his kingdom, selected by the priests
to partake of such abominable honor. (Broduer, The Pageant of Civilization, pp. 62-66.)

General MacArthur sought to annul completely the officials acts of the governments under the Japanese occupation,
because they were done at the shadow of the Japanese dictatorship, the same which destroyed the independence
of Korea, the "Empire of Morning Frehsness"; they violated the territorial integrity of China, invaded Manchuria, and
initiated therein the deceitful system of puppet governments, by designating irresponsible Pu Yi as Emperor of
Manchukuo; they violated the trusteeship granted by the Treaty of Versailles by usurping tha mandated islands in
the Pacific; they initiated that they call China Incident, without war declaration, and, therefore, in complete disregard
of an elemental international duty; they attacked Pearl Harbor treacherously, and committed a long series of the
flagrant violations of international law that have logically bestowed on Japan the title of the bandit nation in the social
world.

The conduct of the Japanese during the occupation shows a shocking an anchronism of a modern world power
which seems to be re-incarnation of one whose primitive social types of pre-history, whose proper place must be
found in an archeological collection. It represents a backward jump in the evolution of ethical and juridical concepts,
a reversion that, more than a simple pathological state, represents a characteristics and well defined case of
sociological teratology.

Since they entered the threshold of our capital, the Japanese had announced that for every one of them killed they
would kill ten prominent Filipinos. They promised to respect our rights by submitting us to the wholesale and
indiscriminate slapping, tortures, and atrocious massacres. Driving nails in the cranium, extraction of teeth and eyes,
burnings of organs, hangings, diabolical zonings, looting of properties, establishments of redlight districts, machine
gunning of women and children, interment of alive persons, they are just mere preludes of the promised paradised
that they called "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".

They promised religious liberty by compelling all protestant sects to unite, against the religious scruples and
convictions of their members, in one group, and by profaning convents, seminaries, churches, and other cult centers
of the Catholics, utilizing them as military barracks, munitions dumps, artillery base, deposits of bombs and gasoline,
torture chambers and zone, and by compelling the government officials and employees to face and to bow in
adoration before that caricature of divinity in the imperial palace of Tokyo.

The Japanese offered themselves to be our cultural mentors by depriving us of the use of our schools and colleges,
by destroying our books and other means of culture, by falsifying the contents of school texts, by eliminating free
press, the radio, all elemental principles of civilized conduct, by establishing classes of rudimentary Japanese so as
to reduce the Filipinos to the mental level of the rude Japanese guards, and by disseminating all kinds of historical,
political, and cultural falsehoods.

Invoking our geographical propinquity and race affinity, they had the insolence of calling us their brothers, without
the prejuce of placing of us in the category of slaves, treating the most prominent Filipinos in a much lower social
and political category than that of the most ignorant and brutal subject of the Emperor.

The civil liberties of the citizens were annulled. Witnesses and litigants were slapped and tortured during
investigations. In the prosecuting attorney's offices, no one was safe. When the Japanese arrested a person, the
lawyer who dared to intercede was also placed under arrest. Even courts were not free from their dispotic members.
There were judges who had to trample laws and shock their conscience in order not to disgust a Nipponese.

The most noble of all professions, so much so that the universities of the world could not conceive of higher honor
that may be conferred than that of Doctor of Laws, became the most despised. It was dangerous to practice the
profession by which faith in the effectiveness of law is maintained; citizens feel confident in the protection of their
liberties, honor, and dignity; the weak may face the powerful; the lowest citizen is not afraid of the highest official;
civil equality becomes reality; justice is admnistered with more efficiency; and democracy becomes the best system
of government and the best guaranty for the welfare and happiness of the individual human being. In fact, the
profession of law was annulled, and the best lawyers for the unfortunate prisoners in Fort Santiago and other
centers of torture were the military police, concubines, procurers, and spies, the providers of war materials and
shameful pleasures, and the accomplices in fraudulent transactions, which were the specialty of many naval and
military Japanese officers.

The courts and Filipino government officials were completely helpless in the question of protecting the constitutional
liberties and fundamental rights of the citizens who happen to be unfortunate enough to fall under the dragnet of the
hated kempei. Even the highest government officials were not safe from arrest and imprisonment in the dreaded
military dungeons, where torture or horrible death were always awaiting the defenseless victim of the Japanese
brutality.

May any one be surprised if General MacArthur decided to annul all the judicial processes?

The evident policy of the author of the October Proclamation can be seen if we take into consideration the following
provisions of the Japanese Constitution:

ART. 57. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law, in the name of the
Emperor.

ART. 61. No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the
executive authority .. shall be taken cognizance of by a Court of Law.

INTERNATIONAL LAW
Nobody dared challenge the validity of the October Proclamation.

Nobody dared challenge the authority of the military Commander in Chief who issued it.

Certainly not because of the awe aroused by the looming figure of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the
Allied Supreme Commander, the military hero, the greatest American general, the Liberator of the Philippines, the
conqueror of Japan, the gallant soldier under whose authority the Emperor of the Japan, who is supposed to rule
supreme for ages as a descendant of gods, is receiving orders with the humility of a prisoner of war.

No challenge has been hurled against the proclamation or the authority of the author to issue it, because everybody
acknowledges the full legality of its issuance.

But because the proclamation will affect the interest and the rights of a group of individuals, and to protect the same,
a way is being sought to neutralize the effect of the proclamation.

The way found is to invoke international law. The big and resounding word is considered as a shibboleth powerful
enough to shield the affected persons from the annulling impact.

Even then, international law is not invoked to challenge the legality or authority of the proclamation, but only to
construe it in a convenient way so that judicial processes during the Japanese occupation, through an exceptional
effort of the imagination, might to segregated from the processes mentioned in the proclamation.

An author said that the law of nations, the "jus gentiun", is not a fixed nor immutable science. On the country, it is
developing incessantly, it is perpetually changing in forms. In each turn it advances or recedes, according to the
vicissitudes of history, and following the monotonous rythm of the ebb and rise of the tide of the sea.

Le driot des gens, en effet, n'est point une science fixe est immuable: bein au contraire, il se developpe sans
cesse, il change eternellement de formes; tour il avance et il recule, selon less vicissitudes de histoire et
suivan un rhythm monotone qui est comme le flux et le reflux d'un mer. (M. Revon, De l'existence du driot
international sous la republique romain.)

Another author has this to say:

International law, if it is or can be a science at all, or can be, at most a regulative science, dealing with the
conduct of States, that is, human beings in a certain capacity; and its principles and prescriptions are not,
like those of science proper, final and unchanging. The substance of science proper is already made for
man; the substance of international is actually made by man, and different ages make differently."
(Coleman Philippson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece of Rome, Vol. I, p. 50.)

"Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still." (Pound, Interpretations of Legal History., p. 1. ) Justice Cardozo
adds: "Here is the great antimony confronting us at every turn. Rest and motion, unrelieved and unchecked, are
equally destructive. The law, like human kind, if life is to continue, must find some path compromise." (The Growth
of Law p. 2.) Law is just one of the manifestations of human life, and "Life has relations not capable of division into
inflexible compartments. The moulds expand and shrink," (Glanzer vs. Shepard, 233 N.Y., 236, 241.)

The characteristic plasticity of law is very noticeable, much more than in any other department, in international law.

In a certain matters it is clear we have made substantial progress, but in other points, he (M. Revon)
maintains, we have retrograded; for example, in the middle ages the oath was not always respected as
faithfully as in ancient Rome; and nearer our own times, in the seventeenth century, Grotius proclaims the
unquestioned right of the belligerents to massacre the women and the children of the enemy; and in our
more modern age the due declaration of war which Roman always conformed to has not been invariably
observed. (Coleman Philippson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol. I, p.
209.)

Now let us see if any principle of international law may effect the enforcement of the October Proclamation.

In this study we should be cautioned not to allow ourselves to be deluded by generalities and vagueness which are
likely to lead us easily to error, in view of the absence of codification and statutory provisions.

Our Constitution provides:

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation. (Sec. 3, Art. II.)

There being no codified principles of international law, or enactments of its rules, we cannot rely on merely legal
precepts.
With the exception of international conventions and treaties and, just recently, the Charter of the United Nations,
adopted in San Francisco Conference on June 26, 1945, we have to rely on unsystemized judicial pronouncements
and reasonings and on theories, theses, and propositions that we may find in the works of authors and publicists.

Due to that characteristic pliability and imprecision of international law, the drafters of our Constitution had to content
themselves with "generally accepted principles."

We must insists, therefore, that the principles should be specific and unmistakably defined and that there is definite
and conclusive evidence to the effect that they generally accepted among the civilized nations of the world and that
they belong to the current era and no other epochs of history.

The temptation of assuming the role of a legislator is greater in international law than in any other department of law,
since there are no parliaments, congresses, legislative assemblies which can enact laws and specific statutes on
the subject. It must be our concern to avoid falling in so a great temptation, as its, dangers are incalculable. It would
be like building castles in the thin air, or trying to find an exit in the thick dark forest where we are irretrievably lost.
We must also be very careful in our logic. In so vast a field as international law, the fanciful wandering of the
imagination often impair the course of dialistics.

THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Is there any principle of international law that may effect the October Proclamation?

We tried in vain to find out in the majority opinion anything as to the existence of any principle of international law
under which the authority of General MacArthur to issue the proclamation can effectively be challenged.

No principle of international law has been, or could be invoked as a basis for denying the author of the document
legal authority to issue the same or any part thereof.

We awaited in vain for any one to dare deny General MacArthur the authority, under international law, to declare null
and void and without effect, not only the laws and regulations of the governments under the Japanese regime, but
all the processes of said governments, including judicial processes.

If General MacArthur, as commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces of Liberation, had authority, full and
legal, to issue the proclamation, the inescapable result will be the complete viodance and nullity of all judicial
processes, procedures, and proceedings of all courts under the Japanese regime.

But those who are sponsoring the cause of said judicial processes try to achieve their aim, not by direct means, but
by following a tortuous side-road.

They accept and recognize the full authority of the author of the proclamation to issue it and all its parts, but they
maintain that General MacArthur did not and could not have in mind the idea of nullifying the judicial processes
during the Japanese occupation, because that will be in violation of the principles of international law.

If we follow the reasoning of the majority opinion we will have to reach the conlusion that the world "processes" does
not appear at all in the October Proclamation.

It is stated more than once, and reiterated with dogmatic emphasis, that under the principles of international law the
judicial processes under an army occupation cannot be invalidated.

But we waited in vain for the specific principle of international law, only one of those alluded to, to be pointed out to
us.

If the law exist, it can be pointed out. If the principle exists, it can stated specifically. The word is being used very
often in plural, principles, but we need only one to be convinced.

The imagined principles are so shrouded in a thick maze of strained analogies and reasoning, that we confess our
inability even to have a fleeting glimpse at them through their thick and invulnerable wrappers.

At every turn international law, the blatant words, are haunting us with the deafening bray of a trumpet, but after the
transient sound has fled away, absorbed by the resiliency of the vast atmosphere, the announced principles, which
are the very soul of international law, would disappear too with the lighting speed of a vanishing dream.

WEAKNESS OF THE MAJORITY POSITION

In the majority opinion three questions are propounded: first, whether judicial acts and proceedings during the
Japanese occupation are valid even after liberation; second whether the October Proclamation had invalidated all
judgement and judicial proceedings under the Japanese regime; and third, whether the present courts of the
Commonwealth may continue the judicial proceedings pending at the time of liberation.
As regards the first question, it is stated that it is a legal tourism in political and international law that all acts of a de
facto government are good and valid, that the governments established during the Japanese occupation. that is, the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines, were de facto governments, and that it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of those governments, "which are not of a
political complexion," were good and valid, and by virtue of the principle of postliminium, remain good and valid after
the liberation.

In the above reasoning we will see right away how the alleged legal truism in political and international law, stated
as a premise in a sweeping way, as an absolute rule, is immediately qualified by the exception as to judicial acts
and proceedings which are of a "political complexion."

So it is the majority itself which destroys the validity of what it maintains as a legal truism in political and international
law, by stating from the beginning of the absolute proposition that all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of a de facto governments are good and valid.

It is be noted that no authority, absolutely no authority, has been cited to support the absolute and sweeping
character of the majority proposition as stated in their opinion.

No authority could be cited, because the majority itself loses faith in the validity of such absolute and sweeping
proposition, by establishing an unexplained exception as regards the judicial acts and proceedings of a "political
complexion."

Besides, it is useless to try to find in the arguments of the majority anything that may challenge the power, the
authority of a de jure government to annul the official acts of a de facto government, or the legal and indisputable
authority of the restored legitimate government to refuse to recognize the official acts, legislative, executive and
judicial, of the usurping government, once the same is ousted.

As to the second question, the majority argues that the judicial proceedings and judgments of the de
factogovernments under the Japanese regime being good and valid, "it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur to refer to judicial processes, when he used the
last word in the October Proclamation, and that it only refers to government processes other than judicial processes
or court proceedings."

The weakness and absolute ineffectiveness of the argument are self-evident.

It is maintained that when General MacArthur declared the processes of the governments under the Japanese
regime null and void, he could not refer to judicial processes, because the same are valid and remained so under
the legal truism announced by the majority to the effect that, under political and international law, all official acts of
a de facto government, legislative, executive or judicial, are valid.

But we have seen already how the majority excepted from said legal truism the judicial processes of "political
complexion."

And now it is stated that in annulling the processes of the governments under Japanese occupation, General
MacArthur referred to "processes other than judicial processes."

That is, the legislative and executive processes.

But, did not the majority maintain that all acts and proceedings of legislative and executive departments of a de
factogovernments are good and valid? Did it not maintain that they are so as a "legal truism in political and
international law?"

Now if the reasoning of the majority to the effect that General MacArthur could not refer to judicial processes
because they are good and valid in accordance with international law, why should the same reasoning not apply to
legislative and executive processes?

Why does the majority maintain that, notwithstanding the fact that, according that said legal truism, legislative and
executive official acts of de facto governments are good and valid, General MacArthur referred to the latter in his
annulling proclamation, but not to judicial processes?

If the argument is good so as to exclude judicial processes from the effect of the October Proclamation, we can see
no logic in considering it bad with respect to legislative and executive processes.

If the argument is bad with respect to legislative and executive processes, there is no logic in holding that it is not
good with respect to judicial processes.

Therefore, if the argument of the majority opinion is good, the inevitable conclusion is that General MacArthur did
not declare null and void any processes, at all, whether legislative processes, executive processes, or judicial
processes, and that the word "processes" used by him in the October Proclamation is a mere surplusage or an
ornamental literary appendix.

The absurdity of the conclusion unmasks the utter futility of the position of the majority, which is but a mere legal
pretense that cannot stand the least analysis or the test of logic.

A great legal luminary admonished that we must have courage to unmasks pretense if we are to reach a peace that
will abide beyond the fleeting hour.

It is admitted that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation as an agent of his government, "may
not unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory if and when exigencies of
the military occupation demand such action," but it is doubted whether the commanding general of the army of the
restored legitimate government can exercise the same broad legislative powers.

We beg to disagree with a theory so unreasonable and subversive.

We cannot accept that the commanding general of an army of occupation, of a rebellious army, of an invading army,
or of a usurping army, should enjoy greater legal authority during the illegal, and in the case of the Japanese,
iniquitous and bestial occupation, than the official representative of the legitimate government, once restored in the
territory wrested from the brutal invaders and aggressors. We cannot agree with such legal travesty.

Broad and unlimited powers are granted and recognized in the commanding general of an army of invasion, but the
shadow of the vanishing alleged principle of international law is being brandished to gag, manacle, and make
completely powerless the commander of an army of liberation to wipe out the official acts of the government for
usurpation, although said acts might impair the military operation or neutralize the public policies of the restored
legitimate government.

We are not unmindful of the interest of the persons who might be adversely affected by the annulment of the judicial
processes of the governments under the Japanese regime, but we cannot help smiling when we hear that chaos will
reign or that the world will sink.

It is possible that some criminals will be let loose unpunished, but nobody has ever been alarmed that the President,
in the exercise of his constitutional powers of pardon and amnesty, had in the past released many criminals from
imprisonment. And let us not forget that due to human limitations, in all countries, under all governments, in peace
or in war, there were, there are, and there will always be unpunished criminals, and that situation never caused
despair to any one.

We can conceive of inconveniences and hardships, but they are necessary contributions to great and noble
purposes. Untold sacrifices were always offered to attain high ideals and in behalf of worthy causes.

We cannot refrain from feeling a paternal emotion for those who are trembling with all sincerity because of the belief
that the avoidance of judicial proceedings of the governments under the Japanese regime "would paralyze the
social life of the country." To allay such fear we must remind them that the country that produced many great hereos
and martyrs; that contributed some of highest morals figures that humanity has ever produced in all history; which
inhabited by a race which was able to traverse in immemorial times the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean and the
Pacific with inadequate means of navigation, and to inhabit in many islands so distantly located, from Madagascar to
the eastern Pacific; which made possible the wonderful resistance of Bataan and Corregidor, can not have a social
life so frail as to be easily paralyzed by the annulment of some judicial proceedings. The Japanese vandalisms
during the last three years of nightmares and bestial oppression, during the long period of our national slavery, and
the wholesale massacres and destructions in Manila and many other cities and municipalities and populated areas,
were not able to paralyze the social life of our people. Let us not loss faith so easily in the inherent vitality of the
social life of the people and country of Rizal and Mabini.

It is insinuated that because of the thought that the representative of the restored sovereign power may set aside all
judicial processes of the army of occupation, in the case to courts of a future invasions, litigants will not summit their
cases to courts whose judgement may afterwards be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing
offenses in the expectancy that they may escape penalty upon liberation of the country. We hope that Providence
will never allow the Philippines to fall again under the arms of an invading army, but if such misfortune will happen,
let the October Proclamation serve as a notice to the ruthless invaders that the official acts of the government of
occupation will not merit any recognition from the legitimate government, especially if they should not conduct
themselves, as exemplified by the Japanese, in accordance with the rules of action of a civilized state.

One conclusive evidence of the untenableness of the majority position is the fact that it had to resort to Executive
Order No. 37, issued on March 10, 1945, providing "that all cases that have heretofore been appealed to the Court
of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision." The far-fetched theory is advanced that this
provision impliedly recognizes the court processes during the Japanese military occupation, on the false assumption
that it refers to the Court of Appeals existing during the Japanese regime. It is self-evident that the Executive Order
could have referred only to the Commonwealth Court of Appeals, which is the one declared abolished in said order.
Certainly no one will entertain the absurd idea that the President of the Philippines could have thought of abolishing
the Court of Appeals under the government during the Japanese occupation. Said Court of Appeals disappeared
with the ouster of the Japanese military administration from which it derived its existence and powers. The Court of
Appeals existing on March 10, 1945, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 37, was the Commonwealth
Court of Appeals and it was the only one that could be abolished.

Without discussing the correctness of principle stated the majority opinion quotes from Wheaton the following:
"Moreover when it is said that occupier's acts are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the
subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that on crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be
reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What does happen is that most matters are allowed to stand
by the stored government, but the matter can hardly be put further than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th
English edition of 1944, p. 245)

Then it says that there is no doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the
occupier, such as the laws, regulations and processes other than the judicial of the government established by the
belligerent occupant.

It is evident that the statement just quoted is a complete diversion from the principle stated in the in an unmistakable
way by Wheaton, who says in definite terms that "it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that
if his acts (the occupant's) should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed."

It can be clearly seen that Wheaton does not make any distinction or point out any exception.

But in the majority opinion the principle is qualified, without stating any reason therefore, by limiting the right of the
restored government to annul "most of the acts of the occupier" and "processes other than judicial."

The statement made by the respondent judge after quoting the above-mentioned principle, as stated by Wheaton, to
the effect that whether the acts of military occupant should be considered valid or not, is a question that is up to the
restored government to decide, and that there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored government
the right to exercise its discretion on the matter, is quoted without discussion in the majority opinion.

As the statement is not disputed, wee are entitled to presume that it is concurred in and, therefore, the qualifications
made in the statement in the majority opinion seem to completely groundless.

THE DUTIES IMPOSED ON OCCUPANT ARMY ARE NOT LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHTS OF THE LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT

The majority opinion is accumulating authorities to show the many duties imposed by international law on the
military occupant of an invaded country.

And from said duties it is deduced that the legitimate government, once restored in his own territory, is bound to
respect all the official acts of the government established by the usurping army, except judicial processes political
complexion.

The reasoning calls for immediate opposition. It is absolutely contrary to all principles of logic.

Between the duties imposed in the military occupant and the legal prerogatives of the legitimate government there
are no logical relationship or connection that might bind the ones with the others.

The military occupants is duty bound to protect the civil rights of the inhabitants, but why should the legitimate
government necessarily validate the measures adopted by the said occupant in the performance of this duty, if the
legitimate government believes his duty to annul them for weighty reasons?

The military occupant is duty bound to establish courts of justice. Why should the legitimate government validate the
acts of said courts, if it is convinced that said courts were absolutely powerless, as was the case during the
Japanese occupation, to stop the horrible abuses of the military police, to give relief to the victims of zoning and Fort
Santiago tortures, to protect the fundamental human rights of the Filipinos life, property, and personal freedom?

The majority opinion recognizes in the military occupant the power to annul the official acts of the ousted and
supplanted legitimate government, a privilege which is inversely denied to the last. This preference and predilection
in favor of the military occupant, that is in favor of the invader and usurper, and against the legitimate government, is
simply disconcerting, if we have to say the least.

PRESUMPTIONS AND SUPPOSITIONS AGAINST TRUTH AND FACTS

The invading military occupant is duty bound to establish and maintain courts of justice in the invaded territory, for
the protection of the inhabitants thereof. It is presumed that the restored legitimate government will respect the acts
of said courts of the army of occupation. Therefore, it is a principle of international law that said acts are valid and
should be respected by the legitimate government. It is presumed that General MacArthur is acquainted with such
principle, discovered or revealed through presumptive operations, and it is presumed that he had not the intention of
declaring null and void the judicial processes of the government during the Japanese regime. Therefore, his October
Proclamation, declaring null and void and without effect "all processes" of said governments, in fact, did not annul
the Japanese regime judicial processes.

So run the logic of the majority.

They don't mind the that General MacArthur speaks in the October Proclamation as follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army, as Commander-in-Chief of the military
forces committed to the liberation of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim and declare:

xxx xxx xxx

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control. (emphasis supplied.)

General MacArthur says categorically "all processes", but the majority insists on reading differently, that, is: "NOT
ALL processes." The majority presume, suppose, against the unequivocal meaning of simple and well known words,
that when General MacArthur said "all processes", in fact, he said "not all processes", because it is necessary, by
presumption, by supposition, to exclude judicial processes.

If where General MacArthur says "all", the majority shall insist on reading "not all", it is impossible to foresee the
consequences of such so stubborn attitude, but it is possible to understand how they reached the unacceptable
possible conclusion which we cannot be avoid opposing and exposing.

Are we to adopt and follow the policy of deciding cases submitted to our consideration, by presumption and
suppositions putting aside truths and facts? Are we to place in the documents presented to us, such as the October
Proclamation, different words than what are written therein? Are we to read "not all", where it is written "all"?

We are afraid to such procedure is not precisely the most appropriate to keep public confidence in the effectiveness
of the administration of justice.

That is why we must insists that in the October Proclamation should be read what General MacArthur has written in
it, that is, that, besides laws and regulations, he declared and proclaimed null and void "ALL PROCESSES",
including naturally judicial processes, of the governments under the Japanese regime.

THE COMMONWEALTH COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO CONTINUE JAPANESE REGIME JUDICIAL

PROCESSES

Now we come to the third and last question propounded in the majority opinion.

The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth tribunals is defined, prescribed, and apportioned by legislative act.

It is provided so in our Constitution. (Section 2, Article VIII.)

The Commonwealth courts of justice are continuations of the courts established before the inauguration of the
Commonwealth and before the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935. And their jurisdiction is the same as
provided by existing laws at the time of inauguration of the Commonwealth Government.

Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission, known as the Organic Act of the courts of justice of the Philippines, is the
one that defines the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, Courts of First Instance, and the
Supreme Court. It is not necessary to mention here the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, because the same has
been abolished by Executive Order No. 37.

No provision may be found in Act. No. 136, nor in any other law of the Philippines, conferring on the Commonwealth
tribunals jurisdiction to continue the judicial processes or proceedings of tribunals belonging to other governments,
such as the governments established during the Japanese occupation.

The jurisdiction of our justice of the peace and municipal courts is provided in section 68, chapter V, of Act No. 136.
The original and appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance is provided in the sections 56, 57, Chapter IV,
of Act No. 136. The original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is provided in 17 and 18, Chapter II, of
the same Act. The provisions of the above-cited do not authorize, even implicitly, any of the decisions and
judgements of tribunals of the governments, nor to continue the processes or proceedings of said tribunals.

NECESSITY OF ENABLING ACT UNDER THE LEGAL DOCTRINE PREVAILING IN THE PHILIPPINES AND IN
THE UNITED STATES
Taking aside the question as to whether the judicial processes of the government established during the Japanese
occupation should be considered valid or not, in order that said processes could be continued and the
Commonwealth tribunals could exercise proper jurisdiction to continue them, under the well- established legal
doctrine, prevailing not only in the Philippines, but also in the proper enabling law.

Almost a half a century ago, in the instructions given by President McKinley on April 7, 1900, for the guidance of the
Philippine Commission, it was stated that, in all the forms of the govenment and administrative provisions which they
were authorized to prescribed, the Commission should bear in mind that the government which they were
establishing was designed not for the satisfaction of the Americans or for the expression of their of their theoretical
views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippines, and the measures adopted
should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent
with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government.

Notwithstanding the policy so outlined, it was not enough for the Philippine Commission to create and establish the
courts of justice provided in Act No. 136, in order that said tribunals could take cognizance and continue the judicial
proceedings of the tribunals existing in the Philippines at the time the American occupation.

It needed specific enabling provisions in order that the new tribunals might continue the processes pending in the
tribunals established by the Spaniards, and which continued to function until they were substituted by the courts
created by the Philippine Commission.

So it was done in regards to the transfer of the cases pending before the Spanish Audiencia to the newly created
Supreme Court, in sections 38 and 39 of Act No. 136 quoted as follows:

SEC. 38. Disposition of causes, actions, proceedings, appeals, records, papers, and so forth, pending in the
existing Supreme Court and in the "Contencioso Administravo." All records, books, papers, causes,
actions, proceedings, and appeals logged, deposited, or pending in the existing Audiencia or Supreme
Court, or pending by appeal before the Spanish tribunal called "Contencioso Administravo," are transferred
to the Supreme Court above provided for which, has the same power and jurisdiction over them as if they
had been in the first instance lodged, filed, or pending therein, or, in case of appeal, appealed thereto.

SEC. 39. Abolition of existing Supreme Court. The existing Audiencia or Supreme Court is hereby
abolished, and the Supreme Court provided by this Act is substituted in place thereof.

Sections 64 and 65 of the same Act allowed the same procedure as regards the transfer of cases and processes
pending in the abolished Spanish Courts of First Instance to the tribunals of the same name established by the
Philippine Commission.

SEC. 64. Disposition of records, papers, causes, and appeals, now pending in the existing Courts of First
Instance. All records, books, papers, actions, proceedings, and appeals lodged, deposited, or pending in
the Court of First Instance as now constituted of or any province are transferred to the Court of First
Instance of such province hereby established, which shall have the same power and jurisdiction over them
as if they had been primarily lodged, deposited, filed, or commenced therein, or in case of appeal, appealed
thereto.

SEC. 65. Abolition of existing Courts of First Instance. The existing Courts First Instance are hereby
abolished, and the Courts of First Instance provided by this Act are substituted in place thereof.

The same procedure has been followed by the Philippine Commission eventhough the courts of origin of the judicial
processes to be transferred and continued belonged to the same government and sovereignty of the courts which
are empowered to continue said processes.

So section 78 of Act No. 136, after the repeal of all acts conferring upon American provost courts in the Philippines
jurisdiction over civil actions, expressly provided that said civil actions shall be transferred to the newly created
tribunals.

And it provided specifically that "the Supreme Court, Courts of the First Instance and courts of the justice of the
peace established by this Act (No. 136) are authorized to try and determine the actions so transferred to them
respectively from the provost courts, in the same manner and with the same legal effect as though such actions had
originally been commenced in the courts created" by virtue of said Act.

MUNICIPAL COURTS UNDER ACT NO. 183

On July 30, 1901, the Philippine Commission enacted the Organic Act of the City of Manila, No. 183.

Two municipal courts for the city were created by section 40 of said Act, one for the northern side of Pasig River and
the other for the southern side.
They were courts with criminal jurisdiction or identical cases under the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace then
existing in Manila. Although both courts were of the same jurisdiction, in order that the criminal cases belonging to
the justice of the peace courts may be transferred to the municipal courts just created, and the proceedings may be
continued by the same, the Philippine Commission considered it necessary to pas the proper enabling act.

So on August 5, 1901, it enacted Act No. 186, section 2 of which provides that all criminal cases and proceedings
pending in the justices of the peace of Manila are transferred to the municipal courts, which are conferred the
jurisdiction to continue said cases and proceedings.

THE CABANTAG CASE

On August 1, 1901, Narciso Cabantag was convicted of murder by a military commission. (Cabantag vs. Wolfe, 6
Phil., 273.) The decision was confirmed on December 10, 1901, and his execution by hanging was set for January
12,1902. .

On December 26, 1901, he fled, but surrendered to the authorities on July 18, 1902. The Civil Governor on
December 2, 1903, commuted the death penalty to 20 years imprisonment. The commutation was approved by the
Secretary of War, following instructions of the President.

Cabantag filed later a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that, with the abolition of the military commission which
convicted him, there was no existing tribunal which could order the execution of the penalty of imprisonment.

The Supreme Court denied the writ, but stated that, if the petitioner had filed the writ before the enactment of Act
No. 865, the question presented to the Supreme Court would have been different.

Act No. 865, enacted on September 3, 1903, is enabling law, wherein it is provided that decisions rendered by the
provost courts and military commission shall be ordered executed by the Courts of First Instance in accordance with
the procedure outlined in said Act.

It is evident from the foregoing that this Supreme Court has accepted and confirmed the doctrine of the necessity of
an enabling act in order that our Courts of First Instance could exercise jurisdiction to execute the decision of the
abolished provost courts and military commission.

It is evident that the doctrine is applicable, with more force, to the judicial processes coming from governments
deriving their authority from a foreign enemy state.

THE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES

It is also evident that the Congress of the United States, by enacting the Bill of the Philippines on July 1, 1902,
confirmed also the same doctrine.

In effect, in section 9 of said Act, the Congress approved what the Philippine Commission did as to the jurisdiction of
the courts established and transfer of cases and judicial processes, as provided in Acts Nos. 136, 186, and 865.

The same doctrine was adopted by the United States government as part of its international policy, as could be
seen in Article XII of the Treaty concluded with Spain on December 10, 1898, in Paris.

Even in 1866 the Congress of the United States followed the same doctrine.

The suit, shown by the record, was originally instituted in the District Court of the United States for the
District of Louisiana, where a decree was rendered for the libellant. From the decree an appeal was taken to
the Circuit Court, where the case was pending, when in 1861, the proceedings of the court were interrupted
by the civil war. Louisiana had become involved in the rebellion, and the courts and officers of the United
States were excluded from its limits. In 1862, however, the National authority had been partially
reestablished in the State, though still liable to the overthrown by the vicissitudes of war. The troops of the
Union occupied New Orleans, and held military possession of the city and such other portions of the State
as had submitted to the General Government. The nature of this occupation and possession was fully
explained in the case of The Vinice.

Whilst it continued, on the 20th of October, 1862, President Lincoln, by proclamation, instituted a Provisional
Court of the State of Louisiana, with authority, among other powers, to hear, try, and determine all causes in
admiralty. Subsequently, by consent of parties, this cause was transferred into the Provisional Court thus,
constituted, and was heard, and a decree was again rendered in favor of the libellants. Upon the restoration
of civil authority in the State, the Provincial Court, limited in duration, according to the terms of the
proclamation, by the event, ceased to exist.

On the 28th of July, 1866, Congress enacted that all suits, causes and proceedings in the Provisional Court,
proper for the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
 should be transferred to that court, and heard, and determined therein; and that all judgements, orders, and
decrees of the Provisional Court in causes transferred to the Circuit Court should at once become the
orders, judgements, and decrees of that court, and might be enforced, pleaded, and proved accordingly.

It is questioned upon these facts whether the establishment by the President of a Provisional Court was
warranted by the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

We have no doubt that the Provisional Court of Louisiana was properly established by the President in the
exercise of this constitutional authority during war; or that Congress had power, upon the close of the war,
and the dissolution of the Provisional Court, to provide for the transfer of cases pending in that court, and of
its judgement and decrees, to the proper courts of the United States. (U. S. Reports, Wallace, Vol. 9, The
Grapeshot, 131-133.)

JUDGEMENTS OF THE REBEL COURTS IN LOUISIANA WERE VALIDATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISION

During the civil war in 1861, the prevailing rebel forces established their own government in Louisiana.

When the rebel forces were overpowered by the Union Forces and the de facto government was replaced by the de
jure government, to give effect to the judgments and other judicial acts of the rebel government, from January 26,
1861, up to the date of the adoption of the State Constitution, a provision to said effect was inserted in said
document.

Section 149 of the Louisiana Constitution reads as follows:

All the rights, actions, prosecutions, claims, contracts, and all laws in force at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution, and not inconsistent therewith, shall continue as if it had not been adopted; all judgments and
judicial sales, marriages, and executed contracts made in good faith and in accordance with existing laws in
this State rendered, made, or entered into, between the 26th day of January, 1861, and the date when this
constitution shall be adopted, are hereby declared to be valid, etc. (U. S. Report, Wallace, Vol. 22,
Mechanics' etc. Bank vs. Union Bank, 281.)

EVEN AMONG SISTERS STATES OF THE UNITED STATES JUDGEMENTS ARE NOT EXECUTORY

The member states of the United States of America belong to the same nation, to the country, and are under the
same sovereignty.

But judgements rendered in one state are not executory in other states.

To give them effect in other states it is necessary to initiate an original judicial proceedings, and therein the
defendants in the domestic suit may plead bar the sister state judgement puis darrien continuance. (Wharton, on the
Conflict of Laws, Vol. II, p. 1411.)

Under the Constitution of the United States, when a judgement of one state in the Union is offered in a court
of a sister state as the basis of a suit nil debet cannot be pleaded. The only proper plea is nul tiel record.
(Id., p. 1413.).

It is competent for the defendant, however, to an action on a judgement of a sister state, as to an action on a
foreign judgement, to set up as a defense, want of jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgement; and, as
indicating such want of jurisdiction, to aver by plea that the defendant was not an inhabitant of the state
rendering the judgement, and had not been served with process, and did not enter his appearance; or that
the attorney was without authority to appear. (Id., pp. 1414-1415.)

The inevitable consequence is that the courts of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in the absence of an
enabling act or of an express legislative grant, have no jurisdiction to take cognizance and continue the judicial
processes, procedures, and proceedings of the tribunals which were created by the Japanese Military
Administration and functioned under the Vargas Philippine Executive Commission of the Laurel Republic of the
Philippines, deriving their authority from the Emperor, the absolute ruler of Japan, the invading enemy, and not from
the Filipino people in whom, according to the Constitution, sovereignty resides, and from whom all powers of
government emanate.

The position of Honorable Asenio P. Dizon, the respondent judge of the Court of the First Instance of Manila in
declaring himself without jurisdiction nor authority to continue the proceedings which provoked the present
controversy, being a judicial process of a Japanese sponsored government, is absolutely correct, under the legal
doctrines established by the United States and the Philippine Government, and consistently, invariably, and without
exception, followed by the same.
If we accept, for the sake of argument, the false hypothesis that the Commonwealth tribunals have jurisdiction to
continue the judicial processes left pending by the courts of the governments established under the Japanese
regime, the courts which disappeared and, automatically, ceased to function with the ouster of the enemy, the
position of the Judge Dizon, in declining to continue the case, is still unassailable, because, for all legal purposes, it
is the same as if the judicial processes in said case were not taken at all, as inevitable result of the sweeping and
absolute annulment declared by the General MacArthur in the October Proclamation.

In said proclamation it is declared in unmistakable and definite terms that "ALL PROCESSES" of the Japanese
sponsored governments "ARE NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT", and they shall remain so until
the Commonwealth, through its legislative power, decides otherwise in a proper validating act.

The fact that the Japanese invaders, under international law, were in duty bound to establish courts of justice during
the occupation, although they made them completely powerless to safeguard the constitutional rights of the citizens,
and mere figureheads as regards the fundamental liberties of the helpless men, women and children of our people,
so much so that said courts could not offer even the semblance of protection when the life, the liberty, the honor and
dignity of our individual citizens were wantonly trampled by any Japanese, military or civilian, does not change the
situation. "ALL PROCESSES" of said court are declared "NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT" in the
October proclamation, and we do not have any other alternative but to accept the law, as said proclamation has the
full force of a law.

The fact that in the past, the legitimate governments, once restored in their own territory, condescended in many
cases to recognize and to give effect to judgments rendered by courts under the governments set up by an invading
military occupant or by a rebel army, does not elevate such condescension to the category of a principle, when
Wheaton declares that no international wrong is done if the acts of the invader are reversed.

Many irrelevant authorities were cited to us as to the duties imposed by the international law on military occupants,
but no authority has been cited to the effect that the representative of the restored legitimate government is a bound
to recognize and accept as valid the acts and processes of said occupants. On the contrary, Wheaton says that if
the occupant's acts are reversed "no international wrong would be committed."

Following the authority of Wheaton, undisputed by the majority, General MacArthur thought, as the wisest course, of
declaring "NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT," by official proclamation, "ALL PROCESSES" under the
Japanese regime, that is legislative, executive and judicial processes, which fall under the absolute adjective "ALL".

That declaration is a law. It is a law that everybody bound to accept and respect, as all laws must be accepted and
respected. It is a law that the tribunals are duty bound to give effect and apply.

We are not unmindful of the adverse consequences to some individuals of the annullment of all the judicial
processes under the Japanese regime, as provided in the October Proclamation, but the tribunals are not guardians
of the legislative authorities, either an army commander in chief, during war, or a normal legislature, in peace time.
The tribunals are not called upon to guide the legislative authorities to the wisdom of the laws to be enacted. That is
the legislative responsibility. Our duty and our responsibility is to see to it that the law, once enacted, be applied and
complied with.

No matter the consequences, no matter who might be adversely affected, a judge must have the firm resolve and
the courage to do his duty, as, in the present case, Judge Dizon did, without fear nor favor. We cannot see any
reason why we should not uphold him in his stand in upholding the law.

It is our official duty, national and international duty. Yes. Because this Supreme Court is sitting, not only as a
national court, but as an international court, as is correctly stated in the concurring opinion of Justice De Joya, and
we should feel the full weight of the corresponding responsibility, as the American courts with admiralty jurisdiction
and the Prize Courts of England did feel. In fact, it is in the judiciary where, more than in any point of view is more
pressing, more imperative, more unavoidable. Justice has no country. It is of all countries. The horizon of justice
cannot be limited by the scene where our tribunals are functioning and moving. That horizon is boundless. That is
why in our constitution the bill of rights has been written not for Filipinos, but for all persons. They are rights that
belong to men, not as Filipinos, Americans, Russians, Chinese or Malayan, but as a members of humanity. The
international character of our duty to administer justice has become more specific by the membership of our country
in the United Nations. And let us not forget, as an elemental thing, that our primary duty is to uphold and apply the
law, as it is; that we must not replace the words of the law with what we might be inclined to surmise; that what is
clearly and definitely provided should not be substituted with conjectures and suppositions; that we should not try to
deduce a contrary intention to that which is unequivocally stated in the law; that we should not hold valid what is
conclusively declared null and void.

The October Proclamation declared "ALL PROCESSES" under the Japanese regime "AND VOID WITHOUT
EFFECT", so they must stand. There is no possible way of evasion. "ALL PROCESSES", in view of the meaning of
the absolute adjective "ALL", include "JUDICIAL PROCESSES". Allegatio contra factum non est admittenda.
 CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons we conclude:

1. That General MacArthur had full legal authority to issue the October Proclamation, and that no principle of the
international law is violated by said proclamation, no international wrong being committed by the reversal by the
legitimate government of the acts of the military invader.

2. That said proclamation was issued in full conformity with the official policies to which the United States and
Philippine Governments were committed, and the annulment of all the facts of the governments under the Japanese
regime, legislative, executive, and judicial, is legal, and justified by the wrongs committed by the Japanese.

3. That when General MacArthur proclaimed and declared in the October Proclamation "That all laws, regulations
and processes" of the Japanese sponsored governments, during enemy occupation, "are null and void and without
effect", he meant exactly what he said.

4. That where General MacArthur said "all processes" we must read and understand precisely and exactly "all
processes", and not "some processes". "All" and "some" have incompatible meanings and are not interchangeable.

5. That the word "processes" includes judicial procedures, proceedings, processes, and cases. Therefore, "all
processes" must include "all judicial processes.".

6. That we have no right to attribute General MacArthur an intention different from what he has plainly, clearly,
unmistakably expressed in unambiguous words with familiar meaning generally understood by the common man.

7. That the judicial proceedings here in question are included among those adversely affected by the October
Proclamation.

8. That the Commonwealth tribunals have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of nor to continue the judicial
proceedings under the Japanese regime.

9. That to exercise said jurisdiction an enabling act of the Congress is necessary.

10. That respondent Judge Dizon did not commit the error complained of in the petition, and that the petition has no
merits at all.

We refuse to follow the course of action taken by the majority in the present case. It is a course based on a
mistaken conception of the principles of international law and their interpretation and application, and on a
pinchbeck. It is a course based on misconstruction or misunderstanding of the October Proclamation, in utter
disregard of the most elemental principles of legal here meneutics. It is a course that leads to nowhere, except to
the brink of disaster, because it is following the dangerous path of ignoring or disobeying the law.

Let us not allow ourselves to be deceived. The issue confronting us is not of passing importance. It is an issue of
awesome magnitude and transcendency. It goes to and reaches the very bottom. It is simple. Lacking in
complexities. But it may shake the very foundation of society, the cornerstone of the state, the primary pillar of the
nation. It may dry the very foundation of social life, the source of vitalizing sap that nurtures the body politic. The
issue is between the validity of one or more Japanese regime processes and the sanctity of the law.

That is the question, reduced to its ultimate terms. it is a simple dilemma that is facing us. It is the alpha and the
omega of the whole issue. Either the processes, or the law. We have to select between two, which to uphold. It is a
dilemma that does not admit of middle terms, or of middle ways where we can loiter with happy unconcern . We are
in the cross road: which way shall we follow? The processes and the law are placed in the opposite ends of the
balance. Shall we inclined the balance of justice to uphold the processes and defeat law, or vice versa?

We feel jittery because some judicial processes might be rescinded or annulled, but we do not tremble with sincere
alarm at the thought of putting the law under the axe, of sentencing law to be executed by the guillotine. We feel
uneasy, fancying chaos and paralyzation of social life, because some litigants in cases during the Japanese regime
will be affected in their private interests, with the annulment of some judicial processes, but we adopt an attitude of
complete nonchalance in throwing law overboard. This baffling attitude is a judicial puzzle that nobody will
understand. So it is better that we should shift to a more understandable way, that which is conformable to the
standard that the world expects in judicial action.

No amount of arguments and lucubration's, no amount of speculative gymnastics, no amount of juggling of

immaterial principles of international law, no amount of presumptions and suppositions, surmises and conjectures,
no amount of dexterity in juridical exegesis can divert our attention from the real, simple, looming, hypostasis of the
issue before us: Law. It is Law with all its majestic grandeur which we are defying and intending to overthrow from
the sacred pedestal where the ages had placed her as a goddess, to be enshrined, obeyed, and venerated by men,
forever. Let us not dare to lay our profaning hands on her vestal virginity, lest the oracle should fling at us the
thunder of his prophetic anathema.
We cannot therefore vote except for the denial of the petition.

HILADO, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion of the majority and, pursuant to the Constitution, proceed to state the reason for my
dissent.

The proceeding involved in the case at bar were commenced by a complaint filed by the instant petitioner, as
plaintiff, on November 18, 1944, in civil case No. 3012 of the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila, the
complaint bearing this heading and title: "The Republic of the Philippines In the Court of First Instance of Manila"
(Annex X of Exhibit A of petition for mandamus). The farthest that said proceedings had gone before the record was
burned or destroyed during the battle for Manila, was the filing by counsel for plaintiff therein of their opposition to a
motion for dismissal filed by opposing counsel.

It is, therefore, plain that the case had not been heard on the merits when the record was burned or destroyed.

The respondent judge, in his order dated June 6, 1945, disposing of the petition dated May 25, 1945 filed by
petitioner, as a plaintiff in said case, and of the petition filed by respondent Eusebio Valdez Tan Keh, as defendant
therein, on May 31, 19045, held: " first, that by virtue of the proclamation of General MacArthur quoted above, all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth became
null and void and without legal effect in Manila on February 3, 1945 or, at the lates, on February 27 of the same
year; second that the proceedings and processes had in the present case having been before a court of the
Republic of the Philippines and in accordance with the laws and regulations of said Republic, the same are now void
and without legal effect; third, that this Court as one of the different courts of general jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, has no authority to take cognizance of and continue said proceedings to final
judgement, until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in the manner and form
provided by law, shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of
the Philippines, and the causes commenced and left pending therein, to the courts created and organized by virtue
of the provisions of Act No. 4007, as revived by Executive Order No. 36, or for the validation of all proceedings had
in said courts."

Petitioner prays that this Court declare that the respondent judge should not have ordered the suspension of the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 and should continue and dispose of all the incidents in said case till its complete
termination. In my opinion, the petition should denied.

In stating the reasons for this dissent, we may divide the arguments under the following propositions:

1. The proceedings in said civil case No. 3012 are null and void under General of the Army MacArthur's
proclamation of October 23, 1944 (41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148);

2. (a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Executive Commission "and later as the Republic of the
Philippines", established here by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces or by his order was not
a de-facto government the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila was not a de facto court, and the judge who
presided it was not a de facto judge; (b) the rules of International Law regarding the establishment of a de
factoGovernment in territory belonging to a belligerent but occupied or controlled by an opposing belligerent are
inapplicable to the governments thus established here by Japan;

3. The courts of those governments were entirely different from our Commonwealth courts before and after the
Japanese occupation;

4. The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government, as now restored, is to be bound by the acts
of either or both of those Japanese-sponsored governments;

5. Even consideration of policy of practical convenience militate against petitioner's contention.

The proceedings in said civil case No. 3012 are null and void under General of the Army MacArthur's
proclamation of October 23, 1944 (41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148).

In this proclamation, after reciting certain now historic facts, among which was that the so-called government styled
as the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943 "under enemy duress, . . . based upon
neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States," the great
Commander-in-Chief proclaimed and declared:
 xxx xxx xxx

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control; and

xxx xxx xxx

I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted
government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

The evident meaning and effect of the 3rd paragraph above quoted is, I think, that as the different areas of the
Philippines were progressively liberated, the declaration of nullity therein contained shall attach to the laws,
regulations and processes thus condemned in so far as said areas were concerned. Mark that the proclamation did
not provide that such laws, regulations and processes shall be or are annulled, but that they are null and void.
Annulment implies some degree of the effectiveness in the act annulled previous to the annulment, but a declaration
of nullity denotes that the act is null and void ab initio the nullity precedes the declaration. The proclamation
speaks in the present tense, not in the future. If so, the fact that the declaration of nullity as to the condemned laws,
regulations, and processes in areas not yet free from enemy occupation and control upon the date of the
proclamation, would attach thereto at a later date, is no argument for giving them validity or effectiveness in
the interregnum. By the very terms of the proclamation itself, that nullity had to date back from the inception of such
laws, regulations and processes; and to dispel any shadow of doubt which may still remain, we need only consider
the concluding paragraph of the proclamation wherein the Commander in Chief of the army liberation solemnly
enjoined upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted government. This
is all-inclusive it comprises not only the loyal citizens in the liberated areas but also those in areas still under
enemy occupation and control. It will be noticed that the complaint in said civil case No. 3012 was filed twenty-six
days after the above-quoted proclamations of General of the Army MacArthur. If the parties to said case were to
consider the proceedings therein up to the date of the liberation of Manila valid and binding, they would hardly be
complying with the severe injunction to render full respect for and obedience to our Constitution and the laws,
regulations and other acts of our duly constituted government from October 23, 1944, onwards. Indeed, to my mind,
in choosing between these two courses of action, they would be dangerously standing on the dividing line between
loyalty and disloyalty to this country and its government.

The proceeding in question, having been had before the liberation of Manila, were unquestionably "processes" of
the Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines within the meaning of the aforesaid proclamation of General
of the Army MacArthur and, consequently, fall within the condemnation of the proclamation. Being processes of a
branch of a government which had been established in the hostility to the Commonwealth Government, as well as
the United States Government, they could not very well be considered by the parties to be valid and binding, at least
after October 23, 1944, without said parties incurring in disobedience and contempt of the proclamation which
enjoins them to render full respect for the obedience to our Constitution and the laws, regulations and other acts of
our duly constituted government. Nine days after the inauguration of the so-called "Republic of the Philippines,"
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States declared in one of his most memorable pronouncements
about the activities of the enemy in the Philippines, as follows:

One of the fourtheenth of this month, a puppet government was set up in the Philippine Island with Jose P.
Laurel, formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, as "president." Jorge Vargas, formerly as a
member of the Commonwealth Cabinet, and Benigno Aquino, also formerly a member of that cabinet, were
closely associated with Laurel in this movement. The first act of the new puppet regime was to sign a military
alliance with Japan. The second act was a hyphocritical appeal for American sympathy which was made in
fraud and deceit, and was designed to confuse and mislead the Filipino people.

I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" nor the
present "Philippine Republic " has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United States. . . .

Our symphaty goes out to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth that great
majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy.

October 23, 1943.

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

President of the United States

(Form U.S. Naval War College International Law Documents, 1943, pp. 93, 94.).

It is a fact of contemporary history that while President Manuel L. Quezon of the Philippines was in Washington,
D.C., with his exiled government, he also repeatedly condemned both the "Philippine Executive Commission" and
the "Philippine Republic," as they had been established by or under orders of the Commander in Chief of the
Imperial Japanese Forces. With these two heads of the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth
of the Philippines condemning the "puppet regime" from its very inception, it is beyond my comprehension to see
how the proceedings in question could be considered valid and binding without adopting an attitude incompatible
with theirs. As President Roosevelt said in his above quoted message, "Our symphaty goes out to those remain
loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth that great majority of the Filipino people who have not been
deceived by the promises of the enemy.

The most that I can concede is that while the Japanese Army of occupation was in control in the Islands and their
paramount military strength gave those of our people who were within their reach no other alternative, these had to
obey their orders and decrees, but the only reason for such obedience would be that paramount military strength
and not any intrinsic legal validity in the enemy's orders and decrees. And once that paramount military strength
disappeared, the reason for the obedience vanished, and obedience should likewise cease.

As was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Williams vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176; 24 Law.
ed., 719), "In the face of an overwhelming force, obedience in such matters may often be a necessity and, in the
interest of order, a duty. No concession is thus made to the rightfulness of the authority exercised." (Emphasis ours.)
The court there refers to its own former decision in Thorington vs. Smith, and makes it clear that the doctrine in the
Thorington case, so far as the effects of the acts of the provisional government maintained by the British in
Casetine, from September, 1814 to the Treaty of Peace in 1815, and the consideration of Tampico as United States
territory, were concerned, was limited to the period during which the British, in the first case, retained possession of
Castine, and the United States, in the second, retained possession of Tampico. In referring to the Confederate
Government during the Civil War, as mentioned in the Thorington case, the court again says in effect that the actual
supremacy of the Confederate Government over a portion of the territory of the Union was the only reason for
holding that its inhabitants could not but obey its authority. But the court was careful to limit this to the time when
that actual supremacy existed, when it said: . . . individual resistance to its authority then would have been futile
and, therefore, unjustifiable." (Emphasis ours.)

Because of its pertinence, we beg leave to quote the following paragraph from that leading decision:

There is nothing in the language used in Thorington vs. Smith (supra), which conflicts with these views. In
that case, the Confederate Government is characterized as one of paramount force, and classed among the
governments of which the one maintained by great Britain in Castine, from September 1814, to the Treaty of
Peace in 1815, and the one maintained by the United States in Tampico, during our War with Mexico, are
examples. Whilst the British retained possession of Castine, the inhabitants were held to be subject to such
laws as the British Government chose to recognize and impose. Whilst the United
States retained possession of Tampico, it was held that it must regarded and respected as their territory.
The Confederate Government, the court observed, differed from these temporary governments in the
circumstance that its authority did not justifying acts of hostility to the United States, "Made obedience to its
authority in civil and local matters not only a necessity, but a duty." All that was meant by this language was,
that as the actual supremancy of the Confederate Government existed over certain territory, individual
resistance to its authority then would have been futile and, therefore, unjustifiable. In the face of an
overwhelming force, obedience in such matters may often be a necessity and, in the interest of order, a
duty. No concession is thus made to the rightfulness of the authority exercised. (Williams vs. Bruffy, 24 Law
ed., 719; emphasis ours.)

The majority opinion, in considering valid the proceedings in question, invokes the rule that when a belligerent army
occupies a territory belonging to the enemy, the former through its Commander in Chief, has the power to establish
thereon what the decisions and treaties have variously denominated provisional or military government, and the
majority holds that the Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines was such a government. Without
prejudice to later discussing the effects which the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy contained
in our Commonwealth Constitution, as well as in the Briand-Kellog Pact, must have produced in this rule in so far as
the Philippines is concerned, let us set forth some considerations apropos of this conclusion of the majority. If the
power to establish here such a provisional government is recognized in the Commander in Chief of the invasion
army, why should we not recognize at least an equal power in the Commander in Chief of the liberation army to
overthrow that government will all of its acts, at least of those of an executory nature upon the time of liberation?
Considering the theory maintained by the majority, it would seem that they would recognize in the Japanese
Commander in Chief the power to overthrow the Commonwealth Government, and all of its acts and institutions if he
had choosen to. Why should at least an equal power be denied the Commander in Chief of the United States Army
to overthrow the substitute government thus erected by the enemy with all of its acts and institutions which are still
not beyond retrieve? Hereafter we shall have occasion to discuss the aspects of this question from the point of view
of policy or the practical convenience of the inhabitants. If the Japanese Commander in Chief represented
sovereignty of Japan, the American Commander in Chief represented the sovereignty of the United States, as well
as the Government of the Commonwealth. If Japan had won this war, her paramount military supremacy would have
continued to be exerted upon the Filipino people, and out of sheer physical compulsion this country would have had
to bow to the continuance of the puppet regime that she had set up here for an indefinite time. In such a case, we
admit that, not because the acts of that government would then have intrinsically been legal and valid, but simply
because of the paramount military force to which our people would then have continued to be subjected, they would
have had to recognize as binding and obligatory the acts of the different departments of that government. But
fortunately for the Filipinos and for the entire civilized world, Japan was defeated. And I now ask: Now that Japan
has been defeated, why should the Filipinos be still bound to respect or recognize validity in the acts of the
Japanese-sponsored government which has been so severely condemned by both the heads of the United States
and our Commonwealth Government throughout the duration of the war? If we were to draw a parallel between that
government and that which was established by the Confederate States during the American Civil War, we will find
that both met with ultimate failure. And, in my opinion, the conclusion to be drawn should be the same in both cases.

As held by the United States Supreme Court in Williams vs. Bruffy (supra), referring to the Confederate
Government, its failure carried with it the dissipation of its pretentions and the breaking down in pieces of the whole
fabric of its government. The Court said among other things:

The immense power exercised by the government of the Confederate States for nearly four years, the
territory over which it extended, the vast resources it wielded, and the millions who acknowledged its
authority, present an imposing spectacle well fitted to mislead the mind in considering the legal character of
that organization. It claimed to represent an independent nation and to posses sovereign powers; as such to
displace to jurisdiction and authority of the United States from nearly half of their territory and, instead of
their laws, to substitute and enforce those of its own enactment. Its pretentions being resisted, they were
submitted to the arbitrament of war. In that contest the Confederacy failed; and in its failure its pretentions
were dissipated, its armies scattered, and the whole fabric of its government broken in pieces. (24 Law, ed.,
719; emphasis ours.)

By analogy, if the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines had been lawful which, however, is not
the case and if Japan had succeeded in permanently maintaining the government that she established in the
Philippines, which would have been the case had victory been hers, there would be more reason for holding the acts
of that government valid, but because Japan has lost the war and, therefore, failed in giving permanence to that
government, the contrary conclusion should legitimately follow.

The validity of legislation exercised by either contestant "depends not upon the existence of hostilities but upon
the ultimate success of the party which it is adopted" (emphasis ours). And, referring to the overthrow of the of the
Confederacy, the Court, said, "when its military forces were overthrown, it utterly perished, and with it all its
enactments" (emphasis ours)

The majority cite on page 9-10 of their opinion a passage from the same case of Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, which is
a mere obiter dictum. The majority opinion says that in this passage the Court was "discussing the validity of the
acts of the Confederate States." In the first place, an examination of the decision will reveal that the controversy
dealt with an act of the Confederate Government, not of the Confederate States individually; and in the second
place, the quoted passage refers to something which was not in issue in the case, namely, the acts of the individual
States composing the Confederacy. But even this passage clearly places the case at bar apart from the Court's
pronouncement therein. The quoted passage commences by stating that "The same general form of government
the same general laws for the administration of justice and the protection of private rights, which has existed in the
States prior to the rebellion, remanded during (its) continuance and afterwards. "In the case at bar, the same
general form of the Commonwealth Government did not continue under the Japanese, for the simple reason that
one of the first acts of the invaders was to overthrow the Commonwealth Constitution and, therefore, the
constitutional government which existed thereunder, as an effect of the following acts and decrees of the
Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces:

1. Order No. 3, dated February 20, 1942 of the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces to the
Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission directed that, in the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial
powers in the Philippines, the "activities" of the "administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be
based upon the existing status, order, ordinances and the Commonwealth Constitution (1 Official Journal of the
Japanese Military Administration, page 34). Under the frame of government existing in this Commonwealth upon the
date of the Japanese invasion, the Constitution was the very fountain-head of the validity and effects of all the
"status, orders, and ordinances" mentioned by the Japanese Commander in Chief, and in overthrowing the
Constitution he, in effect, overthrew all of them.

2. Instruction No. 6 of the Japanese Military Administration (Vol. 1, usages 36 et seq., Official Gazette, edited at the
Office of the Executive Commission) gave the "Detailed Instruction Based on Guiding Principle of the
Administration," and among other things required "The entire personnel shall be required to pledge their loyalty to
the Imperial Japanese Forces. . . ." (This, of course, was repugnant to the frame of government existing here under
the Commonwealth Constitution upon the date of invasion.)

3. Proclamation dated January 3, 19452 of the Japanese Commander in Chief provided in paragraph 3 that "The
Authorities and the People of the Commonwealth should sever their relations with the U.S. o . . ." (This is, likewise,
repugnant to the Commonwealth Constitution and the to the Government of that Commonwealth Constitution and to
the Government of that Commonwealth which was expressly made subject to the supreme sovereignty of the United
States until complete independence is granted, not by the mere will of the United States, but by virtue of an
agreement between that Government and ours, under the Tydings-McDuffie Act.)

The individual States of the Confederate and their governments existed prior to the Civil War and had received the
sanction and recognition of the Union Government, for which the Federal Supreme Court was speaking in the
Williams-Bruffy case; while the Japanese-sponsored governments of the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the
Republic of the Philippines" neither existed here before the war nor had received the recognition or sanction of
either the United States or the Commonwealth Government nay, they had received the most vigorous
condemnation of both.

The Court further says in Williams vs. Bruffy (supra):

No case has been cited in argument, and we think unsuccesfully attempting to establish a separate
revolutionary government have been sustained as a matter of legal right. As justly observed by the late Chief
Justice in the case of Shortridge vs. Macon, I Abb. U.S., 58, decided at the circuit, and, in all material
respects like the one at bar, "Those who engage in rebellion must consider the consequences. If
they succeed, rebellion becomes revolution, and the new government will justify is founders. If they fail, all
their acts hostile to the rightful government are violations of law, and originate no rights which can be
recognized by the courts of the nation whose authority and existence have been alike assailed. S.C., Chase,
Dec., 136. (Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed., 716, 718.) (Emphasis ours.)

I am of opinion that the principles thus enunciated for the case of an unsuccessful rebellion should be applied with
greater force to the case of a belligerent who loss the war. And since the founding of the Japanese-sponsored
government in the Philippines was designed to supplant and did actually supplant the rightful government and since
all its acts could not but a hostile to the latter (however blameless the officials who acted under enemy duress might
be), and since Japan failed, all said acts, particularly those of the Japanese-sponsored court in said civil case No.
3012, "are violations of law, and originate no rights which can be recognized by the courts of the nation whose
authority and existence have been alike assailed", quoting the language of the court in Shortridge vs. Macon, cited
by Mr. Justice Field in Williams vs. Bruffy, supra (24 Law. ed., 718).

II

(a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Executive Commission" and later as the Republic of the
Philippines", established here by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces or by the his
order was not a de facto government--the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila was not a de facto court
and the who presided it was not a de facto judge;

(b) The rules of International Law regarding the establishment of a de facto government in territory belonging
to a belligerent but occupied or controlled by an opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the governments
thus established here by Japan.

Under the doctrine of Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, and the pertinent cases therein cited, the short-lived provisional
government thus established by the Japanese in the Philippines should be classified, at best, as a government of
paramount force. But this is not all. The Constitution of this Commonwealth which has been expressly approved by
the United States Government, in Article II, section 3, under the heading "Declaration of Principles", renounces war
as an instrument of national policy. This renunciation of war as an instruments of national policy follows an equal
renunciation in the Briand-Kellog Pact. The rules of International Law , cited in support of the power or right of a
belligerent army of occupation to set up a provisional government on occupied enemy territory, were evolved prior to
the first World War, but the horrors and devastations of that war convinced, at least the governments of the United
States and France, that they should thereafter renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and they
consequently subscribed the Briand-Kellog Pact. Those horrors and devastations were increased a hundred fold, if
not more, in this second World War, but even before this war occurred, our own people, through our Constitutional
delegates, who framed the Commonwealth Constitution also adopted the same doctrine, and embodied an express
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy in the instrument that they drafted. It is true that in section 3,
Article II, above-cited, our Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as a part of the
law of the Nation. But, of course, this adoption is exclusive of those principles of International Law which might
involve recognition of war as an instrument of national policy. It is plain that on the side of the Allies, the present war
is purely defensive. When Japan started said war, treacherously and without previous declaration, and attacked
Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on those two fateful days of December 7 and 8, 1941, she employed war as an
instrument of the national policy. Under the Briand-Kellog Pact and our Commonwealth Constitution, the United
States and the Commonwealth Government could not possibly have recognized in Japan any right, as against them,
to employ that war as an instrument of her national policy, and, consequently, they could not have recognized in
Japan power to set up in the Philippines the puppet government that she later set up, because such power would be
a mere incident or consequence of the war itself. The authorities agree that such a power, under the cited rules, is
said to a right derived from war. (67 C.J., p. 421, sec. 171.) There can be no question that the United States and the
Commonwealth Governments were free to refuse to be bound by those rules when they made their respective
renunciations above referred to. Indeed, all the United Nations have exercised this free right in their Charter recently
signed at San Francisco.

As necessary consequence of this, those rules of International Law were no longer applicable to the Philippines and
to the United States at the time of the Japanese invasion as a corollary, it follows that we have no legal foundation
on which to base the proposition that the acts of that Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines were valid
and binding. Moreover, I am of opinion, that although at the time of the Japanese invasion and up to the present, the
United States retains over the Philippines, a certain measure of sovereignty, it is only for certain specified purposes
enumerated in the Tydings-McDufie Act of the Commonwealth Constitution. (Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.) And our territory was at the time of the Japanese invasion not a territory of the United States, within
the meaning of the laws of war governing war-like operations on enemy territory. Our territory is significantly called
"The National Territory" in Article I of our Constitution and this bears the stamps of express approval of the United
States Government. The Philippines has been recognized and admitted as a member of the United Nations. We,
therefore, had our own national and territorial identity previous to that invasion. Our nation was not at war with the
Filipinos. And line with this, the Japanese army, in time, released Filipino war prisoners captured in Bataan. Lt. Gen.
Maeda, Chief of Staff, Imperial Japanese Forces, in his speech of January 2, 1942, said:

. . . we had not the slighest intensions to make your people our enemy; rather we considered them as our
friends who will join us has hand-in-hand in the establishment of an orderly Greater East Asia. . . ., (Official
Gazette, edited at the Office of the Executive Commission, Vol. I, p. 55.)

If the Philippines was a neutral territory when invaded by the Japanese, the following principles from Lawrence,
International Law (7th ed.), p. 603, are pertinent:

The Duties of Belligerent States Towards Neutral States. . . . To refrain from carrying on hostilities within
neutral territory. We have already seen that, though this obligation was recognized in theory during the
infancy of International law, it was often very imperfectly observed in practice. But in modern times it has
been strickly enforced, and any State which knowingly ordered warlike operations to be carried on in neutral
territory . . . would bring down upon itself the reprobation of civilized mankind. Hostilities may be carried on
in the territory of either belligerent, on the high seas, and in territory belonging to no one. Neutral land and
neutral territorial waters are sacred. No acts of warfare may lawfully take place within them. . . . (Emphasis
ours.)

In all the cases and authorities supporting the power or right to set up a provisional government, the belligerent had
the right to invade or occupy the territory in the first instance. Such was not the case with the Philippines. President
Roosevelt, in his message to the Filipino people, soon after the landing of American Forces in Leyte, on October 20,
1944, characterized Japan's invasion and occupation of the Philippines as "the barbarous, unprovoked and
treacherous attack upon the Philippines," and he announced the American people's "firm determination to punish
the guilty." (41 Off. Gaz., 149.) (Emphasis ours.) The illustrious leader of the United Nations could not have in more
unmistakable terms the utter illegality of that invasion and occupation. If the establishment of a provinsional
government in occupied territory by a belligerent is "a mere application or extension of the force by which the
invasion or occupation was effected" (67 C.J., p. 421, sec 171), the illegality of the invasion, would necessarily
permeate the government, which was its mere application or extention.

The fact that shortly before December 8, 1941, the date of the "barbarous, unprovoked and treacherous attack," the
meager and almost untrained forces of the Philippine Army had been inducted into the American Army, did not
change the neutral status of the Philippines. That military measure had been adopted for purely defensive purposes.
Nothing could be farther from the minds of the government and military leaders of the United States and the
Philippines in adopting it than to embark upon any aggressive or warlike enterprise against any other nation. It is an
old and honored rule dating as far back as the 18th century that even solemn promises of assistance made before
the war by a neutral to a nation which later becomes a belligerent, would not change the status of the neutral even if
such promises were carried out, so long as they were made for purely defensive purposes. In the words of Vattel
"when a sovereign furnishes the succor due in virtue of a former defensive alliance, he does not associate himself in
the war. Therefore he may fulfill his engagements and yet preserve an exact neutrality." (Lawrence, Principles of
International Law [7th ed.], pp. 585, 586.)

If the Filipinos had, from contemptible cowardice and fear, allowed their shores to be invaded, and their territory
occupied by the Japanese without resistance, such invasion occupation would undoubtedly have been considered in
violation of International Law. Should the Filipinos be punished for having had the patriotism, bravery, and heroism
to fight in defense of the sacredness of their land, the sanctity of their homes, and the honor and dignity of their
government by giving validity, in whatever limited measure, to the lawless acts of the ruthless enemy who thus
overran their country, and robbed them of the tranquility and happiness of their daily lives? And yet, to my mind, to
give any measure of validity or binding effect to the proceedings of the Japanese-sponsored Court of First Instance
of Manila, involved herein, would be to give that much validity or effect to the acts of those same invaders. To
equalize the consequences of a lawful and a wrongful invasion of occupation, would be to equalize right and wrong,
uphold the creed that might makes right, and adopt "the law of the jungle."

If said Japanese-sponsored government was not a de facto government, it would seem clearly to follow that its
"Court of First Instance of Manila" was not a de facto court. But it should additionally be stated that for it be a de
facto court, its judge had to be a de facto judge, which he could not be, as presently demonstrated.

As said by President Osmea, in replying to the speech of General of the Army MacArthur when the latter turned
over to him the full powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government, on February 27, 1945:

xxx xxx xxx

The time has come when the world should know that when our forces surrendered in Bataan and
Corregidor, resistance to the enemy was taken up by the people itself resistance which was inarticulate
and disorganized in its inception but which grew from the day to day and from island until it broke out into an
open warfare against the enemy.
 The fight against the enemy was truly a people's war because it counted with the wholehearted support of
the masses. From the humble peasant to the barrio school teacher, from the volunteer guard to the women's
auxilliary service units, from the loyal local official to the barrio folk each and every one of those
contributed his share in the great crusade for liberation.

The guerrillas knew that without the support of the civilian population, they could not survive. Whole town
and villages dared enemy reprisal to oppose the hated invader openly or give assistance to the underground
movement. . . . (41 Off. Gaz., 88, 89.)

Under these facts, taken together with the General of the Army MacArthur's accurate statement that the "Republic of
the Philippines" had been established under enemy duress, it must be presumed to say the least that the
judge who presided over the proceedings in question during the Japanese occupation, firstly, accepted his
appointment under duress; and secondly, acted by virtue of that appointment under the same duress. In such
circumstances he could not have acted in the bona fide belief that the new "courts" created by or under the orders of
the Japanese Military Commander in chief had been legally created--among them the "Court of first Instance of
Manila," that the Chairman of the "Philippine Executive Commission" or the President of the "Republic of the
Philippines", whoever appointed him, and conferred upon him a valid title to his office and a legitimate jurisdiction to
act as such judge. Good faith is essential for the existence of a de facto judge (Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil., 866,
872). The very idea of enemy duress would necessarily imply that but for the duress exerted upon him by the enemy
he would have refused to accept the appointment and to act thereunder. And why? Because he must be presumed
to know that the office to which he was thus appointed had been created by the enemy in open defiance of the
Commonwealth Constitution and the laws and regulation promulgated by our Commonwealth Government, and that
his acceptance of said office and his acting therein, if willfully done, would have been no less than an open hostility
to the very sovereignty of the United Sates and to the Commonwealth Government, and a renunciation of his
allegiance to both. There is no middle ground here. Either the judge acted purely under duress, in which case his
acts would be null and void; or maliciously in defiance of said governments, in which case his acts would be null and
void for more serious reasons.

The courts created here by the Japanese government had to look for the source of their supposed authority to the
orders of the Japanese Military Commander in chief and the so-called Constitution of the "Republic of the
Philippines," which had been adopted in a manner which would shock the conscience of democratic peoples, and
which was designed to supplant the Constitution which had been duly adopted by the Filipino people in a
Constitutional Convention of their duly elected Constitutional Delegates. And it was decreed that the Commander in
chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces "shall exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts." (Vol. 1, p. 7, Official Journal of
the Japanese Military Administration, cited on pp. 2, 3, of the order of the respondent judge complained of and
marked Exhibit H of the petition for mandamus.) How can our present courts legitimately recognize any efficacy in
the proceedings of such an exotic judicial system, wherein the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces
possessed the highest judicial jurisdiction?

III

The courts of those governments were entirely different from our Commonwealth courts before and after the
Japanese occupation.

Executive Order No. 36 of the President of the Philippines, dated March 10, 1945, in its very first paragraph, states
the prime concern of the government "to re-establish the courts as fast as provinces are liberated from the Japanese
occupation." If the courts under the Japanese-sponsored government of the "Republic of the Philippines" were the
same Commonwealth courts that existed here under the Constitution at the time of the Japanese invasion,
President Osmea would not be speaking of re-establishing those courts in his aforesaid Executive Order. For
soothe, how could those courts under the "Republic of the Philippines" be the courts of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines when they were not functioning under the Constitution of the Commonwealth and the laws enacted in
pursuance of said Constitution? The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth courts was defined and conferred under the
Commonwealth Constitution and the pertinent legislation enacted thereunder, that of the Japanese-sponsored
courts was defined and conferred by the orders and decrees of the Japanese Commander in Chief, and, perhaps,
the decrees of the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the laws of the so-called Legislature under the Republic,
which was not composed of the elected representatives of the people. The Justices and Judges of the
Commonwealth courts had to be appointed by the President of the Commonwealth with confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, pursuant to the Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, under the "Philippine Executive Commission" was appointed by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial
Japanese Forces, and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of
the Court of Appeals, the Judges of first Instance and of all inferior courts were appointed by the Chairman of the
Executive Commission, at first, and later, by the President of the Republic, of course, without confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments under the Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court, the President and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, and the Judges of First Instance
and of all inferior courts in the Commonwealth judicial system, had to swear to support and defend the
Commonwealth Constitution, while this was impossible under the Japanese-sponsored government. In the
Commonwealth judicial system, if a Justice or Judge should die or incapacitated to continue in the discharge of his
official duties, his successor was appointed by the Commonwealth President with confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments, and said successor had to swear to support and defend the Commonwealth Constitution; in the
exotic judicial system implanted here by the Japanese, if a Justice or Judge should die or incapacitated, his
successor would be appointed by the Japanese Commander in Chief, if the dead or incapacitated incumbent should
be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or otherwise, by the Chairman of the "Executive Commission" or the
President of the "Republic", of course without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
Commonwealth Congress, and, of course, without the successor swearing to support and defend the
Commonwealth Constitution.

If, as we believe having conclusively shown, the Japanese-sponsored courts were not the same Commonwealth
courts, the conclusion is unavoidable that any jurisdiction possessed by the former and any cases left pending
therein, were not and could not be automatically transfered to the Commonwealth courts which we re-established
under Executive Order No. 36. For the purpose, a special legislation was necessary.

Executive Order No. 37, in my humble opinion, does not, as held by the majority, imply that the President
recognized as valid the proceedings in all cases appealed to the Court of Appeals. Section 2 of that order simply
provides that all cases which have been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final decision. The adverb "duly" would indicate that the President foresaw the possibility of appeals not
having been duly taken. All cases appealed to the Court of Appeals before the war and the otherwise duly appealed,
would come under the phrase "duly appealed" in this section of the Executive Order. But considering the determined
and firm attitude of the Commonwealth Government towards those Japanese-sponsored governments since the
beginning, it would seem inconceivable that the President Osmea, in section 2 of Executive Order No. 37, intended
to include therein appeals taken to the Japanese-sponsored Court of Appeals, or from the Japanese-sponsored
inferior courts. It should be remembered that in the Executive Order immediately preceeding and issued on the
same date, the President speaks of re-establishing the courts as fast as provinces were liberated from the Japanese
occupation.

IV

The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government, as now restored, is to be bound by the
acts of either or both of those Japanese-sponsored governments.

In the last analysis, in deciding the question of validity or nullity of the proceedings involved herein, we are
confronted with the necessity to decide whether the Court of first Instance of Manila and this Supreme Court, as re-
established under the Commonwealth Constitution, and the entire Commonwealth Government, are to be bound by
the acts of the said Japanese-sponsored court and government. To propound this question is, to my mind, to
answer it most decidedly in the negative, not only upon the ground of the legal principles but also for the reasons of
national dignity and international decency. To answer the question in the affirmative would be nothing short for
legalizing the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines. Indeed, it would be virtual submission to the
dictation of an invader our people's just hatred of whom gave rise to the epic Philippine resistance movement, which
has won the admiration of the entire civilized world.

Even considerations of policy or practical convenience militate against petitioner's contention.

In this connection, the respondent judge, in his order of June 6, 1945, complained of, has the following to say:

It is contended, however, that the judicial system implanted by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic was the same as that of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation; that the laws
administered and enforced by said courts during the existence of said regime were the same laws on the
statute books of Commonwealth before Japanese occupation, and that even the judges who presided them
were, in many instances, the same persons who held the position prior to the Japanese occupation. All this
may be true, but other facts are just as stubborn and pitiless. One of them is that said courts were of a
government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, laws of
the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had become the laws and the Courts had
become the institutions-of Japan by adoption (U.S. vs. Reiter, 27 F. Case No. 16,146), as they became later
on the laws and institution of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines. No
amount of argument or legal fiction can obliterate this fact.

Besides, I am of the opinion that the validity of the acts of the courts in the "judicial system implanted by the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic "would not depend upon the laws that they "administered and
enforced", but upon the authority by virtue of which they acted. If the members of this Court were to decide the
instant case in strict accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth but not by the authority
that they possess in their official capacity as the Supreme Court of the Philippines, but merely as lawyers, their
decision would surely be null and void. And yet, I am firmly of opinion that whoever was the "judge" of the Japanese
sponsored Court of First Instance of Manila who presided over the said court when the proceedings and processes
in the dispute were had, in acting by virtue of the supposed authority which he was supposed to have received from
that government, did so with no more legal power than if he had acted as a mere lawyer applying the same laws to
the case. If duplication of work or effort, or even if confussion, should be alleged to possibly arise from a declaration
of nullity or judicial proceedings had before those Japanese-sponsored courts, it should suffice to answer that the
party so complaining in voluntarily resorting to such courts should be prepared to assume the consequences of his
voluntary act. On the other hand, his convenience should not be allowed to visit upon the majority of the inhabitants
of this country, the dire consequences of a sweeping and wholesale validation of judicial proceedings in those
courts. Let us set forth a few considerations apropos of this assertion. It is a fact of general knowledge that during
the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the overwhelming majority of our people and other resident inhabitants
were literally afraid to go any place where there were Japanese sentries, soldiers or even civilians, and that these
sentries were posted at the entrance into cities and towns and at government offices; that the feared Japanese "M.
P.'s" or Kempeitai's" were a constant terror to them; and lastly, that the greater number who lived or had evacuated
to places for from the Japanese, were found precisely in the cities and towns where the courts were located; and as
a consequence, the great majority of the people were very strongly adverse to traveling any considerable distance
from their homes and were, one might say, in constant hiding. Add to these circumstances, the fact of the practical
absence of transportation facilities and the no less important fact of the economic structure having been so
dislocated as to have impoverished the many in exchange for the enrichment of the few and we shall have a fair
picture of the practical difficulties which the ordinary litigant would in those days have encountered in defending his
rights against anyone of the favored few who would bring him to court. It should be easy to realize how hard it was
for instances, to procure the attendance of witnesses, principally because of the fact that most of them were in
hiding or, at least, afraid to enter the cities and towns, and also because of then generally difficult and abnormal
conditions prevailing. Under such conditions, cases or denial of a party's day in court expected. Such denial might
arise from many a cause. It might be party's fear to appear before the court because in doing so, he would have had
to get near the feared Japanese. It might be because he did not recognize any legal authority in that court, or it
might be his down-right repugnance of the hated enemy. And I dare say that among such people would be found
more than seventeen million Filipinos. These are but a few of countless cause. So that if some form of validation of
such judicial proceedings were to be attempted, all necessary safeguards should be provided to avoid that in any
particular case the validation should violate any litigant's constitutional right to his day in court, within the full
meaning of the phrase, or any other constitutional or statutory right of his. More people, I am afraid, would be
prejudiced than would be benefited by a wholesale validation of said proceedings.

Much concern has been shown for the possible confusion which might result from a decision declaring null and void
the acts processes of the Japanese-sponsored governments in the Philippines. I think, this aspect of the question
has been unduly stressed. The situation is not without remedy, but the remedy lies with the legislature and not with
the courts. As the courts cannot create a new or special jurisdiction for themselves, which is a legislative function,
and as the situation demands such new or special jurisdiction, let the legislature act in the premises. For instance,
the Congress may enact a law conferring a special jurisdiction upon the courts of its selection, whereby said courts
may, after hearing all the parties interested, and taking all the necessary safeguards, so that, a party's day in court
or other constitutional or statutory right under the Commonwealth Government should not be prejudiced by any of
said acts, processes or proceedings, particullarly, those in Japanese-sponsored courts, and subject to such other
conditions as the special law may provide, validate the corresponding acts, processes or proceedings. This, to my
mind, would be more conducive to a maximum of benefit and a minimum of prejudice to the inhabitants of this
country, rather than the procedure favored by the majority.

Finally, let us not equalize the conditions then prevailing in Manila to that prevailing in the provinces, where the
greater number of the people where then living outside the towns, in the farms and the hills. These people constitute
the great majority of the eighteen million Filipinos. To them the semblance of an administration of justice which
Japanese allowed, was practically unknown. But they constituted the majority of loyal citizens to whom President
Roosevelt's message of October 23, 1943 refers. They the majority of our people had an unshaken faith in the
arrival of American aid here and the final triumph of the Allied cause. They were willing to wait for the restoration of
their rightful government, with its courts and other institutions, for the settlement of their differences. May in their
common hardship and sufferings under yoke of foreign oppression, they had not much time to think of such
differences, if they did not utterly forget them. Their undoubted hatred of the invader was enough to keep them away
from the judicial system that said invader allowed to have. Those who voluntarily went to the courts in those tragic
days belong to the small minority.

As to the public order why! any public order which then existed was not due to the courts or other departments of
the puppet government. It was maintained at the point of the bayonet by the Japanese army, and in their own
unique fashion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-49188 January 30, 1990

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RICARDO D. GALANO, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XIII, JAIME K. DEL ROSARIO, Deputy Sheriff, Court of First Instance, Manila, and AMELIA TAN, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Behind the simple issue of validity of an alias writ of execution in this case is a more fundamental question. Should
the Court allow a too literal interpretation of the Rules with an open invitation to knavery to prevail over a more
discerning and just approach? Should we not apply the ancient rule of statutory construction that laws are to be
interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth?

This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 07695 entitled
"Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Hon. Judge Ricardo D. Galano, et al.", dismissing the petition for certiorari against the
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila which issued an alias writ of execution against the petitioner.

The petition involving the alias writ of execution had its beginnings on November 8, 1967, when respondent Amelia
Tan, under the name and style of Able Printing Press commenced a complaint for damages before the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 71307, entitled Amelia Tan, et al. v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 13, then presided over by the late Judge Jesus P. Morfe
rendered judgment on June 29, 1972, in favor of private respondent Amelia Tan and against petitioner Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant Philippine Air Lines:

1. On the first cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damages,
with legal interest thereon from plaintiffs extra-judicial demand made by the letter of July 20, 1967;

2. On the third cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P18,200.00, representing the
unrealized profit of 10% included in the contract price of P200,000.00 plus legal interest thereon
from July 20,1967;

3. On the fourth cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as and for moral
damages, with legal interest thereon from July 20, 1 967;

4. On the sixth cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 damages as and for
attorney's fee.

Plaintiffs second and fifth causes of action, and defendant's counterclaim, are dismissed.

With costs against the defendant. (CA Rollo, p. 18)

On July 28, 1972, the petitioner filed its appeal with the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
51079-R.

On February 3, 1977, the appellate court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, with the modification that PAL is condemned to pay plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as
damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fee, judgment is affirmed, with costs. (CA Rollo, p. 29)

Notice of judgment was sent by the Court of Appeals to the trial court and on dates subsequent thereto, a motion for
reconsideration was filed by respondent Amelia Tan, duly opposed by petitioner PAL.

On May 23,1977, the Court of Appeals rendered its resolution denying the respondent's motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.

No further appeal having been taken by the parties, the judgment became final and executory and on May 31, 1977,
judgment was correspondingly entered in the case.

The case was remanded to the trial court for execution and on September 2,1977, respondent Amelia Tan filed a
motion praying for the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. On October
11, 1977, the trial court, presided over by Judge Galano, issued its order of execution with the corresponding writ in
favor of the respondent. The writ was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes of Branch 13 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila for enforcement.

Four months later, on February 11, 1978, respondent Amelia Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution stating that the judgment rendered by the lower court, and affirmed with modification by the Court of
Appeals, remained unsatisfied.
On March 1, 1978, the petitioner filed an opposition to the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution
stating that it had already fully paid its obligation to plaintiff through the deputy sheriff of the respondent court, Emilio
Z. Reyes, as evidenced by cash vouchers properly signed and receipted by said Emilio Z. Reyes.

On March 3,1978, the Court of Appeals denied the issuance of the alias writ for being premature, ordering the
executing sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes to appear with his return and explain the reason for his failure to surrender the
amounts paid to him by petitioner PAL. However, the order could not be served upon Deputy Sheriff Reyes who had
absconded or disappeared.

On March 28, 1978, motion for the issuance of a partial alias writ of execution was filed by respondent Amelia Tan.

On April 19, 1978, respondent Amelia Tan filed a motion to withdraw "Motion for Partial Alias Writ of Execution" with
Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of Execution. On May 1, 1978, the respondent Judge issued an order which reads:

As prayed for by counsel for the plaintiff, the Motion to Withdraw 'Motion for Partial Alias Writ of Execution
with Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of Execution is hereby granted, and the motion for partial alias writ of
execution is considered withdrawn.

Let an Alias Writ of Execution issue against the defendant for the fall satisfaction of the judgment rendered.
Deputy Sheriff Jaime K. del Rosario is hereby appointed Special Sheriff for the enforcement thereof. (CA
Rollo, p. 34)

On May 18, 1978, the petitioner received a copy of the first alias writ of execution issued on the same day directing
Special Sheriff Jaime K. del Rosario to levy on execution in the sum of P25,000.00 with legal interest thereon from
July 20,1967 when respondent Amelia Tan made an extra-judicial demand through a letter. Levy was also ordered
for the further sum of P5,000.00 awarded as attorney's fees.

On May 23, 1978, the petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash the alias writ of execution stating that no return of
the writ had as yet been made by Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes and that the judgment debt had already been fully
satisfied by the petitioner as evidenced by the cash vouchers signed and receipted by the server of the writ of
execution, Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes.

On May 26,1978, the respondent Jaime K. del Rosario served a notice of garnishment on the depository bank of
petitioner, Far East Bank and Trust Company, Rosario Branch, Binondo, Manila, through its manager and garnished
the petitioner's deposit in the said bank in the total amount of P64,408.00 as of May 16, 1978. Hence, this petition
for certiorari filed by the Philippine Airlines, Inc., on the grounds that:

AN ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION CANNOT BE ISSUED WITHOUT PRIOR RETURN OF THE ORIGINAL
WRIT BY THE IMPLEMENTING OFFICER.

II

PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT TO THE IMPLEMENTING OFFICER AS DIRECTED IN THE WRIT OF

EXECUTION CONSTITUTES SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT.

III

INTEREST IS NOT PAYABLE WHEN THE DECISION IS SILENT AS TO THE PAYMENT THEREOF.

IV

SECTION 5, RULE 39, PARTICULARLY REFERS TO LEVY OF PROPERTY OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR

AND DISPOSAL OR SALE THEREOF TO SATISFY JUDGMENT.

Can an alias writ of execution be issued without a prior return of the original writ by the implementing officer?

We rule in the affirmative and we quote the respondent court's decision with approval:

The issuance of the questioned alias writ of execution under the circumstances here obtaining is justified
because even with the absence of a Sheriffs return on the original writ, the unalterable fact remains that
such a return is incapable of being obtained (sic) because the officer who is to make the said return has
absconded and cannot be brought to the Court despite the earlier order of the court for him to appear for this
purpose. (Order of Feb. 21, 1978, Annex C, Petition). Obviously, taking cognizance of this circumstance, the
order of May 11, 1978 directing the issuance of an alias writ was therefore issued. (Annex D. Petition). The
need for such a return as a condition precedent for the issuance of an alias writ was justifiably dispensed
with by the court below and its action in this regard meets with our concurrence. A contrary view will produce
 an abhorent situation whereby the mischief of an erring officer of the court could be utilized to impede
indefinitely the undisputed and awarded rights which a prevailing party rightfully deserves to obtain and with
dispatch. The final judgment in this case should not indeed be permitted to become illusory or incapable of
execution for an indefinite and over extended period, as had already transpired. (Rollo, pp. 35-36)

Judicium non debet esse illusorium; suum effectum habere debet (A judgment ought not to be illusory it ought to
have its proper effect).

Indeed, technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the execution of a judgment for execution is the fruit and end
of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law (Ipekdjian Merchandising Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 8 SCRA
59 [1963]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 697, 698 [1967]). A judgment
cannot be rendered nugatory by the unreasonable application of a strict rule of procedure. Vested rights were never
intended to rest on the requirement of a return, the office of which is merely to inform the court and the parties, of
any and all actions taken under the writ of execution. Where such information can be established in some other
manner, the absence of an executing officer's return will not preclude a judgment from being treated as discharged
or being executed through an alias writ of execution as the case may be. More so, as in the case at bar. Where the
return cannot be expected to be forthcoming, to require the same would be to compel the enforcement of rights
under a judgment to rest on an impossibility, thereby allowing the total avoidance of judgment debts. So long as a
judgment is not satisfied, a plaintiff is entitled to other writs of execution (Government of the Philippines v. Echaus
and Gonzales, 71 Phil. 318). It is a well known legal maxim that he who cannot prosecute his judgment with effect,
sues his case vainly.

More important in the determination of the propriety of the trial court's issuance of an alias writ of execution is the
issue of satisfaction of judgment.

Under the peculiar circumstances surrounding this case, did the payment made to the absconding sheriff by check
in his name operate to satisfy the judgment debt? The Court rules that the plaintiff who has won her case should not
be adjudged as having sued in vain. To decide otherwise would not only give her an empty but a pyrrhic victory.

It should be emphasized that under the initial judgment, Amelia Tan was found to have been wronged by PAL.

She filed her complaint in 1967.

After ten (10) years of protracted litigation in the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals, Ms. Tan won her
case.

It is now 1990.

Almost twenty-two (22) years later, Ms. Tan has not seen a centavo of what the courts have solemnly declared as
rightfully hers. Through absolutely no fault of her own, Ms. Tan has been deprived of what, technically, she should
have been paid from the start, before 1967, without need of her going to court to enforce her rights. And all because
PAL did not issue the checks intended for her, in her name.

Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the payment to the absconding sheriff by check in his name did not
operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt.

In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person. Article
1240 of the Civil Code provides:

Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in
interest, or any person authorized to receive it. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to receive
the particular payment (Ulen v. Knecttle 50 Wyo 94, 58 [2d] 446, 111 ALR 65). Payment made to one having
apparent authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as though actual authority had been given for its
receipt. Likewise, if payment is made to one who by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work a discharge
(Hendry v. Benlisa 37 Fla. 609, 20 SO 800,34 LRA 283). The receipt of money due on ajudgment by an officer
authorized by law to accept it will, therefore, satisfy the debt (See 40 Am Jm 729, 25; Hendry v. Benlisa supra;
Seattle v. Stirrat 55 Wash. 104 p. 834,24 LRA [NS] 1275).

The theory is where payment is made to a person authorized and recognized by the creditor, the payment to such a
person so authorized is deemed payment to the creditor. Under ordinary circumstances, payment by the judgment
debtor in the case at bar, to the sheriff should be valid payment to extinguish the judgment debt.

There are circumstances in this case, however, which compel a different conclusion.

The payment made by the petitioner to the absconding sheriff was not in cash or legal tender but in checks. The
checks were not payable to Amelia Tan or Able Printing Press but to the absconding sheriff.
Did such payments extinguish the judgment debt?

Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides:

The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver
such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.

The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall
produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor
they have been impaired.

In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in abeyance.

In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied, payment means the discharge of a debt or obligation in
money (US v. Robertson, 5 Pet. [US] 641, 8 L. ed. 257) and unless the parties so agree, a debtor has no rights,
except at his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of cash as medium of payment of his debt (Anderson v. Gill,
79 Md.. 312, 29 A 527, 25 LRA 200,47 Am. St. Rep. 402). Consequently, unless authorized to do so by law or by
consent of the obligee a public officer has no authority to accept anything other than money in payment of an
obligation under a judgment being executed. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner's
checks, in the case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt.

Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does
not, by itself, operate as payment (See. 189, Act 2031 on Negs. Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil Code; Bryan Landon Co. v.
American Bank, 7 Phil. 255; Tan Sunco v. Santos, 9 Phil. 44; 21 R.C.L. 60, 61). A check, whether a manager's
check or ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of
payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the
obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by
commercial document is actually realized (Art. 1249, Civil Code, par. 3).

If bouncing checks had been issued in the name of Amelia Tan and not the Sheriff's, there would have been no
payment. After dishonor of the checks, Ms. Tan could have run after other properties of PAL. The theory is that she
has received no value for what had been awarded her. Because the checks were drawn in the name of Emilio Z.
Reyes, neither has she received anything. The same rule should apply.

It is argued that if PAL had paid in cash to Sheriff Reyes, there would have been payment in full legal contemplation.
The reasoning is logical but is it valid and proper? Logic has its limits in decision making. We should not follow
rulings to their logical extremes if in doing so we arrive at unjust or absurd results.

In the first place, PAL did not pay in cash. It paid in cheeks.

And second, payment in cash always carries with it certain cautions. Nobody hands over big amounts of cash in a
careless and inane manner. Mature thought is given to the possibility of the cash being lost, of the bearer being
waylaid or running off with what he is carrying for another. Payment in checks is precisely intended to avoid the
possibility of the money going to the wrong party. The situation is entirely different where a Sheriff seizes a car, a
tractor, or a piece of land. Logic often has to give way to experience and to reality. Having paid with checks, PAL
should have done so properly.

Payment in money or cash to the implementing officer may be deemed absolute payment of the judgment debt but
the Court has never, in the least bit, suggested that judgment debtors should settle their obligations by turning over
huge amounts of cash or legal tender to sheriffs and other executing officers. Payment in cash would result in
damage or interminable litigations each time a sheriff with huge amounts of cash in his hands decides to abscond.

As a protective measure, therefore, the courts encourage the practice of payments by cheek provided adequate
controls are instituted to prevent wrongful payment and illegal withdrawal or disbursement of funds. If particularly big
amounts are involved, escrow arrangements with a bank and carefully supervised by the court would be the safer
procedure. Actual transfer of funds takes place within the safety of bank premises. These practices are perfectly
legal. The object is always the safe and incorrupt execution of the judgment.

It is, indeed, out of the ordinary that checks intended for a particular payee are made out in the name of another.
Making the checks payable to the judgment creditor would have prevented the encashment or the taking of undue
advantage by the sheriff, or any person into whose hands the checks may have fallen, whether wrongfully or in
behalf of the creditor. The issuance of the checks in the name of the sheriff clearly made possible the
misappropriation of the funds that were withdrawn.

As explained and held by the respondent court:

... [K]nowing as it does that the intended payment was for the private party respondent Amelia Tan, the
petitioner corporation, utilizing the services of its personnel who are or should be knowledgeable about the
accepted procedures and resulting consequences of the checks drawn, nevertheless, in this instance,
 without prudence, departed from what is generally observed and done, and placed as payee in the checks
the name of the errant Sheriff and not the name of the rightful payee. Petitioner thereby created a situation
which permitted the said Sheriff to personally encash said checks and misappropriate the proceeds thereof
to his exclusive personal benefit. For the prejudice that resulted, the petitioner himself must bear the fault.
The judicial guideline which we take note of states as follows:

As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust, the one
who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss. (Blondeau, et al. v. Nano, et al., L-41377,
July 26, 1935, 61 Phil. 625)

Having failed to employ the proper safeguards to protect itself, the judgment debtor whose act made possible the
loss had but itself to blame.

The attention of this Court has been called to the bad practice of a number of executing officers, of requiring checks
in satisfaction of judgment debts to be made out in their own names. If a sheriff directs a judgment debtor to issue
the checks in the sheriff's name, claiming he must get his commission or fees, the debtor must report the sheriff
immediately to the court which ordered the execution or to the Supreme Court for appropriate disciplinary action.
Fees, commissions, and salaries are paid through regular channels. This improper procedure also allows such
officers, who have sixty (60) days within which to make a return, to treat the moneys as their personal finds and to
deposit the same in their private accounts to earn sixty (60) days interest, before said finds are turned over to the
court or judgment creditor (See Balgos v. Velasco, 108 SCRA 525 [1981]). Quite as easily, such officers could put
up the defense that said checks had been issued to them in their private or personal capacity. Without a receipt
evidencing payment of the judgment debt, the misappropriation of finds by such officers becomes clean and
complete. The practice is ingenious but evil as it unjustly enriches court personnel at the expense of litigants and the
proper administration of justice. The temptation could be far greater, as proved to be in this case of the absconding
sheriff. The correct and prudent thing for the petitioner was to have issued the checks in the intended payee's name.

The pernicious effects of issuing checks in the name of a person other than the intended payee, without the latter's
agreement or consent, are as many as the ways that an artful mind could concoct to get around the safeguards
provided by the law on negotiable instruments. An angry litigant who loses a case, as a rule, would not want the
winning party to get what he won in the judgment. He would think of ways to delay the winning party's getting what
has been adjudged in his favor. We cannot condone that practice especially in cases where the courts and their
officers are involved. We rule against the petitioner.
1wphi 1

Anent the applicability of Section 15, Rule 39, as follows:

Section 15. Execution of money judgments. The officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment
by levying on all the property, real and personal of every name and nature whatsoever, and which may be
disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or on a sufficient amount of such
property, if they be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so
much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. ...

the respondent court held:

We are obliged to rule that the judgment debt cannot be considered satisfied and therefore the orders of the
respondent judge granting the alias writ of execution may not be pronounced as a nullity.

xxx xxx xxx

It is clear and manifest that after levy or garnishment, for a judgment to be executed there is the requisite of
payment by the officer to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the
judgment and none such payment had been concededly made yet by the absconding Sheriff to the private
respondent Amelia Tan. The ultimate and essential step to complete the execution of the judgment not
having been performed by the City Sheriff, the judgment debt legally and factually remains unsatisfied.

Strictly speaking execution cannot be equated with satisfaction of a judgment. Under unusual circumstances as
those obtaining in this petition, the distinction comes out clearly.

Execution is the process which carries into effect a decree or judgment (Painter v. Berglund, 31 Cal. App. 2d. 63, 87
P 2d 360, 363; Miller v. London, 294 Mass 300, 1 NE 2d 198, 200; Black's Law Dictionary), whereas the satisfaction
of a judgment is the payment of the amount of the writ, or a lawful tender thereof, or the conversion by sale of the
debtor's property into an amount equal to that due, and, it may be done otherwise than upon an execution (Section
47, Rule 39). Levy and delivery by an execution officer are not prerequisites to the satisfaction of a judgment when
the same has already been realized in fact (Section 47, Rule 39). Execution is for the sheriff to accomplish while
satisfaction of the judgment is for the creditor to achieve. Section 15, Rule 39 merely provides the sheriff with his
duties as executing officer including delivery of the proceeds of his levy on the debtor's property to satisfy the
judgment debt. It is but to stress that the implementing officer's duty should not stop at his receipt of payments but
must continue until payment is delivered to the obligor or creditor.
Finally, we find no error in the respondent court's pronouncement on the inclusion of interests to be recovered under
the alias writ of execution. This logically follows from our ruling that PAL is liable for both the lost checks and
interest. The respondent court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 51079-R does not totally supersede the trial court's
judgment in Civil Case No. 71307. It merely modified the same as to the principal amount awarded as actual
damages.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The judgment of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the trial court's issuance of the alias writ of execution against the
petitioner is upheld without prejudice to any action it should take against the errant sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes. The
Court Administrator is ordered to follow up the actions taken against Emilio Z. Reyes.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., dissenting:

The execution of final judgments and orders is a function of the sheriff, an officer of the court whose authority is by
and large statutorily determined to meet the particular exigencies arising from or connected with the performance of
the multifarious duties of the office. It is the acknowledgment of the many dimensions of this authority, defined by
statute and chiselled by practice, which compels me to disagree with the decision reached by the majority.

A consideration of the wide latitude of discretion allowed the sheriff as the officer of the court most directly involved
with the implementation and execution of final judgments and orders persuades me that PAL's payment to the
sheriff of its judgment debt to Amelia Tan, though made by check issued in said officer's name, lawfully satisfied
said obligation and foreclosed further recourse therefor against PAL, notwithstanding the sheriffs failure to deliver to
Tan the proceeds of the check.

It is a matter of history that the judiciary .. is an inherit or of the Anglo-American tradition. While the common
law as such .. "is not in force" in this jurisdiction, "to breathe the breath of life into many of the institutions,
introduced [here] under American sovereignty, recourse must be had to the rules, principles and doctrines of
the common law under whose protecting aegis the prototypes of these institutions had their birth" A sheriff is
"an officer of great antiquity," and was also called the shire reeve. A shire in English law is a Saxon word
signifying a division later called a county. A reeve is an ancient English officer of justice inferior in rank to an
alderman .. appointed to process, keep the King's peace, and put the laws in execution. From a very remote
period in English constitutional history .. the shire had another officer, namely the shire reeve or as we say,
the sheriff. .. The Sheriff was the special representative of the legal or central authority, and as such usually
nominated by the King. .. Since the earliest times, both in England and the United States, a sheriff has
continued his status as an adjunct of the court .. . As it was there, so it has been in the Philippines from the
time of the organization of the judiciary .. . (J. Fernando's concurring opinion in Bagatsing v. Herrera, 65
SCRA 434)

One of a sheriff s principal functions is to execute final judgments and orders. The Rules of Court require the writs of
execution to issue to him, directing him to enforce such judgments and orders in the manner therein provided (Rule
39). The mode of enforcement varies according to the nature of the judgment to be carried out: whether it be against
property of the judgment debtor in his hands or in the hands of a third person i e. money judgment), or for the sale of
property, real or personal (i.e. foreclosure of mortgage) or the delivery thereof, etc. (sec. 8, Rule 39).

Under sec. 15 of the same Rule, the sheriff is empowered to levy on so much of the judgment debtor's property as
may be sufficient to enforce the money judgment and sell these properties at public auction after due notice to
satisfy the adjudged amount. It is the sheriff who, after the auction sale, conveys to the purchaser the property thus
sold (secs. 25, 26, 27, Rule 39), and pays the judgment creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the
judgment. When the property sold by him on execution is an immovable which consequently gives rise to a light of
redemption on the part of the judgment debtor and others (secs. 29, 30, Rule 39), it is to him (or to the purchaser or
redemptioner that the payments may be made by those declared by law as entitled to redeem (sec. 31, Rule 39);
and in this situation, it becomes his duty to accept payment and execute the certificate of redemption (Enage v. Vda.
y Hijos de Escano, 38 Phil. 657, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., vol. 2, pp. 326-327). It
is also to the sheriff that "written notice of any redemption must be given and a duplicate filed with the registrar of
deeds of the province, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any
lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to the officer
and filed with the registrar of deeds," the effect of failure to file such notice being that redemption may be made
without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens (sec. 30, Rule 39).

The sheriff may likewise be appointed a receiver of the property of the judgment debtor where the appointment of
the receiver is deemed necessary for the execution of the judgment (sec. 32, Rule 39).

At any time before the sale of property on execution, the judgment debtor may prevent the sale by paying the sheriff
the amount required by the execution and the costs that have been incurred therein (sec. 20, Rule 39).

The sheriff is also authorized to receive payments on account of the judgment debt tendered by "a person indebted
to the judgment debtor," and his "receipt shall be a sufficient discharge for the amount so paid or directed to be
credited by the judgment creditor on the execution" (sec. 41, Rule 39).

Now, obviously, the sheriff s sale extinguishes the liability of the judgment debtor either in fun, if the price paid by
the highest bidder is equal to, or more than the amount of the judgment or pro tanto if the price fetched at the sale
be less. Such extinction is not in any way dependent upon the judgment creditor's receiving the amount realized, so
that the conversion or embezzlement of the proceeds of the sale by the sheriff does not revive the judgment debt or
render the judgment creditor liable anew therefor.

So, also, the taking by the sheriff of, say, personal property from the judgment debtor for delivery to the judgment
creditor, in fulfillment of the verdict against him, extinguishes the debtor's liability; and the conversion of said
property by the sheriff, does not make said debtor responsible for replacing the property or paying the value thereof.

In the instances where the Rules allow or direct payments to be made to the sheriff, the payments may be made by
check, but it goes without saying that if the sheriff so desires, he may require payment to be made in lawful money.
If he accepts the check, he places himself in a position where he would be liable to the judgment creditor if any
damages are suffered by the latter as a result of the medium in which payment was made (Javellana v. Mirasol, et
al., 40 Phil. 761). The validity of the payment made by the judgment debtor, however, is in no wise affected and the
latter is discharged from his obligation to the judgment creditor as of the moment the check issued to the sheriff is
encashed and the proceeds are received by Id. office. The issuance of the check to a person authorized to receive it
(Art. 1240, Civil Code; See. 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Enage v. Vda y Hijos de Escano, 38 Phil. 657, cited
in Javellana v. Mirasol, 40 Phil. 761) operates to release the judgment debtor from any further obligations on the
judgment.

The sheriff is an adjunct of the court; a court functionary whose competence involves both discretion and personal
liability (concurring opinion of J. Fernando, citing Uy Piaoco v. Osmena, 9 Phil. 299, in Bagatsing v. Herrera, 65
SCRA 434). Being an officer of the court and acting within the scope of his authorized functions, the sheriff s receipt
of the checks in payment of the judgment execution, may be deemed, in legal contemplation, as received by the
court itself (Lara v. Bayona, 10 May 1955, No. L- 10919).

That the sheriff functions as a conduit of the court is further underscored by the fact that one of the requisites for
appointment to the office is the execution of a bond, "conditioned (upon) the faithful performance of his (the
appointee's) duties .. for the delivery or payment to Government, or the person entitled thereto, of all properties or
sums of money that shall officially come into his hands" (sec. 330, Revised Administrative Code).

There is no question that the checks came into the sheriffs possession in his official capacity. The court may require
of the judgment debtor, in complying with the judgment, no further burden than his vigilance in ensuring that the
person he is paying money or delivering property to is a person authorized by the court to receive it. Beyond this,
further expectations become unreasonable. To my mind, a proposal that would make the judgment debtor
unqualifiedly the insurer of the judgment creditor's entitlement to the judgment amount which is really what this case
is all about begs the question.

That the checks were made out in the sheriffs name (a practice, by the way, of long and common acceptance) is of
little consequence if juxtaposed with the extent of the authority explicitly granted him by law as the officer entrusted
with the power to execute and implement court judgments. The sheriffs requirement that the checks in payment of
the judgment debt be issued in his name was simply an assertion of that authority; and PAL's compliance cannot in
the premises be faulted merely because of the sheriffs subsequent malfeasance in absconding with the payment
instead of turning it over to the judgment creditor.

If payment had been in cash, no question about its validity or of the authority and duty of the sheriff to accept it in
settlement of PAL's judgment obligation would even have arisen. Simply because it was made by checks issued in
the sheriff s name does not warrant reaching any different conclusion.

As payment to the court discharges the judgment debtor from his responsibility on the judgment, so too must
payment to the person designated by such court and authorized to act in its behalf, operate to produce the same
effect.
It is unfortunate and deserving of commiseration that Amelia Tan was deprived of what was adjudged to her when
the sheriff misappropriated the payment made to him by PAL in dereliction of his sworn duties. But I submit that her
remedy lies, not here and in reviving liability under a judgment already lawfully satisfied, but elsewhere.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, J., concurs.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting:

I concur in the able dissenting opinions of Narvasa and Padilla, JJ. and would merely wish to add a few footnotes to
their lucid opinions.

1. Narvasa, J. has demonstrated in detail that a sheriff is authorized by the Rules of Court and our case law
to receive either legal tender or checks from the judgment debtor in satisfaction of the judgment debt. In
addition, Padilla, J. has underscored the obligation of the sheriff, imposed upon him by the nature of his
office and the law, to turn over such legal tender, checks and proceeds of execution sales to the judgment
creditor. The failure of a sheriff to effect such turnover and his conversion of the funds (or goods) held by
him to his own uses, do not have the effect of frustrating payment by and consequent discharge of the
judgment debtor.

To hold otherwise would be to throw the risk of the sheriff faithfully performing his duty as a public officer
upon those members of the general public who are compelled to deal with him. It seems to me that a
judgment debtor who turns over funds or property to the sheriff can not reasonably be made an insurer of
the honesty and integrity of the sheriff and that the risk of the sheriff carrying out his duties honestly and
faithfully is properly lodged in the State itself The sheriff, like all other officers of the court, is appointed and
paid and controlled and disciplined by the Government, more specifically by this Court. The public surely has
a duty to report possible wrongdoing by a sheriff or similar officer to the proper authorities and, if necessary,
to testify in the appropriate judicial and administrative disciplinary proceedings. But to make the individual
members of the general community insurers of the honest performance of duty of a sheriff, or other officer of
the court, over whom they have no control, is not only deeply unfair to the former. It is also a confession of
comprehensive failure and comes too close to an abdication of duty on the part of the Court itself. This Court
should have no part in that.

2. I also feel compelled to comment on the majority opinion written by Gutierrez, J. with all his customary
and special way with words. My learned and eloquent brother in the Court apparently accepts the
proposition that payment by a judgment debtor of cash to a sheriff produces the legal effects of payment, the
sheriff being authorized to accept such payment. Thus, in page 10 of his ponencia, Gutierrez, J. writes:

The receipt of money due on a judgment by an officer authorized by law to accept it will satisfy the debt.
(Citations omitted)

The theory is where payment is made to a person authorized and recognized by the creditor, the payment to
such a person so authorized is deemed payment to the creditor. Under ordinary circumstances, payment by
the judgment debtor in the case at bar, to the sheriff would be valid payment to extinguish the judgment
debt.

Shortly thereafter, however, Gutierrez, J. backs off from the above position and strongly implies that
payment in cash to the sheriff is sheer imprudence on the part of the judgment debtor and that therefore,
should the sheriff abscond with the cash, the judgment debtor has not validly discharged the judgment debt:

It is argued that if PAL had paid in cash to Sheriff Reyes, there would have been payment in full legal
contemplation. The reasoning is logical but is it valid and proper?

In the first place, PAL did not pay in cash. It paid in checks.

And second, payment in cash always carries with it certain cautions. Nobody hands over big amounts of
cash in a careless and inane manner. Mature thought is given to the possibility of the cash being lost, of the
bearer being waylaid or running off with what he is carrying for another. Payment in checks is precisely
intended to avoid the possibility of the money going to the wrong party....

Payment in money or cash to the implementing officer may be deemed absolute payment of the judgment
debt but the court has never, in the least bit, suggested that judgment debtors should settle their obligations
by turning over huge amounts of cash or legal tender to sheriffs and other executing officers. ... (Emphasis
in the original) (Majority opinion, pp. 12-13)
There is no dispute with the suggestion apparently made that maximum safety is secured where the judgment
debtor delivers to the sheriff not cash but a check made out, not in the name of the sheriff, but in the judgment
creditor's name. The fundamental point that must be made, however, is that under our law only cash is legal tender
and that the sheriff can be compelled to accept only cash and not checks, even if made out to the name of the
judgment creditor. 1 The sheriff could have quite lawfully required PAL to deliver to him only cash, i.e., Philippine
currency. If the sheriff had done so, and if PAL had complied with such a requirement, as it would have had to, one
would have to agree that legal payment must be deemed to have been effected. It requires no particularly acute
mind to note that a dishonest sheriff could easily convert the money and abscond. The fact that the sheriff in the
instant case required, not cash to be delivered to him, but rather a check made out in his name, does not change
the legal situation. PAL did not thereby become negligent; it did not make the loss anymore possible or probable
than if it had instead delivered plain cash to the sheriffs.

It seems to me that the majority opinion's real premise is the unspoken one that the judgment debtor should bear
the risk of the fragility of the sheriff s virtue until the money or property parted with by the judgment debtor actually
reaches the hands of the judgment creditor. This brings me back to my earlier point that risk is most appropriately
borne not by the judgment debtor, nor indeed by the judgment creditor, but by the State itself. The Court requires all
sheriffs to post good and adequate fidelity bonds before entering upon the performance of their duties and,
presumably, to maintain such bonds in force and effect throughout their stay in office.2 The judgment creditor, in
circumstances like those of the instant case, could be allowed to execute upon the absconding sheriff s bond.3

I believe the Petition should be granted and I vote accordingly.

PADILLA, J., Dissenting Opinion

From the facts that appear to be undisputed, I reach a conclusion different from that of the majority. Sheriff Emilio Z.
Reyes, the trial court's authorized sheriff, armed with a writ of execution to enforce a final money judgment against
the petitioner Philippine Airlines (PAL) in favor of private respondent Amelia Tan, proceeded to petitioner PAL's
office to implement the writ.

There is no question that Sheriff Reyes, in enforcing the writ of execution, was acting with full authority as an officer
of the law and not in his personal capacity. Stated differently, PAL had every right to assume that, as an officer of
the law, Sheriff Reyes would perform his duties as enjoined by law. It would be grossly unfair to now charge PAL
with advanced or constructive notice that Mr. Reyes would abscond and not deliver to the judgment creditor the
proceeds of the writ of execution. If a judgment debtor cannot rely on and trust an officer of the law, as the Sheriff,
whom else can he trust?

Pursued to its logical extreme, if PAL had delivered to Sheriff Reyes the amount of the judgment in CASH, i.e.
Philippine currency, with the corresponding receipt signed by Sheriff Reyes, this would have been payment by PAL
in full legal contemplation, because under Article 1240 of the Civil Code, "payment shall be made to the person in
whose favor the obligation has been constituted or his successor in interest or any person authorized to receive it."
And said payment if made by PAL in cash, i.e., Philippine currency, to Sheriff Reyes would have satisfied PAL's
judgment obligation, as payment is a legally recognized mode for extinguishing one's obligation. (Article 1231, Civil
Code).

Under Sec. 15, Rule 39, Rules of Court which provides that-

Sec. 15. Execution of money judgments. The officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment by
levying on all the property, real and personal of every name and nature whatsoever, and which may be
disposed of for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or on a sufficient amount of such
property, if there be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so
much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. ... .(emphasis supplied)

it would be the duty of Sheriff Reyes to pay to the judgment creditor the proceeds of the execution i.e., the cash
received from PAL (under the above assumption). But, the duty of the sheriff to pay the cash to the judgment
creditor would be a matter separate the distinct from the fact that PAL would have satisfied its judgment obligation to
Amelia Tan, the judgment creditor, by delivering the cash amount due under the judgment to Sheriff Reyes.

Did the situation change by PAL's delivery of its two (2) checks totalling P30,000.00 drawn against its bank account,
payable to Sheriff Reyes, for account of the judgment rendered against PAL? I do not think so, because when
Sheriff Reyes encashed the checks, the encashment was in fact a payment by PAL to Amelia Tan through Sheriff
Reyes, an officer of the law authorized to receive payment, and such payment discharged PAL'S obligation under
the executed judgment.

If the PAL cheeks in question had not been encashed by Sheriff Reyes, there would be no payment by PAL and,
consequently no discharge or satisfaction of its judgment obligation. But the checks had been encashed by Sheriff
Reyes giving rise to a situation as if PAL had paid Sheriff Reyes in cash, i.e., Philippine currency. This, we repeat, is
payment, in legal contemplation, on the part of PAL and this payment legally discharged PAL from its judgment
obligation to the judgment creditor. To be sure, the same encashment by Sheriff Reyes of PAL's checks delivered to
him in his official capacity as Sheriff, imposed an obligation on Sheriff Reyes to pay and deliver the proceeds of the
encashment to Amelia Tan who is deemed to have acquired a cause of action against Sheriff Reyes for his failure to
deliver to her the proceeds of the encashment. As held:

Payment of a judgment, to operate as a release or satisfaction, even pro tanto must be made to the plaintiff
or to some person authorized by him, or by law, to receive it. The payment of money to the sheriff having an
execution satisfies it, and, if the plaintiff fails to receive it, his only remedy is against the officer (Henderson
v. Planters' and Merchants Bank, 59 SO 493, 178 Ala. 420).

Payment of an execution satisfies it without regard to whether the officer pays it over to the creditor or
misapplies it (340, 33 C.J.S. 644, citing Elliot v. Higgins, 83 N.C. 459). If defendant consents to the Sheriff s
misapplication of the money, however, defendant is estopped to claim that the debt is satisfied (340, 33
C.J.S. 644, citing Heptinstall v. Medlin 83 N.C. 16).

The above rulings find even more cogent application in the case at bar because, as contended by petitioner PAL
(not denied by private respondent), when Sheriff Reyes served the writ of execution on PAL, he (Reyes) was
accompanied by private respondent's counsel. Prudence dictated that when PAL delivered to Sheriff Reyes the two
(2) questioned checks (payable to Sheriff Reyes), private respondent's counsel should have insisted on their
immediate encashment by the Sheriff with the drawee bank in order to promptly get hold of the amount belonging to
his client, the judgment creditor.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the petition and to quash the court a quo's alias writ of execution.

Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento, Cortes, JJ., concurs.

Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento, Cortes, JJ., concurs.

Footnotes

1
Art. 1249, Civil Code; e.g., Belisario v. Natividad, 60 Phil. 156 (1934); Villanueva v. Santos, 67 Phil 648
(1938).

2
See e.g., Sec. 46, Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 4814.

3
See e.g., Sec. 9, Act No. 3598.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2
December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as
well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those
enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:

Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well
as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to
 all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at
least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act.

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on 30
January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead,
she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her
letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:

xxx xxx xxx

With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not
conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government
employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of
government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons
who are not entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law
provides that the Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain portion of the
benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special
projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like.
There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.

xxx xxx xxx 2

Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:

xxx xxx xxx

We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years of
satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a
casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of
enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual employees in the coverage.

Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from the
service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall
sustain its original decision.

xxx xxx xxx3

In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, insisting that she is
entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:

It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1
requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status.
Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1,
implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:

"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:

a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific
activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in Task Force,
Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.

b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the
Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).

c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the
service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with
pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an
amended, or vice- versa.

d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law
and have received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.

e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation

from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided that
 if such officials and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the
availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or
cleared of all charges and their application accepted and approved by the head of
office concerned."

Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a
full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service
Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the
Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683
with more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A
and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the government should be
similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. 4

The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of
Republic Act No. 6683, because:

1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative
Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control
Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31
December 1988, after which petitioner's position became functus officio.

2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its regular plantilla. She
belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on
the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can
expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under
the GSIS law.

3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only for the term of
office (i.e., duration of project).

4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but
reorganization 5to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the
purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will
not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period.
This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just
to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the
WMECP considering its short and limited life-span. 6

5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters and local government units.

Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to define
the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).

Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6
October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683)
merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is
employed in the public sector.

The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:

1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is
made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in
pursuance thereof; 7

2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary
appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service
eligible becomes available. 8

The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination
is required;
 (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the
faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in
scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit
system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or

proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9

The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the
career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous
with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was made.

Included in the non-career service are:

1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal confidential staff(s);

3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal
or confidential staff;

4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a

special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available
in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed
one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a
minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.

5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10

There is another type of non-career employee:

Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic
and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil.
945)

Consider petitioner's record of service:

Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer

holding emergency status with the NIA Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division. 11 From 24
March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide with temporary status on the same project.
On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on
1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated
Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management
& Erosion Control Project) retaining the status of temporary employee. While with this project, her
designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the
status became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The
appointment paper 12attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with the Project.

The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that is,
they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project
(CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service.

Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service
Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring officers and
employees of the national government;

WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous services
by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are
considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered
on contractual, emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;

WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual,
emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by the
Commission.

NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or
casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as
creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)

1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or

other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary
proof of said services;

2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the
effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and

3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and
fulfill the service requirement for retirement.

What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or
contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989
CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in
turn was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee

(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is characterized
by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent
with his tenure.

The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:

a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to
the availability of funds for the same;

b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is co-existent with

the tenure of the appointing authority.

c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-existent with the

appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of
the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and

d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years"

the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is
deemed abolished.

It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous is
the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee
is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.

A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid
reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted
that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP
including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not
have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person, object
or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these
legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-
hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years.
Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.

Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies
only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong
to the same class. 17

Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were we to
sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should
not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always
an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be
an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-
called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used
to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose,
or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in
the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18

During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to Congressman
Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are extended appointments for one (1)
year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he explained:

This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary separation. It is
irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to retire
under this, then he is covered.

It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the
Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified
group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide:

Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
government service as of the date of separation. The term "contractual employees" as used in this
Act does not include experts and consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform
specific activities or services with definite expected output.

Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)

The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated
positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-
terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and
separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus
officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish
two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-terminous or
project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas, retirement presupposes
employment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring
because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can
the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement
benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of
permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the
positions remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.

Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should be
included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of
their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection,
Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a
condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which
need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil
Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-
terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social
legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants"22 After all, co-terminous
personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with
the general disadvantage of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application
for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had
filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law.
While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed
the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application
must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum requirement under
the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application for early retirement
benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.

Footnotes

1 Letter of Commissioner Samilo Borlongay, 17 March 1989.

2 Annex "E", Rollo, P. 11

3 Annex "F", Rollo, p. 14.

4 Rollo, p. 24-25.
 5 AN ACT PROVIDING BENEFITS FOR EARLY, RETIREMENT AND VOLUNTARY SEPARATION
FROM THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, AS WELL AS INVOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF CIVIL
SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO VARIOUS EXECUTIVE ORDERS
AUTHORIZING GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

6 See Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, 12 December 1988, Rollo, 61.

7 Sec. 25, a and b, P.D. No. 807; see also CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, S. of 1991, 5 April
1991.

8 Ibid., also Perez v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. L-48196-R, 11 July 1978; Ata v. Namocatcat, G.R.
No. L-35703, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 320.

9 Executive Order No. 292, Section 7, 83 O.G. No. 39, 75 (September 1987)

10 Ibid, Section 9, p. 77.

11 Per Service Record, Rollo, p. 7.

12 Rollo, p. 70.

13 Page 3, this decision.

14 See Agpalo, Ruben. Statutory Construction, 1986 ed. p. 161.

15 People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 664.

16 G.R. No. 54083, 28 February 1983, 120 SCRA 910.

17 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, L-23794, 17 February 1968.

18 Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, 1986 ed., p. 118-119 citing In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41
(1918); City of Manila v. Gomez, G.R. No. L-37251, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 98; Escribano v.
Ovila, G.R. No. L-30375, September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245 (1978), also Go Chico v. Martinez, 45
Phil. 256 (1923); Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32560, October 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 435
(1970); People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 (1957) and People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949).

19 Deliberations House Bill No. 4942 8 March 1988, 6:30. p.m.

20 An Act to Grant Civil Service Eligibility Under Certain Conditions to Government Employees
Under Provisional or Temporary Status Who have rendered a Total of Seven (7) Years of Efficient
Service and for other Purposes.

21 Rule 1, Sec. 2(c) as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 25, series of 1990, 21 May 1990.

22 See Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 1991, 27 June 1991.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93468 December 29, 1994

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK SUPERVISORS

CHAPTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and REPUBLIC PLANTERS
BANK, respondents.

Filemon G. Tercero for petitioner.

The Government Corporate Counsel for Republic Planters Bank.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU)-REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK SUPERVISORS

CHAPTER seeks nullification of the decision of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated 23 March 1990, which
modified the order of Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz dated 17 August 1989 as well as his order dated 20 April 1990
denying reconsideration.

On 17 March 1989, NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of respondent Bank's employees occupying supervisory positions. On 24 April 1989, the Bank moved
to dismiss the petition on the ground that the supposed supervisory employees were actually managerial and/or
confidential employees thus ineligible to join, assist or form a union, and that the petition lacked the 20% signatory
requirement under the Labor Code.

On 17 August 1989, Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz granted the petition thus

WHEREFORE, . . . let a certification election be ordered conducted among all the regular employees
of the Republic Planters Bank occupying supervisory positions or the equivalent within 20 days from
receipt of a copy of this Order. The choice shall be: (1) National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU)-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter; and (2) No Union.

The payroll three months prior to the filing of this petition shall be utilized in determining the list of
eligible voters . . . .1

Respondent Bank appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor on the main ground that several of the employees
sought to be included in the certification election, particularly the Department Managers, Branch Managers/OICs,
Cashiers and Controllers were managerial and/or confidential employees and thus ineligible to join, assist or form a
union. It presented annexes detailing the job description and duties of the positions in question and affidavits of
certain employees. It also invoked provisions of the General Banking Act and the Central Bank Act to show the
duties and responsibilities of the bank and its branches.

On 23 March 1990, public respondent issued a decision partially granting the appeal, which is now being challenged
before us

WHEREFORE, . . . the appeal is hereby partially granted. Accordingly, the Order dated 17 August
1989 is modified to the extent that Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers,
Cashiers and Controllers are declared managerial employees. Perforce, they cannot join the union of
supervisors such as Division Chiefs, Accounts Officers, Staff Assistants and OIC's (sic) unless the
latter are regular managerial employees . . . .2

NATU filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on 20 April 1990.3 Hence this recourse assailing
public respondent for rendering the decision of 23 March 1990 and the order of 20 April 1990 both with grave abuse
of discretion.

The crucial issue presented for our resolution is whether the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/or confidential employees hence
ineligible to join or assist the union of petitioner.

NATU submits that an analysis of the decision of public respondent readily yields certain flaws that result in
erroneous conclusions. Firstly, a branch does not enjoy relative autonomy precisely because it is treated as one unit
with the head office and has to comply with uniform policies and guidelines set by the bank itself. It would be absurd
if each branch of a particular bank would be adopting and implementing different policies covering multifarious
banking transactions. Moreover, respondent Bank's own evidence clearly shows that policies and guidelines
covering the various branches are set by the head office. Secondly, there is absolutely no evidence showing that
bank policies are laid down through the collective action of the Branch Manager, the Cashier and the Controller.
Thirdly, the organizational setup where the Branch Manager exercises control over branch operations, the Controller
controls the Accounting Division, and the Cashier controls the Cash Division, is nothing but a proper delineation of
duties and responsibilities. This delineation is a Central Bank prescribed internal control measure intended to
objectively establish responsibilities among the officers to easily pinpoint culpability in case of error. The "dual
control" and "joint custody" aspects mentioned in the decision of public respondent are likewise internal control
measures prescribed by the Central Bank.

Neither is there evidence showing that subject employees are vested with powers or prerogatives to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. The bare allegations in the affidavits of
respondent Bank's Executive Assistant to the President4 and the Senior Manager of the Human Resource
Management Department5 that those powers and prerogatives are inherent in subject positions are self-serving.
Their claim cannot be made to prevail upon the actual duties and responsibilities of subject employees.
The other evidence of respondent Bank which purports to show that subject employees exercise managerial
functions even belies such claim. Insofar as Department Managers and Assistant Managers are concerned, there is
absolutely no reason mentioned in the decision why they are managerial employees. Not even respondent Bank in
its appeal questioned the inclusion of Assistant Managers among the qualified petitioning employees. Public
respondent has deviated from the real issue in this case, which is, the determination of whether subject employees
are managerial employees within the contemplation of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715; instead, he merely
concentrated on the nature, conduct and management of banks conformably with the General Banking Act and the
Central Bank Act.

Petitioner concludes that subject employees are not managerial employees but supervisors. Even assuming that
they are confidential employees, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees who are not performing
managerial functions to form and join a union.

On the other hand, respondent Bank maintains that the Department Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and
Controllers are inherently possessed of the powers enumerated in Art. 212, par. (m), of the Labor Code. It relies
heavily on the affidavits of its Executive Assistant to the President and Senior Manager of the Human Resource
Department. The Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers are vested not only with policy-making powers
necessary to run the affairs of the branch, given the independence and relative autonomy which it enjoys in the
pursuit of its goals and objectives, but also with the concomitant disciplinary authority over the employees.

The Solicitor General argues that NATU loses sight of the fact that by virtue of the appeal of respondent Bank, the
whole case is thrown open for consideration by public respondent. Even errors not assigned in the appeal, such as
the exclusion by the Med-Arbiter of Assistant Managers from the managerial employees category, is within his
discretion to consider as it is closely related to the errors properly assigned. The fact that Department Managers are
managerial employees is borne out by the evidence of petitioner itself. Furthermore, while it assails public
respondent's finding that subject employees are managerial employees, petitioner never questioned the fact that
said officers also occupy confidential positions and thus remain prohibited from forming or joining any labor
organization.

Respondent Bank has no legal personality to move for the dismissal of the petition for certification election on the
ground that its supervisory employees are in reality managerial employees. An employer has no standing to
question the process since this is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception is where the employer itself
has to file the petition pursuant to Art. 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively.6

Public respondent, invoking RA 6715 and the inherent functions of Department Managers, Assistant Managers,
Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers, held that these officers properly fall within the definition of managerial
employees. The ratiocination in his Decision of 23 March 19907 is that

Republic Act No. 6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law, restored the right of
supervisors to form their own unions while maintaining the proscription on the right to self-
organization of managerial employees. Accordingly, the Labor Code, as amended, distinguishes
managerial, supervisory and rank-and-file employees thus:

Art. 212 (m) Managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions, if the exercise of such managerial
authority is not routinary in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All
employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees (emphasis supplied).

At first glance, pursuant to the above-definitions and based on their job descriptions as guideposts,
there would seem to be no difficulty in distinguishing a managerial employee from that of a
supervisor, or from that of a mere rank-and-file employee. Yet, this task takes on a different
dimension when applied to banks, particularly the branches thereof. This is so because unlike
ordinary corporations, a bank's organizational operation is governed and regulated by the General
Banking Act and the Central Bank Act, both special laws . . . .

As pointed out by the respondent, in the banking industry, a branch is the microcosm of a banking
institution, uniquely autonomous and
self-governing.

This relative autonomy of a branch finds legal basis in Section 27 of the General Banking Act, as
amended, thus:

. . . . The bank shall be responsible for all business conducted in such branches to
the same extent and in the same manner as though such business had all been
conducted in the head office.
 For the purpose of this Act, a bank and its branches shall be treated as a
unit (emphasis supplied).

Conformably with the above, bank policies are laid down and/or executed through the collective
action of the Branch Manager, Cashier and Controller at the branch level. The Branch Manager
exercises over-all control and supervision over branch operation being on the top of the branch's
pyramid structure. However, both the controller and the cashier who are called in banking parlance
as "Financial Managers" due to their fiscal functions are given such a share and sphere of
responsibility in the operations of the bank. The cashier controls and supervises the cash division
while the controller that of the Accounting Division. Likewise, their assigned task is of great
significance, without which a bank or branch for that matter cannot operate or function.

Through the collective action of these three branch officers operational transactions are carried out
like: The two (2)-signature requirement of the manager, on one hand, and that of the controller or
cashier on the other hand as required in bank's issuances and releases. This is the so-called "dual
control" through check-and-balance as prescribed by the Central Bank, per Section 1166.6, Book I,
Manual of Regulations for Banks and Financial Intermediaries. Another is in the joint custody of the
branch's cash in vault, accountable forms, collaterals, documents of title, deposit, ledgers and
others, among the branch manager and at least two (2) officers of the branch as required under
Section 1166.6 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries.

This structural set-up creates a triad of managerial authority among the branch manager, cashier
and controller. Hence, no officer of the bank ". . . have (sic) complete authority and responsibility for
handling all phases of any transaction from beginning to end without some control or balance from
some other part of the organization" (Section 1166.3, Division of Duties and
Responsibilities, Ibid). This aspect in the banking system which calls for the division of duties and
responsibilities is a clear manifestation of managerial power and authority. No operational
transaction at branch level is carried out by the singular act of the Branch Manager but rather
through the collective act of the Branch Manager, Cashier/Controller (emphasis supplied).

Noteworthy is the "on call client" set up in banks. Under this scheme, the branch manager is tasked
with the responsibility of business development and marketing of the bank's services which place
him on client call. During such usual physical absences from the branch, the cashier assumes the
reins of branch control and administration. On those occasions, the "dual control system" is clearly
manifest in the transactions and operations of the branch bank as it will then require the necessary
joint action of the controller and the cashier.

The grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent is at once apparent. Art. 212, par. (m), of the Labor
Code is explicit. A managerial employee is (a) one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies, or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees; or (b) one who is vested with both powers or prerogatives. A supervisory employee is different from a
managerial employee in the sense that the supervisory employee, in the interest of the employer, effectively
recommends such managerial actions, if the exercise of such managerial authority is not routinary in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment.

Ranged against these definitions and after a thorough examination of the evidence submitted by both parties, we
arrive at a contrary conclusion. Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are not managerial
employees but supervisory employees. The finding of public respondent that bank policies are laid down and/or
executed through the collective action of these employees is simply erroneous. His discussion on the division of
their duties and responsibilities does not logically lead to the conclusion that they are managerial employees, as the
term is defined in Art. 212, par. (m).

Among the general duties and responsibilities of a Branch Manager is "[t]o discharge his duties and authority with a
high sense of responsibility and integrity and shall at all times be guided by prudence like a good father of the family,
and sound judgment in accordance with and within the limitations of the policy/policies promulgated by the Board of
Directors and implemented by the Management until suspended, superseded, revoked or modified" (par. 5,
emphasis supplied).8 Similarly, the job summary of a Controller states: "Supervises the Accounting Unit of the
branch; sees to the compliance by the Branch with established procedures, policies, rules and regulations of the
Bank and external supervising authorities; sees to the strict implementation of control procedures (emphasis
supplied).9 The job description of a Cashier does not mention any authority on his part to lay down policies,
either. 10On the basis of the foregoing evidence, it is clear that subject employees do not participate in policy-making
but are given approved and established policies to execute and standard practices to observe,11 leaving little or no
discretion at all whether to implement said policies or not.12 It is the nature of the employee's functions, and not the
nomenclature or title given to his job, which determines whether he has rank-and-file, supervisory or managerial
status.13

Moreover, the bare statement in the affidavit of the Executive Assistant to the President of respondent Bank that the
Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers "formulate and implement the plans, policies and marketing strategies
of the branch towards the successful accomplishment of its profit targets and objectives,"14 is contradicted by the
following evidence submitted by respondent Bank itself:
 (a) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's Assistant Vice President to all Regional Managers
and Branch Managers giving them temporary discretionary authority to grant additional interest over
the prescribed board rates for both short-term and long-term CTDs subject, however, to specific
limitations and guidelines set forth in the same memorandum;15

(b) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's Executive Vice President to all Regional Managers
and Branch Officers regarding the policy and guidelines on drawing against uncollected deposits
(DAUD);16

(c) Memorandum issued by respondent Bank's President to all Field Offices regarding the guidelines
on domestic bills purchased
(DBP);17 and

(d) Memorandum issued by the same officer to all Branch Managers regarding lending authority at
the branch level and the terms and conditions thereof.18

As a consequence, the affidavit of the Executive Assistant cannot be given any weight at all.

Neither do the Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers have the power to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. The Senior Manager of the Human Resource Management Department
of respondent Bank, in her affidavit, stated that "the power to hire, fire, suspend, transfer, assign or otherwise
impose discipline among subordinates within their respective jurisdictions is lodged with the heads of the various
departments, the branch managers and officers-in-charge, the branch cashiers and the branch controllers. Inherent
as it is in the aforementioned positions, the authority to hire, fire, suspend, transfer, assign or otherwise discipline
employees within their respective domains was deemed unnecessary to be incorporated in their individual job
descriptions; By way of illustration, on August 24, 1989, Mr. Renato A. Tuates, the Officer-in-Charge/Branch Cashier
of the Bank's Dumaguete Branch, placed under preventive suspension and thereafter terminated the teller of the
same branch . . . . Likewise, on February 22, 1989, Mr. Francis D. Robite, Sr., the Officer-in-Charge of International
Department, assigned the cable assistant of the International Department as the concurrent FCDU Accountable
Forms Custodian."19

However, a close scrutiny of the memorandum of Mr. Tuates reveals that he does not have said managerial power
because as plainly stated therein, it was issued "upon instruction from Head Office." 20 With regard to the
memorandum of Mr. Robite, Sr., it appears that the power he exercised was merely in an isolated instance, taking
into account the other evidence submitted by respondent Bank itself showing lack of said power by other Branch
Managers/OICs:

(a) Memorandum from the Branch Manager for the

AVP-Manpower Management Department expressing the opinion that a certain employee, due to
habitual absenteeism and tardiness, must be penalized in accordance with respondent Bank's Code
of Discipline; and

(b) Memorandum from a Branch OIC for the Assistant Vice President recommending a certain
employee's promotional adjustment to the present position he occupies.

Clearly, those officials or employees possess only recommendatory powers subject to evaluation, review and final
action by higher officials. Therefore, the foregoing affidavit cannot bolster the stand of respondent Bank.

The positions of Department Managers and Assistant Managers were also declared by public respondent as
managerial, without providing any basis therefor. Petitioner asserts that the position of Assistant Manager was not
even included in the appeal filed by respondent Bank. While we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that it
is within the discretion of public respondent to consider an unassigned issue that is closely related to an issue
properly assigned, still, public respondent's error lies in the fact that his finding has no leg to stand on. Anyway,
inasmuch as the entire records are before us, now is the opportunity to discuss this issue.

We analyzed the evidence submitted by respondent Bank in support of its claim that Department Managers are
managerial employees 21 and concluded that they are not. Like Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers,
Department Managers do not possess the power to lay down policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. They occupy supervisory positions, charged with the duty among others
to "recommend proposals to improve and streamline operations."22 With respect to Assistant Managers, there is
absolutely no evidence submitted to substantiate public respondent's finding that they are managerial employees;
understandably so, because this position is not included in the appeal of respondent Bank.

As regards the other claim of respondent Bank that Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers are
confidential employees, having control, custody and/or access to confidential matters, e.g., the branch's cash
position, statements of financial condition, vault combination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts
and other negotiable instruments, 23 pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint
custody, 24this claim is not even disputed by petitioner. A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on
delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. 25 While Art. 245 of
the Labor Code singles out managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under
the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states that what
is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed, as elucidated in several cases26 the latest
of which is Chua v. Civil Service Commission 27 where we said:

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always
an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be
an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-
called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used
to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication . . . . Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose,
or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate
legis . . . .

In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration the rationale behind the disqualification
of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez,28 thus: ". . . if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union
in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership." Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its
interests are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are
union members. Collective bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided.29 It is the same reason that
impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art.
245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If confidential employees could
unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather
than the interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest
of" the employers. 30 It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest
which they are duty-bound to protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held in Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-
Calleja 31 reiterated in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC,32 that "confidential employees such as
accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to confidential information, may become
the source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining
agreement."

In fine, only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank, being confidential
employees, are disqualified from joining or assisting petitioner Union, or joining, assisting or forming any other labor
organization. But this ruling should be understood to apply only to the present case based on the evidence of the
parties, as well as to those similarly situated. It should not be understood in any way to apply to banks in general.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The decision of public respondent Secretary of Labor dated 23
March 1990 and his order dated 20 April 1990 are MODIFIED, hereby declaring that only the Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Republic Planters Bank are ineligible to join or assist
petitioner National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter, or join, assist
or form any other labor organization.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion's conclusion that respondent Bank's Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers, being confidential employees of the Bank, are disqualified from joining or assisting petitioner labor union
or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization, including a supervisor's union.
However, I dissent from its conclusion that respondent Bank's Department Managers and Department Assistant
Managers are not disqualified from joining a labor union including a supervisors' union. My years of experience in
the banking industry (perhaps irrelevant to this case) have shown that positions of such Department Heads
(Managers) are as confidential, if not more, than the position of Branch Managers. In fact, most of such Department
Heads are Vice-Presidents of the Bank, which underscores their status both as managerial employees and
confidential personnel of the Bank. It would be incongruous for a Department Manager who, as already stated, is
usually a Vice-President, to be a member of the same labor organization as his messenger or supervisory account
executives. It would be even more untenable and dangerous for a Department Manager who usually is a Vice-
President, being a member of a labor union, to be designated a union representative for purposes of collective
bargaining with the management of which he is a part. I think the public respondent is correct in disqualifying from
membership in a labor union of supervisors, those who are Department Managers and Assistant Managers.

I, therefore, vote for the affirmance in toto of public respondent's decision of 23 March 1990 and order of 20 April
1990.

# Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion's conclusion that respondent Bank's Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers, being confidential employees of the Bank, are disqualified from joining or assisting petitioner labor union
or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization, including a supervisor's union.

However, I dissent from its conclusion that respondent Bank's Department Managers and Department Assistant
Managers are not disqualified from joining a labor union including a supervisors' union. My years of experience in
the banking industry (perhaps irrelevant to this case) have shown that positions of such Department Heads
(Managers) are as confidential, if not more, than the position of Branch Managers. In fact, most of such Department
Heads are Vice-Presidents of the Bank, which underscores their status both as managerial employees and
confidential personnel of the Bank. It would be incongruous for a Department Manager who, as already stated, is
usually a Vice-President, to be a member of the same labor organization as his messenger or supervisory account
executives. It would be even more untenable and dangerous for a Department Manager who usually is a Vice-
President, being a member of a labor union, to be designated a union representative for purposes of collective
bargaining with the management of which he is a part. I think the public respondent is correct in disqualifying from
membership in a labor union of supervisors, those who are Department Managers and Assistant Managers.

I, therefore, vote for the affirmance in toto of public respondent's decision of 23 March 1990 and order of 20 April
1990.

#Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 33.

2 Id., p. 28.

3 Id., pp. 18-19.

4 Id., pp. 103-106.

5 Id., pp. 112-113.

6 Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 101730, 17 June 1993,
223 SCRA 452.

7 Decision of public respondent Secretary of Labor promulgated 23 March 1990, Annex "B,"
Petition; Rollo, pp. 24-26.

8 Records, p. 111.

9 Id., p. 94.

10 Id., pp. 91-92.

11 Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines v. Trajano, G.R. No. 75039, 28 January 1988, 157
SCRA 416.
 12 Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) v. Calleja, G.R. No. 80882, 24 April 1989, 172
SCRA 676.

13 See Batongbacal v. Associated Bank, G.R. No. 72977, 21 December 1988, 168 SCRA 600.

14 Records, pp. 249-250.

15 Rollo, pp. 201-203.

16 Id., pp. 204-205.

17 Id., pp. 206-207.

18 Id., p. 208.

19 Records, pp. 239-240.

20 Id., pp. 233-238.

21 Records, pp. 112-115.

22 Rollo, p. 170.

23 Records, pp. 120-121.

24 Id., p. 265.

25 See Panday v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67664, 20 May 1992, 209 SCRA 122.

26 In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]; City of Manila v. Gomez, No. L-37251, 31 August 1981, 107 SCRA
98; Escribano v. Avila, No. L-30375, 12 September 1978, 85 SCRA 245; Go Chico v. Martinez, 45
Phil. 256 [1923]; Gatchalian v. COMELEC, No. L-32560, 22 October 1970, 35 SCRA 435; People v.
Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 [1957]; People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 [1949].

27 G.R. No. 88979, 7 February 1992, 206 SCRA 65, and cited cases therein.

28 G.R. No. 74425, 7 October 1986, 144 SCRA 628, 635.

29 Alcantara, Samson S., Philippine Labor and Social Legislation Annotated, 1991 Ed., p. 455.

30 Pascual, Crisolito, Labor Relations Law, 1986 ed., p. 159.

31 G.R. No. 78755, 19 July 1989, 175 SCRA 471.

32 G.R. No. 88957, 25 June 1992, 210 SCRA 339.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989

RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LEON GAW, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together with Jacinto N. Pascual,
Sr., President of the same corporation, petitioner Llamado was prosecuted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
in Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49. The two (2) had co-signed a postdated
check payable to private respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for lack
of sufficient funds.
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted the petitioner alone, since jurisdiction over the person of
Pascual, who had thoughtfully fled the country, had not been obtained. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment
for a period of one (1) year of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P 200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. Petitioner was also required to reimburse respondent Gaw the amount of P186,500.00 plus the
cost of suit.

On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial court was read to him, petitioner through counsel orally manifested
that he was taking an appeal. Having been so notified, the trial court on the same day ordered the forwarding of the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 9 July 1987, petitioner through his counsel received from the Court
of Appeals a notice to file his Appellant's Brief within thirty (30) days. Petitioner managed to secure several
extensions of time within which to file his brief, the last extension expiring on 18 November 1987. 1

Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellant's Brief was being finalized by his then counsel of record, sought advice
from another counselor. On 30 November 1987, petitioner, with the assistance of his new counsel, filed in the
Regional Trial Court a Petition for Probation invoking Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition was
not, however, accepted by the lower court, since the records of the case had already been forwarded to the Court of
Appeals.

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals Manifestation and Petition for Probation" dated 16 November 1987,
enclosing a copy of the Petition for Probation that he had submitted to the trial court. Petitioner asked the Court of
Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation or, in the alternative, to remand the Petition back to the trial court,
together with the records of the criminal case, for consideration and approval under P.D. No. 968, as amended. At
the same time, petitioner prayed that the running of the period for the filing of his Appellant's Brief be held in
abeyance until after the Court of Appeals shall have acted on his Petition for Probation.

In a "Manifestation and Motion" dated 3 March 1988 and filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner formally withdrew
his appeal conditioned, however, on the approval of his Petition for Probation. 2

Complying with a Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Comment stating that
it had no objection to petitioner Llamado's application for probation. Private respondent-complainant, upon the other
hand, sought and obtained leave to file a Comment on petitioner Llamado's application for probation, to which
Comment, petitioner filed a Reply. Private respondent then filed his "Comment" on the Office of the Solicitor
General's Comment of 18 March 1988.

In a Resolution dated 17 June 1988, the Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice Magsino, denied the Petition for
Probation. A dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Bellosillo while Mr. Justice Santiago submitted a concurring
opinion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on 23 August 1988,
with another, briefer, dissenting opinion from Mr. Justice Bellosillo.

Petitioner now asks this Court to review and reverse the opinion of the majority in the Court of Appeals and, in
effect, to accept and adopt the dissenting opinion as its own.

The issue to be resolved here is whether or not petitioner's application for probation which was filed after a notice of
appeal had been filed with the trial court, after the records of the case had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals
and the Court of Appeals had issued the notice to file Appellant's Brief, after several extensions of time to file
Appellant's Brief had been sought from and granted by the Court of Appeals but before actual filing of such brief, is
barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended.

P.D. No. 968, known as the Probation Law of 1976, was promulgated on 24 July 1976. Section 4 of this statute
provided as follows:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend
the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an
appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial court could grant an application for probation "at any
time" "after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant" and certainly after "an appeal has been taken from
the sentence of conviction." Thus, the filing of the application for probation was "deemed [to constitute] automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal."

On 1 December 1977, Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D. No. 1257 so as to read as follows:
 Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, senteafter it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his
application, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.

The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing of the application for probation and he
may submit his comment on such application within ten days from receipt of the notification.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial
court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction.
The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal. In the latter case, however, if the application is filed on or after the
date of the judgment of the appellate court, said application shall be acted upon by the trial court on
the basis of the judgment of the appellate court. (Emphasis supplied)

Examination of Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No. 1257, reveals that it had established a prolonged but
definite period during which an application for probation may be granted by the trial court. That period was: 'After
[the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence."
Clearly, the cut-off time-commencement of service of sentence-takes place not only after an appeal has
been taken from the sentence of conviction, but even after judgement has been rendered by the appellate
court and after judgment has become final. Indeed, in this last situation, Section 4, as amended by P.D. No. 1257
provides that "the application [for probation] shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the
appellate court"; for the appellate court might have increased or reduced the original penalty imposed by the trial
court. It would seem beyond dispute then that had the present case arisen while Section 4 of the statute as
amended by P.D. No. 1257 was still in effect, petitioner Llamado's application for probation would have had to be
granted. Mr. Llamado's application for probation was filed well before the cut-off time established by Section 4 as
then amended by P.D. No. 1257.

On 5 October 1985, however, Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 was once again amended. This time by P.D.
No. 1990. As so amended and in its present form, Section 4 reads as follows:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided,
That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis supplied)

In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its present form, Section 4 establishes a much
narrower period during which an application for probation may be filed with the trial court: "after [the trial court] shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant and within the period for perfecting an appeal ." As if to provide
emphasis, a new proviso was appended to the first paragraph of Section 4 that expressly prohibits the grant of an
application for probation "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." It is worthy of
note too that Section 4 in its present form has dropped the phrase which said that the filing of an application for
probation means "the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal". The deletion is quite logical since an application
for probation can no longer be filed once an appeal is perfected; there can, therefore, be no pending appeal that
would have to be withdrawn.

In applying Section 4 in the form it exists today (and at the time petitioner Llamado was convicted by the trial court),
to the instant case, we must then inquire whether petitioner Llamado had submitted his application for probation
"within the period for perfecting an appeal." Put a little differently, the question is whether by the time petitioner
Llamado's application was filed, he had already "perfected an appeal" from the judgment of conviction of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.

The period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, under Section 39 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines for the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129
and under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, or more specifically Section 5 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Court, is fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from. It is also
clear from Section 3 (a) of Rule 122 that such appeal is taken or perfected by simply filing a notice of appeal with the
Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the People of
the Philippines. As noted earlier, petitioner Llamado had manifested orally and in open court his intention to appeal
at the time of promulgation of the judgment of conviction, a manifestation at least equivalent to a written notice of
appeal and treated as such by the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner urges, however, that the phrase "period for perfecting an appeal" and the clause "if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction" found in Section 4 in its current form, should not be interpreted
to refer to Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court; and that the "whereas" or preambulatory clauses of P.D. No.
1990 did not specify a period of fifteen (15) days for perfecting an appeal. 3 It is also urged that "the true legislative
intent of the amendment (P.D. No. 1990) should not apply to petitioner who filed his Petition for probation at the
earliest opportunity then prevailing and withdrew his appeal." 4

Petitioner invokes the dissenting opinion rendered by Mr. Justice Bellosillo in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner then
asks us to have recourse to "the cardinal rule in statutory construction" that "penal laws [should]
be liberally construed in favor of the accused," and to avoid "a too literal and strict application of the proviso in P.D.
No. 1990" which would "defeat the manifest purpose or policy for which the [probation law] was enacted-."

We find ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated arguments of petitioner's counsel and the dissenting
opinion. We are unable to persuade ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands, in authorizing the trial court to grant
probation "upon application by [the] defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal" and in reiterating in the
proviso that

no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction.

did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day period established, as indicated above, by B.P. Blg. 129, the Interim
Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, but rather to some
vague and undefined time, i.e., "the earliest opportunity" to withdraw the defendant's appeal. The whereas clauses
invoked by petitioner did not, of course, refer to the fifteen-day period. There was absolutely no reason why they
should have so referred to that period for the operative words of Section 4 already do refer, in our view, to such
fifteen-day period. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. 5 Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the extent they articulate
the general purpose or reason underlying a new enactment, in the present case, an enactment which drastically but
clearly changed the substantive content of Section 4 existing before the promulgation of P.D. No.
1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot control the specific terms of the statute; in the instant case,
the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1990 do not purport to control or modify the terms of Section 4 as amended. Upon
the other hand, the term "period for perfecting an appeal" used in Section 4 may be seen to furnish specification for
the loose language "first opportunity" employed in the fourth whereas clause. "Perfection of an appeal" is, of course,
a term of art but it is a term of art widely understood by lawyers and judges and Section 4 of the Probation Law
addresses itself essentially to judges and lawyers. "Perfecting an appeal" has no sensible meaning apart from the
meaning given to those words in our procedural law and so the law-making agency could only have intended to refer
to the meaning of those words in the context of procedural law.

Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal interpretation" of penal statutes, we note at the outset that the Probation
Law is not a penal statute. We, however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory language
that appears to favor the accused in a criminal case should be given a "liberal interpretation." Courts, however, have
no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation' or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves, and
as illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that "the
spirit of law" may legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and definite meaning imparted to
them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges and all others who
are charged with the application and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind, however,
that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect are to be derived from the words actually used by the
law-maker, and not from some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the words
of the legislature.

The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the
Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently
impede a disciplined and principled search for the meaning which the law-making authority projected when it
promulgated the language which we must apply. That meaning is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and
unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The Court is simply reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no
need for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to engage in, a process made necessary only
because petitioner rejects the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the statute. The first duty of
a judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco
v. Court of First Instance of Manila warned, confusion and uncertainty in application will surely follow, making, we
might add, stability and continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve:

. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a
particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so
much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to understand and know what
the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by
judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting the words here
and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have
 done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily
have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise
their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court
for its interpretation and construction. 6

The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's grasp of English is steadily
attenuated.

There is another and more fundamental reason why a judge must read a statute as the legislative authority wrote it,
not as he would prefer it to have been written. The words to be given meaning whether they be found in the
Constitution or in a statute, define and therefore limit the authority and discretion of the judges who must apply those
words. If judges may, under cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real intent" of the law, disregard the words in fact
used by the law-giver, the judges will effectively escape the constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority
and discretion. Once a judge goes beyond the clear and ordinary import of the words of the legislative authority, he
is essentially on uncharted seas. In a polity like ours which enshrines the fundamental notion of limiting power
through the separation and distribution of powers, judges have to be particularly careful lest they substitute their
conceptions or preferences of policy for that actually projected by the legislative agency. Where a judge believes
passionately that he knows what the legislative agency should have said on the particular matter dealt with by a
statute, it is easy enough for him to reach the conclusion that therefore that was what the law-making authority
was really saying or trying to say, if somewhat ineptly As Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained:

Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large. They are confined by the nature and
scope of the judicial function in its particular exercise in the field of interpretation. They are under the
constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic society. As a matter of verbal
recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the
meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy
has lodged in its elected legislature. The great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of
the need for discipline in observing the limitations A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to
enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely
suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration He must not read in by way of
creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense of internal contradictions. ... 7

Petitioner finally argues that since under Section 4 of Probation Law as amended has vested in the trial court the
authority to grant the application for probation, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and
should have (as he had prayed in the alternative) remanded instead the records to the lower court. Once more, we
are not persuaded. The trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioner perfected his appeal. The Court of
Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to remand the case except for execution of judgment. Moreover, having
invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is not at liberty casually to attack that jurisdiction when
exercised adversely to him. In any case, the argument is mooted by the conclusion that we have reached, that is,
that petitioner's right to apply for probation was lost when he perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 04678 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Records on Appeal, p. 21.

2 Records on Appeal. pp. 41-42.

3 These clauses read:

WHEREAS, it has been the sad experience that persons who are convicted of offenses and who
may be entitled to probation still appeal the judgment of conviction even up to the Supreme Court,
only to pursue their application for probation when their appeal is eventually dismissed.

WHEREAS, the process of criminal investigation, prosecution, conviction and appeal entails too
much time and effort, not to mention the huge expenses of litigation, on the part of the State;

WHEREAS, the time, effort and expenses of the Government in investigating and prosecuting
accused persons from the lower courts up to the Supreme Court, are often times rendered nugatory
when, after the appellate court finally affirms the judgment of conviction, the defendant applies for
and is granted probation;
 WHEREAS, the probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct
and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders
who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated

WHEREAS, it becomes imperative to remedy the problems above-mentioned confronting our

probation system.

4 Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 12.

5 Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 US 174 (1889); 33 L Ed 302. See also Idaho
Commission on Human Rights v. Campbell, 506 P. 2d 112; 95 Id. 215 (1973).

6 29 Phil. at 188 (1915); Italics supplied.

7 Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Columbia Law Review 527 (1947); Reprinted in 4
Sutherland,' Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1972) 409 at 416-417. Italics supplied.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Santiago V. Marcos, Jr. for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:

It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were moved by their desire to devote their remaining years
to the service of their Creator by forming their own civic organization for that purpose, should find themselves
enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from a community member allegedly without the required
permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known
as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of
Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco,
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It
is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information 1 was filed against petitioner Martin
Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the
Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information 2 on the ground that the facts alleged therein do
not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or
public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was
denied 3 by the trial court, and petitioner's motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits
ensued.

On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment 4 finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of P200.00. Nevertheless, the trial court
recommended that the accused be pardoned on the basis of its finding that they acted in good faith, plus the fact
that it believed that the latter should not have been criminally liable were it not for the existence of Presidential
Decree
No. 1564 which the court opined it had the duty to apply in the instant case.

Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10. However,
accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the case proceeded only with respect to petitioner Centeno.
On May 21, 1993, respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but modified the
penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act committed which caused damage and prejudice to the
complainant, by sentencing petitioner Centeno to suffer an increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months and a
fine of P1,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 5 The motion for reconsideration of the
decision was denied by the court. 6

Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the judicial hierarchy eventually reached
this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of whether solicitations for religious purposes are within the ambit
of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the financial sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a question of
principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court is gratified that it can now grant this case the benefit of a final
adjudication.

Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for
religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious purpose" is not expressly included in the
provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes;
(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) to subject to
State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of
religion guaranteed under the Constitution.

Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law),
provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive

contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional
Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated
Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of a written application for a permit in the form prescribed by the
Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development, the Regional Director or
his duly authorized representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or
disapprove the application. In the interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any
permit issued under Act 4075.

The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negative.

I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned. 7

It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words "charitable" and
"religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three descriptive
words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that "charitable institutions, churches and
personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions in statutes wherein
these two terms are likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e) (corporations
exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal Revenue Code;
Section 88 (purposes for the organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and
Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government Code.

That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas
Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the
framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.

All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities
depend for their support on voluntary contributions. 8 However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the
expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable
purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the
legal sense of the term. 9 Although the term "charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it is a broader
term and includes matters which are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between "charitable
purpose" and "religious purpose," except where the two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the
distinction has been done away with by statute. 10 The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is capable
of different significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a very wide
meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad application
since it would be prejudicial to petitioners.

To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer. However, there are
cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for "religious purposes" have been liberally construed as covered in
the law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes." Thus, the term "charitable purposes," within the meaning
of a statute providing that the succession of any property passing to or for the use of any institution for purposes
only of public charity shall not be subject to succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes. 11 A gift for
"religious purposes" was considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as regards exemption from inheritance tax.12

On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation within the concept of "charitable" purpose
which under Presidential Decree
No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services and Development, under paid of penal
liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly
construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine
underlying virtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused.

For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable
considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or
multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to
construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of
two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions
is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal
unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not
plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment. 13

The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 14 The word "charitable" is a matter of description rather than of precise
definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is charitable must be decided on its own particular
facts and circumstances. 15 The law does not operate in vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by
circumstances in the abstract.

Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein given
which include the words "charitable" and "religious" make use of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as
used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It often connects a series of words or propositions
indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken
separately. 16 Accordingly, "charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the
disjunctive "or" should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration
why the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made applicable to the questioned provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1564.

II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the law for, otherwise, it
will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution.

It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and, consequently,
solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. Prefatorily, it is not implausible that the
regulatory powers of the State may, to a certain degree, extend to solicitations of this nature. Considering, however,
that such an activity is within the cloak of the free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed
by the Constitution, it becomes imperative to delve into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the power to
regulate the exercise of this constitutional right and the allowable restrictions which may possibly be imposed
thereon.

The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it
forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus,
the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in
the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The
freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the
power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected
freedom. 17

Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may
protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring
a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity
and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time
and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. 18

It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything which
may be so called can be tolerated. 19 It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not
necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a
detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. 20 Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of
solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of
funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such
regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an
inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. 21

Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are carried on by persons
and associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and
defrauding a generous public. It is in fact amazing how profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to
people who manipulate them. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or
not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent
purposes. That solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused
is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should
not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the
unworthy. 22 The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy and proper charities
which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money for charity is lessened
or destroyed. 23 Some regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest. 24

To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally
liable therefor.

As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent judge for increasing the penalty imposed by the trial
court, premised on the supposed perversity of petitioner's act which thereby caused damage to the complainant. It
must be here emphasized that the trial court, in the dispositive portion of its decision, even recommended executive
clemency in favor of petitioner and the other accused after finding that the latter acted in good faith in making the
solicitation from the complainant, an observation with which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a doubtful and
difficult question of law can be the basis of good faith, especially for a layman.

There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge which would indicate, impliedly or otherwise, that
petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. This could be reflective upon her objectivity,
considering that the complainant in this case is herself a judge of the Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City. It bears
stressing at this point that a judge is required to so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, 25 should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert its independence, and
must resist any pressure from whatever source.26

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner Martin Centeno is
ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J.:

I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is not covered by
P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for "charitable or public welfare purposes."
My reasons are three-fold.

First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare
purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare
purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not like fund drives for needy families or
victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious
magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of
faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor.
Such solicitation does not engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for
contribution.

Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund
campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are usually conducted
among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not
exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so
as to justify state regulation.

Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior
restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well justify requiring a permit before a
church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we
precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee before one may engage in business could not be
applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because that would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional
right. It is for the same reason that religious rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public
assemblies and other uses of public parks and streets. 2 To read the Decree, therefore, as including within its reach
solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause of the Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain whether a construction of the statute
is not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided.

For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from and to acquit petitioner.

Padilla, J., concurs.

# Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J.:

I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is not covered by
P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for "charitable or public welfare purposes."
My reasons are three-fold.

First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare
purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare
purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not like fund drives for needy families or
victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious
magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of
faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor.
Such solicitation does not engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for
contribution.

Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund
campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are usually conducted
among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not
exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so
as to justify state regulation.

Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior
restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well justify requiring a permit before a
church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we
precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee before one may engage in business could not be
applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because that would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional
right. It is for the same reason that religious rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public
assemblies and other uses of public parks and streets. 2 To read the Decree, therefore, as including within its reach
solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause of the Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain whether a construction of the statute
is not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided.

For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from and to acquit petitioner.

Padilla, J., concurs.

#Footnotes

1 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 25.

2 Annex B, id.; ibid., 20.

3 Annex D, id.; ibid., 34.

4 Annex G, id.; ibid., 40.

 5 Annex H, id.; ibid., 44.

6 Annex J, id.; ibid., 64.

7 Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 48886-88, July 21, 1993,
224 SCRA 665.

8 Scobey vs. Beckman, 41 N.E. 2d 84.

9 See Adye vs. Smith, 26 Am. Rep. 424.

10 See Read vs. McLean, 200 So. 109.

11 In re Seaman's Estate, 139 N.E. 2d 17.

12 In re Clark's Estate, 159 A. 500.

13 Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979 ed., 183.

14 Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 69809, October 16, 1986, 145 SCRA
112.

15 Topeka Presbyterian Manor, Inc. vs. Board, 402 P. ed. 802.

16 Martin, op. cit., 81.

17 Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 301 U.S. 296 (1940).

18 Id., loc. cit.

19 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, 283.

20 Ibid., id., 282.

21 Cantwell vs. Connecticut, supra.

22 Id., loc. cit.

23 City of Seattle vs. Rogers, 106 P. 2d 598.

24 Commonwealth vs. Creighton, et al., 170 A. 720.

25 Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.

26 Rule 1.03. id.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:

1 101 Phil. 386 (1957).

2 B.P. Blg. 880, 3(a).

SECOND DIVISION

JAIME U. GOSIACO, G.R. No. 173807

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
LETICIA CHING and EDWIN
CASTA,
Respondents. Promulgated:

April 16, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The right to recover due and demandable pecuniary obligations incurred by juridical persons such
as corporations cannot be impaired by procedural rules. Our rules of procedure governing the
litigation of criminal actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) have given the
appearance of impairing such substantive rights, and we take the opportunity herein to assert the
necessary clarifications.

Before us is a Rule 45 petition[1] which seeks the reversal of the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR No. 29488. The Court of Appeals' decision affirmed the decision [3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68 in Criminal Case No. 120482. The RTC's decision
reversed the decision[4] of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Branch 58 in Criminal Case
No. 70445 which involved a charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondents Leticia Ching
(Ching) and Edwin Casta (Casta).

On 16 February 2000, petitioner Jaime Gosiaco (petitioner) invested P8,000,000.00 with ASB
Holdings, Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money was loaned to ASB for a period of 48 days with
interest at 10.5% which is equivalent to P112,000.00. In exchange, ASB through its Business
Development Operation Group manager Ching, issued DBS checks no. 0009980577 and
0009980578 for P8,000,000.00 and P112,000.00 respectively. The checks, both signed by Ching,
were drawn against DBS Bank Makati Head Office branch. ASB, through a letter dated 31 March
2000, acknowledged that it owed petitioner the abovementioned amounts.[5]

Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to the DBS Bank San Juan Branch to deposit
the two (2) checks. However, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and payments were
refused because of a stop payment order and for insufficiency of funds. Petitioner informed
respondents, through letters dated 6 and 10 April 2000,[6] about the dishonor of the checks and
demanded replacement checks or the return of the money placement but to no avail. Thus,
petitioner filed a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of San Juan against the private respondents.
Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained at large. Ching denied liability and claimed
that she was a mere employee of ASB. She asserted that she did not have knowledge as to how
much money ASB had in the banks. Such responsibility, she claimed belonged to another
department.

On 15 December 2000, petitioner moved[7] that ASB and its president, Luke Roxas, be impleaded
as party defendants. Petitioner, then, paid the corresponding docket fees. However, the MTC
denied the motion as the case had already been submitted for final decision.[8]

On 8 February 2001, the MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it did not absolve her from
civil liability. The MTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer of ASB, was civilly liable since
she was a signatory to the checks.[9]

Both petitioner and Ching appealed the ruling to the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the RTC on the
ground that the MTC failed to hold ASB and Roxas either jointly or severally liable with Ching.
On the other hand, Ching moved for a reconsideration which was subsequently denied.
Thereafter, she filed her notice of appeal on the ground that she should not be held civilly liable
for the bouncing checks because they were contractual obligations of ASB.

On 12 July 2005, the RTC rendered its decision sustaining Ching's appeal. The RTC affirmed the
MTCs ruling which denied the motion to implead ASB and Roxas for lack of jurisdiction over
their persons. The RTC also exonerated Ching from civil liability and ruled that the subject
obligation fell squarely on ASB. Thus, Ching should not be held civilly liable.[10]

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on the grounds that the RTC erred
in absolving Ching from civil liability; in upholding the refusal of the MTC to implead ASB and
Roxas; and in refusing to pierce the corporate veil of ASB and hold Roxas liable.

On 19 July 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and stated that the
amount petitioner sought to recover was a loan made to ASB and not to Ching. Roxas testimony
further bolstered the fact that the checks issued by Ching were for and in behalf of ASB. The
Court of Appeals ruled that ASB cannot be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case since it is not a
natural person and in the case of Roxas, he was not the subject of a preliminary investigation.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no need to pierce the corporate veil of ASB
since none of the requisites were present.[11]

Hence this petition.

Petitioner raised the following issues: (1) is a corporate officer who signed a bouncing check
civilly liable under B.P. Blg. 22; (2) can a corporation be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case; and
(3) is there a basis to pierce the corporate veil of ASB?

B.P. Blg. 22 is popularly known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
xxx xxx xxx

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons, who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to address the rampant issuance of bouncing checks as payment
for pre-existing obligations. The circulation of bouncing checks adversely affected confidence in
trade and commerce. The State criminalized such practice because it was deemed injurious to
public interests[12] and was found to be pernicious and inimical to public welfare.[13] B.P. Blg. 22
punishes the act of making and issuing bouncing checks. It is the act itself of issuing the checks
which is considered malum prohibitum. The law is an offense against public order and not an
offense against property.[14] It penalizes the issuance of a check without regard to its purpose. It
covers all types of checks.[15] Even checks that were issued as a form of deposit or guarantee were
held to be within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.[16]

When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he may be held
personally liable for violating a penal statute.[17] The statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone
who with intent to defraud another of money or property, draws or issues a check on any bank
with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check on
presentment.[18]Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on the
principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from his own acts on the ground that it was
a corporate act and not his personal act.[19] As we held in Llamado v. Court of Appeals:[20]
Petitioner's argument that he should not be held personally liable for the amount of the check
because it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he signed the same in his
capacity as Treasurer of the corporation, is also untenable. The third paragraph of Section 1 of
BP Blg. 22 states: Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can only be
held civilly liable when he is convicted. In the recent case of Bautista v. Auto Plus Traders
Inc.,[21] the Court ruled decisively that the civil liability of a corporate officer in a B.P. Blg. 22
case is extinguished with the criminal liability. We are not inclined through this case to revisit so
recent a precedent, and the rule of stare decisis precludes us to discharge Ching of any civil
liability arising from the B.P. Blg. 22 case against her, on account of her acquittal in the criminal
charge.

We recognize though the bind entwining the petitioner. The records clearly show that it is
ASB is civilly obligated to petitioner. In the various stages of this case, petitioner has been
proceeding from the

premise that he is unable to pursue a separate civil action against ASB itself for the recovery of
the amounts due from the subject checks. From this premise, petitioner sought to implead ASB
as a defendant to the B.P. Blg. 22 case, even if such case is criminal in nature.[22]
What supplied the notion to the petitioner that he was unable to pursue a separate civil action
against ASB? He cites the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly the provisions
involving B.P. Blg. 22 cases, which state that:
Rule 111, Section 1Institution of criminal and civil action.

xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complainant or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on
the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute
a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.[23]

We are unable to agree with petitioner that he is entitled to implead ASB in the B.P. Blg. 22 case,
or any other corporation for that matter, even if the Rules require the joint trial of both the criminal
and civil liability. A basic maxim in statutory construction is that the interpretation of penal laws
is strictly construed against the State and liberally construed against the accused. Nowhere in B.P.
Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be impleaded as an accused or defendant in the
prosecution for violations of that law, even in the litigation of the civil aspect thereof.

Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable obligations against
a debtor-corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure. Technically, nothing
in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the juridical
person on whose behalf the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a
separate civil

action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such corporate
officer who had signed the bounced check.

In theory the B.P. Blg. 22 criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing check
in behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself, such
civil liability arising from the Civil Code. B.P. Blg. 22 itself fused this criminal liability of the
signer of the check in behalf of the corporation with the corresponding civil liability of the
corporation itself by allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability not from the
corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its behalf. Prior to the amendments to
our rules on criminal procedure, it though clearly was permissible to pursue the criminal liability
against the signatory, while going after the corporation itself for the civil liability.

However, with the insistence under the amended rules that the civil and criminal liability
attaching to the bounced check be pursued jointly, the previous option to directly pursue the civil
liability against the person who incurred the civil obligationthe corporation itselfis no longer that
clear. In theory, the implied institution of the civil case into the criminal case for B.P. Blg. 22
should not affect the civil liability of the corporation for the same check, since such implied
institution concerns the civil liability of the signatory, and not of the corporation.

Let us pursue this point further. B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the
signatory of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for the amount
represented from the check. The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from the
wrongful act of signing the check despite the insufficiency of funds in the account, while the
civil liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very obligation covered by the check
or the consideration for its execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to be
indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the singularity of the amount of each.
If we conclude, as we should, that under the current Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil
action that is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22 action is only the civil liability of the
signatory, and not that of the corporation itself, the distinctness of the cause of action against the
signatory and that against the corporation is rendered beyond dispute. It follows that the actions
involving these liabilities should be adjudged according to their respective standards and merits.
In the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the trial court should determine whether or not the signatory had
signed the check with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit in the bank account, while
in the civil case the trial court should ascertain whether or not the obligation itself
is valid and demandable. The litigation of both questions could, in theory, proceed independently
and simultaneously without being ultimately conclusive on one or the other.

It might be argued that under the current rules, if the signatory were made liable for the
amount of the check by reason of the B.P. Blg. 22 case, such signatory would have the option of
recovering the same amount from the corporation. Yet that prospect does not ultimately satisfy
the ends of justice. If the signatory does not have sufficient assets to answer for the amount of the
checka distinct possibility considering the occasional large-scale transactions engaged in by
corporations the corporation would not be subsidiarily liable to the complainant, even if it in truth
the controversy, of which the criminal case is just a part, is traceable to the original obligation of
the corporation. While the Revised Penal Code imposes subsidiary civil liability to corporations
for criminal acts engaged in by their employees in the discharge of their duties, said subsidiary
liability applies only to felonies,[24] and not to crimes penalized by special laws such as B.P. Blg.
22. And nothing in B.P. Blg. 22 imposes such subsidiary liability to the corporation in whose
name the check is actually issued. Clearly then, should the check signatory be unable to pay the
obligation incurred by the corporation, the complainant would be bereft of remedy unless the
right of action to collect on the liability of the corporation is recognized and given flesh.
 There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery against the corporation be pursued
even as the B.P. Blg. 22 case against the signatory remains extant. First, the possibility that the
plaintiff might be awarded the amount of the check in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and in the civil
action against the corporation. For obvious reasons, that should not be permitted. Considering
that petitioner herein has no chance to recover the amount of the check through the B.P. Blg. 22
case, we need not contend with that possibility through this case. Nonetheless, as a matter of
prudence, it is best we refer the matter to the Committee on Rules for the formulation of proper
guidelines to prevent that possibility.

The other concern is over the payment of filing fees in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and the
civil action against the corporation. Generally, we see no evil or cause for distress if the plaintiff
were made to pay filing fees based on the amount of the check in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and
the civil action. After all, the plaintiff therein made the deliberate option to file two separate cases,
even if the recovery of the amounts of the check against the corporation could evidently be
pursued through the civil action alone.

Nonetheless, in petitioners particular case, considering the previous legal confusion on whether
he is authorized to file the civil case against ASB, he should, as a matter of equity, be exempted
from paying the filing fees based on the amount of the checks should he pursue the civil action
against ASB. In a similar vein and for a similar reason, we likewise find that petitioner should
not be barred by prescription should he file the civil action as the period should not run from the
date the checks were issued but from the date this decision attains finality. The courts should not
be bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest
wrong or injustice would result.[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without prejudice to the right of petitioner Jaime U.
Gosiaco to pursue an independent civil action against ASB Holdings Inc. for the amount of the
subject checks, in accordance with the terms of this decision. No pronouncements as to costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be REFERRED to the Committee on Revision of the Rules for the
formulation of the formal rules of procedure to govern the civil action for the recovery of
the amount covered by the check against the juridical person which issued it.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo. pp. 3-44.

[2]Dated 19 July 2006 and penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia
Alino-Hormachuelos, Chairperson Fourth Division, and Amelita G. Tolentino. id. at 88-95.

[3]Dated 12 July 2005 and penned by Judge Santiago G. Estrella; id. at 83-87.

[4] Dated 08 February 2001 and pendered by Judge Maxwel S. Rosete; id. at 73-82.

[5]The letter was signed by Luke Roxas; id. at 60

[6]Id. at 62.

[7]Id. at 67-71

[8]
Records, p. 764.

[9]See note 4.

[10]See note 3.

[11]See note 2.

[12]Lozano v. Martinez, Nos. L-63419, L-66839-42, L-71654, 74524-25, L-75122-49, L-75812-13, 75765-67, L-75789, 18 December
1986, 146 SCRA 323.

[13]People v. Laggui, G.R. Nos. 76262-63, 18 March 1989, 171 SCRA 305, 311.

[14]See Note 12.

[15]Id.

[16]Que v. People, Nos. L-75217-18, 21 September 1987, 154 SCRA 160.

[17]
1643 18B AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS citing Semones v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.Co., 106 N.C. App. 334, 416 S.E.2d
909 (1992).

[18]Id. citing Walker v. State, 467 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist.1984).

[19]68 A.L.R. 2D 1269.

[20]Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99032, 26 March 1997, 270 SCRA 423.
[21]
G.R. No. 166405, 6 August 2008.
[22]
A traditional theory in criminal law is that a corporation cannot be prosecuted . B.P. 22 clearly adheres to the traditional
theory, as nothing therein holds a juridical person liable for the violation of the said law. Nonetheless, a more modern rule pronounces
that a corporation may be criminally liable for actions or omissions made by its officers or agents in its behalf. And that while a
corporation cannot be imprisoned, it may be fined, its charter may be revoked by the state, or other sanctions may be imposed by law.
See Cox, James. Corporations. 2nd ed. Aspen Publishers. New York. 2003 p. 130.
[23]
Section 1, Rule 111(b), 2000 Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explained the rationale for the
implementation of the abovementioned rule. The reason was to declog the courts of B.P. 22 cases because ordinarily payment of docket
fees is not required in a criminal case for actual damages because prior to its amendment, it became the practice of creditors to use the
courts as their personal collection agencies by the mere expediency of filing a B.P. Blg. 22 case. See FLORENZ D. REGALADO,
REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II. 9th revised ed. pp. 293-294.
[24]
See REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 103. Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
[25]
Santiago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.103959, 21 August 1997, 278 SCRA98,113, citing Raeses v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 76518, 13 July 1990, 187 SCRA 404, and as cited in Cometa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141855, 6 February 2001,
351 SCRA294, 310.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated November 5,
2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b)
of the Revised Penal Code.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in
1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing
that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino
and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a
consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet;
one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of 98,000.00, as evidenced by a
receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return
the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale
or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the
former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's
diamond ring, 18k, worth 45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth 25,000.00; one (1) two-baht
ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth 12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (98,000.00),
Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the
said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to
defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and
benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused
failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (98,000.00),
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.

The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other
hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing
business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner
denied having transacted any business with private complainant.

However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank
receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the
supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of
Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the
amount of 98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the
RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San
Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that
accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional 10,000.00, or a total of 7 years.
The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present petition stating the
following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION
BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE
MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT
CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -

1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF

05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF
SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS PROVED;

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND

LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;

3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;

4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following counter-
arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the offense and the acts
complained of.

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court
affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the
opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both
procedural and substantive issues.

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated
May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating
the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also
correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer
of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to
interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived.5

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed against him. He
contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned
and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This
argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in
reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first
time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b)
of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that
the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong
date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA
ruled:

x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;

the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing
rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is
not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of
the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof
is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does
not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which
accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by
Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be
allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
RPC, which reads:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial
is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the offender, was
not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner
after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items
with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ

q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been finished on 5 July
1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?

a I went looking for him, sir.

q For whom?

a Lito Corpuz, sir.

q Were you able to look (sic) for him?

a I looked for him for a week, sir.

q Did you know his residence?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you go there?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?

a No, sir.

q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?

a I talked to him, sir.

q How many times?

a Two times, sir.

q What did you talk (sic) to him?

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.

q Referring to Exhibit A-2?

a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and he promised me
that he will pay these amount, sir.

q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?

a No, sir.9

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not even be formal; it may be
verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person
charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount
to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not be
formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa
under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law would have
stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and
oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, we
held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of embezzlement.
It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence
of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at
bar.14

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the
elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as
shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold.
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale
took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the
private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious.
Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the
trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the
witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The
assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established
not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of
evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of the continued
validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged
these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the
members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they
decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were
invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously
complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before
the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose
on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money
eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the
said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including
Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law,
and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of penal legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement
as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable
by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of
penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation,
thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable
by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first
paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the
court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.

In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of
the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the
legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no
punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration
with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.

Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that the
strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do
in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20

Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired
Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited
commentary, thus:

The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered with
mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether
or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not
severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to
enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited
class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief
Executive.22

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current inflation rate or
at the ratio of 1.00 is equal to 100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as
opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the
proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change,
thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the
present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present
times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission
of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of
Plunder, from its original minimum amount of 100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to
50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money
Laundering Act may apply, from 1,000,000.00 to 500,000.00.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be excessive
compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen
is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the
property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5
pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen
is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty
of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is 6,000.00, the above-provision states that the penalty is prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the
proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is 6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that
under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree;
hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6
months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even
apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too
far from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the
law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23

Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the
damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the
basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no
longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are not changed:

1. 12,000.00 to 22,000.00 will become 1,200,000.00 to 2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor

minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).

2. 6,000.00 to 12,000.00 will become 600,000.00 to 1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional

medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24

3. 200.00 to 6,000.00 will become 20,000.00 to 600,000.00, punishable by prision correccional

minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).

4. 50.00 to 200.00 will become 5,000.00 to 20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor medium to prision
correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

5. 5.00 to 50.00 will become 500.00 to 5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6
months).

6. 5.00 will become 500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.

x x x x.

II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the penalties are not
changed, as follows:

1st. 12,000.00 to 22,000.00, will become 1,200,000.00 to 2,200,000.00, punishable by prision

correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25

2nd. 6,000.00 to 12,000.00 will become 600,000.00 to 1,200,000.00, punishable by prision

correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26

3rd. 200.00 to 6,000.00 will become 20,000.00 to 600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum
to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

4th. 200.00 will become 20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6
months).

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental
penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a valid classification.
The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as
10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR
was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however,
this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals 142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone
who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3,
considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no
longer exist today.

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in Article
315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case
the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds 22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more
questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters
to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to
Congress. Thus:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional because it is
absurd.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two Thousand
(22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then
that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (100,000.00) Pesos ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:

For every One Hundred Thousand (100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (22,000.00) Pesos
you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But if we de ... (interrupted)

DEAN DIOKNO:

....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The only remedy is to go to Congress...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (22,000.00)
Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (22,000.00) Pesos.

Thank you, Dean.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Thank you.

x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the
application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the
penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is
proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious
crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.

However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what respondent
therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into account the
latters recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum
punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent
was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because
of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present
controversy.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the offense is high.
Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the
commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such
person the protection and safekeeping of the employers loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that
trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such
wrongful acts.

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter of the
crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the crime of
Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by reason
of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two
hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the
amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more
than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter,
the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a
fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable,
upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.

The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the unlawful acts of the
offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is 200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now
becomes 20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of 20,000.00 compared
to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally
defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now
become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes
advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.

The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited) where
the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and
also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage
caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing unlawfully taken,
as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no
longer the element of force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime
of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not
exceeding 1,000.00 (100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or
intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it
is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the
penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the
unlawful taking.

Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be imposed is arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused
exceeds 1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now become 100,000.00 (1:100), and still
punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not
exceed 200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not
more than 200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed 200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal,
200.00 will now become 20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of 200.00 under the existing law will now
become 20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature
despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but
changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally
feasible.

There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the proposal, such
as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit:
Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real
property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other
forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of
malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes
that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and
similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),

Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable officer to render
accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).

In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are punishable by
special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended.34The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without
license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that
the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the
offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be
amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the
RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.

With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and other
related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and
necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no
position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the
applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of
the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who,
after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even
create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.

Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During the oral
arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the
Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to
archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far
different from todays conditions.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative
powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or
supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law,
or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner that
would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put,
the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government;
otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial
legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be increased by
the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall
be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court,
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who
is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be
fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation
to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers
the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution.
Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of
a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the
reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that
would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a
minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is 3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus,
although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity
can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under
Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary
upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral
damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel
punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive
or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply
the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly written.

Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is that the incremental penalty
provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to
the amount of 22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds 22,000.00. As suggested, however,
from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the
appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused
convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be imposed.
Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.

It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos
Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this
Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was
re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the
death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the
Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to
its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the law from
which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process,
considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject
matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality
issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never
touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form
or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments
which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not
thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and
plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community."45

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern time.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values to
the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need
to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and
properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the
likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe
should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient
personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our
Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes
to this conclusion, to wit:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to take into
consideration several factors.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yeah.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Inflation ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those economic
terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred
(100.00) Pesos to ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... One (1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That is legislative in nature.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, okay.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is a power
that belongs to the legislature.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Thank you, Professor.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Thank you.46

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role of the Court
is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in
the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but
consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past
taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the substance of a statute.
The issue is no different from the Courts adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had
previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil
Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals
ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is
truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court
should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to
civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of
money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value
of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be
awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed.
Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC
imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.
However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional 10,000.00, or a
total of seven (7) years.

In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly instructive, thus:

With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the
same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the
penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum,
medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days

Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum
should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in
accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is 98,000.00, which exceeds
22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and
21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty
for every additional 10,000.00 defrauded in excess of 22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may
be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of 98,000.00 is 76,000.00 more than the 22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding
one year for each additional 10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision
mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years,
plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against
petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and
2 months.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court
should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the most
expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on
prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby
DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS
and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See: Concurring Opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I take no part due to prior action in the CA I join the Dissent of J. Abad
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Dissenting Opinion

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part
BVIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* No part.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of the Supreme Court), with
Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of the Supreme Court),
concurring; rollo, pp. 31-41.

2
Rollo, p. 43.

3
Id. at 48-52.

4
Libuit v. People, 506 Phil. 591, 599 (2005).

5
Blas v. Angeles- Hutalla, 482 Phil. 485, 501 (2004).

6
Quinto v. People, 365 Phil. 259, 270 (1999).

7
Rollo, p. 37. (Citations omitted.)

8
Diaz v. People, 585 Phil. 318, 332 (2008), citing Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 670, 675 (1999).

9
TSN, December 17, 1992, pp. 9-10. (Emphasis supplied.)
10
Tan v. People, 542 Phil. 188, 201 (2007).

11
Id., citing Lee v. People, 495 Phil. 239, 250 (2005).

12
Id.

13
555 Phil. 106 (2007).

14
Id. at 114. (Citations omitted.)

15
Cosme, Jr. v. People, 538 Phil. 52, 66 (2006), citing People v. Garillo, 446 Phil. 163, 174-175 (2003).

16
Id., citing Sullon v. People, 500 Phil. 39, 45 (2005) ; People v. Bulan, 498 Phil. 586, 598 (2005).

17
Id. at 67, citing People v. Gaspar, 376 Phil. 762, 779 (1999).

18
Emphasis supplied.

19
Third Edition, 1940.

20
Id. at 16. (Emphasis supplied)

21
1997 Edition.

Id. at 93, citing United States v. Valera Ang Y, 26 Phil. 598 (1914); People v. Salazar y Gabriel, 102 Phil.
22

1184 (1958); Tiu Ua, 51 O.G. 1863; Limaco, 99 Phil. 35 (1956), and People v. Del Rosario y Natividad, 62
Phil. 824 (1936). (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
23

hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions
of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of
the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos,
provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following
means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality or anything of value which the offender
shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an
immoral or illegal consideration.

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any

other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or
by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and by writing
any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or of any
third person.

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
 (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.

(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or business.

(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action
for calumny which the offended party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this
case, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty.

(d) [By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the
check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt
of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for
lack of insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false
pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)]

(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn, restaurant,

boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house and the like without paying therefor, with
intent to defraud the proprietor or manager thereof, or by obtaining credit at hotel, inn,
restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house by the use of any false
pretense, or by abandoning or surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from a hotel,
inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house or apartment house after obtaining credit,
food, refreshment or accommodation therein without paying for his food, refreshment or
accommodation.

3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:

(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.

(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.

(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files,
document or any other papers.

24
May be entitled to Probation.

25
May be entitled to Probation if the maximum penalty imposed is 6 years.

26
May be entitled to Probation.

27
Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010, 613 SCRA 385, 414.

28
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).

29
TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 192-195.

30
463 U.S. 277 (1983)

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
31

penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law.

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material
benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or
capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in
consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
 (d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which
has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its
termination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly,
from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the
purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against
any other interested party.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he
is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any
transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and
which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not
participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the
approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or
group to which they belong.

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not
qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere
representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on
account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of
its authorized release date.

The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and
(c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or
urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k)
of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this
Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from
transacting business in any form with the Government.

32
R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 9.

33
Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an
alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty,
if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than 200 pesos.

34
Revised Forestry Code, as amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987.

35
Taopa v. People, 592 Phil. 341, 345 (2005).

36
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant,
or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic erruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

37
TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, p. 167.

38
People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505, 548 (1996).
 39
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT
40

PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.

41
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.

42
Section 19.

1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x x x.

Gutierrez v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 153266, 159007, 159029, 170084, 172713,
43

173119, 176477, 177990, A.M. No. 06-4-02-SB, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 1, 25.

44
People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 (1953); People v. Tongko, 353 Phil. 37, 43 (1998).

People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, 655 (1953); People v. Dionisio, No. L-15513, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA
45

1299, 1301-1302.

46
TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 183-185.

47
No. L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468.

48
Supra note 15.

49
Id. at 71-72.

50
ART. 65. Rule in Cases in Which the Penalty is Not Composed of Three Periods. In cases in which the
penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the
foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming
one period of each of the three portions.

51
People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 284.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez
seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions, dated 11 June 20041 and 27 January 20052 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En
Bancdirected the Law Department to file the appropriate Information with the proper court against petitioners Carlos
S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of Section 10(g) and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic
Act No. 8189, otherwise known as The Voters Registration Act of 1996.5 Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
thereon was denied.

The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented hereunder:

On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol6 filed a Complaint-Affidavit7 with the
COMELEC thru the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with violation of Section
261(y)(2)8 and Section 261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election Code, similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;
and Section 1210 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages and residents of 113 Mariposa Loop,
Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S.
Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer
of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 42454095 and 07902952, respectively; in their
sworn applications, petitioners made false and untruthful representations in violation of Section 1011 of Republic Act
Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in
fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon
City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A,
as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners, knowing fully well
said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of
time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent charged petitioners, to wit:

Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez committed and
consummated election offenses in violation of our election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y),
subparagraph (2), for knowingly making any false or untruthful statements relative to any data or information
required in the application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (5), committed by
any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for cancellation of his
previous registration, both of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter
Registration Act) for failure to apply for transfer of registration records due to change of residence to another
city or municipality."12

The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if
the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for the prosecution of the same.

Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss13 dated 2 April 2001. They contended therein that
they did not make any false or untruthful statements in their application for registration. They avowed that they
intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen,
Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years, the house of Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San Jose Street in Burauen,
Leyte. On even date, the Barangay District III Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing
therein its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official
residence.14

On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued a
Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), the filing of
the appropriate Information against petitioners, disposing, thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS
to file the necessary information against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for
violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act 8189 and to authorize the
Director IV of the Law Department to designate a Comelec Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the case
with the duty to submit periodic report after every hearing of the case.15

On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the recommendatory Resolution of 28
November 2003, and ordered, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed to file the appropriate
information with the proper court against respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA
ROMUALDEZ for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of the Republic Act No.
8189.16

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.

Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb the assailed En Banc Resolution of 11 June
2004,17 rationalizing, thus:

However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments and issues raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration are merely a rehash of the arguments advanced by the Respondents in [their]
Memorandum received by the Law Department on 17 April 2001, the same [w]as already considered by the
Investigating Officer and was discussed in her recommendation which eventually was made as the basis for
the En Bancs resolution.

As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting
Registration Record does not automatically cancel the registration records. The fact remains that at the time
of application for registration as new voter of the herein Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of
Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame Quezon City was still valid and subsisting.18
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen,
Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez19 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to
Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g),
in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and
Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183, respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against petitioners.21

Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the following arguments:

RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION; and

II

COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON A

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT
WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.22

On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to
Cite for Indirect Contempt,23 alleging that two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, were filed with the
RTC by the COMELEC against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to
Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged that the
COMELEC filed with the RTC, two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R.
Romualdez, charging her with the same offenses as those charged against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez, and
thereafter, docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-03-9183.

On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution24 denying for lack of merit petitioners Motion Reiterating Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.

We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.

Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by private respondent are entirely different
from those which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC. According to petitioners, private
respondents complaint charged them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1) Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the
Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12 of the Voters Registration Act; however, the COMELEC En
Bancdirected in the assailed Resolutions, that they be charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to
Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act. Essentially, petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded due
process of law. Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges which
COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration
Act is vague as it does not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election
offense; hence, it runs contrary to Section 14(1)25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

We are not persuaded.

First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language which
embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.

A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:

Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows:

SEC. 10 Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a
precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a
voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in
three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.

The application shall contain the following data:

xxxx

(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;

xxxx
 (j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct;

The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible
rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest photograph,
attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.

Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform him of the
qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the
accomplished application contains all the data therein required and that the applicants specimen signatures,
fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voters application.

Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:

SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act:

xxxx

(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC,
support the charge directed by the COMELEC En Banc to be filed against petitioners with the RTC. Even a mere
perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 was specifically
mentioned therein. On the matter of the acts covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the Complaint-Affidavit, spells out the
following allegations, to wit:

5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their applications (Annexes "B" and
"C") in violation of the requirements of Section 10, RA 8189 (The Voters Registration Act):

5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B" and "C", claimed to be residents
of 935 San Jose [S]treet, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents
of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City and registered
voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy
of the Certification issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong Barangay, Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, Quezon City is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof, as Annex "D";

5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank
spaces in their applications (Annexes "B" and "C") corresponding to the length of time they have
resided in Burauen, Leyte;

6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are residents and registered voters
of Quezon City, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively;
photocopies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.] Likewise, attached is a "Certification"
(Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B. Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Election Officer, Fourth District,
Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000, together with a certified copy of the computer print-out of the list of voters
of Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex "G-1" ) containing the names of voters Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes
Romualdez. The Certification reads as follows:

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA
REYES ROMUALDEZ are registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV,
Quezon City, Precinct Number 4419A with voters affidavit serial nos. 26195824 and 26195823,
respectively.

This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve."

7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact
that they were and still are, registered voters of Quezon City as early as June 22, 1997;

7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.

A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.

If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting registration, the new application for
registration will be disapproved. The registrant is also liable not only for an election offense of double
registration, but also for another election offense of knowingly making any false or untruthful
statement relative to any data or information required in the application for registration.

In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she fills up a Voter Registration
Record form in his or her own handwriting, which contains a Certification which reads:
 "I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my person are true and correct; that I
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints,
specimen signatures and photographs appearing herein are mine; and that I am not registered as a
voter in any other precinct."27

Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses charged against
them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC,
as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as
contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by
private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by
the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts
as originally alleged in the private respondents Complaint-Affidavit.

Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case of Lacson v. Executive
Secretary.28Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual
recital of facts in the Complaint or Information; and that the object of such written accusations was to furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make his defense. Let it be said
that, in Lacson, this court resolved the issue of whether under the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it is
the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against therein
petitioner and intervenors. In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at
the trial.29 Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.30

Petitioners reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as we have
said, the charges contained in private respondents Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the
COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private
respondents Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant
to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to
refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were
afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondents
Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-
Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum
before the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar,
we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the
nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were
conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They
were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners
actively participated.

The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned police officer therein designated
the offense charged as sexual harassment; but, the prosecutor found that there was no transgression of the anti-
sexual harassment law, and instead, filed an Information charging therein petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On
a claim that there was deprivation of due process, therein petitioner argued that the Information for acts of
lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted was for sexual harassment. The court held that
the designation by the police officer of the offense is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor
to assess the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.

Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the allegations to support the charge of acts of
lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another preliminary investigation for the
offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the
same facts and evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor.32 The court frowns upon such
superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal complaint.33

Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on the ground that
it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2),
Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite
provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense.

We are not convinced.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.34 However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a
criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial
invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in no
uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
 In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing
"on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such
statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges
in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)

"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While
mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our
jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated
the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec
Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional
because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.

Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties
whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure
from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a
sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed
out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:

"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided."

For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a

"manifestly strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining
the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)

At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the
purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An
appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to
Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded
examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment
that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.

We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent a facial challenge:38

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate
state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct."
Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally
unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held:

It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and
when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that
facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its
function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids
the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive
falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly
and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be
applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
 unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in
Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of
the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only
assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to
raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern
with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring
suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove
that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017
and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.

Xxx xxx xxx

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law
may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.

Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an
analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that
a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.

Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice.39 This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.40

As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act.
Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No.
8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no
other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an
uncertainty that makes the same vague.

Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which they do not
understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for
statutory definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the
argument.

This Court reasoned:

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment.Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the
words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as
the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in
the Plunder Law."

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be

interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the
lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in
such a manner is always presumed.
Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be
impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.43

The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the violation of any of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts, but
also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is
illuminating. The law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration in order to
establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly with the
provisions upon which petitioners are charged, i.e., Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are
required to be set forth under the aforesaid sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete, permanent
and updated list of voters. The factual information required by the law is sought not for mere embellishment.

There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts should be set forth in the
application. The periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration delve into the matter of
residency, a requisite which a voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and registered in the permanent list
of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the
requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should state that he/she is not a registered voter of any
precinct. Multiple voting by so-called flying voters are glaring anomalies which this country strives to defeat. The
requirement that such facts as required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the voters application form
for registration is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate.

It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the therein assailed law contains a
similar provision as herein assailed before us. Republic Act No. 602 also penalizes any person who willfully violates
any of the provisions of the Act. The Court dismissed the challenged, and declared the provision constitutional. The
Court in Gatchalian read the challenged provision, "any of the provisions of this [A]ct" conjointly with Section 3
thereof which was the pertinent portion of the law upon which therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian
considered the terms as all-embracing; hence, the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which
embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted. This Court ruled that the law by
legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are
clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law.45 Gatchalian remains good law, and
stands unchallenged.

It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by Congress in a
number of our laws.46 These provisions have not been declared unconstitutional.

Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity.47 To justify its nullification, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.48 We hold
that petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its constitutionality must be upheld in
the absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.

A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and
is the very lis mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC in
finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners.

Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a misapprehension of facts, and
committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of Informations against them with the RTC.

We are once again unimpressed.

The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory expression under Section 26549 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.50 The task of the COMELEC whenever
any election offense charge is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, and make a
determination of probable cause. Under Section 8(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
investigating officer makes a determination of whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed.51 In Baytan v. COMELEC,52 this Court, sufficiently elucidated on the matter of probable cause in the
prosecution of election offenses, viz:

It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the
COMELEC's sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the
COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the
COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.53

It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.54

According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar, held that there was sufficient
cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners, and found no reason to depart therefrom. Without
question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001, petitioners applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election
Officer of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of petitioners registration records as registered voters of
Precinct No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City. The directive by the
COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution55 of 28 November 2000 of Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal
does not appear to be wanting in factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would conclude that there exists
probable cause to hold petitioners for trial. Thus, in the aforesaid Resolution, the Investigating Officer, found:

A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense.

In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez filed their respective
applications for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte on May 9
and 11, 2001, respectively, they stated under oath that they are not registered voters in other precinct (VRR
Nos. 42454095 and 07902941). However, contrary to their statements, records show they are still registered
voters of Precinct No. 4419-A, barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, as per VRR
Nos. 26195825 and 26195823. In other words, respondents registration records in Quezon City is (sic) still
in existence.

While it may be true that respondents had written the City Election Officer of District IV, Quezon City for
cancellation of their voters registration record as voters (sic) therein, they cannot presume that the same
will be favorably acted upon. Besides, RA 8189 provides for the procedure in cases of transfer of residence
to another city/municipality which must be complied with, to wit:

"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. Any registered voter who has
transferred residence to another city or municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence
for the transfer of his registration records.

The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing and the
approval of the Election Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon approval, of the application
for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the Election Officer of their former residence of the voter,
said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the voters registration record to the Election Officer of
the voters new residence."

They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on the procedure for transfer of registration
records by reason of transferred new residence to another municipality. Based on the affidavit executed by
one Eufemia S. Cotoner, she alleged that the refusal of the Assistant Election Officer Ms. Estrella Perez to
accept the letter of respondents was due to improper procedure because respondents should have filed the
required request for transfer with the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte. Despite this knowledge, however,
they proceeded to register as new voters of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of their previous
registrations in Quezon City.

In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration under Section 12 of Republic Act 8189,
respondents admitted that they erroneously filed an application as a new voter (sic) with the office of the
Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, by reason of an honest mistake, which they now desire to correct.
(underscoring ours).

Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such as violation of election law, is mala
prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not necessary. Good faith, ignorance or lack of malice is beside the
point. Commission of the act is sufficient. It is the act itself that is punished.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully submits that there is probable cause to hold
respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for trial in violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189. There is no doubt that they applied for registration as new
voters of Burauen, Leyte consciously, freely and voluntarily.56

We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to prosecute cases or
violations of election laws. Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and where appropriate, prosecute cases or violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who shall be prosecuted, and the corollary
right to decide whom not to prosecute.57 Evidently, must this power to prosecute also include the right to determine
under which laws prosecution will be pursued. The courts cannot dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary
powers. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutors discretion and control of the criminal prosecution.58Its
rationale cannot be doubted. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get
involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution may err
in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should
correct the blunders of the defense.60

Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer,
conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause,
files the Information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the
subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The records show that
Informations charging petitioners with violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act
No. 8189 had been filed with the RTC. The case must, thus, be allowed to take its due course.

It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before this Court to restrain the COMELEC from executing its Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27
January 2005. In a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for lack of merit petitioners Motion
Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt. Logically, the
normal course of trial is expected to have continued in the proceedings a quo.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 of the
COMELEC En Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

*RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Dissenting Opinion
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. NO. 167011 April 30, 2008

SPS. CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

AND DENNIS GARAY, respondents.

Promulgated:

April 30, 2008

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DISSENTING OPINION

TINGA, J.:

This case presented itself with an alluring promise the rare opportunity to declare a penal provision
unconstitutional and void for vagueness, in the process obliterating the impression, spawned by recent
pronouncements of the Court based on an erroneous reading of applicable American jurisprudence, that such a
denouement would not unfold in this jurisdiction. Quite lamentably, the majority prevented the promise from
blossoming to fruition, perpetuating instead a grievous doctrinal error which is already the subject of strenuous
criticism within the legal academe.1

A vague criminal statute at its core violates due process, as it deprives fair notice and standards to all the citizens,
the law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges. The petition in this case has allowed the Court to engage in
as thorough inquiry as there ever has been on the constitutional right to due process, to infuse vitality and
sophistication in the litigation of such primordial right. Yet, in the end, instead of reinforcing a perspective more
attuned to the fullest measure of the peoples democratic rights, the Court has chosen not to rise to the challenge.

The petition should have been granted. The assailed Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
directs the filing of criminal informations against petitioners Carlos and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of Section 10
(g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 (Rep. Act 8189), also known as the Voters Registration Act, in relation to
Section 45(j) of the same law. It is Section 45(j) which criminalizes the violation of Section 10, as well as the
violation of any and all other provisions of Rep. Act 8189, as an election offense. Yet in the final analysis,
Section 45(j) is unconstitutional, violative as it is of the due process clause, and thus should be voided.

I.

The case stemmed from a complaint2 dated 12 July 2000 filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law
Department by private respondents Dennis Garay and Angelino Apostol3 against petitioners, spouses Carlos and
Erlinda Romualdez. The complaint alleged that petitioners violated Sections 261(y)(2) and 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus
Election Code, and Section 12(3) of Republic Act No. 8189 (Rep. Act 8189), also known as the Voters Registration
Act, such violations arising from the acts initiated by petitioners in registering as voters in Burauen, Leyte.

Petitioners had applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen on 9 and 11
May 2000, respectively. In their respective applications, petitioners stated that they were residents of 935 San Jose
St., in Burauen. They left blank the space in the application form requiring them to state the years and months of
their "period of residence" in the aforementioned municipality.4 The complaint alleged that in truth petitioners were
actually residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa St., Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, as well as
registered voters in Precinct No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, in Quezon City. To
support this factual allegation, were various certifications issued by barangay and election officers of Quezon
City,5as well as the Quezon City Voter Registration Records of the petitioners were attached to the complaint.6

The complaint further stated that oppositions had been filed against petitioners application for registration in
Burauen. In response thereto, petitioners filed with the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen various documents
evincing not only their intent to transfer their registration as voters from Quezon City to Burauen, which was their
new place of residence, but the actuality that they had began to formalize such transfer pursuant to Section 12 of
Rep. Act No. 8189. Particularly, said documents include letters from petitioners to the election officer of Burauen
manifesting their intent to transfer their registrations, as well as their respective Affidavits of Transfer of Voters
Registration under Section 12, Rep. Act 8189. Petitioners also explained that by reason of honest mistake, they had
erroneously filed applications as new voters in Burauen, instead of as transferee voters.
The complaint likewise point out the particular provisions of law for which petitioners could be held accountable.
Section 261(y)(2) and (y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code respectively penalizes knowingly making any false or
untruthful statements relative to any data or information required in the application for registration, and the re-
registration anew by a previously registered voter without the filing of an application for cancellation of his previous
registration. On the other hand, the failure to apply for transfer of registration records due to change of residence to
another city or municipality was alleged to be in violation of Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 8189.

The matter was referred to the Commission on Elections and docketed as E.O. Case No. 2000-36. Petitioners filed
a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss. They alleged that they had been intending to reside in Burauen
since 1989, and they actually took up residence therein on 9 May 2000. They claimed having left unanswered the
blank space for "period of residence" in their application for registration because they were unsure what period of
residence was being required.7 They also averred that as early as 18 April 2000, they had already written the
election officer in Quezon City requesting the cancellation of their registration as voters in Barangay Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, but the Assistant Quezon City Election Officer had refused to acknowledge receipt of the same
on the ground that the proper procedure was to file a request for transfer of voters registration records with the
election officer of Burauen. Petitioners noted that they did file an Application for Transfer of Registration Records in
Burauen, and that the same was approved. Finally, they claimed that the filing of the case was politically motivated
as petitioner Carlos Romualdez was a candidate for Congress in the second district of Leyte in the 2001 elections.

On 28 November 2003, the designated Investigating Officer assigned to hear the case, Atty. Maria Norina Tangaro-
Casingal, issued a resolution recommending the prosecution of petitioners for the commission of an election
offense, i.e., violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45(j) of Rep. Act No. 8189. This recommendation
was adopted by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution8 dated 3 February 2004.

Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8189 states in part:

Sec. 10. Registration of Voters. A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a
precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a
voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in
three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.

The application shall contain the following data:

(a) Name, surname, middle name, and/or maternal surname;

(b) Sex;

(c) Date, and place of birth;

(d) Citizenship;

(e) Civil status, if married, name of spouse;

(f) Profession, occupation or work;

(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;

(h) Exact address with the name of the street and house number for location in the precinct maps
maintained by the local office of the Commission, or in case there is none, a brief description of his
residence, sitio, and barangay;

(i) A statement that the applicant possesses all the qualifications of a voter;

(j) A statement that the applicant is not a registered voter of any precinct; and

(k) Such information or data as may be required by the Commission. xxx

The COMELEC observed that a violation of Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8189 is an election offense, pursuant to
Section 45(j) of the same law, which reads:

Sec. 45. Election Offenses. - The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act:

xxxx

(j) Violation of the provisions of this Act.

The COMELEC found that petitioners violated Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8189 in two ways. First, petitioners had
stated under oath that they were not registered voters in any other precinct, when in fact, the records showed that
they still were registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A in Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon
City, at the time they executed their application. The COMELEC pointed out that Section 12 of the same law
provided for the procedure to be observed in cases of transfer of residence to another city/municipality, which
involved an application for transfer of registration with the Election Officer of the new place of residence. Even
though petitioners subsequently filed an application for transfer pursuant to Section 12, manifesting therein that they
had erroneously filed an application as a new voter by reason of honest mistake, the COMELEC pointed out that a
statutory offense such as the violation of election law is "mala prohibita" and that good faith, ignorance or lack of
malice was "beside the point" in such cases.

Second, the COMELEC also stated that petitioners failure to fill up the blank portion of their application on "period
of residence" likewise constituted a violation of Section 10(g), which specifies that the applicant state the periods of
residence in the Philippines and in the places of registration.

A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the COMELEC through a Resolution dated 27
January 2005.9 As a result, the present petition was filed. While the petition was pending with this Court, two
separate Informations dated 12 January 2006 were filed against each of the petitioners by the COMELEC with the
Regional Trial Court of Burauen, and corresponding Orders of Arrest were issued by the trial court judge.

Petitioners allege before us that the COMELEC Resolution violates their constitutional right to due process, as well
as their constitutional rights under Section 14(1) and (2), Article III of the Constitution. In that regard, they point out
that while the complaint alleged violations of Sections 261(y)(2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
12 of Rep. Act 8189, they were charged instead with violation of different provisions of law altogether. Petitioners
likewise argue that Section 45(j) of Rep. Act 8189 is "vague", as "it does not specifically refer to a definite provision
of law the violation of which would constitute an election offense." The provision is thus "not the fair notice required
by the Constitution for provisions of this Act."

Section 45(j) is vague. It does not provide "fair notice" to the citizenry and the standards for enforcement and
adjudication. In precise legal terms, I submit that Section 45(j) violates the due process clause of the Constitution,
and should accordingly be nullified.

II.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The due process clause makes
legally operative our democratic rights, as it establishes freedom and free will as the normative human conditions
which the State is bound to respect. Any legislated restrictions imposed by the State on life, liberty or property must
be in accordance with due process of law. The scope of "due process," as we currently understand it, is admittedly
ambitious, but in its elemental form, it encompasses aboriginal values ascribed to justice such as equity, prudence,
humaneness and fairness.

Section 45(j) is vague. It does not provides "fair notice" to the citizentry, as well as the standards for enforcement
and adjudication. Thus, the section violates the due process clause and thus deserves to be struck down.

The potency of the due process clause has depended on judicial refinement, to allow for the crystallization of its
abstract ideals into a set of standards, from which a deliberate determination can be had whether the provision
bears operative effect following a given set of facts. As a result, various subsets to due process have emerged,
including the distinction between procedural due process and substantive due process. Stated very generally,
substantive due process guarantees against the arbitrary exercise of state power, while procedural due process is a
guarantee of procedural fairness.10 Substantive and procedural due process are equally sacrosanct in the
constitutional order, and a law that is infirm in either regard is wholly infirm.

Among the components of due process, particularly concerning penal statutes, is the fair notice requirement. The
Court, through Justice Sarmiento, acknowledged in People v. Nazario11 that a statute violates due process, and thus
repugnant to the Constitution, if it fails "to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid."12 Such flaw is one characteristic of a vague statute, the other being that "it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."13Both
attributes earmark a statute as "vague", the generally accepted definition of a vague statute being one that lacks
comprehensible standards that people "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application."14

Even though the "fair notice" rule is integral to due process itself, it finds realization in still another provision of our
Bill of Rights. Section 14(2), Article III15 assures that an accused is "to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him." Both Justice Cruz and Fr. Bernas acknowledge that this constitutional right extends
not only to the criminal information against the accused, but also to the language of the statute under which
prosecution is pursued.16 Yet our own jurisprudence has yet to expressly link the fair notice requirement with Section
14(2), Article III,17 though this need not be a contestable point since the due process clause under Section 1, Article
III already embodies the fair notice requirement.
As earlier stated, a penal statute that violates the fair notice requirement is marked by vagueness because it leaves
its subjects to necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. What has emerged as the most
contentious issue in the deliberations over this petition is whether such vagueness may lead to the nullification of a
penal law. Our 2004 ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan18 states: "It is best to stress at the outset that the
overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes."19 The time has come to reconsider that statement. Rooted
in unyielding formalism and deprived of guidance from basic constitutional tenets, that dicta disenchants the rights of
free people, diminishing as it does, the basic right to due process.

III.

A deeper analysis of the vagueness doctrine is in order.

Employing the terminology preferred by Collings, the vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional
uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process
uncertainty cases."20 "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so
obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper
standards for

adjudication.21 Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine.22 This perspective rightly integrates the
vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision
that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness."

Void-for-vagueness derives from the basic tenet of criminal law that conduct may not be treated as criminal unless it
has been so defined by an authority having the institutional competence to do so before it has taken place. It
requires that a legislative crime definition be meaningfully precise.23

The inquiry into whether a criminal statute is "meaningfully precise" requires the affirmative satisfaction of two
criteria. First, does the statute fairly give notice to those it seeks to bind of its strictures? Second, is the statute
precise enough that it does not invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by law enforcement authorities?
Unless both criteria are satisfied, the statute is void for vagueness.

There are three concerns animating the vagueness doctrine. First, courts are rightly concerned that citizens be fairly
warned of what behavior is being outlawed; second, courts are concerned because vague laws provide
opportunities for arbitrary enforcement and put the enforcement decisions in the hands of police officers and
prosecutors instead of legislatures; finally, where vague statutes regulate behavior that is even close to
constitutionally protected, courts fear a chilling effect will impinge on constitutional rights.24 These three interests
have been deemed by the U.S. Supreme Court as important enough to justify total invalidation of a statute,25 such
invalidation warranted unless there is some intervening act that has eliminated the threat to those interests.26

In its essence, the vagueness doctrine is a critical implement to the fundamental role of the courts to rule justly and
fairly.27 Uncertainty in statutes enables persons to be penalized for acts which are not precisely defined in law as
criminal, or for acts which are constitutionally protected but cast within an overbroad definition of a crime.

Our special focus now lies with the "void-for-vagueness" or "procedural due process uncertainty" rule. Two
coordinate functions are served by the doctrine: guidance to the individual in planning his future conduct, and
guidance to those adjudicating his rights and duties.28 It is clear that some substantial degree of definiteness should
be required of penal statutes, for if a person is to be charged with knowledge of all his rights and duties under a
statute regardless of whether he has read or understood it, fundamental fairness requires that he be given at least
the opportunity to discover its existence, its applicability, and its meaning. While the due process requirements of
publication are designed to fill the first of those needs, the due process requirements of definiteness are designed to
fill the latter two.29

The requirement of certainty arose from a fundamental common-law concept, a matter of fairness, and an element
of due process of law.30 No one will deny that a criminal statute should be definite enough to give notice of required
conduct to those who would avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge in its application and the attorney defending
those charged with its violation.31 The rules must be definite enough to enable the judge to make rulings of law
which are so closely referable to the statute as to assure consistency of application.32 In addition, the statute must
serve the individual as a guide to his future conduct, and it is said to be too indefinite if "men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."33 If the statute does not provide adequate
standards for adjudication, by which guilt or innocence may be determined, it will be struck down.34

The danger of a statute that suffers from the vagueness defect cannot be underestimated. Taken to the extreme, the
absence of any clear and definite standards for conviction would leave the matter of freedom of the accused solely
upon the discretion of the judge, to

whom the language of the statute would offer no guide to adjudication. At worse, it could represent "the coercive
force of society run loose at the whim of the [prosecutor] without adequate restraint at the level of the trial court (for
want of standards by which to restrain), enforced against indigent and unrepresented defendants."35 Indeed, the
chances for acquittal as against a vague statute are significantly bettered depending on the skill of the defense
counsel, and the poorer an accused is, the slimmer the chances that a skilled counsel would be within means. Void-
for-vagueness statutes strike special impunity at the impoverished. They smack of unmitigated heedlessness of the
lot of the likely victims of their built-in uncertainty, especially the underprivileged.

Romualdez,36 cited by the ponencia, is unfortunately insensate to these constitutional concerns. That decision
referenced Estrada v. Desierto37 as basis for its response to the vagueness challenge. The ponencia in Estrada did
adopt and incorporate the views stated by Justice Mendoza in his Separate Opinion, particularly, that "[t]he
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases[t]hey are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes... the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. [t]hey cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute."38

However, in his Separate Opinion to the Resolution (on the Motion for Reconsideration) dated 29 January 2002,
Justice Mendoza acknowledged:

[L]et it be clearly stated that, when we said that the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth and vagueness
are analytical tools for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases [and therefore] cannot be made to do service when what is involved
is a criminal statute, we did not mean to suggest that the doctrines do not apply to criminal statutes at
all. They do although they do not justify a facial challenge, but only an as-applied challenge, to those
statutes Neither did we mean to suggest that the doctrines justify facial challenges only in free
speech or First Amendment cases. To be sure, they also justify facial challenges in cases under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution with respect to so-called
fundamental rights..."39

In light of Justice Mendozas subsequent clarification, it is a disputable matter whether Estrada established a
doctrine that "void-for-vagueness or overbreadth challenges do not apply to penal statutes," the reference thereto
in Romualdez notwithstanding. However, there is no doubt that Romualdez itself, which did not admit to a similar
qualification or clarification, set forth a "doctrine" that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases [and] are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes." As a result,
the Office of the Solicitor General invokes Romualdez in its present Memorandum before the Court, and the
petitioners in at least one other case now pending before this Court urges the reexamination of that doctrine.

The ponente has also cited in tandem with the Romualdez precedent this Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza for
the purpose of denominating the key issue as whether the vagueness doctrine can be utilized as an analytical tool to
challenge the statute "on-its-face" or "as applied." Unfortunately, we can only engage that question if we
acknowledge in the first place that the doctrine of vagueness can be applied to criminal statutes, because if not (as
pronounced in Romualdez), there is no point in distinguishing between on-its-face and as-applied challenges.
Moreover, this subsequent Separate Opinion, especially as it may distinguish from Justice Mendozas earlier and
more sweeping Separate Opinion, cannot be asserted as reflective of a doctrine announced by this Court. What
works towards such effect is Romualdez, which again does not offer such clarificatory distinction, and which
certainly does not concede, as Justice Mendoza eventually did, that "we did not mean to suggest that the doctrines
[of void-for-vagueness] do not apply to criminal statutes at all" and that "neither did we mean that that doctrines do
not justify facial challenges "in cases under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution with
respect to the so-called fundamental rights."

What we have thus seen is the queer instance of obiter in a latter case, Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, making a
doctrine of an obiter in an earlier case, Estrada v. Desierto.

Moreover, the controversial statement in Romualdez, as adopted from Estrada with respect to the vagueness
challenge being applicable only to free speech cases, is simply not reflective of the American jurisprudential rule
which birthed the vagueness doctrine in the first place.

The leading American case laying down the rules for the vagueness challenge is Connally v. General Construction
Co.,40 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1926. It concerned a statute creating an eight (8)-hour workday in
Oklahoma, through a provision which read:

'That not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed shall be
paid to laborers, workmen, mechanics, prison guards, janitors in public institutions, or other persons so
employed by or on behalf of the state, ... and laborers, workmen, mechanics, or other persons employed by
contractors or subcontractors in the execution of any contract or contracts with the state, ... shall be deemed
to be employed by or on behalf of the state. ...' (388)41

The statute further penalized violations thereof with a fine. A constitutional challenge to this statute was raised that
the statutory provisions, "if enforced, will deprive plaintiff, its officers, agents and representatives, of their liberty and
property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; that they
contain no ascertainable standard of guilt; that it cannot be determined with any degree of certainty what sum
constitutes a current wage in any locality; and that the term 'locality' itself is fatally vague and uncertain." The U.S.
Supreme Court agreed, holding:

That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well-
recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of
law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of
due process of law. xxx42

The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen cannot be held
to answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reasonably
admit of different constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an uncertain foundation. The crime, and
the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose,
in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue. Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things,
and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen
may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon another.'

We are of opinion that this provision presents a double uncertainty, fatal to its validity as a criminal statute.
In the first place, the words 'current rate of wages' do not denote a specific or definite sum, but minimum,
maximum, and intermediate amounts, indeterminately, varying from time to time and dependent upon the
class and kind of work done, the efficiency of the workmen, etc., as the bill alleges is the case in respect of
the territory surrounding the bridges under construction. The statutory phrase reasonably cannot be confined
to any of these amounts, since it imports each and all of them. The current rate of wages' is not simple, but
progressive-from so much (the minimum) to so much (the maximum), including all between; and to direct the
payment of an amount which shall not be less than one of several different amounts, without saying which,
is to leave the question of what is meant incapable of any definite answer. See People ex rel. Rodgers v.
Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 24-25, 59 N. E. 716, 52 L. R. A. 814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605.

Nor can the question be solved by resort to the established canons of construction that enable a court to
look through awkward or clumsy expression, or language wanting in precision, to the intent of the
Legislature. For the vice of the statute here lies in the impossibility of ascertaining, by any reasonable test,
that the Legislature meant one thing rather than another, and in the futility of an attempt to apply a
requirement, which assumes the existence of a rate of wages single in amount, to a rate in fact composed of
a multitude of gradations. To construe the phrase 'current rate of wages' as meaning either the lowest rate
or the highest rate, or any intermediate rate, or, if it were possible to determine the various factors to be
considered, an average of all rates, would be as likely to defeat the purpose of the Legislature as to promote
it. See State v. Partlow, 91 N. C. 550, 553, 49 Am. Rep. 652; Commonwealth v. Bank of Pennsylvania, 3
Watts & S. (Pa.) 173, 177.

In the second place, additional obscurity is imparted to the statute by the use of the qualifying word 'locality.'
Who can say, with any degree of accuracy, what areas constitute the locality where a given piece of work is
being done? Two men, moving in any direction from the place of operations, would not be at all likely to
agree upon the point where they had passed the boundary which separated the locality of that work from the
next locality. It is said that this question is settled for us by the decision of the state Supreme Court on
rehearing in State v. Tibbetts, 205 P. 776, 779. But all the court did there was to define the word 'locality' as
meaning 'place,' 'near the place,' 'vicinity,' or 'neighborhood.' Accepting this as correct, as of course we do,
the result is not to remove the obscurity, but rather to offer a choice of uncertainties. The word
'neighborhood' is quite as susceptible of variation as the word 'locality.' Both terms are elastic and,
dependent upon circumstances, may be equally satisfied by areas measured by rods or by miles. See
Schmidt v. Kansas City Distilling Co., 90 Mo. 284, 296, 1 S. W. 865, 2 S. W. 417, 59 Am. Rep. 16; Woods v.
Cochrane and Smith, 38 Iowa, 484, 485; State ex rel. Christie v. Meek, 26 Wash. 405, 407-408, 67 P. 76;
Millville Imp. Co. v. Pitman, etc., Gas Co., 75 N. J. Law, 410, 412, 67 A. 1005; Thomas v. Marshfield, 10
Pick. (Mass.) 364, 367. The case last cited held that a grant of common to the inhabitants of a certain
neighborhood was void because the term 'neighborhood' was not sufficiently certain to identify the grantees.
In other connections or under other conditions the term 'locality' might be definite enough, but not so in a
statute such as that under review imposing criminal penalties. Certainly, the expression 'near the place'
leaves much to be desired in the way of a delimitation of boundaries; for it at once provokes the inquiry,
'How near?' And this element of uncertainty cannot here be put aside as of no consequence, for, as the rate
of wages may vary-as in the present case it is alleged it does vary- among different employers and
according to the relative efficiency of the workmen, so it may vary in different sections. The result is that the
application of the law depends, not upon a word of fixed meaning in itself, or one made definite by statutory
or judicial definition, or by the context or other legitimate aid to its construction, but upon the probably
varying impressions of juries as to whether given areas are or are not to be included within particular
localities. The constitutional guaranty of due process cannot be allowed to rest upon a support so
equivocal.43

The statute in question did not involve a proscription on free speech, but a standard of wages with a corresponding
financial penalty for violation thereof. Without any consideration to the notion that the "void-for-vagueness"
challenge should be limited to free speech cases, the U.S. High Court accepted the notion that a vague statute
could be invalidated and then proceeded to analyze whether the statute was indeed vague. The fact that the
statute was invalidated makes it clear then that the "void-for-vagueness" challenge could be employed
against a penal statute.

Within the next 73 years, the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly invalidated penal statutes on the ground of "void-for-
vagueness,"44 in the cases of Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.,45 Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey,46 Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville,47 Grayned v. City of Rockford48, Smith v. Goguen49 and Kolender v. Lawson.50 More recently, in 1999,
the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the rule in City of Chicago v. Morales51 as it invalidated an anti-loitering
ordinance. The decision explained the ordinance as follows:

The ordinance creates a criminal offense punishable by a fine of up to $500, imprisonment for not more than
six months, and a requirement to perform up to 120 hours of community service. Commission of the offense
involves four predicates. First, the police officer must reasonably believe that at least one of the two or more
persons present in a "public place" is a "criminal street gang membe[r]." Second, the persons must be
"loitering," which the ordinance defines as "remain[ing] in any one place with no apparent purpose." Third,
the officer must then order "all" of the persons to disperse and remove themselves "from the area." Fourth, a
person must disobey the officer's order. If any person, whether a gang member or not, disobeys the officer's
order, that person is guilty of violating the ordinance.52

In explaining why the ordinance suffered from the "void-for-vagueness" defect, the U.S. Supreme Court, through
Senior Associate Justice John Paul Stevens, first attacked the statutory definition of "loitering:"

xxx The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the term "loiter" may have a common and accepted
meaning, 177 Ill. 2d, at 451, 687 N. E. 2d, at 61, but the definition of that term in this ordinance--"to remain in
any one place with no apparent purpose"--does not. It is difficult to imagine how any citizen of the city of
Chicago standing in a public place with a group of people would know if he or she had an "apparent
purpose." If she were talking to another person, would she have an apparent purpose? If she were
frequently checking her watch and looking expectantly down the street, would she have an apparent
purpose?

Since the city cannot conceivably have meant to criminalize each instance a citizen stands in public with a
gang member, the vagueness that dooms this ordinance is not the product of uncertainty about the normal
meaning of "loitering," but rather about what loitering is covered by the ordinance and what is not. The
Illinois Supreme Court emphasized the law's failure to distinguish between innocent conduct and conduct
threatening harm. Its decision followed the precedent set by a number of state courts that have upheld
ordinances that criminalize loitering combined with some other overt act or evidence of criminal intent.
However, state courts have uniformly invalidated laws that do not join the term "loitering" with a second
specific element of the crime.53

Next, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the principle of "fair notice" that necessitated the "void-for-vagueness" rule:

First, the purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her
conduct to the law. "No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning
of penal statutes." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). Although it is true that a loiterer is not
subject to criminal sanctions unless he or she disobeys a dispersal order, the loitering is the conduct that the
ordinance is designed to prohibit. If the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is
an unjustified impairment of liberty. If the police are able to decide arbitrarily which members of the public
they will order to disperse, then the Chicago ordinance becomes indistinguishable from the law we held
invalid in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, an officer may issue an order only after prohibited conduct has
already occurred, it cannot provide the kind of advance notice that will protect the putative loiterer from being
ordered to disperse. Such an order cannot retroactively give adequate warning of the boundary between the
permissible and the impermissible applications of the law.

xxx Lack of clarity in the description of the loiterer's duty to obey a dispersal order might not render the
ordinance unconstitutionally vague if the definition of the forbidden conduct were clear, but it does buttress
our conclusion that the entire ordinance fails to give the ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden
and what is permitted. The Constitution does not permit a legislature to "set a net large enough to catch all
possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and
who should be set at large." United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221 (1876). This ordinance is therefore
vague "not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible
normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Coates v.
Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 614 (1971).54

In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor offered this succinct restatement of the void-for-vagueness
rule:

A penal law is void-for-vagueness if it fails to "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" or fails to establish guidelines to prevent
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" of the law. Kolender v . Lawson , 461 U. S. 352, 357 (1983). Of
 these, "the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine `is ... the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' " Id., at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 574-
575 (1974)). I agree that some degree of police discretion is necessary to allow the police "to perform their
peacekeeping responsibilities satisfactorily." See post, at 12 (dissenting opinion). A criminal law, however,
must not permit policemen, prosecutors, and juries to conduct "a standardless sweep ... to pursue their
personal predilections." Kolender v. Lawson, supra, at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, supra, at 575). 55

Consider the lucid explanation of Gunther and Sullivan, which integrates the principles established by American
jurisprudence on that point:

The concept of vagueness under the [freedom of expression clause in the] First Amendment [of the U.S.
Constitution] draws on the procedural due process requirement of adequate notice, under which a law must
convey sufficient definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practices." Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) A law will be void on its face for vagueness if
persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). One of the purposes of this requirement is to
ensure fair notice to the defendant. But the ban on vagueness protect not only liberty, but also equality and
the separation of executive from legislative power through the prevention of selective enforcement. See
Smith v. Goguen (415 U.S. 566): "We have recognized that the more important aspect of the vagueness
doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine the requirement that
legislatures set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement". xxx56

Prior to Romualdez, Philippine jurisprudence had recognized the susceptibility of penal statutes to the vagueness
challenge, even if they did not pertain to the free exercise of speech. Nazario, earlier cited, was one such case.
Another instance, was People v. Dela Piedra,57 decided in 2001, where the Court announced:

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its. penalties. A criminal statute that "fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or
is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness. The
constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an
offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.58

Dela Piedra is inconsistent with the subsequent Romualdez doctrine, yet it embodies the correct basic proposition
which is sensitive to the fundamentals of the due process clause. There was, and still is, no good or logical reason
for Philippine jurisprudence to adopt an opposing rule from that in American jurisprudence in relation to the void-for-
vagueness doctrine. Is the doctrine that "void-for-vagueness" cannot invalidate penal statutes somehow more
appropriate to the Filipino mindset than to the American way? I really could not see any reason to foster the contrary
rule unless it is the intent to effectively moot in the Philippines the right of a Filipino accused to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against him/her through a penal law that defines the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited or establishes guidelines to prevent
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" of the law.

IV.

It is clear that a criminal statute may be nullified on the ground of void-for-vagueness. What are the requisites that
must obtain before a suit predicated on such ground may be brought before the courts? Assuming that the suit
successfully demonstrates the vagueness of the statute or provision of law, what remedy can the courts apply?

There are orthodox precepts in Philippine law that may find application in the resolution of void-for-vagueness
cases. Long established in our jurisprudence are the four requisites for judicial inquiry: an actual case or
controversy; the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself.59 These requisites would accommodate instances such as those in the present case, where the
constitutional challenge to the penal law is raised by the very persons who are charged under the questioned statute
or provision.

On the premise that the statute in question contravenes the due process clause because it is vague, our
jurisprudence likewise supplies the options for remedial measures which the Court can undertake. In essence,
under Philippine jurisprudence, the courts possess a wide berth of discretion when confronted with a penal statute
that is impermissibly vague. The general rule is that an unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights, imposes
no duties, affords no protection, creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed.60 At the same time, there are doctrines in statutory construction that authorize the courts to allow the
survival of the challenged statute or provision of law. It is a well-settled rule that a statute should be construed
whenever possible in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution.61 Where a statute is reasonably
susceptible of two constructions, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, that construction in favor of its
constitutionality shall be adopted while the construction that renders it invalid rejected.
Yet in the United States, even as the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized vague penal laws as contrary to the
due process clause,62 it has also recognized special considerations when the assailed statute also infringes on the
First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Grayned v. City of Rockford,63 expresses thus:

It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly
defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to
be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but
related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it
"operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to
"`steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked."64

One year after Grayned was decided in 1972, a divided U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Broadrick
v. Oklahoma,65 a ruling that would have significant impact in the analysis of First Amendment cases.
Significantly, Broadrick was the main case cited by Justice Mendoza in his Separate Opinion in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan in support of his assertion that "[t]he overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases."66

To understand Broadrick, it should be noted that under U.S. jurisprudence, the general rule is that "an individual has
no standing to litigate the rights of third persons."67 Another traditional rule is the "as applied" mode of judicial review
which "tests the constitutionality of legislation as it is applied to particular facts on a case-by-case basis."68Both
these traditional rules found an exception in the overbreadth doctrine, which is animated by the principle that "a
government purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."69 Particularly in
regard to First Amendment cases, overbreadth carved exceptions to the traditional rules of constitutional litigation.
"First, it results in the invalidation of a law on its face rather than as applied to a particular speaker."70 "Second,
overbreadth is an exception to the usual rules on standing xxx challengers are in effect permitted to raise the rights
of third parties."71

In Broadrick, the U.S. Supreme Court found the opportunity to limit the application of the overbreadth doctrine. But
the constitutional challenge made therein was not limited to overbreadth for question of vagueness was also raised
against a state law restricting the partisan political activities of Oklahoma state employees. In dealing with the
vagueness aspect, the majority opinion concluded that the challenged provisions were not impermissibly vague,
applying the standard test set forth in cases such as Grayned.

Whatever other problems there are with 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that the section fails to give
adequate warning of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out "explicit standards" for those who must
apply it. Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 108. In the plainest language, it prohibits any state classified
employee from being "an officer or member" of a "partisan political club" or a candidate for "any paid public
office." It forbids solicitation of contributions "for any political organization, candidacy or other political
purpose" and taking part "in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign."
Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, as with the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over the
meaning of such terms in 818 as "partisan," or "take part in," or "affairs of" political parties. But what was
said in Letter Carriers, ante, at 578-579, is applicable here: "there are limitations in the English language
with respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions
may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person
exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the
public interest."72

However, in ruling on the claim of overbreadth, Broadrick did not utilize any previously established test or standard,
but instead pronounced a new standard of "substantial overbreadth", otherwise known as "strong medicine".73 It is
clear that the Court in Broadrick still recognized the distinction between vagueness and overbreadth, and resolved
those two questions separately. Nonetheless, as is manifest in Justice Mendozas Separate Opinion in Estrada, the
impression is that the same doctrines apply to both vagueness and overbreadth, notwithstanding Broadrick. Why is
that so?

As earlier explained, a vague penal statute is constitutionally offensive because it fails to give fair notice to those
subjected to the regulation as to what conduct is precisely proscribed. On the other hand, a statute that suffers from
overbreadth is one drawn so broadly, as it penalizes protected speech or behavior as well as such acts within the
right of the State to prohibit. Thus, a statute that prohibits "the commission of illegal acts within state universities" is
arguably vague, as it does not sufficiently define what exactly constitutes "illegal acts". On the other hand, a statute
that proscribes "the commission of acts within state universities that help promote rebellion" is arguably overbroad.
Such a statute may encompass not only those acts of rebellion within the ambit of the State to penalize, but also
legitimate political expressions or criticisms of the State which are fundamentally guaranteed under the free
expression clause.
Another material distinction. In the case of overbroad statutes, it is necessary to inquire into the potential
applications of the legislation in order to determine whether it can be unconstitutionally applied.74 In contrast, the
constitutional flaws attached to a vague statute are evident on its face, as the textual language in itself is insufficient
in defining the proscribed conduct.

Broadrick had alluded to the problems concerning legal standing with respect to overbreadth cases. Because the
area involved was the First Amendment, litigants had traditionally been "permitted to challenge a statute not
because their own right of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the
statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression."75 Yet such expansive standing was problematic for the majority in Broadrick.

The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First Amendment area is that any
enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or
partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected
expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine.76

Thus, as a means of regulating standing in overbreadth cases, the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Broadrick:

[F]acial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a
limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to
sanction moves from "pure speech" toward conduct and that conduct - even if expressive - falls within the
scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive
controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may
deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect - at best a prediction
- cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing
the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. xxx To put the matter another
way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a
statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep. It is our view that 818 is not substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may exist should
be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be
applied.

Broadrick jointly addressed the two concerns with respect to overbreadth cases standing and the facial
invalidation of statutes. It conceded that a successful overbreadth challenge necessitated the facial invalidation of
the statute, a remedy characterized as "strong medicine". In order to limit the application of such "strong medicine",
the U.S. Supreme Court declared that "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."77

Do the same concerns on the overbreadth doctrine that informed Broadrick extend as well to vagueness? It must be
recognized that the problem of overbreadth has no integral relation to procedural due process, which is the
fundamental constitutional problem brought forth by vagueness. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine developed
amidst concerns over restrictions on First Amendment rights and can be said was formulated to bolster the
guarantee of free expression. It is not as clear that the same degree of concern over the right of free expression was
key to the development of the vagueness doctrine, which after all, primarily offended a different constitutional value.

Since First Amendment values were at stake, the U.S. Supreme Court, prior to Broadrick, had found it necessary to
relax the rules on standing with respect to overbreadth cases, a development which the subsequent Broadrick Court
found disconcerting enough as to reverse direction. Yet contrary to the insinuation in Justice Mendozas Estrada
opinion, Broadrick should not bar challenges to vague penal statutes brought forth by those sought to be penalized
under the assailed law. The restrictions on standing brought forth in Broadrick have no material relation to the
legitimate concerns of a defendant who is being prosecuted under a law that defies the fair notice requirement under
the due process clause.

A brief note, at this juncture. Justice Carpio offers his own analysis of "facial challenge" and "as-applied" challenge.
His submission discusses both concepts from the perspective of standing, contending that the present suit cannot
be considered as a "facial challenge", or a challenge against the constitutionality of a statute that is filed where the
petitioner claims no actual violation of his own rights under the assailed statute, but relies instead on the potential
violation of his or other persons rights. Instead, according to Justice Carpio, the present suit may be considered as
an "as-applied" challenge, the traditional approach where the petitioner raises the violation of his constitutional rights
irrespective of the constitutional grounds cited.

I have no dispute with the characterization of the present suit as an "as-applied" challenge, as well as the statement
that third-party standing to assail the constitutionality of statutes is impermissible as a general rule. Said positions
can be accommodated following our traditional rules of standing in constitutional cases, even if these rules hardly
employ the terms "facial challenge" or "as-applied challenge." The difficulty with the submissions preferred terms is
that in United States jurisprudence, a "facial challenge" pertains not only to third-party standing in constitutional
cases, but also the "facial invalidation" of statutes. This matter is problematic if we are to consider the holding of the
U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Salerno,78 penned by the conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist.
In 1987, a divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the "facial challenge" is "the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid."79 This characterization differs greatly from Justice Carpios analysis that "facial challenge"
only pertains to standing. Salerno has given rise to another implication to the "facial challenge" under American
jurisprudence that the nullification of a statute will be justified only if it is established that under no set of
circumstances would the law remain valid. Interestingly, the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza in Estrada also
favorably cites Salerno and the above-quoted declaration therein, a citation that adds to the confusion. Yet by simply
distinguishing "facial challenge" (standing) from "facial invalidation" (adjudication on the merits), we can easily
divorce this holding in Salerno from the aspect of standing, since there is no material relationship between the
question of standing and the quoted-pronouncement in Salerno.

Evidently, if we are to accept the Salerno proposition, and declare that the "facial invalidation" is warranted only
upon demonstration that under no set of circumstances will the challenged provision be constitutional, such a
doctrine would stand as the Everest of judicial review. It would, among others, consequence in the affirmation of
Section 45(j).

But should we accept the Salerno proposition? Tellingly, the declaration has not been met with unanimity in the
American legal community. In a subsequent case, Washington v. Glucksberg80, Justice John Paul Stevens noted in
his concurring opinion that:

Upholding the validity of the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, the Court stated in United States
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), that a "facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." Id., at
745. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=95-1858 - f6f4I do not
believe the Court has ever actually applied such a strict
standard, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=95-1858 - f7f4even
in Salerno itself, and the Court does not appear to apply Salerno here. Nevertheless, the Court does
conceive of respondents' claim as a facial challenge--addressing not the application of the statute to a
particular set of plaintiffs before it, but the constitutionality of the statute's categorical prohibition against
"aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide."81

Further, in City of Chicago v. Morales82, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to work within the parameters ostensibly
set forth in Salerno. Held the U.S. Supreme Court through Justice Stevens: "There is no need, however, to decide
whether the impact of the Chicago ordinance on constitutionally protected liberty alone would suffice to support a
facial challenge under the overbreadth doctrine. For it is clear that the vagueness of this enactment makes a facial
challenge appropriate. This is not an ordinance that "simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter
requirement." It is a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement, and infringes on constitutionally protected
rights. When vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it is subject to facial attack."83

Moreover, the Salerno proposition is simply alien to the Philippine experience. Our jurisprudence has traditionally
deigned to nullify or facially invalidate statutes or provisions thereof without need of considering whether "no set of
circumstances exists under which the [law or provision] would be valid." Among recent examples of laws or legal
provisions nullified as unconstitutional by this Court are B.P. Blg. 885,84 the Marcos-issued Executive Order No. 626-
A,85 Section 46 of Rep. Act No. 4670,86 Rep. Act No. 7056,87 provisions of the 2000 General Appropriations Act
passed by Congress,88 and most recently, Section 47 of P.D. 198.89 Indeed, in a similar vein to the observations of
Justice Stevens as to the American experience, the impossibly high standard set forth in Salerno has never been
applied squarely in this jurisdiction.

If the auto-limiting philosophy set forth Salerno should have influence in this jurisdiction, it should only be to the
effect that the remedy of constitutional nullification should be resorted to by the courts if there is no other means by
which the unconstitutional defect of the law or legal provision can be treated. Then again, such a principle is already
laid down by our accepted rules of statutory construction, such as that "a statute should be construed whenever
possible in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution", or that "where a statute is reasonably susceptible
of two constructions, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, that construction in favor of its
constitutionality shall be adopted, and the construction that will render it invalid rejected."

Our own jurisprudence must expressly reject Salerno, if only because that case has fostered the impression that a
"facial challenge," or a "facial invalidation" necessitates a demonstration that the law involved is unconstitutional in
whatever application. Even though such impression is not universally accepted, our acceptance of the viability of
either the "facial challenge" or "facial invalidation" in this jurisdiction without accompanying comment
on Salernomight imply that the extremely high bar for judicial review set therein prevails in the Philippines.

In order to avoid any further confusion, especially that which may be brought about by Salerno, I had proposed
during deliberations the following definitions for usage in Philippine jurisprudence:

As to standing
The ability of a petitioner to bring forth a suit challenging the constitutionality of an enactment or provisions thereof,
even if the petitioner has yet not been directly injured by the application of the law in question, is referred to as
a "facial challenge."

The ability of a petitioner to judicially challenge a law or provision of law that has been specifically applied against
the petitioner is referred to as an "as-applied challenge."

As to adjudication on the merits

The nullification on constitutional grounds by the courts of a provision of law, or even of the entire statute altogether,
is referred to as "facial invalidation."

The invalidation of the application of a provision of law or a statute only insofar as it applies to the petitioner and
others similarly situated, without need to nullify the law or provision thereof, is referred to as "as-applied
invalidation."

I submit that these terms provide a greater degree of clarity than simply using "facial challenge" and "as-applied
challenge." My subsequent discussion shall hence utilize such terms as well.

V.

The Court, this time and through this case, should reassert that the vagueness challenge is viable against penal
statutes. The vagueness challenge is a critical defense to all persons against criminal laws that are arbitrarily drawn,
formulated without thoughtful deliberation, or designed to yield to the law enforcer the determination whether an
offense has been committed. Section 45(j) of Rep. Act 8189 is indeed a textbook example of a vague penal clause.
The ponencia submits that Section 45(j) does not suffer from the infirmity as it ostensibly establishes that violation of
any provision of Rep. Act No. 8189 is an election offense. I cannot accept the proposition that the violation of just
any provision of Rep. Act No. 8189, as Section 45(j) declares with minimal fanfare, constitutes an election offense
punishable with up to six (6) years of imprisonment.

Section 45(j) categorizes the violation of any provision of Rep. Act 8189 as an election offense, thus effectively
criminalizing such violations. Following Section 46 of the same law, any person found guilty of an election offense
"shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years."

Virtually all of the 52 provisions of Rep. Act 8189 define an act, establishes a policy, or imposes a duty or obligation
on a voter, election officer or a subdivision of government. Virtually all of these provisions are susceptible to
violation, the only qualifier being that they incorporate a verb.

For example, Section 4 states that the "precinct-level list of voters shall be accompanied by an addition/deletion list
for the purpose of updating the list." If the precinct-level list of voters is not accompanied by an addition/deletion list,
an election offense is committed, according to Section 45(j). But if that is so, who commits the election offense? The
COMELEC? What about if the attachment addition/deletion list was somehow alleged as not being geared towards
updating the list? Would that constitute an election offense?

Under Section 37, a voter who was excluded from the certified list of voters due to inadvertence or registered with
an erroneous or misspelled name may file a petition for an order directing that his name be entered or corrected.
Such voter is also required to attach to a "certified copy of the registration record or identification car or the entry of
his name in the certified list of voters used in the preceding election, together with the proof that his application was
denied or not acted upon by the Election Registration Board." If the voter fails to attach any of these requirements,
no matter the reason, an election offense as defined under Section 45(j) has been committed, and the voter may be
sentenced to prison. As to what precisely are the elements of this particular crime, I am at a loss to define.

Even the most innocuous of oversights can be deemed as an election offense under Rep. Act 8189. For example,
Section 10 requires that the applicant-voter submit four (4) identification-size copies of his/her latest photograph. If
such voter submits only three (3) photos instead of four (4), then he/she is theoretically violating a provision of Rep.
Act No. 8189, and is thus committing an election offense under Section 45(j) punishable by no less than one (1)
year of imprisonment without the possibility of probation. Another example, Section 14 requires that the application
for registration of a physically disabled person must be prepared by a relative within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, the Election Officer, or a member of an accredited citizens arm. If an elderly disabled widow has her
trusted maid prepare the application for her, then an election offense is committed as such act violates a provision of
Rep. Act No. 8189. The maid, or perhaps even the widow herself, may now face a prison term of no less than one
(1) year.

In his Separate Opinion, Justice Carpio provides even more telling illustrative samples90 of crimes under Rep. Act
8189 if the draft ponencia were upheld. Indeed, one can make a parlor game out of discerning all the possible acts
that constitute a crime because of Section 45(j). Yet any entertainment that can be derived out of such exercise will
be muted because the consequence involves prison terms.
The very absurdity of such implausible, yet legally possible prosecutions, lend doubt as to whether the legislature
had truly intended such penal consequences. Because Section 45(j) is impermissibly vague, such doubts could be
entertained, to consequences that are deleterious to our freedoms. If Section 45(j) were left by the Court as is, it
would be a validation that our legislators so intended to penalize so trifling an offense.

Moreover, not only does the vagueness of Section 45(j) deprive the voters, election officials, or indeed any live
person (since the provisions of Rep. Act 8189 are susceptible to violation by just about anybody) of fair notice as to
what conduct is exactly proscribed and criminalized. It also leaves prosecutors and judges at a loss as to how
exactly to prosecute or adjudge an election offense under Section 45(j).

We can reasonably presume that save for the specific election offenses under Section 45 (a) to (j) and the specific
penal clause under Section 10 of Rep. Act 8189, all the other provisions of the law were not crafted with the intent to
devise a penal provision. Outside of the bare text of the provision, it would be impossible to discern the precise
elements of the crime, and since these provisions were not designed as penal provisions in the first place, there was
no deliberate intent to design every subject-verb agreement as an element to a crime.

For example, Section 14 provides that with respect to illiterate or disabled applicants, "[t]he fact of illiteracy or
disability shall be so indicated in the application [for registration]." Shorn of any criminal context, as it most assuredly
was in the minds of the legislators, the clause merely required that the fact of illiteracy or disability should be
indicated in the application. Seen benignly, the only concern of the provision is that such fact be manifested in the
application. Since the provision does not even mandate that it be the applicant himself or herself who should make
such indication, there would be no impediment for the election officer to make the indication in behalf of the
applicant.

But if indeed that clause of Section 14 does actually embody an election offense, it would be virtually impossible for
the prosecutor or the judge to ascertain the elements of such crime. Facially, there would appear only to be one
element of the crime, the absence of any indication in the application of the fact of illiteracy or disability. But there is
no indication on the face of the provision as to who exactly commits the crime. Neither is there clarity as to how
exactly such crime is precisely committed.

It bears remembering that it is the second concern of the vagueness doctrine, that the statute is precise enough that
it does not invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by law enforcement authorities, that is perhaps the more
important aspect of the doctrine. Section 45(j) is militantly offensive to that consideration.

Our Philippine criminal laws are predicated on crimes that have precisely defined elements, and the task of the
judge is to determine whether these elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. For the most part, each
crime currently defined in our penal laws consist of only a handful of elements, providing the judge a clearly defined
standard for conviction or acquittal.

That is not the case for a penal provision predicated on "any violation of this Act." A legislative enactment can
consist of 100 provisions. Each provision may describe just one act, right, duty or prohibition, or there could be
several contained in just one provision. The catch-all penal provision ostensibly criminalizes the violation of any one
right, duty, or prohibition, of which there could be hundreds in just one statute. Just any one of these possibly
hundreds of acts mentioned in the law is an element of the consummated crime under the catch-all provision such
as Section 45(j), thus greatly increasing the risk for conviction under such a provision. There could be literally
hundreds of ways that a catch-all provision in just one law could become the source of imprisonment.

Obviously, broader standards lead to broader discretion on the part of judges. Some judges may tend towards a
narrow application of a provision such as Section 45(j), while others might be inclined towards its broad application.
What is certain is that no consistent trend will emerge in criminal prosecutions for violations of provisions such as
Section 45(j), a development that will not bode well for the fair and consistent administration of justice. Provisions
such as Section 45(j) do nothing for the efficient administration of justice. Since such a provision is laced with
unconstitutional infirmity, I submit it is the task of the Court to say so, in order that the courts will need not be
confronted with this hydra of statutory indeterminacy.

The COMELEC did point out that an election offense under Section 45(j) is malum prohibitum, which is a correct
restatement of prevailing doctrine, yet a prospect that makes the provision even more disturbing. Returning to
Section 14, the illiterate or disabled voter precisely requires special assistance because of his/her personal condition
which impairs the ability to properly fill up the application form. As such, the likelihood of inadvertently failing to
indicate the fact of illiteracy or disability is present. Since any criminal intent is irrelevant, any honest mistake
unforgivable, just because Rep. Act 8189 embodies malum prohibitum offenses, the illiterate or disabled voter who
inadvertently fails to indicate the fact of his/her impairment in the application simply has no defense against
imprisonment, except the pity of the judge. And even then, such pity, if wielded, may exceed the discretion of the
judge since the application of the malum prohibitum law simply calls for the execution of its penal clauses once the
offense has been established. Dura lex sed lex, indeed.

VI.
I now wish to address certain points raised by the ponente in rebuttal of my arguments. The claim that the Court
should not touch upon the constitutionality of Section 45(j) because it is not the lis mota of the case is, with due
respect, absurd. While the ponencia claims that the lis mota of this case is the alleged grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC, it cannot be denied that the valid prosecution of the petitioners integrally depends on the
constitutionality of Section 45(j). It appears that the real reason the majority refuses to acknowledge that the
constitutionality of Section 45(j) is the lis mota is simply because they do not find that provision unconstitutional, as
roundabout a path to reason as there ever has been.

The other contentions of the ponente submitted in rebuttal to my position warrant more extensive dissection.

A.

The ponente invokes People v. Gatchalian91 in an attempt to convince that a "catch-all" penal provision is not
inherently unconstitutional, since the Court in 1958, ruling 6-3, had sustained a criminal prosecution based on such
a provision found in the since-repealed Minimum Wage Law92. However, with all due respect, the discussion fails to
take into account distinguishing nuances and contexts that differentiate Gatchalian and its relevant statutes from the
present case and Rep. Act No. 8189.

We cannot deny the fact that the void-for-vagueness constitutional challenge, as with some other standards of
constitutional adjudication, had not yet found full fruition within our own jurisprudence at the time Gatchalian was
decided in 1958, a year when the oldest members of the Court were still studying in law school, and the youngest
among us still in short pants. Indeed, the jurisprudential appreciation then of our fundamental constitutional rights
differed in several critical respects from our presently accepted standards. In 1958, evidence seized from
unconstitutional searches and seizures were admissible into evidence, as the court adopted the exclusionary rule
only in 1967 with Stonehill v. Diokno. In 1958, the suspension of that fundamental right the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus was still believed to be a political question which

could not be the subject of judicial inquiry, the adverse rule emerging only in 1971 with Lansang v. Garcia.93 In 1958,
there was yet no express recognition from this Court of a constitutional right to privacy independent from the right to
liberty, such recognition came only in 1968 with Morfe v. Mutuc.94 These are but a few of the more prominent
examples that can be plumbed from our jurisprudence.

I raise this point for I respectfully submit that Gatchalian can conclusively settle the present case in favor of
the ponentes position only if we believe in a static and unyielding theory of jurisprudence that blindly ignores the
refreshing new insights and wisdoms each new generation gifts to civilization. Our own jurisprudential history
indubitably reveals that this Court does not adhere to so rigid an ideology. A vote that Section 45(j) is constitutional
only for the simple reason that a like-minded provision was sustained way back in 1958 would be premised on a
philosophy utterly alien to the progressive traditions of the Supreme Court.

We need to view the questions now material at bar with a fresh perspective, with an understanding that we may
need to break new ground if need be, to arrive at the proper and enlightened resolution of the
question. Gatchaliancannot serve as crutch to sustain the constitutionality of Section 45(j). It is eminently possible to
declare the nullity of Section 45(j) without having to invalidate the core reasoning and ultimate result of Gatchalian.

B.

In Gatchalian, the accused therein was prosecuted under Section 15(a) of the Minimum Wage Law. Said provision
reads:

SEC. 15. Penalties and recovery of wage due under this Act.

(a) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this Act shall upon conviction thereof be
subject to a fine of not more than two thousand pesos, or, upon second conviction, to imprisonment
of not more then one year, or to both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

The accused in Gatchalian was alleged to have violated, in particular, Section 3 of the Minimum Wage Law, which
prescribed the minimum wage rates an employer "shall pay to each of his employees".

The key mark in Section 15 is its qualification that there must be a "willful violation of any of the provisions" of the
Minimum Wage Law before a criminal prosecution can be had. This distinguishes from Section 45(j), which does not
offer such a critical qualification of intent. The indispensable presence of "willful violation" as an element to the
criminal offense supplies the penal statute with mens rea, an element which has been defined as "a guilty mind, a
guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent." In the 1998 case of City of Chicago v. Morales.95 one of the cases
which I have extensively cited, the U.S. Supreme Court had comfortably ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court has
comfortably held that "a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected
rights."

Crucially, the Court majority96 that decided Gatchalian expressly emphasized the fact that Section 15 expressly
limited such prosecutions only to "willful violations" when it affirmed the provision.
 It is clear from the above-quoted provisions that while Section 3 explicitly requires every owner of an
establishment located outside of Manila or its environs to pay each of its employees P3.00 a day on the
effective date of the Act, and one year thereafter P4.00 a day, Section 15 imposes both a criminal penalty
for a willful violation of any of the above provisions and a civil liability for any underpayment of wages due
an employee. The intention of the law is clear: to slap not only a criminal liability upon an erring employer for
any willful violation of the acts sought to be enjoined but to attach concurrently a civil liability for any
underpayment he may commit as a result thereof. The law speaks of a willful violation of "any of the
provisions of this Act," which is all-embracing, and the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3
thereof which embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted.97

Had the Court ruled Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act unconstitutional, such pronouncement will not
overturn or even be intellectually inconsistent with Gatchalian. For one, there are enough textual qualifications in
Section 15 as opposed to Section 45(j) that spell the difference between a constitutional penal statute and a void
one. Moreover, the same constitutional considerations we have and will fully consider in this petition were not
addressed in Gatchalian.

The accused in Gatchalian had premised his motion to dismiss on two grounds: that Section 3 carried only a civil
liability and did not constitute a criminal offense; and assuming that Section 3 did constitute a criminal offense, the
same provision did not carry any penalty penalizing it.98 These were the two distinct issues which were addressed
by the majority, and also to which the three dissenters responded to. The difference between those issues as
formulated in Gatchalian and those presently confronting us is self-evident.

Still, the accused in Gatchalian did offer the following argument that may be taken into account as we consider the
present case. The argument pertains to the proper interpretation of Section 15(a), which the accused had argued
would result in absurdity should it "be interpreted in a manner that would embrace a willful violation of any of the
provisions of the law."99 As recounted in Gatchalian:

Counsel for appellee however entertains a different interpretation. He contends that if Section 15(a) should
be interpreted in a manner that would embrace a wilful violation of any of the provisions of the law we would
have a situation where even the officials entrusted with its enforcement may be held criminally liable which is
not contemplated in the law. Thus, he contends, the Secretary of Labor may be criminally prosecuted for
willfully not using all available devices for investigation [Section 4(c)], for not presenting to the Wage Board
all the evidence in his possession relating to the wages in the industries for which the Wage Board is
appointed and other information relevant to the establishment of the minimum wage [Section 5(p)], and for
not doing all other acts which the law requires him to do under Section 6. This, he emphasizes, is absurd
and should not be entertained.100

The tenor of this argument is teasingly similar to that adopted by an esteemed colleague and myself in our
respective submissions. The ponente has more or less responded dismissively towards this arguments, relying on
comforting platitudes such as "the wisdom of a law is beyond this Courts function of inquiry."

Perhaps, considering that the ponente now relies on Gatchalian, it should be expected that the Gatchalian Court
would have responded to the above-quoted argument in a like-manner. But it clearly did not. Instead, it emphasized:

To begin with, the Minimum Wage Law is a social legislation which has been adopted for the benefit of labor
and as such it contains provisions that are enjoined to be observed by the employer. These provisions are
substantive in nature and had been adopted for common observance by the persons affected. They cannot
be eluded nor subverted lest the erring employer runs into the sanction of the law. On the other hand, the
provisions adverted to by counsel are merely administrative in character which had been adopted to set the
machinery by which the law is to be enforced. They are provisions established for observance by the
officials entrusted with its enforcement. Failure to comply with them would therefore subject them merely to
administrative sanction. They do not come under the penal clause embodied in Section 15(a). This is clearly
inferred from Section 18(c), of Republic Act No. 602, which provides: "Any official of the Government to
whom responsibility in administration and enforcement has been delegated under this Act shall be
removable on the sustaining of charges of malfeasance or non-feasance in office." This specific provision
should be interpreted as qualifying the penal clause provided for in Section 15(a).101

The Court in Gatchalian plainly realized and acknowledged that there are limitations to the plausible application of
Section 15(a), even if these were not textually committed in the provision itself. The most sweeping of these
limitations is the admonition that those administrative officials charged with correlative rights and duties under the
Minimum Wage Law could not be criminally liable under Section 15(a), despite the absence of any such clarificatory
language in the law itself. I myself am not too comfortable with the methodology used by the Court in so qualifying,
considering the absence of any statutory support that would have indubitably justified this conclusion.102

Yet if we were to examine this passage in the present context, where considerations on the question of void-for-
vagueness have fully blossomed, the Court in Gatchalian expressly acknowledged that Section 15(a) would have
been untenable in some applications, such as if an administrative officer were criminally charged under that
provision. In effect, the Court tacitly acknowledged in Gatchalian that Section 15(a) was indeed void-for-
vagueness, and that line of attack would have been viable to any administrative officer actually charged
under that provision. It would have been one thing for the Court in Gatchalian to have approached that argument
by responding that the wisdom of Section 15(a) was beyond judicial inquiry. That approach would have aligned with
that of the ponente. Instead, Gatchalian rejected that approach and instead expressed an opinion that current-day
commentators would appreciate as an embryonic formulation of the "void-as-applied" principle.

VII.

Since it has been established that Section 45(j) infringes on procedural due process, the final inquiry should be
whether the nullification of Section 45(j) is warranted.

Given the problem of vagueness that attends to Section 45(j), is facial invalidation of the statute warranted?

The practical value of facial invalidation in this case cannot be discounted. Unless Section 45(j) is nullified, it may
still be utilized as a means of criminal prosecution. Because there are dozens, if not hundreds, of different contexts
under which a criminal offense may carved out of Section 45(j), limiting the challenges to the provision to "as-
applied" and its case-by-case method will prove woefully inadequate in addressing the elemental lack of fair notice
that plagues the provision.

The very vagueness of Section 45(j) makes it an ideal vehicle for political harassment. The election season will
undoubtedly see a rise in the partisan political temperature, where competing candidates and their camps will
employ every possible legal tactic to gain an advantage over the opponents. Among these possible tactics would be
the disenfranchisement of voters who may be perceived as supporters of the other side; or the disqualification of
election officers perceived as either biased or impartial enough to hamper a candidate with ill-motives.

The disenfranchisement of voters or the disqualification of election officers could be accomplished through
prosecutions for election offenses. Even if these prosecutions do not see fruition, the mere filing of such charges
could be enough to dampen enthusiasm in voting, or strike fear in conducting honest and orderly elections.

Unfortunately, Section 45(j) is an all too easy tool for mischief of this sort. One can invent any sort of prosecution
using any provision of Rep. Act No. 8189 that would fall within the ambit of the offending Section 45(j). It would not
even matter if the charge is meritorious or not, just the systematic filing of complaints based on Section 45(j) is
sufficient to alter the political climate in any locality.

I find it odd, suspicious even, that the COMELEC is insisting on prosecution the petitioners on Section 45(j), and not
the Omnibus Election Code. The acts for which they are charged are classified as an election offense under Section
261(y) of the Omnibus Election Code which specifically charges as election offenses "any person who knowingly
makes any false or untruthful statement relative to any of the data or information required in the application for
registration;" and "any voter who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for
cancellation of his previous registration." I have no idea whether the COMELEC sees this case as a test case for
prosecutions under Section 45(j). What I do know is that if the Court debunks the present challenge to Section 45(j),
the COMELEC will be emboldened to pursue more prosecutions under Section 45(j), a prospect that would hearten
the most partisan of political operatives. The result would not only be more frivolous complaints for violation of
Section 45(j), but also an undue and utterly unnecessary temperature rise in the political climate.

It might be argued that a ruling that simply imposes an "as-applied invalidation" on Section 45(j) would sufficiently
disquiet such concern. I disagree. Any room left for discretion or interpretation of Section 45(j) would be sufficient for
one with intent to harass voters or election officials with the threat of prosecution under that provision. After all, just
the mere filing of the complaint is enough to effect harassment. Besides, I submit that the acts already expressly
criminalized as election offenses, whether under the Omnibus Election Code, or under Rep. Act No. 8189, already
encompass the whole range of election offenses that could possibly be committed. The petitioners could have been
charged instead with violating Section 261(y) of the Omnibus Election Code.

In recent years, Congress has chosen to employ phraseology similar to Section 45(j) in a number of laws, such as
the Cooperative Code,103 the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,104 and the Retail Trade Liberalization Act.105 I know
from my own experience that this is the product of a legislative predilection to utilize a standard template in the
crafting of bills.

I have come to believe that this standard phraseology constitutes a dangerous trend, and a clear stand from this
Court that Section 45(j) is unconstitutional for being void-for-vagueness would make the legislature think twice
before employing such terminology in the laws that it passes. The problem is less obvious if the law in question
contains only a few provisions, where any person can be reasonably expected to ascertain with ease what particular
acts are made criminal. However, in more extensive laws such as Rep. Act No. 8189 or the especially long codes,
such expectation could not be reasonably met. I am aware that compliance with the requisites for the publication of
laws is considered legally sufficient for the purposes of notice to the public, but I submit that a measure of reason
should be appreciated in evaluating that requirement. If a law runs 400 pages long, with each sentence detailing an
act that is made criminal in nature, the doctrine "ignorance of the law excuses no one" should not be made a ready
and convenient excuse, especially if, as in Rep. Act 8189, the act is made criminal only by implication of a provision
such as Section 45(j).
We should think of the public good that would prevail if the Court makes the stand that Congress cannot criminalize
a whole range of behavior by simply adding a multi-purpose, catch-all provision such as Section 45(j). Congress will
be forced to deliberate which precise activities should be made criminal. Such deliberate thought leads to definitive
laws that do not suffer the vice of void-for-vagueness. These definite laws will undoubtedly inform the people which
acts are criminalized, a prospect wholly consonant with constitutional guarantees of fair notice and due process.

No doubt, Section 45(j) and its ilk in law are dangerous provisions. It would be best if the Court send a message that
this intended prosecution of the petitioners could be accomplished only through the Omnibus Election Code, which
after all specifically penalizes the acts for which they are alleged to have committed.

In the case at bar, an ideal resolution would be to grant the petition and void Section 45(j) and the COMELEC
resolutions authorizing prosecution under it, but without prejudice to the authorization of prosecution of the
petitioners under the Omnibus Election Code, assuming of course such a tack is still legally feasible.

This solution would satisfy whatever motivation there is to sanction the petitioners, yet at the same time make it
clear to the COMELEC that prosecutions under Section 45(j) of Rep. Act No. 8189 cannot avail before this Court. At
the same time, the Court would be able to reiterate comforting precepts that prosecutions under criminal laws that
specifically define and particularly criminalize the acts constituting the offense are preferred over those laws that
broadly define criminal offenses; that the Court will not provide sanctuary to any abusive resort to Section 45(j) of
Rep. Act No. 8189; and that would-be voters who neglect to pay great care to the process of voter registration will
face the sanction of the law.

Sad to say, the majoritys ruling today is beyond comprehension. No good will come out of it. For one, it opens a
Pandoras box of all sorts of malicious wholesale prosecutions of innocent voters at the instance of political
partisans desirous to abuse the law for electoral gain. It emboldens Congress to continue incorporating exactly the
same provision in the laws it enacts, no matter how many hundreds of acts or provisions are contained in the
particular statute. For that matter, it signals that vague penal laws are acceptable in this jurisdiction. Left unabated,
the doctrine will be reflexively parroted by judges, lawyers and law students memorizing for their bar exams until it is
accepted as the entrenched rule, even though it simply makes no sense. Bad folk wisdom handed down through the
generations is soon regarded as gospel truth. I sincerely hope the same mistake is not made with the lamentable
doctrine affirmed by the majority today.

I respectfully dissent.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice