LA FRONTERA SANGROSA:

TIME TO RECONSIDER US DRUG POLICY?

By John Barham

Although the Calderon government in Mexico claims that 28,000 individuals have died
during the four years that Mexico has waged war against the drug cartels, keen observers
along the border feel that the number should be adjusted considerably higher. Whatever
the true numbers might be, do they actually mean anything to the millions of Americans
whose insatiable cravings for illegal drugs fuel the bloody drug wars in Mexico? From
all appearances, drug-obsessed Americans attach little significance to the gory statistics
that underline the seriousness of the struggle. And, in the meantime, the annual bonanza
for the cartels approaches US 145 billion, which represents a 1,000 % mark-up from
source.

The US, in turn, spends up to US 20 billion each year in direct expenditures endeavoring
to shut down the drug pipeline. This figure does not include indirect costs, such as
adjudication, incarceration and lost work time.

Once viewed as the “mules” for the Colombian cartels, Mexico’s drug bosses today are
indisputably “numero uno” in the drug trade in the Western Hemisphere. And, with their
dominance, violence along the border has escalated. The cartels are more determined
than ever, of course, to hold onto their business ventures in cocaine, heroin, marijuana
and other illegal drugs. That determination, in effect, promotes a veritable war in
Mexico, and this is especially true along the US-Mexican border.

Many south of the border are asking these days why Mexico should be held accountable
for fighting a battle that has come about by virtue of the American government’s inability
to control its pagan society’s craving for drugs. And, why is it, they ask, that the US is
not reluctant to interfere in the affairs of other nations, but is unwilling or unable to stem
drug use at home? Unfortunately, such questions have gone unanswered by a succession
of American administrations.

All along the border there are towns like Matamoros, Reynosa and Rio Bravo where
showdowns and shootouts have become commonplace and where, in some locales, local
police forces have all but disappeared, owing to the likelihood of a relatively short
lifespan for any law enforcement officer brave enough to resist the allure of drug money.
In many instances, mayors and other local officials have simply been gunned down, and
the only growth industry in many small towns is the funeral business.

Border culture, long derided by Mexicans in the Bajio and the Federal District as shallow
and characterized by people called “pochos,” who speak neither good Spanish nor good
English, is even more fragile, owing to the drug wars. In cantinas and cafes in small
towns like Piedras Negras and Nogales, the most-played tunes on jukeboxes are the
“narco-corridas,” which capture the imagination of young people and romanticize the
daring exploits of those whose specialty is the is the cross-border movement of drugs.
Journalists on the south side of the border are reluctant to publish stories on the drug
trade, owing to the proclivity of the cartels to punish reporters who are so bold as to
expose the prime movers of the industry. For example, after an AK-47 and grenade
attack on a newspaper office in Nuevo Laredo, journalists by the score abandoned “la
frontera.” And, it is telling that last year, Mexico had the dubious distinction of having
the third most attacks on journalists in the world, occupying the 3rd slot behind Iraq and
Iran.

Crossing the bridge from Brownsville to Matamoros, one quickly notices the sizable
presence of military personnel, who have been deployed to do battle with the cartels. Of
Mexico’s 200,000 members of the military, more than 46,000 have been committed to the
drug wars.

On the other side of the border, the US Border Patrol has reported increasing attacks on
Border Patrol officers, who have come under automatic weapons fire from drug
smugglers and, on several occasions, have had to dodge Molotov cocktails. And, even in
Brownsville, cartel henchmen bearing such dramatic appellations as “el Apache” have
been apprehended.

Beheadings, bombings, mass shootings and the intimidation of legitimate authority, it all
sounds like Iraq. But it is happening on the border between the US and Mexico. In fact,
it is a full-scale war that rivals Iraq in terms of deaths and casualties.

Culpable parties for the drug mess abound on both sides of the border. However, if we
begin to consider what has failed at home, we need look no further than the ill-considered
policies of the US government, which have done little to nothing to dry up the domestic
consumption of illegal drugs. Obviously, using the old adage defining success, the
Mexican cartels have found a need and are actively filling it. If the American drug czars
charged with halting the flow of drugs were half as innovative as the drug bosses, the
story might be much different.

As it now stands, there are only two courses of action that could possibly replace failed
policies phased-in legalization or hard-nosed enforcement. If we are straightforward in
our analysis of this sad state of affairs, we must admit that what exists now is simply
failed strategy that has unwisely attempted to apply old solutions to new challenges from
forces that have shown themselves to be far more sophisticated than the self-perpetuating
and wasteful bureaucrats who operate the domestic industry that euphemistically goes
under the monikers of the DEA and the ONDCP.

Clearly, until the need is no longer present, enterprising individuals and organizations
will continue to satisfy the never-ending demand in the US, and the death toll in Mexico
and along “la frontera” will continue to rise. Inflexible and time-worn policies are
palpably inadequate. Isn’t it time for some innovation and originality with US drug
policies?
John Barha.m, formerly a dean at UTB/TSC, retired from the University of
Missouri in 2006.