Republic of the Philippines for basic needs.
Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated
30 July 2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a
Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent
Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford
Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their
union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie,
Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that
Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely
left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely
left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her
requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded
the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In
1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family,
staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did
not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be
able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely
returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the
wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain
operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown
reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New
Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her
American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which
she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the
Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of
reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in
his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the
family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity,
being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to
Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June
1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American
citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus
and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other
allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She
explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal
person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on
certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to
contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not
have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money
respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the
sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support
their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent
Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well
as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her
children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay
behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to
respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce
papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely
married her American husband and acquired American citizenship.
She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal
because now being an American citizen, her status shall be
governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed
out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent
Crasus of misusing the amount of 90,000.00 which she advanced
to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the
basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent
Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the 90,000.00 she advanced to
him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-
Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to
present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in
support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the
Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of
Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December
1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands
surname, Micklus.9
Felys counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take
the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus,
Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular
officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A,
where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12 and
Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of
New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the
witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was
ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been
over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence
and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to
have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus
deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely
null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves
a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is
decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity,
observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the
defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce
decree in the United States of America and married another man
and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is
already married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or
manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless
allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case
in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly
reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable
institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society
throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the
defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her
marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time
of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal
Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the
Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things
over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for
these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of
plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null
and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of
the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC,
finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional
ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus
and Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN
AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A
DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD
BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE
HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted
provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino
citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she
has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant
has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and
thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the
benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino
citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and
thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances,
plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given
her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former.
To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth
and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is
incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff
be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the
nullity of the marriage of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March
2002,17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic
filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do
not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in
accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained
that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after a
full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become
an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable
laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of
the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological
incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity
was defined, thus
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed
down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by its significance,
deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity,
however, must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned
jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there
is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus
before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into
question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of
Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and
(2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in
which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is
not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave
mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases,
Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves.
It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt
and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her
hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may
indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with
her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was
not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified,
then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to
be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it
is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a
psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling
in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied
with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully
explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the
policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special
situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus
and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the
RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime
after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married
her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged
that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when
she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until
now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses.
Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages;
hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file
the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land,
then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this
Court or the Court of Appeals.35While it is the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over
when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court.
Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only
reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still
being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of
the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198
(1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285
(2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should
dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of
the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to
higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy
of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office
of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date
of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It
may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally
or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication
failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of
the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General
may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within
fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration
or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of
appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to
those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the
validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus
and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and
bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same
Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for
being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and
loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law
nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual
problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated
30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-
Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to
make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented
as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph
of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in
Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566
A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but
it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to
a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter
of legislation and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien
wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry
filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must
be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to
a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired
alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in
the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists
on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying
for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about
in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its
enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to
cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is
one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as
an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family
Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses
who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce
even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly
divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced
here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made
into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper
remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the
marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would
still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove
his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also
show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O.
No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship
and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the
present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondents
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by
GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-
LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement
of property between the parties of the first marriage involving
Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna,
appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA
thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the
husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the
husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in
the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez
& Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his
first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony
conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at
the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948.
In ATTY. LUNAs marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7)
children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli
Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario
Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After
almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA
eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966
and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered
into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of
his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial
Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance
of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo,
Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted
another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm
named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where
ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA
purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th
Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square
meters, for 1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for
36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was
to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the
Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on
July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983,
which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100);
GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA
and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the
condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a
new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100);
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
(12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same
was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties
stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium
unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established
and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand
used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The
said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12,
1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium
unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found
therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son
of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100
portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty.
Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium
unit as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment
became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against
the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644.
The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired
during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no
children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon
the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of pro-indiviso share
consisting of her share in the said properties plus her share in
the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the
latters last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA
through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in
the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be
declared the owner of the portion of the subject properties;that
the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the
condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be
conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer
the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be
ordered to pay attorneys feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. 3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon
the aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium
unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE
METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan
Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books
Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found
in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to
deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate
arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the
RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU
THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES
LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE
MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF
GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE
UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY
DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE
UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE
DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN
THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY
TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR
 ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING
THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED
BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION
FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO
PAY FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the
trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW
OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH
THE USE OF PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS
LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER
THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY
LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified
decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY.
LUNA until the latters death on July 12, 1997. The absolute
divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican
Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA
because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized
in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001
Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium
unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE
METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants,
the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds
and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of
Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as
owner or under any other concept over the condominium
unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect
to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed
from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna"
to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna
and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby
declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on
certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was
unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not
dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
recognizing the Dominican Republic courts approval of
the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the
subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending
parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the
condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to
ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had
validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the
second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the
petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the
Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos,
was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law
in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil
Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued
to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality
rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna
and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty.
Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September
10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino
spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses
are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective
marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable
marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages
have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and
the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce
Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to
the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to
the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-recognition
of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the
respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among
Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse,
or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this
public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce
decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given
legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the
divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA
committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil
Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not
specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they
had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time
of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides,
to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of
gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any
of various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the
Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article
191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia
did not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was
still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code,
as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial
order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of
property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner
has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation
has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well
as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for
judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of
articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code
concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall
be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that
the approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for divorce
instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications
for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds
raised in the action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself
valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of
Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage
between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage
to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous, 22 on
the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had
not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until
the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second
or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner
being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules
on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code,
viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband
and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the
burden of proof to confirm such fact.1wphi1 To establish co-
ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to
offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of
property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient
and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As
the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership
of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate
their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the
disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled
that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of
the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of
coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents
defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case,
the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1wphi1 The
plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The
law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff
must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief
can be granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts
proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party
alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is
not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual
contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the
aggregate amount of at least 306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of 159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna
had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling
146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of
306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna
in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to
362,264.00 of the units purchase price of 1,449,056.00.28 The
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out
of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her
a "thank you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make
the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not
acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the
income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-
ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioners
assertions on her actual contributions through the following
findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence
that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this
case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil
Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases
where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage
which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil
Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not
readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at
first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way
incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for
it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists
a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the
man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of
the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed
to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to
apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of
the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted
in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties
were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal
partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an
inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized
in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of
Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an
actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to
establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed
used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the
trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for 55,000.00 payable to Atty.
Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was
thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement,
Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in
the amount of 97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco
Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan
of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for 49,236.00 payable
to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan
of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for 4,072.00 was
dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the
amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the
acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was
simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of
100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for
SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same
was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the
condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with his
partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear
as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired
for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied
Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were
loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have
evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761
were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer
title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married
to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but
logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in
the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased
or paid for the law office amortization and for the law books. It is
more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the
law office space and the law books from his earnings from his
practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from
SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. 30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the
CA both because they were substantiated by the records and
because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo
them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-
ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere
allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not
serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that
Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds
and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the
properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of
gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership
of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium
unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful
heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice
Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15,
1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case,
and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United
States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that
they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner
in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The
Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition
are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse
of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted
capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a
certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to
correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the
exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim
on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he
made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by
the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine
whether the property relations between petitioner and private
respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before
the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the
divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the
ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were
neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As
explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of
the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno,
Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper to
represent me, without further contesting, subject
to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground
of incompatibility.
 2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be
adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce
in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary
to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce
from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife,
and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife,
or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is
hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No.
1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the
February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its
May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo
T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on
March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October
15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up
to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch
146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico
Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that
the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at 30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be
issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death.
He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined
her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On
February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the
two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed
on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted
documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila
which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid
down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order
denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because
this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of
the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his
first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge
Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of
the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then
Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador
S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on
which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting
the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134
presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit
their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and
legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence
set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position
paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a
Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and
set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January
31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders
dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and
the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers
to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity
to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2,
Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in
Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any
form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants.
All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the
express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as
the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant
petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that
the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our
rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7,
Tacloban City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his
domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo
was void and bigamous because it was performed during the
subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage.
As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed
in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at
the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez
are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence"
for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of
fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention
of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the
Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which
may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and
domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo
was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he
also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up
to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the
Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented
billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese
General Hospital for the period August to December 1992
indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-
envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to
him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling
cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial
address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.
At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches
of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated
in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file
the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the
issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In
resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions
of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage
between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine
law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from
their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the
alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longer be considered married to the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still marriedto private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis
added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse
is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino
wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that
where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the
ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the
Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of
limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied.
The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties
between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained
by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already
established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to
the society where one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating
that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos
are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the
cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are
to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the
Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results;
and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that,
in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we
are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What
we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a
law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these
words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That
wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is
always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with,
that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the
laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law
Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was
done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied
by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both
of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership,
it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint
labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the
divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be
Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property
relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held
that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The
Court described the property regime under this provision as
follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the
union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to
be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents
defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity
to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise
from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order
of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this
case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via
a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November
29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work
and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon
after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in
April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that
his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved
(petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not
file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party
to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or
her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the
Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account
the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file
the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he
claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper
party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as
there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
respective Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes
is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative
history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on
the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in
the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses
assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that
the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between
the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to
be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to
a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse]
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law
"to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating
him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for
that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be
of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article
17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article
26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that
the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the
Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in
this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect
of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific
thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person,
the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of
his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC
to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to
oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect,
as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it
not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be
legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in
the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording
the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
 (c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only
the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of
name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given
res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181,
series of 198237 both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,
the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition
that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not,
by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry.
A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must
be made parties to the proceedings;39and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not
been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration
of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court
for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a
copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the
March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between
Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on
January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and
both parties can now remarry under existing and
applicable laws to any and/or both parties." 3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted
Decision.
 The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4 They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the
Australian government.6 Petitioner a Filipina and respondent
were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy
respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had
revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding
and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court
in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. 14 The
Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the
case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and
Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that
the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of
any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather,
it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce
decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson
thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage
with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized
Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26
of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso
facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the
divorce decree before our courts." 19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision,
we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other
foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction
only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds
that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by
the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to
the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the
take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide
for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 22 and 1723 of the
Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading
and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles
read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of
the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has
been previously married, the applicant shall be required to
furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate
of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment
or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x
x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce
decree is a public document a written official act of an Australian
family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment
is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant
of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked
in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges
may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the
divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was
validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types.
The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under
some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute;
thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground
of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court
may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy." 48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence,
we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on
this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree
raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the
application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit "A" Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and
Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City,
Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian)
on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D"
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that
no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and
Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E"
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2)
for respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S"
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4"
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration of
the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent,
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status;
or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may
turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the
trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial
justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quofor the purpose of
receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the
parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 215723
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN
GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner
vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, and THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the
Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated November
28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106
(RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's petition
for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Facts
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and
respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national,
were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. 4 Their
union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January
23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. 5
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of
Japan, filed for divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City,
Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as
appearing in the Divorce Certificate7and the same was duly
recorded in the Official Family Register ofMichiyuki Koike. 8
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her
Certificate of Marriage9 on file with the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition10 for
judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and declaration of capacity
to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code11 before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-
72692.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.12 On the
other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely,
"Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce"13 and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" 14 both
issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by
the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She
also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled
"Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of
Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the
Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification15 issued by the City Civil
Registry Office in Manila that the original of said divorce
certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition,
photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding
English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil
Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan
2009"17 were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of
Japan's law on divorce.18
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's
petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign divorce
decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or
her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with
Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents
presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or
official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the
national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law
on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan
2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by
Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony
of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and
its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she
was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to
have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan,
particularly those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did
not consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section
46,22 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert
witness on the subject matter was presented and considering
further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreignjudgments and law.23
Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a
Resolution25 dated November 28, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC
erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce.1wphi1
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide
for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However,
Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages
or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a
Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. The provision reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 26
In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws.1wphi1 Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country." This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in
our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven.30 Since our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence
requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.31
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen
and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan
on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of
the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the
instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the
ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts,
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are
in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.32 In this regard, it is
settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered
by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the
Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.33
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals
as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under
paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the
Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to
the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The
determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of
fact are involved shall be final.
This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f)
thereof that an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when there is
error irr the choice or mode of appeal.34
Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to
either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA, the question
of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice
warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further appropriate
proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended
to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense,
for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be
allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation
of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts. 35
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence
to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.