CARMEN DEL PRADO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO L.

CABALLERO and LEONARDA CABALLERO,

respondents. G.R. No. 148225.March 3, 2010.*

Civil Law; Properties; Sales; In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of pricing
agreement: a unit price contract and a lump sum contract.In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose
between two types of pricing agreement: a unit price contract wherein the purchase price is determined by way of
reference to a stated rate per unit area (e.g., P1,000 per square meter), or a lump sum contract which states a full
purchase price for an immovable the area of which may be declared based on the estimate or where both the area
and boundaries are stated (e.g., P1 million for 1,000 square meters, etc.).

Same; Same; Same; What really defines a piece of ground is not the area calculated with more or less certainty
mentioned in its description but the boundaries therein laid down as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared, the area covered within the boundaries of
the immovable prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict between areas and boundaries, it is the latter
which should prevail. What really defines a piece of ground is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty,
mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. In
a contract of sale of land in a mass, it is well-established that the specific boundaries stated in the contract must
control over any statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries. It is not of vital consequence
that a deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area with mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its
extent is objectively indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An error as to the superficial area
is immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the
entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; More or Less; The use of more or less or similar words in designating
quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency.The use of more or less or similar words in designating
quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the description more
or less with reference to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In a contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific boundaries stated in the contract
must control over any other statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries.In the instant case,
the deed of sale is not one of a unit price contract. The parties agreed on the purchase price of P40,000.00 for a
predetermined area of 4,000 sq m., more or less, bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on the East by Lot No.
11908, on the South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No. 11910. In a contract of sale of land in
a mass, the specific boundaries stated in the contract must control over any other statement, with respect to the
area contained within its boundaries.

Same; Same; Same; Essential Elements of a Contract of Sale.Contracts are the law between the contracting
parties. Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract, because it is perfected by mere consent. The essential
elements of a contract of sale are the following: (a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer
ownership in exchange for the price; (b) determinate subject matter; and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent.
All these elements are present in the instant case.

Land Titles; Indefeasibility of Titles; Prescription; It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein; Such indefeasibility commences after one year from the date of entry of the degree of
registration.We find no reversible error in the decision of the CA. Petitioners recourse, by filing the petition for
registration in the same cadastral case, was improper. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. Such indefeasibility commences after one year from the date of entry of the
decree of registration. Inasmuch as the petition for registration of document did not interrupt the running of the
period to file the appropriate petition for review and considering that the prescribed one-year period had long since
expired, the decree of registration, as well as the certificate of title issued in favor of respondents, had become
incontrovertible.
 DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 26, 2000
and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The facts are as follows:

In a judgment rendered on February 1, 1985 in Cadastral Case No. N-6 (LRC Rec. No. N-611), Judge Juan Y.
Reyes of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14, adjudicated in favor of Spouses Antonio L.
Caballero and Leonarda B. Caballero several parcels of land situated in Guba, Cebu City, one of which was
Cadastral Lot No. 11909, the subject of this controversy. 2 On May 21, 1987, Antonio Caballero moved for the
issuance of the final decree of registration for their lots. 3 Consequently, on May 25, 1987, the same court, through
then Presiding Judge Renato C. Dacudao, ordered the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
to issue the decree of registration and the corresponding titles of the lots in favor of the Caballeros. 4

On June 11, 1990, respondents sold to petitioner, Carmen del Prado, Lot No. 11909 on the basis of the tax
declaration covering the property. The pertinent portion of the deed of sale reads as follows:

That we, Spouses ANTONIO L. CABALLERO and LEONARDA B. CABALLERO, Filipinos, both of legal age and
residents of Talamban, Cebu City, Philippines, for and in consideration of the sum of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, paid by CARMEN DEL PRADO, Filipino, of legal age, single and a resident of
Sikatuna St., Cebu City, Philippines, the receipt of which is full is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents
SELL, CEDE, TRANSFER, ASSIGN & CONVEY unto the said CARMEN DEL PRADO, her heirs, assigns and/or
successors-in-interest, one (1) unregistered parcel of land, situated at Guba, Cebu City, Philippines, and more
particularly described and bounded, as follows:

"A parcel of land known as Cad. Lot No. 11909, bounded as follows:

North : Lot 11903

East : Lot 11908

West : Lot 11910

South : Lot 11858 & 11912

containing an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Dec. No. 00787 of the Cebu City
Assessors Office, Cebu City." of which parcel of land we are the absolute and lawful owners.

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1305, covering Lot No. 11909, was issued only on November 15, 1990, and
entered in the "Registration Book" of the City of Cebu on December 19, 1990. 5 Therein, the technical description of
Lot No. 11909 states that said lot measures about 14,457 square meters, more or less. 6

On March 20, 1991, petitioner filed in the same cadastral proceedings a "Petition for Registration of Document
Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1529"7 in order that a certificate of title be issued in her name, covering the whole
Lot No. 11909. In the petition, petitioner alleged that the tenor of the instrument of sale indicated that the sale was
for a lump sum or cuerpo cierto, in which case, the vendor was bound to deliver all that was included within said
boundaries even when it exceeded the area specified in the contract. Respondents opposed, on the main ground
that only 4,000 sq m of Lot No. 11909 was sold to petitioner. They claimed that the sale was not for a cuerpo cierto.
They moved for the outright dismissal of the petition on grounds of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.

After trial on the merits, the court found that petitioner had established a clear and positive right to Lot No. 11909.
The intended sale between the parties was for a lump sum, since there was no evidence presented that the
property was sold for a price per unit. It was apparent that the subject matter of the sale was the parcel of land,
known as Cadastral Lot No. 11909, and not only a portion thereof. 8

Thus, on August 2, 1993, the court a quo rendered its decision with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
herein petitioner. The Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu is hereby ordered and directed to effect the registration
in his office of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Spouses Antonio Caballero and Leonarda Caballero and
Petitioner, Carmen del Prado dated June 11, 1990 covering Lot No. 11909 after payment of all fees prescribed by
law. Additionally, the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu is hereby ordered to cancel Original Certificate No. 1305
in the name of Antonio Caballero and Leonarda Caballero and the Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in the
name of Petitioner Carmen del Prado covering the entire parcel of land known as Cadastral Lot No. 11909. 9

An appeal was duly filed. On September 26, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision, reversing and setting
aside the decision of the RTC.

The CA no longer touched on the character of the sale, because it found that petitioner availed herself of an
improper remedy. The "petition for registration of document" is not one of the remedies provided under P.D. No.
1529, after the original registration has been effected. Thus, the CA ruled that the lower court committed an error
when it assumed jurisdiction over the petition, which prayed for a remedy not sanctioned under the Property
Registration Decree. Accordingly, the CA disposed, as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs. 10

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN MAKING FINDINGS OF
FACT CONTRARY TO THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT[;]

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FAILING TO RULE THAT
THE SALE OF THE LOT IS FOR A LUMP SUM OR CUERPO CIERTO[;]

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR REGISTRATION
OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 11 JUNE 1990 EXECUTED BETWEEN HEREIN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENTS[.]11

The core issue in this case is whether or not the sale of the land was for a lump sum or not.

Petitioner asserts that the plain language of the Deed of Sale shows that it is a sale of a real estate for a lump sum,
governed under Article 1542 of the Civil Code.12 In the contract, it was stated that the land contains an area of 4,000
sq m more or less, bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on the East by Lot No. 11908, on the South by Lot Nos.
11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No. 11910. When the OCT was issued, the area of Lot No. 11909 was
declared to be 14,475 sq m, with an excess of 10,475 sq m. In accordance with Article 1542, respondents are,
therefore, duty-bound to deliver the whole area within the boundaries stated, without any corresponding increase in
the price. Thus, petitioner concludes that she is entitled to have the certificate of title, covering the whole Lot No.
11909, which was originally issued in the names of respondents, transferred to her name.

We do not agree.

In Esguerra v. Trinidad,13 the Court had occasion to discuss the matter of sales involving real estates. The Courts
pronouncement is quite instructive:

In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of pricing agreement: a unit price contract
wherein the purchase price is determined by way of reference to a stated rate per unit area (e.g., P1,000 per
square meter), or a lump sum contract which states a full purchase price for an immovable the area of which may
be declared based on the estimate or where both the area and boundaries are stated (e.g., P1 million for 1,000
square meters, etc.). In Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (478 SCRA 451), the Court discussed the distinction:

"In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is not conclusive and the price may be reduced or
increased depending on the area actually delivered. If the vendor delivers less than the area agreed upon, the
vendee may oblige the vendor to deliver all that may be stated in the contract or demand for the proportionate
reduction of the purchase price if delivery is not possible. If the vendor delivers more than the area stated in the
contract, the vendee has the option to accept only the amount agreed upon or to accept the whole area, provided
he pays for the additional area at the contract rate.

xxxx

In the case where the area of an immovable is stated in the contract based on an estimate, the actual area
delivered may not measure up exactly with the area stated in the contract. According to Article 1542 of the Civil
Code, in the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or
number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although there be a greater or less areas or number
than that stated in the contract. . . .

xxxx

Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared, the area covered within the boundaries of
the immovable prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict between areas and boundaries, it is the latter
which should prevail. What really defines a piece of ground is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty,
mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. In
a contract of sale of land in a mass, it is well established that the specific boundaries stated in the contract must
control over any statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries. It is not of vital consequence
that a deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area with mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its
extent is objectively indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An error as to the superficial area
is immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the
entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object. 14

The Court, however, clarified that the rule laid down in Article 1542 is not hard and fast and admits of an exception.
It held:

A caveat is in order, however. The use of "more or less" or similar words in designating quantity covers only a
reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with reference
to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land..

Numerical data are not of course the sole gauge of unreasonableness of the excess or deficiency in area. Courts
must consider a host of other factors. In one case (see Roble v. Arbasa, 414 Phil. 343 [2001]), the Court found
substantial discrepancy in area due to contemporaneous circumstances. Citing change in the physical nature of the
property, it was therein established that the excess area at the southern portion was a product of reclamation, which
explained why the lands technical description in the deed of sale indicated the seashore as its southern boundary,
hence, the inclusion of the reclaimed area was declared unreasonable. 15

In the instant case, the deed of sale is not one of a unit price contract. The parties agreed on the purchase price
of P40,000.00 for a predetermined area of 4,000 sq m, more or less, bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on
the East by Lot No. 11908, on the South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No. 11910. In a
contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific boundaries stated in the contract must control over any other
statement, with respect to the area contained within its boundaries. 161avvphi1

Blacks Law Dictionary17 defines the phrase "more or less" to mean:

About; substantially; or approximately; implying that both parties assume the risk of any ordinary discrepancy. The
words are intended to cover slight or unimportant inaccuracies in quantity, Carter v. Finch, 186 Ark. 954, 57 S.W.2d
408; and are ordinarily to be interpreted as taking care of unsubstantial differences or differences of small
importance compared to the whole number of items transferred.

Clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a slight difference in quantity. The difference in the
area is obviously sizeable and too substantial to be overlooked. It is not a reasonable excess or deficiency that
should be deemed included in the deed of sale.

We take exception to the avowed rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. After an assiduous scrutiny of the
records, we lend credence to respondents claim that they intended to sell only 4,000 sq m of the whole Lot No.
11909, contrary to the findings of the lower court. The records reveal that when the parties made an ocular
inspection, petitioner specifically pointed to that portion of the lot, which she preferred to purchase, since there were
mango trees planted and a deep well thereon. After the sale, respondents delivered and segregated the area of
4,000 sq m in favor of petitioner by fencing off the area of 10,475 sq m belonging to them. 18

Contracts are the law between the contracting parties. Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract, because it
is perfected by mere consent. The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following: (a) consent or meeting
of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (b) determinate subject matter; and
(c) price certain in money or its equivalent. All these elements are present in the instant case. 19

More importantly, we find no reversible error in the decision of the CA. Petitioners recourse, by filing the petition for
registration in the same cadastral case, was improper. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. Such indefeasibility commences after one year from the date of entry of the
decree of registration.20 Inasmuch as the petition for registration of document did not interrupt the running of the
period to file the appropriate petition for review and considering that the prescribed one-year period had long since
expired, the decree of registration, as well as the certificate of title issued in favor of respondents, had become
incontrovertible.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 DIVISION

[ GR No. 169970, Jan 20, 2009 ]

PROTACIO VICENTE v. DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA +

DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated June 16, 2005 and October 4, 2005 respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 79327, which
reversed the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 208, Mandaluyong City, dated March
30, 2003.

Jovencio Rebuquiao was the registered owner of the property in dispute, then covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34351.[4] On October 1, 1987, Rebuquiao executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of petitioners, spouses Protacio Vicente and Dominga Vicente, over the property in dispute.[5]
Respondent Delia Soledad Avera alleges that on October 9, 1987, Jose Rebuquiao, pursuant to a Special
Power of Attorney granted to him by Jovencio Rebuquiao, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage in favor of Roberto Domingo, Avera's spouse at the time, and herself.[6]

On May 29, 1991, Avera filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC, Branch
70, Pasig City, entitled "Delia Soledad Domingo, etc. v. Roberto Domingo" and docketed as JDRC Case
No. 1989-J (JDRC case).[7] In this case, Avera asserted exclusive ownership over the property in dispute.[8]
On January 23, 1992, a notice of lis pendens was inscribed on TCT No. 34351, pertaining to the JDRC
case pending at the time.[9]

Since 1997, petitioners possessed the property in dispute.[10] On July 22, 1998, TCT No. 34351 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the Registry of Deeds issued petitioners TCT No. 14216 for the property in
dispute, on the basis of the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987.[11] The notice of lis pendens was
carried over to TCT No. 14216.[12]

On November 28, 1994, the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, rendered a Decision in the JDRC case, declaring
the marriage of Avera and Domingo void and ordering the property acquired during their cohabitation to
be put in the custody of Avera, including the property in dispute.[13] After the decision in the JDRC case
became final and executory, the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, issued a Writ of Execution.[14] On June 13,
2001, the same trial court issued an Alias Writ of Execution, which reads:
Movant declared in her motion that the said property is now registered in the name of another person,
namely, Protacio Vicente, under TCT No. 14216 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. It
appearing, however, that the transfer was made notwithstanding the annotation thereon of the notice of lis
pendens that the same property is the subject of the instant case, it can still be the subject of a writ of
execution to satisfy the judgment in favor of herein petitioner.

WHEREFORE, let an alias writ of execution be issued over Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34351, now
covered by TCT No. 14216 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City.

SO ORDERED.[15]
Pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution, respondent Ronberto Valino, in his capacity as Sheriff IV of the
RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, served a Notice to Vacate dated August 15, 2001, on petitioners.[16] On
August 17, 2001, petitioners filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim before the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig
City.[17]

On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) before the RTC, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City, to enjoin Sheriff Valino from
implementing the alias writ of execution.[18] On September 4, 2001, the trial court issued a TRO[19] and, on
May 29, 2002, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, enjoining respondents from enforcing the notice to
vacate.[20] On March 30, 2003, it rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered making the writ of preliminary injunction PERMANENT.

Defendants' counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[21]
It held that petitioners were entitled to permanent injunction considering the following: (1) it is
undisputed that petitioners are the registered owners of the subject property, which certificate of title
confers upon them conclusive ownership of the property; and (2) the writ of execution issued in the JDRC
case could only be issued against a party to the action, and thus not to the petitioners.[22]

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City.[23] The
CA held that petitioners are bound by the outcome of the JDRC case, because the annotation of the notice
of lis pendens (January 23, 1992) was ahead of petitioners' registration of the deed of sale executed on
October 1, 1987 (July 22, 1998).[24] Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied.
[25]

Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:

I

The CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint for injunction despite the fact that the Petitioners
are the registered owners of the property and as such cannot be evicted out therefrom unless:

A. the sale from which they based their acquisition is declared void.

B. the title issued in their names based on the Deed of Sale is likewise declared void.

II

The CA erred in dismissing the complaint because in so doing, it made an implied recognition that a real
property titled under the torrens system may be attacked collaterally in contravention of law and
established jurisprudence[.]

III

The CA erred in concluding that the Petitioners are bound by the lis pendens it being clear that the
property was acquired long before the lis pendens was annotated. Petitioners' (sic) became owners of the
property on October 1, 1987 and not on July 20, 1998 when their ownership was merely confirmed by the
title issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Petitioners maintain that as the registered owners and actual possessors of the property in dispute, they are
entitled to a writ of injunction that will prevent the implementation of the writ of execution corresponding
to the JDRC case.

Respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to the writ of injunction, because the petitioners are
subject to the outcome of the JDRC case and thus the implementation of the writ of execution due to the
notice of lis pendens annotated on their TCT. They further allege: (1) that there was no sale by Rebuquiao
in favor of petitioners on October 1, 1987; and (2) if there was a sale, the same happened in 1997, the year
petitioners registered the deed of sale executed in their favor.[26]

The core issue in the case at bar is whether injunction lies in favor of the petitioners to prevent the
respondents from interfering in the exercise of their rights over the property in dispute.

We find merit in the petition.

Injunction, as a preservative remedy, aims to protect substantive rights and interests.[27] To be entitled to a
writ of injunction, the complainant must establish the following requisites: (1) there must be a right in
esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is
a violation of such right.[28] The grant of the writ is conditioned on the existence of the complainant's clear
legal right, which means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is "enforceable as a matter of law."[29]

As the registered owners and actual possessors of the property in question, petitioners have a clear legal
right to the property in dispute. Section 51 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 provides that
registration is the operative act that conveys or affects registered land as against third persons.[30] Thus, a
TCT is the best proof of ownership of land.[31] In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioners are the
registered owners and actual possessors of the subject property. Moreover, as the registered owners,
petitioners have the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership.[32]

It was erroneous for respondents to assail the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 in favor of
petitioners, because this constitutes a collateral attack on petitioners' TCT. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529
prohibits a collateral attack on a Torrens title.[33] This Court has held that a petition which, in effect,
questioned the validity of a deed of sale for registered land constitutes a collateral attack on a certificate of
title.[34] In the case at bar, respondents' allegation, that the deed of sale executed on October 1, 1987 in
favor of petitioners does not exist, clearly constitutes a collateral attack on a certificate of title. The
allegation of the inexistence of the deed of sale in effect attacks the validity of the TCT issued in the
petitioners' names.

Petitioners' title to the property in dispute is not subject to the outcome of the litigation covered by the
notice of lis pendens annotated on January 23, 1992. Section 24, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that a purchaser of the property affected by the notice of lis pendens is deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action only from the time of filing such notice.[35] Section
14, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure reiterates this rule.[36] Thus, a notice of lis pendens affects a transferee pendente
lite, who by virtue of the notice, is bound by any judgment, which may be rendered for or against the
transferor, and his title is subject to the results of the pending litigation.[37]

A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien.[38] It serves to
protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution.[39] While
the notice of lis pendens remains on a certificate of title, the registrant could rest secure that he would not
lose the property or any part of it during the litigation.[40] Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly
registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome
of the litigation. For this reason, the Court has pronounced that a "purchaser who buys registered land
with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third party stands in the shoes of
his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending litigation."[41]

In the case at bar, the notice of lis pendens does not affect petitioners' title to the property in dispute. A
notice of lis pendens concerns litigation between a transferor and a third party, where the transferee who
acquires land with a notice of lis pendens annotated on the corresponding certificate of title stands in the
shoes of his predecessor and in which case the transferee's title is subject to the results of the pending
litigation. The notice of lis pendens does not concern litigation involving Rebuquiao, who transferred his
title to the property in dispute to petitioners, and his title. The notice of lis pendens pertains to the JDRC
case, an action for nullity of the marriage between Avera and Domingo. Since Rebuquiao's title to the
property in dispute is not subject to the results of the JDRC case, petitioners' title to the same property is
also not subject to the results of the JDRC case.

To determine whether the second requisite for granting a writ of injunction exists, that the act against
which injunction is to be directed is a violation of the complainant's right, we must examine the
implications regarding the implementation of the writ of execution over TCT No. 14216. Pursuant to this
writ of execution, Sheriff Valino served petitioners with a notice to vacate.

If allowed to be carried out, the act against which the injunction is directed, the implementation of the
writ of execution, would violate petitioners' rights as the registered owners and actual possessors of the
property in dispute. The registered owner has the right to possess and enjoy his property, without any
limitations other than those imposed by law.[42] The implementation of the writ of execution would unduly
deprive petitioners, as the registered owners, of their right to possess the subject property, which is one of
the attributes of ownership.[43]

We must stress that until petitioners' title is annulled in a proper proceeding, Avera has no enforceable
right over the property in dispute. At this point, petitioners' possession of the subject property must be
respected. Since Avera failed to prove her indubitable right over the subject property, we rule that
petitioners possess a clear and unmistakable right over the property in dispute that requires the issuance of
a writ of injunction to prevent any damage to their interests as registered owners.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 79327, dated June 16, 2005 and October 4, 2005 respectively, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

PANGANIBANVS DAYRIT

GR No. 151235, 28 July 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners alleged that they are the possessors and owners of Lot 1436 which they inherited
from the late Juan and Ines, the owner of the subject land in question covered by OCT No.
7864. However, the said owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 covering the said lot had been
lost and upon

The owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 covering Lot 1436 had been lost but upon petition
with the trial court in 1977 by Erlinda B. Pacursa (Erlinda), one of the heirs of Ines and a
petitioner herein, the trial court granted the petition. [9] Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of
Misamis Oriental issued an owners duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to Erlinda. [10]
 Petitioners further alleged that unknown to them, a certain Cristobal Salcedo (Salcedo)
asserted ownership over Lot 1436 and believing that it was unregistered, sold a portion of it to
respondent. The latter subsequently discovered that what she had bought was registered land.
Unable to annotate the deed of sale at the back of OCT No. 7864, respondent fraudulently filed
a petition for issuance of the owners copy of said title, docketed as Misc. Case No. 90-018 in
March 1990. This petition of the respondent alleged that the copy issued to Erlinda was lost in
the fire that razed Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City in 1981. While the petition mentioned Erlinda
as the last one in possession of the alleged lost owners duplicate copy of the title, she was not
notified of the proceedings.[11]

The petition in Misc. Case No. 90-018 was subsequently granted and the Register of
Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued an owners duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to
respondent.[12] This second duplicate certificate issued to respondent contained Entry No.
160180, the annotation of a Notice of Adverse Claim filed by Erlinda.[13] The Notice of Adverse
Claim[14] dated 24 February 1992 alleged in part that Erlinda is one of the lawful heirs of Juan
and Ines, the registered owners of the property, and as such, she has a legitimate claim thereto.

Petitioners further alleged that the newly issued owners duplicate certificate of OCT
No. 7864 to respondent was prejudicial to their previously issued title which is still in existence.
Thus, they prayed among others that they be declared as the rightful owners of the property in
question and that the duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 in their possession be deemed valid
and subsisting.[15]

In her answer to the amended complaint, respondent denied all the material allegations of
the complaint and set up affirmative and special defenses. She alleged that Lot 1436 was
actually sold sometime in 1947 by the petitioners themselves and their father, Mauricio
Baconga. The sale was purportedly covered by a Deed of Definite Sale. Salcedo then came
into ownership, possession and enjoyment of the property in question. [16] On 14 February 1978,
Salcedo sold a portion of Lot 1436 with an area of two thousand twenty- five (2,025) square
meters, more or less, to respondent. From then on, the property in question has been in her
actual and physical enjoyment, she added.[17]

Respondent further alleged that the complaint was barred by the principles of estoppel and
laches by virtue of the sales executed by petitioners themselves and their father. The complaint,
according to her, also failed to include as defendants, the heirs of Salcedo who are
indispensable parties.[18]

On 10 August 1992, upon motion duly granted, respondent filed a third-party complaint
against the heirs of Salcedo alleging that as such heirs, they carry the burden of warranting that
their predecessors in interest were the true, legal and rightful owners of the property in question
at the time of the sale. Hence, she prayed therein that she be maintained in peaceful and legal
ownership, possession and enjoyment of the questioned property. [19]

Answering the third-party complaint, the heirs of Salcedo effectively admitted the existence
of the 1978 deed of sale in favor of respondent by their parents and considered the sale as
within the personal and legal right of their parents and an act outside their control. [20]
 After due trial and consideration of the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by
both parties, the trial court rendered a decision against petitioners and in favor of respondent.
The dispositive portion of the decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered:

1. DISMISSING plaintiffs complaint, for lack of merit and cause of

action;
2. DECLARING defendant as the true and real owner of the lot in
question;
3. DECLARING the owners duplicate copy of Original Certificate of
Title No. 7864 (plaintiffs Exh. A) null and void same being obtained by plaintiffs
when they were not owners anymore of Lot 1436;
4. DECLARING the owners duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title
No. 7864 obtained by defendant (Exh. 1) as the one valid to be given like faith
and credit as the one that was lost and declared null and void; and
5. ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City to issue a
transfer certificate of title to Angela N. Dayrit, herein defendant, for her 2,025
square meter portion of Lot 1436; to Anita Baconga Fuentes for her 505 square
meter portion of Lot 1436 and to Atty. Isabelo N. Pacursa or his heirs, he being
allegedly dead already, for his 170 square meter portion of Lot 1436 and after
they shall have presented an approved subdivision plan and an agreement to
partition, to issue to each of them, their respective transfer certificate of title with
an area according to the respective technical description corresponding to each
of their land.

Defendants counterclaim and third-party complaint are hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[21]

The Regional Trial Court Decision was modified by the CA on appeal by petitioners. The
appellate court held that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the valid and subsisting duplicate
certificate of OCT No. 7864 was the one issued to Erlinda, not to respondent, considering that
respondent had failed to comply with the mandatory jurisdictional requirements of law for the
reconstitution of title under Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 26. [22]

The CA invoked the doctrine that a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over a petition
for the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title if the original is in fact not lost.
Citing Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [23] the CA held that the reconstituted certificate is
itself void once the existence of the original is unquestionably demonstrated. [24]

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed in all other respects the ruling of the trial court, including
the critical holding that respondent was the owner of the subject property. The decretal portion
of the CAs decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and

jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered
granting partly the instant appeal. Consequently, the decision of the trial court is
MODIFIED so as to order the cancellation of the owners duplicate copy of OCT
No. 7864 issued to defendant Angelina Dayrit and declaring the owners
duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 (Exh. A and sub-markings with SN No.
 014439) to be still valid for all intents and purposes and to be given like
faith and credit as the original. All other aspects areAFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[25] (Emphasis in the original.)

Petitioners now come before this Court seeking the partial reversal of the decision
rendered by the CA. They contend that the CA erred in finding that the tax declarations and the
alleged adverse possession of respondent and her predecessor-in-interest are conclusive
proofs of their ownership of Lot 1436. They further contend that the CA erred when it found them
guilty of laches.[26]

However, it is apparent that in order that the petition may be properly resolved, we must
ascertain first, who between petitioners and respondent is the rightful owner of the property in
dispute and second, whether petitioners right to recover the property is barred by laches
assuming they are the rightful owners thereof as they claim.

The resolution of the foregoing issues hinges on the question of which owners duplicate
certificate of title is valid and subsisting, the one in petitioners possession or the one issued to
respondent. What appears on the face of the title is controlling in questions of ownership since
the certificate of title is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. [27]

The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate certificate of title in petitioners possession is
valid and subsisting. This Court had already ruled in Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals [28] that if a
certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over
the petition for issuance of a new title. [29]Since the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864
earlier issued to Erlinda is still in existence, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
respondents petition for reconstitution of title. The duplicate certificate of title subsequently
issued to respondent is therefore void and of no effect.

The registered owners of OCT No. 7864 on the face of the valid and subsisting duplicate
certificate of title are still Juan and Ines, petitioners predecessors in interest. [30] Per Section 46
of the Land Registration Act, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. This rule taken in conjunction
with the indefeasibility of a Torrens title leads to the conclusion that the rightful owners of the
property in dispute are petitioners. They are indisputably the heirs of the registered owners, both
of whom are already dead.

These premises considered, it was error on the part of the trial court to rule that respondent
was the owner of the subject property and for the CA to have affirmed such holding. We rule
instead that the successors-in-interest of Juan and Ines are the legal owners of the subject
property, namely petitioners herein.

Petitioners ownership of the property having been established, the question now is
whether they are entitled to its possession. On this point, the Court rules in the negative.
Petitioners are no longer entitled to recover possession of the property by virtue of the equitable
defense of laches. Thus, petitioners argument that laches is not applicable to them has no
merit. By laches is meant:

the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to

do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an equitable one
and does not concern itself with the character of the defendants title but only
with whether or not by reason of plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect,
he should be barred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do
so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant. [31]

In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be
barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. [32] Thus, in the case of Lola v.
Court of Appeals,[33] this Court held that petitioners acquired title to the land owned by
respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due to respondents failure to assert
her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In Miguel v. Catalino,[34] this Court said that
appellants passivity and inaction for more than thirty-four (34) years (1928-1962) justifies the
defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his behalf. Likewise, in the
case of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia,[35] we stated that while the defendant may not be
considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors long continued
possession for thirty-seven (37) years, the original owners right to recover possession of the
property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latters long period of possession
and by patentees inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand. [36]

In this case, both the lower court and the appellate court found that contrary to
respondents claim of possession, it was Salcedo, respondents predecessor-in-interest who had
been in actual possession of the property. In fact, when the lower court conducted an ocular
inspection on the subject premises sometime on 16 March 1993, the court-appointed
Commissioner elicited from the people residing near the subject property, more particularly
Celso Velez, Nieto Abecia and PaquitoNabe, that Salcedo was the owner and the one in
possession of the land until 1978 when respondent became the possessor thereof. [37]

It was only in 1992 or forty-five (45) years from the time Salcedo took possession of the
property that petitioners made an attempt to claim it as their own. Petitioners declared the
property for tax purposes, registered their adverse claim to respondents title, and filed the
instant case all in 1992.[38] These actuations of petitioners point to the fact that for forty-five (45)
years, they did nothing to assert their right of ownership and possession over the subject
property.
 Given the circumstances in the case at bar, the application of the equitable defense of
laches is more than justified.

Petitioners claim that prescription and adverse possession can never militate against the
right of a registered owner since a title, once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse,
open and notorious possession.[39]

They are right in that regard. But their cause is defeated not by prescription and adverse
possession, but by laches.

This Court had occasion to distinguish laches from prescription in the case of Heirs of
BatiogLacamen v. Heirs of Laruan.[40] It was held therein that:

Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right,

taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in
the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because of the
inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property
or parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains
that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid
claim. It is different from and applies independently of prescription. While
prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the
effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question
of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on
some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties.
Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas
prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not.
[41]
(Footnotes are omitted.)

Thus, it is the effect of delay in asserting their right of ownership over the property which
militates against petitioners, not merely the fact that they asserted their right to the property too
late in the day.

All the four (4) elements of laches prescribed by this Court in the case of Go Chi Gun, et
al. v. Co Cho, et al.[42] and reiterated in the cases of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia,[43] Miguel v.
Catalino[44] and Claverias v. Quingco[45] are present in the case at bar, to wit:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks
a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. [46]

Petitioners inaction for forty-five (45) years reduced their right to recover the subject
property into a stale demand.
 In Mejia,[47] the Court held in essence that the principle of laches is one of estoppel
because it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights of third
parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the original patentee and his successors in
interest.[48] The following pronouncement in the case of Claverias v. Quingco[49] is therefore
apropos to the case at bar:

Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and
inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in
cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long
years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessors efforts
and the rise of the land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his
expense.[50]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED insofar as it ruled that the claim of petitioners is barred by laches. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
AURORA N. DE PEDRO v. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION . G.R. No. 194751,
November 26, 2014

FACTS:
This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original
certificates of title, filed against several defendants. One of the defendants is petitioner Aurora De
Pedro (De Pedro).The complaints were filed by respondent Romasan Development Corporation
(RDC) before the RTC of Antipolo City.
Respondent RDC alleged in its complaints that it was the owner and possessor ofland.
Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed. The officers returnreads in
part:xAURORA N. DE PEDRO Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of
Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.
Respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication.
RTC granted the motion. The summons and the complaint were published in Peoples
Balita.
Respondent moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De Pedro, in
default for failure to file their answers. TheRTCgranted the motion.
TheRTC issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents issued to all
defendants in respondents complaint, including the free patent issued to De Pedro.
De Pedro, through counsel, filed before the RTC a motion for new trial, De Pedro argued
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because of improper and defective
service of summons. Citing the officers return, De Pedro pointed out that summons was not
personally served upon her for the reason that according to the messenger of Post Office of
Pasig their (sic) is no person in the said given address.
De Pedro also argued that the case should have been dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia. She alleged that there was a pending civil case filed by her, involving the same
property, when respondent filed the complaints against her and several others.
RTC issued an order denying De Pedros motion for new trial.
The RTC ruled that summons was validly served upon De Pedro through publication, in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, alleging that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied her motion for new trial. CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit, and affirmed the denial of De Pedros motion for new trial.
De Pedros motion for reconsideration was denied in the CA.
De Pedro elevated the case to this court, but this was likewise denied. De Pedro filed
before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment of the RTC on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, litis pendentia, and for having been dispossessed of her property without due
process.
CA promulgated its decision denying De Pedros petition for annulment of judgment. CA
ruled that since petitioner already availed herself of the remedy of new trial, and raised the case
before the CA via petition for certiorari, she can no longer file a petition for annulment of
judgment.51chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
De Pedros motion for reconsideration was denied.
De Pedro filed before this court a Rule 45 petition, seeking the reversal of the CA
decision.

ISSUES:

I. Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro; and
 II. Whether filing a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari is a bar from filing a petition
for annulment of judgment.

RULING:

I. The sheriffs return must show the details of the efforts exerted to personally serve
summons upon defendants or respondents, before substituted service or service by
publication is availed

Regardless of the type of action whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem the
preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. To avail themselves of substituted
service, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriffs actions and a showing that the
defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. The sheriffs return, which
contains these details, is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and on this basis, the court may
allow substituted service. Should the sheriffs return be wanting of these details, substituted
service will be irregular if no other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was presented.

Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is tantamount to
voluntary appearance.

Courts may exercise their powers validly and with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over:
(a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the parties;
and (d) the remedy.

Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an
opportunity to defend those interests. Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be
expected to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as
acting within their jurisdiction.Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect. The relation
of due process to jurisdiction is recognized even in administrative cases wherein the standard of
evidence is relatively lower.

Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative. A
decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction.
Respondents institution of a proceeding for annulment of petitioners certificate of title is sufficient
to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with
the case with authority and competence. Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of
service of summons.95 Thus, as a rule, summons must be served personally upon the defendant
or respondent wherever he or she may be found. If the defendant or respondent refuses to
receive the summons, it shall be tendered to him or her.96chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

If the defendant or respondent is a domestic juridical person, personal service of summons shall
be effected upon its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel wherever he or she may be found.97chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Service of summons through
other modes will not be effective without showing serious attempts to serve summons through
personal service. Thus, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service only for
justifiable causes and if the defendant or respondent cannot be served within reasonable time.98
Substituted service is effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.99chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed when the

defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner or if his or her whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.100 It may only be effected after
unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the
defendants or respondents whereabouts.

Service of summons by extraterritorial service is allowed after leave of court when the defendant
or respondent does not reside or is not found in the country or is temporarily out of the
country.101chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If a defendant or respondent voluntarily appears in trial or participates in the proceedings, it is
generally construed as sufficient service of summons.

In this case, the sheriffs return states:1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO Unserved for the reason that
according to the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given
address.

This return shows no detail of the sheriffs efforts to serve the summons personally upon
petitioner. The summons was unserved only because the post office messenger stated that there
was no Aurora N. De Pedro in the service address. The return did not show that the sheriff
attempted to locate petitioners whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded based on the
return that personal service was rendered impossible under the circumstances or that service
could no longer be made within reasonable time.

The lack of any demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the summons personally
upon petitioner is a deviation from this courts previous rulings that personal service is the
preferred mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or her return the efforts made to
effect personal service. Thus, the sheriffs return in this case was defective. No substituted
service or service by publication will be allowed based on such defective return.

The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process
rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would have been
dismissible had petitioner learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a motion
to dismiss would have been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject
of an action for annulment of judgment.

What cannot be denied is the fact that petitioner was already notified of respondents action for
annulment of petitioners title when she filed a motion for new trial and, later, a petition for
certiorari. At that time, petitioner was deemed, for purposes of due process, to have been
properly notified of the action involving her title to the property. Lack of jurisdiction could have
already been raised in an action for annulment of judgment.

Thus, when petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari instead
of an action for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily participated in the
proceedings against her title. The actions and remedies she chose to avail bound her.
Petitioners failure to file an action for annulment of judgment at this time was fatal to her cause.
We cannot conclude now that she was denied due process.cr

I. Petitioner is already barred from

filing a petition for annulment of
judgment

A petition for annulment of judgment is a recourse that is equitable in character. It is

independent of the case112 and is allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no
available or other adequate remedy.113chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
An action for annulment of judgment may be filed to assail RTC judgments when resort to
other remedies can no longer be had through no fault of petitioner. An action for annulment of
judgment may be based on only two grounds: 1) extrinsic fraud; and 2) lack of jurisdiction. Lack
of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of judgments, circumstances that negate the
courts acquisition of jurisdiction including defective service of summons are causes for an
action for annulment of judgments.
However, this court had an occasion to say that an action for annulment of judgment may
not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those
remedies through his own fault or negligence.115 Thus, an action for annulment of judgment is
not always readily available even if there are causes for annulling a judgment.
In this case, petitioners main grounds for filing the action for annulment are lack of
jurisdiction over her person, and litis pendentia. These are the same grounds that were raised in
the motion for new trial filed before and denied by the RTC. Applying the above rules, we rule that
the CA did not err in denying petitioners petition for annulment of the Regional Trial Courts
judgment. Petitioner had already filed a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari invoking
lack of jurisdiction as ground.
 Petitioners filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for
new trial and lost, with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a
judgment in her favor by abusing and making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law.
This kind of abuse is what this court tries to guard against when it limited its application, and
stated in some of the cases that an action for annulment of judgment cannot be invoked when
other remedies had already been availed.

II. The requisites of litis pendentia are not satisfied when respondent filed
its action for annulment of title

Petitioner argued that the case for annulment of title was dismissible on the ground of litis
pendentia because there was a pending civil case filed by her against respondent.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) identity of parties, or interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.128chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Although both cases involve the same parcel of land, petitioner was not able to show that
there was identity of the relief prayed for. A review of the complaint in the said civil case shows
that it was a case for damages, for alleged improper conduct of respondent relating the property.
The action filed by respondent was an action for annulment of petitioners title. Petitioner was
also not able to show that the relief prayed for in both cases were founded on the same facts.
Petitioners complaint for damages was founded on the alleged misconduct of respondent.
Respondents action for annulment of title was founded on the alleged irregularity in the issuance
of petitioners title. Hence, the petitioner was not able to show that all the requisites for litis
pendentia are present. Respondents action for annulment of title cannot be dismissed on this
ground.