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Industrial Policy in Philippines

The Philippines is a newly industrialized economy whose exports are one of the key drivers
of growth. Its GDP is 1.5 trillion pesos, which is the fourth largest in Southeast Asia.
Philippines' GDP is accounted by 50% service sector, 33% industry sector and 17%
agriculture sector.

Philippines' key economic activities are business process outsourcing (BPO), food
processing, textiles and garments, and manufacturing of electronics. During the 2008-2009
recession, Philippines was one of the few countries with positive economic growth.
Philippines exports continued to increase throughout 2010-2014. Although US and Japan are
the main largest export markets, China, Hong Kong, Germany, Netherlands, France, South
Korea, India and ASEAN are also slowly inching towards being key export markets.

Impact on Philippines' Economy from 1950s to 1990s


The Philippines adopted industrialization policy of import substitution when import and
foreign exchange controls were imposed in response to a balance-of-payments (BOP) crisis in
1949. An over-valued currency, protective tariffs and quantitative import restriction were the
main ways that import substitution was materialized. Further, in 1950s, the Philippines
government established import substitution policies to control the manufacturing sector. This
led to increase in Foreign Direct Investment in Philippines by United States. Philippines
maintained its exchange rate with the US dollar to seek reconstruction assistance from the
United Stated in terms of imports. Hence, the aid inflow from the United States offset the
negative balance of trade in Philippines. Moreover, import restriction stimulated the
manufacturing sector and import controls led to the substitution of domestic production for
imports of textiles, paper and paper products, and nonmetallic mineral products.
Manufacturing net Domestic product (NDP) grew at 12 % per annum and the GNP was
growing at 7.7% per year. However, in the late 1950s, the GNP growth fell to 4.9% as the
allocation of foreign exchange was feeding the corrupt leaders. Lastly, the exports didn't meet
imports demanded as import demand outpaced exports, which disturbed the balance of
payments.

Late 1960s, Philippines faced economic and political turmoil. Renewals of Balance of
payments (BOP) difficulties lead to crisis in 1969. Economic growth remained sluggish,
particularly in the manufacturing sector, and the country failed to develop significant new
export industries as it was overwhelmingly dependent on commodities, coconut products,
sugar, forest products, copper, and gold-for its export earning. To combat BOP difficulties,
the government implemented Republic ACT 5186 and Export Incentives Act of 1970 to
encourage foreign investment. Investments in pioneer industries were allowed to be 100%
foreign-owned whereas; only 40% of non-pioneer industries were allowed to be foreign-
owned. The ownership requirements were relaxed if foreign industries chose to engage in a
pioneer activity/industry. Various fiscal incentives such as accelerated depreciation, tax
exemption on imported capital equipment and exemption from all revenue taxes except
income tax was offered. Furthermore, in 1970s, the government encouraged non-traditional
exports to boost its development. However, this didn't result in what was expected. The
growth of non-traditional exports lead to only few commodities like garments and semi-
conductor devices becoming highly concentrated. On top of that, these non-traditional
exports heavily relied on imported raw material inputs. Additionally, non-tariff barriers were
implemented in the country to protect industries like textiles, basic metals, and fabrics. The
devaluation of the peso (P3.90 to a dollar) and decrease in import controls, traditional exports
of agriculture and mineral products resulted in manufacturing growth rate to decrease.
Subsequently, there was an increase in product competition from abroad at the same time as
import costs increased. After the promulgation of the renewed Export Incentives Act, the
manufacturing recovered slightly. The manufacturing growth rate increased from 5.9% to
6.1% per year and the output growth in manufacturing hit peak in 1977. The Philippine
export growth rate was also respectable as it was 8.6% per annum. However, the GNP
remained 4.9%. The growth of agriculture decreased as well. During this period, the country's
extern al indebtedness increased greatly as a result of the two oil price shocks and the heavy
borrowing from the easily available recycled petrodollars. Government's effort to liberalize
economy was largely unsuccessful because movements to reduce tariffs met stiff resistance
from industrialists.

Due to the increase in the oil prices, the debt service burden increased, exports declined, and
economic growth rate decreased in the Philippines in 1980s. During this period, Marcos, one
of the most corrupt leaders in the world, became the president of Philippines. Under Marco's
government, Philippines adopted trade liberalization program under a World Bank structural
adjustment loan to consolidate the incentive measures to investment and exports. However,
the result was disappointing. Exports did not increase substantially whereas the imports
increase dramatically. The debt-service payments were increasing as well. The government
embarked on a program that focused on removing tariff rates and quantitative restrictions
over a period of 5 years. Hence, the Omnibus Investments code of 1981 was implemented.
This basically accelerate the cheapening of capital and hence, depreciation accelerated.
Philippine economy faced recession during this period as GNP grew at only about 1.8% and
approximately 50% of the population lived below the poverty line. Unemployment was 8.3%
and 12.3% in urban areas. Further, 470,000 Filipinos left the country to work abroad which
led to increasing source of foreign exchange earning in late 1980s. After 1986, during which
the military coup overthrew Marcos and Corazon Aquino became the new president, import
liberalization program was resumed. The old code was simplified and amended. The
amendments included simplified and progressive income taxes, revised investment incentives
and imposed luxury taxes. However, none of these improvements lead to a considerable
growth in the economy especially due to the BOP crisis. Lack of specialization and relatively
small market led to higher production costs and lower quality especially in the textile sector.
The domestic output provided more than 40 - 70 % of domestic supply in industries such as
food, textiles, machinery etc. For instance, Philippine textile plants that were unspecialized
were designed to serve the full range of domestic market demand. This lead to high
production costs, low quality of products and higher fault rates. A lot of infant industries had
to shut down.

Foreign Investment ACT was implemented in 1991 in order to allow the foreign equity
participation to be 100% in a lot of sectors and be transparent about which foreign
investments were allowed or restricted. It also helped decrease bureaucratic discretion such as
the need to obtain prior government approval if the foreign equity participation was higher
than 40%. Furthermore, the maximum tariff rate was reduced. The tariff tier ranged from 0%
on raw materials to 50% for finished products. Due to this, external debt was brought to more
manageable levels. GNP grew at a rate of 7.2% and GDP at 5.2%. However, these policies
did not result in phenomenal economic growth either due to graft involved. Some agriculture
tariffs were maintained at the maximum level permitted by World Trade Organization and
hence, agriculture productivity remained low. The service sector grew during this period. By
1990, approximately 40% of the population works in the service sector. Services accounted
for 44% of GNP. Further, the peso depreciated to P40.89 per U.S. dollar from its previous
rate of P29.47 to a dollar and debt increased. The debt reached P2.1 trillion. Moreover,
reduced cost of capital encouraged the substitution of capital for labor. Hence, by 1996, 5
million new workers joined the labor force in Philippines. In 2011, the export concentration
index was 0.245 for Philippines, which means that there was very low concentration of
exports. The share of manufactures was 21.04%. In conclusion, Philippines pursued industrial
policy that encouraged import substitution rather than promoting exports that penalized the
primary and agriculture sector and benefitted that manufacturing sector. Although many
believe that diverting resources away from agriculture and toward import-substituting
manufacturing discouraged investment in agriculture, which led to disastrous effect on
productivity overall, Philippines actually had a head start in manufacturing compared to its
neighbors. Yet, Philippines did not industrialize fully. The share of manufacturing to GDP
has stagnated at around 25 percent since the 1960s. The share of manufacturing employment
to total employment hardly rose above 10 percent. Asian Development Bank iterates that
"Philippines "missed" a crucial step in the structural transformation process: the rise of
manufacturing and the associated successful job creation in urban areas.

Appendix and Work Cited:

1. Https://atlas.media.mit.edu. Bservatory of Economic Complexity, n.d. Web. 3 Apr.


2015.
2. "Philippines Exports | 1957-2015 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News."
Philippines Exports | 1957-2015 | Data. Trading Economics, n.d. Web. 08 Apr. 2015.
3. "PHILEXPORT - The Philippines: General Economy and Export
Industry."PHILEXPORT - The Philippines: General Economy and Export Industry.
N.p., n.d. Web. 08 Apr. 2015.
4. Sachs, Jeffrey. Trade Policy, Industrial Policy, and the Exchange Rate. N.p.:
University of Chicago Press, 1989. PDF.
5. Medalla, Felipe. Economic Integration in East Asia: A Philippine Perspective.
Manila: n.p., 1989. PDF.
6. "Econ 11 Economic Performance of the Philippines 1950-2000." Her Basket.
University of the Philippines Visayas Cebu College, 30 Jan. 2012. Web. 04 Apr.
2015.
7. Sachs, Jeffrey. Trade Policy, Industrial Policy, and the Exchange Rate. N.p.:
University of Chicago Press, 1989. PDF.
8. Sachs, Jeffrey. Trade Policy, Industrial Policy, and the Exchange Rate. N.p.:
University of Chicago Press, 1989. PDF.
9. "Econ 11 Economic Performance of the Philippines 1950-2000." Her Basket.
University of the Philippines Visayas Cebu College, 30 Jan. 2012. Web. 04 Apr.
2015.
10. "Econ 11 Economic Performance of the Philippines 1950-2000." Her Basket.
University of the Philippines Visayas Cebu College, 30 Jan. 2012. Web. 04 Apr.
2015.
11. "Philippine Development Plans and Policies." The Philippines and the Economy.
Philippine Exporters Confederation, 2000. Web. 4 Apr. 2015.
12. Aldaba. "A New Industrial Policy for the
Philippines."Http://www.bworldonline.com/. Hilippine Institute for Development
Studies, 6 Jan. 2013. Web. 2 Apr. 2015.
13. Philippine Economy." In The Philippines Beyond 2000: An Economic Assessment,
ed. Josef T. Yap, Chapter 3. Makati City, the Philippines: Philippine Institute for
Development Studies.
14. "Encyclopedia of the Nations." Philippines Overview of Economy, Information about
Overview of Economy in Philippines. Encyclopedia of Nations, n.d. Web. 08 Apr.
2015.
15. "Encyclopedia of the Nations." Philippines Overview of Economy, Information about
Overview of Economy in Philippines. Encyclopedia of Nations, n.d. Web. 08 Apr.
2015.
16. "WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION." WTO. N.p., n.d. Web. 08 Apr. 2015.
17. Aldaba. Foreign Direct Investment in the Philippines. N.p.: Philippines Institute for
Development Studies, 1994. PDF.
18. Greson, Philip. "Poverty and Economic Policy in the Philippines." Poverty and
Economic Policy in the Philippines (n.d.): n. pag. Www.imf.org/. 1998. Web. 3 Apr.

2015.
Country ECI_20 MFG MXT YN POP lyn lp eci mfgd mxt APMX APMFG APE
11 DY X f yf xf TX DY CI

Philippi 0.24 21.03 58.77 1413. 948520 3.1 7.9 0.2 16.54 47.7 1.23 1.27 0.99
nes 36 30 5 7 4 6

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