Professional Documents
Culture Documents
For Digesting
For Digesting
579
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The claim of petitioners, which was denied by the then Acting Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, IsmaelMathay, Sr., is based on par. 3, Section 26
of Presidential Decree No. 4. It reads as follows: "Permanent officials and
employees of the Rice and Corn Administration * * * who prefer to retire, if
qualified for retirement, shall be given gratuity equivalent to one month
salary for every year of service but in no case more than twenty-four
months salary, in addition to all other benefits to which they are entitled
under existing laws and regulations."[1]There is no dispute that petitioners
were, prior to their retirement, permanent officials and employees of the
then Rice and Corn Administration abolished under Presidential
Decree No. 4. They being retirable, they exercised the option to do so under
the Optional Retirement Law.[2] They had, therefore, by virtue thereof,
received thegratuity under such law. With the issuance of the aforesaid
Presidential Decree, however, they were led to hope that a claim for
separation gratuity would likewise be justified. Respondent, the then
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit was of a different mind. For
him, there was no legal basis for allowing them double gratuity. He
rendered such a decision. In view of such refusal to give due course to their
plea, they filed this petition before this Court.
It is their submission that to deny them separation gratuity "would render
the clause under consideration meaningless as if it is (sic) never written in
the decree. This would be contrary to the rules on statutory construction
and interpretation that every part of the statute should be carried into
effect."[3] The Solicitor General, in his memorandum for respondent,
rejected such an argument. Thus: "It is respectfully submitted that since
the petitioners herein have already retired and were paid the gratuity under
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616, they are
no longer entitled to the gratuity provided under paragraph 3, Section 26 of
Presidential Decree No. 4."[4] After referring to the gratuity as "a free gift, a
present, or any benefits of pecuniary value bestowed without claim or
demand, or without consideration,"[5] he pointed out that from its very
nature, "there seems to be no apparent reason for granting to the herein
petitioners the gratuity provided for under paragraph 3, Section 26, of
Presidential Decree No. 4, in addition to the gratuity which they have
already received under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1616. This is so because to assume otherwise would not
only be an act of "over-liberality" on the part of the State but likewise
inconsistent with its policy against double pension or gratuity for the same
service."[6]
To bolster his submission, he cited the ruling in Borromeo v. Government
Service Insurance System:[7] "The gratuity received by petitioner under Act
2589 was obviously in consideration of his services to the government as of
his retirement in December 15, 1949. It is similarly obvious that the
retirement benefits he was found to be entitled to receive under the
provisions of Act 910, as amended, were in consideration of the
same services to the government. Therefore, for petitioner to receive full
benefits under the law, in addition to the gratuity he had already received
under Act 2589, would amount to allowing him to receive double pension
for exactly the same services as consideration. The rule in construing or
applying pension and gratuity laws is that, in the absence ofexpress
provisions to the contrary, they will be so interpreted as to prevent any
person from receiving double compensation."[8] It was further stressed that
the enactment of later legislations after the retirement of a public official "is
not a circumstance of sufficient weight to justify our ignoring the general
policy of the State expressed both in Act 2589 as well as in Act 910 against
double pensions for the same services. To the contrary, the fact that even
after petitioner's retirement under Act 2589 another pension law was
enacted under which he could claim greater benefits affords a greater
reason for the application of the general policy against double pensions,
unless the contrary was expressly and clearly provided in the later
enactment."[9]
This Court, after a careful consideration, arrives at the same
conclusion. There must be a provision, clear and unequivocal, to justify a
double pension. The general language employed in paragraph 3, Section 26
of Presidential Decree No. 4 fails to meet that test. All that it states is that
permanent employees of the Rice and Corn Administration who
are retirable are entitled to gratuity equivalent to one month salary for
every year of service but in no case more than twenty-four months salary in
addition to other benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws and
regulations. To grant double gratuity then is unwarranted. No reliance can
be placed to the use of the term "other benefits" found in the paragraph
relied upon. As clearly stated in the memorandum of the Solicitor General,
they refer to "those receivable by a retiree under the general retirement
laws, like the refund of contributions to the retirement fund and the money
value of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves of said official
employee. The clause 'in addition to all other benefits to which they are
entitled under existing laws and regulations,' was inserted to insure the
payment to the retiree of the refund of the contributions to the retirement
fund and the money value of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves of
said official or employee."[10]
That is all it can plausibly signify. To go further would make it a fruitful
parent of injustice. It would set at naught a state policy dictated by reason
and fairness alike. Petitioners seek to claim the status of an exempt
class. The burden of proof is on them. That they failed to meet, relying as
they do on words hardly indicative of their being accorded a favored
status. To justify such a result, it is imperative that the language employed
be of the clearest and most satisfactory character. The paragraph relied
upon in Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 4, to repeat, cannot be so
characterized.
One last word. It is to be added that the rule against double compensation
is nothing new. It was so held in Peralta v. Auditor General.[11] While the
question involved is not identical, its ratio decidendi applies to the instant
situation, namely, to allow what petitioners seek "would be a clear
disregard of the prohibition to receive both the compensation and the
pension, annuity, or gratuity."[12] Peralta was cited with approval in a later
case, San Diego v. Auditor General.[13] A recent decision, Chavez v. Auditor
General,[14] puts the matter tersely but emphatically. Thus: "Appeal from a
decision of the Auditor General, in which we reaffirm the Court's doctrine
against the payment to retirees from the government service of double
pension for exactly the same services."[15]We do so again.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit and
the decision of respondent, the then Auditor General, denying due course to
the claim of petitioner for double gratuity affirmed. No costs.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., did not take part.
De Castro, J., on sick leave.
80 Phil. 848
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
which reversed that of the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the
Department of Justice that ordered a 70 per cent and 30 per cent division
in favor of the petitioners hereinafter deducting from the gross produce the
expenses of harvesting and threshing, the palay planted in the haciendas of
the now respondents located in the Municipality of Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, during the agricultural year of 1946-1947.
The decision appealed from declares that the participations of the parties in
this case should be governed, not by the provisions of section 3 of Act No.
34 which amended section 8 of Act No. 4054, as decided by the said
Tenancy Division of the Departure nt of Justice, but by an oral, contract
embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties, in
accordance with section 8 of Act No. 4054 which according to the lower
court's theory recognizes the validity of an oral contract. The grounds on
which the Court of Industrial Relations bases its decision is that, although
"the records show that Act No. 4054 had been proclaimed effective in the
Province of Pangasinan in January, 1937, Act No. 53 seems to recognize an
oral contract inspite of section 4, of said Act No. 4054;" and there being an
"oral contract embodying the old customs of tenanoy sharing observed by
the parties prior to 1945-1946 agricultural year," Republic Act No. 34 which
amended Act No. 4054 in force in Pangasinan. since 1937 oan not be
applied to tenancy relation between the parties in this case without
impairing the obligations of contract and infringing the Constitution.
After a mature deliberation, we ere of the opinion, and so hold, that the
decision of the lower court is contrary to law and, therefore, must be
reversed.
Section 4 of Act No. 4054 provides that "the contract on share tenancy in
order to be valid and binding shall be in writing, drawn in triplicate in the
language known to all the parties thereto to be signed or thumbmarked
both by the landlord or his authorized representative and by the tenant
before two witnesses, one to be chosen by each party." But, in view of the
provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 53, promulgated on
October 17, 1936, which prescribes that "where a covenant or oontraot
made between the owner of land and a lessee or tenant on share thereof has
not been reduced to writing or has not been set forth in a document written
in a language known to the lessee or tenant, the testimony of such lessee or
tenant "shall be accepted as prima facie evidence on the terms of a
covenant or contract," the lower court concluded that oral contracts are
recognized by law inspite of the provision of section 4 of Act No. 4054
quoted in the preceding paragraph, and therefore the oral contract
embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties in
this case prior to 1945-1946 agricultural year, was valid in Santa Barbara,
Pangasinan, inspite of the provisions of section 4 of Act No. 4054; and that
the effectivity in Pangasinan of Republic Act No. 34, which amended
section 8 of said Act No. 4054 relating to saare basis, started from
November I2, 1946, when the President issued Proclamation No. 14
declaring the provision of Act No. 4054, as amended, to be in full force and
effect throughout the Philippines, and not before.
It is obvious that the conclusions of the lower oourt that (1) the so called
oral contract between the parties in this case was valid and binding upon
the parties during the agricultural year 1946-1947, and (2) that Republic
Act No. 34 amendatory of section 8 and other sections of Act No. 4054
became effective in Pangasinan on November 12, 1946 the date of the
Proclamation, No.14, are erroneous because they are based on incorrect
premises.
(1) The major premise of the first conclusion is not correct. It is elementary
rule that a subsequent general law should not be oonstrued to repeal or
modify a prior special law; and that repeal by implication is not favored,
and therefore the former and subsequent act must if possible, be so
construed as to give effect to both. Hence, Commonwealth Act No. 53 which
refers to "covenant or contract made between the owner of land and a
lessee or tenant on share thereof" in general, and does not mention or make
any reference to Act No. 4054 should be construed to apply to tenancy
contracts on all other agricultural products which may be oral, as well as to
tenancy contract on rice in provinces where Act No. 4054 had not yet then
made effective by Proclamation in which oral tenancy oontraots were valid;
but not in those where said No. 4054 was proclaimed to be effective and,
therefore, oral contracts are not valid and binding. Because, if in the latter
oral contract is not valid and binding, no amount of evidence of whatever
kind can be admitted to prove the legal existence and terms thereof; and
besides it is unconceivable that the Legislature had intended, for it would
be retrogressive, to practically repeal section 4 of Act No. 4054 enacted for
the purpose of preventing serious controversies that may arise as a result of
the conflicting interpretation of verbal contracts and other agreements
affecting rice tenancy between landlords and tenants.
The provisions of Act No. 4054, which provides in its section 4 that an oral
contract or share tenancy is not valid and binding, having been in force in
the province of Pangasinan since January 20, 1937, there could not legally
exists an effective oral contract between the parties embodying the old
customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties prior to 1945-1946
agricultural year, and therefore the rice sharing tenancy between the parties
must be governed since the year 1937 by the provisions of section 8 of Act
No. 4054 and its amendments.
(2) The major premise of the other conclusion is also incorreot.
Proclamation No. 14 issued by the President of the Philippines dated
November 30, 1946, which declares the provisions of Act No. 4054, as
amended, to be in full force and effect throughout the Philippines, was
obviously intended for territories in the Philippines in which said Act had
not yet been declared in force by Proclamation Prior to said date, and not to
provinces, like Pangasinan, where Act No. 4054 had already been put in
force since January 20, 1937, which Proclamation was never set aside or
suspended. It is therefore clear that Act No. 34, amendatory of said Act No.
4054, became effective ipso facto in Pangasinan since the date of its
passage, September 30, 1946, in which, according to the express provision
of section 4 thereof became effective; because an amendment of a law being
a part of the original which is already in force and effect in a certain
territory, must necessarily become effective therein as a part of the
amended law at the time the amendment takes effect. Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 34 provides that the Act shall take effect immediately, that is, upon
its passage or approval by the President on September 30, 1946; and a
statute which is to take immediate effect is operative from the exact
instance of its becoming law.
Taking into consideration that our Constitution, not only does not place any
limitation on the general legislative power, but ordains Congress to
"regulate the relations between landowner and tenant" (section 6, Article
XIV), and provides that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the
State" (section 5, Article II); that it is a "well settled rule that the history of
a legislation is also important in interpreting the intention of the legislative
body, and therefore courts may refer to messages of the executive to the
legislature (2 Sutherland's Statutory Construction, (3rd ed., Section 5002,
5004, pp. 481-489); that the President in its message to Congress of the
Philippines on August 8, 1946, in recommending the earliest approval of
the proposed amendments to the tenancy lam embodied in Republic Act
No. 34, which "establish the fairest possible contractual basis between the
tenant and landowner," according to the Message, the President said that
"In view of the fact that the planting season of rice is under way and that
the harvest mill take place before the next session of the Congress, I
earnestly request that this matter receives your early attention and that the
proposed amendment be enacted at an early date'1; and that Act No. 34 was
passed by Congress and approved by the President on September 30, 1946
to take effect immediately; it is to be inferred that it was the intention of the
Congress to make it applicable to the harvest of rice during the agricultural
year 1946-1947.
No retrospective effect would be given to said provision of section 8 of the
Act No. 4054, as amended by section 3 of the Republic Act No. 34 relating
to share basis, if applied to the rice harvested during agricultural year 1946-
1947; because said Act No. 34 became effective on September 30, that is
before the esspiration of the agricultural 1946-1947, for "one agricultural
year shall mean the length of time necessary for the preparation of the land
sowing, planting and harvesting a crop" (section 6, Act No. 4054), and the
crop in question had been, according to the conclusion of fact of the lower
court, planted during May and harvested during the months from October
to December, 1946, and even January, 1947. And it is a well established rule
recognized by all authorities without exception, that a retrospective or
retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty
or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past; but
that statute is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts
for its operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action
and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage (See cases cited
in 37 Words and Phrases, pp. 530-533).
But even if to apply Republic Act No. 34 to the tenancy relations in
agricultural year 1946-1947 between the parties would be tantamount to
giving said Act retroactive or retrospective effect, our Constitution does not
in terms prohibit the enactment of retrospective laws which do not impair
the obligations of contract or deprive a person of property without due
process of law, that is, which do not divest rights of property and vested
rights. It is evident that there being no valid or binding oral tenancy
contract, nor a written one for that matter, between parties prior to the date
Act No. 34 became effective, no obligations of contract could be impaired
by the application of said Republic Act No. 34. And no vested right having
been acquired by the parties over the 1946-1947 rice crop under the
provision of section 8 of Act No. 4054, applicable to the division of the crop
in the absence of a contract in writing between the parties, before it was
amended by Republic Act No. 34, no vested right could be affected by the
application of said Act No. 34 to the tenancy share in 1946-1947 rice crop.
In view of all the foregoing, and the fact that the conditions set forth in
section 8 of Act No. 4054, as amended by section 3 of the Republic Act No.
34, are complied viith in the present case as found by the lower court in its
decision that is, that the tenant owns the work animals and the necessary
implements, that he defrayed the cost of plowing and cultivation, and that
the cost of harvest and threshing were deducted from the gross produce,
the decision appealed from is reversed or set aside, and the decision by the
Tenancy Lava Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice, in so far
as it applies the provisions of said Act No. 34 to the present case, be carried
out, with costs against the respondent. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Pars, Pablo, Perfecto, Briones, and Padilla, JJ. concur.
DISSENTING
HILADO, J.:
I dissent.
Among the facts stipulated by the parties, as narrated on pages 2-3 of the
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, is that the rice planting season
of 1946-1947 on the lands involved herein commenced in May and ended in
July. It is therefore obvious that the palay crops in question were planted
during those months of the year 1946. It behooves us, consequently, to
inquire: What was the governing provision of the law at the time as to the
respective shares that should pertain to the tenants and to the landlords?
For it goes without saying that both landlords and tenants must be taken to
have entered into their relation as such, for that agricultural year, in view
of, and pursuant to? those legal provisions.
Section 8 of Act No. 4054 provides:
"SEC. 8. Share basis. In the absence of any written agreement to the
contrary and when the necessary implements and the work animals are
furnished by the tenant; and the expenses for planting, harvesting,
threshing, irrigation and fertilizer, if any, as well as other expenses incident
to the proper cultivation of the land, are borne equally by both the landlord
and tenant, the crop shall be divided equally. The division shall be made in
the same place where ,the crop has been threshed and each party shall
transport his share to his warehouse, unless the contrary is stipulated by
the parties: Provided, however, That when the landlord furnishes the work
animal gratuitously it shall be deemed as a special consideration, and the
tenant shall be obliged to transport the share of the landlord to his
warehouse if it is within the municipality where the land cultivated is
situated."
The above quoted provision, along with the other sections of said Act No.
4054, was proclaimed effective in the province of Pangasinan in January,
1937, as found by the Court of Industrial Relations in its decision appealed
from. Hence, there being no written contract of tenancy between the instant
parties, their shares in the crops under consideration must be determined
pursuant to said section 8, which was in force when they entered into their
relation, when the landlords agreed to let the tenants work their lands ana
the latter to work them for the planting and raising of palay. In effect, the
law, because they themselves did not in writing fix them, fixed their shares
in the crop upon a 50-50 basis when the necessary implements and the
work animals were furnished by the tenants, and the expenses for planting,
harvesting, threshing, irrigation and fertilizer, if any, as well as other
expenses incident to the proper cultivation of the land, were borne equally
by both the landlords and tenants. The Court of Industrial Relations
decided that the crops in question shall be divided pursuant to said section
8, with the requirement (in order to adjust matters exactly to the legal
mandate) that the landlords shall reimburse the tenants for one-half of the
expenses of planting and others incidental to the proper cultivation of the
said lands, the said tenants being the owners of their work animals and
implements, the landlords having supplied only the seeds. In my opinion
this is a correct solution of the problem, with the sole modification that the
tenants should also be required to reimburse the landlords for one-half of
the seeds thus supplied or their reasonable value.
I believe that when enacting Republic Act No. 34, amendatory of Act No.
4054, the Congress, and in issuing his proclamation No. 14 of November 12,
1946, the President, did not intend that said amendatory act or said
proclamation should be applicable to crops already planted pursuant to the
former legal provisions in force at the time of the planting and before the
amendment. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 34 itself clearly evinces the
intention to give it only prospective effect, and neither said act nor said
proclamation contain express terms of retroactivity.
Furthermore, for the law, as in the case of section 8 of Act No. 4054, to tell
the landlord and the tenant that if they do not stipulate to the contrary in
writing their shares in the product shall be equal, as therein defined and
specified, and after both parties have accordingly acted, and when the
planted crops are already bearing fruit and nearing harvest, or being
harvested, to change the sharing basis from 50-50 to 70-30 or the like,
would be to my mind nothing short of a deception practised by the law
upon the prejudiced party. I cannot support such an absurd construction.
No consideration of social justice can possibly justify such an injustice to
the landlord or to the tenant, whoever comes out prejudiced by the ex post
facto change in the law. If the change, as happened through Republic Act
No. 34, was against the landlord, it might well have been that he would not
have agreed to enter into that landlord-tenant relation if the law had been
changed before its creation. And we can also suppose that if such change
had been adverse to the tenant and had been made before the initiation of
the landlord-tenant relation, such tenant might not have entered into it and
invested labor or money thereunder.
The construction in favor of giving the amendment retroactive
effectiveness, on the score of social justice, in the first place would appear
rather to tend toward socialism, and in the second, might tend to the
prejudice of the tenants themselves. I say socialism because it subjects the
landlord's property to use and enjoyment by the tenant upon terms not
voluntarily accepted by the former but arbitrarily imposed by the
government after said landlord had agreed to let his property be worked by
the tenant under terms required or permitted by the law in force at the
time. And I say to the prejudice of the tenant himself, because it is not hard
to see that under such a regime no reasonably prudent landlord would be
inclined to allow his property to be worked by a tenant for fear that at any
time before the actual division of the crop the government may arbitrarily
change his share in the crop from that which was required or permitted
when he delivered his property to be worked by his tenant, without such
landlord being able to foresee or even guess how great the change might
come out to be. For instance, under such a theory the government might
have changed the shares from 50-50 to 90-10 or any other proportion more
onerous to the landlord than 70-30. In such a state of affairs it is easily
comprehensible that tenants would likely be deprived of the very
opportunity to work landlords' lands and find it hard to find lands to work,
with the result that what was thought to be a measure of social justice for
the amelioration of their lot may on the contrary tend to aggravate their
situation.
BENGZON, J.:
I believe, like Mr. Justice Hilado, that the law should not apply to contracts
already existing at the time of its approval. I join his dissent.
TUASON, J.:
I concur in Mr. Justice Hilado's dissenting opinion.
Decision reversed.
CASTRO, J.:
The issue posed in this appeal is whether domestic and resident foreign life
insurance companies are entitled to return only 25 per cent of their income
from dividends under the 1957 amendment of section 24 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:
"SEC. 24. Rate of Tax on Corporation. (A) In general there shall be levied,
assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the total net income received in
the preceding taxable year from all sources by every corporation organized
in, or existing under the laws of the Philippines, no matter how created or
organized, but not including duly registered general copartnership
(compaias colectivas). domestic insurance companies and foreign life
insurance companies doing business in the Philippines, a tax upon such
income equal to the sum of the following:
"Twenty per centum upon the amount by which such total net income does
not exceed one hundred thousand pesos; and
"Twenty-eight per centum upon the amount by which such total net income
exceeds one hundred thousand pesos; and a like tax shall be levied,
assessed, collected and paid annually upon the total net income received in
the preceding taxable year from all sources within the Philippines by every
corporation organized, authorized or existing under the laws of any foreign
country: . . . And Provided, further, That in the case of dividends received
by a domestic or resident foreign corporation from a domestic corporation
liable to tax under this Chapter or from a domestic corporation engaged in
a new and necessary industry, as defined under Republic Act Numbered
Nine hundred and one, only twenty-five per centum thereof shall be
returnable for purposes of the tax imposed by this section.
"(B) Rate of Tax on Life Insurance Companies. There shall be levied,
assessed, collected and paid annually from every insurance company
organized in or existing under the laws of the Philippines, or foreign life
insurance company authorized to carry on business in the Philippines, but
not including purely cooperative companies or associations as defined in
section two hundred and fifty-five of this Code, on the total investment
income received by such company during the preceding taxable year from
interest, dividends and rents from all sources whether from or within the
Philippines, a tax of six and one-half per centum upon such
income: Provided, however, That foreign life insurance companies not
doing business in the Philippines shall, on any investment income received
by them from the Philippines, be subject to tax as any other foreign
corporation. . . ."
The Court of Tax Appeals ruled that life insurance companies should report
in full their income from dividends because, while they are treated in
subsection (B), the proviso regarding dividend exclusion is found in
subsection (A) which treats of corporations in general. The petitioner
appealed to this Court, contending, on the basis of the history of the
proviso, that the benefits of dividend exclusion are available to all domestic
and resident foreign corporations regardless of the business in which they
may be engaged.
We agree with the petitioner.
The petitioner is a domestic life insurance company.
On March 1.8, 1959, it filed an income tax return for 1958 showing the
following data:
"GROSS INCOME
From interest
P5,186.44
................................................
From dividends
57,105.29
............................................
TOTAL GROSS INCOME
P62,202.36
....................
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS
10,317.47
........................
__________
P51,974.89
"Net income
.................................................
"Tax assessable:
From interest
P 5,186.44
............................................
From dividends
15,242.55
........................................
Hongkong, Shanghai
P 518,57
Bank ............
Chartered Bank
427 .12
............................
Credit Corp. of the Phil.
700.00
................
Phil, Long Distance Tel,
3,375,00
Co. ..........
San Miguel Brewery
15,379.20
......................
Lombard Insurance Co.
342.40
.................
Bank of P. I.
2,880.00
..................................
Goodrich International
25,000.00
....................
Bacnotan Cement
4,832,00
...........................
Acceptance & Investment
3,651.00
Corp. .....
_________
P57,105.29
_________
[2]Thecomputation is as
follows:
Foreign:
Hongkong, Shanghai
Bank ............. P 518.27
Chartered Bank
427.12
.............................
Lombard Insurance Co.
................. 342.40 P1,288.09
_________
Local:
25% of
P 55.817.83 P13.954.46
...........................................
_________
P15,242.55
_________
[3] E. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes, sec. 297, 606-607 (1940).
only to income received from January 1, 1951 to December 31, 1953 (sec. 3),
were successively extended up to December 1957 by Republic Acts 868,
1056 and 1291 until they were made permanent by Republic Act 1505.
[8] Note that sub-section (A) has no title.
Note that the proviso still speaks of "the tax imposed in this section"
[9]
despite the fact that it appears to qualify only sub-section (A). The
phraseology has been retained in subsequent amendments of section 24.
[10] Note the failure to delete the word "assessed" from sub-section (c).
Note the failure to delete the word "assessed" even in subsequent
[11]
amendments.
The tax exemption granted by Republic Act 901 expired on December 31,
[12]
1962. Sec 1.
The proviso "Provided, however, That premiums shall not include
[13]
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Ignorance of the law excuses no one -- certainly not a judge -- from
compliance therewith. This is particularly true in cases where the law is so
elementary that to be unaware of it or to ignore it constitutes gross
ignorance, which is administratively sanctionable.
Statement of the Case
A sworn Administrative Complaint[1] filed by Judge Pedro B. Cabatingan Sr.
(ret.) charges Judge Celso A. Arcueno of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Cataingan, Masbate, with gross ignorance of the law.
The Facts
The facts are summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in
its Memorandum[2] dated September 25, 2001, as follows:
"Complainant, who is the counsel for the accused [Benito Bucado[3] ] xxx,
narrates that a complaint for Illegal Fishing was filed in respondent's court
for preliminary investigation and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4877-
PVC. Finding a prima facie case against all the accused, respondent issued a
warrant of arrest fixing the bail bond at P50,000 for each of them. Benito
Bucado, one of the accused, posted a property bond. Respondent, however,
in violation of Section 17, rule 114 of the rules of Court, allegedly refused to
accept the bail bond upon the contention that he no longer ha[d]
jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the records were already forwarded
to the Office of the Assistant provincial Prosecutor for review.
"When required to comment, respondent Judge Celso A. Arcueno, denied
the charges. He narrates that the aforementioned criminal case was filed in
his court for preliminary investigation. Finding the existence of probable
cause, he issued a warrant of arrest with the recommended bail of
P50,000.00 for each of the accused. Upon the arrest of the accused, he
issued an Order dated September 15, 1998 requiring them to submit their
counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof. However, the accused failed to submit their counter-
affidavits. They also failed to post bail for their temporary liberty.
After the lapse of the ten (10) day period as provided in Section 3 (f) of Rule
112, Rules of [C]ourt, respondent, finding the existence of probable cause
against the accused, issued a resolution dated 13 October 1998 forwarding
the entire records of the case to the RTC, Branch 49, Cataingan, Masbate
thru the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, for review. On 15 October 1998,
the Office of the Assistant Provincial prosecutor received the records of the
subject criminal case. On 4 November 1998, while the case was being
reviewed by the Office of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, complainant
presented the bail bond of the accused Benito y Ferrer for respondent's
approval.
"Respondent claims that he initially refused to approve the property bond
because he believed that he had already lost jurisdiction over the case. Also,
the tax declaration of the property being put up as a bond was not attached
to the bail bond form to show proof of ownership thereof by the bondsman.
However, on 20 November 1998, he approved said bail bond and
consequently ordered the release of accused Bucado.
"On 18 September 2000, the Third Division of this Court resolved to
DOCKET the complaint as an administrative matter and to require the
parties to MANIFEST to the Court within twenty (20) days from notice,
whether they [were] submitting the case on the basis of the
pleadings/records already filed and submitted.
"In compliance with the aforementioned resolution, respondent Judge filed
a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated 30 October 2000. On 17
January 2001, the Court resolved to NOTE the respondent's Manifestation
with Motion to Dismiss and to consider as WAIVED the filing of
Manifestation by complainant for his failure to submit the same within the
period specified under the Resolution of 18 September 2000."[4]
In his Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss,[5] respondent justified his
refusal to approve the bail bond. His reason for his refusal was that, in
notarizing the bail bond document, complainant grossly violated Section 10
of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In so doing, he
arrogated unto himself the power and authority pertaining to a judge.
Respondent reiterated his previous Manifestation, dated July 12 2000,
praying for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the parties had
mutually and amicably settled the case. He submitted, as proof of the
settlement, the Joint Motion to Dismiss signed by both parties.
The Court Administrator's Recommendation
After a perusal of the records of the case, Deputy Court Administrator Jose
P. Perez, in his Report dated September 25, 2001, explained that the refusal
of respondent judge to approve the bail bond posted by the accused showed
the latter's ignorance of the rules of procedure. Thus, the former submitted
the following recommendations:
"1. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss be DENIED for lack of merit; and
"2. Respondent Judge Celso A. Arcueno be found guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and be ordered to pay a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
[a] similar act shall be dealt with more severely."[6]
This Court's Ruling
We agree with the OCA's findings and recommendation, but with some
modifications as to the penalty.
Administrative Liability
Complainant asserts that respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law for refusing to approve the bail bond of the accused in violation of
Section 17 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Complainant also claims that
this lapse unduly deprived the accused of the constitutional right to bail.[7]
On the other hand, in his Comment[8] dated June 1, 1999, respondent
explains that he refused to approve the bail bond, because he had lost
jurisdiction over the case after forwarding for review the records thereof to
the Office of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. He asserts that "once
jurisdiction is lost, no further action can be entertained in connection
therewith."[9] He adds that the tax declaration for the property put up as a
bond was not attached to the bail bond form to show proof of the
bondsman's ownership or title.[10]
However, in his Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss,[11] dated October 30,
2000, respondent judge proffered a different justification for his refusal to
approve the bail bond. He theorized that complainant, as counsel for the
accused Benito Bucado in Criminal Case No. 4877-PVC and as notary
public, had grossly and seriously violated Section 10 of Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal procedure, as amended. Complainant supposedly
violated this provision by arrogating unto himself the power and authority
that pertained to a judge.
We are not persuaded. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, the argument
of respondent judge in his Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss is clearly
an afterthought; and, hence, deserves no credence.
To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in
the legal system, judges should be embodiments of competence, integrity
and independence.[12] Hence, they are expected to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules and to apply them
properly in all good faith.[13] They are likewise expected to demonstrate
mastery of the principles of law, keep abreast of prevailing
jurisprudence,[14] and discharge their duties in accordance therewith.[15]
Further, judges should administer their office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of law itself, remembering that they are not
depositories of arbitrary power, but are judges under the sanction of
law.[16] It must be emphasized that this Court has formulated and
promulgated rules of procedure to ensure the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Wanton failure to abide by these rules
undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of
law.[17]
Before we can decide whether respondent judge erred in refusing to grant
bail, we deem it necessary to determine first whether he had jurisdiction to
grant it under the circumstances of this case.[18] Bail is defined as the
"security given for the release of a person in custody of the law."[19] Section
17, paragraph (c) of Rule 114 of the Revised rules of Court, provides:
"SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. (c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged
in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or
municipality where he is held."
In the case at bar, Benito Bucado was arrested in the Municipality of
Cataingan after a preliminary investigation conducted by respondent judge.
The latter therefore had the authority to grant bail and to order the release
of the accused.[20] Even if the records of the case had been transmitted for
review to the Office of the provincial Prosecutor, respondent could have
approved the bail bond posted by the accused. Such action cannot be validly
attacked on jurisdictional grounds.[21]
Considering that one of his responsibilities as a judge was to conduct
preliminary investigations, it was therefore his duty to keep abreast of the
laws, rulings and jurisprudence on this matter. Because he had apparently
lagged behind,[22] he fell short of his vow to live up to the injunction of the
code of Judicial Conduct to "maintain professional competence."[23]
When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance thereof.[24]Indeed, everyone is presumed to
know the law.[25] Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know,
excuses no one -- certainly not a judge.[26]
On July 7, 2000, a Joint Motion to Dismiss[27] was executed by complainant
and respondent. It should be remembered that a complaint for misconduct
and similar charges against a judicial or other public officer or employee
cannot just be withdrawn at any time. A simple expediency such as a
complainant's sudden claim of change of mind[28] followed by a withdrawal
of the complaint would not result in the automatic dismissal of the case.[29]
Further, the faith and confidence of the people in their government and its
agencies and instrumentalities need to be maintained. The people should
not be made to depend upon the whims and caprices of complainants who
are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein.[30] To rule otherwise would
subvert the fair and prompt administration of justice as well as undermine
the discipline of court personnel.[31]
In any case, it bears noting that the administrative liability for ignorance of
the law does not necessarily arise from the mere fact that a judge issued an
order that is adjudged to be erroneous.[32] Judges may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order; it is only when they
act fraudulently or with gross ignorance that administrative sanctions are
called for.[33]
To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to
have committed an error that was "gross or patent, deliberate or
malicious."[34] Also administratively liable therefor is a judge who -- shown
to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption --
ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and jurisprudence.[35]
It must be pointed out that this is not the first infraction of Judge Arcueno.
Previously, in Gimeno v. Arcueno Sr.,[36] he was charged with and found
guilty of ignorance of the law when, without any hearing, he granted bail to
the accused who had been charged with a capital offense in a criminal case
for robbery with homicide.[37]Respondent was consequently fined in the
amount of P5,000 and warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act
in the future would be severely dealt with.
Indeed, it seems that respondent judge has remained undeterred in
disregarding the law which he has pledged to uphold and the Code which he
has promised to live by.[38] He appears to be unfazed by the previous
penalty and warnings he received.[39] Because this is his second infraction,
it warrants a heavier penalty.[40]
WHEREFORE, Judge Celso A. Arcueno is hereby found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and is FINED in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000), payable within five days from notice. He is further warned that a
repetition of this or similar offenses will be dealt with even more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio, JJ., concur. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on
leave.