INTRODUCTION

1. Cariaga v. people GR no. 180010

Cenita was the Municipal Treasurer of Cabauatan, Isabela with a salary grade of 24, was convicted for three counts
of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Through counsel, Cenita filed a Notice
of Appeal of the RTC decision, stating that he intended to appeal the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan
which has appellate jurisdiction on Cenitas case.Cenita elevated his case to the Supreme Court, invoking the liberal
interpretation of the rules and admitted the procedural lapse committed by his former counsel, and requests the Court
to transmit the records of the cases to the Saniganbayan in the interest of substantial justice.

The Issue: Whether or not the appeal which was wrongly taken to the Court of Appeals, should be given due course
and transmitted to the Sandiganbayan which has appellate jurisdiction over the case.

The Ruling:
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be
dismissed outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606,1 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:2
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade `27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided. x x x (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied).
Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due to a procedural
lapse militates against the Courts dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioners plea for a relaxation of the
Rules.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict
application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided.3
In Ulep v. People,4 the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that
x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The omission did not appear to
be a dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had that been the case as her appeal could be
dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction which was exactly what happened in the CA.
The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the proper forum, the
Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the
wrong court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases involving government employees with a salary grade lower
than 27 are fairly common, albeit regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and should have known the law
and the rules of procedure. He should have known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they should be
forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully observed this responsibility specially
in cases such as this where a persons liberty was at stake. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The slapdash work of petitioners former counsel and the trial courts apparent ignorance of the law effectively
conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction.5
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions thereto, especially in
criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so
require.6 It can not be gainsaid that the case of petitioner can fall under any of these exceptions.
Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and defense as well as a
proper application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage
petitioner that her appeal is decided scrupulously.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the
records of the cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City Regional Trial Court is warned against
committing the same procedural error, under pain of administrative sanction.

2. Trenas v. People

3. Garcia vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife of retired Major Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, with application for injunctive
relief in order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying the motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No.
0193, a suit for the forfeiture commenced by the Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.

The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias allegedly acquired and
amassed. Then Republic then filed with the Sandiganbay through the OMB a petition for forfeiture of those alleged
unlawfully acquired properties of the Garcias. The case was docketed as Civil Case 0193(Forfeiture I) and
subsequently another case of forfeiture involving the same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case 0196(Forfeiture
II). Thus the two cases were consolidated for convenience and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but
subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA 7080(plunder) and the case
raffled to the second division of SB. The plunder charge covered substantially the same properties identified in both
Forfeiture I and II.

Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that the the plunder case and the
Forfeiture I case should be consolidated in the 2nd division of SB pursuant to RA 8249.

On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture case is not the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case of plunder.

Petitioner argues that the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4thDivision of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case
and that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements.

Issue:
Whether or not the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her three sons
considering that, first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have
been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the plunder case Crim. Case No. 28107 has already been
filed and pending with the 2nd division of the SB.

Held:
The court ruled that the forfeiture cases and plunder cases have different causes of action. The former is civil in
nature and the latter is criminal. On the matter of double jeopardy the court held that:

Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are,
to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a
criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant
in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.

The court also said that RA 7080(plunder) did not repeal RA 1379(forfeiture) stating that:

Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA
1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself
or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime
the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his
salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which
were not lawfully acquired by the officer.

However on the matter on Jurisdiction over the person of Clarita Garcia and his sons the court said that the 4th
division of SB did not acquire jurisdiction because there was no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB
did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children for the reason that there was also no
voluntary appearance since they questioned the jurisdiction of the 4th division of SB through their motion to dismiss
and quashal for lack of jurisdiction into their person . And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases,
insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order
declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For
the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias
summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.

4. COJUANGCO, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Quisumbing, December 21, 1998)

no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The clause unequivocally means that the judge must make his own determination independent of that of the
prosecutor of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, based on the complainant's and his
witnesses' accounts, if any. Supporting evidence other than the report and recommendation of the investigators and
the special prosecutor should be examined by the court
FACTS:
1.January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner, former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the
former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of
their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a
donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation
(COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage
and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and
prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines.
2.Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation conducted by the
PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the
Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
3.In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an Information for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
4.Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of
the Special Prosecutor for review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information.
5.In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation as
contained in the Resolution dated June 2, 1992.
6.August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel of investigators to discuss the merits of
the prejudicial question posed by respondent Lobregat.
7.In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended that the motion to suspend
proceedings be granted.
8.On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to the Office of the Special Prosecutors the
Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial
question.
9.On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan.
10.On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed, through counsel, a Manifestation
stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For
Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed.
11.In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the
country except upon approval of the court.
12.On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the Information.
13.In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil
found no probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the case. The
recommendation for dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996.
14.On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that with the reversal of the earlier
findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record before the respondent
Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction over the
instant case.
ISSUES: 1.WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted
if initially valid? YES
2.WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner? YES
RATIO:
1.Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to issue the warrant of arrest against the
accused:
a.the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the
filing of the Information and
b.the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial
question which will warrant the suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its
resolution.
2.The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the existence of
probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The 2 cited document above were the product of somebody elses
determination, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan.
3.In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, the Court struck down as invalid an order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
which were based only on "the information, amended information and Joint Resolution", without the benefit of the
records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause.
4.In Ho vs. People, the Court the respondent "palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the
challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and without
determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and
recommendation.
5.With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption
effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing
the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he
himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative
reliefs.
6.In La Naval Drug vs. CA , Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover,
"[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it
must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose,
the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the
court jurisdiction over the person.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting opinion;
As a consequence of the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petitioner.
The posting of a bail bond by the petitioner despite the nullity or irregularity of the issuance of the warrant for his
arrest should not be equated with "voluntary appearance" as to cloak the respondent court with jurisdiction over his
person. Truly, his "appearance" in court was not "voluntary." It should be noted that immediately upon learning of the
filling of the Information and the issuance of the warrant, petitioner filed an "Opposition to [the] Issuance of [a]
Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of [the] Ombudsman['s] Resolutions." Said
Opposition was based on the inadequacy of the respondent court's basis for determining probable cause. It was
essentially an express and continuing objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person.
When petitioner posted his bail bond, he expressly manifested at the same time that such was "without prejudice to
his Opposition.

RULE 110
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING THAT INTERRUPTS THE PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME
5. PEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
(BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The
complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-
Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were
dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Consequently the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22 were
filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June 2000,
respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before
MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of
prescription.

In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that governs the prescription of special penal law, B.P.
22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 (An Act To Establish Periods Of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special
Acts) where the right to file an action to a proper court and not to merely to prosecution office for B.P. 22, prescribes
four (4) years from the commission of the crime. The imputed violation occurred sometime in 1995, and only on
February 3, 2000 that a case was formally filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action already
prescribes. RTC granted the motion.

On the other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the office of city prosecutor constitutes an interruption
to the prescription.

ISSUE:

Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a judicial proceeding that can interrupt prescription of crime
under B.P. 22?

HELD:

YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more distinction between cases under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription;
that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation in the office of prosecutor against accused interrupts
the period of prescription.

Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995, the filing of complaint on September 1997,
two (2) years from the commission of the crime validly interrupts the running of prescription. Therefore the action
against the respondent Pangilinan did not prescribe.
6. Chua v. Padillo- NO DIGEST
7. SERAPIO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
The case is a consolidation of 3 petitions filed by Edward Serapio which assailed resolutions of the 3rd
Division of the Sandiganbayan in denying his petition for bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a
petition for habeas corpus in relation to a plunder case against him.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
He received a Php200 million donation from Chavit Singson. He received the donation and turned it over to the
treasurer of the Foundation and it was deposited to the account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In 2000, Singson publicly accused Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities triggering
the filing with the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against Estrada. Petitioner was among the persons
included in the criminal charges.
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations against Estrada and other persons and no
bail was recommended for the provisional released of the accused. Ombudsman found probable cause for plunder
and petitioner filed an MR. It was denied because the information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrests for
the accused, including petitioner. Petitioner was detained at Camp Crame for the said charge. Arraignment was set
and petitioner filed a petition for Bail. Several other bail meetings did not push through.
Even before the Sandiganbayan can resolve the issues, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
habeas corpus and certiorari praying that the issued Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be declared void because he
was denied due process.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner of his right to due process of the law.

HELD: No. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but it is a right conferred by a statute.
Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to answer the charges against him during the preliminary investigation.
Jurisprudence dictates that the Court do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in its conduct of
preliminary investigations. It was enunciated in Raro v. Sandiganbayan that in the performance of the task to
determine probable cause, the Ombudsmans discretion is paramount. The lack of a preliminary investigation does
not impair the validity of the information filed before the court.
The denial of his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus does not deny him of his right to due process because there is no
basis for the issuance of the writ in favor of the petitioner. Petitioner has voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities. Habeas corpus does not lie because there was no deprivation of liberty. Also, the delay in the hearing of
the bail cannot be solely pinned upon the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is also to be blamed. Habeas corpus is not the
appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail.

8. People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appelas

Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged with the crime of rape of a 16-year old girl.
The RTC convicted Carampatana and Oporty guilty as prinicpals and Alquizola as an accomplice while the CA
acquitted them of the crime charged, hence, this present appeal.

After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with her friends, went to Alsons Palace for a drinking
session to celebrate their graduation. During such session, they shared their problems with each other. AAA became
emotional and started crying, prompting her to take her first shot of Emperador Brandy. After consuming more or less
five glasses of drinks, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos lap. Oporto then started kissing her head
and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face
with the cap. The group just laughed at her and still made her drink more. She fell asleep but was woken up so that
she could drink the remaining liquor inside the Brandy bottle. She refused but they insisted so she drank. Again, AAA
fell asleep.

When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized
that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during
one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and
having intercourse with her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private
organ. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
Private respondents aver that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and that the prosecution
cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the private respondents?

HELD:
YES, the Court of Appeals erred in acquitting private respondents. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal
or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. If there is grave
abuse of discretion, however, granting petitioners prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double
jeopardy.

The petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the respondent appellate court committed grave
abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents. It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on
the evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. A more careful perusal will
reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of
Oporto, Carampatana,and Alquizola. It presented the private respondents account and allegations as though these
were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.

The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished
through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is
under twelve years of age. Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could
handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having
sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private
respondents ravished her.

Moreover, Alquizola should not only be deemed as an accomplice but a principal as well by virtue of conspiracy. As
the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and
furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA
and did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAAs lips, breasts,
and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to
sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally
guilty of the crime of rape.

9. People v. Madali
Facts:

An appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 81 of Romblon, Romblon finding accused-appellants guilty
of the murder of Reynaldo M. Abrenica and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. The body of
Reynaldo was found by his wife on the landing of the stairs of their house. An autopsy conducted by Dr.
Villaseor of the PNP Crime Laboratory yielded to the conclusion that the cause of death is intracranial
hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury.

Three years after Reynaldos death, the case was filed after an alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor,
surfaced and implicated the accused-appellants. Based on the testimony of this witness, the accused-
appellants were found guilty in the aforementioned decision.

The accused-appellants, in their appeal, alleged that the trial court erred in failing to resolve doubts and
discrepancies in its findings of fact in favor of the accused and that the court erred in finding credible the
testimonies of Mercy Villamor and Dr. Villaseor.

The complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief separate from that which the OSG would file, by way
of an answer to the brief of accused-appellants. This motion was denied. The OSG subsequently filed a
Manifestation recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants. In view of the position taken by the OSG,
 complainant filed a Memorandum for the Private Complainant (after filing a Manifestation and Motion to File
Brief) which was noted by the Court.

Ruling and Reasoning:

Rule 122, Sec.1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment
or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. It has been held that the word party in the
provision includes not only the government and the accused but other persons who may be affected by the judgment.

The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from the crime. Hence, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainants role is that of a witness for the prosecution.

Ordinarily, the appeal of the criminal cases involves as parties only the accused, as appellants, and the
State, represented by the SolGen, as the appellee. The participation of the private offended party would be a
mere surplusage if the State were simply to seek affirmation of a judgment of conviction. However, where
the OSG takes a contrary position and recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the accused, the
complainants right to be heard as regards indemnity and damages arises.

Nevertheless, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the accused-appellants conviction. Mercy Villamors testimony
is riddled with inconsistencies, improbabilities and uncertainties which relate to material points. Evidence, to be
believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be credible.

10. MANOLET O. LAVIDES vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge
Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had
been contacted by Manolet Lavides for an assignation that night at Lavides' room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman,
Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment
operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date, the police knocked at the door of Room
308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where Lavides was staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police saw him with
Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn
statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for
violation of Article III, 5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and other Purposes) was filed on 7
April 1997 against Lavides in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10 April 1997,
Lavides filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release
of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of
the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged."
On 29 April 1997, 9 more informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel, and by three
other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to
Q-97-70874). In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides had sexual
intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and given money as payment for the said acts
of sexual intercourse." No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate applications for bail in the 9
cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal
Case Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under detention, his arrest having been made in
accordance with the Rules, and thus he must therefore remain under detention until further order of the Court; and
that the accused is entitled to bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right to post bail in the amount of
P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under certain conditions. On 20 May 1997,
Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those filed in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or Q-
97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on 23 May
1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment. On 23 May 1997, the trial court, in
separate orders, denied Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend
arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and
then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in
the 16 May 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of 10 April 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on 7 June
1997. On 2 June 1997, Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's order,
dated 16 May 1997, and its two orders, dated 23 May 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the
conditions set forth in its order of 16 May 1997, respectively. While the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against Lavides,
bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision, invalidating the first two conditions under 16 May 1997 order -- i.e. that (1) the
accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be
present at the hearings of these cases; and (2) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed
to trial in absentia -- and maintained the orders in all other respects. Lavides filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused shall ensure his presence during the trial of these
cases before the bail can be granted.
RULING:
In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no
need for the arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court could ensure Lavides' presence at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under
Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear
before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence
of the accused at the arraignment is required. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would
be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release
on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios
certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The court's strategy to ensure the Lavides' presence at the
arraignment violates the latter's constitutional rights.

11. SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY vs. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L.
ESCUETA
Facts: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple
gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.

With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.
Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel de parte pleaded not guilty to homicide. Pretrial and trial was set
by the judge. However, on the same day after arraignment, the judge issued another order directing the trial
prosecutor to amend the information to murder, in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged
in the information, which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. The prosecutor
entered his amendment by crossing out the word homicide and instead wrote the word murder in the caption and in
the opening parafraph of the Information. On the date scheduled for pre trial, the accused was to be re-arraigned for
the crime of murder. Petitioner objected on the ground that he will be placed in double jeopardy. Petitioner then filed a
motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of double jeopardy. He alleged that he was
validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court I the information for homicide, and the case was terminated
without his express consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the
subsequent filinf of information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy. Said Motion to Quash
was denied by the responded judge ruling that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double
jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former
prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was
merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for
Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the
allegation of aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank, the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder. Petitioner
then filed for a Motion for reconsideration alleging that contrary to respondent judges conclusion that disregard of
rank qualifies the killing to murder, it is a general aggravating circumstance only which only serves to affect the
imposition of the period of penalty. , and that the amendment ordered by the judge was substantial and is therefor not
allowed byt the Rules of Court as the petitioner has already been arraigned. Motion for reconsideration was
granted,and ruled that the original information charging the crime of homicide stands. A petition for certiorari was filed
by the petitioner alleging among others that the motion was not really reconsidered as the prayer was for the judge to
grant the Motion to Quash.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from Homicide to Murder.

Held: NO. Sec 7 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper to wit;

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.

Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first.

As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further
prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide without his
express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.

Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which
terminates the case. And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a newInformation charging the proper offense as
contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is wholly different
from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the
information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new
information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same
offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In this connection,
the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the
amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original
information that was amended by merely crossing out the word Homicide and writing the word Murder, instead,
which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.

RULE 111
12. Lee Pue Liong v. Chua Pe Chin Lee- NO DIGEST :(
13. PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
DOCTRINE: Annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is not a prejudicial question in a criminal
case for parricide.

On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the
pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

HELD: No. RATIO: Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As
such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any
person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on
the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage

between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial
declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned.

14. Magestrado v People (Yeshadarling)

FACTS:
Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against petitioner with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City,
after the filing of petitionerfs counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the OCP recommended the filing of an
information for perjury against petitioner
Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed information for perjury against petitioner with MeTC QC
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath upon a material
matter before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath and which the law so require, to wit: the
said accused subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per
Doc. No. 168, Page No. 35, Book No. CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely alleging that he lost Ownerfs Duplicate
Certificate of TCT No. N-173163, which document was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New Ownerfs
Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as LRC# Q-
10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned to Branch 99 of the said court, to which said Francisco M.
Mag[e]strado signed and swore on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No. CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary
Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit
and petition are false, the truth of the matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and as
a consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said
loan, thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elena
M. Librojo
30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question
alleged that a civil case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the RTC QC, a case for Cancellation of
Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages must be resolved first before pesent Criminal Case may proceed since the
issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action
14 July 1999: MeTC-Branch 43 denied
motion without merit
resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused
trial shall proceed
17 August 1999: MR was filed by petitioner; denied by the MeTC on 19 October 1999
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a prayer for Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of QC
 MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
14 March 2000: RTC dismissed
civil cases are principally for determination whether or not a loan was obtained by petitioner and whether or not he
executed the deed of real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163,
whereas the criminal case is for perjury which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss
to support his petition for issuance of a new ownerfs duplicate copy of said TCT
Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in the criminal case which may be resolved independently of the
civil cases.
Note that the affidavit of loss was executed in support of the petition for issuance of a new ownerfs duplicate copy
of TCT No. N-173163 which petition was raffled to Branch 99 of the RTC
MR also denied
petitioner filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
RTC Judge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch
43 of petitionerfs motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721, as well as his subsequent motion
for reconsideration thereof
CA denied
petitionerfs remedy should have been an appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari

ISSUE: WoN instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct and appropriate remedy? (NO)

HELD: CA affirmed; MeTC QC directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case

RATIO:
resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may be appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule
44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules

Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and
habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period
of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already
attached to the record x x x.

Petitioner: he correctly questioned RTC's Order of dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case through a
Petition for Certiorari before CA
respondents: an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy
SC: agree with respondents
correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only because RTC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitionerfs Petition for Certiorari in but also because RTC Order of dismissal was a final
order from which petitioners should have appealed in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Court

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done
with it in the trial court
the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court
an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the
merits of the latter
RTC's order dismissing petitionerfs Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case finally disposes of the said case and RTC
can do nothing more with the case

Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Revised Rules of Court to be appealable
manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal. \
 (a) Ordinary appeal. \ The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall
be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to
petitioners
Here, appeal was available
it was adequate to deal with any question whether of fact or of law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion or error of judgment which the trial court might have committed.
certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal
perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional,
and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory
this is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory
privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law
Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice.
While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere
technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive
party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of
appeal

Fajardo v Bautista: although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available,
it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly
relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.

December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the Order of the RTC denying his motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case
he had until 18 January 2001 within which to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals
Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner on 19 February 2001 with CA cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal
As petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTCfs dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari had long become final and
executory.

more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition <NOT SO IMPT>
in a nutshell - there was no prejudicial question as both cases may proceed independently; diff questions are being
resolved as mentioned

RULE 112
15. MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD v. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN and TEODORA ESTEBAN
The petitioner is the mother of the late Cheasare Armani Chase Callo Claridad, whose lifeless but bloodied body
was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house
located at No.10 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, Quezon City.
Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip) less than an hour before
the discovery of his lifeless body.
Resolution of the Office of City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for murder due to lack of evidence, motive, and
circumstantial evidence to charge Philip with homicide, much less murder
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice (petition for review) affirmed the dismissal holding that the only circumstantial
evidence connecting Philip to the crime was the allegation that at between 7:00 to 7:30 oclock of the evening in
question, Chase had boarded the white Honda Civic car driven by Philip; that the witnesses positive identification of
Philip as the driver of the car was doubtful, however, considering that Philip did not alight from the car, the windows of
which were tinted; and that the rest of the circumstances were pure suspicions, and did not indicate that Philip had
been with Chase at the time of the commission of the crime
CA (petition for review under Rule 43) dismissed
Hence, the petitioner appealed by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/s & RATIO:

1. WON the CA erred in upholding the decision of the Secretary of Justice that there was no probable cause to
charge Philip and Teodoro with murder for the killing of Chase? NO.
A preliminary investigation, according to Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, is an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by the trial proper in a court of law. The occasion is not for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence but for the presentation only of such evidence as may engender a well-
founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. The
determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor after conducting a
preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended party. Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal
information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed, and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause, although it requires less than evidence justifying a conviction, demands more than bare suspicion.
Under the circumstances presented, we conclude to be correct the CAs determination that no prima facie evidence
existed that sufficiently indicated the respondents involvement in the commission of the crime. It is clear that there
was:
No eyewitness of the actual killing of Chase
There was no evidence showing how Chase had been killed, how many persons had killed him, and who had been
the perpetrator or perpetrators of his killing
Nothing that directly incriminated the respondents in the commission of either homicide or murder.

2. WON the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to warrant the indictment of the respondents for
murder? NO.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with one
another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the
hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

The only circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase are derived from the bare recollections of Ariane
(sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus (respectively, the househelp and nanny in the household of a resident of
the subdivision) about seeing Chase board the white Honda Civic at around 7:00 p.m. of February 27, 2007, and
about Philip being the driver of the Honda Civic.

3. WON the affidavits of the witnesses must be subscribed and sworn? YES.
Preliminary investigation is ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits and supporting documents, through
submission of affidavits and supporting documents, through the exchange of pleadings. Thus, it can be inferred that
the rationale for requiring the affidavits of witnesses to be sworn to before a competent officer so as to ensure that the
affidavits supporting the factual allegations in the Complaint have been sworn before a competent officer and that the
affiant has signed the same in the formers presence declaring on oath the truth of the statement made considering
that this becomes part of the bases in finding probable guilt against the respondent. Well- settled is the rule that
persons, such as an employee, whose unsworn declarations in behalf of a party, or the employees employer in this
case, are not admissible in favor of the latter. Further, it has been held that unsworn statements or declarations are
self-serving and self- serving declarations are not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted, whether they
arose by implication from acts and conduct or were made orally or reduced in writing. The vital objection to the
admission to this kind of evidence is its hearsay character.
Thus, it is imperative that the circumstantial evidence that the victim was last seen in the company of respondent
Philip must be established by competent evidence required by the rules in preliminary investigation. Here, it was
allegedly Chases sister, Ariane, and their two household helpers, Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus, who saw
respondent Philip pick up Chase at around 7:00 oclock in the evening of February 27, 2007. Yet, such fact from
which the inference is derived was not duly proven. The statements of Marivic and Michelle both executed on
February 28, 2007 were not sworn to before the proper officer. Neither was the affidavit dated July 3, 2009 of Ariane
Claridad duly notarized nor is there any explanation why the same was belatedly executed.

4. WON filing in the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 is the correct mode of appeal? NO.
The filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 to review the Secretary of Justices resolution on the determination of
probable cause was an improper remedy. Indeed, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction vis--vis the Secretary of
Justice. A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions
or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the
matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In
reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed
an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed,
and whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof. On the other hand, the
courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justices determination of probable cause only through a special civil action
for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention was
still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed
in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on November 20, 2009.

16. PEOPLE V. BORJE- NO DIGEST

17. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 118896-97. February 20, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor of the said province in 1968
and was again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980 elections, until he was replaced by private complainant
Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986.
Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections where the latter emerged
victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and local elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial
post; and this time, it was petitioner who won.
At the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the Provincial Government of Palawan, as
represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members of Palawan, filed before the Office of the
Tanodbayan two (2) complaints. The first complaint charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the second charged
petitioner, together with several other provincial officers, with violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same
law.
On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on petitioners motion to include co-principals,
issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to suspend pendente liteand ordering the suspension
of petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days from notice.
Issue: WON petitioners preventive suspension is legal and valid.

Ruling:
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:
SEC. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public officer is
mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for
that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the
information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial
on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part
of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as a challenge
to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue the order of
suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a preventive
suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the
official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. In view of this latter provision, the accused elective public officer does not stand
to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the information is
subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into
consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer charged under a valid
information, the protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the
accused.

18. LADLAD V. VELASCO

On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a State of National Emergency.
Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained
him in Camp Crame.

Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was
arrested.

He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This was based on a speech Beltran
allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006. Inquest prosecutor found probable cause.

BASIS: joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally.

He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted by DOJ state prosecutors.

The inquest was based on two letters from CIDG executive officer and deputy director. The letters contained results
of CIDGs investigation implicating Beltran, et al as leaders and promoters of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the
Arroyo government. DOJ state prosecutors found probable cause.

Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion and that such inquest was
void.

Ladlad and Maza petitions:

Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of rebellion.

Basis of the PI: results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran inquest.

During the PI, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an eyewitness
against petitioners. Velasco, who was the prosecutor, gave copies of the affidavit of Fuentes to media members
present during the proceedings.

Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu
under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the
media regarding petitioners case, and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary
investigation.

Furthermore, they contend that the PI was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant to Rule 112 Sec3.

Issues:
1. WON the inquest for rebellion against Beltran was valid? NO.
2. WON there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion? NO.
3. WON the PI conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity? YES.

Held:

1) The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are proper only when the
accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.

The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for
Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted as he did
conduct an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors
subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the
second inquest void. None of Beltrans arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed
Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers
alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.

2) Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the
Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a
political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion
consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents
and find merit in Beltrans contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion.
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP
does not constitute rebellion.

3) The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3a of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint must be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor
or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public.
Here, the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and
accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without
any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule
112.
Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are
grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall issue a
subpoena to the respondents. Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued
subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 to secure copies of the
complaints and its attachments.

During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit
before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes affidavit not to petitioners
or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the
subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainants antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a
witness affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the
charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to
petitioners claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court concluded that there was indeed partiality
on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the PI.

19. Barry Lanier and Perlita v People of the Philippines G.R. No. 189176
The police operatives conducted a test-buy at petitioners residence in Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island where they
were able to purchase P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth of marijuana from petitioners. On the basis of
the test-buy operation, they were able to secure a search warrant from the RTC of Aklan.
A Receipt for Property Seized was prepared by SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan, but petitioners refused to sign the same.
Thereafter, petitioners were placed under arrest. The assistant prosecutor of Kalibo filed an Information charging the
petitioners. The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information before the RTC of Kalibo but the RTC denied the
motion and remanded the case to the provincial prosecutor for preliminary investigation. The prosecutor upheld the
Information and directed the return of the records to the RTC for disposition.
Petitioners filed a petition for review before the DOJ. The Sec. of Justice favored the petitioner on the belief that the
evidences seized were planted. The secretary, in a Resolution, directed the prosecutor to withdraw the Information
before the RTC. RTC then granted the Motion to Withdraw Information by the prosecutor.
OSG filed to the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the Resolution of the DOJ. The CA found probable cause
to sustain the petitioners indictment and reinstated the Information against the petitioners. CA nullified and set aside
the DOJ Resolution and the Order of the RTC.

Issues:
WoN the CA erred in reversing the DOJ resolution which nullified the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause
to indict petitioners for illegal possession of prohibited drugs and the RTC Order granting the Motion to Withdraw the
Information.

Ruling:
No. The CA did not commit any reversible error.
In Crespo v Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal Complaint or Information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case, dismissal, acquittal or conviction rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial
court. The rule applies to a Motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case even before or after the arraignment of
the accused.
When the Secretary of Justice made a determination and concluded that the evidences were planted, he went into
the merits of the defense and exceeded his jurisdiction.
On the part of the RTC, it having acquired jurisdiction over the case, is not bound by the Resolution of the DOJ but is
required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the Secretarys ruling is persuasive, it is not
binding on courts.

RULE 113
20. ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their
intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the second day of initiation rites
has ended, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon
the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including
Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny
received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard
him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could
no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially
ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially,
Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though,
that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped
him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two
reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first,
denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. While the Petition was
pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.
According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of
the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People

Petitioner Dizon sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial
courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did
not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused.

G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino
et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. According
to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as
hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.

In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that
there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits
that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona

Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable
period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the
required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.

ISSUES:
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People: Did the death of Villareal extinguish his criminal liability?

G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People: Was Dizon deprived of due process?

G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals: Did the CA err in convicting accused of the lesser offense of slight
physical injuries instead of homicide?

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona): Did the CA err in dismissing the case for violation of the accused's
right to speedy trial?

HELD:

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note of counsel
for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by
the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to
final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while the
term "pecuniarypenalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs, including civil liability predicated on the criminal
offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than
the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary
penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)

Political Law- The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.

Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones defense, as well
as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of
his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially
since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the
succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court
pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it
could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of
all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called upon to see
to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In
fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the
succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of the
petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case.

The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were elevated to the
Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure
certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the
court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the
complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in
fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however,
that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it
was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion.

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years,
there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the
petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on
August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon.

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s
right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition
includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or
to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an
appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, a verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a
reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the
same offense.

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of the accused or the
imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where
there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.

The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the
imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to
correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point
so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. The present case is one of those instances of grave
abuse of discretion.

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa in finding that the four accused should be held guilty only
of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to
determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required. The reliance on Penesa was utterly
misplaced.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight
physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused "were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa. It then
adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the "multiple
traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites. Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment
heaped on Lenny Villa was serious in nature, it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to
slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act,
even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious
act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to
automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to
discretion.

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of
Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of
the multiple injuries he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those
who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of
bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for
slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the
Petition.

PEOPLE V. LAGUIO
Facts:
Petitioner, People of the Philippines filed this petition for review to nullify and set aside the resolution of RTC in
criminal case, granting private respondent, Lawrence Wang Demurrer to Evidence and aquitting him of 3 charges
filed against him
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis
to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence
acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of
evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that inasmuch as it has been shown in the
present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the accused
possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless
arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission
of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful. In effect, the
People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an
exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure, the police officers were
justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
Issue: whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence
of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
Held:
NO. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part
of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking
from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested
him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on
found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be
no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that reliable information
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from the
testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and
Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante
delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day,
May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria
Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted surveillance operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a
person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These
circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required
in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the
warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.

RULE 114

DAVID vs AGBAY

FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along
the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year
2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. On
April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is
disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4(R.A. 9225)
as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines
(Toronto) on October 11, 2007.

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further
alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled
land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and
criminal suits between him and private respondents family.

On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict
petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in
court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of Justice
(DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioners MLA. It ruled that petitioners subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that
the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the
petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing
the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC
(Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioners
motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law
is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which
involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files
any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person.

Lavides vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act
providing for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing
penalties for its violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment
conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to
the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at
petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police
received reports of petitioners activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 in the
evening of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was
staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an
underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the
arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
was filed on April 7, 1997 against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, where it was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550. Edp
On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the
Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of
Adverse Resolution of the A
bove Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged."[1]
On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant,
Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn
Talingting. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874. In all the cases, it was
alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants who
had been "exploited in prostitution and . . . given money [by petitioner] as payment for the said [acts of] sexual
intercourse."
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
ISSUE: Should bail be granted

RULING: it was held that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the
accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. This pronouncement should be understood in the light of the
fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against
him. It was explained that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between: (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because
until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held; and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to
quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional
right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his
right to bail. It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail.

LACHICA V. TORMIS
Facts:
In an affidavit dated Oct 2, 2003, Trinidad O. Lachica charged Judged Rosabella M Tormis of the Municipal Trial
court of Cebu City, Branch IV, with abuse of authority. On July 2, 2003, accused Domugho was apprehended by the
police at around 8:45pm and was brought to the police station for booking and custody at 9:30pm.
On July 3, 2003, complainant was surprised to receive a call from the accused that she was released from
confinement on July 2 at 10:00pm. Complainant inquired from the police station if an order of release was issued by
the court, but she was informed that the accused was released because of the phone call the respondent judge made
telling the desk officer that the accused already posted a cash bail. Complainant checked the case records but the
expediente contained no copies of the order of release. She was only shown a copy of such at 1:00pm. Also, it was
only on 430pm of july 3, 2003 that the case records was found
The police blotter showed no entry of the order of release received was by the police. Only a notation that there was
a posting of the cash bail bond was entered therein.
Complainant states that it was improper for the respondent judge to receive the cash bail bond as the function
belonged exclusively to the office of the clerk of court. Also, she claimed that said judge committed an act of
impropriety when she called the police station to verbally order the release of the accused.
Respondent judge denied the charges. She states that she issued the order of release at 7pm after accused posted
the cash bond. She claimed that such accused was released because of the order of release and not because of the
phone call. The investigating judge submitted a report recommending that respondent judge be fined in the amount of
P20,000 or suspended for 3 months. OCA agreed with the findings and recommended the suspension of 3 months.

Issue:
WON respondent judge can be held administratively liable for personally receiving the cash bail bond for the
accused.
Held:
Yes. Section 14, of Rule 114 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that:
The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector or internal
revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the
prosecutor who investigated or filed the case.
Section 14 exclusively enumerates those officials who are tasked to receive such bail bond. A judge is not one of
those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of the judge.
Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her judicial authority when she personally
accepted the cash bail bond of the accused and for deliberately misleading the court by making false representations.
She is suspended from office for 6 months w/o salary and other benefits and sternly warned that a repetition of the
same shall be dealt more seriously.