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CASE NO. 31 REPUBLIC V. GALANG
FACTS:
Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga in March
1994. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator while Juvy stayed
at home. They had one child, Christopher.
In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article
36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a
swindler; that Juvy suffers from mental deficiency, innate
immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love
and affection [towards him and their] child. He posited that
Juvys incapacity was extremely serious and appears to be
incurable.
Having found no collusion between the parties, the case was
set for trial. In his testimony, Nestor alleged that he was the
one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not want
to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors
care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy
brought him there. He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and
falsified his signature to encash the check representing
Nestors fathers pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught
Juvy playing mahjong and kuwaho three (3) times. Finally,
he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on
the pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.
Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who
testified that she conducted a psychological test on Nestor. In
her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following
findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary
resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well- means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the
adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off reach of the subject are all obtaining in this case.
major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration
tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure anxiety On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC decision in
toto.
and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions
which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and ISSUE:
lack of self-esteem and gained emotional tensions caused by
his wifes behavior. Whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to
Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration of the
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that
manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very irresponsible prevented her from complying with her essential marital
and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of obligations.
responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities such
as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which HELD:
exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her
None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestors
neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and
evidence his testimonies and the psychologist, and the
child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of
psychological report and evaluation insufficient to prove
initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable
Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the
to perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and
Family Code. Psychological incapacity must be characterized
caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated
The defect should refer to no less than a mental (not
mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
January 22, 2001. The RTC Judge, relying on the Santos Case, assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
stated in the decision that the psychological incapacity of
In the present case, the psychologist did not even identify the
respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of
types of psychological tests which she administered on Nestor
marriage can be characterized by (a) gravity because the
and the root cause of Juvys psychological condition. There
subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of
was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the
marriage and family shouldered by any average couple
inception of the marriage. The report failed to prove the
existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b)
gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why
antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be
and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it
traced to the history of the subject before marriage although
incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties; the
its overt manifestations appear over after the wedding; and
report did not even categorically state the particular type of

personality disorder found. The report failed to establish the
incurability of Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements
that Juvy lacks the initiative to change and that her mental
incapacity appears incorrigible are insufficient to prove that
her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to
undertake.
Petition was granted. Galangs petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the
Family Code was dismissed.
CASE NO. 32 YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Yambao filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of her marriage with respondent Patricio Yambao after
35 years of marriage. She invoked the ground of psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner wife alleged that since the beginning, her marriage
with the respondent husband had been marred by bickering,
quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to
comply with the essential obligations to married life. She
elaborated by saying that through all the years of their
married life, she was the only one who earned a living and
took care of the children and that respondent husband just
ate and slept all day and would spend time with friends. In
addition, she claimed that respondent husband would
venture into several businesses but all of these failed.
Respondent husband was also a gambler. Petitioner wife also
claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent
did not even help to change their diapers or feed them, even
while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean
operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about
children. Later, respondent husband became insecure and
jealous and would get mad every time he would see
petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives.
When respondent husband started threatening to kill
petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and live
separately from him. She then consulted a psychiatrist who
concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Respondent husband denied that he has refused to work. He
claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was
always unable to because of his old age and lack of
qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay long in the
jobs he had because the same could not support the needs of
his family, and yielded benefits that were not commensurate
to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small
businesses but they failed due to various economic crises.
Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact,
contented with living with petitioners relatives since his
every move was being watched with eagle eyes. He also
denied that he gambled. He alleged that even without a
steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of the
amortization of their house in BF Homes, Paraaque City. He
also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering
that there was never any evidence that he had ever harmed
or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to justify the latter
having a nervous breakdown. He further alleged that he never
consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit holding that
petitioner wifes evidence failed to support her argument that
respondent husband was indeed psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations
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On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the totality of petitioner wifes evidence establish
respondents psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage?
HELD:
No. The Court held that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or
clinically identified. What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition.
For a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family
Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be
shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants.
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was
suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he was
unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the
contrary, respondents efforts, though few and far between
they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide
for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success.
Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence
or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not
relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an
awareness to provide for his family, even with his many
failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not
merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the
following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological illness.
That respondent, according to petitioner, lacked effective
sense of rational judgment and responsibility does not mean
he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to
help care for the children, his neglect for his business
ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate
some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have
been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality.
Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA, respondent never
committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or their
children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both
parents, it is safe to assume that both made an impact in the
childrens upbringing. Still, the parties were able to raise three
children into adulthood without any major parenting
problems, and such fact could hardly support a proposition
that the parties marriage is a nullity.
CASE NO. 33 Ting vs Ting
FACTS:
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18
years and while the youngest child was only two years old,
Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin
suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity
consisted of the following manifestations (1.) Benjamins
alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship
and his profession; (2.) Benjamins violent nature brought
about by his excessive and regular drinking; (3.) His
compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin
found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the
property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his
debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
(4.) Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his
failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his
family.
Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would
confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen
played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both
presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each
others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring
the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTCs decision.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
Issues:
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1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it
refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos
and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement
of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void is in accordance with
law and jurisprudence.
Held:
1. No. respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to
discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years
ago.

CASE NO. 34 Kalaw vs. Fernandez,
FACTS:
In the case at bar, petitioner alleged that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity due to
respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioner alleged that respondents habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity
of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute
a psychological incapacity
ISSUES:
1. What is psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code?
2. Should the marriage of the petitioner and respondent
be voided?
HELD:
1. Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the
celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive
the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
2. In dissolving marital bonds on account of either
partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing
the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the
infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void
from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
CASE NO. 35 OCHOSA VS. ALANO AND REPUBLIC
FACTS:
-Bonas illicit affairs with other men started at the onset of
their marriage on October 27, 1973, when Jose was assigned
in various parts of the country as an officer in the AFP.
-She continued her infidelity even when they lived together at
Fort Bonifacio, Makati City some time in 1985, whenever Jose
was out of their living quarters.
-In 1987, Jose was incarcerated in Camp Crame for rebellion
for the alleged participation of the failed coup detat. He
heard circulation of rumors of Bona getting caught having sex
with his driver, Corporal Gagarin.
-Jose got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted
Bona about the rumors, which she and Gagarin admitted.
Since then they were separated, and their foundling, Ramona
Celeste, stayed with Bona in Basilan until1994 to live with
Jose.
-Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa filed a Petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage between him and Bona J. Alano, based
on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill
the essential marital obligations of marriage.
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-Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, one of the witnesses,
testified and submitted a psychological evaluation report on
Bonas mental state. The interviews she had with Jose and
two of his witnesses brought her to the conclusion that
respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder,
and it was traceable to her family history.
-On January 11, 1999, the dispositive portion of the trial court
declared the marriage of Jose and Bona void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity of the
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court
finds that Bonas illness exhibited gravity, antecedence, and
incurability.
-OSG appealed the said ruling to the CA, and the CA
subsequently granted the appeal and reversed the ruling of
the trial court decision.
ISSUE:
WON Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations.
RULING:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects
were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the
marriage. Bonas alleged psychological incapacity did not
satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence.
Her persistent sexual infidelity and abandonment are not
badges of psychological incapacity nor cant it be traced to
the inception of their marriage. The psychiatrists conclusion
about Bonas HPD which made her prone to promiscuity and
sexual infidelity existed before her marriage to Jose, cannot
be taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method
by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be

desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required
in determining psychological incapacity. Dr. Rondains
conclusion was based solely on the assumed truthful
knowledge of Jose. No other witness testified to Bonas family
history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of their
marriage. The two witnesses only started to live with them in
1980 and 1986, respectively. Verily, Dr. Ronda in evaluated
Bonas psychological condition directly from the information
gathered solely from Jose
and his witnesses. These factual circumstances evoke the
possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrists is
tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient
corroboration. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under
Article 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
CASE NO. 36 AURELIO VS. AURELIO
FACTS:
-Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma.
Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988.
-They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo
Gabriel.
-On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent
alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically
incapacitated of performing and complying with their
respective essential marital obligations. In addition,
respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity
was present prior and even during the time of the marriage
ceremony.
-It alleged among others that said psychological incapacity
was manifested by lack of financial support from the
husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight
of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent
jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated
between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist
in the maintenance of the family.
-On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and
displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change
very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending
on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom
was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot
stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to
gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what
she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely.
-On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition
failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the
standards set by the Court for the interpretation and
implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
-RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON the marriage shall be declared null and void?
RULING:
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-Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.
DOCTRINE:
The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the
disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision; (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this
Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity
was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the

manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of
both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the
complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity.
Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically
identified the same as the root causes. Second, the petition
likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such
grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
psychologist reported that respondent
suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic
Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The
incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations
was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, this
Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that
were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can
be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition,
respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family
Code which states that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
CASE NO. 37 ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA VS. EDWARD
RUMBAUA
FACTS:
-Rowena Padilla and Edward Rumbaua were married.
-They never lived together in one habitat because their
marriage was a secret to Edward's family.
-Rowena filed for nullity of their marriage due to
psychological incapacity.
-She alleged that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage
as shown by the following circumstances:
1.) The respondent reneged on his promise to be true with
her under one roof after finding work; 2.) He failed to extend
financial support to her; 3.) He blamed her for his mothers
death; 4.)He represented himself as single in his transactions;
and 5.) He pretended to be working in Davao, although he
was cohabiting with another woman.
- The RTC nullified the marriage in its decision.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court due to prematurity thus denied the nullification of
the parties' marriage. Rowena then filed a petition to the
Supreme Court praying for the Court of Appeal's decision to
be set aside and RTC's decision be reinstated.
ISSUE:
WON the psychologist was able to prove that the respondent
is indeed psychologically incapacitated according to Article 36
of the Family Code of the Philippines.
RULING:
No. The testimony of Dr.Tayag, together with her report,
suffers from very basic flaws. First, what she medically
described was not related or linked to the respondents exact
condition except in a very general way. In short, her
testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously
short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can
be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder;
why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable;
how and why it was already present at the time of the
marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondents
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awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the
success of the petitioners case. Second, her testimony was
short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly
based on what the petitioner related to her. As the doctor
admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the
respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor
jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person sought to
be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If a
psychological disorder can be proven by independent means,
no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence,
however, appears on record to have been gathered in this
case, particularly about the respondents early life and
associations, and about events on or about the time of the
marriage and immediately thereafter.
CASE NO. 38 DIMAYUGA-LAURENA VS. CA, LAURENA
FACTS:
-19 December 1983, Darlene and Jesse wed in intramuros.
They had 2 children, Mark and Michael.
-19 October 1993, Petitioner filed petition of declaration of
nullity of marriage; respondent was psychologically
incapacitated since: 1.) Invited 15yr old boy to sleep in same
hotel room with them during honeymoon. 2.) Watched TV
while Darlene suffered from miscarriage, almost bled to
death. 3.) Prioritized parents needs over hers 4.) Womanizer.
5.) Had female tendencies.
-September 1990, Jesse abandoned conjugal home and
stopped caring for their children.

-Conjugal properties: Makati Duplex; House and lot in
Tanauan, Batangas; Jeddah Caltex dealership; Lancer, Safari,
L300, L200 vehicles, Jeddah Trucking.
-Petitioner prayed for the Dissolution of Conjugal partnership,
Custody, and Monthly support of 30,000.
-CA affirmed RTC decision with modification.
ISSUES:
1) WON the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marriage obligations
2) WON the properties excluded by the court of appeals form
part of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner
and respondent
RULING:
-The petition has no merit.
1) Petitioner failed to prove respondents psychological
incapacity. As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
anchored her petition on respondents irresponsibility,
infidelity, and homosexual tendencies. Petitioner likewise
alleged that respondent tried to compel her to change her
religious belief, and in one of their arguments, respondent
also hit her. However, sexual infidelity, repeated physical
violence, homosexuality, physical violence or moral pressure
to compel petitioner to change religious affiliation, and
abandonment are grounds for legal separation but not for
declaring a marriage void. Petitioner also failed to prove that
respondents psychological incapacity was existing at the time
of the celebration of their marriage. Petitioner only cited that
during their honeymoon, she found it strange that
respondent allowed their 15-year old companion, the son of
one of respondents house helpers, to sleep in their room.
However, respondent explained that he and petitioner
already stayed in a hotel for one night before they went to
Baguio City and that they had sexual relations even before
their marriage. Respondent explained that the boy was with
them to take pictures and videos of their stay in Baguio City
and had to stay with them in the room due to monetary
constraints.
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner
failed to show that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable,
and existing at the time of the solemnization of their
marriage.
2) Properties of respondents parents do not form part of
conjugal partnership of gains.
CASE NO. 39 JORDAN CHAN PAZ vs JEANICE PAVON PAZ
FACTS:
Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996 and got
married in July 1997. Jeanice bore their only child, Evan
Gaubert, on February 12, 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left
their conjugal home on February 23, 1999.
On September 15, 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for
declaration of nullity against Jordan on the grounds of
psychological incapacity in assuming the essential obligations
of marriage. Jeanice alleged that Jordan had the tendency to
lie about his whereabouts, preferred to hang out with friends
to avoid taking care of their child, plays with his Play Station
instead of reporting to work, and relied heavily on his Mom
for financial support. On top of those, Jordan subjected
Jeanice to verbal lashing and insults, including a threat to hurt
her with a pair of scissors.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Jordan Paz was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations.
RULING:
There was no sufficient proof that Jordan was psychologically
incapacitated.
The respondent and the trial court relied heavily on the
expert testimony of psychologist Cristina R. Gates that Jordan
was suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder.
However, as challenged by the petitioner and as ruled by the
High Court, Gates report and testimony were hearsay
evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the alleged
facts she was testifying on.
The respondent was not able to prove the requisites set forth
in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Dimayuga-Laurena vs Court
of Appeals, where psychological incapacity was characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) judicial antecedence and (c) incurability.
CASE NO. 40. JOCELYN SUAZO v ANGELITO SUAZO
FACTS:
Jocelyn and Angelito met each other in 1985, both being 16
years old at the time. The following year, their parents
arranged their wedding and they got married. At the onset, it
was Jocelyn who took the role as bread-winner for their
young family. Angelito did not like to work, a drunkard, and
whenever Jocelyn confronted him about his vices, Angelito
would beat her up. In 1987, Angelito left Jocelyn for another
woman.
Ten years later, Jocelyn filed a petition to have their marriage
declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Jocelyn hired the services of Dr. Nedy Tayag who testified
that, from her interviews with the former, Angelito was
suffering from psychological incapacity that has been present
even before the marriage began, as manifested by the failure
of Angelito to perform essential marital obligations.
Issue:
W/N the marriage should be annulled on the grounds of
psychological incapacity.
Held:
No. The petitioner and the RTC relied heavily on the
testimony by Dr. Tayag which the Court declared, concurring
with the CA, as one-sided. Dr. Tayag only interviewed Jocelyn
and she does not have personal knowledge about the
couples situation. The petition did the satisfy the requisites
of Article 36 and as mentioned in Santos vs CA.
CASE NO. 41. EDWARD LIM vs MA. CHERYL STA. CRUZ-LIM
FACTS:
In 1978, petitioner met respondent in Cebu. After less than a
year of courtship through long distance phone calls, they
became sweethearts and eventually got married in 1979.
From then on, they stayed at the formers grandparents
house in Makati. All their living expenses were paid by the
grandparents. The respondent became uncomfortable with
the set up and asked the petitioner to live independently but
to no avail.
In 1990, respondent filed a police blotter implicating the
petitioner for allegedly being caught in a compromising
position with the stay-in caregiver of the petitioners
grandmother. This incident was even published in one of the
tabloids that brought humiliation to the petitioners family.
Respondent left the petitioner on the same day, bringing with
her their three children.
The RTC declared the marriage null and void on the grounds
that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to
perform marital obligations. The CA reversed the ruling.
Issue:
W/N the marriage is null and void on the grounds of
psychological incapacity.
Held:
No. While the expert opinion of the psychiatrist was
extensive, it is unsupported by other psychological tests that
would prove the psychological incapacity. And having not
satisfied the stringent requisites provided in Santos vs. CA and
Republic vs. CA (Molina), the marriage of the Edward and
Cheryl is upheld.
CASE NO. 42 ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR vs ERLINDA AMPARO-
AGRAVIADOR
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1971 and got
married in 1973. They begot four children.
In 2001, the petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. He
alleged that the respondent did not perform household
chores, stayed away for long periods of time, did not take
care of their children, refused to have sex with him since 1993
and had extra-marital affairs. Respondent denied all
allegations.
8
The RTC nullified the marriage on the strength of petitioners
and the expert witness testimony. The CA reversed the
ruling.
Issue:
W/N the marriage should be nullified on the grounds of
psychological incapacity.
Held:
No. The failure of a marriage should not always be remedied
by being declared void ab initio due to psychological
incapacity. And while the expert testimony of a professional
Psychiatrist is important in the determination of psychological
incapacity of any, or both, of the concerned parties, the
totality of the evidence presented will still establish whether
they psychologically incapacitated or not. Marriage is upheld.
CASE NO. 43
Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical
practitioners. They begot 3 children. 11 years later, Leonida
sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. Leonida testified that Manuel is
a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy towards their
children is often unconventional and was the cause of their
frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of imposing
discipline towards their children but is remarkably so gentle
towards his mom. He is more affectionate towards his mom
and this is a factor which is unreasonable for Leonida. Further,
Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as
evidenced by his unusual closeness to his male companions
and that he concealed his homosexuality from Leonida prior
to their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a man
affectionately over the phone and she confirmed all her fear

when she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their
marriage is null and void not because of PI but rather due to
fraud by reason of Manuels concealment of his
homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTCs
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be
declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of Manuels
concealment of his homosexuality.
HELD: The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a
ground to nullify a marriage. It is the concealment of
homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is
not proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court
should not have taken the publics perception against
Manuels sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the
lower court as an indication of his homosexuality for those
are not conclusive and are not sufficient enough to prove so.
Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was
nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it
alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from
Leonida and that Leonidas consent had been vitiated by such.
CASE NO. 44 PEREZ-FERRARIS V. FERRARIS
Article 36: Psychological Incapacity Armida and Brix are a
showbiz couple. The couples relationship before the marriage
and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so)
was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time,
Armida was happy and contented with her life in the
company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a
responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when
Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began
to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform
his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand
Armidas lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He
thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her
anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological
expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a
dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brixs
leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the
violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his
family.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The
alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-house
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies
during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to
spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a
mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI.
Further, the expert was not able to prove her findings.
Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was
vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such
disorder can be part of his family upbringing She stated that
there was a history of Brixs parents having difficulties in their
relationship- this is of course inconclusive for such has no
direct bearing to the case at bar.
CASE NO. 45 BARCELONA V. CA
BARCELONA V CA 412 SCRA 41 SEPTEMBER 24, 2003 FACTS:
Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997
Decision as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court
9
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Order dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-
24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private
respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to
state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution
1995 Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment against
Diana Barcelona (petitioner). On May 9, 1995, Tadeo filed a
motion to withdraw petition which the RTC granted on June
Tadeo filed annulment again but
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: no cause
of action and violates SC administrative circular 04-94 on
for
reconsideration filed by petitioner (against deferring
resolution) was the complainants failure to state a cause of
action but according to Judge Pison, petitioner was shown to
have violated the complainants right so there is cause of
issued its December 2, 1998 Order denying
petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that "[respondent]
established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must
controvert." After her Motion for Reconsideration 11 was
denied in the March 22, 1999 Order, petitioner elevated the
case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari, 13 docketed
as CA-GR No. 53100.
ISSUE: Whether evidences presented are sufficient to invoke
psychological incapacity in annulling said marriage
HELD: A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out
his case or sustain the issue." The demurrer challenges the

sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict. In
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a
demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. The evidence
against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to
support any finding of psychological incapacity that would
warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage. In the
case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely
shows that he and his wife could not get along with each
other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or
juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting
their marital union. Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to
identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the
incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Medical examination is not a conditio
sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long
as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish
the incapacity adequately. Here, however, the totality of
evidence presented by respondent was completely
insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity --
more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination. PETITION GRANTED. ANNULMENT CASE WAS
DISMISSED
CASE NO. 46 VILLALON V. VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005Jaime F. Villalon vs. Ma.
Corazon N. Villalon Facts: Petitioner Jaime Villalon and
respondent Corazon Villalon met in the early 70s. They began
dating in 1975 and eventually got married on April 22, 1978.
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode moved
into an apartment near the conjugal home. Despite the
separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who
stayed with him on alternate weekends. He voluntarily gave
monthly support to the children an d paid for their tuition
fees. He also shouldered the childrens medical expenses as
well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the
conjugal abode. On July 12, 1996, petitioner filed for a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the
ground of his psychological incapacity. According to
petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity
were:(a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family
relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married
life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to
accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his
wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from
any spousal obligation; and(d) his false assumption of the
fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium
towardsrespondent. On September, 25, 1996, respondent
filed an answer denying petitioners allegation and described
her marriage to the petitioner as fruitful and characterized
by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth intheir
relationship" and that their marital squabbles were normal
based on community standards.Petitioner presented Dr.
Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his
alleged psychologicaldisorder of "Narcissistic Histrionic
Personality Disorder" with "Casanova Complex". To
controvert the findings of petitioners expert witness,
respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who
testified that Dr.Dayans findings were incomplete because a
"team approach" was necessary in evaluating an individuals
personality.RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and respondent as null and void
abinitio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of the petitioner.Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an
10
appeal from the decision of the trial court to the CA.
CAreversed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence,this petition.
Issue: Whether the totality of the evidence and the
psychological reports supported the alleged
psychologicalincapacity of Jaime Villalon.
Ruling: The totality of the evidence in this case does not
support a finding that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary,
what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband
to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good
provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital
infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear
to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which
rendered him incapableof performing his spousal obligations.
The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction
with hismarriage rather tha n a psychological disorder rooted
in petitioners personal history. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
the court held that psychological incapacity, as a ground for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized
by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. In the case
at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered
from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Casanova Complex even before the marriage. Further, sexual
infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is
suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that
the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make petitioner completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage. As held in
Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, refusal to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological

incapacity within the meaning of the law. Petition denied. CA
decision affirmed.
CASE NO. 47 VDA. Catalan vs Catalan Lee
Facts:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After
allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first
wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with
petitioner herein. However, on November 18, 2004 Orlando
died intestate in the Philippines. Subsequently, herein
petitioner filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Petition for
issuance of Letters of Administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the estates of the deceased. While the
petition was pending, Orlandos daughter, herein respondent,
filed similar petition (Spec. Proc. 232). Petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of respondents petition on the ground of litis
pendentia but was, nevertheless, consolidated by the court.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a complaint for Bigamy,
alleging that petitioner contracted her second marriage with
Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.
On the other hand, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy,
alleging that the divorce was not recognized by the Philippine
jurisdiction, making her marriage to Orlando not valid.
The RTC dismissed the petition of herein petitioner and ruled
in favor of respondent. The court found petitioner not
married to Bristol contrary to its ruling in the Criminal case,
which held that the marriage between petitioner and Bristol
was valid when she married Orlando. RTC also ruled that
petitioner is not an interested party for the said petition. CA
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
1. WON the acquittal of petitioner in Criminal Case No.
2699-A follows that her marriage to Bristol is valid.
2. WON the divorce obtained abroad (USA) by Orlando
Catalan is recognized under the Philippine Jurisdiction,
making the marriage with petitioner valid.
HELD:
First, the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate
the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner
was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court
concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy,
it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and
was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the
nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol,
both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an
interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy
case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, the court
already ruled that under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
foreign nationality. Moreover, It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. Should petitioner prove the validity of the
divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the
preferential right to be issued the letters of administration
over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be
issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or
next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule
78 of the Revised Rules of Court. Case is remanded to the
11
Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further
proceedings.
CASE NO. 48 Corpuz vs Sto Tomas
Facts:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig
City. He left the country after his wedding and went back to
surprise respondent but was shocked of her infidelity. Thus,
went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was
granted.
Two years after, Gerbert found another Filipina to love.
Desirous to marry his Filipina fianc, Gerbert registered the
Canadian Decree at the Pasig City Civil Registry. However, he
was informed that his marriage, with Daisylyn, still subsist due
to NSO Circular No. 4 Series of 1982, that the Decree is not
enforceable unless judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage, as dissolved, with the RTC. Although served with
summons, there was no opposition from Daisylyn.
The RTC denied Gerberts petition. It concluded that Gerbert
is not a proper party to file said petition as he is a Canadian
Citizen, the proper party should be Daisylyn according to
Article 26 Par (2) of the Family Code. Hence the present
petition.
Issue:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Held:
On the outset, the rationale and intent behind the enactment,
and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, is that only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to remarry
in case alien spouse has acquired a decree of divorce abroad;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Although, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens, this conclusion is
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the
RTC. The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert
of legal interest to petition with the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree. Since Gerbert is now clothed with
that legal interest, as a Canadian Citizen, to prove the
authenticity of the decree or its validity in accordance with his
national law. This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself (Principle of Comity).
Finally, the Pasig City Civil Registry who accepted the decree,
without the Judicial Recognition from a competent Philippine
court, acted out of turn and without authority of law, hence,
the Decree filed by petitioner is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.
Petition is granted. The case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with the decision.
CASE NO. 49 Republic vs CA
Facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas
were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo
M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents, also
known as, Secret Marriage. The couple did not immediately
live together after the ceremony, only when they discovered
that Castro was pregnant that they lived together and for a
short period of time.
After giving birth, the couples child was adopted by Castros
brother, who is now in the United States. Castro, desiring to
follow her daughter, consulted Atty. Pulgar. Through the
Lawyers effort, they discovered that there was no valid
marriage license prior her marriage with Cardenas. As proof, a
Certification from the Civil Registrar of Pasig was presented.
The trial Court dismissed the petition. The court concluded
that the inability of the certifying official to locate the
marriage license was not conclusive that there was no
marriage license issued. Unsatisfied, Castro filed an appeal to
respondent appellate court, which reversed the decision,
declaring the marriage null and void. Hence the present
petition.
Issue:
whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish
that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private
respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
Held:
The impugned decision is affirmed. At the time the subject
marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides
12
that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license
would render the marriage void ab initio.
However, the certification of "due search and inability to find"
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value,
the certifying official being the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find"
sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage
license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The appellate court found that, Cardenas may have presented
a spurious marriage license, purportedly given by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, to the solemnizing officer making their
marriage null and void.
The petition is dismissed.
******for purposes of review: Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record.
A written statement signed by an officer having custody of
an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search,
no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all applications
for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants,
the date the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data.

CASE NO. 50 SSS vs Bailon
Facts:
In 1955, Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz contracted marriage.
15 years later, Bailon filed at the Court of First Instance (CFI) a
petition to declare Alice presumptively dead and was granted.
13 years later, Bailon and Harque, respondent, contracted
marriage. In 1998, Bailon, a SSS member since 1960 and a
retiree, died. Respondent filed a claim for funeral and death
benefits with SSS and was granted.
Cecilia Bailon-Yap, daughter of Bailon from one Elisa,
contested the grant of SSS benefits to respondent stating that
they are the ones who defrayed the medical and funeral
expenses. Subsequently, Alice reappeared claiming that the
marriage of Harque to Bailon is void. SSS subsequently
cancelled the grant of benefits to respondent and ordered her
to return the same. Respondent appealed to Social Security
Commission (SSC) which declared the marriage of Bailon and
Harque void on the basis of Alice reappearance. Respondent
appealed to CA which reversed the decision of the SSS and
SSC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the subsequent marriage between
Clemente Bailon and Teresita Harque, respondent, is void
upon the reappearance of Alice Diaz.
Held:
The applicable law for the case at bar is the Civil Code not the
Family code since the marriages have been solemnized before
August 1988.
Under the Civil Code, subsequent marriages are valid until
annulled by a petition filed by the reappearing spouse. In the
Family Code, the mere recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse in the Civil Registrar shall
ipso facto terminate the subsequent marriage.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate
the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court
action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made
known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not
terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse
is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouses
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must
still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law. The action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one
of the parties involved. Such action after death of any party
will not produce any legal effect since there is no marriage to
restore.
The petition is dismissed. Respondent is herein the rightful
beneficiary.
CASE NO. 51 Tenchavez vs Escano
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belongs to a prominent
Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary
24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and
ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares.
The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the
couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A
certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-
between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as
13
written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta
are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their
vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents.
However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with
her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single
and when it was approved she left for the United States and
filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on
approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State
of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell
Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten
children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents
whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her
husband.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escao is
valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaos
parents were sufficient in form.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez marriage
remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine Law.
Escaos divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed
valid under the Philippine Law to which Escao was bound

since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escao, like
her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in
not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband
without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in
order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally
getting married again are acts which constitute a willful
infliction of injury upon the husbands feelings in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus
entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our
law on the basis of adultery.
2. No. Tenchavez charge against Vicentas parents are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Tenchavez
about the Escaos animosity toward him strikes the court to
be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by
Tenchavez own letters written before the suit had begun. An
action for alienation of affections against the parents of one
consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or
unworthy motives on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents
with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted
efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling
them to recover damages.
CASE NO. 52 Mariategui vs. CA
Facts:
This is a case for partition of several pieces of land belonging
to Lupo Mariategui, who died without a will.
During his lifetime, Lupo contracted three (3) marriages. The
first wife died, so he contracted a second marriage. The
second wife also passed away so he contracted a third
marriage. The third wife also preceded Lupo in death. The
issue in this case arose because at the time of his death, Lupo
left certain properties which he acquired when he was still
unmarried. Later, Lupos descendants by his first and second
marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated unto themselves a certain lot of the
Muntinlupa Estate and title was issued. Now, Lupos children
by his third marriage filed a complaint with the lower court,
contending that since they were co-heirs of Lupos estate they
were deprived of their respective shares in the lot mentioned.
In answer, the other party said that the complaint was not
really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition but
for recognition of natural children. The lower court ruled in
favor of Lupos heirs from the first and second marriage. Thus,
the case was elevated to the CA, where they raised the issue
of their parents lawful marriage and their legitimacy as
children. CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to
equal shares in the estate. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents were able to prove their
succession rights over the said estate
Ruling:
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents'
demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the
Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are
legitimate children of the deceased. Lupo Mariategui and
Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in
or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration
communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified
that "when his father was still living, he was able to mention
to him that he and his mother were able to get married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known
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in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate
was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise
offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact
that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
CASE NO. 53 Perido v. Perido
FACTS:
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married
twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong,
with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita.
After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with
whom he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and
Gonzalo. Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in
1943. Margarita is the only living child of the first marriage.
The children and grandchildren of the first marriage and
second marriage filed a case regarding the partition of the
properties of Lucio Perido. Margarita et al asserted that the
children and grandchildren of the second marriage were
illegitimate.
ISSUE: W/N the children and grandchildren of the second
marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate, entitling them for
the partition of lands
HELD: Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony
cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take
place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take
place a man and a woman living together as husband and wife
are presumed married. This presumption can be deduced in
the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee,[1] this Court
explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus: "The
basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that
of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil

contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established
by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage.' (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage." In
view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in
concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and,
therefore, legitimate.
CASE NO. 54 Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Sarmiento purchased a parcel of land. The adjacent lot was
owned by the family of Atty. Naguid and was occupied by
Cruz. Sarmiento found out that Cruz is occupying about 71
meters of her lot. She informed Cruz that she would like to
remove the old fence so that she could construct a new one
that will cover the true area of her property but Cruz refused.
Sarmiento filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, which ruled in favor of Sarmiento. Cruz
appealed to the Regional Trial Court and assailed the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, which ruled in
favor of Cruz. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court and reinstated that of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
Rullings:
The complaint does not characterize herein petitioner's
alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same was
legal or illegal. It does not state how petitioner entered upon
the land and constructed the house and the fence thereon. It
is also silent on whether petitioner's possession became legal
before private respondent made a demand on her to remove
the fence. The complaint merely avers that the lot being
occupied by petitioner is owned by a third person, not a party
to the case, and that said lot is enclosed by a fence which
private respondent claims is an encroachment on the
adjacent lot belonging to her.The jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails
to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected
or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar,
the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
reinstated the judgment of the Regional Trial Court ruling that
the Municipal Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the
case.
CASE NO. 55 Delgado vda. Dela rosa vs. Heirs of De Damian
Facts:
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Guillermo and Josefa died without will. The claimants if their
estates may be divided into two groups:
(a) The heirs of Josefa , consisting of her half and full
blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grand nephews and
grand nieces
(b) The alleged heirs of Guillermo, particularly his sisters,
nephews, nieces, and his illegitimate child
As to Josefas family background, her parents were never
married so she and her 4 siblings were all ful blooded natural
children of their mother. Also, her mother gave birth to
another child with another man making it as a half blood
brother.
As to Guillermo, he managed to father an illegitimate child
named Guillierma, intervenor respondent in this case.
Issue: WON the grand nephews and grand nieces are entitled
to inherit by the rights of representation in collateral line
Ruling:
No, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
qualified to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers
and nieces, or their children who were still alive at the time
of her Death. According to article 972 of the new civil code,
the right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters so
therefore it cannot be exercised by the grandnieces and
grandnephews.
Case no. 56 Zapanta vs.Montessa

Facts:
Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May
20, 1958, an information for Bigamy was filed by respondent
Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No. 3405), alleging that the
latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and
without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a
second marriage with said complainant.
On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446 against respondent
Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the
ground of duress, force and intimidation. On the 30th of the
same month respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it
stated no cause of action, but the same was denied on July 7
of the same year.
On September 2, 1958, Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in
Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend proceedings therein, on
the ground that the determination of the issue involved in
Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the
motion on September 20, 1958 as well as petitioners motion
for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After
entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present
action.
Issue:
WON the annulment of second marriage was valid
Ruling:
It is obvious that his act was involuntary and cannot be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he
16
was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus is valid until annulled. Since no annulment was declared
the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the therefore her previous marriage was still valid and her
second marriage is determinative of petitioners guilt or marriage to Karl is will automatically void. Such marriage
innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can
can be no question that the annulment of petitioners remarry.
marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in
the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
is within the jurisdiction of said court. if the defendant in a
case for bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the
right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the
civil action for annulment must first be decided before the
action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to
apply the same rule when the contention of the accused is
that the second marriage is void on the ground that he
entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation.
CASE NO. 57 Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy
Facts:
Karl was married to Lila on July 1978. Lila was married with
Eduardo Marion in 1972. Karl then filed a declaration of
nullity of their marriage on juvenile and domestic relations
court on the grounds of the latters marriage. Lila contents
that the first marriage was void because they was allegedly
force to enter into martial union. Likewise she alleged that
Karl was married as well to another woman before their
marriage.
Issue:
WON the marriage of Karl and Lila is void
Rulings:
It was not necessary for Lila to prove her first marriage
because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage