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Almond (Separate Tables)
Almond (Separate Tables)
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Separate Tables
"'Miss Cooper:Loneliness
is a terriblething
MissCooper:Isanytype an 'alone'type,
MissMeacham.. ?"
(FromTerenceRattigan's
SeparateTables,
(1955,78, 92) GABRIEL
A. ALMOND
InSeparateTables,the hit of the 1955 New Yorktheatricalseason, the Irishplaywright,
Terence Rattigan,used the metaphorof solitarydinersin a second-rateresidentialhotel in
Cornwallto convey the lonelinessof the humancondition.It may be a bit far fetched to
use this metaphorto describe the conditionof politicalscience in the 1980s. But in some
sense the variousschoolsand sects of politicalscience now sit at separatetables, each with
its own conception of proper politicalscience, but each protectingsome secret islandof
vulnerability.
Itwas not alwaysso. Ifwe recallthe state of the professiona quarterof a centuryago,
let us say inthe early 1960s,DavidEaston's(1953) and DavidTruman's(1955)scoldingsof
the professionfor its backwardnessamongthe socialscience disciplines,had been takento
heart by a substantialand productivecadre of young politicalscientists. In 1961 Robert
Dahlwrote hisEpitaphfora Monumentto a SuccessfulProtestreflectingthe sure confidence
of a successfulmovement, whose leaderswere rapidlybecomingthe most visiblefiguresin
the profession. Neither Dahl nor Heinz Eulau,whose BehavioralPersuasionappeared in
1963made exaggeratedor exclusiveclaimsfor the new politicalscience. They expressed
the view that the scientificapproachto the study of politicalphenomenahad proven itself,
and that it could take its place alongsidepoliticalphilosophy,publiclaw, and institutional
historyand description,as an importantapproachto the study of politics.As the part of
the discipline"on the move," so to speak, it created some worry among the older sub-
disciplines.An appropriatemetaphor for the state of politicalscience at that time, per-
hapswould be the "youngTurk-old Turk"model, with the youngTurksalreadybegin-
ningto gray at the temples. But we were all Turks.
Now there is this uneasyseparateness.The publicchoice people seek an anchoragein
reality, a "new institutionalism,"to house their powerful deductive apparatus;the
politicaleconometricianswant to relate to historicaland institutionalprocesses; the
humanistscringeat the avoidanceof politicalvalues by "scientism,"and sufferfrom feel-
Figure I.
IdeologicalDimension
Left Right
Hard HL HR
Methodological
Dimension
Soft SL SR
free market economy, and limitson the power of the state, as well as an aggressiveanti-
communistforeign policy.
If we combine these two dimensionswe end up with four schools of politicalscience,
four separate tables-the soft-left, the hard-left,the soft-right,and the hard-righttables.
Reality,of course, is not quite this neat. The ideologicaland methodologicalshadingsare
more complex, more subtle. To elaborate our metaphor a bit but stillwithinthe refec-
toral realm, since the overwhelmingmajorityof politicalscientistsare somewhere in the
center-"liberal" and moderate in ideology, and eclectic and open to conviction in
methodology-we mightspeak of the great cafeteriaof the center, from whichmost of us
select our intellectualfood, and where we are seated at large tables with mixed and
changingtable companions.
Suppose we begin with the soft left. All of the sub-groupsof the soft left share in the
meta-methodologicalassumptionthat the empiricalworld cannot be understood in terms
of separate spheres and dimensions,but has to be understood as a time-space totality.
"Criticaltheory," as developed by Horkheimer,Adorno, Marcuse,and others of the
"FrankfurtSchool" reject the alleged detachment and disaggregatingstrategy of
mainstreamsocial science. The various parts of the social process must be seen " . . as
aspects of a total situationcaughtup inthe process of historicalchange"(Lukacsquoted in
David Held [1980], 164).The student as well as that which he studies is involvedin strug-
gle. Hence objectivityis inappropriate."Positivistsfailto comprehendthat the process of
knowingcannot be severed from the historicalstrugglebetween humansand the world.
Theory and theoretical labor are intertwinedin social life processes. The theorist cannot
remaindetached, passivelycontemplating,reflectingand describing'society' or 'nature'"
(Held, 165). To understandand explain one must have a commitment to an outcome.
There is no politicalscienceinthe positivistsense, that is, a politicalscience separablefrom
ideologicalcommitment.To seek to separate it is a commitmentto support the existing,
historicallyobsolescent order.
The more orthodox Marxistssuch as PerryAnderson (1976), Goran Therborn(1977),
PhilipSlater (1977), and others, while sharingthe meta-methodology of the "Critical
school," go furtherand argue that unless one accepts historicalmaterialismin the fullest
reductionistsense of explainingthe politicalrealmin classstruggleterms, one ends up fail-
ing to appreciate the relationshipbetween theory and "praxis."
As we consider the composition of the soft left our four-fold metaphor of separate
tables begins to break down. The Marxisttheorists of several persuasions-the "critical
theorists," the "dependency"writers,and "worldsystem" theorists-make quarrelsome
table companions. What they all share is a common belief in the unity of theory and
praxis, in the impossibilityof separatingscience and politics. As a logicalconsequence
positivistpoliticalscience, which believes in the necessity of separatingscientificactivity
from politicalactivity,loses contact with the overridingunityof the historicalprocess and
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efficient, and perhaps equitable than other economies, and much more successfulthan
politicalprocesses in efficientlyallocatingresources .... Muchof what has been produced
by the [Virginian] Center for Study of PublicChoice, can best be described as contribu-
tions to a theory of the failureof politicalprocesses .. inequity,inefficiency,and coercion
are the most general resultsof democratic policyformation"(pp. 106-7).Buchananpro-
posed an automatic deficit reduction plan years before the adoption of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings proposal; and he was the author of an early version of the proposed
constitutional budget-balancingamendment. Buchanan,in two books-Democracy in
Deficit, The PoliticalLegacyof LordKeynes(1977), and TheEconomicsof Politics(1978)-
presents a view of democratic politics in which voters act in terms of their short-run
interests,that is to say oppose taxes and favor materialbenefitsfor themselves;politicians
naturallyplay into these propensities by favoring spending and opposing taxing; and
bureaucratsseek to extend their power and resources without regard to the public
interest.
These theorists differin the extent to whichthey believe that the short-runutilitymaxi-
mizer model captures humanreality.Some scholarsemploy the model only as a way of
generatinghypotheses.ThusRobertAxelrod, usingdeductivemodelling,experimentation
and computer simulation,has made importantcontributionsto our understandingof how
cooperative norms emerge, and in particularhow norms of internationalcooperation
might develop from an originalshort-runutilitymaximizingperspective (1984). Douglass
North (1981), Samuel Popkin(1979), Robert Bates (1988), and others combine rational
choice modellingwith sociologicalanalysisin their studies of thirdworld development and
historicalprocess.
That this view is on the defensive is reflected in recent comments of scholars with
unquestionablescientificcredentials.Thus Herbert Simon challengesthe rationalchoice
assumptionof this literature:
It makes a differenceto research, a very largedifference,to our researchstrategywhether we
are studying
the nearlyomniscient
homoeconomicus
of rationalchoicetheoryor the boundedly
rationalhomopsychologicus of cognitivepsychology.It makesa differencefor research,but it also
makes a differencefor the proper designof politicalinstitutions.JamesMadisonwas well aware
of that, and in the pages of the FederalistPapers,he opted for this view of the humancondition;
"As there is a degree of depravityin mankindwhichrequiresa certaindegree of circumspection
and distrust, so there are other qualitiesin human nature which justifya certain portion of
esteem and confidence:"-a balancedand realisticview, we may concede, of bounded human
rationalityand its accompanyingfrailtiesof motive and reason. (303)
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explicitand testable the assumptionsand beliefsof left ideologies,one hasgone part of the
way toward rejectingthe anti-professionalism of the left. And this is reflected in the ner-
vousness of leadingsocialistand dependency theorists over quantificationand the testing
of hypotheses. Thus ChristopherChase-Dunn,one of the leadingworld system quan-
tifiers, pleads with his colleagues,"My concern is that we not become bogged down in a
sterile debate between 'historicists'and 'social scientists,' or between quantitativeand
qualitativeresearchers.The 'ethnic' boundariesmay provide us with much materialfor
spiriteddialogue,but a real understandingof the world system will requirethat we tran-
scend methodologicalsectarianism"(1982, 181).The leadingdependencytheoristssuchas
Cardoso and Fagenraise serious questions regardingthe validityof "scientifictype, quan-
titative" studies of dependency propositions. For reasons not clearly specified such
research is "premature,"or misses the point. Thus, they probablywould not accept as
valid the findingsof the Sylvan,Snidal,Russett, Jackson,and Duvall(1982) group which
tested a formal model of "dependencia"on a world-wide set of dependent countriesin
the 1970-75period, and came up with mixed and inconclusiveresults. Nevertheless the
dependency and world system quantifiersand econometricians,includingpoliticalscien-
tists and sociologists such as Chase-Dunn(1977) and Rubinson(1979), Albert Bergesen
(1980), Volker Bornschier(1981) and others, are carryingon quantitativestudies oriented
toward the demonstrationof the validityof world system and dependency propositions.
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It is not correct to arguethat politicalscience deviated from classicalpoliticalphilosophy
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,and that it has been on the wrong path ever
since. Nor is it correct to attribute to American politicalscience the effort to separate
politicaltheory from politicalaction. The Straussianscannot legitimatelyclaim exclusive
originin classicalGreek philosophy.The scientificimpulsein politicalstudies had its begin-
nings among the classicalGreek philosophers.Robert Dahl, for my money, is a more
legitimatefollower of Aristotle than is Leo Strauss.
There is a politicalsociologicaltraditiongoing all the way back to Plato and Aristotle,
continuingthrough Polybius,Cicero, Machiavelli,Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu,Hume,
Rousseau,Tocqueville, Comte, Marx, Pareto, Durkheim,Weber and continuingup to
Dahl, Lipset, Rokkan,Sartori, Moore, and Lijphart,which sought, and seeks, to relate
socioeconomic conditionsto politicalconstitutionsand institutionalarrangements,and to
relate these structuralcharacteristicsto policy propensitiesin war and peace.
Our founding fathers belonged to this tradition. Alexander Hamilton observed in
Federalist9, "The science of politics . . . like most other sciences, has received great
improvement. The efficacy of various principlesis now well understood, which were
either not knownat all, or imperfectlyknownto the ancients"(1937). And in Federalist31
Hamiltondeals with the perennialquestionof just how scientificmoraland politicalstudies
could be. He concludes,
Thoughit cannotbe pretendedthat the principles of moraland politicalknowledgehave,in
general,the samedegreeof certaintywiththoseof the mathematics, yet theyhavemuchbetter
claimsinthisrespectthan. we shouldbe disposedto allowthem.(ibid.,189)
It is worth notingthat the hard science-soft science polarity,which we have been led to
assume is a recent phenomenon attributableto the heresy of the Americanbehavioral
movement, has in fact been endemic to the disciplinesince its origins.
Inthe 19thand early20th centuriesAugusteComte, Marxand Engelsand their follow-
ers, Max Weber, EmileDurkheim,VilfredoPareto, and others treated politicsin larger
social science perspectives, with law-likeregularitiesand necessary relationships.At the
turn of the 20th centuryJohnRobert Seeley and Otto Hintze, MoissayeOstrogorski,and
Roberto Michelsall produced what they considered to be "scientificlaws" of politics-
Seeley and Hintzeon the relationshipbetween external pressureand internalfreedom in
the development of the nation states of Western Europe; Ostrogorski, on the incom-
patibilityof the mass-bureaucratic politicalpartyand democracywhichhe derivedfrom a
.e. tugf
weetw
in
sols A te a tca e t
There were two schools of thought in the 19th and early 20th century social sciences
regardingthe degree or kindof science whichwas possible.The work of AugusteComte,
KarlMarx,and VilfredoPareto makes no distinctionbetween the socialand the "natural"
sciences. Bothgroupsof sciencessoughtuniformities,regularities,laws. On the other hand
the notion of a socialscience whichwould consist of ". .. a closed system of concepts, in
which realityis synthesizedin some sort of permanentlyand universallyvalidclassification,
and from which it can againbe deduced. . ." was viewed as entirelymeaninglessby Max
Weber.
The streamof immeasurable towardseternity.The culturalproblems
eventsflowsunendingly
which move men form themselvesever anew and in differentcolors, and the boundariesof that
streamof concreteeventswhichacquiresmeaningandsignificance
areainthe infinite for us, i.e.
whichbecomesan "historical subjectto change.The intellectual
are constantly
individual" con-
analyzedshift.(1949,80)
texts fromwhichit is viewedandscientifically
The "lawfulness"of humaninteractionis of a differentorder for MaxWeber. The subject
matter of the social sciences-human action-involves value orientation, memory and
learning,which can only yield "soft" regularities,"objective possibilities"and probabili-
In his 1921 manifesto, "The Present State of the Study of Politics," Merriam(1925)
advocated the introductionof psychologicaland sociologicalinsightsinto the study of
politicalinstitutionsand processes, and of the introductionof statisticalmethods in an
effort to enhance the rigorof politicalanalysis.Nowhere in this early call to professional
growth and improvement is there anything approximatinga discussion of scientific
methodology. He proposed to do politicalscience ratherthan talkabout it. And indeed, in
the decades followingat the Universityof Chicago,a research programunfoldedexem-
plifyingMerriam'sstress on empiricalresearch, quantification,and social-psychological
interpretation.The scholarsproduced by this programconstituted a substantialpart of
the nucleusof the post-World War "behavioralmovement."
George Catlinmay have been the firstto speak of a "behavioristtreatment of politics"
(1927, xi), and in his argumentabout a science of politicsseems to dispose of all of those
objections which would differentiatesocial and human subject matters from those of
naturalscience. But he is hardlysanguineabout the prospects of science.
4. 44 0...
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la?t a4?i.
Crick'sattributionof this scientificorientationto Chicago populistsdoes not hold up
when we examine the evidence. One has to read the Tocquevillecorrespondence(1962)
to appreciate how close that brilliantinterpreter of American democracy, a century
before the Chicagoschool saw the lightof day, came to doing an opinion survey in his
travels around the country. As he talked to a steamboat captain on the Mississippi,to
farmers in the interior,to bourgeois dinnercompanionson the eastern seabord, and to
officeholdersin Washington,D.C., samplingthe Americanpopulationwas clearlyon his
mind. KarlMarxdrew up a six-page questionnairefor the study of the livingconditions,
workingconditions,attitudes, and beliefsof the Frenchworkingclass in the early 1880s.A
largenumberof copies were distributedto socialistsand workingclassorganizations.The
data gatheredwere to be used in the forthcominggeneralelection (I 880). InMaxWeber's
working papers for his study of the peasantry in East Prussiathere is evidence that he
plannedand partiallyexecuted a survey of Polishand German peasant attitudes. And in
his study of comparative religion he used a formal two-by-two table-worldliness-
unworldliness,asceticism-mysticism-asa way of generatinghypotheses about the rela-
tionship between religiousethics and economic attitudes.
Most of the important discoveries in the development of statistics were made by
Europeans.La Place and Condorcet were Frenchmen;the Bernoullifamilywere Swiss;
Bayes, Galton, Pearson, and Fisherwere Englishmen;Pareto was an Italian;Markova
Russian.The first "publicchoice" theorist was the Welshman, DuncanBlack(1958). The
view that the quantitativeapproach to social science analysiswas peculiarlyAmerican
doesn't stand up to the historicalrecord. What was peculiarlyAmericanwas the improve-
ment in, and the applicationof, quantitativemethods as in survey research, content
analysis,aggregatestatisticalanalysis,mathematicalmodellingand the like, and the pursuit
in empiricaldepth of psychologicaland sociologicalhypotheses largelygenerated in the
Europeansocial science literature.
74 v4w
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Note
*An earlierversion of this paper was delivered as the DistinguishedSocialScience Lectureat the
Northern IllinoisUniversityat DeKaib,Illinois,on November 13, 1987.
References