On Two Bad Theory Weighing Arguments

I.
Theory debate in LD is much more developed and nuanced than it was just five years ago: the
number of competent theory debaters has ballooned, and as a result, the best theory debaters of
2017 are much better than the best theory debaters of 2012. Curiously, however, several
horrendous theory arguments have gained popularity over the past two seasons or so, even
among the top theory debaters in the country. These theory arguments share structural
similarities with bad theory arguments of seasons past, leading me to think they might represent
new instantiations of our debating and judging norms more so than unique developments in
theory practice.
Ill focus on two arguments in particular. First is neg abuse outweighs aff abuse, which often
appears in aff spike sections like this:
NAOAA: Neg abuse outweighs aff abuse because of the inherent time advantage in
being neg. If I am unfair, it merely compensates for the 7-4-6-3 time skew, proven
empirically. Also, neg can adapt to aff unfairness, but aff cant as easily since I have to
restart in a four-minute 1AR.12
Second is 1AR theory bad, which often appears in 2NR responses to 1AR theory like this:
1ARTB: Reject all 1AR theory because the aff gets a 7-6 advantage on it. Also, the aff
can collapse in the 2AR in response to 2NR choices.3
These two arguments are implausible first because of their assumption that side skew should play
a significant role in the outcomes of theory debates. I generally think the common rejoinders
that debaters affirm and negate an equal number of times, that there is a conceptual distinction
between unfairness caused by a debater and any side-based advantage, etc. are knockdown
responses, but I wont cover them in depth here.
The more subtle mistake is in assuming that standards-level theory weighing should be
preclusive rather than comparative.4 Preclusive weighing says theory arguments of type X have
lexical priority, i.e. they always trump, theory arguments of type Y. Comparative weighing says
theory arguments of type X are more impactful than theory arguments of type Y.5 Often,

1
Variants often include burdens on neg theory, such as neg must weigh any abuse story against the time skew.
This claim is also obviously wrong for some of the reasons I outline in this post.
2
Avid readers of Premier Debate Today will recall ***this post*** where I discussed a similar argument made by
Tyler Gamble at the 2014 Meadows tournament. There I treated the argument as interesting case study, but now its
made its way into the mainstream.
3
Im aware that there is also a common resolvability argument for rejecting 1AR theory on the basis that there are
not enough speeches to compare aff and neg offense. This claim may be distinct from the affirming is harder-style
arguments I provide here, but Im not sure, so Ill leave it alone for the purpose of this post.
4
Thanks to Ollie Sussman for hashing this out in detail in a theory lecture at the Premier17 D.C. camp.
5
To illustrate the difference, consider a scenario where Debater 1 wins that there are 10 units of unfairness caused
by a type X abuse, and Debater 2 wins that there are 100 units of unfairness caused by a type Y abuse. A preclusive
weighing argument would dictate that Debater 1 wins because type X always trumps type Y. A comparative
preclusive weighing arguments are merely dressed-up comparative weighing arguments. In the
context of standards-level weighing, a comparative argument might be:
Comparative: Ground outweighs predictability because knowing the arguments ahead of
time doesnt help unless I have the ground to respond to them.
This is an okay weighing argument. It doesnt take into account the specific ground loss or
predictability, but its cogent and judges have voted on far worse. To gain a tactical edge,
however, debaters make the same argument with hyperbolic language and a preclusive prong.
For example:
Preclusive: Ground precludes predictability because knowing the arguments ahead of
time is utterly useless unless I have the ground to respond to them. [Preclusive prong:] So
any amount of ground loss (under their interpretation) outweighs any amount of
unpredictability (under my interpretation).
This type of weighing was common on the standards level many years ago, and bad camp theory
files often included long blocks on predictability outweighs ground, clash outweighs time
skew, etc. These arguments phrased comparatively are weak because of their lack of specificity;
phrased preclusively theyre downright awful. I should not have to justify that ground and
predictability are both important for their impacts to fairness, and one does not always trump the
other.
NAOAA and 1ARTB make two errors related to the preclusive-comparative divide. First, they
almost never justify the preclusive prong of the argument. There should be independent
justification for why the weighing argument is preclusive. More plausible preclusive arguments
include theory before substance, metatheory before theory, and fairness before education. Each
of these weighing arguments has a strong conceptual reason justifying preclusion; they
argue that theory arguments of type X and different in kind from theory arguments of type
Y, not merely different in degree.
Second, NAOAA and 1ARTB rarely justify the preclusive prong because there simply is no
good justification for it. Consider these two reductio ad absurdum scenarios:
Debater 1 reads a blatantly non-topical aff. Say the topic is the UBI and the aff justifies
animal rights. Debater 2 reads topicality and a counterplan with a solvency advocate who
defends something slightly different than the counterplan, so the position is admittedly
slightly unpredictable. Debater 1 extends NAOAA from the aff, claiming solvency
advocate theory precludes topicality.
Debater 1 reads a conditional agent counterplan, a conditional process counterplan, the
epistemic skepticism NC, the non-cognitivism NC, a conditional kritik alternative
fiating the end of capitalism, a discourse kritik, and several blippy procedural theory
arguments hidden in the line-by-line of the refutation on the aff. Debater 2 reads theory

weighing argument might provide an impact magnifier of sorts for type X, so the 10 units should count as 20 or 50
or 90 units, but Debater 2 likely still wins. I use fairness here, but the same could be said of education impacts.
 on whichever of these you find most objectionable. Debater 1 says 1ARTB, claiming any
one of the blippy procedurals precludes the 1AR theory argument.
There is no good argument for why Debater 1 should win, even if the underlying justification for
NAOAA and 1ARTB are true. Suppose it is harder to affirm and harder to beat 1AR theory than
NC theory/topicality. Even granting that these should have theoretical import, the magnitude of
the unfairness caused by Debater 1 is so clearly greater that barring gross incompetence by
Debater 2, the debates are easy to decide.
The deeper argument against the preclusive reading of NAOAA and 1ARTB is that there is no
conceptual distinction between aff and neg theory arguments nor 1NC and 1AR theory. If the
time skew is real and relevant, it merely provides a comparative argument for one over the other.
All else being equal, the aff had a harder time and should win the theory debate. But in the
scenarios above, as in nearly all theory debates, all else is not equal. We can compare the internal
links to fairness. Perhaps the debate does come down to time skew weighing, but there is nothing
magical about time skew, as compared to ground or predictability loss, e.g., that should mandate
such an outcome.
II.
So why do debaters continue to argue NAOAA and 1ARTB preclusively? And why do judges
continue to vote on them argued as such?
For one, these arguments are familiar. They take the same form as bad preclusive weighing of
theory debates past, e.g. ground always trumps predictability, which debaters are accustomed to
arguing and judges are accustomed to voting on. Two, theyre easy. Extending a dropped
NAOAA spike is a lazy way to get out of a messy theory debate, so if judges will vote on it,
debaters will continue to argue it. Worst case scenario, as with many spikes, the time lost on
extending the bad argument is worth it for the potential upside.
To combat these strategies, debaters should of course make conceptual arguments for why time
skew itself is not a valid justification for theory weighing. Debaters should also argue that time
skew must always be weighed comparatively against the unfairness claimed by their theory
argument. Time skew is not conceptually distinct from ground or predictability and should not be
treated as such. Debaters who make these arguments will win because more often than not, the
preclusive prong is unjustified, and an opponent argument for it in the next speech would be a
new implication of the argument.
Judges should treat these arguments for what their worth, which is not very much. If the
preclusive prong is unjustified, then a debaters rhetoric, stating that all abuse of type X
precludes all abuse of type Y, shouldnt matter. My warming impact always outweighs their
econ impact because the environment is interconnected isnt any more legitimate in the face of
good case defense than aff abuse outweighs neg abuse in the face of a plausible competing
theory argument. Judges should also be more willing to evaluate embedded clash. Two
competing theory arguments beg for comparison. A poor weighing argument extended on one
flow doesnt justify ignoring another flow entirely.