Professional Documents
Culture Documents
POLITICAL LAW Bar Review Guide 2017 Professor Alexis Medina
POLITICAL LAW Bar Review Guide 2017 Professor Alexis Medina
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Actual case requirement: Proposed bills do not present a justiciable
controversy: One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of
judicial review is the existence of an actual controversy. This means that there
must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. A proposed bill does not present an
actual justiciable controversy. The filing of bills is within the legislative power
of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint. Also, the judiciary cannot
speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress
may or may not pass. (In The Matter Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movements v. Abolition of Judiciary
Development Fund and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21,
2015)
1 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of
Law; Valedictorian, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine Representative to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Preparatory Committee Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland,
2014); Litigation Lawyer & Transaction Adviser on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs); Professor of Constitutional Law,
San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila,
College of Law; former professor of Constitutional Law, New Ear University, College of Law, Quezon City; Bar Review
Lecturer, Recoletos Review Center, Manila; Partner, Libra Law (Libarios & Partners)
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speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected
speech. As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes
that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct.
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine
is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a
facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. The most distinctive
feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of
the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant
claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant
prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and
can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give
way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that
the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of
the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect
on the speech of those third parties. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)
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violates the constitutional prohibition on legislators intervention on matters
where he may be called upon to act. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R.
No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
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the transfers "to augment any item in this Act", and the effect was that the
2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed the transfer of funds to augment any item in the
GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive,
contravention of the Constitution. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014)
The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not
necessarily savings. Savings are realized only when the purpose for which the
funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had
ceased to exist. Funds described as unreleased or unalloted are not
necessarily savings. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not
transferred to augment existing items in the GAA. There must be an existing
item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation
to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. The
power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent items in the GAA.
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid for because some of the
transfers of appropriation were not made to their respective offices. Cross-
border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited. (Araullo v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
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The Ombudsmans administrative disciplinary authority: The
Ombudsman can impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee: The
Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government, with the exception only of impeachable
officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary: The Ombudsman has the
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsmans
power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only
grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court.
Under RA 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman was given disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers,
members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any
officer under its authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants.
It is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly
impose administrative sanctions. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R.
No. 165132, March 7, 2012)
JBC can set standards for choosing nominees to the judiciary: JBCs
policy of requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they
can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional. The JBC has
the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required
by the Constitution and law for every position. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
NATIONAL ECONOMY
POLICE POWER
Police power and taking of property: The State may not, under the
guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the
community. The requirement under the ordinance for owners of educational
institutions to build their fences six meters back for beautification purposes is
invalid for being unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the
respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes.
(Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
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Test for a valid exercise of police power: There must be reasonable
relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment. The means employed must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the government purpose. Limiting the
height of fences of private properties to one meter and requiring fences in
excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru has no reasonable relation to
its purpose of ensuring public safety and security. The ordinance is thus an
invalid exercise of police power. Compelling the respondents to construct their
fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment
on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how
best to protect their property. (Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No.
161107, March 12, 2013)
EMINENT DOMAIN
Even if the government taking was in 1940, and the action for payment
of just compensation was only filed in 1995, the reckoning point for
determining just compensation is still the value of the property at the time of
taking. Thus, just compensation should be fixed not as of the time of payment
but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940, even though this valuation appears
outdated. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v.
Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)
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"just compensation" to them because their property would not be taken by
NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR
should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights
from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the
possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages. (Republic
v. Borbon, G.R. No. 165354, January 12, 2015)
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE SPEECH
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Violation of the right to suffrage: The COMELECs aggregate time-limit
rule [rule limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one
hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes for
political campaigns or advertisements] violate the peoples right to suffrage by
restricting the right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent
exercise of their right to determine their own destiny. (GMA Network v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)
Why the Comelec prohibition on posting of an election campaign
material during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and
transport terminals is void: The Comelec prohibition on posting of an election
campaign material during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs)
and transport terminals --constitutes a prior restraint on the right to free
expression. Prior restraints are presumed invalid. (1-United Transport Koalisyon
[1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)
Honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are
insulated from libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press
prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The raison d' tre for
the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of official conduct to
guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments
would lead to self-censorship. A "public figure" as defined in Ayers Production
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Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong refers to celebrity. It includes, in short, anyone who has
arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a
person. (Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999)
The actual malice rule applies even if the person subject of criticism
is not a public figure, for as long as he is involved in a public issue: But
even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position
he occupied would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow
that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not
a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was
involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest,
it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to
become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus
is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of
the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. (Borjal v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999)
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reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. (Sales v. People,
G.R. No. 191023, February 06, 2013)
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Police presence at the scene not required in a hot pursuit arrest: In
a hot pursuit arrest, police presence at the scene while the crime was being
committed is not required. It is enough that evidence of the recent commission
of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe,
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No.
182601, November 10, 2014)
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Determining violation of the right to privacy: Reasonable
expectation of privacy test: The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
should be used to determine whether there is a violation of the right to privacy.
The reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part
test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of
privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
(Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
Surveillance cameras should not pry into or cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736,
June 26, 2013)
Expectation of privacy and use of privacy tools in Facebook: To have
an expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show intention to
keep certain posts private through the use of privacy tools. A Facebook user
who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her
post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which
necessarily accompanies said choice. (Vivares v. St. Theresas College, G.R. No.
202666, September 29, 2014)
Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the
writ of habeas data to be granted. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24,
2012)
RIGHT TO BAIL
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Access to information on the winning bidder for a government
project: The peoples constitutional right to information is intertwined with the
governments constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest. The people have the right to access the papers and
documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the winning
bidder for a government project. (Initiatives For Dialogue And Empowerment
Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)
LIBERTY OF ABODE
When evictions and demolitions without any court order are valid:
The Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted
nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner. RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases
where persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons occupy areas
where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to
be implemented. To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a
just and humane manner, RA 7279 commands requires compliance with a
prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders, including
prior 30-day notice and adequate consultation. Evictions and demolitions
without any court order under RA 7279 are valid. (Kalipunan Ang Damay Ang
Mahihirap v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014)
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Academic freedom gives institutions of higher learning the right to
impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel
students who violate disciplinary rules. The power to discipline students is
subsumed in the academic freedom to determine what may be taught, how it
shall be taught and who may be admitted to study. (Cudia v. The
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February
24, 2015)
WRIT OF AMPARO
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to
be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed
forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as
a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Right to counsel not imperative in administrative proceedings: In an
administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services
of counsel. As such, the right to counsel is not imperative. Thus, there is
nothing objectionable in the denial by an adjudicating body of a request to
reschedule an administrative conference because the counsel for the
respondent would not be available. In an administrative proceeding like that
conducted against the petitioner, a respondent has the option of engaging the
services of counsel. As such, the right to counsel is not imperative because
administrative investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service. (Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013)
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judicial discretion and judgment. (Encinas v. PO1 Agustin and PO1 Caubang,
G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013)
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee
on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one-year period. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives,
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011)
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term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected
for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from
an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned by the President. [W]hen a doctrine of
this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the
old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
Nepotism: The prohibition against nepotism applies to appointments
made by a group of individuals acting as a body. A relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of a member of the body that is the
appointing authority (such as the Civil Service Commission) cannot be
appointed by such body. (Civil Service Commission v. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103,
April 23, 2014)
The Arias Doctrine will not apply if the documents in question bore
irregularities too evident too ignore. In such case, the head of office must
exercise a higher degree of circumspection, and go beyond what their
subordinates had prepared. (Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31,
2013)
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The Arias Doctrine applies only to heads of offices, not to public officials
whose duty is to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to
sign it. (Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013) The
Arias Doctrine applies only where the head of an office is being held to answer
for his act of relying on the acts of his subordinate. It is not applicable when
the head of an office is being held liable for relying on other independent
offices. (Jaca v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013)
De facto Officers: Acts are valid and binding: One who is in possession
of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, meaning an
authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, is a de
facto officer. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally
appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired. (Funa v.
Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
The actions of a de facto officer are valid for all purposes as those of
a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons are concerned: A
de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an
office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that
the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as
the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. (Funa v.
Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
ELECTION LAW
Biometrics validation as part of the registration process is not a
"qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of
the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably
regulate: Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge against
the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, including
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013. As non-compliance with
the same results in the penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has
risen to the level of an unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise
of the right of suffrage. They submit that the statutory requirement of biometric
validation is no different from the unconstitutional requirement of literacy and
property because mere non-validation already absolutely curtails the exercise
of the right of suffrage through deactivation. Further, they advance the
argument that deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated as a
valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage under the 1987 Constitution. The
contestation is untenable.
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procedural requirement which does not fall under the limitation that "[n]o
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage." The requirement of biometrics validation for voters is not
a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage.
For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable
element in the election process. The State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its
inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election. (Kabataan Party List v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221318, December
16, 2015)
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The mere act of running for public offices does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)
Subjective non-legal standards (such as, a man of stature does not live
in a dilapidated house or a feedmill) cannot be used to determine residence.
(Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014)
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The Mayor has the power to demolish illegal constructions after due
process: Under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the Local Government Code, insofar as
illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition. This
power is separate and distinct from the power to summarily abate
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nuisances per se. (Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356,
September 29, 2014)
INTERNATIONAL LAW
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that
their principles are not binding. Their principles are binding as generally
accepted principles of international law. "Generally accepted principles of
international law" are based not only on international custom, but also on
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. (Poe-Llamanzares v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
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