PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 164702 March 15, 2006
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) and BUTIL FARMERS PARTY
(BUTIL), Petitioners, - versus - THE HON. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), represented by its HON.
CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR.,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
The petition at bar involves the formula for computing the additional
seats due, if any, for winners in party-list elections.
The antecedents are undisputed.
Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent
COMELEC regarding the formula to be adopted in computing the
additional seats for the party-list winners in the May 10,
2004 elections. In response, the respondent Commission issued
Resolution No. 6835,[1] adopting the simplified formula of "one
additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list
votes." The resolution reads:
Considering that the simplified formula has long been
the one adopted by the Commission and is now the formula of
choice of the Supreme Court in its latest resolution on the
matter, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to adopt the simplified formula of one additional seat per
additional two percent of the total party-list votes in the
proclamation of the party-list winners in the coming May
10, 2004 National and Local Elections.[2] (emphasis supplied)
In finding that this simplified formula is the "formula of choice of the
Supreme Court," respondent Commission quoted the memorandum
of Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, Commissioner-In-Charge for
Party-List concerns, viz:
By way of review, following is a highlight of the legal
discourse on the two [percent] vote requirement for the
party-list system and the corollary issue on additional seat
allocation.
Section 11(b) and Section 12 of R.A. 7941 (Party-List
System Act) provide that "the parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each, provided that those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes xxx. The
COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank
them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately
according to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system."
These provisions of [the] statute were transformed into the
following formulas by the Supreme Court in Veterans
Federation Party vs. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 136781, 136786
& 136795, October 6, 2000).
For the party-list candidate garnering the highest
number of votes, the following formula was adopted:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
----------------------------------- = party relative to total votes
1
Total votes for party-list system for the party-list system
And for the additional seats of other parties who reached
the required two percent mark, the following formula
applies:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional for
concerned = --------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of first the first party
The applicability of these formulas was reiterated in the
June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Supreme Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R.
No. 147589) and Bayan Muna vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No.
147613) penned by Justice Artemio Panganiban, wherein
the Court declared that party-list BUHAY was not entitled
to an additional seat even if it garnered 4.46 [percent] of
the total party-list votes, contrary to BUHAY's contention
which was based on the COMELEC simplified formula of
one additional seat per an additional two percent of the
total party-list votes.
However, on November 10, 2003,[3] the Supreme Court
promulgated a Resolution in the same case, this time
penned by Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.,
granting BUHAY's motion for reconsideration of the June
25, 2003 Resolution, to wit:
It is thus established in the Resolution of 25 June
2003 that, like APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and
AKBAYAN, BUHAY had obtained more than four
percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly
cast for the party-list system and obtained more
than 0.50 for the additional seats. Accordingly,
just like the first four whose additional nominees
are now holding office as member of the House of
Representatives, BUHAY should be declared
entitled to one additional seat.
Effectively, the Supreme Court, with Justices Jose Vitug
and Panganiban registering separate opinions, adopted
the simplified COMELEC formula of one additional seat
per additional two percent of the total party-list votes
garnered when it declared BUHAY entitled to one
additional seat and proceeded to order the COMELEC to
proclaim BUHAY's second nominee.[4] (emphasis
supplied)
Party-List Canvass Report No. 20 [5] showed that the total number of
votes cast for all the party-list participants in the May 10, 2004
elections was 12,721,952 and the following parties, organizations
and coalitions received at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system, to wit:
Rank Party-List Group Votes Percentage to
Received Total Votes
Cast (%)
1 Bayan Muna (BAYAN MUNA) 1,203,305 9.4585
2 Association of Philippine Electric 934,995 7.3495
Cooperatives (APEC)
3 Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party 852,473 6.7008
(AKBAYAN!)
4 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong(BUHAY) 705,730 5.5473
5 Anakpawis (AP) 538,396 4.2320
6 Citizen's Battle Against Corruption 495,193 3.8924
(CIBAC)
7 Gabriela Women's Party 464,586 3.6518
(GABRIELA)
8 Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) 448,072 3.5220 ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN) - 1 seat
9 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL) 429,259 3.3742 Mujiv S. Hataman[7]
10 Alliance of Volunteer Educators 343,498 2.7000
(AVE) Subsequently, ALIF was also proclaimed as "duly-elected party-list
11 Alagad (ALAGAD) 340,977 2.6802 participant and its nominee, Hadji Acmad M. Tomawis, as elected
representative to the House of Representatives." [8]
12 Veterans Freedom Party (VFP) 340,759 2.6785
13 Cooperative Natcco Network Party 270,950 2.1298
(COOP-NATCCO) On June 22, 2004, petitioners PM and BUTIL, together with CIBAC,
filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation [9] with the
14 Anak Mindanao (AMIN) 269,750 2.1204
respondent Commission en banc. They prayed that they be declared
15 Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino 269,345 2.1172 as entitled to one (1) additional seat each and their respective
(ALIF) second nominees be proclaimed as duly elected members of the
16 An Waray (AN WARAY) 268,164 2.1079 House of Representatives. As basis, they cited the formula used by
the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,
Based on the simplified formula, respondent Commission [10]
viz:
issued Resolution No. NBC 04-004 [6] proclaiming the following
parties, organizations and coalition as winners and their qualified Votes Cast for
nominees as representatives to the House of Representatives: Qualified Party Allotted Seats
Additional Seats = ------------------------------ x for First Party
BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA) - 3 seats Votes Cast for First Party
1. Saturnino C. Ocampo
2. Teodoro A. Casio, Jr. On June 25, 2004, petitioners and CIBAC filed a Supplement to the
3. Joel G. Virador Joint Motion (For Immediate Proclamation) [11] to justify their
entitlement to an additional seat, as follows:
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
(APEC) - 3 seats 5. To compute the additional seats that movants are
1. Edgar L. Valdez entitled to using the Veterans formula of the Supreme Court
2. Ernesto G. Pablo in the aforesaid Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
3. Sunny Rose A. Madamba Party and Bayan Muna cases, and Party List Canvass
Report No. 20, the following process is done: Bayan Muna is
AKBAYAN! CITIZEN'S ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!) - 3 seats the "First Party" with 1,203,305 votes.To determine the
1. Loreta Ann P. Rosales number of seats allocated to the first party, we use
2. Mario Joyo Aguja the Veterans formula, to wit:
3. Ana Theresa Hontiveros-Baraquel
Proportion of votes
BUHAY HAYAAN YUMABONG (BUHAY) - 2 seats of first party relative
1. Rene M. Velarde ---------------------- = to total votes for
2. Hans Christian M. Seeres Total votes for party-list system
party-list system
ANAKPAWIS (AP) - 2 seats
1. Crispin B. Beltran
2. Rafael V. Mariano Applying this formula, we arrive at
9.4585%
CITIZEN'S BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) - 1 seat
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva 1,203,305
-------------- = 9.4585%
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY (GABRIELA) - 1 seat 12,721,952
Liza Largoza-Maza
6. Having obtained 9.4585%, the first
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) - 1 seat party, Bayan Muna, is allotted three (3) seats.
Renato B. Magtubo
7. The number of additional seats that
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL) - 1 seat the movants are entitled to are determined as
Benjamin A. Cruz follows:

ALLIANCE OF VOLUNTEER EDUCATORS (AVE) - 1 seat

Votes Cast for
Eulogio R. Magsaysay
Qualifie
d Party
ALAGAD (ALAGAD) - 1 seat
Additional
xxx
Seats = ------------------ x Allotted Seats
Votes Cast for for First Party
VETERANS FREEDOM PARTY (VFP) - 1 seat
First Party
Ernesto S. Gidaya
For BUTIL, the computation is as follows:
COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO)
429,259
- 1 seat
Additional Seats = ------------- x 3 = 1.0701
Guillermo P. Cua
1,203,305
AN WARAY (AN WARAY) - 1 seat
Florencio G. Noel
For CIBAC, the computation is:
495,193

2
 Additional Seats = ------------- x 3 = 1.2345
1,203,305
For PM, the computation is:
448,072
Additional Seats = ------------- x 3 = 1.1171
1,203,305
8. All the foregoing results are greater than one (1);
therefore, the movant-party list organizations are entitled
to one (1) additional seat each.[12]
On July 31, 2004, respondent Commission en banc, issued Resolution
No. NBC 04-011,[13] viz:
This pertains to the 06 July 2004 Memorandum of the
Supervisory Committee, National Board of Canvassers,
submitting its comment/recommendation on the petition
filed by Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Citizens Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC), Partido ng Manggagawa (PM)
and Gabriela Women's Party for additional seat and to
immediately proclaim their respective second nominees to
the House of Representatives, and the letter of Atty.
Ivy Perucho, Legal counsel of the CIBAC, relative to the Joint
Motion for Immediate Proclamation filed by BUTIL, CIBAC,
PM requesting to calendar for resolution the said Joint
Motion.
The Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee reads:
"This has reference to the Urgent Motion for Resolution (re:
Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation dated 22 June
2004) filed on July 1, 2004 by movantsLuzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)
and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), NBC Case No. 04-197
(195) and a similar motion filed by party-list Gabriela
Women's Party (NBC No. 04-200) through counsel, praying
to declare that the herein movants are entitled to one (1)
additional seat each, and to immediately proclaim the
second nominees, to wit: x x x
The Supreme Court, in its latest Resolution promulgated
on November 10, 2003 (sic) in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party vs. Comelec, et al. (G.R. No. 147589)
and Bayan Muna vs. Comelec, et al. (G.R. No. 147613),
laid down a simplified formula of one additional seat
per additional two (2) percent of the total party list
votes.
The same simplified formula was adopted by the
Commission in its Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08
May 2004, to quote:
"The additional seats of other parties who reached the
required two percent mark, the following formula
applies:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of
additional for
concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated
to party No. of votes of the first party first
party
The aforenamed party-list organizations
have not obtained the required additional
two (2) percent of the total party-list votes for
them to merit an additional seat.
3
For your Honors' consideration."
xxx
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES, to direct the Supervisory
Committee to cause the re-tabulation of the votes for
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Luzon
Farmers Party (BUTIL), Partido ng Manggagawa (PM)
and Gabriela Women's Party (Gabriela) and to submit
its comment/recommendation, together with the
tabulated figures of the foregoing parties, for
appropriate action of the Commission.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution
and to furnish copies hereof to the parties concerned for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.[14] (emphases supplied)
For failure of the respondent Commission to resolve the substantive
issues raised by petitioners and to cause the re-tabulation of the
party-list votes despite the lapse of time, petitioners PM and BUTIL
filed the instant petition on August 18, 2004. They seek the issuance
of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Commission: a) to
convene as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List
System; b) to declare them as entitled to one (1) additional seat each;
c) to immediately proclaim their respective second nominees; d) to
declare other similarly situated party-list organizations as entitled to
one (1) additional seat each; and e) to immediately proclaim
similarly situated parties' second nominees as duly elected
representatives to the House of Representatives. [15] They submit as
sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC, AS
THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR THE PARTY-
LIST SYSTEM, COULD BE COMPELLED BY THE
HONORABLE COURT TO MECHANICALLY APPLY THE
FORMULA STATED IN ITS 25 JUNE 2003 RESOLUTION
REITERATED IN THE 20 NOVEMBER 2003 RESOLUTION
IN ANG BAGONG BAYANI CASES IN THE DETERMINATION
OF QUALIFIED PARTY-LIST ORGANIZATIONS AND IN THE
PROCLAMATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NOMINEES.[16]
We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent Commission,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, submits that petitioners'
recourse to a petition for mandamuswith this Court is improper. It
raises the following procedural issues: (a) the proper remedy from
the assailed resolution of the respondent Commission is a petition
for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; (b) the instant
action was filed out of time; and (c) failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed resolution with the respondent
Commission is fatal to petitioners' action. [17]
In assailing petitioners' recourse to a petition for mandamus,
respondent Commission relies on Section 7, Article IX(A) of the 1987
Constitution which provides that "any decision, order or ruling" of
the respondent Commission "may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of
a copy thereof." It contends that in Aratuc v. COMELEC[18] and Dario
v. Mison,[19] this provision was construed as the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 and not the appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45. Respondent Commission further contends that its duty to
proclaim the second nominees of PM and BUTIL is not ministerial but
discretionary, hence, it is not subject to the writ of mandamus.
The arguments fail to impress.
Under the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.[20] We have
consistently ruled that where the duty of the respondent Commission
is ministerial, mandamus lies to compel its performance. [21] A purely
ministerial act, as distinguished from a discretionary act, is one which
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.[22]
The case at bar is one of mandamus over which this Court has
jurisdiction for it is respondent Commission's ministerial duty to
apply the formula as decided by this Court after interpreting the
existing law on party-list representation. It is given that this Court
has the ultimate authority to interpret laws and the Constitution.
[23]
Respondent Commission has no discretion to refuse enforcement
of any decision of this Court under any guise or guile.
In any event, it is the averments in the complaint, and not the
nomenclature given by the parties, that determine the nature of the
action.[24] Though captioned as a Petition for Mandamus, the same
may be treated as a petition for certiorari and mandamus considering
that it alleges that the respondent Commission acted contrary to
prevailingjurisprudence, hence, with grave abuse of discretion and wi
thout jurisdiction. In previous rulings,[25] we have treated differently
labeled actions as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for
reasons such as "justice, equity and fairplay"[26] and "novelty of the
issue presented and its far-reaching effects." [27] The petition at bar
involves the rightful representation in the House of Representatives
of the marginalized groups by the party-list winners and their
constitutional claim merits more than a disposition based on thin
technicality.
Next, respondent Commission contends that the petition at bar was
filed belatedly. Under Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution and
Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the instant petition must be
filed within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of the
decision, order or ruling to be reviewed. Since more than 30 days
have lapsed from the time PM and BUTIL allegedly received notice of
respondent Commission's Resolution No. 6835, it is urged that the
instant petition was filed out of time. [28]
Again, the contention is without merit.
We have interpreted Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution and
Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court to mean final orders, rulings
and decisions of the respondent Commission rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. [29] Before
resolving whether Resolution No. 6835 was rendered in the exercise
of respondent Commission's adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers,
we recapitulate the pertinent events.
On May 8, 2004, respondent Commission issued Resolution No.
6835. On June 2, 2004, it also issued Resolution No. NBC 04-004
holding petitioners entitled to only one (1) nominee each on the
basis of Resolution No. 6835. On June 22, 2004, petitioners filed a
Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation with party-list co-
participant CIBAC, claiming entitlement to an additional seat using
the formula stated in Ang Bagong Bayani. Thereafter, they filed their
Supplement to the Joint Motion (For Immediate
Proclamation). On July 1, 2004, they filed an Urgent Motion for
Resolution (Re: Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation dated 22
June 2004) and again, on July 12, 2004, they filed their Motion to
Resolve (Re: Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation filed on 22
June 2004). In response, respondent Commission en banc issued
Resolution No. NBC 04-011 quoted above, which directed the
Supervisory Committee "to cause the re-tabulation of the votes" of
CIBAC, GABRIELA and petitioners PM and BUTIL. The resolution
referred to the Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee which
adopted the simplified formula in Resolution No. 6835. Without
further ado, petitioners BUTIL and PM filed the instant petition
on August 18, 2004 or eighteen (18) days after the promulgation of
Resolution No. NBC 04-011. Clearly, the instant petition was timely
4
filed. We hold that Resolution No. 6835 was not rendered in the
exercise of respondent COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers. Its
issuance was not brought about by a matter or case filed before the
respondent Commission. Rather, it was issued by the respondent
Commission in the exercise of its administrative function to enforce
and administer election laws to ensure an orderly election.
Finally, respondent Commission contends that petitioners' failure to
file a motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6835 is fatal.
Again, the argument is without merit.
Under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a
motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, order or decision of
the respondent Commission is not allowed. Moreover, the issue of
what formula applies in determining the additional seats to be
allocated to party-list winners is a pure question of law that is a
recognized exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.[30]
We shall now resolve the substantive issue: the formula for
computing the additional seats due, if any, for winners in party-list
elections.
Petitioners cite the formula crafted by the Court in the landmark case
of Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC.[31] They allege that the
June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v.
COMELEC[32] "reiterated that the additional seats for qualified party-
list organizations shall be computed in accordance with the above
formula in Veterans" and that the November 20, 2003
Resolution[33] of the Court in the same case "had not departed from
its 25 June 2003 Resolution."[34]
A review of the pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence on the
party-list system is appropriate.
The Constitution provides:
Art. VI, Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations. (emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the Constitution's mandate, Congress enacted R.A. No.
7941, also known as the "Party-List System Act," to "promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system." The law
provides as follows:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.-- xxx
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,
the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in the proportion of their total number of
 votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives.-- The COMELEC shall tally all the votes
for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis, rank them according to the number
of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as
against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system. (emphases supplied)
These provisions on the party-list system were put to test in the May
11, 1998 elections. In the landmark case of Veterans,[35] several
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for
the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary
injunction, were filed by some parties and organizations that had
obtained at least two percent of the total party-list votes cast in the
May 11, 1998 party-list elections, against COMELEC and 38 other
parties, organizations and coalitions which had been declared by
COMELEC as entitled to party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The following issues were raised: 1) whether the
twenty percent constitutional allocation is mandatory; 2) whether
the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit under
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is constitutional; and 3) how the
additional seats of a qualified party should be determined. In said
case, the Court set the "four inviolable parameters" of the party-list
system under the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, to wit:
First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party
list.
Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat
in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless
of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number of votes."
Likewise, the Court spelled out the formula for allocating the seats for
party-list winners, thus:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the
public and the private respondents, as well as the members
of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they each received. Then the ratio for each party is
computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all
the parties participating in the system. All parties with at
least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving
the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be
referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of
seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is
5
based on proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed
that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.
xxx
Now, how do we determine the number of seats
the first party is entitled to? x x x The formula x x x is as
follows:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to Total votes
for total votes for party-list system Party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party
without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the
total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the
first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total
of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a
rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but
less than six percent, then the first party shall have one
additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is
less than four percent, then the first party shall not be
entitled to any additional seat.
xxx
Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of
additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation. The
formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of concerned party
----------------------
Total No. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system for
concerned = -------------------------- x No. of additional
party No. of votes of seats allocated first party to the
first party
----------------------
Total No. of votes for party-list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of Additional seats concerned party
for concerned = ------------------------ x No. of
additional party No. of votes of seats allocated
first party to the first party[36]
(emphases supplied)
Applying this formula, the Court found the outcome of the May 11,
1998 party-list elections as follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial Additional Seats Total
Garnered Total No. of Votes Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646/503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500/503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802/503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184/503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042/503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303/503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE!PINAY 235,548 2.57% 1 235,548/503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376/503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643/503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617/503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802/503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388/503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1[37] First Party

The case of Ang Bagong Bayani arose during the May 14, 290,760
2001 party-list elections. Two petitions for certiorari were filed by = ------------- x 3
several party-list candidates: (a) to challenge a resolution of the 1,708,253
COMELEC approving the participation of some 154 organizations
and parties in the May 14, 2001 party-list elections; and (b) to = 0.51
disqualify certain parties classified as "political parties" and
"organizations/coalitions" by COMELEC. In a Decision dated June 26,
2001, the Court established the eight-point guideline [38] for the Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any
screening of party-list participants. The case was then remanded to additional seat. It is entitled to only one qualifying seat
the COMELEC for the immediate conduct of summary evidentiary like all the other qualified parties that are ranked below it,
hearings to implement the eight-point guideline. as shown in Table No. 3:

In due time, COMELEC submitted its compliance reports to the Table No. 3
Court. Based on the compliance reports, the Court issued several
resolutions proclaiming BAYAN MUNA with its three nominees and Rank Party-list Votes Percentage Additional
AKBAYAN!, BUTIL, APEC and CIBAC, with one nominee each, as (%) Seats
party-list winners.[39] 2 APEC 802,060 12.29 n/c
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79 n/c
Subsequently, several motions for proclamation were filed by other 4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06 n/c
party-list participants. In resolving the motions, the Court had to 5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96 n/c
consider, among others, the effect of the disqualification after the 6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46 0.51
elections of many party-list participants to the total votes cast for the 7 AMIN 252,051 3.86 0.44
party-list elections. In the previous case of Labo v. COMELEC,[40] this 8 ABA 242,199 3.71 0.42
Court ruled that the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified 9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51 0.40
candidate cannot be considered "stray" except when the electorate is 10 PM 216,823 3.32 0.38
fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31 0.26
bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but nonetheless
cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In its Resolution 12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07 0.24
dated June 25, 2003, the Court held that the Labo doctrine cannot
be applied to the party-list system in view of Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 7941 The additional seats for APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC, if any,
which expressly provides that the votes cast for a party, were not determined in the Court's Resolution dated June 25, 2003,
a sectoral organization or a coalition "not entitled to be voted for as there was a separate pending motion filed by BAYAN MUNA to set
shall not be counted." The Court then proceeded to determine the aside the resolution of the COMELEC proclaiming APEC, AKBAYAN!,
number of nominees the party-list winners were entitled, thus: [41] BUTIL and CIBAC's respective additional nominees.
We shall now determine the number of nominees each
winning party is entitled to, in accordance with the Dissatisfied by the Court's June 25, 2003 Resolution, BUHAY filed a
formula in Veterans. For purposes of determining the motion to have it declared as entitled to one (1) additional
number of its nominees, BAYAN MUNA (the party that seat. On November 20, 2003, in the same case of Ang
obtained the highest number of votes) is considered the Bagong Bayani,[42] the Court computed the additional seats for
first party. The applicable formula is as follows: APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC in accordance with the formula
stated in the Court's Resolution dated June 25, 2003, and found the
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first results as follows:
------------------------------------- = party relative to total
votes APEC -- 1.40
AKBAYAN -- 0.66
Total votes for party-list system for party-list system BUTIL -- 0.58
CIBAC -- 0.56
Applying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent:
Then, the Court resolved pro hac vice to grant BUHAY's motion,
reasoning that:
xxx
It is thus established in the Resolution of 25 June 2003 that,
Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is like APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN, BUHAY had
entitled to three (3) seats. This finding is pursuant to obtained more than four percent (4%) of the total number
our ruling in Veterans x x x. of votes validly cast for the party-list system and obtained
more than 0.50 for the additional seats. Accordingly, just
xxx like the first four whose additional nominees are now
holding office as member of the House of Representatives,
[W]e shall compute only the additional seat or seats to be BUHAY should be declared entitled to additional seat. [43]
allocated, if any, to the other qualified parties -- BUHAY,
AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY. In light of all these antecedents, we deny the petition.

Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we The formula in the landmark case of Veterans prevails.
arrive at 0.51:
First, the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang
Votes Cast for Qualified Party Additional Bagong Bayani referred to the Veterans case in determining the
Seats = ------------------- x Allotted Seats Votes Cast number of seats due for the party-list winners.The footnote on said
for for First Party resolution in computing the additional seats for the party-list
winners states: "[f]or a discussion of how to

6
compute additional nominees for parties other than the first,
see Veterans, supra, at pp. 280-282. x x x."[44] The Court likewise held
that:
We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the
formulas devised in Veterans for computing the
number of nominees that the party-list winners are
entitled to cannot be disregarded by the concerned
agencies of government, especially the Commission on
Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of
seats allocated to the winning party-list candidates
conform to the principle of proportional
representation mandated by the law.[45] (emphases
supplied)
Second, in the November 20, 2003 Resolution in Ang
Bagong Bayani, the Court gave an additional seat to BUHAY only
because it was similarly situated to APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and
AKBAYAN which "had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the
total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system and
obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats." Well to note, the
grant of an additional seat to BUHAY was pro hac vice, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby
RESOLVES, pro hac vice
1. To consider closed and terminated the issue
regarding the proclamation by the COMELEC of
the additional nominees of APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC
and AKBAYAN, such nominees having taken
their oath and assumed office;
2. To DECLARE that BUHAY is entitled to one (1)
additional seat in the party-list system in the
elections of May 2001 and;
3. To ORDER the COMELEC to
proclaim BUHAY's second nominee.
SO ORDERED.[46] (emphasis supplied)
Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular
occasion."[47] A ruling expressly qualified as pro hac vice cannot be
relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. It was therefore
erroneous for respondent Commission to apply the November 20,
2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans has been
abandoned.
The confusion in the petition at bar must have been created by the
way the Veterans formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution
of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani.[48] Be that as it may, we reiterate
that the prevailing formula for the computation of additional seats
for party-list winners is the formula stated in the landmark case
ofVeterans, viz:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party[49] first party
Applying said formula to the undisputed figures in Party-List Canvass
Report No. 20, we do not find petitioners entitled to any additional
seat. Thus:
448,072
Additional seats = ------------ x 2
for PM 1,203,305
= 0.74
429,259
7
Additional seats = ------------ x 2
for BUTIL 1,203,305
= 0.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172103 April 13, 2007
CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GARCIA, (COMELEC), represented
by CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR.,Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the March 7, 2006 Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Resolution No. 06-0248,2 which rejected the Motion for
Proclamation of the Second Nominees of Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC), et al. under the party-list system in connection
with the May 2004 National and Local Elections.
The Facts
The COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
for the Party-List System, issued Resolution No. NBC 04-
0043 promulgated on June 2, 2004, which proclaimed petitioner
CIBAC as one of those which qualified to occupy a seat in Congress
having received the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list representatives. Based on Party-List Canvass Report
No. 19,4 CIBAC received a total number of 493,546 votes out of the
12,627,852 votes cast for all the party-list participants, which, by
applying the formula adopted by the Supreme Court in Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC, 5 resulted in a percentage of 3.9084. 6 In
the computation for additional seats for the parties, the COMELEC
adopted a simplified formula of one additional seat per additional
2%, thereby foreclosing the chances of CIBAC to gain an additional
seat under the party-list system for having received less than what
was prescribed by the poll body. 7
On June 22, 2004, petitioner CIBAC, together with Luzon Farmers
Party (BUTIL) and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), filed a Joint Motion
for Immediate Proclamation8 entreating the COMELEC en banc to
recognize their entitlement to an additional seat and that their
second nominees be immediately proclaimed. They based their claim
on Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna), applying the following Veterans formula:
1awphi1.nt
Votes Cast for Qualified
Party
Additional x Allotted
Seats = Seats
Votes Cast for First Party
for First Party9
On March 7, 2006, the COMELEC en banc issued the challenged
Resolution No. 06-0248 contained in the Excerpt from the Minutes of
the Regular En Banc Meeting of the COMELEC, 10 which adopted the
March 6, 2006 Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee relative
to the Urgent Motion to Resolve the Motion for Proclamation of the
Second Nominees of CIBAC, BUTIL, and PM party-lists, in connection
with the May 2004 elections for party-list representatives. The
pertinent portion reads:
"On 01 May 2004, Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, then CIC on Party-
List Concerns, acting on queries from several party-list candidates
regarding the formula to be used by the Commission in determining
the additional seats for party list winners in the 10 May 2004
elections, issued a memorandum on the matter to the Commission
en-banc. As a result, on the [sic] 08 May 2004, the Commission en
banc promulgated Resolution No. 6835 (Annex A) the resolutory
portion of which reads RESOLVES, to adopt the simplified formula
of one additional seat per additional two percent (underscoring
supplied) of the total party-list votes in the proclamation of the party-
list winners in the coming 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections.
The Party List Canvass Report No. 22 of the National Board of
Canvassers, (Annex B) shows that CIBAC, BUTIL and PM have the
following percentage of total votes garnered:
CIBAC - 3.8638
BUTIL - 3.3479
PM - 3.4947
Following the simplified formula of the Commission, after the first
2% is deducted from the percentage of votes of the above-named
party-lists, they are no longer entitled to an additional seat. It is
worth mentioning that the Commission, consistent with its formula,
denied the petition for a seat of ABA-AKO and ANAD after garnering a
percentage of votes of 1.9900 and 1.9099 respectively.
For consideration."
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to adopt the recommendation of the Supervisory
Committee to deny the foregoing Motion of CIBAC, BUTIL and PM
party-lists for proclamation of second nominees, following the
simplified formula of the Commission on the matter per Comelec
Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08 May 2004.
The Issues
Undeterred, CIBAC filed the instant Petition for Certiorari 11 before
this Court, raising two issues, viz:1^vvphi1.net
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IN
ADOPTING THE SIMPLIFIED FORMULA OF ONE ADDITIONAL SEAT
PER ADDITIONAL TWO PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PARTY-LIST VOTES
IN THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PARTY-LIST WINNERS IN THE MAY
10, 2004 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTION, THUS, ADJUDGING THE
PETITIONER HEREIN AS ENTITLED ONLY TO ONE (1) SEAT, ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
B. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CIBAC, AND OTHER PARTY-LIST
GROUPS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ARE ENTITLED TO ONE (1)
ADDITIONAL SEAT BASED ON THE FORMULA CRAFTED BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF ANG BAGONG BAYANI AND
BAYAN MUNA.12
In gist, the core issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion when it denied petitioner CIBAC an additional seat in
the House of Representatives under the party-list system by using the
simplified formula instead of the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna formula.
8
Petitioner CIBAC asseverates that the COMELEC committed a serious
departure from settled jurisprudence amounting to grave abuse of
discretion when it mistakenly relied on the "simplified formula" as
the basis for its resolution. Moreover, it stressed that the COMELEC
simplified formula runs counter to the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna formula which used the "number of allotted seats for the first
party" as multiplier. If the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna
formula were applied, CIBAC would be entitled to one additional seat,
thus:
495,193 x
3
Additional seats = = 1.2345
1,203,305
Lastly, petitioner faults the COMELEC for its failure to act on and so
dismiss the petitions for disqualification filed by the other party-list
groups which could have enabled the COMELEC to "make an accurate
determination of the votes that each party-list group has actually
obtained." It therefore asks the Court to set aside the assailed
COMELEC Resolution No. 06-0248; and direct the COMELEC to
declare CIBAC as entitled to one (1) additional seat and to
immediately proclaim Ma. Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin, its second
nominee, as member of the House of Representatives.
The Courts Ruling
Entitlement to an additional seat
In deciding the controversy at hand, a second look at the enabling
law, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941, "An Act Providing for the Election of
Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor," is in order. The objective of the law
was made clear in Section 2, thus:
Declaration of Policy.The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible. (Emphasis supplied.)
In determining the number of seats a party-list is entitled to, Sec. 11
prescribes that:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats (emphasis supplied).
The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the four (4)
inviolable parameters to determine the winners in a Philippine-style
party-list election mandated by the Constitution and R.A. 7941, as
follows:
First, the twenty percent allocationthe combined number of all In simplified form, it is written as follows:
party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected 1vvphi1.nt
under the party list.
No. of votes
of
Second, the two percent thresholdonly those parties garnering a Additional concerned
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list No. of additional seats
seats party
system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives. allocated to first
for = x
party
concerned No. of votes
(Emphasis supplied.)
Third, the three-seat limiteach qualified party, regardless of the party of
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of the first
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats. party

Fourth, proportional representationthe additional seats which a xxxx

qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their
total number of votes."13 (Emphasis supplied.)
In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that
has met the 2% threshold, "proportional representation" is the
touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats.
The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional
seats of the first party and other qualified party-list groups was
clearly explicated in Veterans:
[H]ow do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least
two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat.
Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of
votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latters
number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the
number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes of
first party Proportion of votes of first
= party relative to
Total votes for party- total votes for party-list system
list system
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical
representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since,
in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number
is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are
not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained
earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore,
obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the
three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An
increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a
party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional
representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two
additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant
parameter.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
On June 25, 2003, the formula was put to test in Ang Bagong Bayani
and Bayan Muna.1vvphi1.nt In determining the additional seats for
the other qualified partiesBUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM,
SANLAKAS, and ABANSE! PINAYthe following computation was
made:
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at
0.51:

Votes Cast for

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding
Qualified Party x Allotted
it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all Additional
= Seats for First
the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two Seats
Votes Cast for Party
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of
First Party
votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent,
but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional 290,760
or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, = x3
then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat. 1,708,253

We adopted the six percent bench mark, because the first party is not
always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats.
Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total
number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or
more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three
seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the
parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list
seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
xxxx
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation. x x x
xxxx
= 0.51
Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any
additional seat.15
From a scrutiny of the Veterans and Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna formulae in determining the additional seats for party-list
representatives, it is readily apparent that the Veterans formula is
materially different from the one used in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna. In Veterans, the multiplier used was "the [number] of
additional seats allocated to the first party," while in the Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna formula, the multiplier "allotted seats for
first party" was applied. The dissimilarity in the multiplier used
spells out a big difference in the outcome of the equation. This
divergence on the multiplier was pointed out and stressed by
respondent COMELEC. Nevertheless, petitioner insists that the
correct multiplier is the ALLOTTED seats for the first party referring
to the three (3) seats won by Bayan Muna which emerged as the

9
winning first party, as allegedly prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna. On this issue, petitioner ratiocinates this way:
It cannot be emphasized enough that the formula in the Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna cases rendered in 2003, effectively modified
the earlier Veterans formula, with the clear and explicit use of the
"allotted seats for the first party". Considering that the first party,
Bayan Muna, was allotted to the maximum three (3) seats under the
law, it is therefore clear that the multiplier to be used is three (3), the
allotted seats for the first party. 16
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioners case, we reach the
conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat. Party-List
Canvass Report No. 2018 contained in the petition shows that the first
party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a
total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received
a total of 495,190 votes. It was proclaimed that the first party, Bayan
Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats 19 based on June 2,
2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-004 of the COMELEC. A computation
using the Veterans formula would therefore lead us to the following
result:

However, this postulation is bereft of merit and basis.1awphi1.nt 1awphi1.nt

No. of
additional
A careful perusal of the four corners of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna betrays petitioners claim as it did not mention any revision or No. of votes of
seats Additional
reshaping of the Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, the Court had concerned party
allocated Seats for
in mind the application of the original Veterans formula in Ang x =
to concerned
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. This conclusion is based on the No. of votes of the first
the first party
aforequoted formula in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna, as party
party
follows:
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at
0.51: Applying this formula, the result is as
follows:

Votes Cast for Qualified 495,190

Allotted x 2 =
Additional Party
= x Seats for 1,203,305
Seats
First Party
Votes Cast for First Party
0.8230498
0.41152493 x 2 =
290,760 6
= x 3
1,708,253
This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna
formula which used the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party,"
= 0.51 viz:
The phrase "applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY"
admits of no other conclusion than that the Court merely applied the Votes Cast
Veterans formula to Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna in resolving for
the additional seats by the other qualified party-list groups. However, Qualified
it appears that there was an inaccurate presentation of the Veterans Additional Party Allotted Seats for
formula as the Court used the multiplier "allotted seats for the first = x
Seats First Party
party" in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna instead of the Votes Cast
"[number] of additional seats allocated to the first party" prescribed for
in the Veterans formula. It is apparent that the phrase "[number] of First Party
additional" was omitted, possibly by inadvertence from the phrase
"allotted seats for First Party." The disparity is material, substantial, Applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula
and significant since the multiplier "[number] of additional seats to CIBAC, it yields the following result:
allocated to the First Party" prescribed in the Veterans formula
pertains to a multiplier of two (2) seats, while the multiplier "allotted 495,190
Additional
seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna = x 3 = 1.2345
seats
formula can mean a multiplier of maximum three (3) seats, since the 1,203,305
first party can garner a maximum of three (3) seats.
Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the
Moreover, footnote 37 of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna states Court and not the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula that
that "for a discussion of how to compute additional nominees for petitioner alleges.
parties other than the first, see Veterans x x x." It clarifies the
confusion created by the imprecise formula expressed in Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna. Thus, the Court rules that the claimed Ang Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula has not modified the than one (1), then it did not obtain or reach a whole number.
Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, there was really no other Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans
formula approved by the Court other than the Veterans formula in that "in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole
fixing the number of additional seats for the other qualified party-list number is necessary." Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an
groups. Also, in Partido ng Manggagawa v. COMELEC, the Court found additional seat.
that the confusion in the computation of additional seats for the other
qualified party-list groups arose "[from] the way the Veterans COMELECs application of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna is
formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang incorrect
Bagong Bayani." We reiterated that "the prevailing formula for the
computation of additional seats for party-list winners is the formula The Court laments the fact that the COMELEC insisted in using a
stated in the landmark case of Veterans x x x." 17 simplified formula when it is fully aware of the ruling in the Veterans

10
case. The COMELEC explained that it "merely based its judgment on
Comelec Resolution No. 6835 which cited Supreme Court
Resolution20 dated 20 November 2003 granting BUHAYs Motion for
Reconsideration and entitling it to one additional seat for having
garnered more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes
validly cast for the party-list system, thus recognizing once again the
simplified formula." However, in said Resolution, the Court, in
granting BUHAY an additional seat, meant to apply it on that specific
case alone, not being a precedentpro hac vice (for this one
particular occasion); thus, this Resolution cannot be applied as a
precedent to future cases. The simplified formula having already
been abandoned, the COMELEC should have used and adhered to the
Veterans formula.
The Court has consistently reminded the COMELEC of its "function to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election." As judicial decisions form part of the law of
the land, the COMELEC cannot just ignore or be oblivious to the
rulings issued by the Court. Basic is the rule that lower courts and
quasi-judicial tribunals must bow to the decisions and resolutions of
the highest court of the land. The COMELEC is not an exception. It
cannot do otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
March 7, 2006 Comelec Resolution No. 06-0248 is hereby AFFIRMED
only insofar as it denied petitioner CIBACs motion for the
proclamation of its second nominee to an additional seat under the
2004 party-list elections. The portion of Comelec Resolution No. 06-
0248, which adopted and applied the "simplified formula of the
Commission on the matter per Comelec Resolution No. 6835
promulgated 08 May 2004," is annulled and set aside. Respondent
Comelec is ordered to strictly apply the Veterans formula in
determining the entitlement of qualified party-list groups to
additional seats in the party-list system. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Distinguish to this case:
G.R. No. 179271
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner, - versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS,Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO,Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 179295
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY
TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO,
- versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari
and mandamus,[1] assails the Resolution[2] promulgated on 3 August
2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041
(PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
11
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of
BANAT for being moot.BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc,
acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and
Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior
Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for
Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari
with mandamus and prohibition, [3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-
60[4] promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial
proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at
least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List
System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the
canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number
of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [5] (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of
the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R.
Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System.[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because
[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently
been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound
to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.[7] There were no
intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen
(13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay
Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association
of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan!
Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak
Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as
National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for
Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in
open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two
hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine
(15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of
Representation, in connection with the National and Local
Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and
Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers
reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes
cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred
twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one
(16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007
Elections
 i. Total party-list votes already 15,283,659 14 ABONO 337,046
canvassed/tabulated
ii. Total party-list votes remaining WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod
uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e. canvass 1,337,032 ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which
deferred) an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF
REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
outcome) from areas not yet submitted for Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as
canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions
del Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao) 102,430 included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to
at least one seat under the party-list system of
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121 representation in the meantime.

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List
System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: provided, that those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes:
provided, finally, that each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive
Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and
other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en
banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby
RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain
conditions set forth below, the following parties,
organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-
List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY
2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above 3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two 4 Gabriela Womens Party GABRIELA
percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred
thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two 5 Association of Philippine ElectricAPEC
(334,462) votes; Cooperatives

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against 6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment A TEACHER
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a Towards Educational Reforms, Inc.
formula for the additional seats of each party, organization 7 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party AKBAYAN
or coalition receving more than the required two percent
(2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only 8 Alagad ALAGAD
after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that 10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO
have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as 11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
follows:
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
13 Abono ABONO
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES
COALITION RECEIVED
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other
1 BUHAY 1,163,218 parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
3 CIBAC 760,260
The total number of seats of each winning party,
4 GABRIELA 610,451 organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant
to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon
5 APEC 538,971
completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
6 A TEACHER 476,036
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng
7 AKBAYAN 470,872 Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until
8 ALAGAD 423,076 final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render
the proceedings therein moot and academic.
9 BUTIL 405,052
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029 parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes
11 BATAS 386,361 shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of
their respective cases.
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution,
13 ARC 338,194 furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
12
 Total votes for party-list system party-list system
SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis in the original)
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party
(without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the
additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from Proportion of votes received Additional seats
the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC by the first party
Resolution No. 07-72: Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional
seats
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections Equal to or greater than 4% but less than One (1) additional seat
sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers 6%
proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s]
and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) Less than 4% No additional seat
threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum
total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the
thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each; following percentage:

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and 1,178,747

Supervisory Committee of the National Board of
Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes,
as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed,
votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes
received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected
for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the
projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13)
qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as
follows:
- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct
formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is,
as follows:

Party-List Projected total number of votes No. of votes of

concerned party No. of additional
1 BUHAY 1,178,747 Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats
allocated to
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476 a concerned party No. of votes of first party
3 CIBAC 755,964 first party

4 GABRIELA 621,718 WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as
follows:
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
Party List Percentage Additional Seat
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
8 ALAGAD 423,190
CIBAC 1.28 1
9 BUTIL 409,298
GABRIELA 1.05 1
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
APEC 1.05 1
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
A TEACHER 0.83 0
12 ARC 375,846
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
13 ABONO 340,151
ALAGAD 0.71 0

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan BUTIL 0.69 0

Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations
and coalitions, making it the first party in accordance ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated
in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus ARC 0.63 0
COMELEC; ABONO 0.57 0
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions
participating under the party-list system of representation NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by
that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order
to an additional seat or seats based on the formula No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other
prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans; elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the first as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as
party, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is: it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties,
organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first wit:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to total votes for

13

Party List Additional Seats
BUHAY 2 shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12
BAYAN MUNA 1 percentage of votes obtained by each party-list
CIBAC 1 cast in the party-list election, after deducting the
GABRIELA 1 corresponding votes of those which were allotted
APEC 1 formula/procedure
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other
parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of
the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle
them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate
percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional
seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned
parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes
shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of
their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement
this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution
filed by the Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National
Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his
comments/observations and recommendation thereon
[NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution
prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%)
-- of Party-List representatives as mandated by
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be
proclaimed.
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which
prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA
7941 in that it should be applicable only to the
first party-list representative seats to be allotted
on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be
applied; and
14
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the
number of seats corresponding to every 2% of
the votes they received and the additional seats
of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the
group in relation to the total nationwide votes
seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the
prescribed in the
ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A of
COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June
1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of
determining how many seats shall be proclaimed,
which party-list groups are entitled to
representative seats and how many of their
nominees shall seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as
unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats
for party-list representative prescribed by
Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
RECOMMENDATION:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No.
07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of
the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of
the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions
Participating Under the Party-List System During
the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections resolved among others that the total
number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to the Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion
of the canvass of the party-list results.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National
Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head,
NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of
BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this
resolution. SO ORDERED.[10]
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the
ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for
reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of
Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the
COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
[11]
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July
2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations
as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-
List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc.
(AGAP),[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An Waray.[14] Per the
certification[15] by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations
have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
 Party-List No. of Seat(s)
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation
1.1 Buhay 3 of additional seats, one for the First Party
1.2 Bayan Muna 2 and another for the qualifying parties, violates
Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
1.3 CIBAC 2
3. The proportional relationships under the First
1.4 Gabriela 2
Party Rule are different from those required
1.5 APEC 2 under RA 7941;
1.6 A Teacher 1 C. Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the
1.7 Akbayan 1 Philippine party-list system as provided for
under the same case of Veterans Federation Party,
1.8 Alagad 1 et al. v. COMELEC.
1.9 Butil 1
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1 did not commit grave abuse of discretion
1.11 Anak Pawis 1 amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it implemented the First-Party Rule in the
1.12 ARC 1 allocation of seats to qualified party-list
organizations, the same being merely
1.13 Abono 1
in consonance with the ruling in Veterans
1.14 AGAP 1 Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant
Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved
1.15 AMIN 1
herein are constitutional in nature, involving the
correct interpretation and implementation of RA
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing 7941, and are of transcendental importance to
Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for our nation.[17]
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-
list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the
been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory
resolution of SPC No. 07-250. for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

Issues 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list

representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court: Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section
11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes 4. How shall the party-list representative seats be
prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 allocated?
constitutional?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political
4. How shall the party-list representatives be parties from participating in the party-list elections? If
allocated?[16] not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?[18]
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the
following issues in their petition: The Ruling of the Court

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as
National Board of Canvassers, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-
Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified
party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle
proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA
particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule
in allocating additional seats for the First
Party violates the principle of proportional
representation under RA 7941.
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style
party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly
stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party
of list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties
7941 garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in
the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a

15
 maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two
additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.[19]
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its
mathematical interpretation of the term proportional representation,
this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The
party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of
the House of Representatives including those under
the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of
Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and
party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to
modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states
the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-
list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this
point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats Number of seats available
available to x .20 = to
legislative districts party-list representatives
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of
seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative
district is created by law. Since the 14 thCongress of the Philippines
has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-
list representatives.
16
220 x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives
to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the
manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number
of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the
formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates
garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However,
there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941
on the allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule, [20] and Justice Vicente
V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer
formula[21] as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner
of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted
R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of
which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,
[22]
the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for
the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis, rank them according to the number of votes received
and allocate party-list representatives proportionately
according to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization, or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis
supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through
three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of
Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No.
7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of
Representatives including those from the party-list groups
as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No.
2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55
Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be
proclaimed.
 Votes Votes
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list
votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups
shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats

obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately
preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total
the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats
shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups
which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under
the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941.[23]

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first

interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2%

vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the
seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No.
7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or
coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received;
and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against
the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.[24]

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on
the proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as
against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by
making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as
the divisor in computing the allocation of seats. [25] Thirty-four (34)
party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both
the COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for
systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled
up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of
seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono,
and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2%
threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second
percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified partyby
the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats
allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total
party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a
first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as
the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned
party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second
round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders,
from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the
remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the
seats are filled up.[26]

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-
list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the

participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from

the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes garnered during the elections. [27]

17
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868 41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386 42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541 43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD 8,915
FILIPINA
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
9 COOP- 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
NATCCO The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993 the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717 seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In
Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872 purposes.The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived
at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846 candidates.

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751 Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and
their respective percentage of votes garnered
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
over the total votes for the party-list.[28]
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837 Votes
Garnered over
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478 Votes Guaranteed
Rank Party Total Votes for
Garnered Seat
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612 Party-List, in
%
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
CITIZENS 6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938 7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903 8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691 9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1

30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896 10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1

31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255 11 BATAS [29]

385,810 2.42% 1
KASANGGA 12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA29,130 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
PILIPINO
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
Total 17
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
39 ABANSE! 130,356 86 APO 16,421
PINAY 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG 16,241

BUKID

18
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional
received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two- allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
percenters, are the party-list candidates that are entitled to one seat
each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not
distributed 17 guaranteed seats. limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
votes. This is where petitioners and intervenors problem with the candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum
first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed
R.A. No. 7941. seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available
of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of list candidate is entitled. Thus:
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the
two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives. Votes Addition (B) plus
Guarantee Applyin
Garnere al (C), in
d Seat g the
d over Seats whole
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there three
Total integer
are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list seat cap
Votes for s
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one Votes
Ran Party
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the Party Garnere
k List, in
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat d
%
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the (First
(Second
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we Round)
Round)
increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum (B) (E)
(A) (C) (D)
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to 1 BUHAY 1,169,23 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. 4
2 BAYAN 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation MUNA
to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold 3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of 4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral 5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
or group interests in the House of Representatives. [30]
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives 7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed: 8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
9 [31]
COOP- 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked NATCCO
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections. 10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall 12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
13 ANAKPAWI 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to S
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in 14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated. 15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats. 17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no 18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one 19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats
for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

19
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A. is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the
party list system.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
field district candidates and can also participate in the
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A. party list system?

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the
26 SENIOR 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A. party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
CITIZENS candidates.

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO
participate in the party list system?
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A. sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
31 ANG 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under
BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers,
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A. would he qualify?
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A. party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A. would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

Tot 17 55 MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang

al
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3
above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning
party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The
additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of
votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for
each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system
that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly
bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we
suggested or proposed the party list system because we
wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very much
for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways
to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit
within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x
x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198
seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this:
Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats
and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run
under the party list concept or must they be under the
district legislation side of it only?
linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority
political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the
party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all
political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad
base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in
them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo
ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the
party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin
mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko
lamang bigyan ng diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats,
reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run
there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and
probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this
system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the
party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral
candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be
allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he
shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa
sectoral lines.

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these xxxx

parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the
stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to
seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban
and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able

20
 to make common goals with mass organizations so that the
very leadership of these parties can be transformed
through the participation of mass organizations. And if this
is true of the administration parties, this will be true of
others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being
formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to
many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to
which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact
mass organizations so that with their participation, the
policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will
challenge both the mass organizations and the political
parties to come together. And the party list system is
certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the
COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time,
develop this excellent system that they have in Europe
where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party
and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their
very presence there has a transforming effect upon the
philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States,
the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the
Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all
why political parties and mass organizations should not
combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other
so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution
for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more
lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I
support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of
being elected representatives later on through a party list
system; and even beyond that, to become actual political
parties capable of contesting political power in the wider
constitutional arena for major political parties.
x x x [32] (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by
the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a
mechanism of proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations
of a coalition may participate independently provided the
coalition of which they form part does not participate in the
party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party
or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over
the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
21
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a
coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or
concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered
national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent
any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary,
the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted
down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. [33] In
defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a
political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections
is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations
for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if,
for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election
through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral
youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or
affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the
Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the
party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same
for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9
of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections,
able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attainsthe age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his
term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity[34] as there is no financial status required in the law. It is
enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, [35] that is,
if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she
must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of
the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI,
left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence
of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being
filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be
allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to
continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list
elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate
opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is
unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET
ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC
No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC
No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in
the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of
additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance
with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political
parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This
Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR
BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents.
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati."1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory
relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual,
Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba,
and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of
22
Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2,
51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land
area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the
"three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in
violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by
special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional
provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three (3) years following the
return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in
the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmen a as
senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52
of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as
aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I. Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the
proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of
Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise
the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan
Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the
northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong
and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the
City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the
resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing
boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial
jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local
government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates
sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that
the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions.2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized.
The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of
local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government
Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must
be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil
can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No.
7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the
land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an
inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established
land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2
stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory
of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate
reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not
defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time
of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between
the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was
under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal
department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be
left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute
by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue.
This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed
city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We
take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from
using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local
government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per
se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress
from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of
a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained
the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of
fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to
hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain
the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code,
it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the
territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities
should be described by meted and bounds, with technical
descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which
the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other
words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely
as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not
an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a
city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case,
then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the
law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities
must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to
those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply.
To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua
non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which
the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest
intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to
give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments
more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the
same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To
invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral
type of description was used in the law would serve the letter
23
but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the
master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This
could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil.,
141; Tan ada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33
SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government,
which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends
to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat
but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao,
72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case
at bar.
II. Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of
section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective
officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the
officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly
elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall
likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they
shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the
City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and
section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials,
including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of
three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the
new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No.
7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of
Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In
particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent
Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for
two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor
Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming
elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek
another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year
consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus,
petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently
crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section
51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality
must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e.,
that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections;
that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek
re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering
that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely
pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse,
they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over
which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III. Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the
constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52
of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-
urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2)
legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to
commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
Dasmarin as and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of
Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment 6cannot made by
a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed
in the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990
census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias
v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative
districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of
a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly
what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing
for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment
law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation
where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The
intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or
province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of
any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it
is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the
24
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased
to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled
to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the
creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have
been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias
v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a
liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to
impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command
that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench.
Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of
Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of
the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the
ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. To
remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the
municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the
province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second
District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district. We
gave due course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it involves
the validity of the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of
the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is
composed of five (5) legislative districts.1
The first district2 covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of
Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
The second district3 is composed of the municipalities of Barugo,
Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat,
Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.
The third district4 is composed of the municipalities of
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan,
Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba.
The fourth district5 is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities
of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob, Merida, and Palompon.
The fifth district6 is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate,
Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan, Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub- 4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
province by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 of the law 5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959.7 6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the 8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, 9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised 10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
therein." 11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant
to its Section 462, the sub-province of Biliran became a regular TOTAL 272,167 156,462
province. It provides:
Third District: Population Registered
Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular Voters (1990) (1994)
provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite to be held in the sub-provinces and the original
provinces directly affected. The plebiscite shall be 1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649
conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the 2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
national elections following the effectivity of this code. The 3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
new legislative districts created as a result of such 4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48
conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress by 5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
the duly-elected representatives of the original districts out 6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595
of which said new provinces or districts were created until 7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474
their own representatives shall have been elected in the
next regular congressional elections and qualified. TOTAL 214,499 125,763

The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a Fourth District: Population Registered
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a Voters (1990) (1994)
consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third
District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, 1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A 2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
further consequence was to reduce the Third District to five (5) 3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889
municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
census. 5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants,
voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent TOTAL 269,347 155,995
COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties. On Fifth District: Population Registered
December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, Voters (1990) (1994)
among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the
Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth 1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682
District to the Third District of Leyte. The composition of the First 2. Bato, 28,197 116,13
District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the 3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
composition of the Fifth District were not disturbed. After the 4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
movement of municipalities, the composition of the five (5) 5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
legislative districts appeared as follows: 6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
First District: Population Registered 8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616
Voters (1990) (1994) 9. Matalom 28,291 16,247

1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679 TOTAL 309,148 181,242
2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929 Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816 attention of respondent COMELEC, among others, to the inequitable
5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167 distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second
6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497 Districts. He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered
7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357 voters while the Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a
8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700 difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference, he
proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered
TOTAL 303,349 178,688 voters be transferred from the First to the Second District. The
motion was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent
Second District: Population Registered Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of
Voters (1990) (1994) municipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial
composition of each district; and (2) said adjustment complied with
the constitutional requirement that each legislative district shall
1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237 comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307 territory.
3. Carigara 38,863 22,036

25
In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No.
2736 violates the principle of equality of representation ordained in
the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,8 he argues that
respondent COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as
much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to
be worth as much as another's." The Solicitor General, in his
Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor,
however, opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has
no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming
it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution.
Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted
within the parameters of the Constitution.
We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first
inquiry will relate to the constitutional power of the respondent
COMELEC9 to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another legislative district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers
of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our
election laws, are spelled out in black and white in section 2(c),
Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not
invoke this provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The
Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different
Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan
Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the
House of Representatives of the First Congress of the
Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and
until otherwise provided by law, the Members thereof shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered
to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein
made.
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or
such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the
basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI
of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to
the province out of which such new province was created
or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by
the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not
be made within one hundred and twenty days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 10 of
President Corazon C. Aquino, ordaining the Provisional Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang
Pambansa. 11 She then exercised legislative powers under the
Provisional Constitution.12
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now a distinguished member of this Court.
The records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve
26
several prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional
elections under the 1987 Constitution. Among the vital issues were:
whether the members of the House of Representatives would be
elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how the
apportionment should be made.14Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered
three (3) options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow President
Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2) empower the COMELEC
to make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the
power by way of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 15 The
different dimensions of the options were discussed by
Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote
the debates in extenso, viz.:16
xxx xxx xxx
MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by
way of amendment by substitution and this was, I believe, a
prior or a proposed amendment. Also, the chairman of the
Committee on the Legislative said that he was proposing a
vote first by the Chamber on the concept of whether the
election is by province and cities on the one hand, or by
legislative districts on the other. So I propose this simple
formulation which reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION
UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION THE LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS SHALL BE APPORTIONED BY THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS." I hope the chairman will accept the
proposed amendment.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same insofar as
the apportionment is concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento
et al. proposal would also provide for a mandate for the
apportionment later, meaning after the first election, which
will in effect embody what the Commission had approved,
reading as follows: "Within three years following the return
of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section."
So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of
the session, so that all the proponents can work together.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is
suspended.
It was 3:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is
resumed.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I
wonder if the Commission will allow this. We will just
delete the proposed subparagraph (4) and all the
capitalized words in paragraph (5). So that in paragraph
(5), what would be left would only be the following:
"Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section."
But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new
Constitution indicating specifically the following: "FOR
PURPOSES OF THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION PROPOSED
BY THE 1986 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION AND
SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND UNTIL OTHERWISE
PROVIDED BY LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FROM
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE
PROVINCES, CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
AREA AS FOLLOWS."
And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to
Metropolitan Manila Area, to the provinces and to the cities,
without indicating the municipalities comprising each of
the districts. Then, under Section 2, we will mandate the
COMELEC to make the actual apportionment on the basis of
the number of seats provided for and allocated to each
province by us.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will
give mandate to COMELEC to do the redistricting.
Redistricting is vitally linked to the baneful practices of
cutting up areas or spheres of influence; in other words,
gerrymandering. This Commission, being a nonpartisan, a
nonpolitical deliberative body, is in the best possible
situation under the circumstances to undertake that
responsibility. We are not wanting in expertise and in time
because in the first place, the Committee on the Legislative
has prepared the report on the basis of the
recommendation of the COMELEC.
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople
is recognized.
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken by
Commissioner Aquino in this respect. We know that the
reapportionment of provinces and cities for the purpose of
redistricting is generally inherent in the constituent power
or in the legislative power. And I would feel very uncertain
about delegating this to a quasi-judicial body even if it is
one of the constitutional offices created under this
Constitution. We have the assurance of Commissioner
Davide, as chairman of the Committee on the Legislative,
that even given the very short time remaining in the life of
this Commission, there is no reason why we cannot
complete the work of reapportionment on the basis of the
COMELEC plan which the committee has already
thoroughly studied and which remains available to the
Constitutional Commission.
So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino,
Mr. Presiding Officer. I think, it is the safest, the most
27
reasonable, and the most workable approach that is
available to this Commission.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does
Commissioner Davide say:
MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make
the apportionment itself or whether we will leave it to the
COMELEC. So, there arises, therefore, a prejudicial question
for the body to decide. I would propose that the
Commission should now decide what body should make
the apportionment. Should it be the Commission or should
it be the COMELEC? And the Committee on the Legislative
will act accordingly on the basis of the decision.
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Bengzon is recognized.
MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform the
body that I believe the Committee on the Legislative has
precisely worked on this matter and they are ready with a
list of apportionment. They have, in fact, apportioned the
whole country into various districts based on the
recommendation of the COMELEC. So they are ready with
the list and if this body would wish to apportion the whole
country by district itself, then I believe we have the time to
do it because the Committee on the Legislative is ready
with that particular report which need only to be appended
to the Constitution. So if this body is ready to accept the
work of the Committee on the Legislative we would have no
problem. I just would like to give that information so that
the people here would be guided accordingly when they
vote.
MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner
Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner
Davide some questions.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Davide may yield if he so desires.
MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are
considering apply only to the first election after the
enactment of the Constitution?
MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be
for the first election; on the basis of the Sarmiento
proposal, it will only apply to the first election.
MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power
to reapportion.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution
the reapportionment based on the COMELEC study and
between the approval of the Constitution and the first
election the COMELEC no longer has the power to
change that even a bit.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner
Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question to
Commissioner Davide?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will
please proceed.
MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's
proposed apportionment and considering the fact that
there will be a corresponding reduction to 183 seats, would
there be instances representation of under non-
representation?
MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure
the Commission that there will be no case of inequitable
distribution. It will come out to be one for every 350 to
400,000 inhabitants.
MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard
that we refer.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is
recognized.
MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a
motion by Commissioner Sarmiento to mandate COMELEC
to do the redistricting. This was also almost the same
motion by Commissioner Padilla and I think we have had
some kind of meeting of minds. On the other hand, there
seems to be a prejudicial question, an amendment to the
amendment as suggested by Commissioner Aquino, that
instead of the COMELEC, it should be this Commission that
shall make the redistricting. So may I ask Commissioner
Aquino, if she insists on that idea, to please formulate it into
a motion so we can vote on that first as an amendment to
the amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner
Aquino is recognized.
MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to
undertake the apportionment of the legislative districts
instead of the proposal that COMELEC be given the
mandate to undertake the responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is
it the motion or the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed
amendment.
28
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this
proposed amendment which we substitute for paragraphs
4 and 5.
MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely
as a motion to be followed by a deletion of paragraph 4
because that should not really appear as a paragraph in
Section 5; otherwise, it will appear very ugly in the
Constitution where we mandate a Commission that will
become functus officio to have the authority. As a matter of
fact, we cannot exercise that authority until after the
ratification of the new Constitution.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does
Commissioner Sarmiento say?
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So,
may I move for the approval of this proposed amendment.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a
simple plurality to adopt that motion?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a
two-thirds vote.
MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman may
proceed.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the
reapportionment legislative districts.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasure
of Commissioner Aquino?
MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. Is
Commissioner Sarmiento, therefore, adopting my motion?
Would it not be right for him to move that the COMELEC be
mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is
already the Commission that will be mandated.
MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the
amendment the amendment.
Thank you.
MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do the
reapportionment.
VOTING
 THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to
vote.
As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several
Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No
Member raised his hand.)
The results show 30 votes in favor and none against; the
motion is approved.
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC
the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the
power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to
make minoradjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The
meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments was again clarified in the
debates 17 of the Commission, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr.
Presiding Officer. In Section 2, the Commission on
Elections is empowered to make minor
adjustments on the apportionment made here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit
for this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during
the period of amendments a proposal is made. The
authority conferred would be on minor corrections or
amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have
forgotten an intervening municipality in the enumeration,
which ought to be included in one district. That we shall
consider a minor amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de
Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor
adjustment. Can it be possible that one municipality in a
district be transferred to another district and call it a minor
adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding
Officer. Minor, meaning, that there should be no change in
the allocations per district. However, it may happen that we
have forgotten a municipality in between which is still in
the territory of one assigned district, or there may be an
error in the correct name of a particular
municipality because of changes made by the interim
Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa.
There were many batas pambansa enacted by both the
interim and the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the
names of municipalities.
29
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made
only if one of the municipalities is not mentioned in the
ordinance appended to, and it will be up for the COMELEC
now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain
district.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we
may not have the data regarding a division of a municipality
by the interim Batasang Pambansa or the Regular Batasang
Pambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a mother
municipality and the new municipality, but still actually
these are within the geographical district area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the
COMELEC cannot do is that, if, for example, my municipality
is in the First District of Laguna, they cannot put that in any
other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a
substantive one.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments,
Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC
any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent
COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities)
"apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring
the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the
municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District
of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a
regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of
voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the
province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could
devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for
petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal
vehicle. The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of
legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress.
Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives
Congress the power to reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section." In Macias v. COMELEC, 18 we ruled that the
validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable question. But
while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional
reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as
petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District of the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it
transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and
the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also
deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province
of Leyte. No costs. SO ORDERED.
QUALIFICATIONS; NATURAL-BORN
BENGSON v. HRET (refer to previous case on Citizenship)
PRIVILEGES; PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T.
Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money,
by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter
of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the
latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter
in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a
privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the
lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the
corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a
privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or
not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said
publication, defendant was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense,
and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace,
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions
of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase
"speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in
this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its
offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the
acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the
President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when
Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said
letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in
the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made
by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned?
Addressed to the President, the communication began with the
following paragraph:
30
In the light of the recent developments which however
unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly
elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and
rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address
this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital
information which, under the present circumstances, I feel
it my solemn duty to our people to expose.1wph1.t
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly
three operational plans under serious study by some
ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian
political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred
to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious
plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National
Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in
such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in
1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-
talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the
Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and
psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense,
and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says are
"available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control
the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col.
Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP,
(4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the
Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose
Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this
control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo,
Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in
Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent
Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare
Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in
USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners"
wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC)
but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in
the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the
offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of
which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis
ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists,
under the heading "other operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the
Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism"
and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of
letters "typed in two (2) typewriters only" to Editors
of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as
the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957
elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing
the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the
Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in
several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging
to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way
as to give the impression that they reflect the feeling of the
 people or the opposition parties, to undermine the
administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the
"planners" had gone no further than the planning stage, although the
plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future
developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying
to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in
connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging
the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the
officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian
support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be
asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely
from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian,
not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be
appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or
retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies
in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other
intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be
reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary
Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to
the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now
serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding
positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP
stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to
the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country;
and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from
holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support
plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs
are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as
"planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas
and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano
clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is
of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan
of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the
very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly
indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged
operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the
planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages,
considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such
they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to
suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these
two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question
was written by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the
intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public
hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from
their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are
inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over
the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when
plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false,
they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the
alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools
of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the
defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the
"planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be
"tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so
ordered.
31
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G.
JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness
on six counts[1] is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In
answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and
conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege
in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge
Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the
grounds that
1. Accused-appellants reelection being an expression of
popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling,
giving priority to any right or interest not even the police
power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative
amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties
amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the
renewed mandate entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained
lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona
fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily
curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his
mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign
will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to
perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with
his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He
adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the
continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our
first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of
Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the
majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public
mind that election or appointment to high government office, by
itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of
obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of
the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history
of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative
Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; xxx.
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the
accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal
Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was
subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried
or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as
follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance
at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there
was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of
immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined
parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision,
to wit:
xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member
involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after
its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise
such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus
the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to
the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending
sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively
minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
32
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to
attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos [2],
which states, inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a
people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such
fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in
the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the
administrative removal of a public officer for acts done priorto his
present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from
the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is
not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress
or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after
final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It
also serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,[3] it is
the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to
redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the
Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. [4]
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which
voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that
he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform
congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest
was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his
colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the
sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it
is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-
appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to
well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the
aims of the States penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional
Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his
cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
 a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at
the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of
his dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati
Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this
case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and
private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the
New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise
allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program"
for the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and
2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this
purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his
place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his
dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for
his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or
to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves
from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of
the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery
of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in
this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v.
Morfe:[5]
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and
fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to
the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of
their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech
should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from
arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged
class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered
immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from
the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need for any
transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it
that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might
unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices
to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an
33
accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary
would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and
every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the
essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District
of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since
he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives,
the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his
mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention
does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and
that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when
he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other
member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a
congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building,
House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City,
manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through
[an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office
at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City,
where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further
admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and
resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and
other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has
been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of
Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is
presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant
should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the
National Pentientiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no
longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question
of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of laws."[6] This simply means that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of government may not show
any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor
prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that
allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner
from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest
in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of
250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or
a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that
has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to
nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor
with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never
has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against
groups or types of individuals.[8]
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded. [9]
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not
a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all
those belonging to the same class.[10]
Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion
exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.[11]
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of
ones liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or
lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused. [12]The term refers to
the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his
movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his
own pleasure and will.[13]Imprisonment is the detention of another
against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion [14] and it "[is]
something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion
of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."[15]
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature,
changes an individuals status in society. [16] Prison officials have the
difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a
potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide
rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social
mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment
and elimination of certain rights.[17]
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-
appellants claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any
other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
QUORUM
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S.
TATAD, petitioners, vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN.
MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three
great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is
supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for she
sovereign acts, of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying
34
into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the
Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly
shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse
of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done
within their competence and authority. This Court will be neither a
tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S.
Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66,
Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of
Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required
the respondents and the solicitor general "to file COMMENT thereon
within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice." On
August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general
submitted their respective Comments. In compliance with a
Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed
their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said
pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the
controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on
September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have
concurrent jurisdiction1 to hear and decide petitions for quo
warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a
basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such
petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and important
reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the
present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In
fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo
warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate
President4 and the Speaker of the House 5 have been recognized as
exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmen a as
presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular
session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party
affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows: 6
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-
United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent
23 total number of senators 7 (The last six members are all
classified by petitioners as "independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by
Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo
B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same
position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to
2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the
Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro
tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of
Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he
was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while
only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to
the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate
"minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7)
and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The
following session day, the debate on the question continued, with
Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the
third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve
the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was
in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
senators,9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court
the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that
Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that,
according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following
issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on
the arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or
legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition
of and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the
Senate minority leader.
First Issue: The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this
Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate
minority leader. They submit that the definitions of "majority" and
"minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution, specifically
Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect
its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments,
contend in common that the issue of who is the lawful Senate
minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the
domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise
jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of
35
powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the
fundamental law does not provide for the office of a minority leader
in the Senate. The legislature alone has the full discretion to provide
for such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of
selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there
exists no question involving an interpretation or application of the
Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate; neither are
there "peculiar circumstances" impelling the Court to assume
jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general adds that there is
not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners' theory
that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is
precluded from becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and
deliberated on the various important cases involving this very
important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the
Court's power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an
interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the
law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope
falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of
legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the
tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the
question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was
deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain
of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court
ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events
which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the
issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on
the presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect a
Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with
the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the
present . . . so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch
or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in
justiceable but political questions as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the
upper chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in
the House of Representatives. It has already involved the
President of the Philippines. The situation has created a
veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot
be expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court,
upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement
are pinned. 15
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one
can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to decide them. 16
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left
unanswered. 17
In Taada v. Cueno, 18 this Court endeavored to define political
question. And we said that "it refers to 'those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.' It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the]
legality, of a particular measure." 19
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question.
The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full
discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional
limitations. 20 Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within
its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings,
but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion wrote that the Court "had authority to and should inquire
into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]." This
ruling was made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon
v. Baker 22 and Montenegro v. Castaeda 23 that "the authority to
decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege . . .) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and
conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." But the Chief
Justice cautioned: "the function of the Court is merely to check not
to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his
act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary: 24
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues
of similar character are justiciable, not political, is plain and
simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-
called political questions is the principle of separation of powers
characteristic of the presidential system of government the
functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their
nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the
making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative
department; 2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement
of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or
interpreting the same, which belong to the executive
department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of
disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which
are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere
but only within such sphere each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not
only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to
any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass
upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures
taken or decisions made by the other departments provided
that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area
allocated thereto by the Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or
subject to limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem
being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its
wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations
particularly those prescribed by the Constitution would be
set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue
and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts
of justice under the presidential form of government adopted in
our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances,
one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither
the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said
issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend
the Constitution to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v.
36
Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts
have a "duty, rather than a power," to determine whether
another branch of the government has "kept within
constitutional limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in
defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now
fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate
action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of
judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute
pronouncements of the Court. Daza v. Singson, 26 Coseteng v. Mitra,
Jr. 27 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 28 similarly resolved issues assailing
the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning
among political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled
in the Commission on Appointments. The Court held that the issue
was justiciable, "even if the question were political in nature," since it
involved "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI
of] the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v.
Angara, 29 wherein the petitioners sought to nullify the Senate's
concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute." The Court en banc unanimously
stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning, an act
of the political departments of government, it will not review the
wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down
only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and
(2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives 30 (HRET), the Court refused to reverse a decision of
the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred
upon the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of
the Senate as sole judges of all contests relating to the election, the
returns, and the qualifications of their respective members. Such
jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 31 The Court may inquire into a
decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such "decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion" 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine
the enrolled bill doctrine and to look beyond the certification of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill, which was later
enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the
legislative body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of
the House had been breached in the passage of the bill. They averred
further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules
was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter
complained of concerned the internal procedures of the House, with
which the Court had no concern. It enucleated: 34
 It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a
coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative
action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power
and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to
do so. . . . In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court
must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and
deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator
Santiago, a well-known constitutionalist try to hew closely to these
jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI
of the constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the
Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded"
judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the
part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the
Court has no jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the
doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition,
regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the
relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it
is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next
crucial question: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate
minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate
President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They
contend that the constitutional provision requiring the election of the
Senate President "by majority vote of all members" carries with it a
judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and "minority,"
as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that
"majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that
group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President
and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who
voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships
comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority
leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona
cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for
Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members
of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because
they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and
accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners
finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of
the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times.
When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it
simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any
total."36 The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
37
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority,"
much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing
that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual
meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half
of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who
will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant
precedents, which were not contested in petitioners' Reply. During
the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R
Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the
minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the ninth regular
session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency
in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships
to all senators, including those belonging to the minority. 39 This
practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even the
minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. 40 History would
also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred
to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers
belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a
lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and
"minority." Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction
with the larger number of votes," 41 not necessarily more than one
half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is
"a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority." 42 Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would
obviously be the majority while the lesser would be the minority. But
where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to
say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all
the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in
the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there
could be several minority parties, one of which has to be indentified
by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the
general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate,
members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe
which of the many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.
All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed
by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the
power "to determine the rules of its proceedings." 44 Pursuant
thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern
its internal affairs. 45 Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II
thereof, which provide:
Rule I
 ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter
provided, a President, a President Pro Tempore, a Secretary,
and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering
into the discharge of their duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the
majority vote of all its Members. Should there be more than
one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote shall be
taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by
resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such
offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this
Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of
the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the
basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in
the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the
words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion
that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them,
before the courts may intervene. 47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have
the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 48 Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the
courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and
prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is
certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no
authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold the very duty that justifies the
Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying
into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be
neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and
judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically
amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the
petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and
even the practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary
is without power to decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court
may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been
made with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This is the plain implication of
38
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers
upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but likewise "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion,
who was a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in
part: 51
. . . the powers of government are generally considered
divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a given law
is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government as well
as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues
challenging the actions, first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of
Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption
and exercise of power 52 by one without color of title or who is not
entitled by law thereto. 53 A quo warranto proceeding is the proper
legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public
office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. 54 The action may be
brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor 55 or any
person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped
or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 56 The action shall be
brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is
unlawfully holding of exercising such office. 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person
suing must show that he or she has aclear right to the contested office
or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present
no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of
the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be
used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position
has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the
Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-
cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity
tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and exercise of the
powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific
acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government" is restricted only by the
definition and confines of the term "grave abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not
gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the
latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party
that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan
came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein
both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President
cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment"
or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even
the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be
imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
PP v. JALOSJOS (refer to previous case under Parliamentary
Immunity)
DISQUALIFICATION AND INHIBITIONS; EFFECT OF
IMPRISONMENT
PP v. JALOSJOS (refer to previous case under Parliamentary
Immunity
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS; SUSPENSION v. PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON
Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO
G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO,
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S.
ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and
EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59,respondents.
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmen a, Jr., submitted to this
Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman
Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the
ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also
39
asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be
enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the
portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges
against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he
must show cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the
pertinent portions of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio
Osmen a, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the
Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this
chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled
'A Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from
the Second District of Cebu stated the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that
under your unpopular administration the free things they used
to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices.
They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of
the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can
always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come
across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous
situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your
administration is dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second
District of Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without
basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault
upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President,
which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino
people, and would expose said office to contempt and
disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee
of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the
same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges
against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable
Sergio Osmen a, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and
for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio
Osmen a, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as
well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to
require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of
pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmen a, Jr.,
fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be
punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to
the House a report of its findings and recommendations before
the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress
of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmen a alleged; first, the
Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words
constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly
objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business,
and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other
business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious
words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be
subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of
petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority
decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to
answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware
of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in
view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the
special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving
Congressman Osmen a a chance to defend himself, submitted its
reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved
on the same daybefore closing its sessionHouse Resolution No.
175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from
office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of
Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and
Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court
to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to
discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution
No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having
ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committeewhose members
are the sole respondentshad thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmen a, in a privilege speech
delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery
against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that
he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the
purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is also no
question that for having made the imputations and for failing to
produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the
House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for
serious disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue
of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found
Representative Sergio Osmen a, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly
behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact,
scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against
the President of the Philippines in his privilege speech of June
23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they
affronted and degraded the dignity of the House of
Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That
Representative Sergio Osmen a, Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared
guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmen a contended in his petition that: (1) the
Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for
words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20 that
his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be
punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline
therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken
up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he
takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under
the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any
speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House
of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This
section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the
Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has
always been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the
members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place"
than Congress.
40
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has
invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a
member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to
enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that
he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however
powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion
offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices
of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the
United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in
so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using
the following language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a
measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the
infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two
other congressmen were censured for employing insulting words
during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member
of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in
debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee
rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress
have been, or could be censured, committed to prison 3, even expelled
by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply
attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice
and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take
disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of
suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949,
suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives
provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the
United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its
proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer
take action against me, he argues, because after my speech, and
before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business.
Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously
approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension
of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary
practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the
operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew
its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending the period
of limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions that
had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such
laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S.
620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate, court are subject to
revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body."
Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will
not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisited number of members have agreed to a particular measure." 6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme
court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it
is uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative
bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure,
adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security
against hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433;
Holt vs.Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott,
104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany,
23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass.
220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109;
City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs.Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632;
Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W.
Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of
Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p.
584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman
Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution
of censure was presented, the House approved the resolution, despite
the argument that other business had intervened after the
objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief
Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmen a may be
discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We
believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can
not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the
power to determine whether Osmen a conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction,
which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a
prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.,
139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. The principle
is well established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction
in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department
with the legislature since each department is equally
independent within the power conferred upon it by the
Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the
courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative
functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to
example a member, the court will not review its action or
revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur.,
Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark
case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators who had been
expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe,
filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the
Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense,
41
besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of
California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic
language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no
power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department
by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even
in the absence of an express provision conferring the power,
every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative
power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for
any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray
473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in
substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body;
that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high
functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a
power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must
necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and
require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision authority courts to
control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of
the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the
legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the power
this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this
court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof,
in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our
opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although
referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other
disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House
has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious
hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the
legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to
disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our
special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel
bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles
and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives
of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions,
that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute
unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders. 8 And in several
instances, it took action against offenders, even after other
business had been considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend
is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by
resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he
had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases
the latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied
to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the
resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of
powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate
petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to
adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to
removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then
functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive
member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically
provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly
behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel
an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General
to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without restriction as
to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the
Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that
"suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without
that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy."
But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to
the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was
by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the
Twelfth District and maybe the view of the Government of the United
States or of the Governor-General, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had
only those power which were granted to it by the Jones Law 10;
whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and
preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the
Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court
reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the
power it then exercisedthe power of suspension for one year.
Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent legislative
prerogative of suspension 11 which the Constitution did not impair. In
fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a
Senator for 12 months in 1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary,
subject only to such limitations are found in the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by
usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine
Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.
(Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the
district's representation can not be more weightly in the matter of
suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet
deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of
their members to jail.12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition
intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin pursuance
of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had
been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the
House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had
closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It
would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having
become moot or academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent
petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all members of the
House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a
justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit,
however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera
vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important
questions of political law, the Court thought it proper to express at
this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and
decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So
ordered.
[G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE
FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
DECISION
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and
how far it can go, in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner,
Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending
42
criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees
of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against
petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took
over the case from Investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having
been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon
petitioners request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for
approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the
Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the
Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations
against petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the
Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved, forthwith,
three informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner
was indicted thusly:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public
officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization of the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini
Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu
Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming
Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Quiu, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong
Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei
Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @
Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min
Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @
Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen
Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
1984 in violation of Executive Order no. 324 dated April 13, 1988
which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing
fully well that said aliens are disqualified, thereby giving
unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was
unlawfully legalized by said accused.[1]
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555
and no. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of
petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00)
Pesos.Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical
appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a
vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional
liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would
warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the
Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided to
his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the
arraignment on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond
and prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a
recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition
for Certiorari with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before the
Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a
motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her
arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a
temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order deferring
petitioners arraignment and the consideration of her motion to
cancel the cash bond until further advice from the court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the
petition and lifting the temporary restraining order. The subsequent
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioners
intention to accept a fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an
order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan
Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and to defer her
arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09
November 1992, her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The
following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court,
docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a
motion for bill of particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating
that the names of the aliens whose applications she purportedly
approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were
conspicuously omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the
Sandiganbayan to reset petitioners arraignment not later than five
days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two amended
informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32
informations. The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her
motion to dismiss the said informations and directed her to post bail
on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed
against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition
for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March
1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to
disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its 14 th March 1993
resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and seeking the
nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing
Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease and desist from sitting in the
case, as well as from enforcing the 11 th March 1993 resolution
ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 amended
informations, and from proceeding with her arraignment on 12 April
1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been
resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266,
directed the OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended
informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were
consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to
Redetermine probable Cause and to dismiss or quash said
information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution
filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an
order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the
testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The presentation was
scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her
opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion for the prosecution within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a
motion for reconsideration of its 03 rd August 1995 order which would
allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the
Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review
43
on Certiorari, entitled Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan,
docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of
the prosecution to suspend her. On 25 January 1996, the
Sandiganbayan resolved:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the
motion under consideration and hereby suspends the accused
Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines and from any other government position
she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her suspension shall be
for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon
notice.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto
Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the Philippines, Executive House,
Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the
implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of
the Senate shall inform this court of the action taken thereon within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.
The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of
implementation of the suspension order as well as the expiry of the
ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at the time. [2]
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy
thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the
suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive
suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any
law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been
separated from the service, has already received such benefits he
shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended
by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982).
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, [3] the Court
reiterated:
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --- treating of the
suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer --- may no
longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons
indicted upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be
appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary
employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service. [4]
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue
an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the
information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order
of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and
buts about it.[5] Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension,
the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan[6] observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension.[7]
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan
merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as
well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once,
upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public
officials and employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public
officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged.Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office
would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he stands accused.[8]
En passan, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or
self-operative as the validity of the information must be determined
in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the
conduct thereof. It has been said that-
x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the
right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the revised Penal Code
which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under
section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the
information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his
prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is charged do
not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion
to quash the information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117
of the Rules of Court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on
the ground that the acts for which the accused is charged do not
constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the
provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated
only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by
way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a),
section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the
challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground,
should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the
information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an
offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery
of the Revised Penal Code.[9]
44
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be
established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits
proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1)
the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity
of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records an other evidence before the court could have
a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of
the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him,
such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific
crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject
to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal procedure. [10]
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to
petitioners case before the Sandiganbayan has been brought to this
Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon the
resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs.
Vasquez,[11] petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez, [12] petitioner sought the
nullification of the hold departure order issued by the
Sandiganbayan via a Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from
Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with
Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs.
Garchitorena,[13] petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution,
dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice
Garchitorena disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the
resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as filed the 32
amended informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, [14] petitioner assailed the denial by the
Sandiganbayan of her motion for her reconsideration from its
03rd August 1995 order allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of
these cases,[15] the Court declared:
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us
involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No.
107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the
issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the
information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation
of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge
any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because
the official acts complained of therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications
for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of qualified
aliens even though they had arrived in the Philippines after
December 31 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in
not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the
allegations of fact in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603
[1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion
that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the
stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January
1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
 (5) She acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality
in the execution of her official functions.
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the
offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.[16]
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed
against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its
mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under
the Constitution which provides that each-
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence
of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.[17]
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is
a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate
or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,[18] the Court affirmed the order of suspension of
Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his
protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives
of congress. The Court ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress
inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend
or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject
to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019,
which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to
have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No.
3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of
the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of
the government the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has
exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding
into the internal affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article
VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in
the settlement of actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also in the determination of
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the
Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion committed
by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in
general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation
in the light of any emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term
has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes
to the view[19] that unless an infringement of any specific
Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not
deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other
two branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear
disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that
45
can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. If any part of
the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary
needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the
manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has
been decided by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06
December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future
guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS; COMPOSITION
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner, vs. REPRESENTATIVES
MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO
G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be
appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondents.
This case involves a question of power. May the House of
Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral
Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by
the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme
Court review and annul that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago,
in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark
upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the
Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate"
because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude"
into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their
prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest
branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a political
confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head
ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the
accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter involved is left
to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the
sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive
branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it
was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the
President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the
courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the
constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action,
especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As
we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary
power is granted either department of government may not be an
obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse
thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a
constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted,
limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is
to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of
the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have
adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
Associate Justice
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an
express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of Supreme Court
the Philippines which defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of Congressman
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 1st District

The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the Benguet LDP
actions of the executive and legislative branches of the Government,
does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the
irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of Congressman
legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is
brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or 1st District Palawan
prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is
LDP

a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
courts to enable them to administer justice according to
law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to Congressman
hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before
the court, to the determination of which must be brought 2nd District Nueva Ecija
the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.
192, 203.) LDP

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member
Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival Congressman
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District
of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the 1st District Davao del Sur
canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
LDP
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
Congressman

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the 4th District Batangas
election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case LDP
No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of nine (9) ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member

members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Congressman

Court and the remaining six are members of the House
of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional 2nd District Zamboanga del Sur

representation from the political parties and the parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
as follows:
(formerly GAD, now NP)
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and
submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for
decision in July, 1989.

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman

By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won
Associate Justice over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the
LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and
Supreme Court recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at
least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted
Associate Justice in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman
Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman
Supreme Court Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

46
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on
March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP
Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also
that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self-
respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the
members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the
appreciation of the contested ballot1 Congressman Camasura's
revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry
of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority
in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of
Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy
of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc
decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura
by letter2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur
Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already
expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for
having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
"Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members
in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are
"not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a
complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to
LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee
unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and
asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note
of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite. 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the
Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following
letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the
basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during
its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to
the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution
Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of
the decision of the House of Representatives during its
plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable
Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal on
the basis of an LDP communication which is self-
explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations
Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
47
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of this
"distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their
assignments in the HRET because
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the
decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest
entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously
scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See
the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78
promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no
legal impediment to its promulgation, the decision which
was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently
expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration
by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as
October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal
requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization
of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with
a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc, and
concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera,
Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and
Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles,
is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with
Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon
Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case
was, in our view, a conscience vote, for which he earned the
respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of
the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has
come about. It is extremely difficult to continue with
membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to
preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional
body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the
unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being
prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should
not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional
function by factors which have nothing to do with the
merits of the cases before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the
provision for proportional representation in the Tribunal
found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution,
should be amended to provide instead for a return to the
composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is:
three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes
and three (3) of the party having the second largest
number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of
three (3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no
party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative
component in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could
perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole
judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate.
In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial
 elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of
election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the
Constitution that upon designation to membership in the
Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest
themselves of affiliation with their respective political
parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as
they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the
Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated today, 14
March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is
scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman
v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week
recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the
constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead
of the completion of the present congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be
relieved from the chairmanship and membership in the
Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the
Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation
of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at
9:45 tills morning from the House of Representatives that
at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted
to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the
promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET
Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because,
without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks
the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24
of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of
the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this
development undermines the independence of the Tribunal
and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they
have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for
their relief from membership in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also
manifested his intention to resign as a member of the
Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino,
Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also manifested a
similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for
relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them
to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the
Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests
relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are
48
appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in
the decision of the cases before them and that in the
contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators,
thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the
Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective
political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also
submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the
Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof
should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and may not be legally terminated except
only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal
for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the
request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be
relieved from their membership in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT
them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its
concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the
proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in
character despite the inclusion of legislators in its
membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all
the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those
from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only
for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members
of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in
the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but
I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast
his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a
political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-
Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is
on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against
Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice
Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of
March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to
rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol
or whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent
Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging
functions as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent
Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his
functions as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course,
required the respondents to comment5 on the petition within ten
days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and
allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M.
Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G.
Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until
the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the
election of said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by
the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until
otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the
petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority that
nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by
the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on
Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to
remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the
political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on
account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political
party;6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive
with his legislative term,7 for if a member of the Tribunal who
changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the
constitutional provision mandating representation based on political
affiliation would be completely nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of
Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the
LDP9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-
Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political
question beyond the reach of judicial review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol
alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because
he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the
HRET.11 Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of
Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not
the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's
membership in the HRET.12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar
vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party respondent is
erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the
Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the
HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House
of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding
the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of
the HRET.13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner
argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the
assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged
that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET
Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice. 14 Hence, although the
Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to
the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner
for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give
recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to
whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the
Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner
explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the
respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives
had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's
membership in the HETH several newspapers of general circulation
reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect
Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the
Tribunal.16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution
to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an election contest
in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing"
the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
49
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to
that question. It provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of their respective members, Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution,
except the provision on the representation of the main political
parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead
of equal representation of three members from each of the first and
second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935
constitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by
each House, three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the
second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice
in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935
Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it
was impossible for any political party to control the voting in the
tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the
Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores
the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5,
1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court
although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-
political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said
about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral
tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the
Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to
transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised
by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge
contests relating to the election and qualification of
 members of the National Assembly is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the
legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were
created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as
such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to
select their own employees, and to supervise and control
them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral
Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide
congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the
Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from
and independent of the legislature and though not a power
in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority,
an independent organ; while composed of a majority of
members of the legislature it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created
for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to
election returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly may not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the
election and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved
undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchanges on
the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the
1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we
can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House
or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are
constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the
case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are
created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not
constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the
Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is
a constitutional body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then
subject to constitutional restrictions?
50
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional
restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in
the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be
applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it
ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate
departments of the government. Would that ruling still be
valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments
because the separate departments are the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional
bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate
departments of government, I would like to know again if
the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139,
would still be applicable to the present bodies we are
deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these
electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of
partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress
has no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral
tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent
although they are not a separate branch of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all
parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave unto
themselves the determination of controversies with respect
to the election and qualifications of their members, and
precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which
takes care of this particular controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral
tribunals is an exception to this rule because apparently we
have an independent electoral tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are
independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the
wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is
still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral
Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House and
tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on,
are independent from both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question.
How can we say that these bodies are independent when
we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam
President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a
portion of this in the Committee on the Executive, there
was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner
Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in
these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still
sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in
the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case
No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law and
 justice with complete detachment from an political
considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record
how we could achieve such detachment when there are six
politicians sitting there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while
chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling
competence, shown independence in the proceedings of
this Commission. I think we can also trust that the
members of the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111-
112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of
the HRET.
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously
guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a
myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or
the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political
(as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral
tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be
the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the
work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a
mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which
the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member
would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well
abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership
in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They
must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
impartiality, and independence even independence from the political
party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach
of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from
the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice,
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of
tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the
House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's
right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just
as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other
valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has
51
formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this
case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the
LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated
his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members
of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure
because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the
Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional term,
namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to
the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice
Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to
deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however,
that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no
political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove
Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice
Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a
leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons,
and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case
in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled
from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had
revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the
Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura
was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision
may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the
LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the
Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of
Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman
Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in
the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the
protection of his rights against the strong arm of the majority party in
the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for
relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives
had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court,
as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and
discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the
action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the
Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the
land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio
Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a
lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of
the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate
(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the
resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal.
The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays
for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing
the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby
declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution,
and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his
position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991,
cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr.
Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside.
Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation
of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral
cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the
interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY
PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the
parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against
respondent Marciano A. Pineda. SO ORDERED.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS; POWERS
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our
nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the
effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot,
this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would
give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates
that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a
winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the
ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving
effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to
our democratic institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided the
following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR.
ADALLA STS., PALM VILLAGE, MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
______ Years and 10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I
will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed to
such is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion, and that the facts therein are true to
the best of my knowledge.1
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and
Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A.
Aquino2 on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6,
Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.
The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was
filed, petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy amending the
52
certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item
8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he
sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days.3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995
praying for the dismissal of the disqualification case. 4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the
COMELEC wherein petitioner testified and presented in evidence,
among others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, 5 lease contract
between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1,
1994,6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April 28,1995 7 and
Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995.8
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division
of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission
(Second Division) RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant:
petition for Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO
AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of
Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati
City. SO ORDERED.9
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en
banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where
three (3) candidates vied for the congressional seat in the Second
District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty
seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco,
who obtained thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes.10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed
an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending
petitioner's proclamation. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, the Board of Canvassers of the City
of Makati is hereby directed to complete the canvassing of
election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to
suspend the proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino
should he obtain the winning number of votes for the
position of Representative of the Second District of the City
of Makati, until the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the
Commission.
The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to
cause the immediate implementation of this Order. The
Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise directed to
inform the parties by the fastest means available of this
Order, and to calendar the hearing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning,
PICC Press Center, Pasay City. SO ORDERED.11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with
urgent motion to lift order of suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental
Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve
Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested
his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the
determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is
lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation,
the COMELEC en banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal
portion thereof residing:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the
attendant circumstances of the case, the Commission
RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to
suspend its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid
motion, and to allow the parties to be heard thereon because
the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be
studied with more reflection and judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May
6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Second
Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED.
Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and
thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of
Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati
City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the
constitutional qualification of residence. Consequently, the
order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent
should he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by
this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made permanent.
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of
Canvassers of the City of Makati shall immediately
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of
election returns, determine the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates, who shall be immediately
be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated
May 15, 1995 and June 2, 1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2,
1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the
following errors for consideration, to wit:
A. THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE
AND ADJUDGE THE DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8, 1995
ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO
AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS
JURISDICTION, SAID JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE
INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND THE
REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S
IN ANOTHER FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE
HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION
C. THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS
QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX "C", PETITION) DESPITE
53
IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF
JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS
JURISDICTION, THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN DIRECTING
WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE
PROCLAMATION OF THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE THE
MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM
(PENDING THE FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION
CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY NOT TO
THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL.
D. THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST
THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE AND TO
APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
E. IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF
ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED
POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR
LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND
BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S
DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.
F. THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO "DETERMINE
AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING
QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS
DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH
DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE WELL
SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE
OR PERSON WHO WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE
IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED AS
SUBSTITUTE WINNER.15
I
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends
that after the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for member of
the House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the
petition for disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet unresolved
question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC
committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing
the suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in the
Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an
unproclaimed candidate to the House of Representatives and a
member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an
election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly
assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns
and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House
only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the
House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been
proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said
to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section. 17
of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in
an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A.
6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances
mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the
conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the
winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the
COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the
question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the
elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to
Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions
relating to qualifications of candidates Section 6 states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate, who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case
against a candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does
not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the
highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or
termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of
guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong"
seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be
applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application
of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based
on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate
of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall
apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas
Pambansa 881.
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner
could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District
of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice. 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House
of Representatives should be a resident of the district in which he
seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court
held that the term "residence" has always been understood as
synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there
held: 20
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal
that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of
a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as
that of domicile, to wit:
54
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I
remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's concept
of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the
regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, and a resident thereof', that is, in
the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile (emphasis
ours) Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on
section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen
consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some
difficulty especially considering that the
provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the
original concept that it should be by domicile and
not physical and actual residence. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22,
1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier
definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it
as having the same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home," 21 where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of
this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as
explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or
newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing
wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the
essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular
district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated
by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met
by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to
inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner
actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now
encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time
of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of
Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he
was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was
a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that
election. 23 At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a
registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno
and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the
COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of
record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of
candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati
City is an alleged lease agreement of condominium unit in the area.
As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati
City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of
respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by
its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and
respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was
really for only one (l) year because he has other
"residences" in Manila or Quezon City. 26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of
the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself
claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the
short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium
unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate
that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence" 27 is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City." 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing a
successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated
above, the lack of identification sentimental, actual or otherwise
with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the
lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency
for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of
Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the
one year residence requirement as a qualification for a
candidate of Representative, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid
lease agreement cannot, by itself establish; a domicile of
choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do better. 29
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from
Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the
facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. 30 These
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of
petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second
District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the
domicile of origin be deemed to continue requirements are hardly
met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a
change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be
deemed to continue.
55
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to
impose the one year residency requirement in a newly created
political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political
district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a
real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of
Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area
encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-
day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage of the creation
of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in
such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process
of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be
noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was
disqualified from running in the Senate because of the constitutional
two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could
run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove
with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence
for election law purposes for the period required by law. This he has
not effectively done.
III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it
Order instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim
as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes.
The answer must be in the negative.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the
"first" among the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is
to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the
sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters'
preferences. The result suggested by private respondent would lead
not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two
cases of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive disenfranchisement
of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate
they believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had
petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice,
moreover, would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the
acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have
automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing
field would have substantially changed. To simplistically assume that
the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer
is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated
by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered
the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes
the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially
changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such
circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has
swung from one end to the other. In the early case of Topacio
v. Paredes. 32 we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a disqualified,
ineligilble or dead candidate provided the people who voted for such
candidate believed in good faith that at the time of the elections said
candidate was either qualified, eligible or alive. The votes cast in
favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the
next higher number of votes cannot be proclaimed as winner.
According to this Court in the said case, "there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest, that wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question
is the eligibility of the one receiving the plurality of the legally cast
ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of
a non-candidate in view of his unlawful change of party affiliation
(which was then a ground for disqualification) cannot be considered
in the canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the
category of invalid and nonexistent votes because a disqualified
candidate is no candidate at all and is not a candidate in the eyes of
the law. As a result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the only
candidate left in the disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio
v. Paredes that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be
proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the
portion is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of
the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of
votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled
by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea
in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal
votes cast in the elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676.)
However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our
previous ruling in Geronimo v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes
cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the category of invalid or
non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at
all in the eyes of the law," reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson
v. Comelec.
In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella
v. Comelec; 37 and Benito v. Comelec, 38 this Court reiterated and
upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos to the
effect that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher
number of votes to be declared elected, and that a minority or
defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to the office. In these
cases, we put emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo
v. Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute
which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative
policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief
that candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible; they should
not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo,
Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest
number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact
remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will.
Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the
electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was
then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his
subsequent disqualification does not make respondent
Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case
of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we
held that:
56
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally
a petition to deny due course to the certificate of
candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before
Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains
that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the
province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal
considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of
the province voted for her in the sincere belief that
she was a qualified candidate for the position of
governor.Her votes was counted and she obtained
the highest number of votes. The net effect is that
petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated
by the electorate. . . What matters is that in the
event a candidate for an elected position who is
voted for and who obtains the highest number of
votes is disqualified for not possessing the
eligibility, requirements at the time of the election
as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes for the same
position cannot assume the vacated position.
(Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and
we see no compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like
Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally
filed a disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as
SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's
(Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of
Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then,
was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon,
the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain
the degree of finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not
the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as
mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes
in the election, he was obviously not the choice of
the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue
is Santos v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA
740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
who placed second was proclaimed elected after
the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-
candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect,
the second placer won by default. That decision
was supported by eight members of the Court
then (Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente,
Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos
and Melencio-Herrera) and another two
reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.).
One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds,
that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case
of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents
the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio
 vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of
the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot
be deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since
1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has
been disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified
candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void.
This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in
whom, sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious,
the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner
Labo bona fide without any intention to missapply their
franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then
qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately,
petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot
assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for
can or cannot be installed, under no circumstances can a
minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the
office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is
not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for
petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of
Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No. 105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic
view. We cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the
contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has
been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining
qualified candidates because this clearly represents a minority view
supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and
English court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility that
the runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so
measly and insignificant in number that the votes they receive would
be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer" could
receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the
totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in
instances where the votes received by the second placer may not be
considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are
nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among
qualified candidates, should the equation change because of the
disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident.
Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices
could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second
placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election
cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes
cast where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or
plurality of the votes.
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's
conclusion declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective
position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the
basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the
one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the
people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications
necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner
clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for
membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a
majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati
57
City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the
fundamental law itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Our Order restraining respondent COMELEC from
proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of
votes in the congressional elections for the Second District of Makati
City is made PERMANENT. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992.]
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO G.
TIOZON, Petitioners, v. RAUL. A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, as
Secretary of the House of Representatives, MR. JOSE MARIA
TUAO, as Officer-in-Charge, Gen. Services Division of the House
of Representatives, MRS. ROSALINDA G. MEDINA, as Chief
Accountant of the House of Representatives, and the HON.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL; SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS
RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
ITS MEMBERS. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification
of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of
Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a
petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate of candidacy before
the election or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal
within ten (10) days after Dazas proclamation.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; WRIT OF
PROHIBITION; NOT INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR ACTS ALREADY
CONSUMMATED. A writ of prohibition can no longer be issued
against respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of
prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; DE FACTO OFFICERS;
ENTITLED TO EMOLUMENT FOR ACTUAL SERVICES RENDERED.
As a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse
funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid
as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
RESOLUTION
On February 18, 1992, Petitioners, residents of the second
Congressional District of Northern Samar filed the instant petition for
prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then
incumbent congressman of the same congressional district, from
continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that
the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of
the United States since October 16, 1974.
Petitioners allege that Hr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration,
renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating
Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code)
and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
On February 25, 1992, we required respondents to comment. On
March 13, 1992, Respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed a
motion for extension of time to file their comment for a period of
thirty days or until April 12, 1992. Reacting to the said motion,
petitioners on March 30, 1992, manifested their opposition to the 30-
day extension of time stating that such extension was excessive and
prayed that respondent instead be granted only 10 days to file their
comment. On May 5, 1992, the Court noted the manifestation and
opposition.

On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before us that on April 2,
1992, they filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections
on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (SPC 92-084)
and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful
assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until
June 30, 1992. 1
On April 10, 1992, respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment
denying the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States;
that although he was accorded a permanent residency status on
October 8, 1980 as evidenced by a letter order of the District Director,
US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A., 2 he
had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on
August 12, 1985. 3
On April 13, 1992, public respondent Camilo Sabio, Secretary General
of the House of Representatives, Mr. Jose Mari Tuan o, as OIC of the
General Services Division, Mrs. Rosalinda G. Medina, as Chief
Accountant of the House of Representatives and Commission on
Audit, filed their comment. They contend that if indeed Congressman
Daza is a greencard holder and a permanent resident of the United
States of America, then he should be removed from his position as
Congressman. However, they opined that only Congressman Daza can
best explain his true and correct status as a greencard holder. Until he
files his comment to the petition, petitioners prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction should not be
granted. 4
Eight (8) days later, respondent Daza, reacting to the petition before
the COMELEC (SPC 92-084) and hypothesizing that the case before
the COMELEC would become moot should this Court find that his
permanent resident status ceased when he was granted a US non-
immigrant visa, asked this Court to direct the COMELEC to dismiss
SPC No. 92-084. 5
On May 5, 1992, petitioners filed their reply. On May 21, 1992, this
Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file
their respective memoranda.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The central issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Petitioners insist that Congressman Daza should be disqualified from
exercising the functions of his office being a permanent resident alien
of the United States at the time when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 11, 1987 Elections. To buttress their
contention, petitioners cite the recent case of Caasi v. Court of
Appeals. 6
In support of their charge that respondent Daza is a greencard holder,
petitioners presented to us a letter from the United States
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
which reads: 7
File No. A20 968 618
Date: Nov. 5, 1991
LOS914732
Geraghty, OLoughlin and Kenney
Attn: David C. Hutchinson
386 N. Wasbasha Street
St. Paul, Minn. 55102-1308
58
SUBJECT:
Daza, Raul A.
Your request was received in this office on _________; please note the
paragraph(s) checked below:c
x x x
10. [XX] Other remarks:
Service File A20 968 619 relating to Raul Daza reflects: subject
became a Lawful Permanent Resident on Oct. 16, 1974. As far as we
know subject (sic) still has his greencard. No he has not applied for
citizenship.
Sincerely, (sic)
Sgd. District Director
Form G-343 (Rev. 8-20-82)N
We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is
already moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation
filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992 8 that they seek to unseat
respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his
term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992.
Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House
Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification
of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of
Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a
petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate of candidacy before
the election 9 or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral
Tribunal within ten (10) days after Dazas proclamation. 10 Third, a
writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since
his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to
provide for acts already consummated. 11 Fourth, as a de facto public
officer, 12 respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed
during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a de
jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered. 13
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for
being MOOT and ACADEMIC. SO ORDERED.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS; NATURE & COMPOSITION
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD), petitioners, vs. NEPTALI
A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E.
TAADA, respondents.
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.
RESOLUTION
In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E.
Tan ada on October 27, 1992 and respondents Senate President
Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992,
said respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated
October 20, 1992, on the following grounds:
Senator Tan ada alleges that:
1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of
relevant factual precedents;
2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system
recognized both by the letter and spirit of the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions;
3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on
Appointments;
4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
elected respondent Tan ada to the Commission on Appointments.
In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales
and Romulo allege:
1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling
in the two cases of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr.1 and Daza vs. Singson.2
2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of
Appointments to enable it to function as a constitutional body.
3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate
and accepted by all political parties and must govern the selection of
respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments.
4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the
multi-party system which contemplates a realignment of political
parties to remove fractional membership of any party in the
Commission.
On December 16, 1992, the petitioner-in intervention Nationalist
People's Coalition (NPC) filed its separate Comments to the Motions
of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on January 7,
1993 their separate Comments on the Motion of the respondents.
Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents
and in the light of the reasons/arguments submitted in refutation
thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on the following
grounds:
1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of
Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution and We quote
pertinent portions thereof.
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that
the mathematical representation of each of the political
parties represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP 7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN .5
NPC 2.5
LAKAS-NUCD 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of
them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of
the rule on proportional representation of each of the
political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of
Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
application than as above. The problem is what to do with
the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership of
one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to
59
elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced
leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a violation of
Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its
mandate that membership in the Commission be based on
the proportional representation of the political parties. The
election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the
LDP and reduced the representation of one political party
either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
xxx xxx xxx
We find the respondent's claim to membership in the
Commission on Appointments by nomination and election
of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore violative of the same because it is not in
compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall
be elected on the basis of proportional representation of
the political parties represented therein. To disturb the
resulting fractional membership of the political parties in
the Commission on Appointments by adding together two
halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give the LDP an
added member in the Commission by utilizing the
fractional membership of the minority political party, who
is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation
is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion
to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard
the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the
party with a majority representation in the Senate or the
House of Representatives can by sheer force of numbers
impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a
proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the
majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the
balance of power. No party can claim more than what is
entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its
proportional share of members is to confer upon such a
party a greater share in the membership in the Commission
on Appointments and more power to impose its will on the
minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
rightful membership in the Commission.3
The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Tan ada in the
Commission on Appointments for the year alluded to by respondents
is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the
former Senator's Membership in the Commission during his first
election as Senator in 1953-1954. 4 In the following years the
composition of the Commission on Appointments showed varying
membership from the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not
discounting the various coalitions of the rival groups within their
own ranks. During this period, his membership in the Commission
was acquiesced to by the other members of the Senate, including the
Nationalista Party which had a fractional vote. His membership in the
Commission was never contested nor disputed by any party nor
member of the Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as
member of the Commission was constitutionality valid or not never
reached the Court. The older Tan ada's membership in the
Commission on Appointments cannot thus be considered by
respondent Senator Tan ada as a precedent sufficient to overrule the
clear mandate of Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.
It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late
Senator Lorenzo Tan ada, he had his Citizens Party coalesce with the
Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under the
banner of the latter party. His election to the Commission was
principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party with the
Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the
strength of his being the lone representative of the Citizens'
Party.5Senator Tan ada was included in the Nationalista Party ticket in
1953 until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the end
of 1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest candidate of the Nationalista Party
for a term of 6 years and again got
re-elected in 1965 for another 6-year term under the Nationalista
Party. The Nationalista-Citizens Party coalition of 12 Senators in the
Senate from
1965-1967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on
Appointments, including the late Senator Lorenzo Tan ada. As early as
those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportional
representation in the Commission by resorting to a coalition of
political parties in order to resolve and avoid fractional membership
in the Commission. This practice was repeated in
1968-1970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was
nominated and elected to the Commission on Appointments as the
Senator to complete a whole number in the proportional
representation to the Commission, with the late Senator Tan ada
becoming the 16th Senator of the Coalition, enabling it to put 8
members in the Commission. Likewise, in 1970, the late Senator
Tan ada filled up the 18th membership of the Coalition to become the
9th member representing the Coalition in the Commission.
The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Tan ada to the Commission
on Appointments does not reflect any practice or tradition in the
Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation
of the constitutional provision on proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments. No practice or tradition, established
by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a
doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the
absence of judicial confirmation of the constitutionality of the
challenged legislative practice the repeated erroneous legislative
interpretation of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on
the legislature.6
2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the
listing of the party affiliation of the Senators based on the result of
the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members and
including Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the Lakas-
NUCDP. Respondents, however, accepted the fact that for purposes of
determining the proportional representatives of each political party
to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual
number of members of each political party at the time of election of
the members of the Commission on Appointments in the Senate. 7 In
fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona
with the Lakas-NUCDP upheld the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs.
Singson,8 recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the
Commission based on changing political alignments at the time of the
organization of the Commission on Appointments. The issue
therefore has no significance as an argument to set aside our
decision.
3) Senator Tan ada was actually nominated by the LP because the
house rules require that the party must make the nomination. In fact
he nominated himself as representative of the LP-LDP-LABAN. It was
the Majority Leader, an LDP Senator, (Senator Romulo) who
presented the motion to elect respondent Senator Tan ada (along with
the Senators belonging to the other Minority parties NPC and
LAKAS-NUCD) as part of his function or duty to present for election
and votation those previously nominated by the various political
parties. In nominating the twelve (12) Senators to the membership in
the Commission on Appointments, Senator Romulo moved:
Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have
the honor to submit for election to the Commission on
Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its
membership : Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino,
60
Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo for the LDP; Senators
Tolentino and Osmen a for NPC; Senator Rasul, for Lakas-
NUCD; and Senator Tan ada for LP-PDP, Mr. President.9
4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the
Constitution providing for a multi-party system, entitlement to
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments
requires a minimum membership in each house. 10 The statement of
this Court in Daza vs. Singson 11 to the effect that "under the
Constitutional provision on membership of the Commission on
Appointments, the members thereof are NOT limited to the majority
and minority parties therein but extends to all the political parties
represented in each house of Congress", does not and should not be
construed to mean that all political parties, irrespective of numerical
representation in the Senate, are entitled by Constitutional fiat to at
least one representation in the Commission. The Supreme Court in
the subsequent case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 12 made this clear where
it ruled that proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in each
house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to a political
party does not ipso facto entitle such a party to membership in the
Commission on Appointments.
5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the
full complement of 12 Senators be elected to the membership in the
Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions
and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission.
The overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be
a proportional representation of the political parties in the
membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the
specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely
an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the
Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot
disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties
even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations like
the case at bar.
Section 18 provides, in part, as follows:
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of
the President of the Senate as ex-officioChairman, twelve
Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on the basis of
proportional representation . . . .
The respondent's contention that the use of the word "shall" in
Section 18 indicating the composition of the Commission on
Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory,
omitting that part of Section 18 which provides that (they shall be)
elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation.
This interpretation finds support in the case of Taada vs.
Cuenco, 13 where this Court held that the constitutional provision
makes mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators to
the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they should be
elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political
parties. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter mandate
requiring proportional representation must prevail. Such
interpretation is the only correct and rational interpretation which
the court can adopt in consonance with its solemn duty to uphold the
Constitution and give effect the meaning intended by its framers to
every clause and word thereof.
The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve
Senators and twelve Representatives in order that the Commission
may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the Commission
on Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by
majority vote of all the members", and in Section 19 of the same
Article, it is provided that the Commission "shall meet only while
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all
its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein
conferred upon it". In implementing these provisions, the Rules of the
Commission on Appointments provide that the presence of at least
thirteen (13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum,
"Provided however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting
the quorum should come from either house". 14 Even if the
composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can
perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the
required quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the
Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions
and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected
thereto. Even if respondent Senator Tan ada is excluded from the
Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on
proportional representation, the party he represents still has
representation in the Commission in the presence of house members
from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.
Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested
a practical solution to break the impasse in the membership of the
Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote:
. . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the
political parties from forming a coalition with another
political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting
from this decision. 15
The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It
is not part of the disposition of the case. It does not contemplate a
realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court would have
explicitly said so. What we intimated is merely this: That those
entitled to fractional memberships may join their half-memberships
to form a full membership and together nominate one from their
coalition to the Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC
and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-memberships and jointly
nominate one of their own Senators to the Commission. In the same
way the LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate Senator Wigberto
Tan ada to fill up the other slot to complete the membership to twelve.
But the latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator
Tan ada and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is
certainly a violation of the rule on proportional representation.
Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose
who among them will sit as members of the Commission on
Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed
by the Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of senators to be
chosen must comply with the rule on proportional representation.
The question of who interprets what is meant by proportional
representation has been a settled rule that it belongs to this Court.
The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle
temporarily the impasse concerning the membership in the
Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the
Supreme Court is a Senate recognition that the determination of
proportional representation under Article VI, Section 18 of the
Constitution is a function of this Court.
Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to decide.
The framers of our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of
other states, thought it wise to vest in the Supreme Court the role in
final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the
fundamental law. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the
unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to silence the
minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction tyranny by
force of numbers.
The election of respondents Senators Tan ada and Romulo is a clear
disregard of the constitutional provision and when done over the
61
objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse
of discretion. We quote from our decision:
. . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tan ada as
members of the Commission on Appointments by the LDP
Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and
election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority
in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of
August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion.
Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with
the command of the Constitution, and by reason of
numerical strength, knowingly and not merely
inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority
granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly
found to exist. 16
For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with
FINALITY. SO ORDERED.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS; POWERS & FUNCTIONS
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G.
ARCILLA, petitioners, vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional
boundaries. In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are
taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent
Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from
effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason
of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the
constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for
stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to
the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions
of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent
Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the
Commission on Appointments to intervene and file a petition in
intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said petition.
The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The
parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it
involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of
government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also
occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively
clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad
Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
 The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is
to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force
is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in
the constitutional provisions themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions,
not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in accordance with what
they say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions
or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom
the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law
to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are
initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone
of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or
without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and
statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But
we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
62
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with
more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the
1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the
appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth
groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief
Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a
constitutional provision must be presumed to have been
framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior
and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are
bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution
are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the
subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they
express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry
vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, it is provided that
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads
of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the
army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
(4) The President shall havethe power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of
bureaus and offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or
Commodore, and all other officers of The government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the
Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive
Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and
Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their
respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments
required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the
power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under
the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times,
into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the
authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by
successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment
in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and
the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to
state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people
adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first
group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such
confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the
second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e.,
officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this
conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by
the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, read as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the
consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the
heads of the executive departments and bureaus,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of departments 7 [Emphasis supplied].
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision
in the 1935 Constitution. When the frames discussed on the floor of
the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling
was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on
Appointments over presidential appointments more limited than that
held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. Thus-
Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner
Monsod be recognized
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide
later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just
want to take a few minutes of our time to lay the
basis for some of the amendments that I would
like to propose to the Committee this morning.
xxx xxx xxx
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the
Commission on Appointments be limited to the department
heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the levels
of bureau heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two
(2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These
were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from
the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under
the second sentence 9 of the section from the same requirement. The
records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show
the following:
63
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be
recognized
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is
recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed
amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26
which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and
on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase
'colonel or naval captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR
REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is
co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to put
a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line
29 of the same page, start a new sentence with:
HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments
one by one. The first proposed amendment is to
delete the words "and bureaus" on line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other
Commissioners, what would be the justification
of the proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is
actually quite low in the executive department,
and to require further confirmation of
presidential appointment of heads of bureaus
would subject them to political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed
amendment by deletion also includes regional
directors as distinguished from merely staff
directors, because the regional directors have
quite a plenitude of powers within the regions as
distinguished from staff directors who only stay
in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under
the supervisiopn of the staff bureau directors.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to
Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner proposed
an amendment to delete 'and bureaus on Section
16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if
it is not the President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint
them but their appointment shall no longer be
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with
the same answer of Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the
reaction of the Committee?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the
Committee feels that this matter should be
submitted to the body for a vote.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments
one by one. We will first vote on the deletion of the
phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such that
appointments of bureau directors no longer need
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President
shall nominate, and with the consent of a
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the
heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete
the phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7, line 26?
(Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendments
is approved.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is
recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is
recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third
proposed amendment on page 7, line 28. 1
propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on
line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE
SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee
accepts the proposed amendment because it makes
it clear that those other officers mentioned therein
do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is
recognized.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an
amendment to his amendment, so that after
"captain" we insert the following words: AND
OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE
VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION?
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions
provided for in the Constitution whose
appointments are vested in the President, as a
64
matter of fact like those of the different
constitutional commissions.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials
found in Section 16 is not an exclusive list of
those appointments which constitutionally
require confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the
incorporation of the words I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate
his proposed amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following:
AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS
ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE
CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is
modified by the Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course,
that excludes those officers which the
Constitution does not require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, like the members
of the judiciary and the Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear
from the modification made by Commissioner
Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed
amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this
proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and
Davide as accepted by the Committee? (Silence)
The Chair hears none; the amendment, as
amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and
third groups of officers can be made by the President
without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales,
that the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII reading-
He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the
President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in
said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the
officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he
appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by
nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is
not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the
Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition; as
well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981
edition) which meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word
"also" in said second sentence means that the President, in
addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first
sentence, can appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the
officers mentioned in the second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings
of the word "also" as used in the context of said second sentence, the
Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first
sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the
President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences
proximate to each other underscores a difference in message
conveyed and perceptions established, in line with Judge Learned
Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien
juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify such
differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such
officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose
appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII.
Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor
requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even
if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the
purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the
1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose
appointments require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16,
Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President
without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what
they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or
presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such
power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it
is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly
stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint,
the intervenor Commission on Appointments underscores the third
sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
65
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the
absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by
the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows
that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President,
subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-
ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in
the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government.
No reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in
said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered
opinion, after a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the
word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more
than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled
that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at the
end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments. [Emphasis supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately
after the provision which makes practically all presidential
appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of
the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the
Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
herein provided for, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint; ...
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general
rule, presidential appointments to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an
exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers
lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear
and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no
reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word
"alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by
law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President
alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the
power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the
President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated
merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by
law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the
heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word
"alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10,
Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the
light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this
redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments,
except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are
not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted
within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as
they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs. SO ORDERED.

Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident

that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out,
while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately
excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that
need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.

Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the

Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601
of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:

601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs

shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known
respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as
the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in
accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws. The
Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by
the proper department head.

Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972
by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows:

Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The

Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant
chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner
(hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy
Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an
annual compensation in accordance with the rates
prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)

Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were
approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which
the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No.
1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII,
with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an
appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment,
however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.

66