1
Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective
JOSE C. MIRANDA, petitioners, vs. HON.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as
Executive Secretary respondents,
GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting
the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent
component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which
converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into
an independent component city was signed into
law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified
R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528
was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among
others, it changed the status of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component
city, viz:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT
CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT
COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY
OF SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting
the words an independent thereon so that
said Section will read as follows:
SEC. 2. The City of Santiago. The
Municipality of Santiago shall be converted
into a component city to be known as the
City of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as
the City, which shall comprise of the
present territory of the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction
of the City shall be within the present metes
and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is
hereby amended deleting the entire section and in
its stead substitute the following:
SEC. 51. Election of Provincial
Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang
Provincial Position for the Province of
Isabela.- The voters of the City of Santiago
shall be qualified to vote in the elections of
the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and
other elective provincial positions of the
Province of Isabela, and any such qualified
voter can be a candidate for such provincial
positions and any elective provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.- All existing laws or
parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect
upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 8528.2 They alleged as ground the lack of
provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for
ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper
plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of
Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at
bar.Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng
mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige,
Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago
City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial
officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of
petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also
contend that the petition raises a political question
over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor
General for the respondent public officials. The
Solicitor General also contends that petitioners are
not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is
contended that R.A. No. 8528
merely reclassified Santiago City from an
independent component city to a component city. It
allegedly did not involve any creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, hence, a
plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted
by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao,3 a member of the
provincial board of Isabela.4 He contended that both
the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991 do not require a plebiscite to approve a law that
merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in
provincial elections. The rules implementing the
Local Government Code cannot require a

plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners
lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments
of the respondents and the intervenor. They
defended their standing. They also stressed the
changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a
result of its reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of
petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule
that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by
one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.5 Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of
Santiago City when he filed the present petition in
his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city,
hence, he did not need the consent of the city council
of Santiago City. It is also indubitable that the
change of status of the city of Santiago from
independent component city to a mere component
city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown
hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the
enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and
immediate and not a mere generalized grievance
shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly,
the standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm
foundation. They are residents and voters in the city
of Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the
conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be
conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right
in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike
the law as unconstitutional.
Second. The plea that this court back off from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the
ground that it involves a political question has to be
brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal
especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as
including the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. To be sure, the
cut between a political and justiciable issue has been
made by this Court in many cases and need no
longer mystify us. In Taada v. Cuenco,6 we held:
xxx
The term political question connotes what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which under the
Constitution are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
2
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a
justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of such right, and a remedy
granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of
right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable
issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to
approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite
before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident
that whether or not petitioners have the said right is
a legal not a political question. For whether or not
laws passed by Congress comply with the
requirements of the Constitution pose questions that
this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this
Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and
nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject
of a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No.
8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that
the conversion of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city
should be submitted to its people in a proper
plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a
plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterated in
Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or
substantially alter boundaries of local government
units belongs to Congress.8 This power is part of

the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution
vested in Congress.9 The exercise of the power must
be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution. In
the case at bar, the issue is whether the
downgrading of Santiago City from an independent
component city to a mere component city requires
the approval of the people of Santiago City in a
plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on
whether or not the downgrading falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities
per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close
analysis of the said constitutional provision will
reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common
denominator - - - material change in the political
and economic rights of the local government units
directly affected as well as the people therein. It is
precisely for this reason that the Constitution
requires the approval of the people in the political
units directly affected. It is not difficult to appreciate
the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The
1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous
Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of
our people for it was borne out of the people power
in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article
X addressed the undesirable practice in the past
whereby local government units were created,
abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the
vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the
people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local
government unit directly affected was required to
serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of
legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing,
merging or altering the boundaries of local
government units. It is one instance where the
people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter
that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people
as opposed to democracy thru peoples
representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also
in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution
granting more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the
downgrading of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city are
many and cannot be characterized as
insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city
as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor
will be placed under the administrative supervision
of the provincial governor. The resolutions and
ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have
to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of
Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will
now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners
3
pointed out these far reaching changes on the life of
the people of the city of Santiago, viz:10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it
appear that R.A. No. 8528 had merely re-
classified Santiago City from an independent
component city into a component city, the effect
when challenged (sic) the Act were operational
would be, actually, that of
conversion. Consequently, there would
be substantial changes in the political culture and
administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and
the Province of Isabela. Santiago City from an
independent component city will revert to the
Province of Isabela, geographically, politically and
administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of
Santiago City will be added to the land area
comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to the
benefit or advantage of the Provincial Government
of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of
its share from the internal revenue allotment (IRA)
from the National Government (Section 285, R.A.
No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991). The IRA is based on land area and population
of local government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes
collected by the City Government, and which taxes
shall accrue solely to the City Government, will be
redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be
shared with the province such as taxes on sand,
gravel and other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A.
No. 7160), professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No.
7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No.
7160). The Provincial Government will allocate
operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would
be a (sic) diminished funds for the local operations
of the City Government because of reduced shares
of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth
by Section 285 of the R.A. No. 7160. The City
Governments share in the proceeds in the
development and utilization of national wealth shall
be diluted since certain portions shall accrue to the
Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A. No.7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote
for and can be voted as provincial officials (Section
451 and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the
administrative supervision of the Provincial
Governor who is tasked by law to ensure that every
component city and municipality within the territorial
jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope of
its prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and
465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section
30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by
the former (Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160)

and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the
local governance and state of affairs of the city
(Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective
city officials will also be effectively under the control
of the Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No.
7160). Such will be the great change in the state of
the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City
where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is the Office of
the President which has supervisory authority over it
as an independent component city (Section 25, R.A.
No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987
Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and
approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be
subject to the review of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468 (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2)
(vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the
decisions in administrative cases by the former could
be appealed and acted upon by the latter (Section
67, R.A. No. 7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No.
7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city, it
required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite
called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor
reason why this plebiscite should not be called to
determine the will of the people of Santiago City
when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their
city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the
people when a law substantially diminishes their
right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code is in accord with the Constitution
when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs
affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the
law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said
law or ordinance fixes another date.
x x x.
The rules cover all conversions, whether
upward or downward in character, so long as they
result in a material change in the local government
unit directly affected, especially a change in the
political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our
esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A.
No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has the
4
power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This
power of amendment, however, is limited by Section
10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when
an amendment of a law involves the creation,
merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected is mandatory. He
also contends that the amendment merely caused
a transition in the status of Santiago as a
city.Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city
was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A.
No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people
of the local government unit directly affected to vote
in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change
in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the
downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a
mere transition but they cannot blink away from the
fact that the transition will radically change its
physical and political configuration as well as the
rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the
classification involves changes in income,
population, and land area of the local government
unit is there a need for such changes to be
approved by the people x x x."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs
against the letter and spirit of section 10, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No
province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected." It is clear that the Constitution
imposes two conditions - - - first, the creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundary of a local government unit must meet the
criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on
income, population and land area and second, the
law must be approved by the people "by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8,
and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said
criteria and they involve requirements on income,
population and land area. These requirements,
however, are imposed to help assure the
economic viability of the local government unit
concerned. They were not imposed to determine
the necessity for a plebiscite of the
people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does
not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its

requirements on income, population and land area
have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10,
Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes
casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite
shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date."11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal
author of the Local Government Code of 1991,
opines that the plebiscite is absolute and
mandatory.12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two
requirements of the Constitution have different
purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local
Government Code on income, population and land
area are designed to achieve an economic
purpose. They are to be based on verified
indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local
Government Code requires that these "indicators
shall be attested by the Department of Finance, the
National Statistics Office, and the Lands
Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast,
the people's plebiscite is required to achieve
a political purpose --- to use the people's voice as
a check against the pernicious political practice of
gerrymandering. There is no better check against
this excess committed by the political
representatives of the people themselves than the
exercise of direct people power. As well-observed by
one commentator, as the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries are
"xxx basic to local government, it is
also imperative that these acts be done not only by
Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of
the locality concerned. xxx By giving the inhabitants
a hand in their approval, the provision will also
eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and
minimize legislative action designed for the benefit
of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the
autonomy of local government units."13
The records show that the downgrading of
Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of
its people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted
that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed,
Santiago City has been converted to an independent
component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years
ago and the conversion was approved by a majority
of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed
surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the
5
status of Santiago City as there had been no
significant change in its socio-economic-political
status. The only reason given for the downgrading is
to enable the people of the city to aspire for the
leadership of the province. To say the least, the
alleged reason is unconvincing for it is the essence
of an independent component city that its people
can no longer participate or be voted for in the
election of officials of the province. The people of
Santiago City were aware that they gave up that
privilege when they voted to be independent from
the province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the
part of the Committee on Local Government to
submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its
people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect
was about to be voted upon when a recess was
called. After the recess, the chairman of the
Committee anounced the withdrawal of the
amendment "after a very enlightening conversation
with the elders of the Body." We quote the
debates, viz:14
"BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we
consider House Bill No. 8729 as reported out
under Committee Report No. 971.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence]
there being none, the motion is approved.
"Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in
order. With the permission of the Body, the
Secretary will read only the title of the bill without
prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text
thereof.
"The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House
Bill No. 8729, entitled
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED
"AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN
INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO
BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO
_____________________________________
__________________
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
_____________________________________
__________________
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the
sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished

Chairman of the Committee on Local
Government be recognized.
"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR
SOTTO
"Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was
introduced in the House by Congressman
Antonio M. Abaya as its principal author, is a
simple measure which merely seeks to
convert the City of Santiago into a
component city of the Province of Isabela.
"The City of Santiago is geographically located
within, and is physically an integral part of the
Province of Isabela. As an independent
component city, however, it is completely
detached and separate from the said
province as a local political unit. To use the
language of the Explanatory Note of the
proposed bill, the City of Santiago is an
island in the provincial milieu.
"The residents of the city no longer participate in
the elections, nor are they qualified to run for
any elective positions in the Province of
Isabela.
"The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no
longer vested with the power and authority of
general supervision over the city and its
officials, which power and authority are now
exercised by the Office of the President,
which is very far away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province
of Isabela, the City of Santiago is affected,
one way or the other, by the happenings in
the said province, and is benefited by its
progress and development. Hence, the
proposed bill to convert the City of Santiago
into a component city of Isabela.
"Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to
present for consideration of this august Body
Committee Report No. 971 of the Committee
on Local Government , recommending
approval, with our proposed committee
amendment, of House Bill No. 8729.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is
recognized.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that
we close the period of interpellations.
6
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence]
There being none, the period of
interpellations is closed.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the
committee amendments.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President.
"The President. What is the pleasure of Senator
Roco?
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a
reconsideration of the ruling on the motion to
close the period of interpellations just to be
able to ask a few questions?
"Senator Tatad. May I move for a
reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection to the
reconsideration of the closing of the period of
interpellations? [Silence] There being none,
the motion is approved.
"Senator Roco is recognized.
"Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentleman
yield for some questions?
"Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with
the Chairman of the Committee on Local
Government, we were with the sponsors
when we approved this bill to make
Santiago a City. That was about two and a
half years ago. At that time, I remember it
was the cry of the city that it be
independent. Now we are deleting that
word independent.
"Mr. President, only because I was a co-author
and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want
some explanation on what happened
between then and now that has made us
decide that the City of Santiago should
cease to be independent and should now
become a component city.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the
province said during the public hearing that
they are no longer vested with the power and
authority of general supervision over the
city. The power and authority is now being
exercised by the Office of the President and
it is quite far from the City of Santiago.
"In the public hearing, we also gathered that there
is a clamor from some sectors that they want
to participate in the provincial elections.

"Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to
delay this. I did want it on record, however. I
think there was a majority of 14,000 who
approved the charter, and maybe we owe it
to those who voted for that charter some
degree of respect. But if there has been a
change of political will, there has been a
change of political will, then so be it.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank
about it, that was a very important point
raised by Senator Roco, and I will have to
place it on the Record of the Senate that the
reason why we are proposing a committee
amendment is that, originally, there was an
objection on the part of the local officials and
those who oppose it by incorporating a
plebiscite in this bill. That was the
solution. Because there were some sectors
in the City of Santiago who were opposing
the reclassification or reconversion of the city
into a component city.
"Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President
-- because the two of us had special pictures
(sic) in the city -- is that I thought it should be
put on record that we have supported
originally the proposal to make it an
independent city. But now if it is their request,
then, on the manifestation of the Chairman,
let it be so.
"Thank you.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a
few questions, Mr. President?
"Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the
interpellation of our good friend, the
Senator from Bicol, on the matter of the
opinion of the citizens of Santiago City,
there is a resolution passed by the
Sanggunian on January 30, 1997
opposing the conversion of Santiago
from an independent city.
"This opposition was placed on records
during the committee hearings. And that
is the reason why, as mentioned by the
good sponsor, one of the amendments is
that a plebiscite be conducted before the
law takes effect.
"The question I would like to raise-- and I
would like to recall the statement of our
7
Minority Leader -- is that, at this time we
should not be passing it for a particular
politician.
"In this particular case, it is obvious that this
bill is being passed in order that the
additional territory be added to the
election of the provincial officials of the
province of Isabela.
"Now, is this for the benefit of any particular
politician, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr.
President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. With the permission of the two
gentlemen on the Floor, Senator Alvarez is
recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this
city, Mr. President, may I share some
information.
"Mr. President, if we open up the election of the
city to the provincial leadership, it will not be
to the benefit of the provincial leadership,
because the provincial leadership will then
campaign in a bigger territory.
"As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from
this are the citizens of Santiago who will now
be enfranchised in the provincial electoral
process, and whose children will have the
opportunity to grow into provincial
leadership. This is one of the prime reasons
why this amendment is being put forward.
"While it is true that there may have been a
resolution by the city council, those who
signed the resolution were not the whole of
the council. This bill was sponsored by the
congressman of that district who represents
a constituency, the voice of the district.
"I think, Mr. President, in considering which
interest is paramount, whose voice must be
heard, and if we have to fathom the interest
of the people, the law which has been crafted
here in accordance with the rules should be
given account, as we do give account to
many of the legislations coming from the
House on local issues.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why
I am raising this question is that, as
Senator Roco said, just two-and-a-half
years ago we passed a bill which indeed
disenfranchized--if we want to use that

phrase-- the citizens of the City of
Santiago in the matter of the provincial
election. Two-and-a-half years after, we
are changing the rule.
"In the original charter, the citizens of the City
of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in
order to approve the conversion of the
city into an independent city. I believe
that the only way to resolve this issue
raised by Senator Roco is again to
subject this issue to another plebiscite as
part of the provision of this proposed bill
and as will be proposed by the Committee
Chairman as an amendment.
"Thank you very much, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the
Constitution does not require that the change
from an independent to a component city be
subjected to a plebiscite.
Sections 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution provides as follows:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
This change from an independent city into a
component city is none of those
enumerated. So the proposal coming from
the House is in adherence to this
constitutional mandate which does not
require a plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here
is conversion. The word conversion appears
in that provision wherein we must call a
plebiscite. During the public hearing, the
representative of Congressman Abaya was
insisting that this is not a conversion; this is
merely a reclassification. But it is clear in the
bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we
are converting it into a component
city. That is how the members of the
committee felt. That is why we have
proposed an amendment to this, and this
is to incorporate a plebiscite in as much
as there is no provision on incorporating
a plebiscite. Because we would like not
only to give the other people of Santiago
8
a chance or be enfranchised as far as the
leadership of the province is concerned,
but also we will give a chance to those
who are opposing it. To them, this is the
best compromise. Let the people decide,
instead of the political leaders of Isabela
deciding for them.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is
recognized.
"Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I
think we can move to close the period of
interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence]
There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the
committee amendments, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection? Silence]
There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a
new Section 3, as follows:
"SEC. 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE
ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD
SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:
"SEC. 49. PLEBISCITE. - THE CONVERSION
OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A
COMPONENT CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF
ISABELA SHALL TAKE EFFECT UPON THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF
THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE
WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE
WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL
OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE
SUCH PLEBISCITE.
"The President. Is there any objection?
"Senator Enrile. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.
"Senator Enrile. I object to this committee
amendment, Mr. President.
"SUSPENSION OF SESSION
"Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute
suspension of the session.
"The President. The session is suspended for a
few minutes if there is no objection. [There
was none]

"It was 7:54 p.m.
"RESUMPTION OF SESSION
"At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
"The President. The session is resumed.
"Senator Sotto is recognized.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very
enlightening conversation with the elders of
the Body, I withdraw my amendment.
"The President. The amendment is withdrawn.
"Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.
"Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor
for the withdrawal of the amendment.
"Mr. President, with due respect to the
Senator from Isabela -- I am no great fan
of the Senator from Isabela -- but it so
happens that this is a local bill affecting
not only his province but his own city
where he is a resident and registered
voter.
"So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and
death and of national importance, senatorial
courtesy demands that we, as much as
possible, accommodate the request of the
Senator from Isabela as we have done on
matters affecting the district of other
senators. I need not remind them.
"Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express
my deepest appreciation for the statement of
the gentleman from Ilocos and
Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the
feeling is not mutual. At least for now, I have
suddenly become his great fan for the
evening.
"May I put on record, Mr. President, that I
campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago
not because I do not want it to be a city but
because it had disenfranchised the young
men of my city from aspiring for the
leadership of the province. The town is the
gem of the province. How could we extricate
the town from the province?
9
"But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr.
President, and also the Chairman of the
Committee.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is
recognized.
"Senator Tatad. There being no committee
amendments, I move that the period of
committee amendments be closed.
"The President. Shall we amend the title of this
bill by removing the word independent
preceding component city?
"Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are
merely citing the title. The main title of this
House Bill No. 8729 is An Act Amending
Certain Sections of Republic Act 7720. The
title is the title of Republic Act 7720. So, I do
not think that we should amend that
anymore.
"The President. What is the pending
motion? Will the gentleman kindly state the
motion?
"Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period
of committee amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence]
There being none, the motion is approved.
"Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual
amendments, I move that we close the
period of individual amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence]
There being none, the period of individual
amendments is closed.
"APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND
READING
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we
vote on Second Reading on House Bill No.
8729.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence]
There being none, we shall now vote on
Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
"As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
"Several Members. Aye
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]
"House Bill No. 8729 is approved on Second
Reading."

The debates cannot but raise some quizzical
eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading
of the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to
listen to the voice of the people of the city via a
plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. vs. COMELEC,15 BP
885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros
Occidental without consulting its people in a
plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the
law as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee
cited the illicit political purpose behind its
enactment, viz:
"The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted,
was to have the creation of the new Province a fait
accompli by the time elections are held on February
7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so
that the new Governor and other officials shall by
then have been installed in office, ready to function
for purposes of the election for President and Vice-
President. Thus, the petitioners reported after the
event: With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held;
Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed by
President Marcos as in existence; a new set of
government officials headed by Governor Armando
Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections
were held on February 7, 1986, the political
machinery was in place to deliver the solid North to
ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What
happened in Negros del Norte during the elections -
the unashamed use of naked power and resources -
contributed in no small way to arousing peoples
power and steel the ordinary citizen to perform
deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one
proud to be a Filipino today.
"The challenged Act is manifestly void and
unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing
acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite, the
proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte
and the appointment of its officials are equally
void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the
areas of the proposed new province (as provided by
Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of
the remaining areas of the integral province of
Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of
Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities
of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla,
Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan,
Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan,
Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly
contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article
XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution
that no province may be created or divided or its
boundary substantially altered without the approval
of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. It is plain that all the cities and
10
municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental,
not merely those of the proposed new province,
comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters
of the whole and entire province of Negros
Occidental have to participate and give their
approval in the plebiscite, because the whole
province is affected by its proposed division and
substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the
plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be
partitioned and seceded from the province is as
absurd and illogical as allowing only the
secessionists to vote for the secession that they
demanded against the wishes of the majority and to
nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena
also cite two instances when allegedly independent
component cities were downgraded into
component cities without need of a
plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis
Occidental,16 and the City of San Carlos,
Pangasinan17 whose charters were amended to
allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the
election of officials of the province to which their city
belongs without submitting the amendment to a
plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of
Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly
situated as the city of Santiago.The said two
cities then were not independent component
cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities
were chartered but were not independent
component cities for both were not highly
urbanized cities which alone were considered
independent cities at that time. Thus, when the
case of San Carlos City was under consideration by
the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained:18
"x x x Senator Pimentel. The bill under
consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the
voters of San Carlos to vote in the elections of
provincial officials. There is no intention
whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City
of San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever
that the enactment of this bill will, in any way,
diminish the powers and prerogatives already
enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City
of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It
is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill
merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of the
city, the power to vote in provincial
elections, without in any way changing the
character of its being a component city. It is for
this reason that I vote in favor of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the
bill19 allowing qualified voters of the city of Oroquieta
to vote in provincial elections of the province of
Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he

explained that the right to vote being given to the
people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its
status as a component city.20 Indeed, during the
debates, former Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed
out the need to remedy the anomalous
situation then obtaining xxx where voters of one
component city can vote in the provincial election
while the voters of another component city cannot
vote simply because their charters so
provide.21 Thus, Congress amended other
charters of component cities prohibiting their
people from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby
issued commanding the respondents to desist from
implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN,
FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO
PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO,
CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO
PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO
PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO
PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL,
FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and EIGHTY-TWO
(82) JOHN DOES, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio,
Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco,
Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and Special Attorney
Juan A. Sison for petitioners.
Adaza, Adaza and Adaza for respondent Erning
Abano.
Crisologo Law Office and Pedro Quadra for
respondent Camilo Pilotin.
Juan T. David for respondent Vincent Crisologo.
Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
11
Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with
preliminary injunction, filed by the Solicitor General
and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the
order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20
July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion
to transfer Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said
Court of First Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et
al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to
effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of
the cases aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital of the province.
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed
persons descended on barrio Ora Centro,
municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and
set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the
afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the
same municipality and province, several residential
houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting
in the destruction of various houses and in the death
of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After
investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal,
with several state prosecutors assigned by the
Department of Justice to collaborate with him, on 10
June 1970 filed in the Court of First Instance of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases
47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson)
charging that the seventeen private respondents
herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons,
"confederating, conspiring, confabulating and
helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be
burned several residential houses, knowing the said
houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain
persons named in the filed informations in barrios
Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur
(Petition, Annexes B and B-1). Accused Camilo
Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and on
15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before
respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28 and
29 July 1970.
It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the
Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No.
221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with
official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a
special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970.
Three days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the
Secretary further issued Administrative Order No.
226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit
Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and

pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented
by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the
Department of Justice.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the
respondent judge for a transfer of cases 47-V and
48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the
Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling
attention to the circumstance that they were issued
at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of
the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La
Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and
personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The
accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and on
20 July 1970, the respondent judge declined the
transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative
Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to
the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of
justice required it for the more expeditious disposal
of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused
had already pleaded; that if the objective of the
proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a
change of venue from the Supreme Court under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should
have been done right at the very inception of these
cases.
In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to
transfer the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, the
prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and
mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and
praying this Court to set aside the order of denial of
the transfer and to compel the respondent Court of
First Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, as well
as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and
48-V) at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio
City.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of
discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative
Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below,
but did not require or command it, to transfer the
cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and
likewise denied that the circumstances justified any
such transfer.
At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the
respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding with
the trial of the cases until further orders.
We agree with respondents that the present laws do
not confer upon the Secretary of Justice power to
determine what court should hear specific cases.
Any such power, even in the guise of administrative
regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the
12
time-honored separation of the Executive and the
Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts
of their independence, it would endanger the rights
and immunities of the accused or civil party. It could
be much too easily transformed into a means of
predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so
as to produce a result in harmony with the
Administration's preferences. The creation by
Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts
for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the
regular Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate
the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be
filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit
the transfer of preselected individual cases to the
circuit courts. Neither do Administrative Orders Nos.
258 and 274 evidence any such intention;
particularly since Administrative Order No. 258,
Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as
confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the
same year, in Section 3 of Part III thereof, provides
that the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases
pending in the regular Courts of First Instance
should be effected by raffle, chance here operating
to nullify any executive arbitration of what particular
cases should be apportioned to either tribunal. The
very terms of Administrative Order No. 226, issued
on 18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar,
relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing,
and not directing, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V (People vs.
Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District, reveals that the Secretary
himself was aware of the impropriety of imperatively
directing transfer of specified cases. Respondent
Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing
Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not
mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion
and violated neither the law nor the Executive
Orders heretofore mentioned.
It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to
consider Department Administrative Order No. 226
of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory respondent
Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the contention of
the prosecuting officers that the cases against
private respondents herein should be transferred to
the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District because a miscarriage of justice was
impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution
witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be
endangered. This claim was buttressed by the
affidavits of the injured parties and prosecution
witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan
to testify in cases 47-V and 48-V and expressing

their willingness to testify if the cases are heard
outside of Ilocos Sur, where they can be free from
tension and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear
thus expressed can not be considered fanciful and
unfounded when account is taken of the
circumstances that the informations filed in the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur show that of the one
hundred armed participants in the burning of the
houses at barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro,
Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are still
unidentified and at large; that one of the accused,
private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an
influential family in the province, being concededly
the son of the Congressman for the first district of
Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor that the reluctant
witnesses are themselves the complainants in the
criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear
that attempts will be made to silence them; that it is
not shown that the Executive branch is able or willing
to give these witnesses full security during the trial
and for a reasonable time thereafter, that even if
armed security escorts were to be provided, the
same would be no guarantee against the possibility
of murderous assault against the affiant witnesses,
as recent events have proved; that Constabulary
reports (Annex H) show that between 1 January and
31 May 1970 no less than 78 murders have been
reported committed in said province, of which
number only 21 were solved; and, finally, that the
promotion and confirmation of respondent Judge
Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the
Court of First Instance of the Second Judicial
District, Branch III, was actively supported by
Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of
accused Vincent Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K
to N-2 to petitioner's supplemental memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by
the complaining witnesses, who had on a previous
occasion freely given evidence before the
investigators in Manila, renders manifest the
imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial
to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be
judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of
truth and justice and the State is to be given a fair
chance to present its side of the case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer
of the trial site can not be made, because it is a long
standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands
that one who commits a crime is amenable therefor
only in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed,
for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26
Phil. 376, and People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, that
the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance in the
Philippines is limited to certain well-defined territory
13
and they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged
with one offense committed outside of that limited
territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a),
of the Revised Rules of Court providing that "in all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or province
wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredient thereof took place."
It is well to note that this Court has explained
in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149, 150, that the
purpose of the rule invoked by accused respondents
herein was "not to compel the defendant to move to
and appear in a different court from that of the
province where the crime was committed, as it would
cause him great inconvenience in looking for his
witnesses and other evidence in another place."
Where the convenience of the accused is opposed
by that of the prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is
but logical that the court should have power to
decide where the balance of convenience or
inconvenience lies, and to determine the most
suitable place of the trial according to the exigencies
of truth and impartial justice.
In the particular case before Us, to compel the
prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its
witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they
know is to make a mockery of the judicial process,
and to betray the very purpose for which courts have
been established. Since the rigorous application of
the general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a),
would result here in preventing a fair and impartial
inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must be
admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that
the general rule relied upon by accused respondents
should yield to occasional exceptions wherever
there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the
rigor of the law would become the highest injustice
"summum jus, summa in juria."
The respondents accused can not complain that to
transfer the trial to a site where the prosecution's
witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know
would be equivalent to railroading them into a
conviction. Because regardless of the place where
its evidence is to be heard, the prosecution will be
always obligated to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of justice
clearly lean in favor of the prosecution being given
full opportunity to lay its case before a proper arbiter:
for a dismissal of the charges for lack of evidence is
a verdict that the prosecution can neither challenge
nor appeal.

We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced
by an impasse of the kind now before Us, are to
confess themselves impotent to further the cause of
justice. The Constitution has vested the Judicial
Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts
as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section
13), and such judicial power connotes certain
incidental and inherent attributes reasonably
necessary for an effective administration of justice.
The courts "can by appropriate means do all things
necessary to preserve and maintain every quality
needful to make the judiciary an effective institution
of government" (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil.
322).
One of these incidental and inherent powers of
courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from
one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring
site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and
impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of
justice, so demands. This authority was early
recognized in England as inhering in the courts of
justice even prior to the eighteenth century. The
opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior
Court, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067, has
shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice
Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle (Eng.) 2 Burr 834,
decided in 1759, said that, in this respect, "the law is
clear and uniform as far back as it can be traced."
And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question
was fully discussed, and all the judges appear to
have agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption,
Jr., saying at page 525:
There is another common-law right, equally open
to defendants and prosecutors, ... that where it
appears that either party cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial in the proper county, then this court
... has jurisdiction to take the case out of the
proper county, as it is called, and to bring it into
an indifferent county ... This jurisdiction to change
the venue ... has been exercised by this court
from a very early period. We have reported cases,
where the doctrine is laid down in emphatic
language; we have the practice of the Court of
Queen's Bench in England independently of any
practice of our own court ... The general
jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to
change the venue from one county to any other,
cannot be the subject of doubt.
This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in
furtherance of justice, exercised through writs
of certiorari, has, according to the weight of
authority, passed to the State Supreme Courts of the
14
American Union.1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs.
Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page 436, it was held that
the power to transfer the place of holding trials
became thoroughly engrafted upon the common
law, long before the independence of this country;
and from that time forth, not only has the practice
prevailed in the courts of England, but the power
is now exercised by the Courts of very many if not
all of our states, either by force of express statute
or the adoption of the common law in the
jurisprudence of the same.
That such inherent powers are likewise possessed
by the Philippine courts admits of no doubt, because
they were organized on the American pattern with
the enactment of the first judicial organic law, Act
136, on 11 June 1901, by the Philippine
Commission, then composed by a majority of able
American lawyers, fully familiar with the institutions
and traditions of the common law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333,
this Court stated:
And it is safe to say that in every volume of the
Philippine Reports, numbers of cases might be
cited wherein recourse has been had to the
rules, principles and doctrines of the common
law in ascertaining the true meaning and scope
of the legislation enacted in and for the
Philippine Islands since they passed under
American sovereignty.
Among the earliest measures of the Philippine
Commission, after the establishment of Civil
Government under American sovereignty, was
the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136,
"An Act providing for the organization of courts
in the Philippine Islands." This Act in express
terms abolished the then existing Audiencia or
Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance,
and substituted in their place the courts
provided therein. It sets out in general terms the
jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers of the
new courts and their judges. The majority of the
members of the body which enacted it were able
American lawyers. The spirit with which it is
informed, and indeed its very language and
terminology would be unintelligible without
some knowledge of the judicial systems of
England and the United States. Its manifest
purpose and object was to replace the old
judicial system, with its incidents and traditions
drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system
modeled in all its essential characteristics upon

the judicial systems of the United States. It
cannot be doubted, therefore, that any incident
of the former system which conflicts with the
essential principles and settled doctrines on
which the new system rests, must be held to be
abrogated by the law organizing the new
system.
While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it
difficult to believe that the framers' intent was to
deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and
particularly upon this Supreme Court, the inherent
jurisdiction possessed by the English and American
courts under their common law heritage to transfer
the place of trial of cases in order to secure and
promote the ends of justice, by providing fair and
impartial inquiry and adjudication.
Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or
general authority from liability in a civil action for acts
done by them in the exercise of their judicial
functions, upheld in the Alzua case as essentially
inherent in the courts established by Act 136, even if
not expressly provided for, the power to transfer the
place of trials when so demanded by the interest of
justice is equally essential and possesses no inferior
rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the words of this
Court in the Alzua case just cited:
The grounds of public policy and the reasoning
upon which the doctrine is based are not less
forceful and imperative in these Islands than in
the countries from which the new judicial system
was borrowed; and an examination of the reasons
assigned ... leaves no room for doubt that a failure
to recognize it as an incident to the new judicial
system would materially impair its usefulness and
tend very strongly to defeat the ends for which it
was established. (21 Phil. 333-334)
Not only has there been since then no proof of any
specific pronouncement, by Constitution or
Congress, against the exercise by our Courts of the
power discussed heretofore: on the contrary, the law
establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic
Act No. 5179, in its Section 4, provides express
legislative recognition of its existence:
SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold
sessions anywhere within their respective
districts: Provided, however, that cases shall be
heard within the province where the crime subject
of the offense was committed. And provided
further, that when the interest of justice so
demands, with prior approval of the Supreme
15
Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring
province within the district ... (Emphasis supplied)
Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have
been satisfied by the filing of the criminal case in
question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur, in which province the offenses charged were
committed, according to the informations; since the
holding of the trial in a particular place is more a
matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction; since the
interests of truth and justice can not be subserved by
compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the
respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because its
witnesses, for just and weighty reasons, are
unwilling to testify therein, and the respondent court,
ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the
motion to have the case transferred to another court,
this Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial power
possessed by it under the Constitution and the
statutes, should decree that the trial of cases 47-V
and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either
in San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio City, at the
earlier available date. This arrangement would have
the advantage that the same trial judge could later
be authorized to hear the defense witnesses in
Vigan, if circumstances so demanded. Furthermore,
the adjudication of the case by a judge other than
respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would
remove any doubt or suspicion that the same was in
any way influenced by the trial Judge's being
beholden to the Crisologo family.
The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the
ideals set by this Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, where We said:
... The most perfect procedure that can be
devised is that which gives opportunity for the
most complete and perfect exercise of the powers
of the court within the limitations set by natural
justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives
the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the
court to transmute themselves into concrete acts
of justice between the parties before it. The
purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter but
to give it effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient
objection which can be urged against procedure
today is that it so restricts the exercise of the
court's power by technicalities that part of its
authority effective for justice between the parties
is many times in inconsiderable portion of the
whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart

justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the
thing itself which courts are always striving to
secure to litigants. It is designed as the means
best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words,
it is a means to an end. It is the means by which
the powers of the court are made effective in just
judgments. When it loses the character of the one
and takes on that of the other the administration
of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory
and lays itself open to grave criticism. (Manila
Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523,
529 [1911]. Emphasis and paragraphing
supplied.)
In resume, this Court holds, and so rules:
(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit
Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the
Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and
individual cases;
(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the
Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and
other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power
and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and
disposition of a case pending in a Court of First
Instance be transferred to another Court of First
Instance within the same district whenever the
interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are
serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by
the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case
would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead
to a miscarriage of justice.
(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and
adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of
Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal
Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest
of truth and justice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs
of certiorari and mandamus prayed for are
granted; the order of the respondent Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 July 1970, is
sustained in so far as it holds that the
Administrative Order No. 221 of the Department
of Justice is not mandatory, but only directory;
nevertheless, said order is declared in grave
abuse of discretion and set aside in so far as it
declines to transfer the trial of its cases Nos. 47-
V and 48-V to another court within the district; and
16
said respondent Court is accordingly directed and
ordered to remand the two criminal cases
aforesaid to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District for hearing of the
evidence for the prosecution either in Baguio or
San Fernando, La Union, at the earliest available
date, and such other proceedings as the Circuit
Criminal Court may determine in the interest of
justice.
The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer
for their appearance at the trial and sentence by the
Circuit Criminal Court for the Second Judicial
District, in the same amount, and under the same
terms and conditions as their present bail bonds,
which will be replaced by those herein ordered, all
within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. JANCOM
ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and
JANCOM INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY.
LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure filed by petitioner Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), seeking to reverse
and set aside the November 13, 2000 decision of the
Court of Appeals declaring valid and perfected the
waste management contract entered into by the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Secretary of National Resources and the Executive
Committee to oversee the build-operate-transfer
implementation of solid waste management
projects, and JANCOM Environmental Corporation.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
In 1994, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202 creating
the Executive Committee (EXECOM) to oversee the
BOT implementation of solid waste management
projects, headed by the Chairman of the MMDA and
the Cabinet Officer for Regional Development-
National Capital Region (CORD-NCR). The
EXECOM was to oversee and develop waste-to-
energy projects for the waste disposal sites in San
Mateo, Rizal and Carmona, Caviteunder the build-
operate-transfer (BOT) scheme. The terms of

reference for the waste-to-energy projects provided
that its proponents should have the capability to
establish municipal solid waste thermal plants using
incineration technology. This type of technology was
selected because of its alleged advantages of
greatly reduced waste volume, prolongation of the
service life of the disposal site, and generation of
electricity.
While eleven (11) proponents submitted their
pre-qualification documents, most failed to comply
with the requirements under Section 5.4 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 6957, otherwise known as the
Build-Operate-Transfer Law. On July 21, 1995, the
Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) recommended the pre-qualification of three
proponents, namely: i) JANCOM International Pty.
Ltd.; ii) First Philippine International W-E Managers;
and iii) PACTECH Development
Corporation. On July 26, 1995, the EXECOM
approved the recommendation of the
PBAC. On July 27, 1995, MMDA forwarded to the
Investment Coordinating Committee (ICC)
Secretariat the pre-feasibility study on the
privatization of the Carmona and San Mateo landfill
sites. The project was later presented to the ICC-
Technical Board (ICC-TB) and then endorsed to the
ICC-Cabinet Committee (ICC-CC).
On May 2, 1996, the PBAC conducted a pre-bid
conference where it required the three pre-qualified
bidders to submit, within ninety (90) days, their bid
proposals.On August 2, 1996, JANCOM and First
Philippines requested for an extension of time to
submit their bids. PACTECH, on the other hand,
withdrew from the bidding.
Subsequently, JANCOM entered into a
partnership with Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) to form
JANCOM Environmental Corporation while First
Philippines formed a partnership with OGDEN. Due
to the change in the composition of the proponents,
particularly in their technology partners and
contractors, the PBAC conducted a post pre-
qualification evaluation.
During the second bid conference, the bid
proposals of First Philippines for the Carmona site
and JANCOM for the San Mateo site were found to
be complete and responsive. Consequently,
on February 12, 1997, JANCOM and First
Philippines were declared the winning bidders,
respectively, for the San Mateo and the Carmona
projects.
In a letter dated February 27, 1997, then MMDA
Chairman Prospero I. Oreta informed JANCOMs
Chief Executive Officer Jay Alparslan that the
17
EXECOM had approved the PBAC recommendation
to award to JANCOM the San Mateo Waste-to-
Energy Project on the basis of the final Evaluation
Report declaring JANCOM International Ltd., Pty.,
together with Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), as the sole
complying (winning) bidder for the San Mateo Waste
Disposal site, subject to negotiation and mutual
approval of the terms and conditions of the contract
of award. The letter also notified Alparslan that the
EXECOM had created a negotiating team composed
of Secretary General Antonio Hidalgo of the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council,
Director Ronald G. Fontamillas, General Manager
Roberto Nacianceno of MMDA, and Atty. Eduardo
Torres of the host local government unit to work out
and finalize the contract award. Chairman Oreta
requested JANCOM to submit to the EXECOM the
composition of its own negotiating team.
Thereafter, after a series of meetings and
consultations between the negotiating teams of
EXECOM and JANCOM, a draft BOT contract was
prepared and presented to the Presidential Task
Force on Solid Waste Management.
On December 19, 1997, the BOT Contract for
the waste-to-energy project was signed between
JANCOM and the Philippine Government,
represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid
Waste Management through DENR Secretary Victor
Ramos, CORD-NCR Chairman Dionisio dela Serna,
and MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta.
On March 5, 1998, the BOT contract was
submitted to President Ramos for approval but this
was too close to the end of his term which expired
without him signing the contract. President Ramos,
however, endorsed the contract to incoming
President Joseph E. Estrada.
With the change of administration, the
composition of the EXECOM also changed.
Memorandum Order No. 19 appointed the Chairman
of the Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs
and Project to be the EXECOM chairman. Too,
Republic Act No. 8749, otherwise known as the
Clean Air Act of 1999, was passed by
Congress. And due to the clamor of residents of
Rizal province, President Estrada had, in the interim,
also ordered the closure of the San
Mateo landfill. Due to these circumstances, the
Greater Manila Solid Waste Management
Committee adopted a resolution not to pursue the
BOT contract with JANCOM. Subsequently, in a
letter dated November 4, 1999, Roberto Aventajado,
Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Flagship
Programs and Project informed Mr. Jay Alparslan,
Chairman of JANCOM, that due to changes in policy

and economic environment (Clean Air Act and non-
availability of the San Mateo landfill), the
implementation of the BOT contract executed and
signed between JANCOM and the Philippine
Government would no longer be pursued. The letter
stated that other alternative implementation
arrangements for solid waste management for Metro
Manila would be considered instead.
JANCOM appealed to President Joseph
Estrada the position taken by the EXECOM not to
pursue the BOT Contract executed and signed
between JANCOM and the Philippine Government,
refuting the cited reasons for non-
implementation. Despite the pendency of the
appeal, MMDA, on February 22, 2000, caused the
publication in a newspaper of an invitation to pre-
qualify and to submit proposals for solid waste
management projects for Metro Manila. JANCOM
thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a
petition for certiorari to declare i) the resolution of the
Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste
Management Committee disregarding the BOT
Contract and ii) the acts of MMDA calling for bids and
authorizing a new contract for Metro Manila waste
management, as illegal, unconstitutional, and void;
and for prohibition to enjoin the Greater Metropolitan
Manila Solid Waste Management Committee and
MMDA from implementing the assailed resolution
and disregarding the Award to, and the BOT contract
with, JANCOM, and from making another award in
its place. On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered
a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioners
JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, and
JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS PTY., LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA, and
against respondent GREATER METROPOLITAN
MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMM.,
and HON. ROBERTO N. AVENTAJADO, in his
Capacity as Chairman of the said Committee,
METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
and HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY, in his capacity as
Chairman of said Authority, declaring the Resolution
of respondent Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid
Waste Management Committee disregarding
petitioners BOT Award Contract and calling for bids
for and authorizing a new contract for the Metro
Manila waste management ILLEGAL and VOID.
Moreover, respondents and their agents are hereby
PROHIBITED and ENJOINED from implementing
the aforesaid Resolution and disregarding
petitioners BOT Award Contract and from making
another award in its place.
18
Let it be emphasized that this Court is not preventing
or stopping the government from implementing
infrastructure projects as it is aware of the
proscription under PD 1818. On the contrary, the
Court is paving the way for the necessary and
modern solution to the perennial garbage problem
that has been the major headache of the
government and in the process would serve to
attract more investors in the country.
(Rollo,p. 159.)
Instead of appealing the decision, MMDA filed a
special civil action for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order with the Court of
Appeals which was later docketed therein as CA-
G.R. SP No. 59021. The appellate court not only
required JANCOM to comment on the petition, it also
granted MMDAs prayer for a temporary restraining
order. During the pendency of the petition
for certiorari, JANCOM moved for the execution of
the RTC decision, which was opposed by MMDA.
However, the RTC granted the motion for execution
on the ground that its decision had become final
since MMDA had not appealed the same to the
Court of Appeals. MMDA moved to declare
respondents and the RTC judge in contempt of
court, alleging that the RTCs grant of execution was
abuse of and interference with judicial rules and
processes.
On November 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 59021 and
a companion case, CA-G.R. SP No. 60303.
MMDAs motion for reconsideration of said
decision having been denied, MMDA filed the instant
petition, alleging that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in finding that:
1) There is a valid and binding contract
between the Republic of the Philippines
and JANCOM given that: a) the contract
does not bear the signature of the
President of the Philippines; b) the
conditions precedent specified in the
contract were not complied with; and c)
there was no valid notice of award.
2) The MMDA had not seasonably
appealed the Decision of the lower court
via a petition for certiorari.
Before taking up the substantive issue in
question, we shall first dispose of the question as to
whether it is fatal to petitioners cause, that rather
than appealing the trial courts decision to the Court
of Appeals, it instead filed a petition

for certiorari. While petitioner claims that the trial
courts decision never became final by virtue of its
having appealed by certiorari to the Court of
Appeals, the trial court ruled that petitioners failure
to file an appeal has made its decision final and
executory. At bottom, the question involves a
determination of the propriety of petitioners choice of
the remedy of certiorari in questioning the decision
of the trial court.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
Plain it is from a reading of the above provision
that certiorari will lie only where a court has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. If the court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter and of the person, its rulings upon
all questions involved are within its jurisdiction,
however irregular or erroneous these may be, they
cannot be corrected by certiorari. Correction may be
obtained only by an appeal from the final decision.
Verily, Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
xxx xxx xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
19
may file an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65.
There can be no dispute that the trial courts May
29, 2000 decision was a final order or judgment
which MMDA should have appealed, had it been so
minded. In its decision, the trial court disposed of the
main controversy by declaring the Resolution of
respondent Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid
Waste Management Committee disregarding
petitioners BOT Award Contract and calling for bids
for and authorizing a new contract for the Metro
Manila waste management ILLEGAL and VOID.
This ruling completely disposed of the controversy
between MMDA and JANCOM. In BA Finance
Corporation vs. CA (229 SCRA 5667 [1994]), we
held that a final order or judgment is one which
disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be
done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined. An order or judgment is deemed final
when it finally disposes of the pending action so that
nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In
other words, a final order is that which gives an end
to the litigation. A final order or judgment finally
disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or
some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire
controversy or on some definite and separate branch
thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set
aside. Where no issue is left for future consideration,
except the fact of compliance or non-compliance
with the terms of the judgment or doer, such
judgment or order is final and
appealable (Investments, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 147 SCRA 334 [1987]).
However, instead of appealing the decision,
MMDA resorted to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, as a mode of obtaining reversal of the
judgment. This cannot be done. The judgment was
not in any sense null and void ab initio, incapable of
producing any legal effects whatever, which could be
resisted at any time and in any court it was
attempted. It was a judgment which could or may
have suffered from some substantial error in
procedure or in findings of fact or of law, and on that
account, it could have been reversed or modified on
appeal. But since it was not appealed, it became
final and has thus gone beyond the reach of any
court to modify in any substantive aspect. The
remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the
judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true even if
the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court
rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, or the exercise of power in
excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the
findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. The

existence and availability of the right of appeal
proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the
requirements for availment of the latter remedy is
precisely that there should be no appeal (Mercado
vs. CA, 162 SCRA 75 [1988]). As incisively
observed by the Court of Appeals:
The special civil action for certiorari is available only
when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Sec.
1, rule 65, id.)
Admittedly, appeal could have been taken from the
assailed RTC decision. However, petitioners
maintain that appeal is not a speedy remedy
because the RTC decision prohibiting them from
conducting a bidding for a new waste disposal
project has adverse and serious effects on the citys
garbage situation.
Nevertheless, the RTC decision is not immediately
executory. Only judgments in actions for injunction,
receivership, accounting and support and such other
judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared
to be immediately executory shall be enforced after
their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal
therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court
(Sec. 4, rule 39, id.).
Since the RTC decision is not immediately
executory, appeal would have stayed its
execution. Consequently, the adverse effects of said
decision will not visit upon petitioners during the
appeal. In other words, appeal is a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
But as no appeal was taken within the reglementary
period, the RTC decision had become final and
executory. Well-settled is the rule that the special
civil action for certiorari may not be invoked as a
substitute for the remedy of appeal (BF Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 267). Therefore, the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari does not lie.
Moreover, petitioners instituted the instant action
without filing a motion for reconsideration of the RTC
decision. Doctrinal is the rule that certiorari will not
lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed
before the respondent tribunal to allow it an
opportunity to correct its errors (Zapanta vs.
NLRC, 292 SCRA 580).
(Rollo, p. 47-48.)
Admittedly, there are instances where the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted
20
to despite the availability of an appeal. In Ruiz, Jr.
vs. Court of Appeals (220 SCRA 490 [1993]), we
held:
Considered extraordinary, [certiorari] is made
available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of the law (Rule 65, Rules of Court, Section 1). The
long line of decisions denying the petition
for certiorari, either before appeal was availed or
specially in instances where the appeal period has
lapsed, far outnumbers the instances when certiorari
was given due course. The few significant
exceptions were: when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; or when the
broader interests of justice so require, or when the
writs issued are null . . . or when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.
In the instant case, however, MMDA has not
sufficiently established the existence of any fact or
reason to justify its resort to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari.Neither does the record show
that the instant case, indeed, falls under any of the
exceptions aforementioned.
The Court thus holds that the Court of Appeals
did not err in declaring that the trial courts decision
has become final due to the failure of MMDA to
perfect an appeal within the reglementary period.
With the foregoing disquisition, it would appear
unnecessarily to discuss and resolve the substantive
issue posed before the Court. However, the
procedural flaw notwithstanding, the Court deems it
judicious to take cognizance of the substantive
question, if only to put petitioners mind to rest.
In its second assignment of errors, petitioner
MMDA contends that there is no valid and binding
contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
respondents because: a) the BOT contract does not
bear the signature of the President of the
Philippines; b) the conditions precedent specified in
the contract were not complied with; and that c) there
was no valid notice of award.
These contentions hold no water.
Under Article 1305 of the Civil Code, [a] contract
is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby
one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give
something or to render some service. A contract
undergoes three distinct stages preparation or
negotiation, its perfection, and finally, its
consummation. Negotiation begins from the time the
prospective contracting parties manifest their

interest in the contract and ends at the moment of
agreement of the parties. The perfection or birth of
the contract takes place when the parties agree
upon the essential elements of the contract. The last
stage is the consummation of the contract wherein
the parties fulfill or perform the terms agreed upon in
the contract, culminating in the extinguishment
thereof (Bugatti vs. CA, 343 SCRA 335
[2000]). Article 1315 of the Civil Code, provides that
a contract is perfected by mere consent. Consent,
on the other hand, is manifested by the meeting of
the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract (See
Article 1319, Civil Code). In the case at bar, the
signing and execution of the contract by the parties
clearly show that, as between the parties, there was
a concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect
to the material details of the contract, thereby giving
rise to the perfection of the contract. The execution
and signing of the contract is not disputed by the
parties. As the Court of Appeals aptly held:
[C]ontrary to petitioners insistence that there was no
perfected contract, the meeting of the offer and
acceptance upon the thing and the cause, which are
to constitute the contract (Arts. 1315 and 1319, New
Civil Code), is borne out by the records.
Admittedly, when petitioners accepted private
respondents bid proposal (offer), there was, in effect,
a meeting of the minds upon the object (waste
management project) and the cause (BOT
scheme). Hence, the perfection of the
contract. In City of Cebu vs. Heirs of Candido
Rubi (306 SCRA 108), the Supreme Court held that
the effect of an unqualified acceptance of the offer or
proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon
notice of the award to the bidder.
(Rollo, p. 48-49.)
In fact, in asserting that there is no valid and
binding contract between the parties, MMDA can
only allege that there was no valid notice of award;
that the contract does not bear the signature of the
President of the Philippines; and that the conditions
precedent specified in the contract were not
complied with.
In asserting that the notice of award to JANCOM
is not a proper notice of award, MMDA points to the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 6957, otherwise known as the BOT Law, which
require that i) prior to the notice of award, an
Investment Coordinating Committee clearance must
first be obtained; and ii) the notice of award indicate
21
the time within which the awardee shall submit the
prescribed performance security, proof of
commitment of equity contributions and indications
of financing resources.
Admittedly, the notice of award has not
complied with these requirements. However, the
defect was cured by the subsequent execution of the
contract entered into and signed by authorized
representatives of the parties; hence, it may not be
gainsaid that there is a perfected contract existing
between the parties giving to them certain rights and
obligations (conditions precedents) in accordance
with the terms and conditions thereof. We borrow the
words of the Court of Appeals:
Petitioners belabor the point that there was no valid
notice of award as to constitute acceptance of
private respondents offer. They maintain that former
MMDA Chairman Oretas letter to JANCOM EC
dated February 27, 1997 cannot be considered as a
valid notice of award as it does not comply with the
rules implementing Rep. Act No. 6957, as
amended. The argument is untenable.
The fact that Chairman Oretas letter informed
JANCOM EC that it was the sole complying
(winning) bidder for the San Mateo project leads to
no other conclusion than that the project was being
awarded to it. But assuming that said notice of award
did not comply with the legal requirements, private
respondents cannot be faulted therefore as it
was the government representatives duty to
issue the proper notice.
In any event, petitioners, as successors of those who
previously acted for the government (Chairman
Oreta, et al), are estopped from assailing the validity
of the notice of award issued by the latter. As private
respondents correctly observed, in negotiating on
the terms and conditions of the BOT contract and
eventually signing said contract, the government had
led private respondents to believe that the notice of
award given to them satisfied all the requirement of
the law.
While the government cannot be estopped by the
erroneous acts of its agents, nevertheless,
petitioners may not now assail the validity of the
subject notice of award to the prejudice of private
respondents. Until the institution of the original
action before the RTC, invalidity of the notice of
award was never invoked as a ground for
termination of the BOT contract. In fact, the reasons
cited for terminating the San Mateo project, per
Chairman Aventajados letter to JANCOM EC

dated November 4, 1999, were its purported non-
implementability and non-viability on account of
supervening events, e.g., passage of the Clean Air
Act, etc.
(Rollo, p. 49-50.)
MMDA also points to the absence of the
Presidents signature as proof that the same has not
yet been perfected. Not only that, the authority of the
signatories to bind the Republic has even been put
to question. Firstly, it is pointed out that
Memorandum Order No. 202 creating the Executive
Committee to oversee the BOT implementation of
solid waste management projects only charged the
officials thereof with the duty of recommending to the
President the specific project to be implemented
under the BOT scheme for both San Mateo and
Carmona sites. Hence, it is concluded that the
signatories, CORD-NCR Chairman Dionisio dela
Serna and MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta, had no
authority to enter into any waste management
project for and in behalf of the Government.
Secondly, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 292 is
relied upon as authority for the proposition that
presidential approval is necessary for the validity of
the contract.
The first argument conveniently overlooks the
fact that then Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources Victor Ramos was likewise a signatory to
the contract. While dela Serna and Oreta may not
have had any authority to sign, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources has such an
authority. In fact, the authority of the signatories to
the contract was not denied by the Solicitor
General. Moreover, as observed by the Court of
Appeals, [i]t was not alleged, much less shown, that
those who signed in behalf of the Republic had acted
beyond the scope of their authority.
In truth, the argument raised by MMDA does not
focus on the lack of authority of the signatories, but
on the amount involved as placing the contract
beyond the authority of the signatories to
approve. Section 59 of Executive Order No. 292
reads:
Section 59. Contracts for Approval by the
President. Contracts for infrastructure projects,
including contracts for the supply of materials and
equipment to be used in said projects, which involve
amounts above the ceilings provided in the
preceding section shall be approved by the
President: Provided, That the President may, when
conditions so warrant, and upon recommendation of
22
the National Economic and Development Authority,
revise the aforesaid ceilings of approving authority.
However, the Court of Appeals trenchantly
observed in this connection:
As regards the Presidents approval of infrastructure
projects required under Section 59 of Executive
Order No. 292, said section does not apply to the
BOT contract in question. Sec. 59 should be
correlated with Sec. 58 of Exec. Order No. 292. Said
sections read:
SECTION 58. Ceiling for Infrastructure Contracts.
The following shall be the ceilings for all civil works,
construction and other contracts for infrastructure
projects, including supply contracts for said projects,
awarded through public bidding or through
negotiation, which may be approved by the
Secretaries of Public Works and Highways,
Transportation and Communications, Local
Government with respect to Rural Road
improvement Project and governing boards of
government-owned or controlled corporations:
xxx xxx xxx
Save as provided for above, the approval ceilings
assigned to the departments/agencies involved in
national infrastructure and construction projects
shall remain at the levels provided in existing laws,
rules and regulations.
Contrary to petitioners claim that all infrastructure
contracts require the Presidents approval (Petition,
p. 16), Sec. 59 provides that such approval is
required only in infrastructure contracts involving
amounts exceeding the ceilings set in Sec.
58. Significantly, the infrastructure contracts treated
in Sec. 58 pertain only to those which may be
approved by the Secretaries of Public Works and
Highways, Transportation and Communications,
Local Government (with respect to Rural Road
Improvement Project) and the governing boards of
certain government-owned or controlled
corporations. Consequently, the BOT contract in
question, which was approved by the DENR
Secretary and the EXCOM Chairman and Co-
Chairman, is not covered by Exec. Order No. 292.
(Rollo, p. 51-52.)
The provision pertinent to the authority of the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
would actually be Section 1 of Executive Order No.
380, Series of 1989 which provides that The

Secretaries of all Departments and Governing
Boards of government-owned or controlled
corporations [except the Secretaries of Public Works
and Highways, Transportation and Communication,
and Local Government with respect to Rural Road
Improvement projects] can enter into publicly
bidded contracts regardless of amount (See also
Section 515, Government Accounting and Auditing
Manual Volume I). Consequently, MMDA may not
claim that the BOT contract is not valid and binding
due to the lack of presidential approval.
Significantly, the contract itself provides that the
signature of the President is necessary only for its
effectivity (not perfection), pursuant to Article 19 of
the contract, which reads:
This contract shall become effective upon approval
by the President of the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to existing laws subject to
the condition, precedent in Article 18. This contract
shall remain in full force and effect for twenty-five
(25) years subject to renewal for another twenty-five
(25) years from the date of Effectivity. Such renewal
will be subject to mutual agreement of the parties
and approval of the President of the Republic of
the Philippines.
(Rollo, p. 94.)
Stated differently, while the twenty-five year
effectivity period of the contract has not yet started
to run because of the absence of the Presidents
signature, the contract has, nonetheless, already
been perfected.
As to the contention that there is no perfected
contract due to JANCOMs failure to comply with
several conditions precedent, the same is, likewise,
unmeritorious.Article 18 of the BOT contract reads:
ARTICLE 18
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
xxx
18.2.1. The BOT COMPANY hereby
undertakes to provide the
following within 2 months from execution
of this Contract as an effective
document:
a) sufficient proof of the actual equity
contributions from the proposed
shareholders of the BOT COMPANY in
a total amount not less than
PHP500,000,000 in accordance with the
23
BOT Law and the implementing rules
and regulations;
b) sufficient proof of financial commitment
from a lending institution sufficient to
cover total project cost in accordance
with the BOT Law and the implementing
rules and regulations;
c) to support its obligation under this
Contract, the BOT COMPANY shall
submit a security bond to the CLIENT in
accordance with the form and amount
required under the BOT Law.
xxx
18.2.3 Completion of Documentary
Requirements as per Schedule 4 by the
BOT Company
As clearly stated in Article 18, JANCOM
undertook to comply with the stated conditions within
2 months from execution of the Contract as an
effective document. Since the President of
the Philippines has not yet affixed his signature on
the contract, the same has not yet become an
effective document. Thus, the two-month period
within which JANCOM should comply with the
conditions has not yet started to run. It cannot thus
be said that JANCOM has already failed to comply
with the conditions precedent mandated by the
contract. By arguing that failure [of JANCOM] to
comply with the conditions results in the failure of a
contract or prevents the judicial relation from coming
into existence, MMDA reads into the contract
something which is not contemplated by the
parties. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave
no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control (Art. 1370, Civil Code).
We, therefore, hold that the Court of Appeals did
not err when it declared the existence of a valid and
perfected contract between the Republic of
the Philippinesand JANCOM. There being a
perfected contract, MMDA cannot revoke or
renounce the same without the consent of the
other. From the moment of perfection, the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping
with good faith, usage, and law (Article 1315, Civil
Code). The contract has the force of law between
the parties and they are expected to abide in good
faith by their respective contractual commitments,
not weasel out of them. Just as nobody can be
forced to enter into a contract, in the same manner,
once a contract is entered into, no party can

renounce it unilaterally or without the consent of the
other. It is a general principle of law that no one may
be permitted to change his mind or disavow and go
back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary
thereto, to the prejudice of the other
party. Nonetheless, it has to be repeated that
although the contract is a perfected one, it is still
ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is
approved by the President.
Moreover, if after a perfected and binding
contract has been executed between the parties, it
occurs to one of them to allege some defect therein
as reason for annulling it, the alleged defect must be
conclusively proven, since the validity and the
fulfillment of contracts cannot be left to the will of one
of the contracting parties.In the case at bar, the
reasons cited by MMDA for not pushing through with
the subject contract were: 1) the passage of the
Clean Air Act, which allegedly bans incineration; 2)
the closure of the San Mateo landfill site; and 3) the
costly tipping fee. These reasons are bereft of merit
Once again, we make reference to the insightful
declarations of the Court of Appeals:
Sec. 20 of the Clean Air Act pertinently reads:
SECTION 20. Ban on Incineration. Incineration,
hereby defined as the burning of municipal, bio-
chemical and hazardous wastes, which process
emits poisonous and toxic fumes, is hereby
prohibited: x x x.
Section 20 does not absolutely prohibit incineration
as a mode of waste disposal; rather only those
burning processes which emit poisonous and toxic
fumes are banned.
As regards the projected closure of the San
Mateo landfill vis--vis the implementability of the
contract, Art. 2.3 thereof expressly states that [i]n the
event the project Site is not delivered x x x, the
Presidential task Force on Solid Waste Management
(PTFSWM) and the Client, shall provide within a
reasonable period of time, a suitable alternative
acceptable to the BOT COMPANY.
With respect to the alleged financial non-viability of
the project because the MMDA and the local
government units cannot afford the tipping fees
under the contract, this circumstance cannot, by
itself, abrogate the entire agreement.
Doctrinal is the rule that neither the law nor the
courts will extricate a party from an unwise or
undesirable contract, or stipulation for that matter, he
24
or she entered into with full awareness of its
consequences (Opulencia vs. CA, 293 SCRA
385). Indeed, the terms and conditions of the subject
contract were arrived at after due negotiations
between the parties thereto.
(Rollo, p. 54.)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59021 dated November 13,
2001 AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF TAGUIG, M.
Mla., complainant, vs. Judge SANTIAGO
G. ESTRELLA, respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
MELO, J.:
At bar is a sworn letter-complaint dated October
20, 1997 filed by 10 members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Taguig, Metro Manila charging Judge
Santiago G. Estrella of Branch 68 of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
stationed in Pasig City with serious misconduct
relative to Election Protest No. 144, entitled Ricardo
D. Papa, Jr. vs. Isidro B. Garcia.
The present controversy stems from an election
protest filed by then mayoral candidate Ricardo D.
Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate
proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the
May 8, 1995 elections. In his protest, Papa
impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the
municipality. This was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig and eventually raffled to the sala of
respondent wherein it was docketed as Election
Protest No. 144.
Garcia filed his answer with counter-protest and
after the rejoinder of issues, Papa filed a Motion to
Withdraw First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of
Action, thereby limiting his cause of action to only
one: the determination of the number of the plain
Garcia votes which should be considered stray and
their number deducted from votes credited to
protestee Garcia, there having been another
candidate surnamed Garcia.
The motion was granted and forthwith, the
revision committee opened 712 questioned ballot
boxes, examined the contents, and revised the
ballots.

On March 14, 1996, after the revision of ballots
was completed, Papa filed a Motion for Technical
Examination, wherein he objected to more than
5,000 ballots, the same allegedly having been
Written By One (WBO) or Written By Two (WBT)
persons. Respondent judge granted the
motion. However, on March 25, 1996, Papa
withdrew this motion.
On April 10, 1996, a final revision report was
submitted to respondent judge by Atty. Katherine A.
Go, the over-all chairperson of the Revision
Committee. The report stated that Papa actually
objected to a total of 11,290 ballots for Garcia, over
5,000 of which were objected to by reason of the
same having been written by one person (WBO) or
written by two (WBT). The said report also
mentioned that Garcia had 3,049 plain Garcia votes.
Thereafter, both parties offered their respective
exhibits, which were all admitted by respondent
judge.
On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an
order directing the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to examine the contested ballots in the
presence of a representative of both parties. The
pertinent portion of the order provided that so as to
enable the court to get a complete overview of the
matter, it was better to have a handwriting expert
examine the questioned ballots to settle once and for
all the questions and objections relative to the
ballots.
After the NBI finished its examination of the
contested ballots and upon the determination by
respondent that he had no further need of the ballot
boxes, he issued an order dated May 19, 1997
directing the removal of the ballot boxes and election
paraphernalia from his courtroom. On May 27, 1997,
respondent ordered the immediate transfer of all the
ballot boxes and election paraphernalia to the sala
of Judge Vivencio Baclig, Branch 157 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, so that Judge
Baclig may proceed with the trial of the vice-
mayoralty election protest of the same
municipality. On June 5, 1997, all the ballot boxes
which contained both contested and uncontested
ballots were removed from the custody of
respondent and transferred to RTC, Branch 157. On
June 26, 1997, the NBI Report was submitted to
respondent.
On July 22, 1997, Garcia filed a Manifestation
and Formal Motion with Formal Query, praying that
an order be issued to the Branch Clerk of Court to
be furnished a copy of the NBI Reports and/or allow
him to copy or review or at least to read said
reports. Respondent judge denied the motion on the
25
same day, proclaiming that the examination of
contested ballots by the NBI was ordered, upon the
instance of the court, and not by the parties, hence,
only the court was given copies of the NBI Reports.
On the same day that Garcias motion was
denied, respondent also set the date of promulgation
of judgment for July 31, 1997. This prompted Garcia
to file a Manifestation and Most Urgent Motion to
Defer and/or Cancel Scheduled Promulgation of
Judgment premised on respondents refusal to
furnish him a copy of the NBI Reports, and Garcias
physical impossibility of examining the contested
ballots because (a) the report was submitted on
June 26, 1997, and (b) the contested ballots and
other election paraphernalia had been transferred to
the sala of Judge Vivencio Baclig in RTC, Branch
157. Respondent judge denied Garcias motion on
July 28, 1997, explaining that:
. . . To allow parties at this stage to secure copies of
the NBI report and to comment on the same before
promulgating the decision would be opening the
floodgates for undue delay.
Thereafter, Garcia filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, with a prayer for
restraining order and preliminary injunction with the
COMELEC on July 29, 1997.The very next day or on
July 30, 1997, the COMELEC issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge
from proceeding with the scheduled promulgation of
judgment set on July 31, 1997.
On August 21, 1997, after the expiration of the
TRO, Papa filed a Motion for Immediate
Promulgation of Judgment, requesting that the same
be heard on August 25, 1997. This was, however,
granted by respondent judge the very next day, three
days ahead of the date set for hearing of the motion,
with respondent setting August 27, 1997 as the
promulgation date. Forthwith, Garcia filed with the
COMELEC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
Reiterating Prayer for Preliminary Injunction.
One day before the scheduled promulgation of
judgment, or on August 26, 1997, the COMELEC
issued an order directing respondent to allow both
parties or their counsel to have access to the NBI
reports and to give the parties copies thereof before
the promulgation of the decision.
On the day of the promulgation of judgment
(August 27, 1997), respondent gave Garcias
counsel 5 minutes to go over Questioned
Documents Report No. 152-297 which consisted of
53 pages, and Questioned Document Report No.
152-297(A), which consisted of 17 pages.

Thereafter, judgment was promulgated,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, and all the forgoing considered, the
Court resolves to SUSTAIN as it hereby SUSTAINS
the Protest lodged by Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., and
accordingly renders judgment DECLARING the
aforenamed Protestant the duly elected mayor of the
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila.
The Counter-Protest filed by protestee Isidro B.
Garcia is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to damages as no proof was
presented by either party.
Complainants further claim that it was only after
the promulgation of judgment that Garcia was able
to secure copies of the NBI Reports.
It must be noted that Papa filed an Urgent
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on August 26,
1997, a day before the scheduled promulgation of
judgment lending credibility to the claim of Garcia
that Papa had prior knowledge of respondents
decision. Despite Garcias opposition, respondent
granted said motion on September 2, 1997. That
same day, respondent also issued the Writ of
Execution.
Complainants now allege that respondent
judge, together with Papa and the NBI officials
concerned, violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which provides that:
Sec. 3. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officers and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(e) Causing undue injury to any party,
including the government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. . . .
26
Complainants claim that: respondent gave
unwarranted benefits to Papa and caused, on the
other hand, undue injury to Mayor Garcia as well as
to the people of Taguig by depriving the latter of their
duly elected mayor, and giving Papa unwarranted
benefits; the decision and reports were prepared,
issued, and executed with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence; that
respondent conspired, confederated, and
confabulated with the NBI officials concerned and
Papa to make the NBI Reports and the decision
favorable to Papa; that respondent did not bother to
check the figures and to analyze the data contained
in the reports, allegedly because a careful perusal of
said reports would have led to the discovery of flaws
and mistakes; and that the hasty transfer of ballot
boxes from respondents sala to that of Judge
Vivencio Baclig violated Section 255 of the Omnibus
Election Code which requires the examination and
appreciation of the ballots to be done by the judge
himself rather than mere reliance on the work of the
Revision Committee.
In his Comment dated December 10, 1997,
respondent vehemently denied the allegations in the
complaint by addressing complainants two main
issues: (1) whether it was proper for respondent to
have designated the NBI to conduct the necessary
handwriting examination and to submit reports on
the results thereof to the court and not to the parties
considering that said reports were the sole basis of
the decision rendered by the court, and (2) whether
it was proper for respondent to have granted the
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the
declared winner Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., allowing him
to take his oath notwithstanding the pendency of an
appeal filed with the Commission on Elections
concerning the decision rendered by respondent.
In addressing the first issue, respondent
claimed that the examination conducted by the NBI,
which included the segregation, photocopying, and
photographing of the contested ballots was in fact
done in the presence of the court and the
representatives of the parties. Respondent also
alleged that the NBI gave one copy each of the
reports only to the court since the request therefor
did not emanate from the parties. He further claimed
that the reports were made available to the parties
as early as August 25, 1997, but that neither party
took the time to reproduce the same.
Concerning the second issue, respondent
asserted that he acted in accordance with the Rules
of Civil Procedure which provide that upon motion of
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party,
the court may, in its discretion and upon good
reasons, order the execution of a judgment or final

order even before the expiration of the period to
appeal.Respondent further contended that Papa,
the rightful winner of the May 1995 elections, had
been deprived of his right to sit as the duly elected
mayor of the Municipality of Taguig and that his
constituents had been equally deprived of his
services as their duly elected municipal head.
In the letter-reply dated August 12, 1998,
complainants informed this Court that the
COMELEC had promulgated an En Banc resolution
in SPR No. 42-97 entitled, Isidro B. Garcia vs. Hon.
Santiago G. Estrella, Judge, RTC, Branch 68, Pasig
City and Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., nullifying the
September 2, 1997 order of respondent directing
execution pending appeal of his July 21, 1997
decision and the corresponding Writ of Execution,
and ordering (a) Papa to cease and desist from
performing or continuing to perform the duties and
functions of Mayor of the Municipality of Taguig
pending the final resolution of the appeal, and (b) to
immediately relinquish the position of Mayor of
Taguig in favor Garcia.
Both complainants and respondent were
required by the Court on April 12, 2000 to manifest
whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the record.Respondent did
manifest that he was so willing, while complainants,
despite proper service of the notice, failed to
respond. They are, therefore, deemed to be likewise
willing to submit the case for resolution without
further pleadings and arguments.
In the previous report and recommendation
dated February 29, 2000 submitted by Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, it was pertinently
observed that respondent gravely abused his
discretion in deciding the case and in issuing the
questioned order since grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction occurs when a
board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions
exercises its judgment in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner, or fails to consider the
evidence adduced by the parties. The Office of the
Court Administrator echoed the COMELECs finding
that respondents action showed utter disregard of
the appropriate procedure required of him, resulting
in the disenfranchisement of thousands of voters.
No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence (Rule
1.01, Canon 1). Indeed, in every case, a judge shall
endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and
applicable laws unswayed by partisan interests,
public opinion, or fear of criticism (Rule 3.02, Canon
27
3, Code of Judicial Conduct). Thus, this Court has
continually reminded members of the bench that:
The Judge should always be imbued with a high
sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of
his obligation to promptly and properly administer
justice. He must view himself as a priest for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious
crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a
priest in the performance of the most sacred
ceremonies of religious liturgy, the judge must
render service with impartiality commensurate with
public trust and confidence reposed in him.
(Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 [1998])
In the case at bar, respondents demeanor
during the entirety of the trial is clearly wanting. From
the outset, it must be noted that Garcia obtained a
total of 41,900 votes as compared to Papas
36,539. However, respondent based his decision to
proclaim Papa the winner of the 1995 elections on
the basis of the NBI reports which recommended the
deduction of 12,734 votes from Garcia's total votes
of 41,900 (per revision report), and 3,809 votes from
Papas total votes of 36, 539 (per revision
report). Deducting 12,734 votes from Garcias votes
would give him a total of 29,166; while deducting
3,809 votes from Papas votes would result in him
getting a total of 32,730 votes. This will wipe out
Garcias edge of 5,361 and give Papa a judge-made
plurality of 3,564 votes.
A more careful perusal of the data contained in
the NBI reports would have shown a different
outcome. Upon analyzing the NBI report, it should
have been apparent to respondent that the actual
count of the listed Garcia-manufactured ballots
(GMB) to be deducted is 12,388 votes. This would
have resulted in a total of 29,512 votes for Garcia as
compared to 32,730 for Papa. It must also be noted
that there were 3,049 votes for Garcia which were
not counted because these were considered stray
votes, there having been another candidate
surnamed Garcia. This other candidate was,
however, declared a nuisance candidate. Upon
adding these 3,049 alleged stray Garcia votes to
Garcias 29,512, we get a total of 32,561 votes for
Garcia as compared to 32,730 for Papa. This would
have given Papa only a margin of 169 votes. This
close margin between the two candidates should
have given respondent reason enough to subject the
NBI Reports to closer scrutiny. It should be noted
that respondent had already transferred the
questioned ballot boxes to another RTC sala on
June 5, 1997, 21 days before he received the reports
and recommendation of the NBI. This fact made it
impossible for him to form a proper basis for his

decision, as clearly, there was no way for him to
ascertain the veracity of the NBI Reports. Section
255 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that,
where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so
warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the court the
interests of justice so require, it shall immediately
order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys,
ballots and other documents used in the election be
brought before it and that the ballots be examined
and the votes recounted.
In this case, respondent was remiss in
examining the questioned ballots despite the wrong
figures, computations, and typographical errors and
mistakes present in the NBI
Reports. Notwithstanding these errors, respondent
based his decision solely on the conclusions and
findings of the NBI.
Respondents obvious partiality for Papa is
further bolstered by his acts during the promulgation
of judgment on August 27, 1997. The facts show that
respondent did not set the NBI Reports for hearing,
nor was Garcia allowed to confront the NBI officials
concerned. He did not even allow Garcia to get
copies of the reports until after the promulgation of
the decision on August 27, 1997, and this, only after
the COMELEC had ordered respondent to do so on
August 26, 1997. In fact, the only time Garcias
counsel was able to study the two reports of the NBI
consisting of 53 and 17 pages, respectively, was five
minutes before the promulgation of
judgment. Respondents justification that he alone
should have copies of the reports since these were
court-sponsored and the request did not emanate
from either of the parties, is an explanation which
this Court finds hard to accept.
Judge Estrellas obvious bias became even
more apparent when he granted the motion for
execution pending appeal filed by Papa on the day
of promulgation of judgment, August 27, 1997. What
is disturbing is that said motion was dated August
26, 1997, a day before the scheduled promulgation,
indicating that Papa had prior knowledge of a
decision favorable to him.
On this score, we find pertinent our ruling in the
recent case of Evelyn Agpalasin vs. Judge Ernesto
M. Agcaoili, (A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April 12, 2000),
that:
A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation
before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid such
action as may reasonably tend to waken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or
friendships constitute an element in determining his
judicial course. He must not only render a just,
28
correct and impartial decision but should do so in
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as
to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. A decision
which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will
nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety
when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed
to be less than impartial and honest.
We also find credence in the COMELEC
resolution promulgated on January 5, 1998 which
observed that it was physically impossible for the
NBI document examiners to have examined over
16,000 ballots and to have come out with an
accurate finding. Declared thus the COMELEC:
In the case at bench, the NBI necessarily examined
xerox copies of 14,664 ballots from 713 precincts
and without the guidance of objections from revisors,
the NBI document examiner, on his own initiative
and determination, sorted out as written by one
person 12,274 ballots in six (6) groups. This was
done in a record time of less than two (2) months,
from March 31, 1997 to May 19, 1997.
As we know, standard document examination
procedure requires the examination of original
documents (ballots, in this case) not
photocopies. Other than this, invalidating ballots not
objected to by the revisors in the revision report, as
pointed out, is not sanctioned by the rules on
revision and appreciation of ballots.
To conduct this kind of examination, involving
enormous number of ballots, is almost impossible to
accomplish. One would have to spread the 14,664
ballots from 713 precincts beside each other, in a
floor or table space bigger than the size of a
basketball court, and by going over those thousands
of ballots, pick at random groups of ballots six
groups in all and, by examining them, reach a
conclusion that the ballots in each of these groups
were written by one person. Common sense dictates
that this is simply an impossible procedure.And we
are not convinced that through this method, the NBI
could correctly and with scientific precision invalidate
12,724 ballots of the protestee.
Indubitably, the foregoing have raised the
suspicion of partiality on the part of
respondent. Verily, a judge must promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. These stringent standards are intended to
assure parties of just and equitable decisions and of
a judiciary that is capable of dispensing impartial
justice in every issue in every trial (Abundo vs.
Manio, Jr., 312 SCRA 1 [1999]).

WHEREFORE, Judge Santiago G. Estrella is
hereby found guilty of serious misconduct, partiality,
and inexcusable negligence, and is ordered to pay a
fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with the stern warning that any similar
misconduct on his part in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET
AL., respondents.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.
Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay
Transportation Co.
P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez. A. M.
Zarate for respondent Raymundo Transportation Co.
Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.
MALCOLM, J.:
The preliminary and basic question presented by the
petition of the Manila Electric Company, requesting the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be permitted to use the
Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the
compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric
Company by such transportation companies, relates to
the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the
legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting
as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No.
1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a
franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain,
and operate an electric railway, and to construct,
maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power
system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly
direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal."
Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any
franchise or right of way is granted to any other person
or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over
portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein,
the terms on which said other person or corporation
shall use such right of way, and the compensation to
be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or
corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators,
the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was
filed in this court, it was ordered that the petitioner be
29
required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and
the transportation companies affected by the petition.
Thereafter, the Attorney-General disclaimed any
interest in the proceedings, and opposition was
entered to the petition by a number of public utility
operators. On the submission of memoranda after an
oral hearing, the petition was made ready for
resolution.
Examining the statutory provision which is here
invoked, it is first noted that power is attempted to be
granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting
as a board of arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as
an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a majority
of the members of the Supreme Court is made final.
And it is finally observed that the franchise granted the
Manila Electric Company by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, although only a contract between
the parties to it, is now made to effect the rights of
persons not signatories to the covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method
of the parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration
is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement
may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters
submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which
find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code.
Citation of authority is hardly necessary, except that it
should be recalled that in the Philippines, and in the
United States for that matter, it has been held that a
clause in a contract, providing that all matters in dispute
between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and
to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot
oust the courts of jurisdiction (Wahl and
Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301;
Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69;
Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908;
District of Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U. S., 161.)
We would not be understood as extending the
principles governing arbitration and award too far.
Unless the arbitration agreement is such as absolutely
to close the doors of the courts against the parties, the
courts should look with favor upon such amicable
arrangements. We can also perceive a distinction
between a private contract for submission to arbitration
and agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of
a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others
than the parties to a particular franchise. Here,
however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it
remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators
is made final, which if literally enforced would leave a
public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by
Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for a
judicial determination of the question in dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case
of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner's

Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an
Act of a state legislature authorizing the
commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate
and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a
bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative
power to the courts. But that is not the question before
us. Here the question is not one of whether or not there
has been a delegation of legislative authority to a court.
More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be
final, to act in that capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators,
exercise judicial functions, or the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise
administrative or quasi-judicial functions. The first case
would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted
the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it
would presuppose the right to bring the matter in
dispute before the courts, for any other construction
would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render
the award a nullity. But if this be the proper
construction, we would then have the anomaly of a
decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting
as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts
and eventually coming before the Supreme Court,
where the Supreme Court would review the decision of
its members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second
case, if the functions performed by the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be
considered as administrative or quasi-judicial in nature,
that would result in the performance of duties which the
members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take
it upon themselves to perform. The present petition
also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly,
for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to
determine if the members of the court may be
constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court
at all.
lawphil.net
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only
which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the
Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights,
should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the
Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty
not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
30
jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec.
26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of
"jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only
mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme
Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the
exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There
is an important distinction between the Supreme Court
as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A
board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense
of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction
which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised
by the Supreme Court. lawph!l .net
In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice
Taney, it was said:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively
judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to
exercise any other. . .. Its jurisdiction and powers and
duties being defined in the organic law of the
government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress
cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any
other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty.
. .. The award of execution is a part, and an essential
part of every judgment passed by a court exercising
judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of
the term, without it. Without such an award the
judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving
the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be
merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter,
and without any operation upon the rights of the
parties, unless Congress should at some future time
sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to
carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial
power confided to this court, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power that the
court is allowed to exercise under this act of
Congress. And while it executes firmly all the judicial
powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully abstain
from exercising any power that is not strictly judicial
in its character, and which is not clearly confided to it
by the Constitution. (Gordon vs. United States [1864],
2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697 Appendix.)
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue,
the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No.
1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the
operation of a democratic government constitutionally
established, and that it would be improper and illegal
for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom
shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric
Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme
Court decline to proceed further in the matter.