Taada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29,
1986)

TAADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed
on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared
that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have
no force and effect.
TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
in any other date, without its previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion
of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the
law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to
one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is
not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.

In Re: JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO

Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the IBP

A.M. No. 93-7-696-0
February 21, 1995

Facts:
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently
read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a
few substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than
this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from
1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts,
dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the
Supreme Court.

Case 1: Cases involving Traders Royal Bank (TRB).

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders
Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This
he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT
No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his
sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a
second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a
mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by
TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vested in him by a Special
Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.

Case 2: Cases involving United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).

Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure
repayment thereof. The mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial
lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold
on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a
stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale
was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.

Case 3: Cases involving Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC).

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court
battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had
obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single
Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp.
(Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability
thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB,
Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action
in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.

Issue:

Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive contempt?

Held:

Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly

committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end that
he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the
Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of
TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is
herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or court
employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.

In Re: Argosino B.M No 712

FACTS:
Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the
Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was
granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he
be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the
required good moral character he now possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15)
certifications among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious order. In addition, he, together with the others who were convicted,
organized a scholarship foundation in honor of their hazing victim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the Rolls
of Attorneys, and practice law.

HELD:
YES. Petition granted.

RATIO:
Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the
required good moral character as required before taking the Lawyers Oath and to sign
the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not
inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally
reminded that the Lawyers Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality before the
practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started is expected to
continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society.

Ah Chong
15 Phil. 488
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
Laws: Article 1 RPC, Art 3 RPC

FACTS:
August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is
there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was
being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called
out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the
knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an unlawful aggression) which had been
placed against the door. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow,
the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his
roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was
playing a trick on him
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of
which took place in a house where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under
his pillow for his personal protection.
trial court held it as simple homicide

ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake
as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide
or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act.

HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime
NO.
GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with
criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code
Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.
o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act
o "malice" signifying the intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act itself does not make man guilty
unless his intention were so
o Actus me incito factus non est meus actus - an act done by me against my will is
not my act
GR: courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of
cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal WITHOUT
regard to the intent of the doer
EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so
construed
ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that
had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the
facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which
he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner,

vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.

G. R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001356

FACTS: The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She
contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to
perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His true color of being an emotionally
immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He
was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 oclock in the afternoon until
1:00 oclock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,
respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a
loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children
themselves were not spared from physical violence.

Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she
returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn
out as expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaultedpetitioner for
about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He
was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.

Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage
to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner
still subsists.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.

(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.

HELD:

(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no
evidence showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent. Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances.
Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and
further explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.

(2) The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only
when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.

Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal
life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additionalprocedural
guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages
grounded on psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and
Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are
mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

LawPhils Full text
link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jan1991/gr_81561_1991.html

FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the
booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders carrying Four (4) wrapped
packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the
packages. She refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts,
Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves
contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained
inside the cellophane wrappers.

The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting
in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:
Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.

FACTS:

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known

as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill
did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section
24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that
it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate
for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred
that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and
substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the
Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to
note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD:
No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means,
according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that
there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of
Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a
significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

Oposa vs. Factoran

(G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents.
The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant
(respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the
court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of
contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The
Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right --
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II
of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the
DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's
natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in
Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative
Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners
(and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's
duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the
wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit

by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.

Villareal vs. People

GR No. 151258 February 1, 2012 664 scra

FACTS:
Seven Freshmen Law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law havebeen
initiated by the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on February 1991. The initiation rites
startedwhen the neophytes were met by some members of the mentioned fraternity at
the lobby of theAteneo Law School. They were consequently brought to a house and
briefed on what will behappening during the days when they will be initiated. They were
informed that there will bephysical beatings and that the neophytes can quit anytime
they want. They were brought toanother house to commence their initiation.The
neophytes were insulted and threatened evenbefore they got off the van. Members of
the fraternity delivered blows to the neophytes as theyalighted from the van. Several
initiation rites were experienced by the neophytes like the Indianrun, Bicol express and
rounds. They were asked to recite provisions and principles of thefraternity and were hit
every time they made a mistake. Accused fraternity members, Dizon andVillareal, asked
the head of the initiation rites (Victorino) to reopen the initiation. Fraternity members
subjected neophytes to paddling and additional hours of physical pain. After the last
session of beatings, Lenny Villa could not walk. Later that night, he was feeling cold and
his condition worsened. He was brought to the hospital but was declared dead on arrival.
Criminal case was filed against 26 fraternity members and was subsequently
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and penalized with
reclusion perpetua. On January 10, 2002 CA modified the criminal liability of
each of the accused according to individual participation. 19 of the the accused
were acquitted, 4 of the appellants were found guilty of slight physical injuries, and 2 of
the accused-appellants (Dizon and Villareal) were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide. Accused Villareal petitioned for review on Certriori under Rue
45 on the grounds that the CA made 2 reversible errors: first, denial of due process and
second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, petitioner
Villareal died on 13 March 2011 and filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.

ISSUE:
Whether or not criminal liability for personal penalties of the accused is extinguished by
death

Doctrine:
Yes, criminal liability of the accused is extinguished by death. The Court took note of
counsel for petitioners Notice of Death when it has been received while the petition was
pending resolution. Personal penalties refer to the service of personal or imprisonment
penalties, while pecuniary penalties refer to fines, costs, civil liability. Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code states that the criminal liability of a convict for personal penalties is
totally extinguished by death of the convict. His pecuniary penalty has been extinguished
since the death of the accused happened before his final judgment. Therefore, the death
of the petitioner for both personal and pecuniary penalties including his civil liability has
ended. His petition has also been dismissed and the criminal case against him has been
closed and terminated