Case Digest Doctrines Reviewer

Case Digests-Doctrines/Reviewer
Civil Law Review 1

Christian V. Asas
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I Effect and Application of Laws
a.) Article 2 Date of Effectivity of Laws

(i.) Requirement of publication
(ii.) Issuances that are covered/not covered by Article 2
People vs. Que Po Lay, G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954
Montemayor, J.
FACTS: Que Po lay who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S.
checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central
Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as
required by Circular No. 20. Thus, he was found guilty by the CFI of Manila of violating
Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not Circular No. 20 has force and effect as it was not published in the
Official Gazette pursuant to CA No. 638 and Act No. 2930.
HELD: Yes. The laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations
and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws
provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices
and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely
enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for
the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of
Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by
Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth
day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the
new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being
issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of
law according to settled jurisprudence. Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially
like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its
violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory
that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.
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Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the
effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their
promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the
termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is
of the opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with
the same.
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year
1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's
conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not
have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after
November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not
binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession
thereof.
But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the
Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by
appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in
the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section
19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and
decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before
its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and
consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the
trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of
the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.
Taada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985

Cruz, J.:
FACTS: Lorenzo M. Taada and others filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court
to compel Juan C. Tuvera to publish in the Official Gazette the various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation,
and administrative orders. Said action is based on the premises that it is a peoples right to be
informed on matters of public concern pursuant to Section 6, Article 4, of the 1973 Constitution
and on the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. The Solictor General moved for the outright
dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners have no legal personality not being
personally or directly affected or prejudiced by the non-publication of presidential issuances and
not being the aggrieved party. Likewise, the Solicitor General contended that publication in the
Official Gazette is not required for the laws to become effective if the laws themselves provide
for their own effectivity dates in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
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ISSUES: (1.) Whether or not the petitioners have legal personality in making the instant
petition.
(2.) Whether or not the publication is necessary for the presidential issuances in
question to be effective.
HELD: (1.) Yes. When the question is one of the public right and the object of mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in the interest
and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws. In the case at bar, the right sought by the petitioners is a
public right recognized by the fundamental law. (2.) Yes. The publication of all presidential
issuances of public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law pursuant to Section
1, Commonwealth Act 638. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the
publication of presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
Taada vs. Tuvera, Resolution, December 29, 1986

Cruz, J.:
FACTS: Same petitioners in the earlier case filed another petition to the Supreme Court for
reconsideration/clarification of certain matters as follows: (1.) What is meant by law of public
nature or general applicability?; (2.) Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not?; (3.) What is meant by publication?; (4.) Where is the
publication to be made?; (5.) When is the publication to be made? In the comment of the
Solicitor General, he moved for the dismissal of the same on the grounds that being a request for
advisory opinion, the clause unless it is otherwise provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when
necessary, did not have to made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision
was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This comment elicited a
reply from the petitioners. After the February Revolution, the new Solicitor General filed a
rejoinder averring that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government
agency or for particular persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary
must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration
was not binding because it was not supported by 8 members of the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the earlier decision will be upheld and the present petition be given due
course.
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HELD: Yes. The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or any
other date, without its previous publication. Publication cannot be dispensed with because it
would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to public in general albeit there are some that do
not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid intrusion
of privacy or as class legislation or an ultra vires act of the legislation. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. These statutes
include:
1.) Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or at
present, direct conferred by the Constitution.
2.) Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to valid delegation.
3.) Charter of the city.
4.) Presidential decrees including those naming public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements.
5.) Circulars issued by the Monetary Board if they are meant not merely to interpret by to
fill in the details of the Central Bank Act which such body is supposed to enforce.
Statutes which do not need to be published are as follows:
1.) Interpretive regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
2.) Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or

guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
3.) Instructions issued by the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption.
4.) The rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments of
workloads of his personnel or the wearing of proper office uniforms.
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5.) Municipal Ordinances are not covered by the rule but by the Local Government Code.
Publication must be made in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the law. Newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available,
have a wider readership, and come out regularly. However, the court cannot rule upon the
wisdom of law or to repeal or modify it if found impractical. Thus, as of now, it should be in the
Official Gazette pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code.
La Bugal Blaan Tribal Association vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, June 27, 2004
Carpio-Morales, J.:
FACTS: The petitioners herein assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise
known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc.
(WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws.
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.
279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-
owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which,
upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources that will be promoted by the
proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining,
for purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral
resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital investment in
a single mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency (US
$50,000,000.00).
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the
exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942
defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their
filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions
govern financial or technical assistance agreements. On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its
publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general
circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however,
or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares
of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15,
1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
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95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942.
This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 279, the law in force when the WMC FTAA was executed, did
come into effect.
HELD: Yes. E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then President Aquino on July 25, 1987, two
days before the opening of Congress on July 27, 1987. Section 8 of the E.O. states that the same
"shall take effect immediately." This provision, according to petitioners, runs counter to Section
1 of E.O. No. 200, which provides, Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
On that premise, petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 could have only taken effect
fifteen days after its publication at which time Congress had already convened and the
President's power to legislate had ceased. Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the
validity of E.O. No. 279 was settled in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, supra.
This is of course incorrect for the issue in Miners Association was not the validity of E.O. No.
279 but that of DAO Nos. 57 and 82 which were issued pursuant thereto.
Nevertheless, petitioners' contentions have no merit. It bears noting that there is nothing
in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date other than even before the
15-day period after its publication. Where a law provides for its own date of effectivity, such date
prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence of the phrase
"unless it is otherwise provided" in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies
only when a statute does not provide for its own date of effectivity.
What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process requires, as this Court held
in Taada v. Tuvera, is the publication of the law for without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a
ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being "the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation," is deemed written in the law. Hence, the due process clause, which,
so Taada held, mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279.
Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication "either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines," finds suppletory application.
It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on
August 3, 1987. From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200,
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and Taada v. Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its
publication in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
That such effectivity took place after the convening of the first Congress is irrelevant. At
the time President Aquino issued E.O. No. 279 on July 25, 1987, she was still validly exercising
legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly states: Sec. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to
exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers
by President Aquino; it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted. There
can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No. 279 is an effective, and a validly enacted, statute.
Umali vs. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1992

Padilla, J.:
FACTS: Congress enacted Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN ACT ADJUSTING THE BASIC
PERSONAL AND ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO INDIVIDUALS FOR
INCOME TAX PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY THRESHOLD LEVEL, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE SECTION 29, PARAGRAPH (L), ITEMS (1) AND (2) (A) OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES." Section 3 of the said Act provides, This act shall take effect upon its approval.
The said act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on
14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation.
On 26 December 1991, respondents promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92, the

pertinent portions of which read as follows: Sec. 1. SCOPE Pursuant to Sections 245 and 72
of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7167, these Regulations
are hereby promulgated prescribing the collection at source of income tax on compensation
income paid on or after January 1, 1992 under the Revised Withholding Tax Tables (ANNEX
"A") which take into account the increase of personal and additional exemptions. Sec. 3. Section
8 of Revenue Regulations No. 6-82 is amended by Revenue Regulations No. 1-86 is hereby
further amended to read as follows: Section 8. Right to claim the following exemptions. . . .
Each employee shall be allowed to claim the following amount of exemption with respect to
compensation paid on or after January 1, 1992. Sec. 5. EFFECTIVITY. These regulations
shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992.
ISSUES: (1.) Whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took effect upon its approval by the President on 19
December 1991, or on 30 January 1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following its publication on
14 January 1992 in the "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation.
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(2.) Assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, whether or not the said
law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income earned or received during calendar
year 1991.
HELD: (1.) Caltex vs. CIR. In this case, Sec. 3 of R.A. 6965 contains the effectivity clause
which provides. "This Act shall take effect upon its approval." R.A. 6965 was approved on
September 19, 1990. It was published in the Philippine Journal, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, on September 20, 1990. Pursuant to the Act, an implementing
regulation was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Revenue Memorandum
Circular 85-90, stating that R.A. 6965 took effect on October 5, 1990. Petitioner took exception
thereof and argued that the law took effect on September 20, 1990 instead. In Taada vs. Tuvera,
the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for its effectivity and neither can it
become effective upon its approval notwithstanding its express statement, following Article 2 of
the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen days after
September 20, 1990, or specifically, on October 5, 1990. Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep.
Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after fifteen (15) days following its
publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya."
(2.) Yes. It will also be observed that Rep. Act 7167 speaks of the adjustments that it
provides for, as adjustments "to the poverty threshold level." Certainly, "the poverty threshold
level" is the poverty threshold level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by Congress, not
poverty threshold levels in futuro, at which time there may be need of further adjustments in
personal exemptions. Moreover, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that these personal and
additional exemptions are fixed amounts to which an individual taxpayer is entitled, as a means
to cushion the devastating effects of high prices and a depreciated purchasing power of the
currency. In the end, it is the lower-income and the middle-income groups of taxpayers (not the
high-income taxpayers) who stand to benefit most from the increase of personal and additional
exemptions provided for by Rep. Act 7167. To that extent, the act is a social legislation intended
to alleviate in part the present economic plight of the lower income taxpayers. It is intended to
remedy the inadequacy of the heretofore existing personal and additional exemptions for
individual taxpayers.
And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions that it provides for
shall be available thenceforth, that is, after Rep. Act 7167 shall have become effective. In other
words, these exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax returns which is,
under the National Internal Revenue Code, done not later than the 15th day of April after the end
of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, as aforestated, on 30
January 1992, the increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 (though
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not before 30 January 1992). But these increased exemptions can be available on 15 April
1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available
in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect
of said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid, by 15 April 1991 and by 15 July
1991, at which time Rep. Act 7167 had not been enacted. To make Rep. Act 7167 refer back to
income received during 1990 would require language explicitly retroactive in purport and effect,
language that would have to authorize the payment of refunds of taxes paid on 15 April 1991 and
15 July 1991: such language is simply not found in Rep. Act 7167.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as

available only in respect of compensation income received during 1992, as the implementing
Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 purport to provide. Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 would in effect
postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993, and thus
literally defer the effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 to 1 January 1993. Thus, the implementing
regulations collide frontally with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall
take effect upon its approval." The objective of the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue in postponing through Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 the legal effectivity of
Rep. Act 7167 is, of course, entirely understandable to defer to 1993 the reduction of
governmental tax revenues which irresistibly follows from the application of Rep. Act 7167. But
the law-making authority has spoken and the Court cannot refuse to apply the law-maker's
words. Whether or not the government can afford the drop in tax revenues resulting from such
increased exemptions was for Congress (not this Court) to decide.
Paras, J.: Dissenting: The part of the decision which affirms the obiter
dictum enunciated in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera to the effect that a law becomes effective not
on the date expressly provided for in said law, but on the date after fifteen (15) days from the
publication in the Official Gazette or any national newspaper of general circulation. I say obiter
dictum because the doctrine mentioned is not the actual issue in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera.
In other words, the ratio decidendiin that case was the ruling that without publication, there can
be no effectivity. Thus, the statement as to which should be applied "after fifteen (15) days
from publication" or "unless otherwise provided by law" (Art. 2, Civil Code) was mere obiter.
The subsequent ruling in the resolution dated June 26, 1991 in Caltex, Inc. vs. Com. of Internal
Revenue cannot likewise apply because it was based on the aforesaid obiter in Tanada
v. Tuvera (supra). In the instant tax exemptions case, the law says effective upon
approval, therefore, since this law was approved by the President in December, 1991, its
subsequent publication in the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually immaterial.
Fortune Motors vs. MBTC, G.R. No. 115068, November 28, 1996
Hermosisima, Jr., J.:
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FACTS: Fortune Motors obtained several loans from MBTC secured by real estate mortgage.
Due to financial constraints, petitioner failed to pay the loan upon maturity. Consequently on
May 25, 1984, respondent bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and in effect,
foreclosed the real estate mortgage. The extrajudicial foreclosure was actually conducted by
Senior Deputy Sheriff Pablo Y. Sy who had sent copies of the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the
opposing parties by registered mail. In accordance with law, he posted copies of the Notice of
Sheriff's Sale at three conspicuous public places in Makati the office of the Sheriff, the
Assessor's Office and the Register of Deeds in Makati. He thereafter executed the Certificates of
Posting on May 20, 1984. The said notice was in fact published on June 2, 9 and 16, 1984 in
three issues of "The New Record." An affidavit of publication, dated June 19, 1984, 2 was
executed by Teddy F. Borres, publisher of the said newspaper. Fortune Motors filed a complaint
for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The trial court ruled in its favor but reversed by
CA. The case reached SC. It is the contention of Fortune Motors that the newspaper "Daily
Record" where the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure was published does not qualify as a
newspaper of general circulation. It further contends that the population that can be reached by
the "Daily Record" is only .004% as its circulation in Makati in 1984, was 1000 to 1500 per
week. Hence, it concludes that only 1648 out of a population of 412,069 were probable readers
of the "Daily Record," and that this is not the standard contemplated by law when it refers to a
newspaper of general circulation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Daily Record is a newspaper of general circulation.
HELD: Yes. Bonnevie vs. CA. To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that "it is
published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals." The newspaper
need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general circulation.
In the case at bench, there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law
regarding publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. This is evidenced by
the affidavit of publication executed by the New Record's publisher, Teddy F. Borres, which
stated that it is a newspaper edited in Manila and Quezon City and of general circulation in the
cities of Manila, Quezon City et. al., and in the Provinces of Rizal . . . , published every Saturday
by the Daily Record, Inc. This was affirmed by Pedro Deyto, who was the executive editor of the
said newspaper and who was a witness for petitioner. Deyto testified: a) that the New Record
contains news; b) that it has subscribers from Metro Manila and from all over the Philippines; c)
that it is published once a week or four times a month; and d) that he had been connected with
the said paper since 1958, an indication that the said newspaper had been in existence even
before that yearIn the case at bench, there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
law regarding publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. This is evidenced
by the affidavit of publication executed by the New Record's publisher, Teddy F. Borres, which
stated that it is a newspaper edited in Manila and Quezon City and of general circulation in the
cities of Manila, Quezon City et. al., and in the Provinces of Rizal . . . , published every Saturday
by the Daily Record, Inc. This was affirmed by Pedro Deyto, who was the executive editor of the
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said newspaper and who was a witness for petitioner. Deyto testified: a) that the New Record
contains news; b) that it has subscribers from Metro Manila and from all over the Philippines; c)
that it is published once a week or four times a month; and d) that he had been connected with
the said paper since 1958, an indication that the said newspaper had been in existence even
before that year.
A perusal of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1079 and Act 3135 shows that the said laws
do not require that the newspaper which publishes judicial notices should be a daily newspaper.
Under P.D. 1079, for a newspaper to qualify, it is enough that it be a "newspaper or periodical
which is authorized by law to publish and which is regularly published for at least one (1) year
before the date of publication" which requirement was satisfied by New Record. Nor is there a
requirement, as stated in the said law, that the newspaper should have the largest circulation in
the place of publication.
b.) Article 3. Ignorantia legis non excusat
c.) Article 4. G.R. prospective application of laws

(i.) exceptions to the principle of non-retroactivity
Article 22 of the RPC. Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Article 62 of the RPC. Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency

shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity
with the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially

punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing
the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the
penalty.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the
crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the
offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal
cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices
and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means
employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those
persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their
cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:
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(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided
by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal
in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed
upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is
within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious
or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of
said crimes a third time or oftener.
Albino Co vs. CA, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993

Narvasa, C.J.
FACTS: In payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated
petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against
the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. The
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated
reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." Hence, he was charged for BP 22
before RTC Pasay which led to his conviction.
He appealed to CA. He contended that reliance in the case of Que vs. People for his
conviction is reversible. It is because that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of
an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the
issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the
judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing"
check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official
pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice (Circular No. 4). This
administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry
Circular No. 12) almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to
the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that
Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the
deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that
the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an
obligation. The CA affirmed the conviction and reasoned that the Que doctrine did not amount
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to the passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one,
i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.
ISSUE: Whether or not Que doctrine shall be given retroactive effect.
HELD: No. The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which,
"although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this
being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . .
People vs. Jabinal (1967) People vs. Macarandang (1959), People vs. Lucero (1958),
People vs. Mapa (1967). The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of
the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law. It is true that the doctrine was overruled
in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act
be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set

forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371,
374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual
existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.
d. Article 5 Mandatory and prohibitory laws
(i.) violation makes act void; exceptions
e. Article 6 Waiver of rights
(i.) Requisites of valid waiver
Cui vs. Arellano University, G.R. No. L-15121, May 30, 1961
FACTS: Emeteri Cui is a former student of AU for 7 semesters as scholar at the time his uncle,
Francisco Capistrano, was the Dean of the College of Law of the said University. When
Capistrano transferred to Abad Santos University, he also transferred. However, at the time
when he is about to take the Bar, he needs to get his TOR from AU but the latter refused until he
paid under protest the tuition fees for 7 semesters.
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HELD: The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between
plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school
without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The
lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that Memorandum No. 48
s 1949 of the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory,
not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it
was more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and
simply because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in
its brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void
because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the
corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question
whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad
Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend
personal equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane.
Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for,
regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public
policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound
principle of public policy.
The Director of Public Schools is correct in its letter to AU. There is one more point that
merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered into between Cui and Arellano
University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs.
Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts
are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the
practice of government officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office to lay
down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but courts consider the
practices of government officials as one of the four factors in determining a public policy of the
state. It has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of
public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a
transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public
welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty . If Arellano University understood clearly the real
essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No.
38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951,
which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the
Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic
honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, we read: 'In order to declare a contract void
as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be
done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and
good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The policy
enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in
recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the
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understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase

the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with
sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good
customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have received some kind of
social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and
keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical
confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the
Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the
giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading
colleges and universities of the United States after which our educational practices or policies are
patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant
students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom
society has an established interest or a first lien.
People vs. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991

Davide, Jr., J:
HELD: Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a

known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver
the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a
right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person
forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of
such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: . . . the doctrine
of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word "waiver" covers
every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects
his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to
him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or
guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the
waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy;
and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his
private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public
right, and without detriment to the community at large. . . . Although the general rule is that any
right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in
derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it
infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public
interest may be waived. While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by
statute and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional
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provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional
rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver.
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo, it was held, rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime
fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested;
and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges.
Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to

consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will." This Court has recognized
waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; the right to counsel and to remain silent; and the right to be heard.
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill
of Rights. Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states: . . . These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless,
clearly suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such
waiver will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another
of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and
whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs,
or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
f. Article 7 Repeal of laws
(i.) Express and implied repeals
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377
Bautista-Angelo, J.:
FACTS: Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration
(RCA), wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400
metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the National Economic Council (NEC) as embodied in its Resolution No. 70,
series of 1964. The President submitted the said letter to his cabinet for consideration and the
latter approved the same. Consequently, the President designated RCA as the government
agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Feliciano announced an
invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding. Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc. (IPCPAI) together with Ramon Gonzales opposed the importation via filing a
petition for prohibition to the Supreme Court. The opposition is anchored on the ground that the
importation is illegal even there is a certification from the NEC that there is a shortage of rice of
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such gravity as to constitute a national emergency because Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3452 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties upon payment of
the corresponding taxes. In disputing the opposition, Feliciano and others stated that the validity
of the importation is based on the provisions of R.A. No. 2207, which in their opinion, still stand.
ISSUE: Whether or not the importation in question is valid.
HELD: Yes. Although, the IPCPAIs contention that R.A. No. 3452 prohibits government
agency to import rice is correct, it does not follow that there is no law which allow government
to undertake importation of rice into the Philippines. R.A. No. 2207 provides the color of
validity in the importation in question. The said law is not repealed by R.A. No. 3452. It is
admitted that Section 16 of R.A. No. 3452 provides All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, it is certainly not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended
to be repealed. Rather it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that
a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the
presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore. In the case at bar, irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
between R.A. No. 2207 and R.A. No. 3452 does not exist. The two laws can be construed as
harmonious parts of legislative expression of its policy to promote rice and corn program.
g.) Article 8 Judicial decisions form part of the law of the land
(i.) Law and jurisprudence

(ii.) Stare Decisis
Ting vs. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 1665562, March 31, 2009

Nachura, J.:
FACTS: This is a case of petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by
Carmen on the allegations that Benjamins psychological incapacity is manifested by the
following: (1.) Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession; (2.) Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
(3.) His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and (4.) Benjamins irresponsibility and
immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.
Carmen presented as witness a psychiatrist in the person of Dr. Oate who merely evaluated
Benjamin based on the TSN of the latters deposition. In opposition, Benjamin presented Dr.
Obra who evaluated Benjamin based on the TSN of the latters deposition, interview with his
brother, and psychiatric report of Dr. Pentz of University of Pretoria in South Africa. The lower
court declared the marriage null and void. The CA reversed the ruling but subsequently
reconsidered.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the Molina case which was promulgated more than five years after the
filing of the petition in this case.
HELD: Yes. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two
simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8
of the Civil Code.
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English
courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato
S. Punos discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting
opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections is enlightening: The latin phrase stare decisis
et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine
started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it
is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in
litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not
be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed
conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or
principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent
"arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy
well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations
that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep
internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to
deal with for over two centuries."
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation
although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis
have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty
of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The
second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own
precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an
obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a
command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis
constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves
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judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare
decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in
constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis
is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible.
Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the
court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the
venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself and not what we have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare
decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after
a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other
federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss
had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and
the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy
for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule
and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In
Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal."
Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the
colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise
refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain
provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,
we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent
is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed
on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its
merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The
court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying
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practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would
lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the
old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have
so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos

and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis
is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and
again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of
a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."
The Molina ruling was not abandoned. In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te, we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to
impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it,
which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect
to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly
advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by
the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case
involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
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Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.: To require the
petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to
attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have
proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants.
It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina
Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist
and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-
trial conference.
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys
alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly,
be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
Albino Co vs. CA, supra
Pesca vs. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

Vitug, J.:
FACTS: Another case under Article 36. It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that
respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital
covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became
apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at
least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased
petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The
children themselves were not spared from physical violence. Finally, on 19 November 1992,
petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon
City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to
forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay,
things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse. On the morning of 22
March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical
examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions
and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed
against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. The trial court declared the
marriage null and void. The CA reversed. The case reached SC.
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The petitioner contended that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court
of Appeals and Molina, promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive
application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the
guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In
any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.
HELD: The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and
reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded: It should be obvious, looking at all the
foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of,
but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated."
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" -
that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith
in accordance therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel
provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the
concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court
has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines
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to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in
her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone
at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
h.) Articles 9 and 10 Duty to render judgment; Rule on interpretation of law
Karen Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997
Torres, Jr., J.:
FACTS: This case arose from the serious illegal detention and four counts of rape cases and a
civil case for damages with preliminary attachment filed against Greg Bartelli before RTC
Makati. Bartelli was able to escape during the hearing of his petition for bail. In the civil case,
the Judge issued an Order granting the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance
Corporation in the amount of P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the
trial court.
The Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking

Corporation. In a letter to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked
Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. Deputy Sheriff of
Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the
garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental
to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the
subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China
Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the
dollar deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body,
whatsoever. This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank
on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has
been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the
plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of
preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Central Bank answered the query in the negative saying that Section 113 of CB Circular No.
960 is absolute in application admitting no exception.
Meanwhile, the trial court granted petitioners' motion for leave to serve summons by
publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y
Northcott." Summons with the complaint was a published in the Manila Times once a week for
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three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared
in default. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners
awarding the petitioners damages. Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of
decision, said notice was published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive
weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of
judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on
Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960. Thus, petitioners invoked SCs jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the secrecy of foreign currency deposits is applicable in this case.
HELD: No. Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good
and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by
the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by
said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four
(4) days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the
other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the
amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and
besmirched reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and
knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could not, however get the award
of damages because of this unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the
favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. If Karen's sad
fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the
incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than his child's rights to said
award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages from this alien who had the gall to
wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the
flaw in the questioned provisions. It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in
1983 or at a time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments
were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities
of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the
questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and
oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to
anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case
before us.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we
rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg
Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano
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de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous , this is one of those
fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would
be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the
guilty at the expense of the innocent. Call it what it may but is there no conflict of legal
policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court
against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the
dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime?
This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny. We definitely cannot have both ways and
rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.
i.) Articles 11 and 12 Customs; absence of presumption.
Custom is a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed as a

social rule, legally binding and obligatory.
Requisites: (a.) Plurality of acts, or various resolutions of a juridical question raised

repeatedly in life; (b.) Uniformity, or identity of acts or various solutions to the juridical
questions; (c.) General practice by the great mass of the social group; (d.) Continued
performance of these acts for a long period of time; (e.) General conviction that the practice
corresponds to a juridical necessity or that it is obligatory; and (f.) The practice must not be
contrary to law, morals or public order.
j.) Article 13 Legal periods; Rule in case of leap year.
National Marketing Corporation vs. Tecson, G.R. No. L-291131, August 27, 1961
Concepcion, C.J.:
FACTS: In the case of Price Stabilization Corporation (PSC) vs. Michael D. Tecson, the CFI of
Manila ruled on November 14, 1955 in favor of PSC. The said decision was served to the
defendant on November 21, 1955. On December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation
(NMC), successor of properties, rights, and assets of PSC filed a complaint to the same court for
the revival of the judgment rendered. Tecson moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction and prescription. The court granted the motion on the ground that Article 13 of
the NCC treated year as composed of 365 days and since 1960 and 1964 are leap years, the
complaint filed by NMC was beyond the 10-year prescriptive period by two days. Thus, the case
reached SC on pure question of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not NMC cause of action has prescribed.

HELD: Yes. The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes
the explicit provision of Art. 13 of the NCC limiting the connotation of each year as the term
is used in our laws 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the SC
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thereof had held on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a natural
month or solar month in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such provision was
incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same SC
declared that, pursuant to Art. 7 of the said Code, whenever months xxx are referred to in the
law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days, not the natural, solar or
calendar months, unless they are designated by name in which case they shall be computed
by the actual number of days they have. This concept was, later, modified in the Philippines,
by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), pursuant to which, month shall be
understood to refer to a calendar month. In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del
Rosario, with the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (RA 386) xxx we have reverted
to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered
as the regular 30-day month xxx and not the solar or civil month, with the particularity that,
whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned months, days, or nights, ours has added thereto
the term years and explicitly ordains that it shall be understood that years are of 365 days.
Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not
realistic for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-
appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Article 13 of our Civil
Code, and reviving Section 13 of the RAC, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in
effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy
embodied in the RAC, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.
CIR vs. Primetown Property Group, G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007
Corona, J.:
FACTS: On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group,
Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to
petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and
materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the
real estate industry to slowdown. As a consequence, while business was good during the first
quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to P71,879,228 that year. According to
Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. 7 Nevertheless,
respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from
real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of P26,318,398.32. Therefore, respondent was
entitled to tax refund or tax credit. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos
required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim. Respondent complied
but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA dismissed the same as it was filed beyond the two-year
prescriptive period provided for in Section 229 of the NIRC. The CTA found that respondent
filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit
commenced on that date. Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under
Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the
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year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed
its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. The CTA denied the
subsequent MR prompting Primetown to go to CA. The CA reversed the CTAs decision
reasoning that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap
year. The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a
leap year. In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15,
1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days
each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor
construed. Upon denial of the MR, the CIR went to SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Primetowns claim is within the two-year prescriptive period.
HELD: Yes. The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA
within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis,
however, is not. As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law
speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing
Corporation v. Tecson, we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a
regular year or a leap year.
However, in 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides, "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it
shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day
of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset.
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of
days it may contain." It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered
day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is
not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month." To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008
to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008
until February 29, 2008.
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and
abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be
reasonably reconciled with the previous one). Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 states, All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. A repealing
clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the laws to be abolished. Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws
inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987. Implied repeals, however, are not favored.
An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test
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is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and
they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter the computation of legal
periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a
leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar
months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is
irrelevant. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal
periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law,
governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. We therefore hold that
respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar
month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the
reglementary period.
k.) Article 14 Applicability of Penal Laws
(i.) Principles of territoriality and generality; Exceptions.
Principle of Generality criminal law is binding on all persons who live or sojourn the
in the Philippine Territory.
Exceptions: (a.) Treaty stipulations provide the contrary. (Article 2 of RPC and Article
14 of NCC). RP-US Military Bases Agreement of March 14, 1947 which expired on September
16, 1991. RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement signed on February 10, 1998; (b.) Principles of
public international law. This provides immunities for sovereigns and other chiefs of State,
ambassadors, ministers, plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and charges daffaires. However, a
consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is
subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which it is accredited. (c.) Laws of
preferential application provide to the contrary. RA No. 75 which penalizes acts which would
impair the proper observance by the Republic and inhabitants of the Philippines of the
immunities, rights, and privileges of duly accredited foreign diplomatic representatives in the
Philippines. Sec. 6, R.A. No. 75. Any person who assaults, wounds or in any other manner
offers violence to the person of an ambassador or a public minister, in violation of the law of
nations, shall be imprisoned not more than three years and fined not exceeding two hundred
pesos, in the discretion of the court, in addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the
RPC.
Principle of Territoriality criminal laws undertake to punish crimes committed within

the Philippine Territory. As a rule, penal laws of the Philippines are enforceable only within its
territory.
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Exceptions: (a.) Article 2 of the RPC. National interest is imperiled by the criminal acts
embodied in the said provision. (b.) Crimes on board a foreign vessel even if it is within the
territorial waters of the coastal state. Philippine courts do not acquire jurisdiction over offenders
nor can Philippine laws apply as long as the effect of such crime does not disturb our peace and
order. French rule crimes are not triable in the courts of that country (where the ship is
located), unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory or the safety of
the state is endangered. English rule crimes are triable in that country, unless they merely
affect things within the vessel or they refer to the internal management thereof. (c.) Section 58 of
RA 9372 (Human Security Act).
l.) Articles 15, 16, and 17 lex nationalii, lex rei sitae, and lex loci celebrationis
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Personal law that which attaches to him wherever he may go. The law that generally
governs his status, capacity, condition, family relations, and the consequences of his actuations.
Status place of an individual in society and consists of personal qualities and

relationships more or less permanent, with which the state and community are concerned.
Characteristics of status: (a.) It is conferred primarily by the state and not by the
individual; (b.) It is a matter of public interest or social interest; (c.) Being a concept of social
order, it cannot easily be terminated at the mere will or desire of the parties concerned; and (d.) It
is generally supposed to have a universal character.
Capacity only part of ones status and may be defined as the sum total of his rights and
obligations.
Kinds of capacity: (a.) Juridical Capacity passive capacity, the fitness to be the subject
of legal relations. (b.) Capacity to act active capacity, the power to do acts with legal effects.
Theories on how personal law is determined: (a.) Nationality Theory personal theory;
the status and capacity of persons are determined by the law of this nationality or his national
law; (b.) Domiciliary Theory territoriality theory; by virtue of which the status and capacity of
a person is determined by the law of his domicile; (c.) Situs or Eclectic Theory views the law
of a particular place or situs of an event or transaction as generally controlling law.
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
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However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, will, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of
the Republic of the Philippines in the foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
Article 18 pertains to the suppletory application of NCC to Code of Commerce and

special laws.
Article 26 of the Family Code. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the county where they are solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Miciano vs. Brimo, G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927

Romualdez, J.
FACTS: The judicial administrator of the estate of deceased Joseph G. Brimo filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however,
approved it. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil
Code which, among other things, provides the following: Nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
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person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Turkish law shall apply in this case.
HELD: No. But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions
are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws,
they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so
much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme
of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the
matter. The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the
oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record
that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with
and executed.
NOTES: One of the provisions of the will provides, I like desire to state that although by law, I
am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free
choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of
time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this,
my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand
whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that
the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance
with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. If this
condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy. The fact is, however, that the said
condition is void, being contrary to law pursuant to article 792 of the civil Code. And said
condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one
to govern his testamentary dispositions. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions
above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional
and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor. It results from all this that
the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
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imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. All of the remaining clauses
of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not
appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
In the Matter of Testate Estate of the Deceased Edward E. Christensen: Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R.
No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Labrador, J.:
FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision of the CFI of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding of said court, approving among things the final accounts of the
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid
by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled
to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without
issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance
with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in
Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants

except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now

married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding
the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has
she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now
resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in
trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as
any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as
aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all
the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real,
personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated,
of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from
any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
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It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account
and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California
alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is
the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California
Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable.
It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural
child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The CFI ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a
testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable. Oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied.
Hence, this appeal.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show
that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New
York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school
teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with
Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there
for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was
teaching school in Sacramento, California.
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Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and
came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again
returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year,
1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military
Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he
left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945.
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951.
He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE

THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
RULING: In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there
for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely
and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used
to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of
Laws)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California
when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never
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to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same
thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired
a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never
been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two
homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while
living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for
several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection
with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a
domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of
meaning, from the mearest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and
it is not safe to insist that any one use is the only proper one. (Goodrich)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning
of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only
and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can
refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
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under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel. But appellant invokes the provisions of
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated,
it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We
have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on
the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly
cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State
of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern
the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law
being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the
forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the
purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign
law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the
renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the
matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the Conflict of Laws
principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should
not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the
"endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers.
The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of
Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going
on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this
inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point
applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that
greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still
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more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-
law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of
the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject,
or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of
the forum. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with
respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land
is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these
cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the
parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes
only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will
be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the
parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving

movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as
to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the
conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of
the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was
France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to
French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would
show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property
should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the
surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of
action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to
resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of
distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it
accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying
its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws
rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in
turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the
narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'"
(Harvard Law Review)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as

governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
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conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a
question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to
send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of
the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory
of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also
its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which
the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities.
(2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application
in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal. The pertinent
parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws
are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the
foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to
this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of
foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall
respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its
nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by
the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
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(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be

certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in
attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the
rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws
rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule
laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a
will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where
he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal
questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in
questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules
control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same
rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of
the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by
the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition
as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine.
The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a disposition
of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is
one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity
which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than
ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the
citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to
go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law
for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
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It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the
place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention
can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil
Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the
testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile,
the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case
will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of
which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must
apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides
no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson; Riera vs. Palmaroli; Miciano vs. Brimo;
Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock; and Gibbs vs. Government) cited by appellees to support
the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject
in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject
is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California,
is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946
of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to
the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
NOTES:
RENVOI
means referring back
is a procedure whereby a jural matter presented is referred by the conlict of laws rule of
the forum to a foreign state, the conflict of laws of which, in turn refers the matter to the
law of the forum or a third state.
Remission- reference back to the law of the forum

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Transmission- reference is made to a third state. Process of applying the law of a foreign state
thru the law of the second state.
Ex an Italian domiciled in the Philippines (Natinanality) died while he was in England

(domiciliary). If the English court, following domiciliary) will try the case, it will refer the matter
to the Philippines (Nationali) which in turn will be transmitted to Italy. Hence England will
ultimately apply Italian law
When does it arise?

A: when there is doubt as to whether the reference by the lex fori to the foreign law
involves:
a. The reference to the internal law of foreign state (in which case, no renvoi since they
will assume jurisdiction)
b. Reference to the entire law of the foreign state, including their conflict of laws rule,
hence it would likely result to renvoi if they will refer back the matter. (ex. First state
follows lex nationli, while the 2nd follows lex domicilli, when 1st state refer it to
second state, the latter will refer it back to the 1st state.
Various ways of dealing with renvoi.

1. Reject renvoi. Reference is made only to the internal law of the foreign state. Not its
entirety. We do not want the matter to be referred back to us, we do not want to assume
jurisdiction. EX. Art. 16, par 2 of civil code. (succession- intrinsic validity, apply
nationality)
2. Accept renvoi. Here reference is made to the entire law of the foreign state, including
their conflict of law rules. Hence in turn, we accept reference back to our law. Therefore,
Philippine law is applied. single renvoi. We mentally referred back to the Philippines the
jural matter.
3. Follow the theory of desistment or mutual disclaimer. We desist or refrain from
applying foreign law. The Philippine law will apply. Same result with accepting renvoi,
but different process. In accepting, there is mental reference of the matter back to
Philippine law. In desistment, we refrain from applying foreign law because it is
inadequate and founded on a different basis (ex. Our law follows nationality, if we refer
the matter to the national law of the person and we found that their law follows , not
nationality, but domiciliary, we desit to apply forign law but instead apply Philippine law)
4. Foreign court theory.
a. means that our court will apply whatever the foreign court will apply. It will put itself in
the position of the foreign court and apply whatever such foreign court will apply if
confronted with same case.
b. Advantage- regardless of the forum there is only one result and applicable law.
c. Drawback:INTERNATIONAL PINGPONG- when we follow the foreign court
theory and the foreign state, likewise follow the foreign court theory, we will follow
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whatever the forign court will apply but such foreign court will apply whatever our
court will apply---- hence international pingpong.
d. RESULTS OF APPLYING FOREIGN COURT THEORY:
i. Foreign court may reject renvoi, result: we will apply our internal law
ii. Foreign court accepts renvoi, result: we will apply the foreign law (mentally: we will
apply what foreign court will apply, but since they accepted renvoi, it will result to
DOUBLE RENVOI(when we follow foreign court theory and the foreign court
accepts renvoi)
iii. Foreign court follows desistment, result: Apply foreign law
iv. Foreign court applies foreign court theory: international pingpong
Double renvoi vs transmission
1. DR deals with two countries, transmission with 3 or more countries
2. DR deals with referring back, transmission with transmitting
Objections to renvoi- it woud place the court to a perpetually enclosed circle from which it
would never emerge and that it would never find a sutiable body of substantive ruled to apply to
a particular case.
FALSE CONFLCIT- renvoi is not applied in false conflict, which means that in solving a
conflicts problem between two state only one state has an interest in applying its own law while
the other state does not, hence false conflict. Result: the court will apply the substantive law of
the only interested state.
Testate Estate of Amos Bellis et al. vs. Edward A. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358
Bengzon, J.P., J.:
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items
have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second
wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died as resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September
15, 1958. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
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therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen
and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower
court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting
partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and
filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In
the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. After the parties filed
their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964,
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the
national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to the SC to raise the issue of which law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Texas law shall apply.
HELD: Yes. In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine
of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it
is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time
of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas,
it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.
Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
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Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Article 16 provides, Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found.
Article 1039 provides, Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants countered that Article 17(3) which states that, Prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. prevails as the exception to Art.
16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the
phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the
new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication
of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine
law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing
a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo,
a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.
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The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are
to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
II. Human Relations
m.) Articles 19 to 22
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
same.
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.
(i.) Principle of abuse of rights. If the right is exercise in bad faith and for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another, there is liability under the principle of abuse of right, for
the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused
especially to the prejudice of others.
Requisites: (a.) There is a legal right or duty; (b.) It is exercised in bad faith; and (c.) For
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
(ii.) Article 20 vs. Article 21. In Article 20, the act is contrary to law while in Article 21,
the act is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. In Article 20, the act is done
willfully or negligently while in Article 21, the act is done willfully.
(iii.) Breach of promise to marry

(iv.) Damnum absque injuria; volenti non fit injuria
(v.) Accion in rem verso. It is an action for recovery of what has been paid without just
cause.
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Requisites: (a.) Defendant has been enriched; (b.) Plaintiff has suffered loss; (c.)
Enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground; and (d.) Plaintiff has no other action
based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict.
Accion in rem verso vs. Solutio Indebiti. In solutio indebiti, mistake is essential
element; but in accion in rem verso, it is not necessary that there has been mistake in payment.
Hermosisima vs. CA, G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960

Concepcion, J.:
FACTS: Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the
Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since
one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his
cabin on board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February
1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to
marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and
clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.
Hence, she together with her son, filed a complaint and moral damages for alleged breach of
promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter,
but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered
petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which
was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. Thereafter, the court rendered a decision
in her favor and affirmed by the CA with a modification of increasing the amount of
compensatory and moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hermosisima is liable for damages for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: No. Inasmuch as these articles (Article 43 and 44 of the Civil Code of Spain) were
never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia, that "the action for
breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged
with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deemed it best, however, to
change the law thereon as embodied in their report, Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889
refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The
subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles
but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that
might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the
adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating
liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken. Hence, Article 56 to 65 were
inserted. These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The elimination of this Chapter
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is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the
case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action
in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States. The views thus expressed were
accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law
making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages
made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable.
NOTES: Another basis of the CA in the award of damages is Hermosisima is guilty of

seduction; hence, liable for damages under 2219 of the NCC. Apart from the fact that the
general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those following the
one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates
that the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in
Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present
case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around thirty-
six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to
bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
Wassmer vs. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

Bengzon, J.P., J.:
FACTS: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954, Velez
left this note for his bride-to-be saying that they have to postpone the wedding as his mother
opposes it and he is leaving on Convair. The following day, he sent a telegram saying that
nothing changed and he will be returning very soon. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he
heard from again. Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in
default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29,
1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages;
P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs. The
subsequent petition for relief from orders, judgment, and proceedings and motion for new trial
and reconsideration was eventually denied as Velez failed to appear on the hearing of the same
and the possibility of amicable settlement becomes nil.
ISSUE: Whether or not Velez is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that
the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code
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authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals , as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay , is that "mere breach of a promise to
marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the
draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may
be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The record reveals that on
August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the
flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were
given and gifts received. And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was
then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My
mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day
before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he
never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all
the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No
question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert
hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00,
should be totally eliminated. Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to
exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him
because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is
devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in
a "wanton ... , reckless and oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that
considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA, 219 SCRA 115

Davide, Jr., J.:
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FACTS: Marilou Gonzales, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the RTC Branch 38,
Lingayen, Pangasinan a complaint for damages against Baksh for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old,
single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed
to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before
the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Gonzales then
prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs,
and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of Gonzales applying Article 21 of
the NCC. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the case
reached the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 is applicable in this case.
HELD: Yes. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions
that would have made it so. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21,
which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
In the light of the laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
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It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of
every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated
by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held
liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the seduction.
The SC cited the cases of Hermosisima vs. CA (see the digest above); Tanjanco vs. CA,
wherein the SC likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery
was eventually denied because the SC was not convinced that such seduction existed. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a
promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (US vs.
Buenaventura).
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is
nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to
Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, the private
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that
if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily
because of her own doing, for: She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a
doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . . or a waitress in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give
her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. . And this predicament
prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner.
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by
good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even
remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words
directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust
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which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of
love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner
clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect
Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable
acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not
have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in
sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had
qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was
not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in
legal fault." At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said
that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner
stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the
solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher
values of morality and dignity.
Amonoy vs. Sps. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 140420, February 15, 2001
Panganiban, J.:
FACTS: This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of Branch I of the CFI of Pasig,
Rizal, for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos, involving six (6) parcels of
land situated in Tanay Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes
Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formida. On 12 January 1965, the Project of Partition
submitted was approved and xxx two (2) of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba
and Alfonso Formilda. The Attorney's fees charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on 20
January 1965 Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formida executed a deed of real estate mortgage
on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his
attorney's fees. But it was only on 6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled
and the properties adjudicated, that the estate was declared closed and terminated. Asuncion and
Alfonso eventually died leaving as one of the heirs Angela Gutierrez.
Because his Attorney's fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on 21 January
1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure in Civil Case No. 12726 entitled Sergio Amonoy vs.
Heirs of Asuncion Pasamba and Heirs of Alfonso Fornilda before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, and
this was assigned to Branch VIII. The heirs opposed, contending that the attorney's fees charged
were unconscionable and that the attorney's fees charged were unconscionable and that the
agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of
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Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage,
P11,880.00 as value of the harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorney's fees. Failing in
that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction. They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the
said lots were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the auction sale was held where Amonoy was
the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his bid was judicially confirmed. A deficiency
was claimed and to satisfy it another execution sale was conducted, and again the highest bidder
was Amonoy at P12,137.50. Included in those sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez spouses
had their house.
More than a year after the Decision in Civil Code No. 12726 was rendered, the said
decedent's heirs filed on 19 December 1973 before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, Civil case No. 18731
entitled Maria Penano, et al vs. Sergio Amonoy, et al, a suit for the annulment thereof. The case
was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
on 22 July 1981.
Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a
notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy's motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders
of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots,
including the house of the Gutierrez spouses. On 27 September 1985 the petition entitled David
Fornilda, et al vs Branch 164 RTC Ivth Pasig, Deputy Sheriff Joaquin Antonil and Atty. Sergio
Amonoy, G.R. No. L-72306, was filed before the Supreme Court. Among the petitioners was the
plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. On a twin musiyun (Mahigpit na Musiyon Para Papanagutin
Kaugnay ng Paglalapastangan) with full titles as fanciful and elongated as
theirPetisyung (Petisyung Makapagsuri Taglay and Pagpigil ng Utos), a temporary restraining
order was granted on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the petitioners' houses. The SC
eventually granted the certiorari. But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the
abovementioned Decision, respondents' house had already been destroyed, supposedly in
accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court. Thus, a Complaint for
damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against
petitioner before the RTC on December 15, 1989. In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC
dismissed respondents' suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower court's ruling and ordered
petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of damnum absque injuria is applicable in this case.
HELD: No. Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a
person's rights is a loss without injury- damnum absque injuria - for which the law gives no
remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises one's rights does no actionable injury and
cannot be held liable for damages. However, this principle is not applicable in this case.
True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents' house on May 30, 1986 under
the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary
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Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents' house, was issued by the
Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the
Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June
4, 1986. Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he
unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents' house well until the middle of 1987. This is
clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrez's testimony.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their
continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right.
Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the
demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the
RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right
that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then he
was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
A commentator on this topic explains: The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of
a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the modern concept of
social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices
another xxx. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of
justice xxx; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason it is not permissible to
abuse our rights to prejudice others.
In Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. CA, it was held, Article 19, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; recognizes the
primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible xxx.
Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the
TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his
alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of
respondents; house. Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle
premised on the valid exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise
to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is
occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden et al. vs. Roberto Reyes a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, G.R. No. 154259,
February 28, 2005
Chico-Nazario, J.:
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FACTS: Hotels general manager in the person of Masakazu Tsuruoka celebrated his natal day a
the hotels penthouse wherein several people were invited including Dr. Violeta Filart. When Dr.
Filart is about to attend the party, she met Reyes at the lobby and allegedly invited the latter to go
with her in the party. However, when Reyes lined up for food in the party, he was allegedly
approached and shouted by the hotels secretary in the person of Ruby Lim and was asked to
leave the party as he is not invited in the party causing him shame and humiliation. Thus, he
filed a action for damages before RTC Quezon City Br. 104. The lower court dismissed the
claim but was reversed by the CA. Hence, the case reached the SC. Petitioners Lim and Hotel
Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable
for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria is applicable in this case.
HELD: No. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed
in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not
find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still
under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
However, Nikko Hotel Manila Garden et al. are no liable for damages. In the absence of
any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule
and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim
having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to
be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and
is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that considering the
closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was
made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and
there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs
reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between
them . . . Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take
him out.
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported.
It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented
any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and
Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party. Ms. Lim, not
having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot
be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its
employee.
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Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Elsewhere, we explained that
when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible." The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of
ones duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent
to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised
in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of

the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article
21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it
is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must
be intentional. As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that
Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other
personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an
explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being
"single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly
influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen." The lameness of
this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and
conjectures.
Pe vs. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962

Bautista-Angelo, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant Cecilio Pe is
a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in
the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying
with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe
Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their
family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their
family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted
her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to
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teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal
not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their
relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in
1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing
Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless. Sometime in April,
1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B Espaa
Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left,
her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However,
plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written
on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be
that of defendant. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI
but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts. Lolitas parents filed an action
for damages based on Article 21 of the NCC before the CFI of Manila but the latter dismissed the
same as the plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status,
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. The case reached SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cecilio Pe is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that
defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs
injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact
that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and
Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents,
brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that
they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection
Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it
was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the
uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that
the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their
part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both
of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love
with defendant who is a married man."
The view of the trial court is untenable. The circumstances under which defendant tried
to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an
ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him.
This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the
latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was
considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach
in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her
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parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita.
Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national.
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the
parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection
and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her
and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he
has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
Bunag, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992
Regalado, J.:
FACTS: Zenaida and Conrado were lovers but have a quarrel one another. One day, while
Zenaida was walking along Figueras St., Pasay City Conrado came riding in a car driven by a
malefactor. He invited Zenaida to have merienda in Aristocrat Manila instead of San Juan De
Dios and to talk some matters pertinent to them. However, while on their way, she was forcedly
brought in a motel and allegedly raped there. Thereafter, Conrado told her that he will only
allow her to go home if they were already married. So, they proceeded to the house of Conrados
grandmother in Pamplona, Las Pinas and lived there for almost one month as husband and wife.
They applied for marriage license in Bacoor, Cavite. However, Conrado left and never returned.
Thus, a complaint for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed in RTC Bacoor, Cavite by
Zenaida and the trial ruled in her favor. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Conrado is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action
for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore,
a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to

those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in
relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in
the statutes.
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Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly
abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and
thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege
on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts
contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible
transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and
exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and
Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law
that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal
liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results
in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence, extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist.
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by
mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with
it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not
between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up
to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of
evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it
is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. Thus,
in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for
rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said
offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.
n.) Articles 22 to 23 Principle of Unjust Enrichment
o.) Article 25 Enjoining thoughtless extravagance
p.) Article 26 Respect of rights of others; civil actions for violation
q.) Article 28 Unfair competition

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r.) Article 29 Effect of acquittal of the accused in a criminal case on the civil action
(i.) Proof beyond reasonable doubt vs. Preponderance of evidence
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. On the other hand, preponderance
of evidence is an evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. In the last analysis, it means probability of truth.
(ii.) Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
Section 1.Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated
in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay
in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing
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fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced,
it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Section 5.Judgment in civil action not a bar. A final judgment rendered in a civil
action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the
defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil action.
s.) Articles 30 to 35, 2176 Independent Civil Actions
(i.) Sections 2 to 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
Section 2.When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment
has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended
party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-
examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist.
Section 3.When civil action may proceeded independently. In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
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shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
t.) Article 36 Prejudicial question
Prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal.
(i.) Sections 6 to 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
Section 6.Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of

the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the
same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)
Section 7.Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
III. Persons and Personality
Person any being, natural or artificial, capable of possessing legal rights and
obligations.
Kinds: (a.) Natural human beings created by God through the intervention of the
parents; (b.) Juridical those created by law.
Personality is the quality derived from being a person. While a person is any being
susceptible of rights and obligations, personality is the aptitude of that being of becoming the
subject, active or passive, of juridical relations. Personality is thus an attribute of persons. It is a
consequence of human existence; it is born with man and stays with him until death. Although
inherent in every natural person, it is extended by law to entities which has no natural existence,
or to juridical or artificial persons.
u.) Article 37 Juridical capacity; capacity to act
Juridical capacity vs. capacity to act: (a.) passive vs. active; (b.) inherent vs. merely
acquired; (c.) lost only through death vs. lost through death and may be restricted by other
causes; (d.) can exist without capacity to act vs. exists always with juridical capacity.
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v.) Articles 38 to 39 Restrictions on capacity to act
w.) Articles 40 to 41 Birth; civil personality; presumptive civil personality of unborn child
x.) Articles 42 to 43 Death
Rule 131, Sections 3(jj) and (kk) on presumption of survivorship
Section 3 (jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the
same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and
there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is
determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according
to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have
survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to
have survived, if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.
Section 3 (kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the
other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the
same time.
y.) Articles 44 to 47 Juridical Persons
z.) Articles 50 to 51 Domicile and Residence
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300, September 18, 1995
Kapunan, J:
FACTS:Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First district of Leyte indicating in the section Residence in constituency
where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election: seven months. Thereupon,
private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo who is her opponent and incumbent Representative of the
First district of Leyte, filed a petition for disqualification and cancellation of certificate of
candidacy of Marcos for failure to meet the constitutional requirement of residency. Petitioner
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then filed his amended/corrected certificate of candidacy to the head office of COMELEC after
being rejected by the provincial election supervisor of Leyte contending that she made an honest
misinterpretation of the section and thus she would like to rectify the same by adding the word
since childhood. COMELEC, however, granted private respondents petition for
disqualification, hence, petitioners amended certificate of candidacy were strike off on the
ground that it was filed after the lapse of deadline. In ruling thus, COMELEC contends that when
petitioner chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there
by registering as a voter there, together with her husband Ferdinand Marcos, and expressly
declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. Her motion for
reconsideration was denied. On a resolution, COMELEC ordered that the petitioners
proclamation as Representative be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes. On account of the resolutions disqualifying her from running for the congressional seat
and on the COMELECs resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to the
Supreme Court for relief.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tacloban, Leyte is petitioners domicile.
HELD: Yes. A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law.
While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a
tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not
intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "for the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's
"permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends
to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based
on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence vs. Domicile. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is
that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up
his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a
person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his
purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless,
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for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice.
Residence vs. Domicile. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place
and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose
at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in
the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of
domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that
the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon
it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile". In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives, this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as
having the same meaning as domicile.
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to
be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly
make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
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It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in

jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in
the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in
the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for
residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in
Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her
period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8
the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact
were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April
24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally
cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where
she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then,
in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions
if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the
confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even
if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or
semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
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time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in
the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes.
In Larena vs. Teves, we stressed: This court is of the opinion and so holds that a person
who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever
had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in
another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for
various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter
municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, We explained that: A citizen may leave the
place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that,
of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When
an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return
to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other
reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or
lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of
every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's
birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of
(actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution: In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in
Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college
studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her
degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his
office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos
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when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of
the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a
voter in San Miguel, Manila. In February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In
1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of
Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable
is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None
of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during
her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close
ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays
and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base
where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by
appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our
country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the
COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Montejos contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did
not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she
"abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her
domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." Such contention is
not tenable.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila,
Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate: (1.) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2.) A bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3.)
Acts which correspond with the purpose.
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In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent
plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment
requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant
the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin
by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.
For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article
110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains: In the Civil Code, there
is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a
person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or
juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence.
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: The husband shall fix the residence of the
family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic. A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the
concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing
which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor
of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Note
the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in Article 58, which means wherever
(the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only
actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence.
Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade
su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place
to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the
law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring
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Christian V. Asas
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into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family
unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence. Very
significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110
is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the
case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical
to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be
faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or
other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision
must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used.
Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a
place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without
actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been
established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also
established in some other
place.
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during
the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations where the
spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert
to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs. Villareal this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has
given cause for divorce." Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or
to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the
Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her
domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her
husband on pain of contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,

petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's
actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had
several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is
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no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that
Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have
been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil
Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of
the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from
that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses.
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that
insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife
the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner
married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte,
while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes"
and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as
temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion
pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin
or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to
assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a
positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage
itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
NOTES: Article VI, Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25
years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representative, a registered voter in
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Christian V. Asas
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the district in which he shall be elected , and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Padilla, J: Dissenting Opinion: To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial
regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other
words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in allsituations satisfy the
length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional
purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to
represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to
acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner
simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the
candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the
disqualified candidate not being counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the
legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and
consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially
when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
Regalado, J.: Dissenting Opinion: Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect
that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile, 9 she
nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual
change.10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's
domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death.
Davide, Jr.: Dissenting Opinion: The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in
evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it.
Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the
legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority
opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal
domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion
is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased
husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden
is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably
failed to discharge that burden.
Vitug, J.: Separate Opinion: The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of

congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It
signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a
"member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether
or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on
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Christian V. Asas
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Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A
ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not
allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked
with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by
law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment
on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than
a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election,
returns and qualification" of its members.
Mendoza, J.: Separate Opinion: In my view the issue in this case is whether the
Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack
eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a
petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the
COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the
parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such
proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their
dispute to that body.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected
official's qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously
silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code,
or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the
qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25,
1 the following: Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who
commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate. The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause
of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking
power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution
withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of
voters. (Art. IX, C, 2(3))
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Christian V. Asas
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The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their
grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those
for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate
or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the raceeither from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other
hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is
to remove the incumbent from office.
Romero, J.: Separate Opinion: I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others
similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she
was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free
will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently,
to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion
to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two
places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
Puno, J.: Concurring Opinion: It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the
deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife
from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the
exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts
of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in
any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife
lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public
policy.
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as
started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule
that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which
provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code.
By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further
effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary
determination of her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its
firm guarantees of due process and equal protection of
law. It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead
husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-
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Christian V. Asas
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based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity.
It cannot survive a constitutional challenge.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule
that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is
the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue
after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the
universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also
restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of
the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments
and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We
cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of
equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who
has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution
for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way
to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Francisco, J.: Concurring Opinion: Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin

which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in
1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband.
In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital
duties and obligations to one another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the
fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place. Thus, while the
wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon
the latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her
marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair
situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no
longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon
her husband's death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private
respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned
Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s

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Civil Law Review 1

I Effect and Application of Laws

a.) Article 2 Date of Effectivity of Laws

Taada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985

Taada vs. Tuvera, Resolution, December 29, 1986

3.) Charter of the city.

Statutes which do not need to be published are as follows:

2.) Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or

Umali vs. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1992

On 26 December 1991, respondents promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92, the

The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as

ISSUE: Whether or not Daily Record is a newspaper of general circulation.

b.) Article 3. Ignorantia legis non excusat

c.) Article 4. G.R. prospective application of laws

Article 62 of the RPC. Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency

1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially

Albino Co vs. CA, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993

ISSUE: Whether or not Que doctrine shall be given retroactive effect.

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set

d. Article 5 Mandatory and prohibitory laws

(i.) violation makes act void; exceptions

e. Article 6 Waiver of rights

(i.) Requisites of valid waiver

understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase

People vs. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991

HELD: Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a

It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to

f. Article 7 Repeal of laws

(i.) Express and implied repeals

ISSUE: Whether or not the importation in question is valid.

(i.) Law and jurisprudence

Ting vs. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 1665562, March 31, 2009

To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos

Albino Co vs. CA, supra

Pesca vs. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

h.) Articles 9 and 10 Duty to render judgment; Rule on interpretation of law

The Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking

i.) Articles 11 and 12 Customs; absence of presumption.

Custom is a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed as a

Requisites: (a.) Plurality of acts, or various resolutions of a juridical question raised

j.) Article 13 Legal periods; Rule in case of leap year.

ISSUE: Whether or not NMC cause of action has prescribed.

k.) Article 14 Applicability of Penal Laws

(i.) Principles of territoriality and generality; Exceptions.

Principle of Territoriality criminal laws undertake to punish crimes committed within

Status place of an individual in society and consists of personal qualities and

Article 18 pertains to the suppletory application of NCC to Code of Commerce and

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

Miciano vs. Brimo, G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be

xxx xxx xxx

Remission- reference back to the law of the forum

Ex an Italian domiciled in the Philippines (Natinanality) died while he was in England

When does it arise?

Various ways of dealing with renvoi.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Texas law shall apply.

II. Human Relations