Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13982 July 31, 1920

DIEGO DE LA VIA, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO VILLAREAL, as Auxiliary Judge of First Instance, and NARCISA
GEOPANO, respondents.

Del Rosario and Del Rosario and W. F. Mueller for petitioner.

J. Lopez Vito for respondents.

JOHNSON, J.:

This is an original petition presented in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is to obtain an order
declaring: (a) That the respondent, the Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the
Court of First Instance of the province of Iloilo, has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a certain
action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcisa Geopano against her husband,
Diego de la Via, the petitioner herein; (b) that the said respondent judge has exceeded his power
and authority in issuing, in said action, a preliminary injunction against the said petitioner prohibiting
him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the
action; and (c) that all the proceedings theretofore had in said court were null and void.

It appears from the record that on September 17, 1917, Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo against Diego de la Via, alleging: (1) That she was a
resident of the municipality of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, and that the defendant was a resident of the
municipality of Vallehermoso, Province of Oriental Negros; (2) that she was the legitimate wife of the
defendant, having been married to him in the municipality of Guijulgan, Province of Negros
Oriental, in the year 1888; (3) that since their said marriage plaintiff and defendant had lived as
husband and wife and had nine children, three of whom were living and were already of age; (4) that
during their marriage plaintiff and defendant had acquired property, real and personal, the value of
which was about P300,000 and all of which was under the administration of the defendant; (5) that
since the year 1913 and up to the date of the complaint, the defendant had been committing acts of
adultery with one Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and having her as his concubine, with
public scandal and in disgrace of the plaintiff; (6) that because of said illicit relations, the defendant
ejected the plaintiff from the conjugal home, for which reason she was obliged to live in the city of
Iloilo, where she had since established her habitual residence; and (7) that the plaintiff, scorned by
her husband, the defendant, had no means of support and was living only at the expense of one of
her daughters. Upon said allegations she prayed for (a) a decree of divorce, (b) the partition of the
conjugal property, and (c) alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400 per month.

Subsequent to the filing of the said complaint, Narcisa Geopano, the plaintiff therein, presented a
motion, which was later amended, alleging, among other things, that since the filing of her complaint
she had personal knowledge that the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the property
which belonged to the conjugal partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant, to the prejudice
of the plaintiff, and prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant restraining
and prohibiting him in the premises.
The defendant Diego de la Via, petitioner herein, opposed the said motion for a preliminary
injunction, and, subsequently, demurred to the complaint upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause, "nor over the person of the defendant."

After hearing the respective parties the respondent judge, in to separate orders, dated November 1
and November 2, 1917, respectively, overruled the defendant's demurrer, and granted the
preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiff.

Thereafter and on April 27, 1918, the defendant, Diego de la Via filed the present petition
for certiorari in this court, upon the ground that the respondent judge had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the action in question, and had exceeded his power and authority in issuing said
preliminary injunction.

The questions arising out of the foregoing facts are as follows:

1. May a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband
during the existence of the marriage?

2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the partition of the
conjugal property is also prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband
restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property
during the pendency of the action?

I.

The petitioner contends that the Court of First Instance of Iloilo had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the said action for divorce because the defendant therein was a resident of the
Province of Negros Oriental and the plaintiff, as the wife of the defendant, must also be considered a
resident of the same province inasmuch as, under the law, the domicile of the husband is also the
domicile of the wife; that the plaintiff could not acquire a residence in Iloilo before the marriage
between her and the defendant was legally dissolved.

This contention of the petitioner is not tenable. It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the
wife follows that of her husband. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of
interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation,
the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strenghten, and secure their
interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But the authorities
are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule. "Under modern laws it is clear that many
exceptions to the rule that the domicile from of the wife is determined by that of her husband must
obtain. Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and seperate domicile from that of her husband
where the theorical unity of husband and wife is is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce
proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of
the parties by agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or
attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the
wife of the benefit of the husband's domicile." (9 R. C. L., 545.)

The case of Narcisa Geopano comes under one of the many exceptions above-mentioned, to wit:
"Where the husband has given cause for divorce, the wife may acquire another and seperate
domicile from that of her husband." In support of this proposition there is a formidable array of
authorities. We shall content ourselves with illustrative quotations from a few of them, as follows:
 Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being that of her husband, universal
jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in the case where the husband's conduct
has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a divorce, which justifies her in leaving him,
and, therefore, necessarily authorities her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate
domicile. Cheever vs. Wilson, 9 Wall. (U. S.), 108; Barber vs. Barber, 21 How. (U. S.), 582; 2
Bishop, Mar. and Div., 475; Schouler, Hus. and Wife, sec. 574; 5 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of
Law, p. 756." (Smith vs. Smith, 43 La. Ann., 1140, 1146.)

The matrimonial domicile of the wife is usually that of the husband, but if she is justified in
leaving him because his conduct has been such as to entitle her to a divorce, and she
thereupon does leave him and go into another state for the purpose of there permanently
residing, she acquires a domicile in the latter state. (Atherton vs. Atherton, 155 N. Y., 129; 63
Am. St. Rep., 650.)

The law will recognize a wife as having a separate existence, and separate interests, and
separate rights, in those cases where the express object of all proceedings is to show that
the relation itself ougth to be dissolved, or so modified as to establish separate interests, and
especially a separate domicile and home, bed and board being put, apart for the whole, as
expressive of the idea of home. Otherwise the parties, in this respect, would stand upon very
unequal ground, it being in the power of the husband to change his domicile at will, but not in
that of the wife. (Harteau vs. Harteau, 14 Pick. [Mass.], 181; 25 Am. Dec., 372, 375-376.)

Under the pauper laws, and upon general principles, the wife is regarded as having the
domicile of her husband; hut this results from his marital rights, and the duties of the wife. If
the husband has forfeited those rights be misbehavior, and has left and deserted the wife,
they may have different domiciles, in the view of the law regulating divorces. (Harding vs.
Alden, 9 Greenl. [Me.], 140; 23 Am. Dec., 549, 552.)

Though as a general principle of law the domicile of the husband is regarded as the domicile
of the wife, according to the prevailing view a wife may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from her husband so as to confer jurisdiction upon the courts of the state, in which
her domicile or residence is established, to decree a divorce in her favor. (9 R. C. L. 400-
401, citing various cases.)

The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their
relations with third parties, and has no application in cases of actual separation and
controversy between themselves as to the temporary or permanent severance of the
marriage ties by judicial proceedings. Vence vs. Vence, 15 How. Pr., 497; Schonwald vs.
Schonwald, 55 N. C., 367; Cheever vs. Wilson, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.), 109; 19 L. ed., 605.
(Notes, p. 498, 16 L. R. A.)

In the case of Schonwald vs. Schonwald (55 N. C., 343), the plaintiff tried to do what the petitioner in
this case insists the respondent Narcisa Geopano should have done. In that case the wife filed a bill
of divorce in a court in North Carolina, where her husband resided. She herself had not resided in
that state for three years previous to the filing of the suit, as required by the statute; but she claimed
that the domicile of her husband was also her domicile and, inasmuch as her husband, the
defendant, had been a resident of North Carolina for more than three years, she had also been a
resident of that state during that time. The court dismissed the bill, holding that the legal maxim that
"her domicile is that of her husband" would not avail in the stead of an actual residence. The court
said:
 It is true that for many purpose the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife, but it
is not so for every purpose. The maxim that the domicile of the wife follows that of the
husband cannot be applied to oust the court of its jurisdiction; neither, from party of reasons
can it give jurisdiction. (P. 344.)

Turning to the Spanish authorities, we find that they agree with the American authorities in holding
that the maxim or rule that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband, is not an absolute
one. Scaevola, commenting on article 40 of the Civil Code (which is the only legal provision or
authority relied upon by the petitioner in this case), says:

Although article 64 of the Law of Civil Procedure provides that the domicile of a married
woman, not legally separated from her husband, is that of the latter, yet, when the tacit
consent of the husband and other circumstances justify it, for the purpose of determining
jurisdiction, the habitual residence of the woman should be considered as her domicile where
her right may be exercised in accordance with article 63. (Scaevola, Civil Code, p. 354.)

Manresa, commenting upon the same article (art. 40) says:

The domicile of married women not legally separated from their husband shall be that of the
latter. This principle, maintained by the Supreme Court in numerous decisions, was
modified in a particular case by the decision of June 17, 1887, and in conformity with this last
decision, three others were afterwards rendered on October 13, 23, and 28, 1899, in all of
which it is declared that when married women as well as children subject to parental
authority live, with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from
where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile, which should be considered
in determining jurisdiction in cases of provisional support guardianship of persons, etc. (1
Manresa, 233.)

If the wife can acquire a separate residence when her husband consents or acquiesces, we see no
reason why the law will not allow her to do so when, as alleged in the present case, the husband
unlawfully ejects her from the conjugal home in order that he may freely indulge in his illicit relations
with another woman. Under no other circumstance could a wife be more justified in establishing a
separate residence from that of her husband. For her to continue living with him, even if he had
permitted it, would have been a condonation of his flagrant breach of fidelity and marital duty.
Furthermore, in this case no longer was there an "identity of persons and of interest between the
husband and the wife." Therefore the law allowed her to acquire a separate residence. For, "it would
do violence to the plainest principle of common sense and common justice of to call this residence of
the guilty husband, where the wife is forbidden to come, . . . the domicile of the wife." (Champon vs.
Champon, 40 La. Ann., 28.)

It is clear, therefore, that a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that
of her husband, during the existence of the marriage, where the husband has given cause for
divorce.

II.

We come now to the second question whether or not the respondent judge exceeded his power in
issuing the preliminary injunction complained of by the petitioner.

Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides:

 A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter
provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it:

1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof,
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a
limited period or perpetually;

2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the plaintiff;

3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to

be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the
action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

The petitioner quotes the foregoing section and argues that the respondent Narcisa Geopano was
not entitled to have a preliminary injunction issued against her husband because contrary to the
requirement of the first paragraph of said section, she was not entitled to the relief demanded, which
consisted in restraining the power and authority which the law confers upon the husband; that under
articles 1412 and 1413 of the Civil Code, the husband is the manager of the conjugal partnership
and, as such, is empowered to alienate and encumber and conjugal property without the consent of
the wife; that neither could the wife obtain a preliminary injunction under paragraph 3 of said section,
upon the ground that the defendant was committing some acts in violation of the plaintiff's rights,
because the plaintiff, as the wife of the defendant, had nor right to intervene in the administration of
the conjugal property, and therefore no right of hers was violated.

We cannot subscribe to that argument of counsel. The law making the husband the sole
administrator of the property of the conjugal partnership is founded upon necessity and convenience
as well as upon the presumption that, from the very nature of the relating between husband and
wife, the former will promote and not injure the interests of the latter. So long as this harmonious
relation, as contemplated by law, continues, the wife cannot and should not interfere with the
husband in his judicious administration of the conjugal property. But when that relation ceases and,
in a proper action, the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to partition the conjugal property, it is
just and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife, that the husband's power of
administration be curtailed, during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering
the conjugal property is concerned.

In her motion for a preliminary injunction, Narcisa Geopano alleged that the defendant was about to
alienate or encumber the property belonging to the conjugal partnerships, with the object of injuring
her interests; and this allegation does not appear to have been controverted by the defendant either
in this court or in the court below. In view of this fact, we are of the opinion that under both
paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 164 of Act No. 190, above quoted, the respondent judge was
empowered and justified in granting the preliminary injunction prayed for by her. It cannot be
doubted that, if the defendant should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the
pendency of the action for divorce, and squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act
"would probably work injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would probably be "in violation of the
plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual."
In this case the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by said paragraph 3 is not the right to
administer the conjugal property, as counsel for the petitioner believes, but the right to share in the
conjugal property upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

The case under consideration, then, is covered or contemplated by the statute (sec. 164, Act No.
190), so that there can be no question, in our opinion, as to the power of the respondent judge to
issue the preliminary injunction complained of by the petitioner. Indeed, even in a case not covered
by the statute this court had upheld the power of Court of First Instance to grant preliminary
injunctions. In the case of Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company vs. Del Rosario and Jose (22
Phil., 433), Doroteo Jose asked for, and the Court of First Instance granted ex parte, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction directing the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company to
continue furnishing electricity to Jose. Thereupon the Light Company filed in this court a petition for
the writ of certiorari against Judge S. del Rosario upon the ground that Courts of First Instance in
these Islands are wholly without jurisdiction to issue preliminary mandatory injunctions under any
circumstances whatever. This court denied that petition, determining the power of the Courts of First
Instance to issue preliminary injunction, as follows:

The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventative and mandatory, is a logical and
necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance in these
Islands, as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction, both legal and
equitable.

Insofar as the statute limits or prescribes the exercise of this power it must be followed: but
beyond this, and in cases not covered by or contemplated by the statute, these courts must
exercise their jurisdiction in the issuance of preliminary injunctions upon sound principles
applicable to the circumstances of each particular case, having in mind the nature of the
remedy, and the doctrine and practice established in the courts upon which our judicial is
modeled.

The only limitation upon the power of Courts of First Instance to issue preliminary injunctions,
either mandatory of preventative, is that they are to be issued in the "manner" or according to
the "method" provided therefor in the Code of Civil Procedure.

We conclude, therefore, that in an action for divorce brought by the wife against the husband, in
which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a preliminary
injunction against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the
conjugal property during the pendency of the action.

It follows from all of the foregoing that the respondent, the Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary
Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and
determine the action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent Narcisa Geopano, and that
he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the defendant,
prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency
of the action.

Therefore, the petition should be and is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.

Leven S. Puno for petitioner.

Benigno M. Puno for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The subject of this petition is the preliminary injunction issued by the respondent court pending
resolution of a case on appeal. We deal only with this matter and not the merits of the case.

As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of
duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.

Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot
located at
#17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He
claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his
share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical
treatment.

In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children
and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a
building and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease to Nobumichi Izumi. She also informed the court
that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead
maintaining a separate residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma
Cumareng and their three children.

In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of
their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She
also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes
Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties.
After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous
marriage on October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement
in 1985 at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled
to support from his respondent wife.1

This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with
the administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. She alleged inter alia that he
had harassed the tenant of the Forbes Park property by informing him that his lease would not be
renewed. She also complained that the petitioner had disposed of one of their valuable conjugal
properties in the United States in favor of his paramour, to the prejudice of his legitimate wife and
children.

The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent his wife from entering into a
new contract of lease over the Forbes Park property with its present tenant, or with future tenants,
without his consent.

After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary
injunction prayed for by his wife.2

The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of
the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the
other because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family
Code, reading as follows:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of the administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or the
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

He further notes that the respondent court failed to appoint an administrator of the conjugal assets
as mandated by Art. 61 of the Code, thus:

Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled
to live separately from each other.

The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall
designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or
conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have
the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the
petition has no merit.

We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole
mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her
administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in
enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution of the
appeal.

The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly
provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted,
states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a
written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as
the administrator.

While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was
implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties
(and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved
by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now
under challenge.

The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the
things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the
plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may,
before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and
thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.3

As observed by Francisco, "Injunction is primarily a preventive remedy. Its province is to afford relief
against future acts which are against equity and good conscience and to keep and preserve the
thing in the status quo, rather than to remedy what is past or to punish for wrongful acts already
committed. It may issue to prevent future wrongs although no right has yet been violated."4

The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen
years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less
shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely
suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he
should at least be given his share of the rentals.

In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife alleged that the
petitioner's harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park
would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom on which they
depend for their subsistence. She also testified the numerous . . . including various dollar accounts,
two houses in Quezon City and Cebu City, and a Mercedes Benz. The private respondent also
complained that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in
Apple Valley, San Bernardino, California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma Cumareng, to improve his
paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his legitimate family.

These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the injunction is necessary
to protect the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the
conjugal assets.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened
violation.5Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's
legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the
private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in
our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may
result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch
as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties,
it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management.

Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the
express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ, concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48183 November 10, 1941

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Cardenas & Casal for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Acting Solicitor Luciano for appellee.

MORAN, J.:

On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena Ramirez
Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of
character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a document which in
part recites as follows:

Que ambos comparecientes convienen en vivir separados el uno del otro por el resto de su
vida y se comprometen, y obligan reciprocamente a no molastarse ni intervenir ni mezclarse
bajo ningun concepto en la vida publica o privada de los mismos, entre si, quendado cada
uno de los otorgantes en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.

On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree
of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11,
1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the peace
court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband and wife in the city of Manila.
Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint herein instituted two
actions against the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other
concubinage in the court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction of the
accused for which he was sentenced to penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On the
trial for the offense of concubinage accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy, and the case
was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the dismissal before the trial to be
premature this was under the former procedure and without deciding the question of double
jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits. Accused was convicted of
concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to a penalty of two months and one day
of arresto mayor. Hence this appeal.

As to appellant's plea of double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the office of bigamy for
which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court below are two
distinct offenses in law and in fact as well as in the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of the
second marriage, with the first still existing, characterizes the crime of bigamy; on the other hand, in
the present case, mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife characterizes
the crime of concubinage. The first in an offense against civil status which may be prosecuted at the
instance of the state; the second, an offense against chastity and may be prosecuted only at the
instance of the offended party. And no rule is more settled in law than that, on the matter of double
jeopardy, the test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether
he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. (Diaz v. U. S., 223 U. S., 422; People v. Cabrera,
43 Phil., 82)

Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which they
agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal
for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of
concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt
that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.

We said before (People vs. Guinucod, 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which bars the offended party
from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape
and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has
been committed. We are now convinced that this is a narrow view in way warranted by the language,
as well as the manifest policy, of the law. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code provides:

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders. (Emphasis ours.)

As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have
been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No
logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both
instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes
unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband
who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as where, upon
acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore,
hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from
prosecuting the offense.

In this arriving at this conclusion we do not with to be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do

an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor
entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of
the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is anything morally
condemnatory in a situation of his character, the remedy lies not with us but with the legislative
department of the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of our
authority.

Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted, without costs.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and G.R. No. 164401

CECILIA SUNGA,
Petitioners,

- versus - Present:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

APPEALS; THE HONORABLE CARPIO MORALES,
PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional TINGA,
Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, VELASCO, JR., and
Zamboanga Del Norte; THE BRION, JJ.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
SHERIFF, Branch 11, Sindangan,
Zamboanga Del Norte; THE
CLERK OF COURT OF MANILA,
as Ex-Officio Sheriff; and Promulgated:
LAMBERTO T. CHUA,
Respondents. June 25, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45, seeking to nullify and set
aside the Decision[1] and Resolution dated November 6, 2003 and July 6, 2004,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75688. The
impugned CA Decision and Resolution denied the petition for certiorari interposed
by petitioners assailing the Resolutions[2] dated November 6, 2002 and January 7,
2003, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11 in Sindangan,
Zamboanga Del Norte in Civil Case No. S-494, a suit for winding up of
partnership affairs, accounting, and recovery of shares commenced thereat by
respondent Lamberto T. Chua.
The Facts

In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership to engage in the

marketing of liquefied petroleum gas. For convenience, the business, pursued
under the name, Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite), was registered as a sole
proprietorship in the name of Jacinto, albeit the partnership arrangement called for
equal sharing of the net profit.

After Jacintos death in 1989, his widow, petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and
married daughter, petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business
without Chuas consent. Chuas subsequent repeated demands for accounting and
winding up went unheeded, prompting him to file on June 22, 1992 a
Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and
Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment, docketed
as Civil Case No. S-494 of the RTC in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and
raffled to Branch 11 of the court.

After trial, the RTC rendered, on October 7, 1997, judgment finding for
Chua, as plaintiff a quo. The RTCs decision would subsequently be upheld by the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 58751 and by this Court per its Decision dated August 15,
2001 in G.R. No. 143340.[3] The corresponding Entry of Judgment[4] would later
issue declaring the October 7, 1997 RTC decision final and executory as
of December 20, 2001. The fallo of the RTCs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants, as follows:

(1) DIRECTING them to render an accounting in acceptable form under

accounting procedures and standards of the properties, assets, income and
profits of [Shellite] since the time of death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from whom
they continued the business operations including all businesses derived from
[Shellite]; submit an inventory, and appraisal of all these properties, assets,
income, profits, etc. to the Court and to plaintiff for approval or disapproval;

(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the partnership any and
all properties, assets, income and profits they misapplied and converted to
 their own use and advantage that legally pertain to the plaintiff and account for
the properties mentioned in pars. A and B on pages 4-5 of this petition as basis;

(3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the plaintiff shares and
interest of the plaintiff in the partnership of the listed properties, assets and good
will in schedules A, B and C, on pages 4-5 of the petition;

(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but unreceived income
and profits from the partnership from 1988 to May 30, 1992, when the
plaintiff learned of the closure of the store the sum of P35,000.00 per month,
with legal rate of interest until fully paid;

(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the partnership and

terminate its business activities pursuant to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all
the interest, shares, participation and equity in the partnership, or the value thereof
in money or moneys worth, if the properties are not physically divisible;

(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan guilty of breach of

trust and in bad faith and hold them liable to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages; and,

(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of P25,000.00 as

attorneys [fee] and P25,000.00 as litigation expenses.

NO special pronouncements as to COSTS.

SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied.)

Via an Order[6] dated January 16, 2002, the RTC granted Chuas motion for
execution. Over a month later, the RTC, acting on another motion of Chua, issued
an amended writ of execution.[7]

It seems, however, that the amended writ of execution could not be

immediately implemented, for, in an omnibus motion of April 3, 2002, Chua, inter
alia, asked the trial court to commission a certified public accountant (CPA) to
undertake the accounting work and inventory of the partnership assets if petitioners
refuse to do it within the time set by the court. Chua later moved to withdraw his
motion and instead ask the admission of an accounting report prepared by CPA
Cheryl A. Gahuman. In the report under the heading, Computation of
Claims,[8] Chuas aggregate claim, arrived at using the compounding-of-interest
method, amounted to PhP 14,277,344.94. Subsequently, the RTC admitted and
approved the computation of claims in view of petitioners failure and refusal,
despite notice, to appear and submit an accounting report on the winding up of the
partnership on the scheduled hearings on April 29 and 30, 2002.[9]

After another lengthy proceedings, petitioners, on September 24, 2002,

submitted their own CPA-certified valuation and accounting report. In it,
petitioners limited Chuas entitlement from the winding up of partnership affairs to
an aggregate amount of PhP 3,154,736.65 only.[10] Chua, on the other hand,
submitted a new computation,[11] this time applying simple interest on the various
items covered by his claim. Under this methodology, Chuas aggregate claim went
down to PhP 8,733,644.75.

On November 6, 2002, the RTC issued a Resolution,[12] rejecting the

accounting report petitioners submitted, while approving the new computation of
claims Chua submitted. The fallo of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves, as it is

hereby resolved, that the Computation of Claims submitted by the
plaintiff dated October 15, 2002 amounting to P8,733,644.75 be
APPROVED in all respects as the final computation and accounting of
the defendants liabilities in favor of the plaintiff in the above-captioned
case, DISAPPROVING for the purpose, in its entirety, the computation
and accounting filed by the defendants.

SO RESOLVED.[13]
Petitioners sought reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC
per its Resolution of January 7, 2003.[14]

In due time, petitioners went to the CA on a petition for certiorari[15] under

Rule 65, assailing the November 6, 2002 and January 7, 2003 resolutions of the
RTC, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75688.

The Ruling of the CA

As stated at the outset, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision of November
6, 2003, denied the petition for certiorari, thus:
 WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[16]

The CA predicated its denial action on the ensuing main premises:

1. Petitioners, by not appearing on the hearing dates, i.e., April 29 and 30,
2002, scheduled to consider Chuas computation of claims, or rendering, as
required, an accounting of the winding up of the partnership, are deemed to have
waived their right to interpose any objection to the computation of claims thus
submitted by Chua.

2. The 12% interest added on the amounts due is proper as the unwarranted
keeping by petitioners of Chuas money passes as an involuntary loan and
forbearance of money.

3. The reiterative arguments set forth in petitioners pleadings below were

part of their delaying tactics. Petitioners had come to the appellate court at least
thrice and to this Court twice. Petitioners had more than enough time to question
the award and it is now too late in the day to change what had become final and
executory.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was rejected by the appellate court

through the assailed Resolution[17] dated July 6, 2004.Therein, the CA explained
that the imposition of the 12% interest for forbearance of credit or money was
proper pursuant to paragraph 1 of the October 7, 1997 RTC decision, as the
computation done by CPA Gahuman was made in acceptable form under
accounting procedures and standards of the properties, assets, income and profits
of [Shellite].[18] Moreover, the CA ruled that the imposition of interest is not based
on par. 3 of the October 7, 1997 RTC decision as the phrase shares and interests
mentioned therein refers not to an imposition of interest for use of money in a loan
or credit, but to a legal share or right. The appellate court also held that the
imposition of interest on the partnership assets falls under par. 2 in relation to par.
1 of the final RTC decision as the restitution mentioned therein does not simply
mean restoration but also reparation for the injury or damage committed against
the rightful owner of the property.

Finally, the CA declared the partnership assets referred to in the final

decision as liquidated claim since the claim of Chua is ascertainable by
mathematical computation; therefore, interest is recoverable as an element of
damage.

The Issues

Hence, the instant petition with petitioners raising the following issues for
our consideration:

I.

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can [impose] interest on a final
judgment of unliquidated claims.

II.

Whether or not the Sheriff can enforce the whole divisible obligation
under judgment only against one Defendant.

III.

Whether or not the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth

Sunga Chan with her husband Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to
answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment.[19]

Significant Intervening Events

In the meantime, pending resolution of the instant petition for review and
even before the resolution by the CA of its CA-G.R. SP No. 75688, the following
relevant events transpired:

1. Following the RTCs approval of Chuas computation of claims in the

amount of PhP 8,733,644.75, the sheriff of Manila levied upon petitioner Sunga-
Chans property located along Linao St., Paco, Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 208782,[20] over which a building leased to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) stood. In the auction sale of the levied lot, Chua,
with a tender of PhP 8 million,[21] emerged as the winning bidder.

2. On January 21, 2005, Chua moved for the issuance of a final deed of sale
and a writ of possession. He also asked the RTC to order the Registry of Deeds of
Manila to cancel TCT No. 208782 and to issue a new certificate. Despite
petitioners opposition on the ground of prematurity, a final deed of sale [22] was
issued on February 16, 2005.
3. On February 18, 2005, Chua moved for the confirmation of the sheriffs
final deed of sale and for the issuance of an order for the cancellation of TCT No.
208782. Petitioners again interposed an opposition in which they informed the
RTC that this Court had already granted due course to their petition for review
on January 31, 2005;

4. On April 11, 2005, the RTC, via a Resolution, confirmed the sheriffs final
deed of sale, ordered the Registry of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 208782,
and granted a writ of possession[23] in favor of Chua.

5. On May 3, 2005, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). On May 24, 2005, the sheriff
of Manila issued a Notice to Vacate[24] against petitioners, compelling petitioners
to repair to this Court anew for the resolution of their petition for a TRO.

6. On May 31, 2005, the Court issued a TRO,[25] enjoining the RTC and
the sheriff from enforcing the April 11, 2005 writ of possession and the May 24,
2005 Notice to Vacate. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order[26] on June 17,
2005, suspending the execution proceedings before it.

7. Owing to the clashing ownership claims over the leased Paco property,
coupled with the filing of an unlawful detainer suit before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) in Manila against PNB, the Court, upon the banks motion, allowed,
by Resolution[27] dated April 26, 2006, the consignation of the monthly rentals with
the MeTC hearing the ejectment case.
 The Courts Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue: Interest Proper in Forbearance of Credit

Petitioners, citing Article 2213[28] of the Civil Code, fault the trial court for
imposing, in the execution of its final judgment, interests on what they considered
as unliquidated claims. Among these was the claim for goodwill upon which the
RTC attached a monetary value of PhP 250,000. Petitioners also question the
imposition of 12% interest on the claimed monthly profits of PhP 35,000, reckoned
from 1988 to October 15, 1992. To petitioners, the imposable rate should only be
6% and computed from the finality of the RTCs underlying decision, i.e., from
December 20, 2001.

Third on the petitioners list of unliquidated claims is the yet-to-be

established value of the one-half partnership share and interest adjudicated to
Chua, which, they submit, must first be determined with reasonable certainty in a
judicial proceeding. And in this regard, petitioners, citing Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[29] would ascribe error on the RTC for adding a 12% per
annum interest on the approved valuation of the one-half share of the assets,
inclusive of goodwill, due Chua.

Petitioners are partly correct.

For clarity, we reproduce the summary valuations and accounting reports on

the computation of claims certified to by the parties respective CPAs. Chua
claimed the following:

A 50% share on assets (exclusive of goodwill) at fair

market value (Schedule 1) P 1,613,550.00

B 50% share in the monetary value of goodwill

 (P500,000 x 50%) 250,000.00

C Legal interest on share of assets from June 1, 1992 to

Oct. 15, 2002 at 12% interest per year (Schedule 2) 2,008,869.75

D Unreceived profits from 1988 to 1992 and its corresponding

interest from Jan. 1, 1988 to Oct. 15, 2002
(Schedule 3) 4,761,225.00

E Damages 50,000.00

F Attorneys fees 25,000.00

G Litigation fees 25,000.00

TOTAL AMOUNT P 8,733,644.75

On the other hand, petitioners acknowledged the following to be due to

Chua:

Total Assets Schedule 1 P2,431,956.35

50% due to Lamberto Chua P1,215,978.16
Total Alleged Profit, Net of Payments Made,
May 1992-Sch. 2 1,613,758.49
50% share in the monetary value of goodwill
(500,000 x 50%) 250,000.00
Moral and Exemplary Damages 50,000.00
Attorneys Fee 25,000.00
Litigation Fee 25,000.00

TOTAL AMOUNT P3,154,736.65

As may be recalled, the trial court admitted and approved Chuas

computation of claims amounting to PhP 8,733,644.75, but rejected that of
petitioners, who came up with the figure of only PhP 3,154,736.65. We highlight
the substantial differences in the accounting reports on the following items, to
wit: (1) the aggregate amount of the partnership assets bearing on the 50% share of
Chua thereon; (2) interests added on Chuas share of the assets; (3) amount of
profits from 1988 through May 30, 1992, net of alleged payments made to Chua;
and (4) interests added on the amount entered as profits.

From the foregoing submitted valuation reports, there can be no dispute

about the goodwill earned thru the years by Shellite. In fact, the parties, by their
own judicial admissions, agreed on the monetary value, i.e., PhP 250,000, of this
item. Clearly then, petitioners contradict themselves when they say that such
amount of goodwill is without basis. Thus, the Court is loathed to disturb the trial
courts approval of the amount of PhP 250,000, representing the monetary value of
the goodwill, to be paid to Chua.

Neither is the Court inclined to interfere with the CAs conclusion as to the
total amount of the partnership profit, that is, PhP 1,855,000, generated for the
period January 1988 through May 30, 1992, and the total partnership assets of PhP
3,227,100, 50% of which, or PhP 1,613,550, pertains to Chua as his share. To be
sure, petitioners have not adduced adequate evidence to belie the above CAs
factual determination, confirmatory of the trial courts own. Needless to stress, it is
not the duty of the Court, not being a trier of facts, to analyze or weigh all over
again the evidence or premises supportive of such determination, absent, as here,
the most compelling and cogent reasons.
This brings us to the question of the propriety of the imposition of interest
and, if proper, the imposable rate of interest applicable.

In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr.,[30] the Court held that the legal interest at 12%
per annum under Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 416 shall be adjudged only in
cases involving the loan or forbearance of money. And for transactions involving
payment of indemnities in the concept of damages arising from default in the
performance of obligations in general and/or for money judgment not involving a
loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the governing provision is Art.
2209 of the Civil Code prescribing a yearly 6% interest. Art. 2209 pertinently
provides:

Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of

money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there
being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest
agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is
six per cent per annum.

The term forbearance, within the context of usury law, has been described as
a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of
time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and
payable.[31]

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the imposition of

interest, if proper, and the applicable rate, as follows: The 12% per annum rate
under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to loans or forbearance of money,
goods, or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of
money, goods, or credit, while the 6% per annum under Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code applies when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the
concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of
obligations in general,[32] with the application of both rates reckoned from the time
the complaint was filed until the [adjudged] amount is fully paid. [33] In either
instance, the reckoning period for the commencement of the running of the legal
interest shall be subject to the condition that the courts are vested with discretion,
depending on the equities of each case, on the award of interest.[34]
Otherwise formulated, the norm to be followed in the future on the rates and
application thereof is:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, is breached, the

contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
Damages of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable
damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual

and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
 1. When the obligation breached consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation,
the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation not constituting loans or forbearance of money is

breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can
be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when
such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court
is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes

final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality
until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent
to a forbearance of credit.[35]

Guided by the foregoing rules, the award to Chua of the amount representing
earned but unremitted profits, i.e.. PhP 35,000 monthly, from January 1988 until
May 30, 1992, must earn interest at 6% per annum reckoned from October 7, 1997,
the rendition date of the RTC decision, until December 20, 2001, when the said
decision became final and executory. Thereafter, the total of the monthly profits
inclusive of the add on 6% interest shall earn 12% per annum reckoned from
December 20, 2001 until fully paid, as the award for that item is considered to be,
by then, equivalent to a forbearance of credit. Likewise, the PhP 250,000 award,
representing the goodwill value of the business, the award of PhP 50,000 for moral
and exemplary damages, PhP 25,000 attorneys fee, and PhP 25,000 litigation fee
shall earn 12% per annum from December 20, 2001 until fully paid.
 Anent the impasse over the partnership assets, we are inclined to agree with
petitioners assertion that Chuas share and interest on such assets partake of an
unliquidated claim which, until reasonably determined, shall not earn interest for
him. As may be noted, the legal norm for interest to accrue is reasonably
determinable, not, as Chua suggested and the CA declared, determinable by
mathematical computation.

The Court has certainly not lost sight of the fact that the October 7, 1997
RTC decision clearly directed petitioners to render an accounting, inventory, and
appraisal of the partnership assets and then to wind up the partnership affairs by
restituting and delivering to Chua his one-half share of the accounted partnership
assets. The directive itself is a recognition that the exact share and interest of Chua
over the partnership cannot be determined with reasonable precision without going
through with the inventory and accounting process. In fine, a liquidated claim
cannot validly be asserted without accounting. In net effect, Chuas interest and
share over the partnership asset, exclusive of the goodwill, assumed the nature of a
liquidated claim only after the trial court, through its November 6, 2002 resolution,
approved the assets inventory and accounting report on such assets.

Considering that Chuas computation of claim, as approved by the trial court,

was submitted only on October 15, 2002, no interest in his favor can be added to
his share of the partnership assets. Consequently, the computation of claims of
Chua should be as follows:

(1) 50% share on assets (exclusive of goodwill)

at fair market value PhP 1,613,550.00

(2) 50% share in the monetary value of goodwill

(PhP 500,000 x 50%) 250,000.00

(3) 12% interest on share of goodwill from December

20, 2001 to October 15, 2000
[PhP 250,000 x 0.12 x 299/365 days] 24,575.34

(4) Unreceived profits from 1988 to May 30, 1992 1,855,000.00

(5) 6% interest on unreceived profits from January

1, 1988 to December 20, 2001[36] 1,360,362.50
(6) 12% interest on unreceived profits from December
20, 2001 to October 15, 2002
[PhP 3,215,362.50 x 12% x 299/365 days] 316,074.54

(7) Moral and exemplary damages 50,000.00

(8) Attorneys fee 25,000.00

(9) Litigation fee 25,000.00

(10) 12% interest on moral and exemplary damages,

attorneys fee, and litigation fee from December
20, 2001 to October 15, 2002
[PhP 100,000 x 12% x 299/365 days] 9,830.14

TOTAL AMOUNT PhP 5,529,392.52

Second Issue: Petitioners Obligation Solidary

Petitioners, on the submission that their liability under the RTC decision is
divisible, impugn the implementation of the amended writ of execution,
particularly the levy on execution of the absolute community property of spouses
petitioner Sunga-Chan and Norberto Chan. Joint, instead of solidary, liability for
any and all claims of Chua is obviously petitioners thesis.

Under the circumstances surrounding the case, we hold that the obligation of
petitioners is solidary for several reasons.

For one, the complaint of Chua for winding up of partnership affairs,

accounting, appraisal, and recovery of shares and damages is clearly a suit to
enforce a solidary or joint and several obligation on the part of petitioners. As it
were, the continuance of the business and management of Shellite by petitioners
against the will of Chua gave rise to a solidary obligation, the acts complained of
not being severable in nature. Indeed, it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line
between when the liability of one petitioner ends and the liability of the other
starts. In this kind of situation, the law itself imposes solidary obligation. Art. 1207
of the Civil Code thus provides:

Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or

more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that each
one of the former has a right to demand, or that each of the latter is
bound to render, entire compliance with the prestation. There is solidary
liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or
the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. (Emphasis ours.)

Any suggestion that the obligation to undertake an inventory, render an

accounting of partnership assets, and to wind up the partnership affairs is divisible
ought to be dismissed.

For the other, the duty of petitioners to remit to Chua his half interest and
share of the total partnership assets proceeds from petitioners indivisible obligation
to render an accounting and inventory of such assets. The need for the imposition
of a solidary liability becomes all the more pronounced considering the
impossibility of quantifying how much of the partnership assets or profits was
misappropriated by each petitioner.

And for a third, petitioners obligation for the payment of damages and
attorneys and litigation fees ought to be solidary in nature, they having resisted in
bad faith a legitimate claim and thus compelled Chua to litigate.

Third Issue: Community Property Liable

Primarily anchored as the last issue is the erroneous theory of divisibility of

petitioners obligation and their joint liability therefor. The Court needs to dwell on
it lengthily.
 Given the solidary liability of petitioners to satisfy the judgment award,
respondent sheriff cannot really be faulted for levying upon and then selling at
public auction the property of petitioner Sunga-Chan to answer for the whole
obligation of petitioners. The fact that the levied parcel of land is a conjugal or
community property, as the case may be, of spouses Norberto and Sunga-Chan
does not per se vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of the property. Verily, said
property is not among those exempted from execution under Section 13,[37] Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.

And it cannot be overemphasized that the TRO issued by the Court on May
31, 2005 came after the auction sale in question.

Parenthetically, the records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto

were married on February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. Withal, their absolute community property may be held liable for
the obligations contracted by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code
pertinently provides:

Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

(1) x x x x

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by

the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or
by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other.

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the

consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited. (Emphasis ours.)

Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner

Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on
May 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her
husbands benefit.
 It may be stressed at this juncture that Chuas legitimate claim against
petitioners, as readjusted in this disposition, amounts to only PhP 5,529,392.52,
whereas Sunga-Chans auctioned property which Chua acquired, as the highest
bidder, fetched a price of PhP 8 million. In net effect, Chua owes petitioner Sunga-
Chan the amount of PhP 2,470,607.48, representing the excess of the purchase
price over his legitimate claims.

Following the auction, the corresponding certificate of sale dated January

15, 2004 was annotated on TCT No. 208782. On January 21, 2005, Chua moved
for the issuance of a final deed of sale (1) to order the Registry of Deeds of Manila
to cancel TCT No. 208782; (2) to issue a new TCT in his name; and (3) for the
RTC to issue a writ of possession in his favor. And as earlier stated, the RTC
granted Chuas motion, albeit the Court restrained the enforcement of the RTCs
package of orders via a TRO issued on May 31, 2005.

Therefore, subject to the payment by Chua of PhP 2,470,607.48 to petitioner

Sunga-Chan, we affirm the RTCs April 11, 2005 resolution, confirming the
sheriffs final deed of sale of the levied property, ordering the Registry of Deeds of
Manila to cancel TCT No. 208782, and issuing a writ of possession in favor of
Chua.

WHEREFORE, this petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the

assailed decision and resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 75688 are
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) The Resolutions dated November 6, 2002 and January 7, 2003 of

the RTC, Branch 11 in Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte in Civil Case No. S-494,
as effectively upheld by the CA, are AFFIRMED with the modification that the
approved claim of respondent Chua is hereby corrected and adjusted to cover only
the aggregate amount of PhP 5,529,392.52;

(2) Subject to the payment by respondent Chua of PhP 2,470,607.48 to

petitioner Sunga-Chan, the Resolution dated April 11, 2005 of
the RTC, confirming the sheriffs final deed of sale of the levied property, ordering
the Registry of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 208782, and issuing a writ of
possession in favor of respondent Chua, is AFFIRMED; and
 The TRO issued by the Court on May 31, 2005 in the instant petition
is LIFTED.

No pronouncement as to costs.