1 Amer - China, Vietnam, & SCS

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China, Vietnam, and the South China

Sea: Disputes and Dispute Management
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Ramses Amer
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Institute for Security & Development Policy , Nacka , Sweden
Published online: 21 Jan 2014.
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To cite this article: Ramses Amer (2014) China, Vietnam, and the South China Sea: Disputes
and Dispute Management, Ocean Development & International Law, 45:1, 17-40, DOI:
10.1080/00908320.2013.839160
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DOI: 10.1080/00908320.2013.839160
China, Vietnam, and the South China Sea:

Disputes and Dispute Management
RAMSES AMER
Institute for Security & Development Policy
Nacka, Sweden
This article examines recent developments in the South China Sea; in particular, the
China-Vietnam relationship. The developments are presented in the broader context of

the Sino-Vietnamese approach to managing border disputes since full normalization of
relations in late 1991. The challenges for China and Vietnam in managing their disputes
and related tension in the South China Sea are also discussed.
Keywords China, South China Sea, Vietnam
Introduction
This article examines recent developments in the South China Sea, in particular with regard
to the China-Vietnam relationship. The developments are outlined in the broader context
of the Sino-Vietnamese approach to managing border disputes since full normalization of
relations in late 1991. The focus is on the tension caused by incidents since 2009. The
challenges for China and Vietnam to manage their disputes and related tension in the
South China Sea are also discussed. For recent developments (i.e., since 2009), the article
primarily draws on official information available from China and Vietnam; thus, it focuses
on the official dimension of the relationship between the two countries.
The China-Vietnam Approach to Managing Territorial Disputes1991

to 20081
Context, Progress, and Challenges

Following the full normalization of relations between China and Vietnam in November
1991, sharp differences relating to maritime disputes (i.e., conflicting claims to the Paracel
and Spratly archipelagoes and to water and continental shelf areas in the South China
Sea and in the Gulf of Tonkin) have regularly led to tension. Differences relating to oil
exploration in the South China Sea and the signing of contracts with foreign companies for
exploration have exacerbated the situation as have fisheries matters.
Received 31 March 2013; accepted 29 April 2013.

Address correspondence to Ramses Amer, Associate Professor in Peace and Conflict Research,
Associated Fellow, Institute for Security & Development Policy, Vastra Finnbodavagen 2, 13130
Nacka, Sweden. E-mail: ramsesamer@gmail.com
17
18 R. Amer
In order to manage their disputes, China and Vietnam have initiated a system of talks
structured as follows:
high-level talks, that is, with presidents, prime ministers, and general secretaries of
the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV);
foreign ministerlevel talks;
government-level talks, that is, deputy and vice-ministers; and
expert-level talks.2
The first achievement was the signing of the agreement of 19 October 1993 on the
principles for handling the land border and the Gulf of Tonkin disputes.3 It was further
agreed to set up joint working groups at the expert level to deal with the two issues. The
joint working group on the Gulf of Tonkin met 17 times from March 1994 leading to the
signing of the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and
Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin in December 2000.4 Talks at the expert level
on the disputes in the South China Sea proper, the so-called sea issues, were initiated in
November 1995.5
Compared to the Gulf of Tonkin issues, less progress has been achieved with regard to
the disputes in the South China Sea proper; that is, the competing sovereignty claims to the
Paracel and Spratly archipelagos as well as the overlapping claims to waters and continental
shelf areas to the east of the Vietnamese coast. The talks have been constrained with Vietnam
pushing for the inclusion of the Paracels as an issue alongside that of the Spratlys whereas
China wants to discuss only the latter. Further complicating matters, China seems to view
the disputes over water and continental shelf areas as part of the broader Spratly conflict,
or at least as overlapping with areas within the so-called nine dashed lines displayed on
Chinas official maps, whereas Vietnam views the overlapping claims as separate from the
conflict over the Spratlys. It appears that Vietnam may not want to initiate talks relating to
the areas of overlapping claims in the South China Sea proper as it could be interpreted
as giving legitimacy to Chinas claims to those areas; in other words, Vietnam rejects the
claims made by Chinas through its nine dashed lines. Thus, of the three South China Sea
issues to be addressed by the two countries, there is only agreement on putting one on the
agenda for talks; namely, the Spratly archipelago, which is a multilateral conflict situation
involving other claimants.
The Gulf of Tonkin6

The crucial issue was how to achieve a mutually acceptable framework or model for
dividing the Gulf of Tonkin. The impact of islands was of crucial importance, in particular
considering Bach Long Vi Island which is an island China had controlled and inhabited
before it was handed over to Vietnam in the late 1950s.7 Logically, Vietnam would take the
position that Bach Long Vi Island should have its full impact in any agreed line. On the other
hand, China had an interest in minimizing its impact. An assessment of the coordinates in
the 2000 Agreement indicates that the impact of Bach Long Vi was not valued fully in
the delimitation. Bach Long Vi was given a quarter of impact; that is, 15 nautical miles
from the island.8
Another potentially complicating factor in the negotiations was the status of the Sino-
French Agreement of 1887.9 Vietnam may have favored using the line in the agreement to
delimit the Gulf of Tonkin since that was to its advantage. China would have opposed it
arguing that the 1887 Agreement was only for indicating administrative control over the
islands in the gulf and did not apply to the water and the seabed in the gulf.10 The 2000
China, Vietnam, and the South China Sea 19
Agreement indicates that, if the status of the 1887 Agreement was brought up during the
negotiations, it did not have an impact on the delimitation of maritime zones in the Gulf of
Tonkin.
The increased number or rounds of expert-level talks and government-level talks in
2000 is evidence of the complexities involved in reaching a mutually acceptable delimitation
agreement. The political pressure to reach an agreement before the end of 2000 generated
this increased activity. The agreement indicates that the two sides endorsed a line of
equidistance, albeit modified to deal with the impact of islands, in particular Bach Long Vi
Island.11
The issue of fishing in the Gulf of Tonkin is linked to the border disputes. The two
countries held six rounds of talks between April and December 2000, which led to the
Agreement on Fishing Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin signed on 25 December 2000.12
The Fishing Agreement provides for joint fishing areas, cooperation in preserving and sus-
tainably exploiting the aquatic resources in the gulf, and regulations for fishing cooperation
and scientific research.13
In order for the maritime boundary and fishery agreements to enter into force, it was
necessary to agree on a supplementary protocol to the Fishery Agreement, which was
signed in Beijing on 29 April 2004.14 Ratification of the boundary and fishery agreements
followed on 30 June 2004.15
Entry into force of the Gulf of Tonkin agreements has been followed by expert-level
talks on the delimitation of the maritime area outside of the entrance of the Gulf of
Tonkinreferred to as the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin, with the first meeting held in
January 2006.16
South China Sea

For maritime issues in the South China Sea proper, talks were initiated at a later stage than
those in relation to the Gulf of Tonkin and much remains to be achieved. The focus here
is how China and Vietnam have managed to bring the regular episodes of tension in the
1990s under control.
While the initiation of expert-level talks in 1995 was the first concrete move toward an
institutionalized form of management of disputes between China and Vietnam in the South
China Sea, a noticeable shift in how the two states dealt with actions taken by the other
came in response to a dispute in May 1998 relating to the activities of a Chinese exploration
ship in areas of the South China Sea also claimed by Vietnam.17 This issue was smoothed
without the serious tension that characterized a similar incident of a Chinese exploration
ship in MarchApril 1997.18 As the public statements were fewer in connection with the
May 1998 incident, it is difficult to assess how the more successful management of the
incident was brought about, but less public rhetoric and more restraint by the two parties
appear to have been contributing factors. Judging from the Vietnamese official explanation,
its approach by diplomatic negotiations and patience in dealing with China bore fruit in
connection with the May 1998 incident.19 An additional observation is that both China and
Vietnam were reluctant to engage in long periods of accusations and counteraccusations.
However, this did not imply that either side refrained from publicizing their discontent
or from protesting against actions carried out by the other side. The difference in 1998,
as compared to earlier years, was that the official complaint or accusation was stated on
a limited number of occasions, and then no further public statement on the incident in
question was made. This tended to avoid an escalation of tension.
20 R. Amer
Developments in 1999 further indicated the progress made in the management of the
disputes between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea. The only public protest in
1999 was made by Vietnam in late March in response to a Chinese decision to temporarily
ban fishing in the South China Sea.20 This is in line with the provisions of the Joint
Declaration of 27 February 1999,21 issued in the connection with the visit to China by the
general secretary of the CPV, relating to the mode of behavior to be adopted in relation to
the South China Sea. According to Section 3, the two sides agreed to maintain the existing
negotiation mechanism on the sea issues and to try to find a basic long-term solution
through negotiations. Pending a solution, they would discuss the possibility of engaging in
bilateral cooperation in such areas as protecting the sea environment, hydro-meteorology,
and natural calamity prevention and control. They also agreed to refrain from any actions
that could further complicate or widen the dispute and to refrain from the use or the threat
to use of force. Finally, they agreed to promptly conduct discussions and satisfactorily
solve any differences so that they would not affect the normal development of bilateral
ties.22
During 2000, no incidents relating to the South China Sea caused tension as the
two countries moved to put greater emphasis on conflict management in the South China
Sea through continued talks, by exploring potential cooperation in certain fields, and by
exercising mutual self-restraint. This was most evidently displayed in the Joint Statement
on All-Round Cooperation in the New Century, signed on 25 December 2000 by the two
foreign ministers.23 Section IX is devoted to the South China Sea and the two sides agreed
to maintain the existing negotiation mechanism on the marine issue and to persist in
seeking a fundamental and everlasting solution acceptable to both sides through peaceful
negotiations.
During the period 20012008, a variety of incidents caused limited periods of tension
linked to legislative actions relating to the disputed archipelagoes, oil exploration and
agreements, and fishing bans, but in general the situation in the South China Sea between
the two countries remained stable.24
Developments Since 2009
Incidents: 20092011
On 12 March 2009, Vietnam reiterated its sovereignty claims to the Paracels and Spratlys
in response to the announcement that the Zhou Jiang International Travel Agent would
start tours to Phu Lam Island in the Paracels.25 In early May 2009, Vietnam submitted
a Partial Submission with respect to Vietnams continental shelf area beyond 200 nautical
miles in the North Area of the South China Sea26 as well as a Joint Submission with
Malaysia, relating to the southern part of the South China Sea to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).27 The submissions prompted China to protest
and reiterate its claims in the South China Sea.28 The government-level delegations dealing
with territorial issues met on two occasions in 2009.29
In mid-May Vietnam reacted negatively to a fishing ban announced by China for the
period of 16 May to 1 August 2009,30 and in June 2009 Vietnam released information
about an incident in which Chinese patrol forces arrested 3 fishing boats manned by
37 fishermen from Quang Ngai province. According to Vietnam, the fishing boats were
conducting normal fishing activities in the waters of Hoang Sa archipelago (i.e., the Paracel
archipelago).31 In August, the Vietnamese fishing boat QNg 95031TS was seized by China
in the vicinity of the Paracels. Vietnam requested the release of the vessel and crew through
a diplomatic note to the Chinese embassy in Vietnam.32 China informed the Vietnamese
embassy that the vessel and the crew had been released.33 In October, Vietnam protested
against the inhumane acts by the Chinese armed officers against Vietnamese fishermen
who had sought refuge in the Paracel archipelago.34 On 15 December, Vietnam officially
stated that it was concerned about the Chinese repeated seizures of Vietnamese fishing
boats and fishermen.35
In addition, on 16 November 2009 Vietnam protested against the decision by the
authorities in Hainan Province to set up hamlet administration in Yongxing island and
Zhaoshu island in the Paracel archipelago.36 Also, in response to Chinas move to send
two Yuzheng vessels to the Paracels and a medical ship to the Spratlys, Vietnam
protested and reiterated its indisputable sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa
archipelagos (i.e., the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes).37
Vietnamese protests about arrest of fishermen continued in 2010.38 There was also
a Vietnamese protest on 5 April 2010 regarding Chinas dispatch of Yuzheng fishery
administration ships to patrol Truong Sa area, which stated that it was a serious violation
of Vietnams sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago.39 Another protest by Vietnam on

6 May related to the fishing ban issued by China on 29 April which took effects from
16th May to 1st August 2010 in some waters at sea, covering some areas under the
sovereignty of Vietnam in the East Sea (i.e., the South China Sea).40 On 24 June 2010, the
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry strongly protested against the passage of the 20102020
Grand Plan for Construction and Development Plan of International Tourism Island of
Hainan, under which Truong Sa (Spratly) and Hoang Sa (Paracel) Archipelagos will be
incorporated.41 Further, on 5 August Vietnam again protested China sending the M/V
Western Spirit seismic survey vessel, together with escort ships, to conduct seismic study
in the Tri Ton Island area of Hoang Sa Archipelago (i.e., the Paracel archipelago) as well
as in the oil and gas exploration Lots 141, 142 and 143 of the continental shelf of
Vietnam.42
In response to the heightened tension, the prime ministers of the two countries held
talks in Hanoi on 28 October 2010, and decided to seek satisfactory solutions to existing
issues relating to the South China Sea. According to the official Vietnamese report, the two
sides also reached consensus on speeding up negotiations on basic principles to settle sea
issues, and satisfactorily settling fishermen and fishing boat issues.43 The official Chinese
report did not mention anything about fishermen and fishing boats.44
The year 2011 began with tension already in January when Vietnam protested that the
Chinese State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping (SBSM) officially provide online map
service Map World, which continues to embed the nine-dotted line in the East Sea (i.e., the
South China Sea).45 China responded that it enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South
China Sea islands and their adjacent waters.46 In February, Vietnam protested against a
Chinese navel exercise in the Paracel archipelago,47 and in March publicly announced that
it was objecting to military drills carried out by China in the Spratly archipelago.48 On
10 March 2011, Vietnam protested that the Hainan provincial authority announced March
3rd the 12th Five-year Plan on socio-economic development, which included plans for the
Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes.49 On 8 April, Vietnam reacted to the report that Chinas
Hainan Provincial authority listed Dao Cay (Tree) Island in Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands of
Viet Nam (Zhaoshu dao as referred to by the China) one of the key islands prioritized for its
protection, conservation and construction. Vietnam asked China to end and not to repeat
activities that violate Viet Nams sovereignty.50
On 18 April 2011, government-level talks were held in Hanoi and the two countries
agreed to soon sign an agreement on fundamental principles to guide the settlement
22 R. Amer
of sea-related differences and arising issues through peaceful negotiations and based on
international law, especially the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.51
In May 2011, China reacted to the holding of elections to Vietnams National As-
sembly in the Spratly archipelago by stating that China has indisputable sovereignty over
the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters (i.e., Spratly islands).52 China also stated
that unilateral action taken by any country on the Nansha Islands is an infringement on
Chinas territorial sovereignty, thus illegal, invalid and not in line with the spirit of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).53 Vietnam responded
that it possesses historical and legal foundations to assert her sovereignty over Truong Sa
(Spratly) and Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelagos. It further stated that Vietnams holding
of the elections in Truong Sa archipelago is of her internal affair.54 On 14 May Vietnam
protested about the announcement published at the Web site of Haikou City, Hainan
Province, relating to the management plan for the fishing holiday season in the South
China Sea Region in 2011 effective 12 p.m. May 16 through 12 p.m. August 1. Vietnam
stated that it had indisputable sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa
(Spratly) archipelagos, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction for her exclusive economic
zone [EEZ] and continental shelf under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. It also stated
that Chinas unilateral implementation of such fishing ban in the East Sea is a violation
of the Vietnamese sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago, sovereign rights and
jurisdiction for Viet-nams exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.55 Furthermore,
on 19 May Vietnam announced that it had affirmed its sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel)
and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagos and protested against Chinas recent acts relating to
the two archipelagos.56 Vietnams reaction had primarily been prompted by the fact that the
State Oceanic Administration of China had released the 2011 China Ocean Development
Report.57
The Incidents of May and June 201158

On 28 May 2011 the spokesperson of Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented on
Chinas maritime law enforcement and surveillance in the South China Sea, emphasizing
that China opposes Vietnams oil and gas exploration activities within the waters under the
jurisdiction of China which undermine Chinas rights and interests as well as jurisdiction
over the South China Sea.59 The spokesperson also stated that such activities violate the
bilateral consensus on the South China Sea issue, and that the actions taken by Chinas
competent authorities are regular maritime law enforcement and surveillance activities in
the waters under the jurisdiction of China.60
The actions taken by Chinas competent authorities were referred to as the May 26
incident during Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference on 29 May, when
it was claimed that a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel cut the exploration cables of
Binh Minh 02 seismic vessel of Viet Nam National Oil and Gas Group (PVN) while it
was conducting seismic survey in the continental shelf of Viet Nam.61 The spokesperson
stated that Vietnam was resolutely opposed to the Chinas act that damaged and hindered
the Viet Nams normal survey and exploration activities within the Vietnamese continental
shelf and exclusive economic zone, inflicting severe damages on Viet Nam National Oil
and Gas Group. Further, Vietnam considered that Chinas act was a serious violation
of the sovereign and jurisdiction rights of Viet Nam to its continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone.62 In addition, the spokesperson clarified that the area where Vietnam
conducted exploration activities situates entirely in the EEZ and the 200-nautical mile
continental shelf of Vietnam in accordance with the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
It was also stated that the area is neither a disputed area nor is it an area managed by
China. According to Vietnam, China has deliberately misled the public into thinking
that it is a disputed area.63
On the issue of the extent of Chinas claims in the South China Sea, the vice chairman of
the National Border Committee of Vietnam, Nguyen Duy Chien, stated that Chinas nine-
dash line in the East Sea, aka Bull tongue-shaped line, is completely legally groundless
and is in contrary to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention to which China is a party.64
He further stated that Chinas claim encroaches the exclusive economic zones and the
continental shelves of many regional countries, including Viet Nam, and thus are rejected
by many countries.
On 9 June, the spokesperson of Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs described a
further incident: the Viking II, a vessel hired by Viet Nam National Oil and Gas Group,
was conducting 3D seismic exploration in Block 136/03 located within the continental
shelf of Vietnam when Chinese fishing vessel No 62226, supported by two Chinese
Yuzheng fishery administration vessels No 311 and No 303, cut off Viking II, then veered
with acceleration.65 Despite warning flares from the Vietnamese side, the Chinese fishing
vessel headed on and rammed exploration cables of the Viking II. The specialized cable
slashing device of the vessel was trapped in the Viking IIs cables, jamming Viking II
operation. When this had occurred Chinese Yuzheng 311 and 303, together with several
Chinese fishing vessels, rushed to rescue Vessel 62226. The spokesperson also noted that
it was the second incident since 26 May, and stated that these systematic acts by the
Chinese side aim at disputing an undisputed area with a goal to materialize its the nine
dotted line claim and this was unacceptable to Vietnam.66
China responded stating that the Vietnamese remarks do not tally with the fact.67 The
spokesperson of Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that Chinese fishing boats have
been operating in the waters off Wanan Bank for generations, and they were conducting
normal operation in the above waters on the morning of June 9 when the Chinese fishing
boats were illegally chased away by armed Vietnamese ships. During the chase, the
fishing net of one of the Chinese fishing boats tangled with the cables of a Vietnamese
oil and gas exploration vessel which was operating illegally in the same waters. Then,
the Vietnamese vessel dragged the Chinese fishing boat for more than one hour. In this
situation, the Chinese fishermen were forced to take the initiative to cut off the fishing
net so as to separate the two vessels. According to China, the action of the Vietnamese
vessel seriously endangered Chinese fishermens lives. The spokesperson stressed that
Vietnam grossly infringed Chinas sovereignty as well as maritime rights and interests by
exploring oil and gas illegally in the Wanan Bank waters and chasing away Chinese fishing
boats.68
The statements made by the two sides in late May and June 2011 highlighted their
respective views on the dispute situation, the extent of the disputes, and their views on
the management and possible settlement of the disputes in the South China Sea. China
in reference to the core of the South China Sea issue, referred to sovereign disputes
between neighboring countries of the South China Sea over some islands and reefs of
Nansha Islands as well as demarcation disputes over part of waters of the South China
Sea (i.e., the Spratly islands).69 Vietnam referred to issues relating only to two countries,
such as the entrance of the Gulf of Tonkin, the Hoang Sa archipelagothe Paracel between
Vietnam and China, issues relating to countries and other parties concerned, such as the
issue of Truong Sa archipelagothe Spratly, and to issues not only related to the East
Sea coastal countries but also related to the countries outside the region, such as security
and safety of navigation.70
24 R. Amer
One of the main areas of differences relates to Chinas claims within the so-called nine
dashed lines. Chinas response to Vietnams submissions to the CLCS in 2009, through two
NotesCML/17/2009 and CML/18/2009to the UN secretary-general, included a map of
the South China Sea displaying the nine dashed lines. In the Notes, China stated that it has
indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters,
and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed
and subsoil thereof.71 In a more recent Note on 14 April 2011, China claimed that Chinas
Nansha islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and
Continental Shelf (i.e., the Spratly islands),72 implying that China considers that they are
entitled to full maritime zones. China did not mention any map in this communication. In
the official statements in June 2011, the terminology used was that China has indisputable
sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and adjacent waters73 and that China has
indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and the adjacent waters (i.e., the Spratly
Islands).74
Vietnam has objected to Chinas claims within the nine dashed lines and, as articulated
in the statement of 29 May 2011 by the vice chairman of the National Border Committee
of Vietnam, Nguyen Duy Chien, considers that Chinas nine-dash line in the East Sea, aka
Bull tongue-shaped line, is completely legally groundless and is in contrary to the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention. The vice chairman also stated that Chinas claim encroaches
the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelves of many regional countries,
including Viet Nam, and thus are rejected by many countries.75 In response to the two
incidents of late May and early June 2011, Vietnam explicitly stated that these systematic
acts by the Chinese side aim at disputing an undisputed area with a goal to materialize its
the nine dotted line claim and that this was unacceptable to Vietnam.76
Reducing Tension and Management of the Incidents

After the MayJune 2011 public display of differences and tension, the two countries took
action. Vietnam dispatched to Beijing a special envoy, the deputy minister of foreign affairs,
Ho Xuan Son, who held talks with his Chinese counterpart, Zhang Zhijun, and met with
Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo on 25 June 2011.77 According to Vietnamese
reports,78 the two sides concurred that the bilateral relationship needed to proceed in a
manner to benefit peace, stability and development in the region. In relation to the
situation in the South China Sea, the two sides emphasised the necessity to actively
implement the common perception of the two countries leaders, peacefully solving the
two countries disputes at sea through negotiation and friendly consultation; employing
effective measures and working together to maintain peace and stability. The two sides
also agreed on the need to steer public opinions along the correct direction, avoiding
comments and deeds that harm the friendship and trust of the people of the two countries.
Furthermore, the two sides agreed to speed up the tempo of negotiations so as to early sign
an Agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea issues between Vietnam
and China as well as to boost the implementation of the 2002 DOC and of follow-up
activities so that substantial progress will soon be achieved.79
On 27 June, Vietnams deputy minister of foreign affairs provided more information
about his talks in Beijing. Asked about the progress of negotiations on the Agreement
on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea issues between Viet Nam and China,
he answered that after the completion of the demarcation of land border in late December
2008,80 the two countries had agreed to shift the focus of territorial border negotiations
to sea issues. He explained that the two sides had agreed that, before solving practical
issues, it was necessary to negotiate to sign the Agreement on basic principles guiding
the settlement of sea issues.81 He argued that there are major and important orientations
that the two sides need to observe and explained that, between early 2010 and now, the
two sides have held six working-level rounds of negotiations.82
On 28 June, the spokesperson of Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to a
question about Chinas comment on the consensus reached between China and Vietnam
on the South China Sea issue in connection with the visit by the special envoy from
Vietnam. The spokesperson said that, in connection with the visit, the two sides had an
in-depth exchange of views on the current South China Sea issue, arriving at important
consensus. According to the spokesperson,
Both sides agreed to resolve disputes through friendly consultation rather than
take actions that may complicate and expand the situation, and oppose external
forces interference in the China-Vietnam dispute so as to jointly safeguard
peace and stability of the South China Sea.83
The October 2011 Basic Principles Agreement and High-Level Summit and
Developments in 2012 and 2013
Two significant developments took place in October 2011: The Agreement on Basic Prin-
ciples Guiding the Settlement of Sea-Related Issues was signed in Beijing,84 and the first
high-level summit between the two countries since 2008 took place when the general
secretary of CPV, Nguyen Phu Tong, visited China.
The Agreement on Basic Principles stated that the government-level delegations of both
countries agreed that the satisfactory settlement of maritime issues between Viet Nam and
China goes in line with the basic interests and shared aspiration of the people of the two
countries and is conducive to regional peace, stability, co-operation and development.
They also agreed on the basis of the common understanding that Vietnamese and Chinese
Leaders reached on maritime issues to solve maritime issues under a set of principles
divided into six points.85
The first point outlined that, in the context of the overall collaboration between the
two countries and by persistently pursuing friendly consultations to settle in satisfactory
manner maritime issues, they would contribute to make the South China Sea a zone of
peace, friendship and co-operation.86
The second point stated that, on the basis of full respect for legal evidences, taking
into account other factors such as history as well as taking into account each others
reasonable concerns, the two sides agreed that with a constructive attitude they would
make efforts to expand common understanding, narrow differences and continuously
promote negotiations. Furthermore, [b]ased on the legal regime and principles recognized
by international law including the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the two sides would
be make efforts to seek mutually acceptable fundamental and lasting solutions to maritime
disputes.87
The third point outlined that the two sides agreed to strictly abide [by] the agreements
and common understanding reached by their high-level leaders and adhere to the principles
and spirit of the 2002 DOC in their negotiations on maritime issues. In that context it was
stated that, in relation to maritime disputes between Viet Nam and China, the two sides
shall settle them through friendly negotiations and consultations. In case the disputes
involve other countries, the consultations shall include all other parties concerned.88
26 R. Amer
The fourth point stated that in the process of seeking fundamental and lasting solutions
to maritime issues, on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefits, the two
sides agreed to actively discuss provisional and temporary measures without affecting
each sides positions and policies.89
In the fifth point, it was agreed to deal with easier matters first. The two sides would
speed up the negotiations on demarcation of the mouth of Tonkin Gulf and actively discuss
co-operation for mutual development in this area. They would promote cooperation in
less sensitive fields like marine environment protection, scientific research, search and
rescue, and prevention and mitigation of natural disasters.90
The sixth point outlined that the two sides agreed to hold periodic meetings between
heads of governmental delegations on a rotational basis and also hold irregular meet-
ings if necessary. They also agreed to establish a hotline between the Governmental
delegations.91
During his visit to China, the general secretary of the CPV met with then president and
general secretary of the CPC, Hu Jintao, and other Chinese leaders.92 In the joint statement,
attention was devoted to maritime issues. It was stated that the two sides exchanged views
in a sincere and straightforward manner on the sea issue, stressing their political will and
determination to settle disputes via friendship negotiation and talks in order to maintain
peace and stability in the South China Sea.93 It was further stated that the [l]eaders of the
two Parties and the two countries will maintain regular exchanges and dialogues on the sea
issue between Vietnam and China and timely direct the proper settlement of the sea issue
from the political and strategic height. The two sides agreed to speed up negotiations on
the sea issue, seek basic and long-term solutions acceptable to both sides. They would
also actively discuss to find transitional and temporary measures that do not affect each
sides stance and policies, including research and discussions on co-operation for mutual
development. The two sides also stated that they will firmly speed up negotiations on the
demarcation of areas beyond the mouth of the Tonkin Gulf and actively discuss co-operation
for mutual development on this area.
Then vice-president of China, Xi Jinping, made an official visit to Vietnam on 2022
December 2011. The two sides reviewed the overall collaboration between the two coun-
tries, including territorial issues.94
Vietnams minister of foreign affairs, Pham Binh Minh, made an official visit to China
on 1215 February 2012. In talks with his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, the two
reviewed the bilateral relationship, including territorial issues, and reiterated the two sides
commitment to settle their differences by peaceful means.95
Vietnams deputy foreign minister, Ho Xuan Son, held talks with his Chinese coun-
terpart, Zhang Zhijun, in Beijing on 27 and 28 February 2012. Territorial issues featured
prominently in their talks. They agreed to establish working groups at the department level
to negotiate on the delineation of the sea area outside the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf mouth and
cooperate in jointly developing this area.96 They also agreed to set up working groups to
cooperate in less sensitive sea domains, including sea environment protection, scientific
research out at sea, search and rescue activities and mitigation of damage caused by natural
calamities. Finally, they agreed to launch a hotline between the two foreign ministries
to make timely exchanges and discussions for appropriate solutions to arising sea issues.
The hotline was opened on 2 March 2012.97
On 21 and 22 May 2012 the first-round of talks at the departmental level was held
in Hanoi on the demarcation of areas outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. The talks
were described as being held in a friendly, frank and constructive atmosphere.98 The
second round of talks was held in Beijing on 26 and 27 September. The two sides affirmed
their resolve to make efforts to push up negotiations . . . and accelerate the demarcation
of the sea area beyond the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin, and they also discussed co-
operation measures for joint development in the area.99 Further, they agreed that the
guiding principles for the demarcation of the area are based on international law, especially
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and related international reality.100
The third round of talks were held in Hanoi on 29 and 30 May 2013 in a friendly,
straightforward and constructive atmosphere. The two sides affirmed their determination
to push forward negotiations. They also agreed to establish a group of technical experts
to jointly survey the sea area off the Gulf of Tonkin in order to perform the negotiation
tasks.101
On 29 and 30 May 2012, the first round of negotiations on cooperation in less sensitive
fields at sea was held in Beijing. The talks dealt with the implementation of cooperation
in fields such as marine environmental protection, maritime science research, research
and rescue at sea and preventing and limiting impacts of natural disasters. The two sides
reached high consensus on the cooperative principle of mutual respect, equality and mutual
benefit. Furthermore, they agreed on the working mechanism of working teams.102 At the
second round of talks, held in Hanoi on 68 November 2012, the two sides presented and
exchanged views on projects of priority co-operation in marine environmental protection,
marine science research, search and rescue at sea, and natural disaster prevention, and
agreed to assign expert teams to promptly conduct research and contribute preliminary
opinions on these priority projects.103 The third round of negotiations on less sensitive
fields at sea was held in Beijing on 2224 April 2013. The two sides agreed to pursue
three priority co-operation projects on sea search and rescue at sea, the exchange of ideas
and research on managing the environment in the Gulf of Tonkin and researching the
Holocenne sediment in the Red River and Changjiang River Deltas.104
On 1921 June 2013, Vietnams president made a state visit to China at the invitation
of Chinas president Xi Jinping.105 In connection with the high-level visit, several agree-
ments were signed between the two countries. One was an agreement between Vietnams
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and Chinas Ministry of Agriculture on
the establishment of a hot line on unexpected incidences in fishing operations at sea.106
In addition the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (PETROVIETNAM) and the China Na-
tional Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) renewed their agreement on joint exploration
for energy reserves in the Gulf of Tonkin.107 In the joint statement from the state visit
issued on 21 June 2013, considerable attention was devoted to border issues.108 The two
sides stated that they highly valued the agreement to set up a hotline to deal with unex-
pected incidents in fishing activities at sea and that they had agreed to settle unexpected
incidents in fishing activities at sea between the two countries in a satisfactory manner.109
The two sides reached a consensus that the two Parties and States should maintain regular
exchanges and dialogues and to advance the satisfactory settlement of sea-related issues.
They agreed to seriously carry out the agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement
of sea-related issues. They will persistently seek fundamental and long-term solutions
acceptable to both sides through consultations and friendly negotiations.110 It was agreed
to intensify negotiations of the Working Group on the sea off the Gulf of Tonkin a well
as to increase negotiations of the Working Group on Viet NamChina cooperation in less
sensitive issues at sea.111 The two sides also agreed that, before sea-related issues are
settled thoroughly, they will stay calm and restrain themselves so as not to complicate and
expand disputes. At the same time, they will make good use of the hotline for managing
and controlling crisis at sea between the two Foreign Ministries, properly settling emerging
issues with a constructive attitude, not letting the issue affect the overall situation of their
28 R. Amer
relationship as well as peace and stability in the South China Sea. Finally, the two sides
reached consensus on the comprehensive and effective implementation of the DOC.112
In early August Chinas foreign minister, Wang Yi, visited Vietnam for talks with his
Vietnamese counterpart, Pham Binh Minh as well as with Vietnams prime minister and
the secretary general of the CPV. The two sides confirmed their commitment to managing
the situation in the South China Sea.113
Despite these positive developments, there were incidents in 2012 that led to Viet-
namese complaints relating to Chinas activities and actions in the South China Sea, in-
cluding: Chinas fishing ban; the arrest of Vietnamese fishermen; the opening of blocks for
oil concessions in the South China Sea; and the establishment of the city of Sansha. In late
November 2012, Vietnam claimed that Chinese fishing boats had blocked and severed
the cable of a Vietnamese seismic survey vessel in the vicinity of Con Co Island, an area
located within Vietnams EEZ.114 Chinas main complaint was voiced in response to the
adoption of Vietnams Law of the Sea, also referred to as Maritime Law.115
There have also been incidents in 2013 that led to Vietnamese complaints relating to
Chinas activities in the South China Sea, including: legislative decisions and development
plans affecting the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes;116 activities in the Paracel and Spratly
archipelagoes;117 and harassment of Vietnamese fishing boats, including an alleged shooting
incident.118
The intense tension that the incidents in late May and early June 2011 caused was
brought under control by late June 2011 through the talks that led to the October 2011
Agreement on Basic Principles. The agreement has enhanced the mechanisms for manage-
ment of sea-related issues and disputes through a de facto bilateral code of conduct. The
high-level summit in October 2011 signaled a renewed push for better management of such
issues by both states after a 3-year pause. More conducive conditions for managing disputes
and reducing tension between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea were created.
A continued push for enhanced management was displayed at the high-level summit in
June 2013. In addition, the June 2013 agreement on the establishment of a hot line on
unexpected incidences in fishing operations at sea can be seen as move to address the
reoccurring incidents involving fishermen as exemplified by three official complaints by
Vietnam in 2013.119
Developments in 2012 and 2013 display that key provisions of the October 2011
Agreement on Basic Principles have been implemented; for example, the initiation of
department-level talks on both the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin and on co-operation in
less sensitive fields at sea. However, 2012 and 2013 also display that differences persist.
Conclusion
While China and Vietnam would like to manage and settle their disputes in the South
China Sea peacefully, there are periods of tension between the two countries. The level of
tension increased during the period 20092011. This was brought under control through
the October 2011 Agreement on Basic Principles, which is a major development and can
be considered as a de facto bilateral code of conduct between China and Vietnam. The
high-level summit held in October 2011 was also important in demonstrating the political
will to address and manage the disputed issues. The more recent high-level summit in June
2013 has again demonstrated the political will to manage the disputed issues.
Nevertheless, differences in perceptions exist between the two countries regarding
which areas in the South China Sea are disputed. As has been the situation since the full
normalization of relations in late 1991, overlapping claims to maritime zones in the South
China Sea to the east of the Vietnamese coast, where Vietnams EEZ and continental
shelf overlap with Chinas so-called nine dashed lines, will be the subject of continued
differences between the two countries and incidents causing periodic tension in bilateral
relations are likely to persist. Developments in 2012 and 2013 support this prediction. The
establishment of the hotline and the initiation of department-level talks on the area outside
the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin as well as talks on co-operation in less sensitive fields at
sea are positive steps in dispute management.
A significant issue between the states is the lack of agreement on the scope of disputes
in the South China Sea. Only the dispute relating to the Spratly archipelago is on the
agenda. China opposes the inclusion of any discussion of the Paracel archipelago. Vietnam
opposes the inclusion of areas to the east of the Vietnamese coast where Vietnams claims
to the continental shelf and EEZ areas extend within the limit of the so-called nine dashed
lines of China. If China and Vietnam could agree on the scope and the issues that are
disputed, it would be an important step forward in creating an agenda for expert-level talks
that would also contribute to the multilateral efforts. This does not mean that either side
should abandon their sovereignty claims, but rather that they should recognize they have
overlapping claims and that the situation needs to be addressed. The two parties ought to
move to acknowledge that the other party has claims, even if they consider these claims
to be illegitimate. Only when the overall claims situation is taken into account can the
management efforts be effectively used to prevent incidents and associated tension from
recurring.
At the regional level, China and Vietnam can contribute positively to the successful
implementation of the 2002 DOC and to the process of developing the conflict management
mechanisms needed to maintain stability and avoid tension in the South China Sea such as
a regional code of conduct applicable to the South China Sea.
Notes
1. The land border dispute and the settlement of that dispute in late 1999 will not be included
in this overview and analysis. For details about the land border issue, see Ramses Amer, The Sino-
Vietnamese Approach to Managing Boundary Disputes, Maritime Briefing, Vol. 3, No. 5 (Durham,
UK: International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, 2002), 829, 3840. See also
with respect to the broader context of the territorial issues between the two countries, Ramses Amer,
Sino-Vietnamese Border Disputes, in Beijings Power and Chinas Borders: Twenty Neighbors in
Asia, ed. Bruce Elleman, Stephen Kotkin, and Clive Schofield, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2012),
295309.
2. See, generally, Amer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach, supra note 1, at 914, 5058;
Ramses Amer, Assessing Sino-Vietnamese Relations Through the Management of Contentious Is-
sues, Contemporary Southeast Asia 26 (2004): 329331; Ramses Amer and Nguyen Hong Thao,
Vietnams Border Disputes: Legal and Conflict Management Dimensions, Asian Yearbook of Inter-
national Law 12 (20052006): 118122; Ramses Amer and Nguyen Hong Thao, The Management
of Vietnams Border Disputes: What Impact on Its Sovereignty and Regional Integration? Contem-
porary Southeast Asia 27 (2005): 433434, and Ramses Amer and Nguyen Hong Thao, Vietnams
Border DisputesAssessing the Impact on Its Regional Integration, in Vietnams New Order: In-
ternational Perspectives on the State and Reform in Vietnam, ed. Stephanie Balme and Mark Sidel
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 7476.
3. Report by Xinhua News Agency, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part Three, Far East,
1825: B/2 (21 October 1993) (hereafter BBC/SWB/FE); and report by Voice of Vietnam, BBC/SWB/FE,
1825: B/23.
30 R. Amer
4. Agreement Between the Peoples Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves
of the Two Countries in Beibu Gulf/Bac Bo Gulf, 25 December 2000, Law of the Sea Bulletin, no.
63 (2007): 7274. The text has also been reproduced in Nguyen Hong Thao, Maritime Delimitation
and Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf, Ocean Development and International Law 34 (2005):
4144; and Zou Keyuan, The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in
the Gulf of Tonkin, Ocean Development and International Law 34 (2005): 2224.
5. BBC/SWB/FE, 2463: B/1 (17 November 1995).
6. This section is partly derived from Nguyen Hong Thao and Ramses Amer, The Man-
agement of Vietnams Maritime Boundary Disputes, Ocean Development and International Law
38 (2007): 312313; and Ramses Amer and Nguyen Hong Thao, Regional Conflict Management:
Challenges of the Border Disputes of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, Austrian Journal of South-
East Asian Studies 2, no. 2 (2009): 6263. For a broader study on China and maritime delimitation
including the Gulf of Tonkin, see Zou Keyuan, China and Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Past,
Present and Future, in Conflict Management and Dispute Settlement in East Asia, ed. Ramses Amer
and Keyuan Zou (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 149169. For a broader study on Chinas perspectives
and approaches to managing maritime disputes including the Gulf of Tonkin, see Li Jianwei and
Ramses Amer, Recent Practices in Dispute Management in the South China Sea, in Maritime
Energy Resources in Asia: Legal Regimes and Cooperation, ed. Clive Schofield, Special Report No.
37 (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2012), 9298. For a study on the role of
the Chinese province of Hainan in the context of the Gulf of Tonkin settlement, see Baiying Kang
and Jianwei Li, Hainans Role in the Management of South China Sea Issues: A Case Study of the
Gulf of Tonkin, in Conflict Management and Dispute Settlement in East Asia, ed. Ramses Amer
and Keyuan Zou (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 201220. For a broader study on Vietnam and maritime
delimitation including the Gulf of Tonkin, see Nguyen Hong Thao, Vietnam and Maritime Delimi-
tation, in Conflict Management and Dispute Settlement in East Asia, ed. Ramses Amer and Keyuan
Zou (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 171199.
7. See Zou Keyuan, Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, Ocean De-
velopment and International Law 30 (1999): 245246, 253.
8. Nguyen Hong Thao, The Gulf of Tonkin: A Case Study of Dispute Settlement, in
Management and Resolution of Inter-State Conflicts in Southeast Asia, ed. Kamarulzaman Askandar
(Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network, 2003), 210213.
9. The text of the 1887 Agreement was reproduced by Vietnam. See Conventions of 1887
and 1895 on the Delineation of the Border Between Vietnam and China (Hanoi: Department of Press
and Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1979).
10. For an argument in a similar vein with a parallel being drawn to the Breviee Line drawn
in 1939 in the Gulf of Thailand, see Zou Keyuan, supra note 7, at 238240.
11. For an argument relating to the fairness of the outcome, see Nguyen Hong Thao, supra
note 8, at 210.
12. China and Vietnam Initial Agreements on Delimitation of Beibu Bay/Fishery Coopera-
tion, 25 December 2000, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2792/2796/t16280.htm (accessed 24 February 2011).
13. Nguyen Hong Thao, supra note 4, at 3541; Zou Keyuan, Sino-Vietnamese Fishery
Agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 17 (2002):
127148. See also Li Jianwei and Chen Pingping, China-Vietnam Fishery Cooperation in the Gulf
of Tonkin Revisited, in The South China Sea: Towards A Region of Peace, Security and Cooperation,
ed. Tran Truong Thuy (Hanoi: Gioi and Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, 2011), 303317.
14. Viet Nam, China Ink Deal on Fisheries in Tokin Gulf, 1 May 2004,
Vietnam News Agency, available at vietnamnews.wnagency.com.vn/2004-04/30/Stories/07.htm
(accessed 1 May 2004). See also Protocol on China-Vietnam Agreement on Fishery Coop-
eration in Beibu Bay Signed, 30 April 2004, Peoples Daily Online (English version), avail-
able at www.english.people.com.cn/200404/30/eng20040430 142001.html (accessed 4 October
2004).
15. Vietnam, China Exchange Documents Ratifying Tonkin Gulf Demarcation Agree-
ment, 1 July 2004, Nhan Dan, available at www.nhandan.org.vn/english/news/010704/domestic
vietnamchina.htm (accessed 19 July 2004). See also Two China-Vietnam Beibu Gulf Agreements
Take Effect, 1 July 2004, Peoples Daily Online (English version), available at www.english.
people.com.cn/200407/01/eng20040701 148157.html (accessed 3 October 2004).
16. On the initiation of talks, see Vietnam and China Hold Talks on Sea De-
lineation, 20 January 2006, Nhan Dan, available at www.nhandan.com.vn/engligs/news/
200106/domestic vnandchin.htm (accessed 23 January 2006); and Viet Nam, China Meet for Talks
on Shared Sea Border, 9 January 2006, Vietnam News Agency, available at vietnamnews.vnagency.
com.vn/showarticle.php?num=01POL200106 (accessed 22 January 2006).
17. On 20 May 1998, a spokesperson for the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that
the Chinese ship Discovery 08 was operating in the Spratly archipelago, even deeply into Vietnams
continental shelf, and that this was a violation of Vietnams territorial sovereignty. BBC/SWB/FE,
3233 B/11 (22 May 1998). The Chinese response came on 21 May when a spokesman for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that China had indisputable sovereignty over the Spratly is-
lands and their surrounding waters, and that the presence of Chinese ships in these waters for
normal activities was within Chinas sovereign rights. BBC/SWB/FE, 3235 G/1 (25 May 1998).
On 22 May, the spokesperson for Vietnams Foreign Ministry said that the ship and two armed
fishing vessels had withdrawn from Vietnams sea area. The Vietnamese approach to the prob-
lem was said to have been in line with the persistent policy of settling disputes through diplo-
matic negotiations. In this spirit, Vietnam had patiently maintained contact with China on the
operation of the Chinese ships in Vietnams sea territory. BBC/SWB/FE, 3236 B/12 (26 May
1998).
18. On 15 March 1997 the Voice of Vietnam announced that China had sent Kanta Oil
Platform No 3 together with two pilot ships Nos 206 and 208 to carry out exploratory oil
drilling in areas lying within Vietnams continental shelf. BBC/SWB/FE, 2870 B/4 (18 March 1997);
BBC/SWB/FE, 2871 B/4 (19 March 1997). The first public Chinese reaction came on 18 March
when a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Chinas normal operation within
its EEZ and continental shelf was indisputable. BBC/SWB/FE, 2872 G/1 (20 March 1997). The
bilateral dispute continued throughout March. Then, according to information carried by the Voice
of Vietnam on 9 April, quoting a Vietnamese expert, the Chinese rig and its tugboats had been
withdrawn from Vietnams EEZ and continental shelf since 1 April. BBC/SWB/FE, 2889 B/3 (10 April
1997).
19. See note 17.
20. BBC/SWB/FE, 3496 B/4 (30 March 1999). Report carried by Voice of Vietnam.
21. Vietnam-China Joint Declaration, reproduced in Vietnam Law and Legal Forum 5, no.
54 (February 1999): 13.
22. Ibid.
23. Joint Statement on All-Round Cooperation in the New Century Between the Peo-
ples Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 26 December 2000, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2792/2793/t16248.htm (accessed 24 February 2011).
24. For details, see Ramses Amer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach to Managing Border
DisputesLessons, Relevance and Implications for the South China Sea Situation, in The South
China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Developments, Proceedings of the International
Workshop, Co-organized by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Vietnam Lawyers Associ-
ation, 2627 November 2009, Hanoi, Vietnam, ed. Tran Truong Thuy (Hanoi: Gioi and Diplomatic
Academy of Vietnam, 2010), 265266. On Chinas attempts in 2007 and 2008 to influence foreign
oil companies to end their joint activities with Vietnam in the South China Sea, see Nguyen Hong
Thao and Ramses Amer, A New Legal Arrangement for the South China Sea? Ocean Development
and International Law 40 (2009): 339.
25. Vietnams Response to Zhou Jiang International Travel Agents Announcement of the
Opening of a Tour to Phu Lam Island of the Paracels: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman
32 R. Amer
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50. Viet Nam Reiterates Its Indisputable Sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong
Sa (Spratly) Archipelagos, 9 April 2011, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at
34 R. Amer
www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/pbnfn/ns110421161428/newsitem print preview (accessed 29 April

2011).
51. On 18 April 2011, government-level talks were held in Hanoi. Viet Nam, China
Talk Border-Related Issues, 19 April 2011, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at
(accessed 20 April 2011).
52. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yus Remarks on Vietnam Holding So-Called
National Assembly Deputies Elections on Chinas Nansha Islands, 10 May 2011, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/
eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t822021.htm (accessed 13 July 2011).
53. Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in The South China Sea, Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, available at www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-
conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea (accessed 14 March 2013).
54. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Mrs. Nguyen Phuong Nga Answers Questions
at the Regular Press Conference on 12th May 2011, 12 May 2011, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/pbnfn/ns110512182457/newsitem print preview
(accessed 13 July 2011).
55. Chinese Unilateral Fishing Ban in the East Sea Is a Violation of Vietnamese
Sovereignty, 14 May 2011, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.
vn/en/tt baochi/pbnfn/ns110516112044/newsitem print preview (accessed 13 July 2011); Vietnam
Opposes Chinas Fishing Ban in East Sea, 14 May 2011, Nhan Dan, available at www.nhandan.com.
vn/cmlink/nhandan-online/homepage/politics/external-relations/vietnam-opposes-china-s-fishing-
ban-in-east-sea-1.296297?mode=print#JsxOTrJG3o1y (accessed 17 July 2011).
56. VN Asserts Sovereignty over Hoang Sa, Truong Sa, 20 May 2011, Viet Nam
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/
ns110520145753/newsitem print preview (accessed 13 July 2011).
57. The release of the 2011 Report was highlighted in the Vietnamese reaction. See ibid.
58. For a detailed case study of the May and June incidents of 2011, see Ramses Amer and
Li Jianwei, Recent Developments in the South China SeaAn Assessment of the Core Bilateral
Relationship Between China and Vietnam, in Maritime Security Issues in the South China Sea and
the Arctic: Sharpened Competition or Collaboration? ed. Gordon Houlden and Nong Hong (Beijing:
China Democracy and Legal System, 2012), 4353.
59. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yus Remarks on Chinas Maritime Law En-
forcement and Surveillance on the South China Sea, 28 May 2011, 28 May 2011, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
xwfw/s2510/2535/t826601.htm (accessed 13 July 2011).
60. Ibid.
61. Press Conference on Chinese Maritime Surveillance Vessels Cutting Exploration Cable
of PetroViet Nam Seismic Vessel, 1 June 2011, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available
at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/pbnfn/ns110530220030/newsitem print preview (accessed 13 July
2011).
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga Answers Question from the
Media at the Press Conference on June 9th 2011 Concerning the Viking II Incident, 9
June 2011, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/
pbnfn/ns110610100618/newsitem print preview (accessed 13 July 2011); Regular Press
Briefing by MOFAs Spokesperson Nguyen Phuong Nga on June 9th, 2011, 10
June 2011, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/
tt baochi/pbnfn/ns110610145220/newsitem print preview (accessed 13 July 2011).
66. Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference Viking II Incident, 9 June 2011,
supra note 65; Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regular Press Briefing 9 June 2011, supra
note 65.
67. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Leis Remarks on Vietnamese Ships Chas-
ing Away Chinese Fishing Boats in the Waters Off the Nansha Islands, 9 June 2011, Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/
eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t829427.htm (accessed 13 July 2011).
68. Ibid.
69. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Leis Regular Press Conference on June 28,
2011, 29 June 2011, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t835066.htm (accessed 13 July 2011).
70. Foreign Ministrys Spokeswoman Nguyen Phuong Nga Answers Questions from the Me-
dia on June 10th, 2011, 11 June 2011, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.
gov.vn/en/tt baochi/pbnfn/ns110611180531/newsitem print preview (accessed 13 July 2011).
71. China Note CML/17/2009; Note CML/18/2009, supra note 28.
72. Note from the Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nations,
14 April 2011, CML/8/2011, available at the CLCS Web site, supra note 26. This Note was in response
to Note 000228 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations,
5 April 2011. For a detailed analysis of the Chinese Notes in the context of the broader submissions
of the outer limits of the continental shelf by coastal states of the South China Sea, see Nguyen
Hong Thao and Ramses Amer, Coastal States in the South China Sea and Submissions of the Outer
Limits of the Continental Shelf, Ocean Development and International Law 42 (2011): 245263.
It can be noted that, in response to both Chinas Note and the Philippines Note, Vietnam sent Note
77/HC-2011, 3 May 2011, to the UN Secretary-General in which Vietnam stated its positions as
follows: Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelagoes are integral parts of Vietnamese
territory. Vietnam further stated that it has sufficient historical evidence and legal foundation to assert
her sovereignty over these two archipelagoes. The Philippines and Viet Nam Notes are available at
the CLCS Web site, supra note 26.
73. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Leis Regular Press Conference on June 7, 2011, 8
June 2011, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at www.fmprc.gov.
cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t829435.htm (accessed 13 July 2011).
74. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Remarks on Vietnamese
Ships, 9 June 2011, supra note 67.
75. Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference Cutting Exploration Cable, 1
June 2011, supra note 61.
76. Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference Viking II Incident, 9 June 2011,
supra note 65; Regular Press Briefing, 9 June 2011, supra note 65.
77. It appears that China dispatched representatives to Vietnam earlier in June, although they
were not officially publicized at that time. Vietnamese officials and researchers, interviewed by the
author, Hanoi, September 2011.
78. Vietnam-China Joint Release, 26 June 2011, Nhan Dan, available at
www.nhandan.com.vn/cmlink/nhandan-online/homepage/politics/external-relations/vietnam-
china-joint-press-release-1.301599?mode=print#WprkPfz2NI5s (accessed 13 July 2011); Viet
Nam-China Joint Press Release, 26 June 2011, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at
(accessed 13 July 2011).
79. Vietnam-China Joint Release, 26 June 2011, supra note 78; Viet Nam Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Viet Nam-China Joint Press Release, 26 June 2011, supra note 78.
80. Joint Statement: On the Completion of the Demarcation and Markers Place-
ment on the Entire Land Border Line Between Vietnam and China, 6 January
2009, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/cn vakv/ca
tbd/nr040818094447/ns090106100042/newsitem print preview (accessed 8 January 2009).
81. Vietnam Advocates Maintaining Peace, Stability in East Sea, 28 June 2011, Nhan Dan,
available at www.nhandan.com.vn/cmlink/nhandan-online/homepage/politics/external-relations/
vietnam-advocates-maintaining-peace-stability-in-east-sea-1.301810?mode=print#iBVJGR3mS4
Ww (accessed 17 July 2011); Press Interviews Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ho Xuan
Son on Meeting with Chinese State Councillor, 28 June 2011, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign
36 R. Amer
Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns110628095717/

newsitem print preview (accessed 13 July 2011).
82. Vietnam Advocates Maintaining Peace, Stability in East Sea, 28 June 2011, supra note
81; Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Interviews Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ho
Xuan Son, 28 June 2011, supra note 81.
83. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson, 29 June 2011, supra note 69.
84. Agreement on the Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Maritime Issues Be-
tween the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Peoples Republic of China, 13 October
2011, Viet Nams Sovereign Boundaries Web site, National Boundary Commission, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, available at biengioilanhtho.gov.vn/eng/agreementonthebasicprinciplesguiding-nd-
0e80c28a.aspx (accessed 14 August 2013). The agreement is attached as the Appendix to this article.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. The visit was widely publicized by official sources in both China and Vietnam. For China,
see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China Web site at www.fmprc.gov.cn
and the International Department Central Committee of the CPC Web site at www.idcpc.org.cn. For
Vietnam, see the Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site at www.mofa.gov.vn/en and the
Nhan Dan Web site at www.nhandan.com.vn.
93. Vietnam-China Joint Statement, 16 October 2011, Communist Party of Vietnam
Online Newspaper, available at www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/Modules/News/NewsDetail.aspx?co id =
30107&cn id = 484891 (accessed 14 August 2013).
94. The visit was widely publicized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic
of China at www.fmprc.gov.cn.
95. Minister of Foreign Affairs on China Visit, 12 February 2012, Viet Nam Min-
ns120213163837/newsitem print preview (accessed 7 March 2012). For a less detailed Chinese
report from the talks, see Yang Jiechi Holds Talks with His Vietnamese Counterpart Pham Binh
Minh, 12 February 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available
at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2792/2794/t904678.htm (accessed 7 March 2012).
96. Talks Between Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Xuan Son and Chinese Counter-
part, 29 February 2012, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/
en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns120229101237 (accessed 7 March 2012).
97. The hotline was initiated through a phone conversation between the deputy ministers on
2 March 2012. Foreign Ministries of Viet Nam, China Set Up Hotline, 3 March 2012, Viet Nam
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/
ns120304165832/newsitem print preview (accessed 7 March 2012). See also Vietnam-China Hot-
line Opens, 3 March 2012, Nhan Dan, available at www.nhandan.org.vn/en/politics/external-
relations/item/496502-.htm (accessed 15 August 2013).
98. Vietnam-China First-Round Talk Held on the Tonkin Gulf Area, 24 May 2012, Nhan
Dan, available at www.nhandan.org.vn/en/politics/external-relations/item/1514602-.html (accessed
15 August 2013).
99. Vietnam, China Discuss Sea Area Off Tonkin Gulf, 28 September 2012, Nhan Dan,
available at www.nhandan.org.vn/en/politics/external-relations/item/719902-.html (accessed 15 Au-
gust 2013).
100. Ibid.
101. Vietnam, China Talk Sea Area Off Tonkin Gulf, 31 May 2013, Nhan Dan,
available at www.nhandan.org.vn/en/politics/external-relations/item/1767602-vietnam-china-talk-
sea-area-off-tonkin-gulf.html (accessed 15 August 2013).
102. Viet Nam, China Negotiate Cooperation in Less Sensitive Fields at Sea, 13 June
2012, Viet Nams Sovereign Boundaries Web site, National Boundary Commission, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, available at biengioilanhtho.gov.vn/eng/vietnam-chinanegotiatecooperationin-nd-
41d89522.aspx (accessed 15 August 2013).
103. Vietnam, China Discuss Less Sensitive Fields, 8 November 2012, Nhan Dan, avail-
able at en.nhandan.org.vn/cmlink/nhandan-online/homepage/politics/external-relations/vietnam-
china-discuss-less-sensitive-fields-1.376398?mode=print (accessed 26 November 2012).
104. Vietnam, China Discuss Non-Sensitive Issues at Sea, 25 May 2013, Nhan Dan, avail-
able at www.nhandan.org.vn/en/politics/external-relations/item/1114202-.html (accessed 15 August
2013).
105. The visit was widely publicized by official sources in both China and Vietnam. For China,
see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China Web site at www.fmprc.gov.cn.
For Vietnam, see the Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site at www.mofa.gov.vn/en.
106. Vietnamese, Chinese Presidents Hold Talks in Beijing, 20 June 2013,
Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/
nr040807105001/ns130620040619/newsitem print preview (accessed 28 June 2013).
107. Vietnam, China Renew Joint Exploration Agreement, 20 June 2013, Nhan Dan,
available at www.nhandan.org.vn/en/politics/external-relations/item/1808402-vietnam-china-renew-
joint-exploration-agreement.html (accessed 15 August 2013). In 2005, PETROVIETNAM and
CNOOC signed a framework agreement on oil and gas co-operation in the agreed offshore area of
the Gulf of Tonkin. The two sides then signed an official agreement on 6 November 2006 and the
governments of China and Vietnam approved it. It has been in effect since 2 January 2007. See
ibid.
108. Viet Nam, China Issue Joint Statement, 22 June 2013, Viet Nam Min-
ns130624152141/newsitem print preview (accessed 28 June 2013).
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. For Chinese reports, see Foreign Minister Wang Yi Holds Talks with Foreign
Minister Pham Binh Minh of Vietnam, 5 August 2013, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples
Republic of China, available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2792/2794/t1064523.shtml
(accessed 18 August 2013); General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)
Central Committee Nguyen Phu Trong Meets with Foreign Minister Wang Yi, 6 Au-
gust 2013, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2792/2794/t1064804.shtml (accessed 18 August
2013); and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung of Vietnam Meets with Foreign Minister
Wang Yi, 6 August 2013, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China,
available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2792/2794/t1064808.shtml (accessed 18
August 2013). For Vietnamese reports, see Chinese FM Visits Viet Nam to Boost Ties,
5 August 2013, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/
en/nr040807104143/nr111027144142/ns130805160547/newsitem print preview (accessed 18
March 2013); PM Dung Receives Chinese Foreign Minister, 6 August 2013, Viet Nam Min-
ns130806044740/newsitem print preview (accessed 18 March 2013); and Viet Nam Pri-
oritises Fostering Ties with China, 6 August 2013, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns130806161304/
newsitem print preview (accessed 18 March 2013).
114. See Viet Nam Protests Chinese Unilateral Fishing Ban in the East Sea, 24 Jan-
uary 2012, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/
pbnfn/ns120123233459/newsitem print preview (accessed 7 March 2012); Viet Nam Protests
Chinas Acts Against Fishermen, 1 March 2012, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, avail-
38 R. Amer
March 2012); Vietnam Asks China to End Sovereignty Violations, 16 March 2012, Nhan Dan, avail-
2013); Vietnam Protests Chinese Oil Companys Move, 26 June 2012, Nhan Dan, available at
www.nhandan.org.vn/en/politics/external-relations/item/560402-.html (accessed 15 August 2013);
Vietnam Protests Chinas Activities in So-Called Sansha City, 24 July 2012, Nhan Dan, avail-
2013); and Vietnam Asks China to Respect Sovereignty, 11 October 2012, Nhan Dan, available at
www.nhandan.org.vn/en/politics/external-relations/item/740802-.html (accessed 15 August 2013).
Regarding the November incident, see Remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Luong Thanh
Nghi on December 4, 2012, 4 December 2012, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available
at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/pbnfn/ns121206103459/newsitem print preview (accessed 21 Jan-
uary 2013). See also PetroVietnam Protests Chinese Ships Cutting of Survey Cable, 13 December
2012, Viet Nams Sovereign Boundaries Web site, National Boundary Commission, Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, available at biengioilanhtho.gov.vn/eng/petrovietnamprotestschineseships-breakageof-
nd-4466f14c.aspx (accessed 15 August 2013).
115. Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun Lodges a Solemn Representation Con-
cerning the Passing of the Maritime Law of Vietnam by the Vietnamese Parliament, 21
June 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2792/2794/t945207.htm (accessed 29 August 2012); For-
eign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunyings Remarks on the Law of the Sea of Viet Nam,
31 December 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, available at
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t1002940.shtml (accessed 27 March 2013).
116. Remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi on Jan-
uary 14, 2013, 14 January 2013, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at
gust 2013); Remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi on Chinese New Map
and Oceanic Development Plan, 26 April 2013, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available
at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/pbnfn/ns130426025830/newsitem print preview (accessed 16 Au-
gust 2013)
117. Remarks by Representative of the National Boundary Commission on 19 March 2013,
21 March 2013, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/
pbnfn/ns130321162108/newsitem print preview (accessed 16 August 2013); Remarks by For-
eign Ministry Spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi on Chinese Recent Actions Violating Viet Nams
Sovereignty in Hoang Sa Archipelago, 1 May 2013, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, avail-
August 2013)
118. Remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesman on March 25, 2013, 26 March 2013, Viet Nam
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/pbnfn/ns130326202046/
newsitem print preview (accessed 16 August 2013); Remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Luong Thanh Nghi on Chinese Ram of Vietnamese Fishing Boat No 90917, 28 May
2013, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/
pbnfn/ns130528215426/newsitem print preview (accessed 16 August 2013); Remarks by For-
eign Ministry Spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi Regarding Fishing Vessels QNg 96787 TS
and QNg 90153 TS, 18 July 2013, Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at
gust 2013).
119. Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Remarks by Foreign Ministry Spokesman, 26
March 2013, supra note 118; Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Remarks by Foreign Ministry
Spokesman, 28 May 2013, supra note 118; Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Remarks by
Foreign Ministry Spokesman, 18 July 2013, supra note 118.
Appendix
Agreement on the Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Maritime
Issues Between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Peoples Republic
of China
The delegation of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the delegation
of the Government of the Peoples Republic of China agreed that the satisfactory settlement
of maritime issues between Viet Nam and China goes in line with the basic interests and
shared aspiration of the people of the two countries and is conducive to regional peace,
stability, co-operation and development. The two sides agreed, on the basis of the common
understanding that Vietnamese and Chinese Leaders reached on maritime issues and The
1993 Agreement on the Basic Principles for the Settlement of Border and Territorial Matters
Between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Peoples Republic of China, to solve
maritime issues under the following principles:
1. Taking the overall relationship of the two countries as the most important element
and proceeding from on the strategic and panoramic view and guiding by the spirit
of Friendly neighbourliness, comprehensive co-operation, long-term stability and
future-oriented relations and good neighbours, good friends, good comrades and
good partners, persistently pursue friendly consultations to settle in satisfactory
manner maritime issues, thus making the East Sea a zone of peace, friendship and co-
operation, contributing to the development of the Viet Nam-China comprehensive
strategic cooperative partnership, as well as to regional peace and stability.
2. On the basis of full respect for legal evidences, taking into account other factors
such as history, as well as each others reasonable concerns, and with a constructive
attitude, the two sides would make efforts to expand common understanding, narrow
differences and continuously promote negotiations. Based on the legal regime and
principles recognized by international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea, the two sides shall make efforts to seek mutually acceptable
fundamental and lasting solutions to maritime disputes.
3. In the negotiations on maritime issues, the two sides will strictly abide the agree-
ments and common understanding reached by their high-level leaders and adhere to
the principles and spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC).
4. For maritime disputes between Viet Nam and China, the two sides shall settle
them through friendly negotiations and consultations. If the disputes involve other
countries, the consultations shall include all other parties concerned.
5. In the process of seeking fundamental and lasting solutions to maritime issues, on
the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefits, the two sides shall actively
discuss provisional and temporary measures without affecting each sides positions
and policies, including the active consideration and discussion on co-operation for
joint development based on the principles mentioned in Article 2 of this Agreement.
6. To address maritime issues incrementally, taking the easier matters first. To stead-
fastly speed up the negotiations on demarcation of the mouth of Tonkin Gulf and
actively discuss co-operation for joint development in this area. To actively promote
co-operation in less sensitive fields like marine environment protection, scientific
research, search and rescue, and prevention and mitigation of natural disasters. To
make efforts to enhance mutual trust to facilitate the settlement of more difficult
matters.
40 R. Amer
7. The two sides shall conduct periodical meetings between the Heads of Governmental
delegations for border negotiations twice a year on a rotational basis and hold
irregular meetings if necessary. The two sides agreed to establish a hotline between
the Governmental delegations to exchange views and address maritime issues in an
appropriate and timely manner.
This Agreement is done in Beijing, on the 11th day of October 2011, in duplicate, each in
Vietnamese and Chinese, both texts being equally authentic.
Sources: Viet Nams Sovereign Boundaries Web site, National Boundary Com-
mission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at biengioilanhtho.gov.vn/eng/agree
mentonthebasicprinciplesguiding-nd-0e80c28a.aspx (accessed 14 August 2013); Viet Nam
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/
nr040807105001/ns111101161013/newsitem print preview (accessed 14 August 2013).

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Ocean Development & International Law

China, Vietnam, and the South China

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China, Vietnam, and the South China Sea:

China-Vietnam relationship. The developments are presented in the broader context of

Keywords China, South China Sea, Vietnam

The China-Vietnam Approach to Managing Territorial Disputes1991

Context, Progress, and Challenges

Received 31 March 2013; accepted 29 April 2013.

The Gulf of Tonkin6

South China Sea

Developments Since 2009

of Vietnams sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago.39 Another protest by Vietnam on

The Incidents of May and June 201158

Reducing Tension and Management of the Incidents

www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt baochi/pbnfn/ns110421161428/newsitem print preview (accessed 29 April

Affairs, available at www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns110628095717/

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