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Pepcon
Pepcon
This case study summarises the causes and effects of the disaster and its
implications to industrial safety and risk analysis . It is divided as follows : section 2
gives a brief background to the disaster , section 3 details the incident including the
causes of the explosion through assessment reports and explores social and political
amplification of risk , section 4 provides details on the effect of the disaster both on
principles of industrial safety as well as risk analysis and suggests changes to
existing methods , section 5 gives a conclusion to the case study .
2 Background :
The AP involved in this explosion was being produced at Pepcon by a batch process
that included combining electrolytically produced sodium perchlorate and ammonium
chloride. The resulting AP was blended to customer specifications in several stages
involving blending, evaporative drying, and kiln drying using a steam heated batch
dryer. The dryer was located in a dual use building situated in the southwestern
quadrant of the facility.AP is normally shipped in large aluminium "tote" containers,
each holding
several thousand pounds of the white granular material. At the time of the explosion ,
Several hundred of the aluminium "totes" were stored in one area of the plant
awaiting shipment, along with a smaller number of fiber drums. Another storage area
at the plant contained several thousand 55-gallon plastic drums of the product
awaiting final blending . In addition to the chemicals at the plant, a 16-inch, high-
pressure (300
psi) natural gas transmission line ran underneath the plant and also supplied
the plant through a pressure reducing assembly.
The product (ammonium perchlorate) apparently had not been tested for mass(large
quantity) detonation prior to this fire and the precautions for ammonium perchlorate
are somewhat different depending on its particle
sizes. There are different Guide numbers, hazardous materials numbers, and
instructions for particle size under 45 microns and over 45 microns. A
firefighter approaching a vehicle or plant might well not know which
instructions to follow without detailed knowledge gained in pre-fire planning. The
product size range at the Henderson plant was from 90 microns to 400 microns with
most storage inventory averaging 200 microns [3]. For either particle size, the
firefighters are warned of the explosion
potential ,but bulk quantities as large as those normally stored in a plant or fixed site
are not covered by the manual . The Guidebook
did not make it clear enough that even large particle size ammonium perchlorate
can explode catastrophically.
3 The Incident
3.1 Causes
When preparing AP for different customers, the practice at Pepcon was to load the
dryer and monitor the temperature at unspecified intervals. In between checking the
temperature, the dryer was left unattended for as long as 60 minutes [8]. Loading
and unloading the dryer created much dust that deposited on walls and layered on
horizontal surfaces of the structure. Housekeeping was casual and only performed
well when inspections were scheduled. Dust along with dirt from the floor was swept
and collected in poly drums for reprocessing [9]. Previous fire incidents in the batch
dryer building were initiated by various causes including; belt and break friction,
electrical sparks, undefined ignition of insulation on the dryer, overheated electrical
motors and welding or flame cutting sparks. Each of these fires either burned out or
were extinguished by water. The prime candidate for fire initiation on the day of the
explosions was from welding or flame cutting sparks. Most of the process buildings
on the site were constructed with steel framework to which fibreglass panels were
attached as siding and roof structure, The welding and flame cutting operation was
being done in close to the batch drying facility to repair damage caused by high
winds.
Regulations and codes in force at the time of this explosion mandated that facilities
of combustible construction that store or process Class 4 oxidisers or explosives
required automatic fire detection and deluge sprinkler protection. In addition, each
facility was required to have an emergency plan and periodic training exercises
conducted in cooperation with local emergency organisations. At Pepcon, there was
none of the above. In fact the plant manager in charge of safety testified that he did
not recall any specific requirements with respect to storage and handling of AP. The
only fire alarm system at the plant was installed in the administration building and a
warehouse used for equipment assembly.
One of the major challenges faced by the Clark County Fire Department
in this incident was the management of information. The Department itself
had an urgent need for information on what had happened, was happening, and
could happen, in order to formulate a plan for operations and evacuation.
This required consultation with Fire Department personnel, plant
management, and experts from other agencies, under extremes of stress and
uncertainty.
While the process of planning and evaluation was taking place, there
were immediate and constant pressures from the local news media for details
and for information to broadcast to the public concerning the dangers and
actions that should be taken. The time required to gather and analyse
information resulted in some incorrect information being broadcast and
caused widespread public confusion. At the same time the national news
media were calling for more details. The Clark County Fire Department's
Public Information Officer responded and established an official source of
media information within an hour after the explosion.
Many residents were in near panic from rumours of several different
scenarios and dangers. Radio and television stations quickly devoted their
air time to the situation, but lacked a source of accurate information
during the first hour. Conflicting information was broadcast and, as a result, people in
the area reported confusion about whether to stay indoors
to avoid the smoke, evacuate, go to shelters, or take some other action.
The confusion extended to schools in the area, with some keeping children
inside and others sending students home. This emphasises the need to establish
working lines of communication with the news media.
Based upon the risk assessment and good engineering practices, the following
procedures and systems should have been incorporated at PEPCON [3]:
1. Better fire watch training
2. Better housekeeping
3. Ventilation system
4. Elimination of fuel sources
5. Sprinkler/deluge systems
6. Elimination of combustible building products
7. Alarm and fire sensing systems
8. Storage spacing and separation
9. Evacuation procedures
10. Standpipes that use gravity flow
These procedures would cost more initially, but the risk analysis that should precede
their implementation would clearly show the cost benefit of the fire protection
countermeasures and training.
5 Conclusion
The cast study shows that the most significant factors involving ignition in the plant
included (1) high sensitivity ofAP and other chlorate compounds,
(2) the quality of housekeeping, (3) possible open drums of product wastes, (4)
inadequate welding procedures in high hazard areas, and (5) the high wind
conditions.
Nevertheless this case study points to the need to integrate land-use planning with
disaster management. The situation whereby a dense urban development, the City
of Henderson surrounds existing major hazardous industrial facilities is a disaster
waiting to happen. Avoiding the juxtaposition of heavy resi- dential development and
major hazard facilities can minimize the off-site consequences of a technological
hazard event by reducing the number of citizens exposed to a hazard event [7]. The
need to maintain appropriate separation distances between industrial facilities and
residential development has to be emphasised. Another implication of the PEPCON
explosion for land- use planning and disaster management is the adverse effect of
locating sensitive land uses such as schools, day care cen- ters and hospitals close
to major hazardous facilities. The location of schools within the same complex as
PEPCON and other industrial facilities led to convergence as parents flocked to the
schools to pick up their children, and jammed the schools telephone lines in order to
obtain information about the welfare of the children.Also, Hendersons lack of
political jurisdiction over the island ignores the fact that lo- cal communities are the
ones most at risk and therefore should be involved in decisions that affect their lives.
The prevailing arrangement precludes the city emergency management per- sonnel
that could conceivably respond faster than the county unit from responding to any
hazard event on the island. The issue of prompt response is critical because in an
emergency a swift response may avert more dangerous consequences.
References
[5] Fire Hazards and Fire Prevention. Safety Rules, Pacific Engineering and
Products CO. March 1, 1985.
[7]Ibitayo, Olurominiyi O., Alvin Mushkatel, and K. David Pijawka. "Social and
political amplification of technological hazards: The case of the PEPCON explosion."
Journal of hazardous materials 114.1 (2004): 15-25.
[8] The PEPCON Disaster. A Report by The United Steelworkers of America. March
1989.