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Representation (arts)
Representation is the use of signs that stand in for and take the place of something else.[1] It is through
representation that people organize the world and reality through the act of naming its elements.[1] Signs are arranged
in order to form semantic constructions and express relations.[1]

For many philosophers, both ancient and modern, man is regarded as the
"representational animal" or animal symbolicum, the creature whose
distinct character is the creation and the manipulation of signs things
that "stand for" or "take the place of" something else.[1]

Representation has been associated with aesthetics (art) and semiotics

(signs). Mitchell says "representation is an extremely elastic notion, which
extends all the way from a stone representing a man to a novel
representing the day in the life of several Dubliners".[1]

The term 'representation' carries a range of meanings and interpretations.

In literary theory, 'representation' is commonly defined in three ways.

1. To look like or resemble

2. To stand in for something or someone
3. To present a second time; to re-present[2]
Bust of Aristotle, Greek philosopher
Representation began with early literary theory in the ideas of Plato and
Aristotle, and has evolved into a significant component of language,
Saussurian and communication studies.[2]

Contents
1 Defining representation
2 History
3 Contemporary ideas about representation
4 Peirce and representation
4.1 Semiotics and logic
4.2 Using signs and objects
5 Saussure and representation
6 Notes
7 See also
8 References
9 External links

Defining representation
To represent is "to bring to mind by description," also "to symbolize, to be the embodiment of;" from O.Fr. representer
(12c.), from L. repraesentare, from re-, intensive prefix, + praesentare "to present," lit. "to place before".

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A representation is a type of recording in which the sensory information

about a physical object is described in a medium. The degree to which an
artistic representation resembles the object it represents is a function of
resolution and does not bear on the denotation of the word. For example,
both the Mona Lisa and a child's crayon drawing of Lisa del Giocondo
would be considered representational, and any preference for one over the
other would need to be understood as a matter of aesthetics.

History
Since ancient times representation has played a central role in
understanding literature, aesthetics and semiotics. Plato and Aristotle are
key figures in early literary theory who considered literature as simply one
form of representation.[3] Aristotle for instance, considered each mode of
representation, verbal, visual or musical, as being natural to human
beings.[4] Therefore, what distinguishes humans from other animals is
their ability to create and manipulate signs.[5] Aristotle deemed mimesis as
Reproduction of the Mona Lisa
natural to man, therefore considered representations as necessary for
people's learning and being in the world.[4] Plato, in contrast, looked
upon representation with more caution. He recognised that literature
is a representation of life, yet also believed that representations create
worlds of illusion leading one away from the "real things".[6] For
Plato, representation, like contemporary media, intervenes between
the viewer and the real, creating illusions that lead one away from
"real things". Plato believed that representation needs therefore, to be
controlled and monitored due to the possible dangers resulting in its
ability to foster antisocial emotions or encourage the imitation of
evil.[5]

Aristotle went on to say it was a definitively human activity.[1] From Greek theatrical masks depicted in
Hadrians Villa mosaic
childhood man has an instinct for representation, and in this respect
man differs from the other animals that he is far more imitative and
learns his first lessons though imitating things.[1] Aristotle discusses representation in three ways

1. The object: The symbol being represented.

2. Manner: The way the symbol is represented.
3. Means: The material that is used to represent it.
The means of literary representation is language. An important part of representation is the relationship between
what the material and what it represents. The questions arising from this are, "A stone may represent a man but how?
And by what and by what agreement, does this understanding of the representation occur?"[1]

One apprehends reality only through representations of reality, through texts, discourses, images: there is no such
thing as direct or unmediated access to reality. But because one can see reality only through representation it does not
follow that one does not see reality at all Reality is always more extensive and complicated than any system of
representation can comprehend, and we always sense that this is so-representation never "gets" reality, which is why
human history has produced so many and changing ways of trying to get it.[7]

Consequently, throughout the history of human culture, people have become dissatisfied with language's ability to
express reality and as a result have developed new modes of representation. It is necessary to construct new ways of
seeing reality, as people only know reality through representation.[7] From this arises the contrasting and alternate
theories and representational modes of abstraction, realism and modernism, to name a few.

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Contemporary ideas about representation

It is from Platos caution that in the modern era many are aware of political and ideological issues and the influences
of representations. It is impossible to divorce representations from culture and the society that produces them. In the
contemporary world there exist restrictions on subject matter, limiting the kinds of representational signs allowed to
be employed, as well as boundaries that limit the audience or viewers of particular representations. In motion picture
rating systems, M and R rated films are an example of such restrictions, highlighting also societys attempt to restrict
and modify representations to promote a certain set of ideologies and values. Despite these restrictions,
representations still have the ability to take on a life of their own once in the public sphere, and can not be given a
definitive or concrete meaning; as there will always be a gap between intention and realization, original and copy.[5]

Consequently, for each of the above definitions there exists a process of communication and message sending and
receiving. In such a system of communication and representations it is inevitable that potential problems may arise;
misunderstandings, errors, and falsehoods. The accuracy of the representations can by no means be guaranteed, as
they operate in a system of signs that can never work in isolation from other signs or cultural factors. For instance, the
interpretation and reading of representations function in the context of a body of rules for interpreting, and within a
society many of these codes or conventions are informally agreed upon and have been established over a number of
years. Such understandings however, are not set in stone and may alter between times, places, peoples and contexts.
How though, does this agreement or understanding of representation occur? It has generally been agreed by
semioticians that representational relationships can be categorised into three distinct headings: icon, symbol and
index.[5]

For instance objects and people do not have a constant meaning, but their meanings are fashioned by humans in the
context of their culture, as they have the ability to make things mean or signify something.[6] Viewing representation in
such a way focuses on understanding how language and systems of knowledge production work to create and circulate
meanings. Representation is simply the process in which such meanings are constructed.[6] In much the same way as
the post-structuralists, this approach to representation considers it as something larger than any one single
representation. A similar perspective is viewing representation as part of a larger field, as Mitchell, saying, "
representation (in memory, in verbal descriptions, in images) not only 'mediates' our knowledge (of slavery and of
many other things), but obstructs, fragments, and negates that knowledge"[8] and proposes a move away from the
perspective that representations are merely "objects representing", towards a focus on the relationships and processes
through which representations are produced, valued, viewed and exchanged.

Peirce and representation

Charles Sanders Peirce (18391914) was an innovative and accomplished
logician, mathematician, and scientist, and founded philosophical
pragmatism. Peirce's central ideas were focused on logic and
representation.

Semiotics and logic

Peirce distinguished philosophical logic as logic per se from mathematics
of logic. He regarded logic (per se) as part of philosophy, as a normative
field following esthetics and ethics, as more basic than metaphysics,[9] and
as the art of devising methods of research.[10] He argued that, more
generally, as inference, "logic is rooted in the social principle", since
inference depends on a standpoint that, in a sense, is unlimited.[11]

Charles Sanders Peirce

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Peirce held that logic is formal semiotic,[12] the formal study of signs in the broadest sense, not only signs that are
artificial, linguistic, or symbolic, but also signs that are semblances or are indexical such as reactions. He held that "all
this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs",[13] along with their representational and
inferential relations, interpretable by mind or quasi-mind (whatever works like a mind despite perhaps not actually
being one);[14] the focus here is on sign action in general, not psychology, linguistics, or social studies).

He argued that, since all thought takes time, "all thought is in signs"[15] and sign processes ("semiosis") and that the
three irreducible elements of semiosis are (1) the sign (or representamen), (2) the (semiotic) object, the sign's subject
matter, which the sign represents and which can be anything thinkablequality, brute fact, or lawand even fictional
(Prince Hamlet), and (3) the interpretant (or interpretant sign), which is the sign's meaning or ramification as formed
into a kind of idea or effect that is a further sign, for example, a translation.[16] Even when a sign represents by a
resemblance or factual connection independent of interpretation, the sign is a sign because it is at least potentially
interpretable. A sign depends on its object in a way that enables (and, in a sense, determines) interpretation, forming
an interpretant which, in turn, depends on the sign and on the object as the sign depends on the object and is thus a
further sign, enabling and determining still further interpretation, further interpretants. That essentially triadic
process is logically structured to perpetuate itself and is what defines sign, object, and interpretant.

An object either (1) is immediate to a sign, and that is the object as represented in the sign, or (2) is a dynamic object,
which is the object as it really is, on which the immediate object is founded. Usually, an object in question, such as
Hamlet or the planet Neptune, is a special or partial object. A sign's total object is the object's universe of discourse,
the totality of things in that world to which one attributes the object. An interpretant is either (1) immediate to a sign,
for example a word's usual meaning, a kind of interpretive quality or possibility present in the sign, or (2) dyanamic,
an actual interpretant, for example a state of agitation, or (3) final or normal, a question's true settlement, which
would be reached if thought or inquiry were pushed far enough, a kind of norm or ideal end with which any actual
interpretant may, at most, coincide.

Peirce said that, in order to know to what a sign refers, the mind needs some sort of experience of the sign's object,
experience outside, and collateral to, the given sign or sign system. In that context he spoke of collateral experience,
collateral observation, collateral acquaintance, all in much the same terms.[17] For example, art work can exploit both
the richness and the limits of the audience's experience; a novelist, in disguising a roman clef, counts on the typical
reader's lack of personal experience with the actual individual people portrayed. Then the reader refers the signs and
interpretants in a general way to an object or objects of the kind that is represented (intentionally or otherwise) by the
novel. In all cases, the object (be it a quality or fact or law or even fictional) determines the sign to an interpretant
through one's collateral experience with the object, collateral experience in which the object is newly found or from
which it is recalled, even if it is experience with an object of imagination as called into being by the sign, as can happen
not only in fiction but in theories and mathematics, all of which can involve mental experimentation with the object
under specifiable rules and constraints. Through collateral experience even a sign that consists in a chance semblance
of an absent object is determined by that object.

Peirce held that logic has three main parts:

1. Speculative grammar,[18] on meaningfulness, conditions for meaning. Study of significatory elements and
combinations.
2. Logical critic,[19] on validity, conditions for true representation. Critique of arguments in their various distinct
modes.
3. Speculative rhetoric, or methodeutic,[20] on conditions for determining interpretations. Methodology of inquiry in
its mutually interacting modes.
1. Speculative Grammar. By this, Peirce means discovering relations among questions of how signs can be
meaningful and of what kinds of signs there are, how they combine, and how some embody or incorporate others.
Within this broad area, Peirce developed three interlocked universal trichotomies of signs, depending respectively on
(1) the sign itself, (2) how the sign stands for its object, and (3) how the sign stands for its object to its interpretant.

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Each trichotomy is divided according to the phenomenological category involved: Firstness (quality of feeling,
essentially monadic), secondness (reaction or resistance, essentially dyadic), or thirdness (representation or
mediation, essentially triadic).[21]

1. Qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns. Every sign is either (qualisign) a quality or possibility, or (sinsign) an actual
individual thing, fact, event, state, etc., or (legisign) a norm, habit, rule, law.
2. Icons, indices, and symbols. Every sign refers either (icon) through similarity to its object, or (index) through
factual connection to its object, or (symbol) through interpretive habit or norm of reference to its object.
3. Rhemes, dicisigns, and arguments. Every sign is interpreted either as (rheme) term-like, standing for its object in
respect of quality, or as (dicisign) proposition-like, standing for its object in respect of fact, or as (argument)
argumentative, standing for its object in respect of habit or law. This is the trichotomy of all signs as building
blocks of inference.
Some (not all) sign classes from different trichotomies intersect each Lines of joint classification of signs.
other. For example, a qualisign is always an icon, and is never an
Every sign is:[22]
index or a symbol. He held that there were only ten classes of signs 1. 2. 3.
logically definable through those three universal trichotomies.[23] He I. Qualisign or Sinsign or Legisign
thought that there were further such universal trichotomies as well. and
Also, some signs need other signs in order to be embodied. For II. Icon or Index or Symbol
example, a legisign (also called a type), such as the word "the," needs and
to be embodied in a sinsign (also called a token), for example an III. Rheme or Dicisign or Argument
individual instance of the word "the", in order to be expressed.
Another form of combination is attachment or incorporation: an index may be attached to, or incorporated by, an icon
or a symbol.

Peirce called an icon apart from a label, legend, or other index attached to it, a "hypoicon", and divided the hypoicon
into three classes: (a) the image, which depends on a simple quality; (b) the diagram, whose internal relations, mainly
dyadic or so taken, represent by analogy the relations in something; and (c) the metaphor, which represents the
representative character of a sign by representing a parallelism in something else.[24] A diagram can be geometric, or
can consist in an array of algebraic expressions, or even in the common form "All __ is ___" which is subjectable, like
any diagram, to logical or mathematical transformations.

2. Logical critic or Logic Proper. That is how Peirce refers to logic in the everyday sense. Its main objective, for
Peirce, is to classify arguments and determine the validity and force of each kind.[19] He sees three main modes:
abductive inference (guessing, inference to a hypothetical explanation); deduction; and induction. A work of art may
embody an inference process and be an argument without being an explicit argumentation. That is the difference, for
example, between most of War and Peace and its final section.

3. Speculative rhetoric or methodeutic. For Peirce this is the theory of effective use of signs in investigations,
expositions, and applications of truth. Here Peirce coincides with Morriss notion of pragmatics, in his interpretation
of this term. He also called it "methodeutic", in that it is the analysis of the methods used in inquiry.[20]

Using signs and objects

Peirce concluded that there are three ways in which signs represent objects. They underlie his most widely known
trichotomy of signs:

Icon
Index
Symbol[25]

Icon

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This term refers to signs that represent by resemblance, such as portraits and some paintings though they can also be
natural or mathematical. Iconicity is independent of actual connection, even if it occurs because of actual connection.
An icon is or embodies a possibility, insofar as its object need not actually exist. A photograph is regarded as an icon
because of its resemblance to its object, but is regarded as an index (with icon attached) because of its actual
connection to its object. Likewise, with a portrait painted from life. An icon's resemblance is objective and
independent of interpretation, but is relative to some mode of apprehension such as sight. An icon need not be
sensory; anything can serve as an icon, for example a streamlined argument (itself a complex symbol) is often used as
an icon for an argument (another symbol) bristling with particulars.

Index

Peirce explains that an index is a sign that compels attention through a connection of fact, often through cause and
effect. For example, if we see smoke we conclude that it is the effect of a cause fire. It is an index if the connection is
factual regardless of resemblance or interpretation. Peirce usually considered personal names and demonstratives
such as the word "this" to be indices, for although as words they depend on interpretation, they are indices in
depending on the requisite factual relation to their individual objects. A personal name has an actual historical
connection, often recorded on a birth certificate, to its named object; the word "this" is like the pointing of a finger.

Symbol

Peirce treats symbols as habits or norms of reference and meaning. Symbols can be natural, cultural, or abstract and
logical. They depend as signs on how they will be interpreted, and lack or have lost dependence on resemblance and
actual, indexical connection to their represented objects, though the symbol's individual embodiment is an index to
your experience of its represented object. Symbols are instantiated by specialized indexical sinsigns. A proposition,
considered apart from its expression in a particular language, is already a symbol, but many symbols draw from what
is socially accepted and culturally agreed upon. Conventional symbols such as "horse" and caballo, which prescribe
qualities of sound or appearance for their instances (for example, individual instances of the word "horse" on the page)
are based on what amounts to arbitrary stipulation.[5] Such a symbol uses what is already known and accepted within
our society to give meaning. This can be both in spoken and written language.

For example, we can call a large metal object with four wheels, four doors, an engine and seats a "car" because such a
term is agreed upon within our culture and it allows us to communicate. In much the same way, as a society with a
common set of understandings regarding language and signs, we can also write the word "car" and in the context of
Australia and other English speaking nations, know what it symbolises and is trying to represent.[26]

Saussure and representation

Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (18571913) played a major role in the development of semiotics with his
argument that language is a system of signs that needs to be understood in order to fully understand the process of
linguistics.[27] The study of semiotics examines the signs and types of representation that humans use to express
feelings, ideas, thoughts and ideologies.[28] Although semiotics is often used in the form of textual analysis it also
involves the study of representation and the processes involved with representation.

The process of representation is characterised by using signs that we recall mentally or phonetically to comprehend
the world.[29] Saussure says before a human can use the word "tree" she or he has to envision the mental concept of a
tree.

Two things are fundamental to the study of signs:[30]

1. The signified: a mental concept, and

2. The signifier: the verbal manifestation, the sequence of letters or sounds, the linguistic realisation.
The signifier is the word or sound; the signified is the representation.

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Saussure points out that signs:

Are arbitrary: There is no link between the signifier and the signified
Are relational: We understand we take on meaning in relation to other
words. Such as we understand "up" in relation to "down" or a dog in
relation to other animals, such as a cat.
constitute our world "You cannot get outside of language. We exist
inside a system of signs".[30]
Saussure suggests that the meaning of a sign is arbitrary, in effect; there is
no link between the signifier and the signified.[31] The signifier is the word
or the sound of the word and the signified is the representation of the word
or sound. For example, when referring to the term "sister" (signifier) a
person from an English speaking country such as Australia, may associate
that term as representing someone in their family who is female and born
to the same parents (signified). An Aboriginal Australian may associate the
term "sister" to represent a close friend that they have a bond with. This
means that the representation of a signifier depends completely upon a
persons cultural, linguistic and social background. Saussure argues that if
Ferdinand de Saussure
words or sounds were simply labels for existing things in the world,
translation from one language or culture to another would be easy, it is the
fact that this can be extremely difficult that suggests that words trigger a representation of an object or thought
depending on the person that is representing the signifier.[32] The signified triggered from the representation of a
signifier in one particular language do not necessarily represent the same signified in another language. Even within
one particular language many words refer to the same thing but represent different people's interpretations of it. A
person may refer to a particular place as their "work" whereas someone else represents the same signifier as their
"favorite restaurant". This can also be subject to historical changes in both the signifier and the way objects are
signified.

Saussure claims that an imperative function of all written languages and alphabetic systems is to "represent" spoken
language.[33] Most languages do not have writing systems that represent the phonemic sounds they make. For
example, in English the written letter "a" represents different phonetic sounds depending on which word it is written
in. The letter "a" has a different sound in the word in each of the following words, "apple", "gate", "margarine" and
"beat", therefore, how is a person unaware of the phonemic sounds, able to pronounce the word properly by simply
looking at alphabetic spelling. The way the word is represented on paper is not always the way the word would be
represented phonetically. This leads to common misrepresentations of the phonemic sounds of speech and suggests
that the writing system does not properly represent the true nature of the pronunciation of words.

Notes
1. Mitchell, W. 1995, "Representation", in F Lentricchia & T McLaughlin (eds), Critical Terms for Literary Study, 2nd
edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago
2. O'Shaughnessy, M & Stadler J, Media and society: an introduction, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, South
Melbourne, 2005
3. Childers J (ed.), Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and Cultural Criticism, Columbia University Press, New
York, 1995
4. <Vukcevich, M 2002, "Representation", The University of Chicago, viewed 7 April 2006
5. Mitchell, W, "Representation", in F Lentricchia & T McLaughlin (eds), Critical Terms for Literary Study, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago 1990
6. Hall, S (ed.), Cultural Representations and Signifying Practice, Open University Press, London, 1997. ISBN 978-
0761954323
7. Dryer 1993, cited in OShaughnessy & Stadler 2005

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8. Mitchell, W, Picture Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994

9. On his classifications, see Peirce, C.S. (1903), CP 1.180202 Eprint (http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cl_o
_sci_03.htm) and (1906) "The Basis of Pragmaticism" in The Essential Peirce 2:3723. For the relevant quotes,
see "Philosophy" and "Logic" at Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/d
ictionary.html), Bergman and Paavola, editors, U. of Helsinki.
10. Peirce, C.S., 1882, "Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic" delivered September 1882, Johns Hopkins
University Circulars, vol. 2, no. 19, pp. 1112, November 1892, Google Book Search Eprint (https://books.google.
com/books?id=E0YFAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA11&dq=%22art+of+devising+methods+of+research%22). Reprinted in
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce v. 7, paragraphs 5976, The Essential Peirce 1:214214; Writings of
Charles S. Peirce 4:378382.
11. Peirce, C.S. (1878) "The Doctrine of Chances", Popular Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 604615, 1878, reprinted in
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. 2, paragraphs 645668, Writings of Charles S. Peirce 3:276290,
and The Essential Peirce 1:142154. "...death makes the number of our risks, the number of our inferences,
finite, and so makes their mean result uncertain. The very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the
assumption that this number is indefinitely great. .... ...logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be
limited. .... Logic is rooted in the social principle."
12. Peirce, C. S. (written 1902), "MS L75: Logic, Regarded As Semeiotic (The Carnegie application of 1902): Version
1: An Integrated Reconstruction", Joseph Ransdell, ed., Arisbe, see Memoir 12 (http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/lib
rary/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-05.htm#m12).
13. Peirce, C.S., The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. 5, paragraph 448 footnote, from "The Basis of
Pragmaticism" in 1906.
14. See "Quasi-Mind (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/quasimind.html)" at the Commens Dictionary of
Peirce's Terms, Mats Bergman and Sami Paavola, eds., University of Helsinki.
15. Peirce, C.S. (1868), "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" (Arisbe Eprint (http://www.cspeirc
e.com/menu/library/bycsp/question/qu-frame.htm)), Journal of Speculative Philosophy vol. 2, pp. 103114.
Reprinted (Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. 5, paragraphs 213263, the quote is from paragraph
253).
16. For Peirce's definitions of semiosis, sign, representamen, object, interpretant, see the Commens Dictionary of
Peirce's Terms (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html).
17. Ten quotes on collateral observation from Peirce provided by Professor Joseph Ransdell can be viewed here (htt
p://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=57101#57101). Also see pp. 404409 in "Pragmatism" by Peirce in The
Essential Peirce v. 2.
18. See "Grammar: Speculative (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/grammarspec.html)" in Commens
Dictionary of Peirce's Terms.
19. See "Critic (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/critic.html)" in Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms.
20. See "Methodeutic (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/methodeutic.html)" in Commens Dictionary of
Peirce's Terms.
21. "Categories, Cenopythagorean Categories (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/categories.html)",
Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms, Mats Bergman and Sami Paavola, editors, University of Helsinki.
22. Peirce (1903 MS), "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined", under
other titles in Collected Papers (CP) v. 2, paragraphs 23372, and reprinted under the original title in Essential
Peirce (EP) v. 2, pp. 28999. Also see image of MS 339 (http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/msg0
0850.html) (August 7, 1904) supplied to peirce-l by Bernard Morand (http://www.iutc3.unicaen.fr/~moranb/) of the
Institut Universitaire de Technologie (France), Dpartement Informatique.
23. See Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, v. 2, paragraphs 254263, reprinted in Philosophical Writings of
Peirce pp. 115 (https://books.google.com/books?id=ClSjXRIbxAMC&pg=PA115)118, and in The Essential Peirce
v. 2, pp. 294296.
24. On image, diagram, and metaphor, see "Hypoicon (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/hypoicon.html)"
in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms (http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html).
25. For Peirce's definitions of icon, index, symbol, and related terms, see the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms
(http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html)
26. Dupriez, B, A Dictionary of Literary Devices, University of Toronto Press, Canada, 1991.
27. Culler, J 1976, Saussure, Fontana Modern Masters, Britain, 1976.

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28. Ryder, M, Semiotics: Language and Culture, 2004 viewed 6 April 2006 see link below
29. Klarer, M, An Introduction to Literary Studies, Routledge, London, 1998.
30. Barry, P, Beginning Theory: an Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory, Manchester University Press, Great
Britain, 2002.
31. Holdcroft 1991 no details
32. Chandler, D, Semiotics for Beginners: Modality and representation, viewed 8 April 2006
33. Arnason, D, Reference material, 2006, viewed 12 April 2006

See also
Aspectism Media influence Symbol
Cultural artifact Painting Western painting
Culture theory Program music Work of art
Figurative art Realism (arts) Conceptual art
Foundation for the Advancement of Art Representative realism

References
Arnason, D, Semiotics: the system of signs (https://web.archive.org/web/20071212232406/http://130.179.92.25/Ar
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Vukcevich, M, Representation, The University of Chicago, 2002, viewed 7 April 2006.

External links
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