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Russia in Syria - Final Web 2
Russia in Syria - Final Web 2
Disrupting the
Chessboard
Perspectives on the Russian
Intervention in Syria
October 2015
The Iran Project
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard Kennedy School
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Fax: (617) 495-8963
Email: belfer_center@harvard.edu
Website: http://belfercenter.org/theiranproject
Cover Photo: Friday, Oct. 16, 2015: a target is hit during a Russian air raid in
Syria. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service)
Disrupting the
Chessboard
Perspectives on the Russian
Intervention in Syria
October 2015
Editor
Payam Mohseni
Inaugural Director, Belfer Centers Iran Project
Fellow for Iran Studies, Belfer Center
Lecturer on Government, Department of Government,
Harvard University
Telephone: 617-495-4793
Email: payam_mohseni@hks.harvard.edu
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School iii
Oct. 20: Vladimir Putin and Bashar Assad
arrive for their secret meeting in
the Kremlin.
Introduction:
The Russian Intervention in Syria........................................ 1
Subject of Analysis.........................................................................................2
Themes.............................................................................................................3
Iran....................................................................................................................5
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 1
Various narratives explaining Russias recent decision have
emerged which portray Russia alternatively as attempting to
re-establish its role as a world empire or as a power-balancer
protecting its interests in the Middle East. This publication
aims to present different scholarly perspectives and viewpoints
on Russian objectives in Syria and the implications it holds for
world politics. It does so by gathering the opinions of several
experts with different backgrounds and analytic viewpoints
from across the world.
Subject of Analysis
Themes
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 3
Michael Davis see as resurgent Russian imperial ambitions? Can
these viewpoints be reconciled with the narrative of Russian
decline? And if so, how should this affect the international com-
munitys engagement with Russia over Syria?
Given the worries that exist in the United States about the
implications of the nuclear deal on Iranian regional power and
ambitions, the Russian intervention in many ways may exac-
erbate these concerns. Qassem Suleimanis trip to Moscow to
presumably discuss with Russia its involvement in Syria shortly
after the diplomatic nuclear agreement reflected Irans heavy
commitment to its regional strategy and posture. If the Syrian
conflict is not resolved peacefully, the Russian intervention
could consolidate Irans position within the Russian orbit and
axis of power, hence preventing significant outreach by Iranian
President Rouhani to the West or the potential of Iran being
weaned away from Russia and moving closer politically to
America and its allies in the European Union. While Kayhan
Barzegar notes the strong cooperation between Iran and Russia,
he argues that this is not, at the moment, a strategic alignment
but rather a tactical one in which security and political objec-
tives overlap. However, the continuation and escalation of
the Syrian conflict could potentially further entrench the two
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 5
countries into a greater strategic partnership. In this sense,
Jamal Wakims analysis of a larger geopolitical realignment
would be a more realist assessment of Irans position on the
global geopolitical landscape in the foreseeable future.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 7
Oct. 5: A Russian pilot fixes an air-to-air
missile at his Su-30 jet fighter
before a take off at Hmeimim
airbase in Syria.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 9
Bassam Haddad (Ph.D.) is Director of the Middle East Studies
Program and Associate Professor at the School of Policy,
Government, and International Affairs (SPGIA) at George
Mason University. He is the author of Business Networks
in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience
(Stanford University Press, 2011) and Co-Editor of Dawn of
the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order? (Pluto Press, 2012)
Bassam serves as Founding Editor of the Arab Studies Journal
a peer-reviewed research publication and is co-producer/director of
the award-winning documentary film, About Baghdad, and director
of a critically acclaimed film series on Arabs and Terrorism, based on
extensive field research/interviews. Bassam is Co-Founder/Editor of
Jadaliyya Ezine and the Executive Director of the Arab Studies Institute,
an umbrella for five organizations dealing with knowledge production
on the Middle East. He serves on the Board of the Arab Council for the
Social Sciences and is Executive Producer of Status Audio Journal.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 11
The statements and views presented in this report
are solely those of the individual authors and
do not imply endorsements of other views and
assessments of this report.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 13
between Russia and the West. The result will be, as the experi-
ences of the Georgian and Ukrainian crises in 2008 and 2014
respectively show, not a direct Western confrontation with Russia
but rather potentially a middle way solution for solving the crisis.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 15
The Russian Moment
via Syria
Bassam Haddad
Director of the Middle East Studies Program and Associate Professor,
School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs (SPGIA) at
George Mason University
Though these, and other analyses all contain more than a grain of
truth, they intersect with what can be called the forced Russian
moment whereby the Russian leadership are trying to establish
its intervention in Syria as a crown on the countrys ascension to
global power. Whether it results in a dangerous showdown in the
context of brinkmanship or simply sets new terms for an alter-
native balance of power in the region, Russian decision-makers
determined that the Syrian crisis happens to be the time and place
for such an advance, and it comes at the right time when Russia
is content to distract from its own adventures close to home. No
matter the analysis, Syria is a vehicle, not a goal, for Russia. China
is watching and not disagreeing.
The rationale for the current active leap cannot possibly be the
same as that of simply supporting the regime in its fight, as this
conflict has long turned into something of international propor-
tions. It is facile to explain this direct intervention as a response to
the US intervention in its relatively mild campaign against ISIS. But
the Russians are not interested in ISIS as much as they are inter-
ested in the regimes tenure and much more in its own regional and
international clout. ISIS and similar groups can be, and at times
have been, a godsend for the Syrian regime in its own propaganda
war regarding the nature of the uprising, even its first moments.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 17
Russias decision is also not simply a calculated move to avoid a
complete tipping of the balance in favor of the opposition, even
if this is part of the rationale. Such a concern could have been
served in a far less risky manner by taking defensive positions
along the coastal lines and elsewhere, thereby justifying retal-
iation to potential attackers. The main purpose of the Russian
plan was not, or is not, simply to preserve the regimes existing
territorial control, and I argue, nor is it to regain lost territory
though this may well be one of the results with the aid of other
forces, including Iranian ones, on the ground. Rather, this is
likely to be an attempt to establish a Russian moment, however
premature and rushed, deliberated by a president that is eager to
restore, aggrandize, and/or be heard loud and clear in a slowly
emerging kind of world where the global economic- and pow-
er-pie seems to be less and less dominated by a single power
and, ironically, more and more democratically distributed. The
Russian objective is to test the waters a bit using a particular
rationale that has some legitimacy worldwide: fighting ISIS.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 19
Putins Unexpected Move in
Syria: Perspectives on the
Russian Intrevention in Syria
Marwan Kabalan
Director of Policy Analysis and Director of Contemporary Syria
Studies, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 21
Russia picked a convenient regional and international moment
for intervention. The failure of the Obama administration
strategy to contain Daesh a year into the US-led international
coalition aerial campaign and its hesitance to train and equip
an acceptable Syrian opposition force to confront Daesh on
the ground lent Moscow the legitimate political ground to
intervene.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 23
Understanding Russian
Strategic Ambiguity in Syria
Christopher Sage1 and Michael Davis2
1
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Chairman of the Military
Committee, NATO headquarters, Brussels
2
Military Assistant/Speechwriter for the Chairman of the NATO
Military Committee
It was Ivan the Gatherer himself, who wed the Russians with
the Byzantine Empire in 1472, when he married the last true
heir of Byzantium and added the double headed eagle to the
Russian regalia. As inheritors of the Byzantine mandate, it is
natural for an expansionist Russia to feel comfortable returning
in force to Syria, a country where personal and military contacts
survive from the earliest days of Syrian independence.
Beyond Syrian regime survival and shifting the focus away from
Ukraine, Russian objectives from a military perspective are
three-fold: secure access to the Mediterranean Sea by keeping a
foothold in Syria, mute Western influence in the region by offer-
ing parallel or replacement security strategies to Daesh-battered
countries, and contest freedom of movement for the United
States and its allies by creating a formidable A2/AD bubble.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 25
King Abdullah II of Jordan recently spoke at the United Nations
on the same day as Presidents Obama and Putin. He called the
fight against Daesh a third world war.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 27
the national security of Russia, China and Iran. The Russians
and the Chinese were profoundly disturbed by the increasing
involvement of Chechens, Caucasians, Central Asians, and
Uyghur Chinese in the fighting in Syria.
Conclusion
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 29
Russias Strikes in Syria:
New Risks or a Window of
Opportunity?
Irina Zvyagelskaya
Chief Researcher, The Institute of Oriental Studies; Professor, Moscow
Institute of International Relations (University) and at the Institute of
African and Asian Studies (Moscow State University).
Russia does not want to send troops to Syria for combat opera-
tions; there is already a force to wage the war on the ground. The
Syrian army, along with its alliesIranian militias, the Kurds,
and Hezbollahhas been fighting against jihadists. Russia will
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 31
provide air support for ground operations, a missing element
in the actions of the coalition coined up by the U.S. With local
boots on the ground, air strikes are to ensure success.
This said, one should not ignore the silver lining. Russias
involvement in the conflict in Syria could contribute to its
resolution. Russia has been working on two parallel tracks for
several years, getting seriously involved in mediation efforts.
Russia will continue its consultations with a moderate part of
the Syrian opposition to incite it to participate in the political
process and, probably, to minimize possible damage. It is not
inconceivable that Assad, who is totally dependent on Rus-
sian aid, can be forced to take a more responsible position like
accepting an idea of an inclusive transitional government fol-
lowed by national elections. Such an option looks as a win-win
outcome, but it presumes trust and coordination among various
players. An alternative might be a partition of Syria into several
zones of influence with shaky balances and no winners.