G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012
and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit
made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs
to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where
it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence,
the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of
public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests
the ownership in some other person.
Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten
years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan)
applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B
(the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque
City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square
meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot
4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio,
Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque River, in the
Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by
Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for
land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant
because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He
alleged that the property had been formed through accretion
and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous
and adverse possession for more than 30 years.2
The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for
land registration, stating that it needed the property for its
flood control program; that the property was within the legal
easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that
assuming that the property was not covered by the legal
easement, title to the property could not be registered in
favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was
an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from
accretion.3
Ruling of the RTC
On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land
registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants,
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR.,
both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE
OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the
Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Paraaque with an area of
one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less
and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a
portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque Cadastre,
LRC Rec. No.
their names with the following technical description, to wit:
xxxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the
corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed.
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the
RTC,5 to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY
SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE
ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE
ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE
SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE
GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF
THE RIVER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION
FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEES FAILURE TO
FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION
THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN,
PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30)
YEARS.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motion on October 20, 2003.7
Issues
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8
I
RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN
ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD
ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN
EVIDENCE.
Page 1 of 42
II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED
WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAAQUE RIVER
WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE
REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED
UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO
FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION.
IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY
AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR
MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil
Code was applicable herein; and whether or not respondents
could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription
pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code
to respondents benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the
waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the
Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C.
Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this
application which was previously a part of the Paraaque
River which became an orchard after it dried up and further
considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is
owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was
obtained by him through inheritance from his mother,
Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art. 457
of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters."9
The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio
Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the
land which was previously part of the Paraaque River which
became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4
which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant
which was obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision,
p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both
lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in
the face of the fact that respondents evidence did not
establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the
Paraaque River.
The Republics submission is correct.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the
burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by
a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such
evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than
that offered in opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled
to claim the property as their own and apply for its
registration under the Torrens system only if they established
that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along
the banks of rivers.12 The deposit of soil, to be considered
accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking
place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.13
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of
the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their
application for land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of
proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the
river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed
that the property was the dried-up river bed of the Paraaque
River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold
that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of
the Paraaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it
dried up."
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did
not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in
their mothers name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came
about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and
the Paraaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then
be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited
near Lot 4 by the current of the Paraaque River, resulting in
the formation of Lot 4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one,
respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of
the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along
a river bank. There are several other causes, including the
drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was,
in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In
Page 2 of 42
other words, respondents did not establish at all that the
increment of land had formed from the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current.
Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume
of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of
1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and
imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span
of about 20 to 30 years the span of time intervening
between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of
their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet
in existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents witness
Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to
have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for
the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-
up bed of the Paraaque River. Confirming this explanation
was Arcadio, Jr.s own testimony to the effect that the
property was previously a part of the Paraaque River that
had dried up and become an orchard.
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.s own
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform
conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been
formed by the drying up of the Paraaque River. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the
consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein
described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried
River Bed."14
That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with
the location of Lot 4998-B, which was described as "bounded
by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of
respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563)
in the Northeast."15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up
river bed as an accretion that became respondents property
pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was
definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river
to form dry land involved the recession of the water level
from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to
accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition
of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current.
In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or
less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners
had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article
457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to
accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and
categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that
where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there
is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then
to apply the law.17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be
divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code
expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are
public dominion of the State.18 It follows that the river beds
that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an
express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should
belong to some other person.19
II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents application for land registration
covering Lot 4998-B also because they had taken possession
of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely
for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest
being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river
bank. It rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the
applicants became the owners thereof, they took possession
of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their
predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of the
subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the
fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly
approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that
Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OICChief, Surveys Division Land
Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject
property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it
does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts
to grant the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants
in this case and in view of the foregoing reports of the
Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied
all the requirements of law which are essential to a
government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance
of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed
to prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not
having presented any witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which
pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of
imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in
Page 3 of 42
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that
respondents "took possession of the same property
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than
thirty (30) years."22
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the
highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed
on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on
the Court,23 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions
to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference
made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review
the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open,
public and adverse possession of the land for more than 30
years, the RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the
applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession of
the same property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than thirty years because their
predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the
subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the
fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed
per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was
duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact
that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys Division
Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject
property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it
does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts
to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents period of
supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the
fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining
owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision
nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed
showing their possession of the property "continuously,
openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The
decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and
had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to
us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because,
firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove
the payors ownership of the land the taxes were paid
for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of
a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys
of the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open,
public and adverse possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the
gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act
of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in
that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the
alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that
the deposit created by the current of the water becomes
manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because
Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the
ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by
respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to
possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive
prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous,
open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not
even validated or preponderantly established. The admission
of respondents themselves that they declared the property for
taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only
from 199928 signified that their alleged possession would at
most be for only nine years as of the filing of their application
for land registration on March 7, 1997.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that
respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years
in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire
the land by prescription or by other means without any
competent proof that the land was already declared as
alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that
declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its
public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being
either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420
of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of
public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use,
such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares
that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to
acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the Court
resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29 a
case involving the registration of land found to be part of a
dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the
Court held:
As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land,
admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on
(1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her
predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to
October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property
from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370
of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the
Civil Code, the same must fail.
Page 4 of 42
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of
man and not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect
title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the
public domain. It is only after the Government has declared
the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that
the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm
extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of
the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the
Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is
property of the public domain which is not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent
any declaration by the government, that a portion of the
creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable
character.
xxxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up
after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land
would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-
interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article
461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the
owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the
owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them
only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the
present Civil Code are applicable only when "river beds are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both
the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive
Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the
construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held:
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for
interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural
change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do
not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to
accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial
drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by
the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does
not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios
cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be
considered as forming part of the land of the public domain
which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership.
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where
there has been a change in the course of a river, not where
the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even
alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such
a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry
river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold
emphases supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore,
that there is a showing of a title from the State.31Occupation
of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil
Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots
the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso
facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the
natural change of course of the waters only after paying their
value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and
cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless
previously declared by the Government to be alienable and
disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be
already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents
could not be deemed to have acquired the property through
prescription.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already
classified as alienable and disposable by the Government.
They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and
disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to
wit:33
NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL.
CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48
of the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-
OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot
4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on
03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the propertys nature as
alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the Government,
such as a presidential proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Page 5 of 42
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
alienability and disposability of public land, we said in registered remains inalienable.
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap34 that:
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic
engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners
evidence must be established that the land subject of the have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must been declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)
still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial Environmental
establish the existence of a positive act of the government
Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
(CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
and disposable in the following manner, viz:
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government
that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that
number of years is alienable and disposable. a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
subject of the application for registration falls within the
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
by private claimants were subject of a government
must present a copy of the original classification approved by
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
custodian of the official records. These facts must be
accept the submission that lands occupied by private
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that
assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)
the land is alienable and disposable.

In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v.

Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the
Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved the issue of whether the
certifications submitted by respondent.1wphi1 The
notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to
government officials who issued the certifications were not
establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to
presented before the trial court to testify on their contents.
wit:
The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
To prove that the land in question formed part of the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This the land is alienable and disposable.
survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area,
Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
xxxx
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit
"E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain,
Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
government certifications may fall under the class of
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section
owned by the State. x x x."
23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie
evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land therein. (Emphasis supplied)
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that
the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in
the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
by the Bureau of Forest Devt" did not prove that Lot 4998-B
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such
was already classified as alienable and disposable.
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive
prescription of Lot 4988-B.

Page 6 of 42
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27,
2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio
C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot
4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or
less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City,
Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively
belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of
the Parat1aque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116290 December 8, 2000
DIONISIA P. BAGAIPO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONOR
LOZANO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision dated June 30, 1994 of the
Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 555-89, of
petitioners complaint for recovery of possession with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction and damages.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot
No. 415, a 146,900 square meter agricultural land situated in
Ma-a, Davao City under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
15757 particularly described as follows:
Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos. 419 and 416; on the SE
by the Davao River; on the SE., (sic) by Lots Nos. 1092 and
1091; and on the NW., by Lots Nos. 413 and 4181
Respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel
of land located across and opposite the southeast portion of
petitioners lot facing the Davao River. Lozano acquired and
occupied her property in 1962 when his wife inherited the
land from her father who died that year.
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint2 for Recovery of
Possession with Mandatory Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against Lozano for: (1) the surrender of possession
by Lozano of a certain portion of land measuring 29,162
square meters which is supposedly included in the area
belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-15757; and (2) the
recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters
which Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River traversed
her property. Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change
in course of the said river, her property became divided into
three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, 415-B and 415-C.
In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot
415 and presented before the trial court a survey
plan3prepared by Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno. The
survey plan allegedly showed that: a) the area presently
occupied by Bagaipo, identified as Lot 415-A, now had an
area of only 79,843 square meters; b) Lot 415-B, with an
area measuring 37,901 square meters, which cut across
Bagaipos land was taken up by the new course of the Davao
River; and c) an area of 29,162 square meters designated as
Lot 415-C was illegally occupied by respondent Lozano. The
combined area of the lots described by Engineer Magno in the
survey plan tallied with the technical description of Bagaipos
land under TCT No. T-15757. Magno concluded that the land
presently located across the river and parallel to Bagaipos
property still belonged to the latter and not to Lozano, who
planted some 350 fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the
old abandoned river bed.
Bagaipo also presented Godofredo Corias, a former barangay
captain and long-time resident of Ma-a to prove her claim
that the Davao River had indeed changed its course. Corias
testified that the occurrence was caused by a big flood in
1968 and a bamboo grove which used to indicate the position
of the river was washed away. The river which flowed
previously in front of a chapel located 15 meters away from
the riverbank within Bagaipos property now flowed behind it.
Corias was also present when Magno conducted the relocation
survey in 1988.
For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo
is actually an accretion to their titled property. He asserted
that the Davao River did not change its course and that the
reduction in Bagaipos domain was caused by gradual erosion
due to the current of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is
also because of the rivers natural action that silt slowly
deposited and added to his land over a long period of time.
He further averred that this accretion continues up to the
present and that registration proceedings instituted by him
over the alluvial formation could not be concluded precisely
because it continued to increase in size.
Lozano presented three witnesses: Atty. Pedro Castillo, his
brother-in-law; Cabitunga Pasanday, a tenant of Atty.
Castillo; and Alamin Catucag, a tenant of the Lozanos.
Atty. Castillo testified that the land occupied by the Lozanos
was transferred to his sister, Ramona when they extra-
judicially partitioned their parents property upon his fathers
death. On September 9, 1973, Atty. Castillo filed a land
registration case involving the accretion which formed on the
property and submitted for this purpose, a survey
plan4approved by the Bureau of Lands as well as tax
declarations5 covering the said accretion. An Order of General
Default6 was already issued in the land registration case on
November 5, 1975, but the case itself remained pending since
the petition had to be amended to include the continuing
addition to the land area.
Mr. Cabitunga Pasanday testified that he has continuously
worked on the land as tenant of the Castillos since 1925,
tilling an area of about 3 hectares. However, the land he tilled
located opposite the land of the Lozanos and adjacent to the
Davao River has decreased over the years to its present size
of about 1 hectare. He said the soil on the bank of the river,
as well as coconut trees he planted would be carried away
each time there was a flood. This similar erosion occurs on
the properties of Bagaipo and a certain Dr. Rodriguez, since
the elevation of the riverbank on their properties is higher
than the elevation on Lozanos side.
Alamin Catucag testified that he has been a tenant of the
Castillos since 1939 and that the portion he occupies was
Page 7 of 42
given to Ramona, Lozanos wife. It was only 1 hectare in 1939
but has increased to 3 hectares due to soil deposits from the
mountains and river. Catucag said that Bagaipos property
was reduced to half since it is in the curve of the river and its
soil erodes and gets carried away by river water.
On April 5, 1991, the trial court conducted an ocular
inspection. It concluded that the applicable law is Article
4577 . To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.7 of the New Civil Code
and not Art. 4618 The reduction in the land area of plaintiff
was caused by erosion and not by a change in course of the
Davao River. Conformably then, the trial court dismissed the
complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.9
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in:
....NOT GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE
RELOCATION SURVEY (EXHIBIT "B") PREPARED BY
LICENSED GEODETIC ENGINEER GERSACIO MAGNO.
THE CASE OF "DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. HEIRS OF
JUANA CAROLINA" 140 SCRA 396 CITED BY THE
RESPONDENT COURT IN DISREGARDING EXHIBIT
"B" IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
....NOT FINDING THAT ASSUMING WITHOUT
ADMITTING THAT THE QUESTIONED LOT 415-C
(EXHIBIT "B-1") OCCUPIED BY RESPONDENT
LEONOR LOZANO WAS THE RESULT OF AN
ACCRETION, THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCRETION
CANNOT AND DOES NOT APPLY IN THE INSTANT
CASE TO FAVOR SAID RESPONDENT BECAUSE SAID
LOT 415-C IS WITHIN AND FORM PART OF
PETITIONERS LAND DESCRIBED IN TCT NO. 15757
(EXHIBIT "A")
....FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES WHEN
SHE INSTITUTED THE SUIT.
....NOT ORDERING RESPONDENT LEONOR LOZANO
TO VACATE AND SURRENDER LOT 415-C IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER AND FOR HIM TO PAY PETITIONER
DAMAGES FOR ITS UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION
THEREOF.
....NOT HOLDING PETITIONER ENTITLED TO THE
ABANDONED RIVER BED.10
For this Courts resolution are the following issues: Did the
trial court err in holding that there was no change in course of
the Davao River such that petitioner owns the abandoned
river bed pursuant to Article 461 of the Civil Code? Did
private respondent own Lot 415-C in accordance with the
principle of accretion under Article 457? Should the relocation
survey prepared by a licensed geodetic engineer be
disregarded since it was not approved by the Director of
Lands? Is petitioners claim barred by laches?
On the first issue. The trial court and the appellate court both
found that the decrease in land area was brought about by
erosion and not a change in the rivers course. This conclusion
was reached after the trial judge observed during ocular
inspection that the banks located on petitioners land are
sharp, craggy and very much higher than the land on the
other side of the river. Additionally, the riverbank on
respondents side is lower and gently sloping. The lower land
therefore naturally received the alluvial soil carried by the
river current.11 These findings are factual, thus conclusive on
this Court, unless there are strong and exceptional reasons,
or they are unsupported by the evidence on record, or the
judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of
facts.12 These factual findings are based on an ocular
inspection of the judge and convincing testimonies, and we
find no convincing reason to disregard or disbelieve them.
The decrease in petitioners land area and the corresponding
expansion of respondents property were the combined effect
of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil
Code is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim ownership over
the old abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent.
The riverbeds former location cannot even be pinpointed with
particularity since the movement of the Davao River took
place gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to the
present.
The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian
owner when the following requisites are present: 1) That the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from
the effects of the current of the water; and 3) That the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the
river.13 These requisites were sufficiently proven in favor of
respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change in
the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through
avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and
was caused by alluvium and erosion.14
As to Lot 415-C, which petitioner insists forms part of her
property under TCT No. T-15757, it is well to recall our
holding in C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, 135:
The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to
plaintiffs estate, which is covered by a Torrens certificate of
title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner
thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual
changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions
which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the
effect of the current become the property of the owners of the
banks (Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the new).
Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on
running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that
respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act.15
Petitioner did not demonstrate that Lot 415-C allegedly
comprising 29,162 square meters was within the boundaries
of her titled property. The survey plan commissioned by
petitioner which was not approved by the Director of Lands
was properly discounted by the appellate court. In Titong vs.
Court of Appeals16 we affirmed the trial courts refusal to give
probative value to a private survey plan and held thus:
Page 8 of 42
the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of
Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No.
2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No.
2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their
original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and
plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of Lands for
verification and approval.1wphi1 A survey plan not verified
and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private
writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be
proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in
evidence without any objection as to its due execution and
authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give
probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to
believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other
In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary now to
discuss the defense of laches. It is mooted by the disquisition
on the foregoing issues.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated June 30, 1994, of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G. R. CV No. 37615, sustaining
the judgment of the court a quo, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF
SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an
applicant in a Land Registration case by oppositors thereto,
the Government and a Government lessee, involving as it
does ownership of land formed by alluvium.
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the
land sought to be registered. His registered property is
bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the
Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The
Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the
Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the applicant's registered
land on the east and on the west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern
tip of the applicant's land. Applicant's registered property is
bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed
an accretion in the sense that it naturally accrues in favor of
the riparian owner or should the land be considered as
foreshore land?
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2)
two subsequent resolutions 2 of the Intermediate Appellate
Court 3 (now the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case
No. N-84, 4 the application over which was filed by private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now
deceased, before the Court of First Instance 5
(now the
Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed
an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore
land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of
approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was
denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for
reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now
deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with
the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of
foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially,
such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on
the ground that the property formed part of the public
domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of
Fisheries, on May 27, 1958, gave due course to his
application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the
property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as
suitable for fishpond purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed
Emiliano Navarro's application. Aggrieved by the decision of
the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of
Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the grant. The
then Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of
the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960,
Sinforoso Pascual flied an application to register and confirm
his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga,
Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an
area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land
is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas,
Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay
River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the
northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as
the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila
Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property
resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed
the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the
Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating
that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest
possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same
being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs
to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry,
through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's
application for the same reason as that advanced by the
Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands
withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the
sole oppositor.
On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general
default excepting the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry.
Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of
general default was lifted and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro
thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro
Page 9 of 42
claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been
part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of
Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part
of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued
by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the
President; and that be bad already converted the area
covered by the lease into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on
November 6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for
ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and
their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed
and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion
of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The
defendants in the case were alleged to have built a
provisional dike thereon: thus they have thereby deprived
Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This,
notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate
the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus,
Pascual appealed to the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been
docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of
the parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for
ejectment was consolidated with the land registration case
and was jointly tried by the court a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases,
Emiliano Navarro died on November 1, 1961 and was
substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was
substituted by his heirs, the herein private respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment
finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a
part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land
registration proceedings.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent]
Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for ejectment
in Civil Case No. 2873;
(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso
Pascual for land registration over the land in
question; and
(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual,
through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 2873 and as applicant in Land
Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in
both instances." 6
The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent
appellate court, assisted the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in not finding the
land in question as an accretion by the
action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to
the land admittedly owned by applicants-
appellants [private respondents].
2. The lower court erred in holding that the
land in question is foreshore land.
3. The lower court erred in not ordering the
registration of the land in controversy in
favor of applicants-appellants [private
respondents].
4. The lower court erred in not finding that
the applicants-appellants [private
respondents] are entitled to eject the
oppositor-appellee [petitioners]. 7
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the
court a quo and granted the petition for registration of the
subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters
from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty meters (50) meters
from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this
wise:
The paramount issue to be resolved in this
appeal as set forth by the parties in their
respective briefs is whether or not the
land sought to be registered is accretion or
foreshore land, or, whether or not said land
was formed by the action of the two rivers
of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of
the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of
the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject
land is accretion but if formed by the action
of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that applicants-appellants
[private respondents] owned the land
immediately adjoining the land sought to be
registered. Their property which is covered
by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by
the Talisay River, on the west by the
Bulacan River, and on the north by the
Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan rivers
come from inland flowing downstream
towards the Manila Bay. In other words,
between the Talisay River and the Bulacan
River is the property of applicants with both
rivers acting as the boundary to said land
and the flow of both rivers meeting and
emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject
land was formed at the tip or apex of
appellants' [private respondents'] land
adding thereto the land now sought to be
registered.
This makes this case quite unique because
while it is undisputed that the subject land
is immediately attached to appellants'
[private respondents'] land and forms the
tip thereof, at the same time, said land
immediately faces the Manila Bay which is
Page 10 of 42
part of the sea. We can understand
therefore the confusion this case might
have caused the lower court, faced as it was
with the uneasy problem of deciding
whether or not the subject land was formed
by the action of the two rivers or by the
action of the sea. Since the subject land is
found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing
appellants' [private respondents'] land, it
would be quite easy to conclude that it is
foreshore and therefore part of the
patrimonial property of the State as the
lower court did in fact rule . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It is however undisputed that appellants'
[private respondents'] land lies between
these two rivers and it is precisely
appellants' [private respondents'] land
which acts as a barricade preventing these
two rivers to meet. Thus, since the flow of
the two rivers is downwards to the Manila
Bay the sediments of sand and silt are
deposited at their mouths.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how the
Manila Bay could have been the cause of
the deposit thereat for in the natural course
of things, the waves of the sea eat the land
on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland. It
would not therefore add anything to the
land but instead subtract from it due to the
action of the waves and the wind. It is then
more logical to believe that the two rivers
flowing towards the bay emptied their cargo
of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus
causing appellants' [private respondents']
land to accumulate therein.
However, our distinguished colleage [sic],
Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem to
accept this theory and stated that the
subject land arose only when . . . . Pascual
planted "palapat" and "bakawan" trees
thereat to serve as a boundary or strainer.
But we do not see how this act of planting
trees by Pascual would explain how the land
mass came into being. Much less will it
prove that the same came from the sea.
Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument
that it were the few trees that acted as
strainers or blocks, then the land that grew
would have stopped at the place where the
said trees were planted. But this is not so
because the land mass went far beyond the
boundary, or where the trees were planted.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of
appellants [private respondents] clearly
show that the land that accumulated
beyond the so- called boundary, as well as
the entire area being applied for is dry land,
above sea level, and bearing innumerable
trees . . . The existence of vegetation on the
land could only confirm that the soil thereat
came from inland rather than from the sea,
for what could the sea bring to the shore
but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and
corrals? On the other hand, the two rivers
would be bringing soil on their downward
flow which they brought along from the
eroded mountains, the lands along their
path, and dumped them all on the northern
portion of appellants' [private respondents']
land.
In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate
from the lower court's finding. While it is
true that the subject land is found at the
shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants'
[private respondents'] land, said land is not
foreshore but an accretion from the action
of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact,
this is exactly what the Bureau of Lands
found out, as shown in the following report
of the Acting Provincial Officer, Jesus M.
Orozco, to wit:
"Upon ocular inspection of
the land subject of this
registration made on June
11, 1960, it was found out
that the said land is . . . .
sandwitched [sic] by two
big rivers . . . . These two
rivers bring down
considerable amount of
soil and sediments during
floods every year thus
raising the soil of the land
adjoining the private
property of the applicant
[private respondents].
About four-fifth [sic] of
the area applied for is now
dry land whereon are
planted palapat trees
thickly growing thereon. It
is the natural action of
these two rivers that has
caused the formation of
said land . . . . subject of
this registration case. It
has been formed,
therefore, by accretion.
And having been formed
by accretion, the said land
may be considered the
private property of the
riparian owner who is the
applicant herein [private
respondents] . . . .
In view of the above, the
opposition hereto filed by
the government should be
withdrawn, except for the
portion recommended by
the land investigator in his
report dated May 2, 1960,
to be excluded and
considered foreshore. . .
."
Page 11 of 42
 Because of this report, no less than the
Solicitor General representing the Bureau of
Lands withdrew his opposition dated March
25, 1960, and limited "the same to the
northern portion of the land applied for,
compromising a strip 50 meters wide along
the Manila Bay, which should be declared
public land as part of the foreshore" . . . . 8
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent
appellate court ordered the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration in the name of
private respondents and the reversion to private
respondents of the possession of the portion of the
subject property included in Navarro's fishpond
permit.
On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the aforecited decision. The Director of
Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same
decision. Both motions were opposed by private respondents
on January 27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court
promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however,
modified its decision, to read, viz:
(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of
Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion
included in their fishpond permit covered by
Plan Psu-175181 and hand over possession
of said portion to applicants-appellants, if
the said portion is not within the strip of
land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay
on the northern portion of the land subject
of the registration proceedings and which
area is more particularly referred to as fifty
(50) meters from corner 2 towards corner
1; and fifty (50) meters from corner 5
towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181. . . . 9
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General,
acting as counsel for the Director of Forestry, an extension of
time within which to file in this court, a petition for review of
the decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent
appellate court and of the aforecited resolution dated
November 21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of
Forestry, filed a petition for review entitled, "The Director of
Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals." 10 We, however, denied
the same in a minute resolution dated July 20, 1981, such
petition having been prematurely filed at a time when the
Court of Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners' pending
motion to set aside the resolution dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
November 29, 1978.
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an
entry of judgment stating that the decision dated November
29, 1978 had become final and executory as against herein
petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil
Case No. 2873 of the Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of
the decision dated November 29, 1978 was filed by
petitioners' new counsel.
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a
resolution granting petitioners' request for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court
denied petitioners' second motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion
for reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within
fifteen (15) days from the notice of the final order or
judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is
imputed to have palpably erred in appreciating the fact of the
case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and case law
relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.
We find no merit in the petition.
The disputed property was brought forth by both the
withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the
accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by
the action of the sea which brought soil and sand
sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and
bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio
Pascual in 1948
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil
Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-
hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the
eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners'
own tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article
457, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. 11 Accretion is
the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is
the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank 12; the
owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian
owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the
latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or
lake or other tidal waters. 13 The alluvium, by mandate of
Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the
riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be
seen 14 but is not automatically registered property, hence,
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons 15.
Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property
under the principle of accretion, is misplaced.
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its
northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay. Petitioners' land,
therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and
not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, petitioners
Page 12 of 42
insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In fact,
one of the petitioners, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court
that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed land
being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted
palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began
to
rise. 16
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the
disputed land; (b) petitioners' own tract of land; (c) the
Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers.
Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the
disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If
the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or
both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should
have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and
western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on
the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila
Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion,
which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of
claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners'
own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is
obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as
to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be
remembered that we held that:
Appellant next contends that . . . . Manila
Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find
said contention untenable. A bay is part of
the sea, being a mere indentatiom of the
same:
"Bay. An opening into
the land where the water
is shut in on all sides
except at the entrance; an
inlet of the sea; an arm of
the sea, distinct from a
river, a bending or curbing
of the shore of the sea or
of a lake. " 7 C.J. 1013-
1014." 17
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank
but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of
Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on
the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article
457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866.
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not
difficult to discern from the facts of the case. As the trial court
correctly observed:
A perusal of the survey plan . . . . of the
land subject matter of these cases shows
that on the eastern side, the property is
bounded by Talisay River, on the western
side by Bulacan River, on the southern side
by Lot 1436 and on the northern side by
Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that
the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers meet a
certain portion because the two rivers both
flow towards Manila Bay. The Talisay River
is straight while the Bulacan River is a little
bit meandering and there is no portion
where the two rivers meet before they end
up at Manila Bay. The land which is adjacent
to the property belonging to Pascual cannot
be considered an accretion [caused by the
action of the two rivers].
Applicant Pascual . . . . has not presented
proofs to convince the Court that the land
he has applied for registration is the result
of the settling down on his registered land
of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be
rightfully be considered as an accretion
[caused by the action of the two rivers].
Said Art. 457 finds no applicability where
the accretion must have been caused by
action of the bay. 18
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the
aforegoing observation is that the disputed land is part of the
foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public
domain. The respondent appellate court, however, perceived
the fact that petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the disputed
land must be an accretion formed by the action of the two
rivers because petitioners' own land acted as a barricade
preventing the two rivers to meet and that the current of the
two rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to
the Manila Bay which accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare
land. These conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in
the light of the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was
deposited, not on either the eastern or western portion of
petitioners' land where a river each runs, but on the northern
portion of petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila Bay.
Worse, such conclusions are further eroded of their practical
logic and consonance with natural experience in the light of
Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat and
bakawan trees on the northern boundary of their own land. In
amplification of this, plainly more reasonable and valid are
Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in his dissenting
opinion when he stated that:
As appellants' (titled) land . . . . acts as a
barricade that prevents the two rivers to
meet, and considering the wide expanse of
the boundary between said land and the
Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters
. . . . it is believed rather farfetched for the
land in question to have been formed
through "sediments of sand and salt [sic] . .
. . deposited at their [rivers'] mouths."
Moreover, if "since the flow of the two rivers
is downwards to the Manila Bay the
sediments of sand and silt are deposited at
their mouths," why then would the alleged
cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at
the northern portion of appellants' titled
land facing Manila Bay instead of merely at
the mouths and banks of these two rivers?
That being the case, the accretion formed at
said portion of appellants' titled [land] was
not caused by the current of the two rivers
but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay)
into which the rivers empty.
Page 13 of 42
 The conclusion . . . . is not supported by
any reference to the evidence which, on the
contrary, shows that the disputed land was
formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no
less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs
of the original applicant, testified on cross-
examination that the land in dispute was
part of the shore and it was only in 1948
that he noticed that the land was beginning
to get higher after he had planted trees
thereon in
1948. . . . .
. . . . it is established that before 1948 sea
water from the Manila Bay at high tide could
reach as far as the dike of appellants'
fishpond within their titled property, which
dike now separates this titled property from
the land in question. Even in 1948 when
appellants had already
planted palapat and bakawan trees in the
land involved, inasmuch as these trees were
yet small, the waves of the sea could still
reach the dike. This must be so because in .
. . . the survey plan of the titled property
approved in 1918, said titled land was
bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So
Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the north.
It was only after the planting of the
aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in
question began to rise or to get higher in
elevation.
The trees planted by appellants in 1948
became a sort of strainer of the sea water
and at the same time a kind of block to the
strained sediments from being carried back
to the sea by the very waves that brought
them to the former shore at the end of the
dike, which must have caused the shoreline
to recede and dry up eventually raising the
former shore leading to the formation of the
land in question." 19
In other words, the combined and interactive effect
of the planting of palapat and bakawan trees, the
withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually
resulting in the drying up of its former foreshore,
and the regular torrential action of the waters of
Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on
the northern boundary of petitioners' own tract of
land.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank,
Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as
such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public
domain
At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila
Bay and Laguna de Bay.
While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and
Valeriano 20 that Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes
of determining which law on accretion is to be applied in
multifarious situations, we have ruled differently insofar as
accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are
concerned.
In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San
Jose 21, Republic v. Court of Appeals 22, Republic v. Alagad 23,
and Meneses v. Court of
Appeals 24, we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake
the accretion on which, by the mandate of Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the
land contiguous thereto.
The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling
for the application of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore
of Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a
sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866
provides as follows:
Lands added to the shores by accretions
and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public domain.
When they are no longer washed by the
waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for
the coast-guard service, the Government
shall declare them to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and
as increment thereof.
In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law,
unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this
controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank
which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is.
As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is
intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation
belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public
uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private
person, except through express authorization granted in due
form by a competent authority." 25 Only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the right and the
power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by
action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public
utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries
or for coast guard services. 26 Petitioners utterly fail to show
that either the executive or legislative department has
already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article
4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of
petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
DENIED and DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA
NAZARENO TAPIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN,
MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON.
ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO
Page 14 of 42
M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their
official and/or private capacities, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:p
Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia
Nazareno Tapia challenge the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint by the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The
complaint was for annulment of the verification, report and
recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands
regarding a parcel of public land.
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not
petitioners exhausted administrative remedies before having
recourse to the courts.
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in
Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was
formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up
Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and
Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses
stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents
allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio
Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the
Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A
decision was rendered against private respondents, which
decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, Branch 20.
The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for
execution of judgment after the same became final and
executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of
judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 24 which dismissed the same. Antonio Nazareno and
petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but private
respondents filed another case for certiorari with prayer for
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was
likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally
enforced with the private respondents being ejected from
portions of the subject lots they occupied..
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the
Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-
106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the
accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved
survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it
was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of
Lands.
In compliance with the order of respondent District Land
Officer Alberto M. Gillera, respondent Land Investigator
Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered a
report to the Regional Director recommending that Survey
Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (equivalent to Lot No. 36302,
Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and
that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public
land applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the
Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario rendered a decision ordering
the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio
Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the
private respondents who, if qualified, may file public land
applications covering their respective portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with
respondent Rolleo Ignacio, Undersecretary of the Department
of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands
Abelardo Palad then ordered him to vacate the portions
adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever
improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered
that private respondents be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for
reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno
and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC,
Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of
investigation by respondent Gillera, report and
recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent
Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of
respondent Hilario and order of execution by respondent
Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the
administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC dismissing the complaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A. No.
141, as amended, it contended that the approval of the
survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands.
Hence, factual findings made by the Metropolitan Trial Court
respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling as
the preparation and approval of said survey plans belong to
the Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
resources. 1
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion
for reconsideration filed by Antonio Nazareno cannot be
considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No.
141 inasmuch as the same had been acted upon by
respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-
in-charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as Undersecretary
acting for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case does
not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. It also held that there was no
showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders
were issued and executed..
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH
IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING FACTS
AND THE LAW ON THE MATTER;
Page 15 of 42
 II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
EXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR.,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA,
PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE DECISION OF
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LANDS,
REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE
PROPER SUBJECT FOR ANNULMENT WELL
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER
COURT.
The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the
question of whether or not the subject land is public land.
Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an
accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the
Civil Code which provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion,
as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil
Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites : (1) that
the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the
sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if
present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received
from the effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on
alluvion to their case, the above-mentioned requisites must
be present. However, they admit that the accretion was
formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling
materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the
Cagayan River bounding their land. 3 It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and
other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible,
resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of
Manila, 4 this Court held that the word "current" indicates the
participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of
waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not
having met the first and second requirements of the rules on
alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that
petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of
the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous
Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571. 5 The mere filing of said
Application constituted an admission that the land being
applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey
Plan No. MSi-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302,
Cad-237) which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio
Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land
was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio
Nazareno was, however, controverted by respondent Labis in
his investigation report to respondent Hilario based on the
findings of his ocular inspection that said land actually covers
a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of
Cagayan River. The investigation report also states that,
except for the swampy portion which is fully planted to nipa
palms, the whole area is fully occupied by a part of a big
concrete bodega of petitioners and several residential houses
made of light materials, including those of private
respondents which were erected by themselves sometime in
the early part of 1978. 6
Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land
as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of
sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in
accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the
Bureau of Lands. 7 This Court has often enough held that
findings of administrative agencies which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality. 8 Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties
and not reviewable by this Court. 9
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the
accretion was man-made or artificial. In Republic v. CA, 10this
Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be
due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable.
This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits
caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco
v. Director of Lands, et al., 11 where the land was not formed
solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river
bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct
and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-
made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of
the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co.
consequent to its sawmill
operations. 12 Even if this Court were to take into
consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site
was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting
in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials
into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his
land, 13 the same would still be part of the public domain.
Having determined that the subject land is public land,
a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well as the Office of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have
jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land
Law. Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed petitioners'
complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.
However, this Court agrees with petitioners that
administrative remedies have been exhausted. Petitioners
could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as
an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision
being appealed from was the decision of respondent Hilario
who was the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands. Said
decision was made "for and by authority of the Director of
Lands". 14 It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for the
Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the
Bureau of Lands.
Page 16 of 42
In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation
was "Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of the
Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio
Nazareno's motion for reconsideration by affirming or
adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said
motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the
Department. In the case of Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, 15 this Court held that the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may
modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the
Director of Lands with respect to questions involving public
lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of
Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted
beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and
5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 16
As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted
land is public land, being an artificial accretion of sawdust. As
such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and
control over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4
of the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141) which states, thus:
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources shall be the exclusive
officer charged with carrying out the
provisions of this Act through the Director of
Lands who shall act under his immediate
control.
Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director
of Lands shall have direct executive control
of the survey, classification, lease, sale or
any other form of concession or disposition
and management of the lands of the public
domain, and his decisions as to questions of
fact shall be conclusive when approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim,
arbitrariness or capriciousness in the execution order of public
respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the Director of Lands. This
Court finds otherwise since said decision was based on the
conclusive finding that the subject land was public land. Thus,
this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Director
of Lands acted within his rights when he issued the assailed
execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions.
Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order
directing them to vacate the subject land practically changed
respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect for
petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions
of the subject land to private respondents Salasalans and
Rabayas as they had not yet been issued patents or titles
over the subject land. The execution order merely directed
the segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the subject land
which was actually being occupied by private respondents
before they were ejected from it. Based on the finding that
private respondents were actually in possession or were
actually occupying the subject land instead of petitioners,
respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and in the
exercise of his administrative discretion, directed petitioners
to vacate the subject land on the ground that private
respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants
thereof.
While private respondents may not have filed their application
over the land occupied by them, they nevertheless filed their
protest or opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous Sales
Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an
application as they were in fact directed to do so. In any case,
respondent Palad's execution order merely implements
respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted that petitioners'
own application still has to be given due course. 17
As Director of Lands, respondent Palad is authorized to
exercise executive control over any form of concession,
disposition and management of the lands of the public
domain. 18 He may issue decisions and orders as he may see
fit under the circumstances as long as they are based on the
findings of fact.
In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros, 19 this Court held that
where, in the disposition of public lands, the Director of Lands
bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly
acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the
evidence, the error is one of judgment, but not an act of
grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. Thus,
except for the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, this Court finds no reversible error nor grave abuse
of discretion in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 94283 March 4, 1991
MAXIMO JAGUALING, ANUNCITA JAGUALING and
MISAMIS ORIENTAL CONCRETE PRODUCTS,
INC.,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION), JANITA F.
EDUAVE and RUDYGONDO EDUAVE, respondents.
Cabanlas, Resma & Cabanlas Law Offices for petitioners.
Jaime Y Sindiong for private respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Between the one who has actual possession of an island that
forms in a non-navigable and non-flotable river and the owner
of the land along the margin nearest the island, who has the
better right thereto? This is the issue to be resolved in this
petition.
The parties to this case dispute the ownership of a certain
parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental
with an area of 16,452 square meters, more or less, forming
part of an island in a non-navigable river, and more
particularly described by its boundaries as follows:
North by the Tagoloan River,
South by the Tagoloan River,
East by the Tagoloan River and
West by the portion belonging to Vicente Neri.
Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental1 an action to quiet title and/or remove a
cloud over the property in question against petitioners.
Page 17 of 42
Respondent Court of Appeals2 summarized the evidence for
the parties as follows:
The appellant [private respondent Janita Eduave]
claims that she inherited the land from his [sic]
father, Felomino Factura, together with his co-heirs,
Reneiro Factura and Aldenora Factura, and acquired
sole ownership of the property by virtue of a Deed of
Extra Judicial Partition with sale (Exh. D). The land is
declared for tax purposes under Tax Decl. No. 26137
(Exh. E) with an area of 16,452 square meters more
or less (Exh. D). Since the death of her father on
May 5, 1949, the appellant had been in possession of
the property although the tax declaration remains in
the name of the deceased father.
The appellants further state that the entire land had
an area of 16,452 square meters appearing in the
deed of extrajudicial partition, while in [the] tax
declaration (Exh. E) the area is only 4,937 square
meters, and she reasoned out that she included the
land that was under water. The land was eroded
sometime in November 1964 due to typhoon Ineng,
destroying the bigger portion and the improvements
leaving only a coconut tree. In 1966 due to the
movement of the river deposits on the land that was
not eroded increased the area to almost half a
hectare and in 1970 the appellant started to plant
bananas [sic].
In 1973 the defendants-appellees [petitioners
herein] asked her permission to plant corn and
bananas provided that they prevent squatters to
come to the area.
The appellant engaged the services of a surveyor
who conducted a survey and placed concrete
monuments over the land. The appellant also paid
taxes on the land in litigation, and mortgaged the
land to the Luzon Surety and Co., for a consideration
of P6,000.00.
The land was the subject of a reconveyance case, in
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
Branch V, at Cagayan de Oro City, Civil Case No.
5892, between the appellant Janita Eduave vs. Heirs
of Antonio Factura which was the subject of
judgment by compromise in view of the amicable
settlement of the parties, dated May 31, 1979. (Exh.
R);
That the heirs of Antonio Factura, who are presently
the defendants-appellees in this case had ceded a
portion of the land with an area of 1,289 square
meters more or less, to the appellant, Janita Eduave,
in a notarial document of conveyance, pursuant to
the decision of the Court of First Instance, after a
subdivision of the lot No. 62 Pls-799, and containing
1,289 square meters more or less was designated as
Lot No. 62-A [sic], and the subdivision plan was
approved as Pls-799-Psd-10-001782. (Exh. R; R-1
and R-2);
The portion Lot No. 62-A, is described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 62-A, Psd-10-
001782 being a portion of Lot 62, Pls-799,
Tagoloan Public Land Subdivision) situated
in Bo. Sta. Cruz, Municipality of Tagoloan,
Province of Misamis Oriental. Bounded on
the W, and on the N along lines 4-5-1 by
Lot 62-B of the subdivision plan 10-001782;
on the E by line 1-2 by Lot 64; Pls-799; on
the S, along line 2-3-4 by Saluksok Creek,
containing an area of one thousand two
hundred eighty nine (1,289) square meters
more or less.
Appellant also applied for concession with the Bureau
of Mines to extract 200 cubic meters of gravel (Exh.
G & G-1); and after an ocular inspection the permit
was granted (Exh. K, and K-1 and K-2). That the
appellant after permit was granted entered into an
agreement with Tagoloan Aggregates to extract sand
and gravel (Exh. L; L-1; and L-2), which agreement
was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds
(Exh. M; M-1; and M-2);
The defendants-appellees [petitioners herein] denied
the claim of ownership of the appellant, and asserted
that they are the real owners of the land in litigation
containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or
less. During the typhoon Ineng in 1964 the river
control was washed away causing the formation of
an island, which is now the land in litigation. The
defendants started occupying the land in 1969, paid
land taxes as evidenced by tax declaration No.
26380 (Exh. 4) and tax receipts (Exhs. 7 to 7-G),
and tax clearances (Exhs. 8 & 9). Photographs
showing the actual occupation of the land by the
defendants including improvements and the house
were presented as evidence (Exh. 11 to 11-E). The
report of the Commissioner who conducted the
ocular inspection was offered as evidence of the
defendants (Exh. G).
The sketch plan prepared by Eng. Romeo Escalderon
(Exh. 12) shows that the plaintiffs' [private
respondents'] land was across the land in litigation
(Exh. 12-A), and in going to the land of the plaintiff,
one has to cross a distance of about 68 meters of the
Tagoloan river to reach the land in litigation.3
On 17 July 1987 the trial court dismissed the complaint for
failure of private respondents as plaintiffs therein to establish
by preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over
the land in litigation. The court found that the island is a delta
forming part of the river bed which the government may use
to reroute, redirect or control the course of the Tagoloan
River. Accordingly, it held that it was outside the commerce of
man and part of the public domain, citing Article 420 of the
Civil Code.4
As such it cannot be registered under the land registration
law or be acquired by prescription. The trial court, however,
recognized the validity of petitioners' possession and gave
them preferential rights to use and enjoy the property. The
trial court added that should the State allow the island to be
the subject of private ownership, the petitioners have rights
better than that of private respondents.5
Page 18 of 42
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, respondent court found
that the island was formed by the branching off of the
Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto the accumulation of
alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of
the Civil Code6 the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful and
true owners of the land subject of this case and ordered
petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of
the land to private respondents.7
In the present petition, petitioners raise the following as
errors of respondent court, to wit:
1. Whether [or not] respondent court correctly
applied the provisions of Articles 463 and 465 of the
new Civil Code to the facts of the case at bar; and
2. Whether [or not] respondent court gravely abused
its discretion in the exercise of its judicial authority
in reversing the decision appealed from.8
Petitioners point out as merely speculative the finding of
respondent court that the property of private respondents
was split by the branching off or division of the river. They
argue that because, as held by the trial court, private
respondents failed to prove by preponderance of evidence the
identity of their property before the same was divided by the
action of the river, respondent court erred in applying Article
463 of the Civil Code to the facts of this case.
It must be kept in mind that the sole issue decided by
respondent court is whether or not the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint for failure of private respondents
(plaintiffs below] to establish by preponderance of evidence
their claim of ownership over the island in question.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the trial court
because it did not take into account the other pieces of
evidence in favor of the private respondents. The complaint
was dismissed by the trial court because it did not accept the
explanation of private respondents regarding the initial
discrepancy as to the area they claimed: i.e., the prior tax
declarations of private respondents refer to an area with
4,937 square meters, white the Extra-judicial Partition with
Sale, by virtue of which private respondents acquired
ownership of the property, pertains to land of about 16,452
square meters.
The trial court favored the theory of petitioners that private
respondents became interested in the land only in 1979 not
for agricultural purposes but in order to extract gravel and
sand. This, however, is belied by other circumstances
tantamount to acts of ownership exercised by private
respondents over the property prior to said year as borne out
by the evidence, which apparently the trial court did not
consider at all in favor of private respondents. These include,
among others, the payment of land taxes thereon, the
monuments placed by the surveyor whose services were
engaged by the private respondent, as evidenced by the
pictures submitted as exhibits, and the agreement entered
into by private respondents and Tagoloan Aggregates to
extract gravel and sand, which agreement was duly
registered with the Register of Deeds.
Private respondents also presented in evidence the testimony
of two disinterested witnesses: Gregorio Neri who confirmed
the metes and bounds of the property of private respondents
and the effects of the typhoon on the same, and Candida
Ehem who related on the agreement between private
respondents and petitioners for the latter to act as caretakers
of the former.9 The trial court disregarded their testimony
without explaining why it doubted their credibility and instead
merely relied on the self-serving denial of petitioners.10
From the evidence thus submitted, respondent court had
sufficient basis for the finding that the property of private
respondents actually existed and was Identified prior to the
branching off or division of the river. The Court of Appeals,
therefore, properly applied Article 463 of the Civil Code which
allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or
isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner
thereof prior to such separation or isolation.11
Notwithstanding the foregoing and assuming arguendo as
claimed by petitioners that private respondents were not able
to establish the existence and identity of the property prior to
the branching off or division of the Tagoloan River, and
hence, their right over the same, private respondents are
nevertheless entitled under the law to their respective portion
of the island.
It is clear petitioners do not dispute that the land in litigation
is an island that appears in a non-flotable and non-navigable
river; they instead anchor their claim on adverse possession
for about fifteen years. It is not even controverted that
private respondents are the owners of a parcel of land along
the margin of the river and opposite the island. On the other
hand, private respondents do not dispute that the island in
question has been in the actual physical possession of
petitioners; private respondents insist only that such
possession by petitioners is in the concept of caretakers
thereof with the permission of private respondents.
This brings Us, as phrased earlier in this opinion, to the
underlying nature of the controversy in this case: between
the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a
non-navigable and non-flotable river and the owner of the
land along the margin nearest the island, who has the better
light thereto?
The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed
in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass
of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its
present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation
of alluvial deposits. In this regard the Court of Appeals also
did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code.12 Under
this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land
along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more
accurately, because the island is longer than the property of
private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the
owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of
their property along the margin of the river.
What then, about the adverse possession established by
petitioners? Are their rights as such not going to be
recognized? It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion
belong to the riparian owner.13 This preferential right is, under
Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the
margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are
in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation
of the same.14 In fact, no specific act of possession over the
accretion is required.15 If, however, the riparian owner fails to
assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse
Page 19 of 42
possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land
titled under the torrens system must itself still be
registered.16
Petitioners may therefore, acquire said property by adverse
possession for the required plumber of years under the
doctrine of acquisitive prescription. Their possession cannot
be considered in good faith, however, because they are
presumed to have notice of the status of private respondents
as riparian owners who have the preferential right to the
island as recognized and accorded by law; they may claim
ignorance of the law, specifically Article 465 of the Civil Code,
but such is not, under Articles 3 and 526 of the same code,
an adequate and valid defense to support their claim of good
faith.17 Hence, not qualifying as possessors in good faith, they
may acquire ownership over the island only through
uninterrupted adverse possession for a period of thirty
years.18 By their own admission, petitioners have been in
possession of the property for only about fifteen years. Thus,
by this token and under the theory adopted by petitioners,
the island cannot be adjudicated in their favor.
This case is not between parties as opposing riparian owners
contesting ownership over an accession but rather between a
riparian owner and the one in possession of the island. Hence,
there is no need to make a final determination regarding the
origins of the island, i.e., whether the island was initially
formed by the branching off or division of the river and
covered by Article 463 of the Civil Code, in which case there
is strictly no accession because the original owner retains
ownership, or whether it was due to the action of the river
under Article 465, or, as claimed by petitioners, whether it
was caused by the abrupt segregation and washing away of
the stockpile of the river control, which makes it a case of
avulsion under Article 459.19
We are not prepared, unlike the trial court, to concede that
the island is a delta which should be outside the commerce of
man and that it belongs to the State as property of the public
domain in the absence of any showing that the legal
requirements to establish such a status have been satisfied,
which duty properly pertains to the State.20 However, We are
also well aware that this petition is an upshot of the action to
quiet title brought by the private respondents against
petitioners. As such it is not technically an action in rem or an
action in personam, but characterized as quasi in rem which
is an action in personam concerning real property.22 Thus, the
judgment in proceedings of this nature is conclusive only
between the parties23 and does not bind the State or the
other riparian owners who may have an interest over the
island involved herein.
WHEREFORE, We find no error committed by respondent
court and DENY the petition for lack of sufficient merit. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
G. R. NO. 158449 October 22, 2004
LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN, JOSE REYES
IGTIBEN, JOSE DEL ROSARIO IGTIBEN, JR. and
THERESA TOPACIO MEDINA, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68546,1 which set aside the decision of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo Cavite in LRC
Case No. 98-133 (LRA Record No. N-69787)2 and dismissed
petitioners application for registration of a parcel of land.
On 08 January 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court an
application for registration of land under Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an area
of 2,988 square meters, situated in Barangay Malabag,
Silang, Cavite, and more particularly described as Lot 5442,
Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre, Ap-04-007007 (hereinafter
referred to as the Subject Property). Petitioners alleged that
they acquired the Subject Property by purchase, and that
they, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open,
public, and adverse possession of the Subject Property in the
concept of owner for more that 30 years.3
No opposition was filed against the application and so
petitioners proceeded with the presentation of their evidence.
The State was represented in the proceedings by Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Jose M. Velasco, Jr.4
Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented, the trial court traced the history of possession of
the Subject Property back to 1958, when the Subject Property
was first declared for tax purposes by Justina Hintog.5
Teodoro Calanog came into possession of the Subject
Property in 1968. In the same year, the Subject Property was
transferred to spouses Alfredo Tonido and Agatona Calanog.
Agatona Calanog allegedly inherited the Subject Property
from Teodoro Calanog, her father; on the other hand, Alfredo
Tonido supposedly purchased the same property also from
Teodoro Calanog, his father-in-law. Alfredo Tonido planted
the Subject Property with palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and
other fruit bearing trees. After the demise of Agatona
Calanog, the rest of the Tonido family, consisting of Alfredo
and his children, Samuel, Elizabeth, Benjamin, Imelda and
Esther, shared possession of the Subject Property.6
On 21 November 1995, the Tonido family sold the Subject
Property to petitioners, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale.7
The history of possession of the Subject Property, as related
above, was supported by tax declarations in the name of
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest from 1958 to
1998.8
On 15 August 2000, the trial court rendered a decision
approving petitioners application for registration of the
Subject Property. The Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the decision of
the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
In its appeal, the Republic alleged that the trial court erred in
approving the application for registration despite petitioners
Page 20 of 42
failure to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Subject Property since 12
June 1945, or earlier, as required by Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073. Moreover, petitioners
also failed to produce muniments of title to tack their
possession to those of their predecessors-in-interest in
compliance with the prescriptive period required by law.9
On 20 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision finding the appeal meritorious, setting aside the
decision of the trial court, and dismissing the application for
registration of petitioners.10 The Court of Appeals denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its resolution dated
22 May 2003.11
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the decision of the
Court of Appeals be set aside and that the decision of the trial
court, approving petitioners application for registration of the
Subject Property, be reinstated.12
In the original application filed by petitioners before the trial
court, they claim that they are entitled to confirmation and
registration of their title to the Subject Property in accordance
with Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, although
they had not identified under which specific paragraph of the
said Section.13
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree reads
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of
land in any other manner provided for by
law.
By the allegation of petitioners in their application of
actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and
adverse possession of the Subject Property in the
concept of owner, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, for a given period of time,
it can be logically presumed that their claim to the
right to register the Subject Property was based on
Section 14, paragraph (1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
However, subsequent pleadings filed by both
petitioners and respondent Republic before the Court
of Appeals and this Court, discuss mainly the Public
Land Act, thus, establishing that the application for
registration filed by petitioners before the trial court
is essentially an application for judicial confirmation
of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject
Property, governed by Sections 47 to 57 of the Public
Land Act.
Proceedings under the Property Registration Decree
and the Public Land Act are the same in that both
are against the whole world, both take the nature of
judicial proceedings, and the decree of registration
issued for both is conclusive and final. They differ
mainly in that under the Property Registration
Decree, there already exists a title which the court
only needs to confirm. On the other hand, under the
Public Land Act, there exists a presumption that the
land applied for still pertains to the State, and that
the occupants and possessors can only claim an
interest in the land by virtue of their imperfect title
or continuous, open, and notorious possession
thereof. Nonetheless, in the end, the two laws arrive
at the same goal, namely, a Torrens title, which aims
at complete extinguishment, once and for all, of
rights adverse to the record title.14
In general, an applicant for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title under the Public Land Act must
be able to prove that: (1) the land is alienable public land;
and (2) his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act.15
The finding of fact of the trial court that the Subject Property
is alienable public land is undisputed. What is to be
determined herein is whether petitioners have complied with
the period of possession and occupation required by the
Public Land Act.
The provision of the Public Land Act that is particularly
relevant to petitioners application is Section 48(b). Through
the years, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has been
amended several times. The case of Republic v.
Doldol16provides a summary of these amendments, as
follows
x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141
provided for possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation
by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The same, however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now
reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
Page 21 of 42
 possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented
by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
PD No. 1073, presently requires, for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, the
possession and occupation of the piece of land by the
applicants, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. This provision is in total conformity with
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
heretofore cited.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
petitioners have failed to comply with the period of
possession and occupation of the Subject Property, as
required by both the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that
Indeed, the earliest period that the applicants could
claim ownership over the property is in 1958, which
is the earliest date Justina Hintog, the previous
owner/occupant, declared the property for taxation
purposes. This is far later than June 12, 1945, the
date prescribed by law that the applicants
possession under claim of ownership should have
begun at the latest.17
Petitioners maintain, however, that RA No. 6940, enacted on
28 March 1990, has repealed by implication Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, and has
effectively reduced the required period of possession and
occupation of the land to thirty years prior to the filing of the
application for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title.
Petitioners arguments are without merit. This Court has
already laid down the standard for repeals by implication, as
follows
It has been the constant holding of this Court that
repeals by implication are not favored and will not be
so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature
so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as
United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is
necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to
exist, that it be shown that the statutes or statutory
provisions deal with the same subject matter and
that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There
must be a showing of repugnancy clear and
convincing in character. The language used in the
latter statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted.
An inconsistency that falls short of that standard
does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest
indication of the legislative purpose to repeal.18
In herein case, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the
provisions of RA No. 6940 do not even address the same
subject matter.
In the Public Land Act, the ways by which the State may
dispose of agricultural lands is enumerated, to wit
SEC. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes can be disposed of only as follows
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease; and
4. By confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;
(b) By administrative legalization
(free patent).
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate
chapters of the Public Land Act since the specific
requirements and application procedure differ for every mode.
More particularly, the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles may be done two ways, either by: (a) administrative
legalization or free patents under Chapter VII of the Public
Land Act; or (b) judicial legalization or judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles under Chapter VIII of the same
Act. Having filed their application before the courts,
petitioners have pursued a judicial legalization or judicial
confirmation of their title to the Subject Property.
Petitioners primarily base their arguments on the amendment
by RA No. 6940 of Section 44 of the Public Land Act, to read
as follows
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who is not the owner of more than twelve (12)
hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior
to the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a
tract or tracts of agricultural public land subject to
disposition, who shall have paid the real estate tax
thereon while the same has not been occupied by
any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of
this Chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for
such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve
(12) hectares.
While the above-quoted provision does provide for a 30-year
period of occupation and cultivation of the land, Section 44 of
the Public Land Act applies to free patents, and not to judicial
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title to which
Section 48(b) applies.
The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public
Land Act was recognized by Mr. Justice Puno, in his separate
opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Page 22 of 42
Natural Resources,19 in which he discussed the development
of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal system
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land
Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership
under the civil law. This ownership is based on
adverse possession for a specified period, and
harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on
administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect
or incomplete titles and Section 48(b) and (c) of the
same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.
The remaining provisions of RA No. 6940 amend Sections 44
and 47 of the Public Land Act by extending the periods for
filing of applications for free patents and for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, respectively, to
31 December 2000. Except for extending the period for filing
of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles, RA No. 6940 does not touch on the other
provisions under Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act, such as
Section 48(b) and the prescriptive period provided therein.
Consequently, applying the standard provided by this Court
on repeal by implication, there can be no conflict or
inconsistency between Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
and the provisions of RA No. 6940 that would give rise to a
repeal of the former by the latter.
The subsequent effectivity of RA No. 9176 on 01 January
2001 does not affect the position of this Court on the issues
discussed herein. Once again, Section 47 is the only provision
under Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act amended by RA No.
9176 by further extending the period for filing of applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to 31
December 2020. The other provisions of the Public Land Act
amended by RA No. 9176, such as Sections 44 and 45,
already refer to free patents under Chapter VII. Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, and the
prescriptive period provided therein still remain unchanged.
IN ALL:
(1) Section 44 of the Public Land Act, as amended by
RA No. 6940, which provides for a prescriptive period
of thirty (30) years possession, applies only to
applications for free patents;
(2) The case at bar is a judicial application for
confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title over
the Subject Property covered by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act; and
(3) Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act requires for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title the continuous possession of the land since 12
June 1945, or earlier, which petitioners herein failed
to comply with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The Court AFFIRMS the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68546, which reversed the
decision of the lower court in LRC Case No. 98-133 (LRA
Record No. N-69787) and dismissed the application for land
title of petitioners. No cost.
G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the
Decision1 dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution2 dated
February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
72456.
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa)
tiled with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion,
Cebu an application3 for land registration covering a parcel of
land with an area of 5,525 square meters and situated in
Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his
application, which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-81,
Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property, which is more
particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is
alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from
his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the
latters other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and (c) he
and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the
property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30)
years.
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan
07-0008934 to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the
property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence
the annotation on the advance survey plan made by Cynthia
L. Ibaez, Chief of the Map Projection Section, stating that
"CONFORMED PER L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. 2545
Project No. 28 certified on June 25, 1963, verified to be within
Alienable & Disposable Area".5 Espinosa also presented two
(2) tax declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabels
name Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137 to prove
that she had been in possession of the property since 1965.
To support his claim that he had been religiously paying the
taxes due on the property, Espinosa presented a
Certification6 dated December 1, 1998 issued by the Office of
the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax
declarations for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 Tax
Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and 010717 .8
Petitioner opposed Espinosas application, claiming that: (a)
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known
as the "Public Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as
Espinosas predecessor-in-interest possessed the property
only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the tax declarations do not
prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-
interest are in the character and for the length of time
required by law.
On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment9 granting
Espinosas petition for registration, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering for the registration and the
Page 23 of 42
confirmation of title of Espinosa over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-
D (New), situated at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion,
Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of 5,525 square meters
and that upon the finality of this decision, let a corresponding
decree of registration be issued in favor of the herein
applicant in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the
property is alienable and disposable and that he complied
with the requirements of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the
above-entitled case, the Court is convinced, and so holds,
that Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and
possession over the subject lot which is within the area
considered by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, public,
continuous, adverse and under claim of title thereto within
the time prescribed by law (Sec. 14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529)
and/or in accordance with the Land Registration Act.11
Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosas failure to
prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-
interest were for the period required by law. As shown by Tax
Declaration No. 013516, Isabels possession commenced only
in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by
Section 48(b) of the PLA. On the other hand, Espinosa came
into possession of the property only in 1970 following the sale
that transpired between him and his mother and the earliest
tax declaration in his name was for the year 1978. According
to petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest
were supposedly in possession for more than thirty (30) years
is inconsequential absent proof that such possession began on
June 12, 1945 or earlier.12
Petitioner also claimed that Espinosas failure to present the
original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy
thereof is fatal to his application. Citing Del Rosario v.
Republic of the Philippines13 and Director of Lands v. Judge
Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the submission of the original
tracing cloth is mandatory in establishing the identity of the
land subject of the application.15
Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the
advance survey plan is not the evidence admissible to prove
that the subject land is alienable and disposable.16
By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioners
appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision dated August 18, 2000.
The CA ruled that possession for at least thirty (30) years,
despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945,
sufficed to convert the property to private. Thus:
The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the
following grounds:
a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has
successfully established valid title over the subject land and
that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in
continuous, adverse, public and undisturbed possession of
said land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years
before the filing of the application. Established jurisprudence
has consistently pronounced that "open, continuous and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public
land ipso jure converts the same into private property
(Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214
SCRA 604). This means that occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years by applicant and his predecessor-in-
interest vests title on such applicant so as to segregate the
land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 41); and
b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12,
1945 is the latest amendment of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act (C.A. No. 141), but a strict implementation of the
law would in certain cases result in inequity and unfairness to
Espinosa. As wisely stated by the Supreme Court in the case
of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567:
"Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus
foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of
land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and
exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more."17
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other
documentary evidence, not necessarily the original tracing
cloth plan, as the identity and location of the property can be
established by other competent evidence.
Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without
merit. While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for
registration purposes may be the original tracing cloth plan
from the Land Registration Commission, the court may
sufficiently order the issuance of a decree of registration on
the basis of the blue print copies and other evidence
(Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. L-70594, October 10, 1986). The said case provides
further:
"The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the
applicant sufficient to justify the registration and confirmation
of her titles and did not find it necessary to avail of the
original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration
Commission for purposes of comparison, should not militate
against the rights of the applicant. Such is especially true in
this case where no clear, strong, convincing and more
preponderant proof has been shown by the oppositor to
overcome the correctness of said plans which were found
both by the lower court and the Court of Appeals as
conclusive proofs of the description and identities of the
parcels of land contained therein."
There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic,
supra the Supreme Court pronounced that the submission in
evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by
the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original
registration of land is a mandatory requirement, and that
failure to comply with such requirement is fatal to ones
application for registration. However, such pronouncement
need not be taken as an iron clad rule nor to be applied
strictly in all cases without due regard to the rationale behind
the submission of the tracing cloth plan.
Page 24 of 42
x x x:
xxxx
As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be
established by other competent evidence like a duly approved
blueprint copy of the advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and
technical description of Lot 8499, containing and identifying
the boundaries, actual area and location of the lot, the
presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be
excused.18
Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that
the property is alienable and disposable:
Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and
disposable. In the duly approved Advance Survey Plan As-07-
0000893 (sic) duly approved by the Land Management
Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, it is certified/verified
that the subject lot is inside the alienable and disposable area
of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by
the CA in its Resolution20 dated February 13, 2006.
Petitioners Case
Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the
CAs assailed decision and attributes the following errors: (a)
Espinosa failed to prove by competent evidence that the
subject property is alienable and disposable; (b)
jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan identifies the
property in preparation for a judicial proceeding but does not
convert the property into alienable, much less, private; (c)
under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the submission of the
original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to determine the
exact metes and bounds of the property; and (d) a blueprint
copy of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the
identity and location of the property only if it bears the
approval of the Director of Lands.
Issues
The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa
has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that
is worthy of confirmation and registration is hinged on the
determination of the following issues:
a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan
substantially complies with Section 17 of P.D. No.
1529; and
b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the
plan made by the geodetic engineer who conducted
the survey sufficed to prove that the land applied for
is alienable and disposable.
Our Ruling
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosas
application is anchored on Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in
relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA and the grant thereof is
warranted in view of evidence supposedly showing his
compliance with the requirements thereof.
This Court is of a different view.
Based on Espinosas allegations and his supporting
documents, it is patent that his claim of an imperfect title
over the property in question is based on Section 14(2) and
not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section
48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his possession
and that of his predecessor-in-interest commenced on June
12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed under the two (2) latter
provisions. On the contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged that
he acquired title thru his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for
thirty (30) years, or through prescription. Therefore, the rule
that should have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529, which states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts
disposition of this case stemmed from their failure to apprise
themselves of the changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA
underwent over the years. Section 48(b) of the PLA originally
states:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, except as against the Government, since July
twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title was since July 26, 1894 or
earlier.
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended
Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty (30)-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Thus:
Page 25 of 42
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the
requirement for possession and occupation for a period of
thirty (30) years to possession and occupation since June 12,
1945 or earlier. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073 states:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),
Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in
the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-
in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the
requirement for possession and occupation since June 12,
1945 or earlier was adopted under Section 14(1) thereof.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that
applications under Section 48(b) of the PLA filed after the
promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege and prove
possession and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945
or earlier. However, vested rights may have been acquired
under Section 48(b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No. 1073.
That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who
had already been in possession of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years at the time
P.D. No. 1073 was promulgated be denied because their
possession commenced after June 12, 1945? In Abejaron v.
Nabasa,21 this Court resolved this legal predicament as
follows:
However, as petitioner Abejarons 30-year period of
possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act, as
amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said
P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on
June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi
doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b)
takes place by operation of law, then upon Abejarons
satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have
already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This
follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot
impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated,
"Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-
interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on
January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24,
1947" may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land
Act.22 (Citations omitted)
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an
imperfect title over an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain on the basis of a thirty (30)-year possession
and occupation, it must be demonstrated that such
possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947
and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073.
There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest that it
provides for two (2) modes of acquisition. It is not the case
that there is an option between possession and occupation for
thirty (30) years and possession and occupation since June
12, 1945 or earlier. It is neither contemplated under Section
48(b) that if possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it is still
possible to acquire an imperfect title if such possession and
occupation spanned for thirty (30) years at the time of the
filing of the application.
In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa
complied with the requirements of Section 48(b) of the PLA in
relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 based on supposed
evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in
possession of the property for at least thirty (30) years prior
to the time he filed his application. However, there is nothing
on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired
title by means of possession and occupation of the property
for thirty (30) years. On the contrary, the earliest tax
declaration in Isabels name was for the year 1965 indicating
that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve (12) years had
lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into
possession.
The CAs reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court23 is misplaced considering that the application
therein was filed on October 20, 1975 or before the effectivity
of P.D. No. 1073. The same can be said with respect to
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals.24 The petition
for registration therein was filed on August 21, 1968 and at
that time, the prevailing rule was that provided under Section
48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 the applicants therein
entered into possession of the property on June 17, 1978 and
filed their application on February 5, 1987. Nonetheless, there
is evidence that the individuals from whom the applicant
purchased the property, or their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in possession since 1937. Thus, during the effectivity of
Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942, or while the
prevailing rule was possession and occupation for thirty (30)
years, or prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073, the thirty
(30)-year prescriptive period was already completed.
Thus, assuming that it is Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation
to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply in this
case, as the lower courts held, it was incumbent upon
Espinosa to prove, among other things, that Isabels
possession of the property dated back at least to June 12,
1945. That in view of the established fact that Isabels alleged
possession and occupation started much later, the lower
courts should have dismissed Espinosas application outright.
In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the
present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA. That there were
instances wherein applications were granted on the basis of
Page 26 of 42
possession and occupation for thirty (30) years was for the
sole reason discussed above. Regrettably, such reason does
not obtain in this case.
Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that
should apply, it follows that the subject property being
supposedly alienable and disposable will not suffice. As
Section 14(2) categorically provides, only private properties
may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and
421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for
public use, public service or intended for the development of
national wealth, are considered private. In Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic,26 this Court held that there must be an
official declaration to that effect before the property may be
rendered susceptible to prescription:
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that
"property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth" are public dominion
property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth." (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the
State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the
State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration
shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.27
Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and
occupied the property for an aggregate period of thirty (30)
years, this does not operate to divest the State of its
ownership. The property, albeit allegedly alienable and
disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property is not held by
the State in its private capacity, acquisition of title thereto
necessitates observance of the provisions of Section 48(b) of
the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. For
prescription to run against the State, there must be proof that
there was an official declaration that the subject property is
no longer earmarked for public service or the development of
national wealth. Moreover, such official declaration should
have been issued at least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the
case may be, prior to the filing of the application for
registration. The period of possession and occupation prior to
the conversion of the property to private or patrimonial shall
not be considered in determining completion of the
prescriptive period. Indeed, while a piece of land is still
reserved for public service or the development of national
wealth, even if the same is alienable and disposable,
possession and occupation no matter how lengthy will not
ripen to ownership or give rise to any title that would defeat
that of the States if such did not commence on June 12,
1945 or earlier.
At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation
on the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible
evidence that would overcome the presumption that the
property belongs to the inalienable public domain.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands
not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the
State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.28
In Republic v. Sarmiento,29 this Court reiterated the earlier
ruling in Menguito v. Republic30 that the notation made by a
surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed is
alienable and disposable is not the positive government act
that would remove the property from the inalienable domain.
Neither it is the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert
the presumption that the property is inalienable:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print
copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the
DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-
geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and
disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such
a notation to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and
does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public
domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This
survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area,
Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit
"E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners
in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land
Page 27 of 42
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic
engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does
not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of
the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the
land in question has been declared alienable."31 (Citations
omitted and underscoring supplied)
Therefore, even if Espinosas application may not be
dismissed due to his failure to present the original tracing
cloth of the survey plan, there are numerous grounds for its
denial. The blueprint copy of the advanced survey plan may
be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the
subject property if: (a) it was duly executed by a licensed
geodetic engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land
Management Services (LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is
accompanied by a technical description of the property which
is certified as correct by the geodetic surveyor who conducted
the survey and the LMS of the DENR. As ruled in Republic v.
Guinto-Aldana,32 the identity of the land, its boundaries and
location can be established by other competent evidence
apart from the original tracing cloth such as a duly executed
blueprint of the survey plan and technical description:
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a
convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the
exact identity of the property applied for registration and to
ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of
the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a
registration application must be denied for failure to present
the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is
accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a duly executed
blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed technical
description of the propertywhich may likewise substantially
and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the
property sought to be registered.33
However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan may be
offered as evidence of the identity, location and the
boundaries of the property applied for, the notation therein
may not be admitted as evidence of alienability and
disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,34 this Court
enumerated the documents that are deemed relevant and
sufficient to prove that the property is already outside the
inalienable public domain as follows:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not
enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant must present a copy of the original classification of
the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the
DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such
copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the Presidents
proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of such official record.1wphi1 These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.35 (Citation omitted)
Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail
the benefits of either Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 in
relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA or Section 14(2) of P.O.
No. 1529. Applying Section 14(1) of P.O. No. 1529 and
Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit improper, Espinosa failed to
prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property dated back
to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable
and disposable. On the other hand, applying Section 14(2) of
P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the property is
patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able to prove that
his possession and occupation and that of Isabel were of the
character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has
been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE
COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision dated November 11,
2004 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's application for registration of
title over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New) located at
Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 21
August 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16
December 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration
Case No. T-635.
The Antecedent Facts
This case originated from an Application for Original
Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering
Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a
portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters,
or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas.
Page 28 of 42
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial
hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of
Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20
September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to
6794,4 and in the 18 October 1999 issue of Peoples Journal
Taliba,5 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous
place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto.
Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the
land.6 All adjoining owners and all government agencies and
offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing.7
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case
for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the
Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner).
On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order 8 of
General Default against the whole world except as against
petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino
Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court
gave Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file
his written opposition.9 Carandang failed to file his written
opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an
Order10 dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated
the Order of General Default.
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999,
respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga
Torres (Torres), respondents Operations Manager and its
authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista
(Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records
Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon
City.
The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that
Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse,
open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of
an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27
September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation
covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato
Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave
Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961,
Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the
land was adjudicated to one of Antonios children, Prospero
Dimayuga (Porting).11On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land
to respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated
the land in favor of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation
could apply for registration of land provided such entity and
its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30
years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that
respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in
the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which
possession converted the land to private property.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the
Order of General Default, the Court hereby
adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot
13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-
04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome,
Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas,
with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of
and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a
domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws with principal office at
19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de
Roxas, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the
corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner
alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application
for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and
its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of
possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner
alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are
general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner
argued that additional witnesses should have been presented
to corroborate Evangelistas testimony.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the trial courts Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of
the possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only
from the fact that he worked there for three years but also
because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors.
On Evangelistas failure to mention the name of his uncle who
continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled
that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to
name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also
ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of
Fortunatos relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect
Evangelistas statement that Fortunato took over the
possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroys
death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events
regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became
public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small
community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court
of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring
the corroboration of the sole witness testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a
competent witness since he was only testifying on the fact
that he had caused the filing of the application for registration
and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its
Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing
the grant of title to applicant corporation despite the
following:
Page 29 of 42
 1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-
interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in the concept
of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire
the subject tract of land.13
The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-
interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in
the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier;
and
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for
registration of the land under the Public Land Act.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has
the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land
forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that
respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of
the public domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be
clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the
State.14 The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence,
the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
applicant.15
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO),
Batangas City,16 certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls
within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project
No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31
December 1925." The second certification17 in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the
Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of
the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls
within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto.
Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative
Order (DAO) No. 20,18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the
functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR.
Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50
hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status
for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,19 dated 19
April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No.
38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to
issue certificates of land classification status for areas below
50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for lands covering over
50 hectares.20 In this case, respondent applied for registration
of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50
hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate
covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square
meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond
the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and
disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority
under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land
classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical
Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor
products (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering
over five hectares for public infrastructure projects;
and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for
logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor
[products] (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for
logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic
meters within calamity declared areas for public
infrastructure projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use
permits covering over five hectares for public
infrastructure projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical
Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the
trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify
that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the
Page 30 of 42
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that
the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the
certifications submitted by respondent. The government
officials who issued the certifications were not presented
before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial
court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in
evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that
the land is alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public
except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO
is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances
of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and
disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication21 of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the
land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third
person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such
as entries made by the Civil Registrar22in the books of
registries, or by a ship captain in the ships logbook.23 The
certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of
a government office. The certifications are not even records of
public documents.24 The certifications are conclusions
unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative
value.25 Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their
mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.26 Such
government certifications may fall under the class of
documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section
23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie
evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they
do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted
as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof
of the facts stated therein.27 Here, Torres, a private individual
and respondents representative, identified the certifications
but the government officials who issued the certifications did
not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the
certifications cannot be given probative value.28 The contents
of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was
incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the
certifications.29 Torres did not prepare the certifications, he
was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not
conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within
the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and
disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land
allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR
Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No.
582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print
plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications
submitted by respondent show that under the Land
Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and
disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states
that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December
1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely
serves to prove the precise location and the metes and
bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in
any way certify the nature and classification of the land
involved."30 It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic
engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not
sufficient proof of the lands classification.31 However,
respondent should have at least presented proof that would
explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification.
Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents
submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the
technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision
plan, and the Geodetic Engineers certification were faithful
reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He
did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the
Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of
classification on the blue print plan was different from the
other certifications submitted by respondent.
Page 31 of 42
 There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and
Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the
testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced.
Petitioner alleges that Evangelistas statement that the
possession of respondents predecessors-in-interest was
open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole
world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual
evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that
respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest
had held the land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at
least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in
possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only
worked on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that
his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroys land. The Court
of Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelistas
knowledge of Kabesang Puroys possession of the land
stemmed "not only from the fact that he had worked thereat
but more so that they were practically neighbors."32 The Court
of Appeals observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to
understand that people in the said community knows
each and everyone. And, because of such familiarity
with each other, news or events regarding the
acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast
tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason
why such an event became of public knowledge to
them.33
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by
Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the
exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato,
which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community.
He did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and
Porting. In fact, Evangelistas testimony is contrary to the
factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one
of Antonios children. Antonio was not even mentioned in
Evangelistas testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires
that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration.
However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated
testimony insufficient to prove that respondents
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in
the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot
consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration.
Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondents
acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the
Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was
hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained
his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years
starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership.34 Respondent did not present any credible
explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955
considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in
possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty
taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the
Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only
in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation,
cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain
in this case.
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to
the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines
may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or
acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by
purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of
conservation, ecology, and development, and subject
to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress
shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the
public domain which may be acquired, developed,
held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,35 the
Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public
domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no
prohibition against private corporations from acquiring
agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation
of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens
of the Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private
corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were
no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the
prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.36 The Court
explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in
the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold
alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease. x x x x
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge
landholdings, the Constitution could have simply
Page 32 of 42
 limited the size of alienable lands of the public
domain that corporations could acquire. The
Constitution could have followed the limitations on
individuals, who could acquire not more than 24
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12
hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic
family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a
corporation would be more effective in preventing
the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is
registered in the name of a corporation, upon the
death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in
the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the
farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-
up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from
one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens
the constitutional limitation on individuals from
acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable
lands of the public domain. Without the
constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired
the maximum area of alienable lands of the public
domain could easily set up corporations to acquire
more alienable public lands. An individual could own
as many corporations as his means would allow him.
An individual could even hide his ownership of a
corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders
of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient
vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a
limited area of alienable land of the public domain to
a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is
safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain,
since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional
intent is removed. The available alienable public
lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-
growing population. The most effective way to insure
faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to
grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain
only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the
practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.37
In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land
registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390
square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired
from members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case
was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme
when the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court
ruled that the land was already private land when Acme
acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme
acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution,
private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not
exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not
more than 144 hectares.39
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open,
exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the
period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself that
the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the
required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land
from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already effected by operation of law from
the moment the required period of possession
became complete.
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The
Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis
of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this
appeal was already private property at the time
it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme
thereby acquired a registrable title, there being
at the time no prohibition against said corporations
holding or owning private land. x x x.40(Emphasis
supplied)
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case.
In Director of Lands, the "land x x x was already private
property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme." In
this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997
from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest,
has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years
since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the
land from Porting, the land was not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file
for registration of alienable and disposable land, the
corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor
had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to
the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse
possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least
30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of
Appeals,41 the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the
above rulings, the parcels of land in question had
already been converted to private ownership through
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-
Page 33 of 42
 interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in
1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of
the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-
interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them
in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution
against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain except through lease (Article XIV,
Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them
for they were no longer alienable lands of the public
domain but private property.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to
apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to
establish that when it acquired the land, the same was
already private land by operation of law because the statutory
acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed.
The length of possession of the land by the corporation
cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years
acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of
such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the
public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original
registration of land under the doctrine in Director of
Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA 9176) further amended
the Public Land Act43 and extended the period for the filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next
following section are hereby granted time,
not to extend beyond December 31, 2020
within which to avail of the benefits of this
Chapter: Provided, That this period shall
apply only where the area applied for does
not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,
further, That the several periods of time
designated by the President in accordance
with Section Forty-five of this Act shall
apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section
shall not be construed as prohibiting any of
said persons from acting under this Chapter
at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the
effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as
having been filed in accordance with the provisions
of this Act.
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is
limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only
acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable
land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an
individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of
land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for
56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of
44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio.
In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot
have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from
whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the
corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares,
when the land had already become private land by operation
of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove
that any portion of the land was already private land when
respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16
December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No.
T-635. We DENY the application for registration filed by
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
G.R. No. 133250 May 6, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
For resolution of the Court are the following motions: (1)
Motion to Inhibit and for Re-Deliberation filed by respondent
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation ("Amari" for
brevity) on September 13, 2002; (2) Motion to Set Case for
Hearing on Oral Argument filed by Amari on August 20, 2002;
(3) Motion for Reconsideration and Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Amari on July 26, 2002 and August
20, 2002, respectively; (4) Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent
Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) on July 26, 2002
and August 8, 2002, respectively; and (5) Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Clarification filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General on July 25, 2002. Petitioner Francisco I.
Chavez filed on November 13, 2002 his Consolidated
Opposition to the main and supplemental motions for
reconsideration.
To recall, the Courts decision of July 9, 2002 ("Decision" for
brevity) on the instant case states in its summary:
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or
Page 34 of 42
 disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private cor
porations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void
for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged
areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and
further declare them no longer needed for public
service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in
view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to
law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are
"inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must
perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Amari seeks the inhibition of Justice Antonio T. Carpio,
ponente of the Decision, on the ground that Justice Carpio,
before his appointment to the Court, wrote in his Manila
Times column of July 1, 1997, "I have always maintained that
the law requires the public bidding of reclamation projects."
Justice Carpio, then a private law practitioner, also stated in
the same column, "The Amari-PEA reclamation contract is
legally flawed because it was not bid out by the PEA." Amari
claims that because of these statements Justice Carpio should
inhibit himself "on the grounds of bias and prejudgment" and
that the instant case should be "re-deliberated" after being
assigned to a new ponente.
The motion to inhibit Justice Carpio must be denied for three
reasons. First, the motion to inhibit came after Justice Carpio
had already rendered his opinion on the merits of the case.
The rule is that a motion to inhibit must be denied if filed
after a member of the Court had already given an opinion on
the merits of the case,1 the rationale being that "a litigant
cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court
xxx (only to) raise an objection of this sort after a decision
has been rendered." Second, as can be readily gleaned from
the summary of the Decision quoted above, the absence of
public bidding is not one of the ratio decidendi of the Decision
which is anchored on violation of specific provisions of the
Constitution. The absence of public bidding was not raised as
an issue by the parties. The absence of public bidding was
mentioned in the Decision only to complete the discussion on
the law affecting reclamation contracts for the guidance of
public officials. At any rate, the Office of the Solicitor General
in its Motion for Reconsideration concedes that the absence of
public bidding in the disposition of the Freedom Islands
rendered the Amended JVA null and void.2 Third, judges and
justices are not disqualified from participating in a case just
because they have written legal articles on the law involved in
the case. As stated by the Court in Republic v. Cocofed,3 -
The mere fact that, as a former columnist, Justice
Carpio has written on the coconut levy will not
disqualify him, in the same manner that jurists will
not be disqualified just because they may have given
their opinions as textbook writers on the question
involved in a case.
Besides, the subject and title of the column in question was
"The CCP reclamation project" and the column referred to the
Amari-PEA contract only in passing in one sentence.
Amaris motion to set the case for oral argument must also be
denied since the pleadings of the parties have discussed
exhaustively the issues involved in the case.
The motions for reconsideration reiterate mainly the
arguments already discussed in the Decision. We shall
consider in this Resolution only the new arguments raised by
respondents.
In its Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, Amari
argues that the Decision should be made to apply
prospectively, not retroactively to cover the Amended JVA.
Amari argues that the existence of a statute or executive
order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to
which legal consequences are attached, citing De Agbayani v.
PNB,4 thus:
x x x. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be
complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary,
in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have
acted under it and may have changed their positions.
What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
litigation regard be had to what has been done while
such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now
accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being
nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned
with. This is merely to reflect awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental
organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of
time may have elapsed before it can exercise the
power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law
of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be
no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.
Page 35 of 42
 In the language of an American Supreme Court
decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, - with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official." This
language has been quoted with approval in a
resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in
Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. x x x.
xxx
x x x That before the decision they were not
constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly. There
is all the more reason then to yield assent to the now
prevailing principle that the existence of a statute or
executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an
operative fact to which legal consequences are
attached.
Amari now claims that "assuming arguendo that
Presidential Decree Nos. 1084 and 1085, and
Executive Order Nos. 525 and 654 are inconsistent
with the 1987 Constitution, the limitation imposed by
the Decision on these decrees and executive orders
should only be applied prospectively from the finality
of the Decision."
Amari likewise asserts that a new doctrine of the Court cannot
operate retroactively if it impairs vested rights. Amari
maintains that the new doctrine embodied in the Decision
cannot apply retroactively on those who relied on the old
doctrine in good faith, citing Spouses Benzonan v. Court of
Appeals,5 thus:
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence
interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was
that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above.
The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the
DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to
Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But
while our decisions form part of the law of the land,
they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code
which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit,
non respicit, the law looks forward not backward.
The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually
divests rights that have already become vested or
impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565
[1961]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only
prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines.
Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
[1974] "x x x when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
There may be special cases where weighty considerations of
equity and social justice will warrant a retroactive application
of doctrine to temper the harshness of statutory law as it
applies to poor farmers or their widows and orphans. In the
present petitions, however, we find no such equitable
considerations. Not only did the private respondent apply for
free agricultural land when he did not need it and he had no
intentions of applying it to the noble purposes behind the law,
he would now repurchase for only P327,995.00, the property
purchased by the petitioners in good faith for P1,650,000.00
in 1979 and which, because of improvements and the
appreciating value of land must be worth more than that
amount now.
The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our
rulings in Monge and Tupas when they purchased the
property from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago. Under
the rulings in these two cases, the period to repurchase the
disputed lot given to respondent Pe expired on June 18, 1982.
He failed to exercise his right. His lost right cannot be revived
by relying on the 1988 case of Belisario. The right of
petitioners over the subject lot had already become vested as
of that time and cannot be impaired by the retroactive
application of the Belisario ruling.
Amaris reliance on De Agbayani and Spouses Benzonan is
misplaced. These cases would apply if the prevailing law or
doctrine at the time of the signing of the Amended JVA was
that a private corporation could acquire alienable lands of the
public domain, and the Decision annulled the law or reversed
this doctrine. Obviously, this is not the case here.
Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations were
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. But
since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, private
corporations were banned from holding, except by lease,
alienable lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution
continued this constitutional prohibition. The prevailing law
before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is
that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease,
alienable lands of the public domain. The Decision has not
annulled or in any way changed the law on this matter. The
Decision, whether made retroactive or not, does not change
the law since the Decision merely reiterates the law that
prevailed since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus,
De Agbayani, which refers to a law that is invalidated by a
decision of the Court, has no application to the instant case.
Likewise, Spouses Benzonan is inapplicable because it refers
to a doctrine of the Court that is overruled by a subsequent
decision which adopts a new doctrine. In the instant case,
there is no previous doctrine that is overruled by the
Decision. Since the case of Manila Electric Company v. Judge
Castro-Bartolome,6 decided on June 29, 1982, the Court has
applied consistently the constitutional provision that private
corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of
the public domain. The Court reiterated this in numerous
cases, and the only dispute in the application of this
constitutional provision is whether the land in question had
already become private property before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution.7 If the land was already private land
before the 1973 Constitution because the corporation had
possessed it openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely
for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier, then
Page 36 of 42
the corporation could apply for judicial confirmation of its There are, moreover, special circumstances that disqualify
imperfect title. But if the land remained public land upon the Amari from invoking equity principles. Amari cannot claim
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, then the corporation good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended
could never hold, except by lease, such public land. JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the
Indisputably, the Decision does not overrule any previous instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the
doctrine of the Court. qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even
before the filing of this petition, two Senate Committees14 had
already approved on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee
The prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of
Report No. 560. This Report concluded, after a well-publicized
the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold,
investigation into PEAs sale of the Freedom Islands to Amari,
except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. This is
that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public
one of the two main reasons why the Decision annulled the
domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and
Amended JVA. The other main reason is that submerged
assuming all the attendant risks, including the annulment of
areas of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are inalienable and
the Amended JVA.
beyond the commerce of man, a doctrine that has remained
immutable since the Spanish Law on Waters of 1886. Clearly,
the Decision merely reiterates, and does not overrule, any Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost
existing judicial doctrine. incurred by PEA in reclaiming the Freedom Islands. Amari
states that it has paid PEA only P300,000,000.0015 out of
the P1,894,129,200.00 total reimbursement cost agreed upon
Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by
in the Amended JVA. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have
the government, the Decision does not overrule existing law
even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of
or doctrine. Since the adoption of the Regalian doctrine in this
submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have
jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have always been
started to construct any permanent infrastructure on the
part of the public domain. And since the enactment of Act No.
Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have
1654 on May 18, 1907 until the effectivity of the 1973
introduced any physical improvement or development on the
Constitution, statutory law never allowed foreshore lands
reclamation project that is the subject of the Amended JVA.
reclaimed by the government to be sold to private
And yet Amari claims that it had already spent a
corporations. The 1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined and
"whopping P9,876,108,638.00" as its total development cost
expanded the ban to include any alienable land of the public
as of June 30, 2002.16 Amari does not explain how it spent
domain.
the rest of the P9,876,108,638.00 total project cost after
paying PEA P300,000,000.00. Certainly, Amari cannot claim
There are, of course, decisions of the Court which, while to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.
recognizing a violation of the law or Constitution, hold that
the sale or transfer of the land may no longer be invalidated
In its Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, PEA claims
because of "weighty considerations of equity and social
that it is "similarly situated" as the Bases Conversion
justice."8 The invalidation of the sale or transfer may also be
Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A. No. 7227 is
superfluous if the purpose of the statutory or constitutional
tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and
ban has been achieved. But none of these cases apply to
other military reservations. PEAs comparison is incorrect. The
Amari.
Decision states as follows:

Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino

As the central implementing agency tasked to
citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to a
undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with
Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the
authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place
subsequent sale to a citizen.9 Similarly, where the alien who
of DENR as the government agency charged with
buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the
leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public
sale is validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to
domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by
limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved.10 In short,
PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that
the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the
DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands,
buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a
does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands
qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified
of the public domain. Only when qualified private
party. In the instant case, however, Amari has not transferred
parties acquire these lands will the lands become
the Freedom Islands, or any portion of it, to any qualified
private lands. In the hands of the government
party. In fact, Amari admits that title to the Freedom Islands
agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable
still remains with PEA.11
or disposable lands of the public domain, these lands
are still public, not private lands.
The Court has also ruled consistently that a sale or transfer of
the land may no longer be questioned under the principle of
PEA is the central implementing agency tasked to
res judicata, provided the requisites for res judicata are
undertake reclamation projects nationwide. PEA
present.12 Under this principle, the courts and the parties are
took the place of Department of Environment and
bound by a prior final decision, otherwise there will be no end
Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) as the
to litigation. As the Court declared in Toledo-Banaga v. Court
government agency charged with leasing or
of Appeals,13 "once a judgement has become final and
selling all reclaimed lands of the public domain. In
executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how
the hands of PEA, which took over the leasing
erroneous it may be." In the instant case, there is no prior
and selling functions of DENR, reclaimed
final decision adjudicating the Freedom Islands to Amari.
foreshore lands are public lands in the same
manner that these same lands would have been
public lands in the hands of DENR. BCDA is an

Page 37 of 42
 entirely different government entity. BCDA is
authorized by law to sell specific government lands
that have long been declared by presidential
proclamations as military reservations for use by the
different services of the armed forces under the
Department of National Defense. BCDAs mandate is
specific and limited in area, while PEAs mandate is
general and national. BCDA holds government lands
that have been granted to end-user government
entities the military services of the armed forces.
In contrast, under Executive Order No. 525, PEA
holds the reclaimed public lands, not as an end-user
entity, but as the government agency "primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government."
In Laurel v. Garcia,17 cited in the Decision, the Court ruled
that land devoted to public use by the Department of Foreign
Affairs, when no longer needed for public use, may be
declared patrimonial property for sale to private parties
provided there is a law authorizing such act. Well-settled is
the doctrine that public land granted to an end-user
government agency for a specific public use may
subsequently be withdrawn by Congress from public use and
declared patrimonial property to be sold to private parties.
R.A. No. 7227 creating the BCDA is a law that declares
specific military reservations no longer needed for defense or
military purposes and reclassifies such lands as patrimonial
property for sale to private parties.
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial
property, can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino
citizens or qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called
Friar Lands acquired by the government under Act No. 1120
are patrimonial property18 which even private corporations
can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or
municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become
patrimonial property in the hands of the public or municipal
corporation. Once converted to patrimonial property, the land
may be sold by the public or municipal corporation to private
parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations.
We reiterate what we stated in the Decision is the rationale
for treating PEA in the same manner as DENR with respect to
reclaimed foreshore lands, thus:
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply
turn around, as PEA has now done under the
Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of
hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed
lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the
constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse
equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over
80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire
x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates
to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds, if
not thousands, of hectares of alienable lands of the public
domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands
are private lands. This will result in corporations amassing
huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating
the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to
prevent. This will completely reverse the clear direction of
constitutional development in this country. The 1935
Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more
than 1,024 hectares of public lands. The 1973 Constitution
prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of
public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally
reiterated this prohibition.
Finally, the Office of the Solicitor General and PEA argue that
the cost of reclaiming deeply submerged areas is "enormous"
and "it would be difficult for PEA to accomplish such project
without the participation of private corporations."19 The
Decision does not bar private corporations from participating
in reclamation projects and being paid for their services in
reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits, following the
explicit constitutional mandate, is for private corporations to
acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no
prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of
private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from
acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain. They can acquire not more than 12 hectares
per individual, and the land thus acquired becomes private
land.
Despite the nullity of the Amended JVA, Amari is not
precluded from recovering from PEA in the proper
proceedings, on a quantum meruit basis, whatever Amari
may have incurred in implementing the Amended JVA prior to
its declaration of nullity.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motions for Reconsideration to be
without merit, the same are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
The Motion to Inhibit and for Re-Deliberation and the Motion
to Set Case for Hearing on Oral Argument are likewise
DENIED.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME
PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari
from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court
affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square
meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
Page 38 of 42
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title
under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public
Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up
the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation
duly organized in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December
23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles
of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its
secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration
proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962,
from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of
the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took
place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land
relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., dates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the
Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from
generation to generation until the same came into
the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse
and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from
whom the applicant bought said land on October 29,
1962, hence the possession is already considered
from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private
land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the
non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or
their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its
ocular investigation of the land sought to be
registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land
sought to be registered by the applicant was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for
the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality
when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the
townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on
November 15, 1979, and which donation was
accepted by the Municipal Government of
Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special
session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these
findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution
to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the
registration proceedings have been commenced only on July
17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into
effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since
section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a
prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in
force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question
from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration
in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to
the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of
the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and
affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer
controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer
Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on
October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural
minorities who had, by themselves and through their
Page 39 of 42
progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period
and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right
granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title
judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme,
as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to
acquire and register ownership of said lands under any
provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of
its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether
or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in
1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings
instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was
already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein
against private corporations holding lands of the public
domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of
the lands at the time of institution of the registration
proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other
hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional
prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of
facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a
domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of
which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in
Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been
possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their
predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976,
Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati
Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court,
assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person,
was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or
natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to
be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it
under section 48(b). Because it is still public land
and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified
to apply for its registration under section 48(b),
Meralco's application cannot be given due course or
has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional
prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one
hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which
no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other
hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to
judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish,
we should not make any distinction or qualification.
The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section
48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs.
Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA
641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing
the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in
1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed
and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without
the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed
what is the better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes
evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings
cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak,
in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880
for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private
individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and
5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly
it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an
Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well
or better, in view of the other provisions, might be
taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was
expected from all but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not
to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because
expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph
(b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with, for he has
been in actual and physical possession, personally
and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,
Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore
is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act
No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public
Page 40 of 42
 domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of
the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the
land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of
Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
longer any title or control, and the sale thus made
was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned,
likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and
affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in
jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has
vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from
the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act as by free
patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions
as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability
of considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum
of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome
a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in
truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land
from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the
moment the required period of possession became complete.
As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already
private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it
from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in
the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the
1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically
"public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels
and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually
confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land
Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in
the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public
land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of
so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation
then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or
lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.
The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973
Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of
the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before
that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in
analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair
vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has
no retroactive application to the sales application of
Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the
time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares.
Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of
vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights
by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a
change in the constitution of the State, except in a
legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S.
1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of
the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer
open to doubt or controversy.
Page 41 of 42
 Its compliance with the requirements of the Public The ends of justice would best be served, therefore,
Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect by considering the applications for confirmation as
of segregating the said land from the public domain. amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in
The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land the names of the original persons who as natural
is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
123 Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15 conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as
granting the applications for confirmation of title to
simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting
the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to
be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the
Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying
the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s
1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But
themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas
subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained,
benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate. rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in
the dissent in Meralco.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so
holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no
The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were,
referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, searching examination and inquiry in many past cases.
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as
period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice
converted to private property by the mere lapse or Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from
on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land
appeal was already private property at the time it was under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only
registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion,
said corporation's holding or owning private land. The and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter.
objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and,
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed
again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is
hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's
application on the technicality that the Public Land
Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are
natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title
would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was
a technical error not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as
the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded
that there is no prohibition against their sale of the
land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there
any prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with
the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership
by operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great
cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

Page 42 of 42