Cario vs CHR

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not
attend work and decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof,
eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated,
and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario ordered the dismissal from the
service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the
Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for
certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case.
Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cario.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain
specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the
character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and
decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in
fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC
on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to
do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil
or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi
judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and
resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim
that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question,
initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed.
 SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS MANALO

G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

(Section 11: The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.)

FACTS: Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14,
2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and member of Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU) summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangays. Respondents were not
able to attend. Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Idelfornso, Bulacan.
At past noon, several armed soldiers entered their house. They asked if he was Bestre, but his
mother Ester replied that he was Raymond. The armed soldier then slapped him on both cheeks,
nudged him in the stomach, and he was handcuffed. He was brought to the rear of the house. They
as the mother to follow them, but eventually, asked her to stop and stay. Raymond recognized the
men who came to take him: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz, and Pula de la
Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU. He also saw two barangay
councilors. Hae was forced in to a white L300 van and was blindfolded.

Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. Another person was taken, he recognized
the voice as it was from his brother Reynaldo. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a
different room. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymonds) room and it was his
(Raymonds) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of
the New Peoples Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. The two
brothers suffered from severe torture and suffering from the hands of these officials.

On or about June 13, 2007, they were brought to Pangasinan to raise poultry and also to farm the
land of Donald Caigas. They were no longer in chains. This time, respondents started to plan their
escape. They earned 1,400 between them. There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and
Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted
respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his
cohorts had a drinking session. 1:00AM Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of
the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving
behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs.They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus
freed from captivity.

The case was originally a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO filed by the petitioners on August
23, 2007 to stop the respondents and their officers and agents from depriving them of their right of
liberty and other basic rights.

While the petition was pending , writ of amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. They prayed that the
petition be considered a petition for the writ of amparo, the court issue the writ commanding therein
respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific
matter required by law.

December 26, 2007 CA rendered a decision granting the privilege of the writ of amparo.

ISSUE: WON the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly given

HELD: Yes. The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule). On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of
the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances. It was an exercise for the first time
of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our peoples constitutional rights, which
made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the
martial law regime. Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage is confined to two instances: 1) extralegal killing
committed without due process; 2) enforced disappearances are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government.

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents were abducted from their houses and were continuously detained until they escaped
on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated
by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner.

The respondents are given the privilege of the writ of amparo. But since their disappearance has now
passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. These people are directly connected to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents rights to life,
liberty and security. Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted,
kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as
respondents assert.

First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the
body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion.

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right
to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of
person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III,
Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State
guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.

In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from threat is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the
part of the military.
 RICARDO VALMONTE VS FELICIANO BELMONTE

GR NO 74930, FEBRUARY 13, 1989

(Section 28 Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.)

FACTS: A controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte a letter requesting the list of names of
the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 Million each on guaranty of
Mrs. Imelda Marcos. Likewise, he is requesting certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. He argues Art
VI, Sec 6 of Freedom Constitution, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

Deputy General of the GSIS Meynardo Tiro replied stating that Belmonte referred to him Valmontes letter for study and
reply. He stated that it is of confidential relationship exists between GSIS and all those who borrow from it; that GSIS has
a duty to its customers to preserve its confidentiality. Petitioner having not yet received the reply, wrote another letter
saying that for failure to receive a reply, they are now free to do whatever action necessary to pursue desired objective in
pursuance of public interest. Valmonte, joined by other petitioners, filed an instant suit.

July 19, 1986, Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and regular
Batasang Pambansa, including 10 opposition member, were granted housing loand by GSIS. Respondent claims that
actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS.

ISSUE: whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to
information.

HELD: An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to
them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned
under our Constitution.

Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy
of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the
exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by
the government's monopolizing pertinent information.

The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the
public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government. But the right to information is not absolute. Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is
limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."

The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa
belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986
election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos. GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
government and its employees. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. GSIS is expected to manage its
resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws, rules and regulations.

When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the
rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in
this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the
individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot
be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS.

The "constituent ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated. Consequently,
that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.

Whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the
ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.

But it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined and certain legal right to the thing
demanded. The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to
prepare the list requested.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government Service
Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted
 MEYER v. NEBRASKA

FACTS: The vocation of the plaintiff is teaching and in teaching, as he did, a certain subject in a language other than
English language, he encroached upon the rights of no other person. The plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the
District Court of Hamilton County, Nebraska under an information which charged that on May 25, 1920, while an
instructor in Zion Parochial School, he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond
Parpart, a child of ten years, who had not attained and successfully passed the eighth grade. The information is based
upon An Act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska, approved April 9, 1919. A state law
forbidding, under penalty, the teaching in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, of any modern
language, other than English, to any child who has not attained and successfully passed the eighth grade, invades the
liberty guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment and exceeds the power of the state. The statute, therefore, was intended
not only to require that the education of all children be conducted in the English language, but that, until they had
grown into that language and until it had become a part of them, they should not in the schools be taught any other
language. The obvious purpose of this statute was that English language should be and become the mother tongue of all
children reared in this state. The enactment of such a statute comes reasonably within the police power of the state.

ISSUE: WON the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error
by the Fourteenth amendment.

HELD: YES. It was held that education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified persons
who devote themselves thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and honorable, essential, indeed, to the
public welfare. Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. As the statute
undertakes to interfere only with teaching which involves a modern language, leaving complete freedom as to other
matters, there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to protect the childs health by
limiting his mental activities. It is well known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed
at an early age, and experience shows that this is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of the ordinary
child.

FACTS:
Robert Meyer, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School,
was tried and convicted in the district of Hamilton, Nebraska under an
information which charged him for unlawfully teaching reading German
language to Raymond Partpar, a ten year old child who had not
successfully reached the eight grade. The information was based upon
An Act Relating to the Teaching of Foreign Language in the State of
Nebraska, which prohibited any subject in any language other than
English to any person who has not successfully passed the eight grade.

ISSUE: May the State prohibit the teaching of foreign language to children
who has not reach a certain grade level?

HELD:
It was held that it is incompetent for the government to
prohibit the teaching of the German language to students between certain
age levels since there is nothing inherently harmful in the language that
will impair the upbringing of the child; and in fact such a subject could
improve his academic background.
Pierce vs Society of Sisters

FACTS:
The State of Oregon passed a law requiring
parents/guardians of children ages 8-16 to send their child to public
school. The manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public
schools by children 8-16 who have not completed their 8th grade.
Society of Sisters operates a private school. It owns valuable
building, especially constructed and equipped for the school purposes.
The law has already caused the withdrawal from its school of children,
who would other wise continue attending the same school. Society then
filed a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the law contending that the same
unconstitutional.

ISSUE: May the State require children to attend only public schools before
they reach a certain age?

HELD:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which the
government under the Constitution reposes excludes any general power
of the State to standardize its children by enforcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.
 DECS and Dir. of Educational Measurement vs. Roberto Rey San Diego and
Judge Dizon-Capulong
G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989

FACTS: Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree
of B.S. Zoology, had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests and was
applying to take another test. NMAT Rule provides that a student shall be allowed only
three (3) chances to take the test. After three successive failures, a student shall not
be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The Regional Trial Court held that the
petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality
education.

RULING: NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to

those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education. The regulation of practice of medicine is a reasonable method of protecting
the health and safety of the public. This regulation includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a means of
achieving the countrys objective of upgrading the selection of applicants into medical
schools and of improving the quality of medical education in the country It is the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every
citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirement.
The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal
protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who
have also qualified are denied entrance.
The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court has been
reversed.
VIRTUOSO VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE
82 SCRA 191, 1978
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr. filed an application for the
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the preliminary examination
which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless
formality as respondent Municipal Judge failed to meet the strict standard
required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable
cause. He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that
tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail
imposed was clearly excessive. It was in the amount of P16,000.00, the
alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner
It was later ascertained that the petitioner is a seventeen
year old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the child and Youth
Welfare Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners application for release should be
granted.
HELD:
Yes. As a minor, he could be provisionally released on
recognizance in the discretion of a court. This Court should, whenever
appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code,
which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate.
"The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being."
 IMBONG VS OCHOA
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG
and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents. G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject/One Title Rule
Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of
the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must
concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something
has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to ones freedom of expression, as they are modes which ones
thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a
law must not be so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or
put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal
the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the
parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to
retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can
stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members
could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of conception according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of fertilization and (b) the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent
the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from
passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only
drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside
the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the
term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under
Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs
and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only after these devices and
materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are
safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures
(a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has
the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To
allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the
provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the
State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making,
and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii)
which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the
right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not
deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to
accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-
and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum
on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children
with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant)
the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by
the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a public health service provider. The private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to private health care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and
knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the
needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical
care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does
not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid.
There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48
hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render
RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard
on the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time
and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not
otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has,
on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well
being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the
law shows that both reproductive health and responsible parenthood are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood which bears to the attainment
of the goal of achieving sustainable human development as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one
which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
 PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for
C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F.
Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8,
1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil
status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner
learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys
policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective
January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner
illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was
apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of
company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an
employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely
by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and
employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those
cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of
the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The
record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys
policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her
supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or
tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it
likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a
privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by
PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and
ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or
dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also
imperatively required.
 OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792, 1993
FACTS:
The petitioner, all minors and alleges that the plaintiffs "are
all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the
full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical rainforests, duly joined and represented by their
parents instituted a complained as a taxpayers class suit and prayed for
the rendering of judgment ordering defendant Factoran, then Secretary of
the DENR, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist form receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
two grounds: 1) lack of cause of action against him and 2) the issue raised
was a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the
aforementioned grounds. Thus, the petitioners filed a special civil action
for certiorari seeking to rescind and set aside.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said petitioners have a cause of action to
prevent the misappropriation or impairment of the Philippine rainforests
and have the defendant stop form receiving, processing and approving
timber license agreements.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioners have a cause of action. The complaint
focuses on one specific fundamental legal right-the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.This right unites with the
right to health which is provided for in SEC. 15 of Article 2.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation
and self-perpetuation -- aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners -- the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said
right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
E.O. No.192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which serve as the bases for policy formulation and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR, the primary government
agency for the proper use and development of the countries natural
resources. The right of the petitioners and all they represent to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the owner who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action.
 LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS (Romero[1], 1994)
FACTS
The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City raised a complaint with the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA), seeking to stop the operation of the City Government of Caloocan of an
8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and
the pollution of the surrounding water.
LLDA discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been maintaining the open dumpsite at the
Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management
Bureau of the DENR. They also found the water to have been directly contaminated by the operation of the
dumpsite.
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and other entities to completely
halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter on the Camarin
dumpsite.
The City Government went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered
to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology
within its territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control Law that the review of cease and
desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of Appeals and not the RTC.
RTC denied LLDAs motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining LLDA from
enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency of the case.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to
issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage.
The residents seek a review of the decision.

ISSUE
WoN the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive.
THEORY OF THE PARTIES
City Government of Caloocan: As a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the
Local Government Code, they have the mandate to operate a dumpsite and determine the effects to the
ecological balance over its territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA: As an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by
RA No. 4850, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to various
provisions in EO No. 927.

RULING
YES.
1. LLDA is mandated by law to manage the environment, preserve the quality of human life and ecological
systems and prevent undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution in the Laguna Lake area and
surrounding provinces and cities, including Caloocan.
While pollution cases are generally under the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, it does not preclude mandate from special laws that provide another
forum.
In this case, RA No. 4850 provides that mandate to the LLDA. It is mandated to pass upon or approve or
disapprove plans and programs of local government offices and agencies within the region and their underlying
environmental/ecological repercussions.
The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over the case when the DENR acted as
intermediary at a meeting among the representatives of the city government, LLDA and the residents.

2. LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.
a. Explicit in the law.
4, par. (3) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of
its jurisdiction.
While LLDA was not expressly conferred the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order in that
language, the provision granting authority to make () orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution, has
the same effect.

b. Necessarily implied powers.

Assuming arguendo that the cease and desist order was not expressly conferred by law, there is
jurisprudence enough to the effect.
While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such power as expressly granted to
it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its express powers. Otherwise, it will be reduced to a toothless paper agency.
In Pollution Adjudication Board vs Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the PAB has the power to issue
an ex-parte cease and desist order on prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable
standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.
LLDA has been vested with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of the projects within
the LagunaLake region, and this includes the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the area.
 Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague
G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as
the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for
the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled
Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of
the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee
and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for
debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against
Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest
budgetary priority to education.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being
higher than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only
a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the
very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court
finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional
 Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs Hon. Franklin Drilon

G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI), a firm engaged principally
in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement, challenges the
constitutionality of Dept. Order. No. 1 of the DOLE. The petitioner assails that the order was
discriminatory against males and females and that it does not apply to all Filipino workers and only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills and it was violative of the right to travel and is
likewise an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, being a legislative and not executive in
character. The petitioner likewise invokes Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law and would cause great and irreparable injury that PASEI members will face under the
Order.

The SolGen filed a comment saying that the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment
ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hong Kong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria,
and Switzerland. It is submitted that the Dept. Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power.

Issue: WON the Dept. Order was a valid exercise of Police Power

Held: The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all- comprehensive embrace.

Its scope is ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

As to the Petitioners reliance to Sec. 3 Art. XIII of the Constitution which guarantees the workers
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is not well
taken and again, must submit to the demands and necessities is the states power of regulation.

The protection to labor does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the
constitution more importantly is that such employment must be decent, just, and humane. It is bad
enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy
their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to
insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away
from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously
dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered
an indefinite ban on deployment.
 G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
WIGBERTO E. TAADA et al, petitioners,
vs.

EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation and
enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and
employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of
various executive offices concerned therewith.

They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products and (2) that the
WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme
Court.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation,
the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered
automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be
performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation
on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute
because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined
the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty
as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such
exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of
signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership
should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of
economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if
not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make
their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 GARCIA VS. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
191 SCRA 288, 1990
FACTS:
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) approving thetransfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan toBatangas and the
shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only tonaphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).Under P.D. No.
1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the publicdomain located in Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for
thePetrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration, management, andownership of the Philippine National
Oil Company (PNOC).

The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government ownedcorporation, located at Bataan. It produces
60% of the national output ofnaphtha.Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the
BataanPetrochemical Corporation (BPC) and appliedwith BOI for registration asa new domestic producer of
petrochemicals. Its application specifiedBataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration
ofthe project was the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstockor fuel for its petrochemicalplant. The
petrochemical plant was to be ajoint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on
February 24, 1988 by BOI.BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives byBOI, like, (1)
exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of theentire proceeds of liquidation investments in currency
originally made andat the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3)remittance of earnings on
investments. As additional incentive, the Houseof Representatives approved a bill introduced by the petitioner
eliminatingthe 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw materialsin the petrochemical
plant.However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in BPC,
personally delivered to TradeSecretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989 advising himof BPC's
desire to amend the original registration certification of its projectby changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to
Batangas. The reasonadduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation,and the presence in
Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation.The petitioner
vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than PresidentAquino expressed her preference that the plant be
established in Bataanin a conference with the Taiwanese investors, the Secretary of NationalDefense and The Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces.Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the transfer of theproject to
Batangas, BPC filed its request for approval of the amendments.Its application is as follows: "(1) increasing the
investment amount fromUS$220 million to US$320 million; (2) increasing the production capacityof its naphtha
cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3)changing the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or
liquefiedpetroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, toBatangas. BOI states that it has
taken a public position preferring Bataanover Batangas as the site of the petrochemical complex, as this
wouldprovide a better distribution of industries around the Metro Manila area. Inadvocating the choice of Bataan as
the project site for the petrochemicalcomplex, the BOI, however, made it clear in its view that the BOI or
thegovernment for that matter could only recommend as to where the projectshould be located. The BOI recognizes
and respects the principle that thefinal choice is still with the proponent who would in the final analysisprovide the
funding or risk capital for the project.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was abuse of discretion on the part of the Board ofInvestments for yielding to the wishes of the
investor, the national interestnotwithstanding?

HELD:
YES. under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty ofthe State to "regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals
andpriorities." The development of a self-reliant and independent nationaleconomy effectively controlled by Filipinos
is mandated in Section 19,Article II of the Constitution.Apetrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment
opportunity. Itshould not be treated like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-makingventure, or even an assembler
of cars or manufacturer of computer chips,where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit.
Thepetrochemical industry is essential to the national interest.
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government givenunprecedented favors, but through its regulatory
agency, the BOI, itsurrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initialchoice, a choice free from any
suspicion of unscrupulousmachinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the bestinterests of the Filipino people.

The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a graveabuse of discretion in approving the transfer of
the petrochemical plantfrom Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock fromnaphtha only to
naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final sayis in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary
notwithstanding.
No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer.This is a repudiation of the independent
policy of the governmentexpressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs theway it deems
best for the national interest.`

One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who inpart said he would not mind having a government
run like hell byFilipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it isnot even a foreign government but
an ordinary investor whom theBOI allows to dictate what we shall do with our heritage.
 ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 343, 1989
FACTS:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked andchallenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae
after performing hiseleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversaryto the ground thinking him
dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger toresume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules'increasing
amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned onHercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could
never die as longas any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned,Hercules then held Antaeus up
in the air, beyond the reach of thesustaining soil, and crushed him to death.Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of
life, without whoseinvigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.The cases before us are not as
fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they alsotell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who,
likeAntaeus, need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive."Land for the Landless" is a slogan that
underscores the acute imbalancein the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it ismore than a
slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become abattlecry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the
dispossessedamong us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935
mandated the policy ofsocial justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all thepeople," especially the less
privileged. In 1973, the new Constitutionaffirmed this goal, adding specifically that "the State shall regulate theacquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private propertyand equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.'
Significantly, therewas also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarianreform program aimed at
emancipating the tenant from the bondage of thesoil." The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing
thesesentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on SocialJustice and Human Rights, containing
grandiose but undoubtedly sincereprovisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in thefollowing
words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reformprogram.The cases involved have been consolidated because
they concerncommon legal questions, including serious challenges to theconstitutionality of RA 6657 otherwise known as
the ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Law of 1988 and other supplementary to RA 6657 suchas PD 27 (providing for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands fordistribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum landownership in
favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27) Pres. Proc. 131(instituting CARP) and EO 229 (providing the mechanics
ofimplementation of CARP) RA 6657 is the most recent legislation, signed into law by Pres. Aquino on June 10, 1988.
ISSUE: WON RA 6657, PD 57, Proc. 31 & Eos 228 & 229 considered asvalid and constitutional?
HELD:
YES. The assailed laws are considered as a valid exercise of both policepower and of eminent domain. The extent that it
sets retention limits is anexercise of police power. It must be noted that like taxation, the power ofeminent domain could
be used as an implement of police power of thestate. The expressed objective of thelaw was the promotion of the
welfareof the farners, which came clearly under the police power of the state. Toachieve this purpose, the law provided for
the expropriation of agriculturallands (subject to minimum retention limits for the landowner) to bedistributed among the
peasantry. As the ponencia observed:The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as thequestion of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that themeasures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits
forlandowners, there is an exercise of the police power for theregulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution.But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary todeprive such owners of whatever lands they
may own in excess ofthe maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under thepower of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation isimperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of theuse of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and thephysical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing
tothe owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercisenot of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain.It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitionscontemplate more than a mere
regulation of the use of private landsunder the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of privateagricultural
lands that has dispossessed the owners of their propertyand deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to
entitlethem to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.The expropriation before us affects all private
agricultural lands wheneverfound and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximumretention limits
allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intendedfor the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small
segment ofthe population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of oursociety, from the impoverished farmer to the
land-glutted owner. Itspurpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goesbeyond in time to the
foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure andedify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of
Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today,although hopefully only as
beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling lifewe will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today.And,
finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitutionitself that has ordained this revolution in the farms,
calling for "a justdistribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been theprison of their dreams but can now
become the key at least to theirdeliverance.Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will
betremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriationunder the laws before us, we estimate that
hundreds of billions of pesoswill be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initiallyappropriated, which is
already staggering as it is by our present standards.Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.We assume
that the framers of the Constitution were aware of thisdifficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority
project ofthe government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisionedthe expropriation that would be needed,
they also intended that the justcompensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a lessconventional if more
practical method. There can be no doubt that theywere aware of the financial limitations of the government and had
noillusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full forthe lands they wanted to be distributed among
the farmers. We maytherefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner ofpayment as is now provided for by
the CARP Law, particularly thepayment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), orindeed of the
entire amount of the just compensation, with other things ofvalue. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a
similarscheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the lawin force at the time they deliberated on the
new Charter and with whichthey presumably agreed in principle.In relation thereto, the just compensation to be made by
the Governmentin the form of financial instruments and not money is justified by therevolutionary character of of the
scheme and the need to allow thegovernment time to raise the funds needed.
 Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR
G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990
Facts:
On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which
includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business,
avers that it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13,
16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared
unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provies, among others, the
product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry business.
Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree
farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents
no more than 5% of the total investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers.
That the land is incidental but not the principal factor or consideration in their industry.
Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which
covers agricultural lands.

Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including in

its definition of Agriculture the livestock and poultyr industry?

Ruling:
The Court held YES.
Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the
word agriculture, it showed that the framers never intended to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform
program of the government.
Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reasin why they used the term
farmworkers rather than agricultural workers in the said law is because agricultural
workers includes the livestock and poultry industry, hence, since they do not intend to
include the latter, they used farmworkers to have distinction.
Hence, there is merit on the petitioners argument that the product-sharing plan applied
to corporate farms in the contested provisions is unreasonable for being consficatory
and violative of the due process of law.
 Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101,
November 22, 2011

I. THE FACTS
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition
filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution
Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are
operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared
that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the
original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI
stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences
and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret
voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be,
over their printed names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares
allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just
the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21,
1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999
(since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and
thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties,
whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with
respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain
with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier
decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since,
contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but
also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of
laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that
must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The
majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was
in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they
received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves
whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the
lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one
of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no
ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent
grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only
involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as
regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate
under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands
originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive
considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered
commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may
be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting
the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to
ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering
that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are
within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB
will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda
Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the
separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the
assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of
the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21, 1989 (the date
when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess
the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform
coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21,
1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the
contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of
the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the
Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme.
Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing
that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to
determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of
what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on
May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in
Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years
from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award
(CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant
case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of
the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the
FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at
agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to
persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain
as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given
the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital
stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI
stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of
[sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the
HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220
total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP
approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control
over HLI.]
 Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian
Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,
there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which
is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the
State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
 BASCO VS PAGCOR
FACTS:
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by Presidential Decree
1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power to establish, operate and maintain gambling
casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a
success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs charter
was updated through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and
integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR. They claim
that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal protection clause and b) it violates the local
autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila to waive its right
to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which
exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as
well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy
principle.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.

HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is
not clearly explained in Bascos petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449)
horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP
42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD.
1869 for one, unconstitutional.

Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause
does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long
as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all
persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The equal protection clause does
not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law
as though they were the same.

2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was
clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may
provide.

Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The
Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and abolish municipal
corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide
for exemptions or even take back the power.

Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is
a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are
owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government.

This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local governments.
 LIMBONA VS. MANGELIN
170 SCRA 786, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner is the elected speaker of the Batangas, pampook
of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brefity). Respondents are members of
said Assembly.
Congressman Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representative invited the petitioner in his
capacity as speaker of the Assembly to participate in consultation and
dialogue regarding the charting of the autonomous government of Muslim
Mindanao to be held in Manila.
Petitioner sent a telegram through the Secretary of the
Assembly to all the members thereof informing that there will be no
session this November in view of the invitation of Cong. Matalam.
However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session and declared
the seat of the Speaker vacant. This was reiterated in another session on
November 5 of same year.
Respondents allege that because the Sangguniang
Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in
their affairs, much less strike down their acts.
ISSUE:
Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now
constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other
words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous
governments of Region IX and XII?
HELD:
Yes, it may assume jurisdiction. In resolving this case the SC
made a differentiation between decentralization of administration and
decentralization of power.
There is Decentralization of administration when the
central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable,"
and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government
of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over
them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other
hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the
central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree
No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "the President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." In
the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is
made to discharge chiefly administrative services.
 PAMATONG VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate ofCandidacy for President. Respondent Commission on
Elections(COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate ofCandidacy in its Resolution No. 6558
dated January 17, 2004. Thedecision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners LuzvimindaG. Tancangco
and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as theybelieved he had parties or movements to back up his
candidacy.On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration ofResolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration wasdocketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitionersMotion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirantsfor national elective positions, denied the same
under the aegis ofOmnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELECdeclared petitioner and
thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates whocould not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by
apolitical party or are not supported by a registered political party with anational constituency. Commissioner Sadain
maintained his vote forpetitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.In this Petition For Writ of
Certiorari, petitioner seeks toreverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of hisright to equal
access to opportunities for public service under Section 26,Article II of the 1987 Constitution,[by limiting the number
of qualifiedcandidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaignand/or are nominated by political
parties. In so doing, petitioner arguesthat the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on
theelectoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choosetheir leaders. The COMELEC
supposedly erred in disqualifying him sincehe is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e.,
hepossesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of thepresident, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he hasnumerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has thecapacity to
wage an international campaign since he has practiced law inother countries, and he has a platform of government.
Petitioner likewiseattacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared bythe COMELEC.
Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear andreasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of
candidatessince it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his program of government.

ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional provision ensuring equal access toopportunities for public office creates a constitutional
right to run for orhold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency?
HELD:
NO.Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutionalprovision ensuring equal access to opportunities for
public office is theclaim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and,particularly in his case,
to seek the presidency. There is none. What isrecognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed bylaw.
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such aright nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right.There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggestssuch a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.The equal access provision is a subsumed part of ArticleII of the Constitution, entitled
Declaration of Principles and State Policies.The provisions under the Article are generally considered not
selfexecuting,and there is no plausible reason for according a differenttreatment to the equal access provision.
Like the rest of the policiesenumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judiciallyenforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline forlegislative or executive action.[3] The disregard of the
provision does notgive rise to any cause of action before the courts.An inquiry into the intent of the framers
produces the samedetermination that the provision is not self-executory. The originalwording of the present Section
26, Article II had read, The State shal lbroaden opportunities to public office and prohibit publicdynasties.
Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr .successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the
wordbroaden to the phrase ensure equal access, and the substitution of theword office to service. He
explained his proposal in this wise:I changed the word broaden to ENSUREEQUAL ACCESS TO because what
is important wouldbe equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, itwould necessarily mean that the government
would bemandated to create as many offices as are possible toaccommodate as many people as are also
possible.That is the meaning of broadening opportunities topublic service. So, in order that we should not
mandatethe State to make the government the number oneemployer and to limit offices only to what may
benecessary and expedient yet offering equalopportunities to access to it, I change the wordbroaden. [7] mphasis
supplied)Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State toenact positive measures that would
accommodate as many peopleas possible into public office. The approval of the Davideamendment indicates the
design of the framers to cast theprovision assimply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and notreflective of the
imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is tobe regarded as the source of positive rights. It
is difficult to interpret theclause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective meansand reach are not
properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claimsthat can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely
open-ended.[8] Words and phrases such as equal access, opportunities, andpublic service are susceptible to
countless interpretations owing to theirinherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framersto
inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from whichinnately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access toopportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some validlimitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found inthe provisions[9] of
the Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance Candidates
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452[10] dated December 10, 2002outlining the instances wherein theCOMELEC
may motu proprio refuse togive due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.As long as the limitations apply to
everybody equally withoutdiscrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equalityis not sacrificed
as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations aremeant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate ofcandidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person isexempt from the limitations or the
burdens which they create.
 LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
233 SCRA 163
Petitioner: Marcelino Libanan
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN and Agustin B. Docena
Ponente: J. Vitug

FACTS:

Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was a former member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 elections.

He was charged in conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude Docena (Respondent), a
qualified replacement of a deceased member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a
member of the said body.

In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution suspending their respective public position and
office for ninety (90) days.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if
executed shall affront the petitioners right for due process; [2] the suspension would assault his
covenant to the people of Samar as their vice-governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented
by the suspension no longer exist.

Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed
while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly
elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is valid?

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer
charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was
charged.

The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public
office is "a public agency or trust,"and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision
which petitioner invokes.

Hence, SC dismissed the petition. SANDIGANBAYANs decision is affirmed.

 AQUINO-SARMIENTO v. MORATO

[G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991.]

FACTS: In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of MTRCB, wrote its records officer
requesting that she be allowed to examine the boards records pertaining to the voting slips
accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television
productions. The records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from
respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be
examined. Petitioners request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that
whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the
individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, purely and completely
private and personal. Petitioner argues that the records she wishes to examine are public in character
and respondent Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking
examination of the boards records.

On July 27, 1989, the respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential,
private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members. In
a Board meeting held on June 22, 1989, respondent Morato told the Board that he has ordered some
deletion on the movie Mahirap ang Magmahal notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier
approved for screening by the Board with the classification R-18 without cuts. The respondent
explained that his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by
virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 dated June 22, 1988, which allows the Chairman of the
Board to downgrade a film already reviewed especially those which are controversial. Petitioner
seeks the nullification of Res. No. 88-1-25 and Res. No. 10-89.

ISSUE: WON Res. No. 88-1-25 and Res. No. 1089 are valid.

HELD: NO. It was held by the Supreme Court that the respondents refusal to allow petitioner to
examine the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as
well as the individual voting slips of its members, is violative of petitioners constitutional right of
access to public records. The SC also held that Morato, as Chairman of the MTRCB, is not vested
with any authority under the provisions of PD 1986 to reverse or overrule by himself alone a decision
rendered by a committee which conducted a review of motion pictures or television programs. The
power to classify motion pictures into categories such as General Patronage or For adults only is
vested with the respondent of the Board itself and not with the Chairman thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Granted. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by
the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void.
 Legaspi vs. CSC G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987

Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspis request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas
who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles
who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary
writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information.

The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It
is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspis actual interest in the
civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It
has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question
is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of
a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws.

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a

public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the
right.

The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress
for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.
 RICARDO VALMONTE VS FELICIANO BELMONTE
GR NO 74930, FEBRUARY 13, 1989

FACTS: A controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte a letter
requesting the list of names of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to
secure a clean loan of P2 Million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. Likewise, he is requesting
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. He argues Art VI, Sec 6 of Freedom
Constitution, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Deputy General of the GSIS Meynardo Tiro replied stating that Belmonte referred to him Valmontes
letter for study and reply. He stated that it is of confidential relationship exists between GSIS and all
those who borrow from it; that GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve its confidentiality.
Petitioner having not yet received the reply, wrote another letter saying that for failure to receive a
reply, they are now free to do whatever action necessary to pursue desired objective in pursuance of
public interest. Valmonte, joined by other petitioners, filed an instant suit.
July 19, 1986, Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct
interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including 10 opposition member, were granted housing
loand by GSIS.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS.
ISSUE: whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their
constitutional right to information.

HELD: An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought
and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to
the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to
check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech
is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information
ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent
information.
The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and
honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. But the right to information is not
absolute. Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public
interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda Marcos. GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. GSIS is expected to manage its resources with
utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential
conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests
of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the
Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS.
The "constituent ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function
would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to
information.
Whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
But it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined and certain
legal right to the thing demanded. The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there
being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and
records evidencing loans granted.