The industrialization of the Belgian Congo

Frans Buelens and Danny Cassimon

Introduction

Industrialization is a hallmark for measuring economic development as it is recognized that

economic development includes a shift from agriculture to industry and further on to
services. In general the terms of trade are more advantageous for manufacturing goods than
for raw materials. So industrialization is important (Rodrik 2004). Among others, the
historical examples of the United States and Japan are there to demonstrate the importance
of catching up with industrialization as well as the possibility to realize such industrialization
within a rather short period of time.

Although, as the China example makes clear, catching up is possible indeed for those
countries having (for whatever reason) not industrialized until now, this Chinese route
seems not to be applicable to a lot of countries, especially not to some of the former African
colonial possessions. They do not seem to be able to realize the take-off towards a
diversified industrialization and subsequent development of the service sector. One of the
most striking examples is the former Belgian Congo, being nowadays one of the poorest
countries in the world. Nevertheless, when the Belgian Congo became independent in 1960
it had a well developed economic structure; in fact it was one of the highest developed
countries of Africa. The debate on what went wrong afterwards is complicated as so many
issues are involved such as foreign intervention, civil war, the effects of dictatorship and the
long lasting influence of colonialism.

In this paper we will investigate the last issue by highlighting the economic development
pattern of the Belgian Congo. In particular we will focus on the analysis of its
industrialization pattern. We will indicate the following points. First, although Congo is often
cited as an example of a Raubwirtschaft colonial type (referring to the Belgian King
Leopold II reign), there was an important evolution in the overall economic structure
especially after 1908. Second, the Belgian Congo was seen as a country to exploit in the
interest of Belgium that could profit from the Congo raw materials and tropical products and
that could gather high dividends from its capital export. Third, this would not prevent that
the Belgian Congo was one of the most industrialized countries of Africa in 1960. Fourth,
even an advanced social security system was elaborated during the 1950s and considerable
efforts were made in the medical and educational sector (although concentrated in primary
schooling). Fifth, there was a huge kind of uneven development between rural and urban
areas, as well as between regions. Sixth, human capital development was highly neglected,
especially with regard to the formation of highly skilled Africans. In fact Belgium simply did
not allow Africans in any administrative, political, military, or company top job and forbade
university schooling for Africans until 1954 (except for religious schooling).
Section 1 will highlight some of the particularities of the now-DRC that are of importance for
understanding the specific Congolese industrialization pattern. Section 2 will show how this
industrialization evolved over time, dividing the industrialization process in three
(sub)periods. In the first period (1920-1940) a first wave of industrialization takes place,
centered on the export of raw materials (tropical crops as well as minerals) and supported
by state investments in infrastructure. The second period (1940-1958) sees a second wave of
industrialization starting with the Second World War, and continuing into the 1950s. It is
characterized by a growing internal market, a tendency to import substitution and a
changing class structure. By the end of the colonial era a third period seems to announce
itself with big plans for the development of the capital goods sector. These plans were
however never realized during the colonial era. Later on, during the Mobutu dictatorship,
some of these plans would be partially realized, although the overall economic structure had
collapsed. Section 3 provides some overall data on the Congo industrialization. Section 4
summarizes and concludes.

Section 1. Congos economic history and some of its particularities

In 1885, when the colonization of the Congo took place, the territories of what is by now
called the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were a sparsely populated region in the
Middle of Africa. Their economic activities were restricted to hunting, fishing and agriculture.
By 1960, when the country became independent, the economic structure had profoundly
changed1. The main economic activity of the country had become mining; the second most
important activity related to tropical products such as palm oil, cotton, coffee etc. But the
economic structure was not restricted to mining and tropical products. Congo had obtained
the second highest degree of industrialization of Sub Saharan Africa (Huybrechts 2010).
Global industrialization rates were about 14% of the countrys GDP; whereas in some regions
(as that of Leopoldville, now Kinshasa 2 ) more than 25% of economic activity was in
industrialization. African agriculture however had become the handmaiden of this
development, with an agricultural population that was one of the poorest of Africa. In the
decades after 1960 this vast industrial and mining structure would collapse. Some particular
elements in the history of Belgian colonialism can contribute to understanding what went
wrong (see also Buelens 2007).

In 1885 the Congo Free State was born under the reign of King Leopold II, who was also king
of Belgium (and from then on King of two countries). The Congo at the time did not exist as a
single country. It came into existence as a unified territory under colonial domination. The
Berlin Act of 1885 gave some official status to this acquisition. The Act would play an
important role in the way the economic structure of the country would develop. Indeed, due
to that Act it was forbidden for colonial rulers to develop a protectionist policy towards

1
For an extensive list with the number of all companies by sector and sub sector, see
especially Centrale Bank van Belgisch-Congo en Ruanda Urundi (1959).
2
Throughout the text we will use the historical names and indicate also their actual names.
As in so many other colonies it was European practice to give European names to original
African places; some towns created by European colonists even had no African name.
Leopoldville would be named Kinshasa after 1960. Originally however Kinshasa and
Leopoldville were two separate places, near to each other.
other countries; no infant industry policy was allowed here. The Berlin Act defined the
Congo Free State as a free trade zone prohibiting Belgium to establish a preferential trade
tariff in the Belgian Congo. Later on this would imply that Belgian owned companies would
be founded in the Belgian Congo in order to meet with foreign competition. In 1925 e.g.
textile company TEXAF was founded in order to meet with systematic dumping practices of
Japan that tried to conquer the Congo market (Lacroix 1967: 19).

Colonization had started with the expropriation of the Congolese population of their lands.
By the ordinance of 1/7/1885 the principle of free estates ("terres vacantes") was
established. The overwhelming part of the Congo territory became state owned (Dubois
1913: 13). Only those small territories in which people lived remained free of state
ownership. Following the colonial state would use these estates in order to give big land
grants, (mining and other) concessions (for a long period of time) or even sell the estates to
colonial investors. In exchange the colonial state received stocks of those colonial companies,
making the colonial state the biggest investor in the Congo. This Congo Portfolio would
enable the colonial state to finance most of its activities, due to the high dividends paid by
colonial companies (Buelens and Marysse 2009). Later on, during the Second World War,
Congo would even finance the Belgian government in exile as well as provide for the
servicing of the Belgian debt (Huybrechts 2010).

Rather soon after 1885 the Congo proved to be one of the richest mining regions of Africa
and even of the whole world. Consequently, colonial exploitation focused on first the rubber,
ivory and copal business (during King Leopold II), switching to mining in 1906 with the
foundation of the three mining companies UMHK (Union Minire du Haut Katanga),
Forminire (Socit Internationale Forestire et Minire du Congo) and BCK (Compagnie du
Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga (BCK). Each of them received enormous land grants.
In the meantime King Leopold II had come under severe attack for his colonial practices; as a
consequence political power switched from Leopold II to Belgium in 1908. But more
importantly (Ndaywel Nziem 1998 28-30), economic power switched to the Socit
Gnrale de Belgique, one of the strongest holding companies in Europe at the time. When
in 1928 the Banque dOutremer merged with Socit Gnrale, the most important Congo
holding company, the CCCI the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie -
provided Socit Gnrale with the near total control of the Belgian Congo.

From 1906 on mining became the centerpiece of colonial policy. It had heavy consequences
for population policy and for African agriculture. Indeed, as the country was thinly populated
(approximately 10 million people around 1908; 14.4 million in 1959) (Huybrechts 2010: 25)
and the need for miners was high, mining companies like UMHK tried to attract miners from
other regions out of their villages. African agriculture lost most of its workforce. It
contributed to a highly uneven development of the Belgian Congo, with African agriculture
devastated in favor of a few mining regions, with the mining centre of Elisabethville (now
Lubumbashi), where UMHK was located, as the most important one. The countryside, where
tropical products were harvested, did not develop in the same way. Prices were kept low; its
products were shipped to be exported. This gave rise to the further development of a
second growth pole in the region around Leopoldville, the main commercial centre, situated
at the Congo river. In fact, that town had developed already during the Congo Free State
period as an important place for trade. In the late 1920s it became also the capital of the
Belgian Congo and gained in importance due to a lot of administrative activities.

Belgium followed a hugely apartheid-inspired colonial ruling system, based on brutal military
force. The Force Publique was led by Belgian officers and trained in oppressing people.
Belgium held all of the top jobs in the administration, in the army as well as in companies in
its own hands. Attending university was simply forbidden for Africans (until 1954); top
functions were only for Europeans. Belgium thought it would be needed for ruling the Congo
for a thousand years to come. Thus colonial rulers highly neglected human capital formation
during the colonial era. As a result, when in 1960 Africans took over, they had never been
given the opportunity to develop their skills in administering the country, nor in military or in
political functions, in the management of companies, in law, in civil engineering etc. It would
prove to be a disaster.

Political unrest, civil war as well as foreign intervention contributed to this, but the Belgian
colonial policy of keeping Africans out of any leading position also had a huge responsibility
in this process. It made the Congo to become a fragile state. When in 1960 Patrice Lumumba
became the first democratic elected Prime Minister of the Belgian Congo, both the Belgian
government and the Socit Gnrale were not pleased. Instead of giving full support to the
first elected government, Belgian neo-colonialist interventions contributed a lot to political
instability. Patrice Lumumba was murdered, and the (rich) Katanga and Kasai provinces
started secession, leading to the Congo Secession War. When Mobutu took over he received
full support from Belgium, notwithstanding that under the Mobutu dictatorship the Congo
would be led to ruin.

Section 2. The evolving industrialization process of the Belgian Congo

2.1. Raubwirtschaft

There can hardly be any doubt that the primary (and nearly sole) objective of the first stage
of the Congo (the Congo Free State, as a personal possession of King Leopold II) was to
exploit the colony by extracting as much profit as possible from the exploitation of its natural
resources. Almost all the lands were appropriated by the state (Decree of 1885) and would
later on be used to be sold or to be given as concessions to private companies. The Congo
People was submitted to severe exploitation. Rubber, ivory and copal were the main
products extracted by a cruel system of forced labor (Gann and Duignan 1979 30). Other
tropical crops such as the exploitation of tropical timber from the forests of Mayumb (near
the Atlantic Ocean) would follow.

This system has rightly been characterized as Raubwirtschaft. It led to a stylized image of
the Congo: At one extreme, European powers set up "extractive states," exemplified by the
Belgian colonization of the Congo (Acemoglu 2001). Highly inspired by what the Dutch did
in Indonesia, the King took it for granted that colonies should be exploited under supervision
of the state for the well being of Belgium. The most violent exploitation of natural and
human resources would take place (Jewsiewicki 1983a). Population would diminish sharply
during this era.
The Congo being a big trading economy, a central place was reserved for the growth and
development of Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). The town was situated at the Congo river,
some 400 km from the coast. It was the central place for acquiring trading products from
elsewhere in the Congo (transported mainly by the Congo River) and for transporting them
further on by the Congo railway (connecting Matadi with Leopoldville). This will be an
important issue, as it will be exactly this city centre that will develop into the main centre of
one of the two main growth centers of the Belgian Congo.

The Raubwirtschaft met fierce resistance from the international community at the time,
forcing King Leopold II to transfer the Congo in 1908 to the supervision of the Belgian state.
The Belgian Congo was born. Things would change somewhat in the years after, although
the bare essence of an extractive state remained, the main difference being that is was by
now done on in a more scientific way of exploitation3. From an economic point of view,
the sectoral composition would be changing too, with ivory, rubber and copal no longer
being the main economic items, for replaced by copper and other metals. The foundation of
the 3 companies of 1906 (UMHK, Forminire and BCK; see earlier), all of them based in
Katanga, marked the switch. Of course, it would take several years before they would be
able to start mining production and the process of transformation was somewhat hampered
by the First World War. But soon after the war the new economic policy would become
visible.

It is hardly possible to talk about industrialization as such in that period. Nevertheless there
were some companies who saw light in that period such as SOCOL (Socit Colonial de
Construction). It was founded in 1911 for the construction of the railway Elisabethville-
Bukama4. Indeed, during the first decades a lot of attention went to one of the basic
infrastructural needs of colonization: transport. The main means of transport in the Belgian
Congo was the Congo river; additional equipment was in railways. Until the end of
colonization both means would dominate the transport industry.

2.2. The first wave of industrialization (1920-1939)

Soon after the First World War the scientific exploitation of the Belgian Congo could start
up, in contrast to the Raubwirtschaft policy of Leopold II. But that did not mean the Congo
would be developed in the interests of its people. Belgium joined the overall mercantile
colonial opinion, stating that colonies had to supply the mother countries with raw

3
For example, Flicien Cattier, professor at the Free University of Brussels (ULB, Universit
Libre de Bruxelles) and from 1935 on vice-governor of the Socit Gnrale, criticized
Leopold II in the following way: "... L'Etat du Congo n'est point un Etat colonisateur (..) c'est
peine un Etat : c'est une entreprise financire (..) La colonie n'a t administre ni dans les
intrts des indignes ni mme dans l'intrt conomique de la Belgique: Procurer au Roi-
Souverain un maximum de ressources, tel a t le ressort de l'activit gouvernementale."
(Cattier 1906 341).
4
Later on it would develop into a multinational company and changed its name in 1941 in
Socit Continentale et Coloniale de Construction (Socol), specialized in industrial
constructing all over the world.
materials. Belgium focused on the theory of comparative advantage. It saw the Congos
comparative advantage mainly in (a) minerals for export (b) tropical products. Belgium
would export in exchange machinery and other manufactured products5. And it would
receive huge amounts of dividends in exchange for Belgian capital exports to the Congo. But
Belgian exporters pursued an aggressive strategy not to let foreign competition grow in the
Congo basin. Only those products with complementary aspects with Belgian industries were
allowed and favored. Belgium had a strong position in metalworking and machinery.
Following it tried to export as many of these products to the Belgian Congo6.

Within this context industrialization took place, directly linked to mining, commercial centre
activities and tropical crops. It was mainly financed by Belgian investors: a sharp increase of
(Belgian) foreign direct investment in the Belgian Congo in the period 1920-28 can be
observed (giving rise to a sharp competition for scarce African labor). As can be seen from
table 1 the capital account balance was increasing from 92 million BEF7 in 1920 to 1530
million BEF in 1928, mainly due to private foreign investments. Industrial production
developed in both export and import substituting activities. In fact there was roughly a
50/50 division between both sectors (Lacroix 1967: 2). But this did not mean that any kind of
industrial production was favored. Roughly speaking, industrial production for export was (a)
for the first transformation in cases where it was too costly to export products as such (for
example for copper) (b) for those transformations where it was for technical reasons not
otherwise possible, for example palm oil (Ahrens 1953: 31). Besides, industrial production
for the home market was for a certain range of consumer goods for which it was more
profitable to produce them directly in the Belgian Congo (for example: beer, cotton fabrics,
cement) or industrial goods whenever these were needed to keep production going (for
example cement, electrical production or chemicals for the mining companies). The Belgian
Congo started the production of cement (1920), soap (1922), beer (1924); cotton fabrics

5
For example, Xavier Carton de Wiart, the son of Henry Carton de Wiart wrote in 1930: "La
mise en valeur des territoires coloniaux (...) n'est pas, pour les nations blanches une question
de simple profit: c'est une ncessit vitale. Comme au temps des Conquistadors, nos
comptoirs d'outre-mer nous envoient leurs pices, leur ivoire, leurs bois, le mtal-or de notre
trsor public, mais ils nous envoient surtout l'tain, le cuivre, le coton que rclament nos
ingnieurs et nos ouvriers, le cacao, le caf, l'huile, indispensables notre alimentation, les
diamants, le radium." (Carton de Wiart 1930: 12). Henry Carton de Wiart was the brother of
Edmond Carton de Wiart, the former Secretary of Leopold II and from 1910 on, a director of
the Socit Gnrale.
6
la Belgique naurait pas permis limplantation au Congo dune industrie de base
concurrente des producteurs belges. (Lacroix 1967: 21) This line of conduct was held on.
Even in 1953 when the Antwerp based TITAN ANVERSOIS company founded the Ateliers de
Leopoldville, it met with such fierce competition from Usines Tubes, a daughter
company of the Socit Gnrale that it had to close its doors. One of the reasons was that
the government had lowered the import taxes on tubes making it easier for Usines Tubes
to import their products (Joye and Lewin 1961: 101; Lacroix 1967: 326). According to the
chairman of the Board of directors, Lucien Varda, Titan Anversois had been the victim of
dumping practices (Moniteur des Intrts Matriels, 31/01/1959).
7
BEF stands for Belgian Franc, but Belgium created also the COF (Congolese Franc) that had
the same parity as the Belgian Franc.
(1925), sugar (1925) and even some metal fabrication companies (Lacroix 1967: 21). A brief
overview in the remainder of this section will document the nature of this first
industrialization.

Table 1. Capital account of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi (1920-1939) (million BEF)
Capital account Current account Overall balance
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1920 84 8 92 57 149
1921 39 47 86 -110 -24
1922 120 77 197 -78 119
1923 162 -47 115 25 140
1924 64 121 185 42 227
1925 369 170 539 -250 289
1926 587 450 1037 -540 497
1927 720 -45 675 -530 145
1928 1614 -84 1530 -409 1121
1929 989 210 1199 -343 856
1930 1236 261 1497 -284 1213
1931 736 341 1077 -279 798
1932 -24 581 577 -238 319
1933 -108 376 268 -77 191
1934 -3 -326 -329 186 -133
1935 -198 -456 -654 287 -367
1936 -955 1126 171 218 389
1937 -119 -328 -447 537 90
1938 -78 -204 -282 82 -200
1939 -9 109 100 106 206
(1) Capital operations in the long run (private capital)
(2) Capital operations in the long run(government capital)
(3) Capital account balance (long run)
(4) Current account balance
(5) Overall balance
Source: Vandewalle (1966 : 77)

2.2.1. Mining and the industrialization of Katanga

Congo was rich in minerals (gold, copper, cobalt, tantalite, columbite, cassiterite, uranium,
tin ). Belgium concentrated all its economic efforts into the exploitation of these minerals.
Industrial development in that region was the handmaiden of the export of those raw
materials. Especially in Katanga (the home base of UMHK) this gave rise to an impressive
industrialization wave in several sectors. First, as Katanga was that far away from the
Atlantic Ocean, it was not profitable to export many raw materials as such, they had to
undergo a first transformation in order to lower transport costs. Second, as Katanga was
sparsely populated and produced not enough food other industries had to be developed
such as mills and meat producing farms. So in 1923 the Brasseries du Katanga (Brassekat)
was founded (brewery), in 1924 Compagnie dElevage et dAlimentation du Katanga (Elakat),
in 1929 the Minoteries du Katanga, in 1930 Compagnie des Grands Elevages Congolais
(Grelco). Third, there were the housing needs of the staff and the construction needs of the
firms that gave rise to the development of all kind of construction linked firms: Ciments du
Katanga (Cimenkat) (founded in 1922); Compagnie Foncire du Katanga (1922). Fourth, a lot
of supporting activities such as electricity power plants, chemicals (Sogechim was founded in
19298) and metal construction workhouses were needed. As far as energy is concerned, the
UMHK had the highest power generation capacity in place of the Belgian Congo9 (other
mining regions as Kilo-Moto also had power plants of a lower capacity). Due to the rather
low production output traditional thermal processes were used by UMHK at first,
notwithstanding the extremely high cost of coke (that had first to be imported from Europe,
afterwards from South Rhodesia). But UMHK looked for using hydraulic resources
(Gouverneur 1971 57). Indeed, the Belgian Congo offers great possibilities for electricity, as
its hydraulic power potential is enormous. From 1930 on the Socit Gnrale des Forces
Hydro-Electriques du Katanga (Sogefor), a daughter company of the UMHK, realized a series
of hydro electric power plants in Katanga; Sogelec, Socit Gnrale Africaine dElectricit (a
daughter company of Sogefor) would exploit it. All this implied that a vast network of
interconnected firms was founded to make mining possible.

Industrialization as a consequence of mining needs was especially developed in the Katanga

region. In other regions of the Belgian Congo, mining was far from absent but the diamond
production in Kasai or the gold production in Kilo-Moto did not give rise to the same
development of an industrial network as the mining needs in Katanga did.

2.2.2. Tropical products

Belgium decided to transform African agriculture by the system of compulsory crops, with
cotton being the main item (besides other tropical products as palm oil, coffee, cacao,
timber, tabac ). Nearly 800.000 villagers were obliged to grow cotton. This served the
interests of the (at the time) vast textile industry in Belgium that would no longer be
dependent on the raw materials from other countries. Following in 1920 the COTONCO
company was founded, that would buy all the cotton produced by African farmers (Cotonco
did not have own cotton plantations). The purchase of raw cotton took place at a state-
defined (low) minimum price in order to make Belgian textile companies competitive on an
international scale. The Congo transformed in one big cotton plantation, comparable to the
Southern United States. Large areas of the Congo (including Ul, Maniema, Ubangi, Kivu,
Lualaba and Lusambo) became compulsory cotton producers (Foutry 1986: 122-24, Vellut
1979: 370). In 1947 Cotonco had 73 factories all over the Congo.

Besides cotton, a second main crop was palm oil production. This was mainly the work of
UNILEVER10. Already in 1911 the Lever Company had acquired vast territories in the Belgian

8
Sogchim produced mainly sulphuric acid, needed for the production of electrolytic copper
for UMHK) (Dumortier 1947).
9
The construction of electric power plants during colonial times has been highly unevenly
throughout the country and mainly linked to industrial power plants (exception made for the
region of Leopoldville).
10
Originally Lever Brothers; Unilever was the result of a merger in 1930 between the Dutch
Margarine Unie with Lever Brothers.
Congo. Lord Lever acquired five big circle areas in the Congo. Production was done by
salaried and by small farmers. The main aim was export. But due to technical reasons it was
not possible to export the oil as such; it had to undergo a first transformation. That was the
main reason why Huileries du Congo Belge (founded in 1911) set up a lot of factories in the
Belgian Congo. As such, palm oil became a major export crop (second after cotton) with the
Belgian Congo being the second African exporter after Nigeria (Lacroix 1967: 243).

African agriculture became the handmaiden of economic (industrial) development. But it did
not stop with the transformation of agriculture towards export crops. Because of massive
mining recruitment campaigns African villages were deprived of the majority of their young
and strong workers, leaving older people, women and children populating these villages. It
would lead to the impoverishment of the rural areas.

2.2.3. Consumption products for the internal market: the role of Leopoldville
Not all of cotton production was for export; in 1925, a Belgian firm, Texaf, was founded. It
would produce vast amounts of textile products for the internal market. Texaf would
become active mainly in the Leopoldville region. This was a logical choice. Indeed it was
immediately connected with the fast growing commercial township of Leopoldville, one of
the two main growth centers of the Belgian Congo11. Later on, it would also become the
capital of the country (instead of Boma). Several industries were developed in its
surroundings, all of them to serve the immediate needs of the town (and region). Breweries
were started from 1923 on, with the foundation of Brasserie de Leopoldville. Texaf would
become a holding company in 1934; transferring her textile manufacturing activities in
Usines Textiles de Leopoldville (UtexLeo). In 1925 the sugar industry started with the
foundation of Compagnie Sucrire Congolaise (at Moerbeke-Kwilu). This company was the
copybook example Congolese firm: Compagnie Sucrire Congolaise not only developed sugar
activities but also activities in the field of construction, metal working, timber industry and
hospitals (Lippens 1953: 65). Just like in Katanga, construction was an important business.
Construction for manufacturing aims as well as residential construction called for the
development of construction companies and all the materials it needed, one of the most
important being cement. In 1920 a cement industry was created in Lukula (Ciments du
Congo); in 1928 Compagnie Immobilire du Congo became responsible for housing; not
unimportant as cities were growing fast (Kipr 1993). Besides, investments were also made
in supporting activities, the main one being shipbuilding. Indeed, as the Congo River was the
main means of transport, ships (and maintenance facilities) were needed. In 1928 Chanic
(Chantier Naval et Industriel du Congo) was founded, near Leopoldville. Before World War II
Chanic was mainly busy in assembling components from ships coming from Belgium
(Cockerill Yards, Hoboken, near Antwerp) as well as in maintenance activities. Last but not
least, just as in Katanga, there was a huge need for energy. In 1923 the Socit Coloniale
dElectricit (Colectric) was founded. It would distribute electricity from the electric power
plant of Zongo. Additionally, in 1930 the Forces Hydro-Electriques de Sanga would start
production of the Sanga Waterfalls on the Congo River (near to Leopoldville).

11
The influence of Leopoldville would reach the wide environment going even into
Stanleyville (Kisangani nowadays), considered as a third potential (although minor) growth
centre.
The first wave of investment came to an end with the crisis of the thirties. Nearly no new
investments took place, and existing companies were severely hit. For example, one out of
three soap companies was liquidated (Lacroix 1967: 169). Moreover European and African
labor was shrinking; several companies replaced even European labor with African labor.
Being an export economy of raw materials, prices as well as export volumes were heavily
shrinking. The colonial government was focused however on the export markets and tried to
do everything to save the export industry. Industrial production for the internal market did
also diminish. Between 1930 and 1935 overall internal market demand fell back to the 1920
level. Production for the internal market would only again reach the 1929 level in 1944
(Lacroix 1967: 169). Examples are numerous and are well documented by Lacroix: Cement
production fell down from 64.000 ton (1929) to 21.000 ton (1944); Beer production from
24.000 hl (1929) to 8700 hl (1934); Internal consumption of sugar fell from 2100 ton (1929)
to 937 ton (1933) and reached 2125 ton in 1938 (Lacroix 1967: 169-170).

From 1935 on things changed. Even some new investments were made; the multinational
Bata shoe company would found Socit Bata Congolaise in 1937 (Joye 1961: 273) with a
manufacturing unit in Leopoldville. But the real upswing would come with the Second World
War.

2.3. The Second Wave of Industrialization (1940-1957)

The Second World War (and its aftermath) fundamentally changed the Congolese economy.
First, huge requirements in minerals and crops were put forward for allied efforts to win the
war12. Following this, productive capacity and production increased enormously. Industrial
production rose at a high average rate of at least 14 % a year in the period 1935-1949
(Lacroix 1967: 21-22). In 1951, tropical agricultural product exports stood at 7,694 billion
BEF (on total exports of 20,406 billion BEF) compared to 388 millions BEF and 1,533 billion
BEF in 1937 (Ahrens 1953 31). The number of enterprises was sharply increasing from 7396
in 1948 to 11784 enterprises in 1952. The number of construction companies would rise
from 104 in 1948 to 402 in 1952 (Derkinderen 1953 42-51). This tremendous change had
several consequences (see also Peemans 1975a).

First, the transport infrastructure was no longer adapted to such an expanding economy. It
would need important investments after the war. Second, due to this increase in production
the number of miners and workers increased sharply (from 480.000 (1940) to 800.000
(1945)) and the uneven development between the rural areas and the industrial centers
(and towns) was even more disturbed than before. Third, as the Second World War cut all
the links between the Belgian Congo and Belgium and as the number of workers increased,
companies were forced to upgrade the skills of their African workers: at the end of the war
high skilled workers and (lower) clerks occupied positions they did not held before the war.
Fourth, companies made enormous profits. These accumulated reserves would be able to
finance a lot of post-war investments. Congo was even forced to finance the Belgian

12
One example out of many states that firms had to work all day round: "L'norme effort de
guerre accompli par les Usines Textiles de Leopoldville pendant la guerre et toujours pour le
moment: les usines ont march presque continuellement 24 heures par jour." (Fransolet 1947:
185).
government in exile. Fifth, as imports from Belgium had no longer been possible during the
war and industrial sectors had seen competition from European providers diminish due to
the war, they had been able to develop further. A typical example is Chanic. It developed
into a real metalworking conglomerate with a diversified production. During World War II,
Chanics activities exploded. The complete construction of ships came to pass the spot and
thus led to a real shipyard industry in the Congo. Chanic diversified its production to food
cans and took on the distribution of products from Caterpillar and other (mostly American)
companies. Moreover, it would help founding other companies such as Cegeac (Compagnie
Gnrale d'Automobiles et d'Aviation du Congo) and Congacier. It had a staff of more than
3000 after the Second World War.

Besides economic changes something more fundamentally changed at the social and
political level. First the world would never be the same again, with regard to the idea of
colonialism. Neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States accepted old fashioned
European colonialism. A growing number of colonized peoples urged to become
independent; it would not be otherwise in the Belgian Congo. Second, the class composition
of Congo had profoundly changed with a growing (lower) middle class, an industrial working
class and an impoverished poor agricultural population. This changing class structure would
favor independence. Third Belgian official colonialist doctrine changed the focus from
exploitative colonialism towards development colonialism. It was motivated by some
concern over the social condition of the Congolese people but also about the best way to
meet with the growing resistance against colonization. Consequently during the 1945-1958
period the Congolese internal market developed through a policy of increasing wages, social
security systems (pensions and child allowances) and even a minimum wage. Besides the
opportunity of being able to manufacture and sell consumer goods in a well-developed
internal market, the political motive was also important, as stated by Derkinderen: the
Government wants to support the middle classes, in order to stabilize the home-market ()
these middle classes are necessary, if only to act as intermediaries between big capital and
the aboriginal proletariat. These classes, to which natives should be admitted, will further a
peaceful evolution. (Derkinderen 1953: 52).

In the meantime, on the economic side, a Ten Year Plan (1949-1959) was elaborated. That
plan put forward huge investments in the Congo. The 1949-1959 Ten Year Plan was
essentially aimed at adapting and developing transport infrastructure, as this was no longer
suited to the needs of the state of development of the Congo economy. Additional Capital
(public and private) investments between 1950 and 1957 stood at about 124 billion BEF or
(on average) 27.5 percent of GDP per year (Peemans 1975b: 187-193; Vanthemsche 1993:
345). Strong economic growth asked for such a high investment volume in public
infrastructure. Financing could partly be done by reserves, partly by new loans. Planning was
in the mood, partly due to the Soviet Union successes, partly due to the Keynesian answer to
the crisis of the 1930s. But near to absent in the Ten Year Plan was any meaningful
investment in African agriculture. Moreover, some very promising objectives, such as the
foundation of a Socit de Dveloppement Colonial (in order to stimulate the building of
strategic sectors ) and a Socit pour le Dveloppement de lEconomie Indigne (in
order to stimulate the building of small entreprises by Africans), were not carried through.
During the War growth rates were extremely high. Now, when the war was over, growth
rates continued their high levels. The Ten Year Plan, the Cold War, the Korean War, strategic
stockpiling by allied powers and the fear of a Third World War kept the Congo economy on
the same high growth path. Especially growth rates in the mining sector were high. Growth
rates of individual mining products for some minerals as tantalite-columbite boomed to
more than 722 % only between 1946 and 1952. For wolfram it was 396%, for cobalt 217 %,
for zinc 183 % and even for copper 42%. The total value of mineral exports rose from 3,314
billion BEF (in 1946) to 12,108 billion BEF (in 1952) (Marthoz 1953: 71)13.

Besides all this, there was also an additional factor: a widespread fear that a Third World
War was near. It made the Belgian government looking for a place to flight and the Socit
Gnrale turning to other regions for investments with Canada and the Belgian Congo as two
of the favorite ones. The result was an additional huge amount of investment in the Belgian
Congo.

Between 1950 and 1957, not only the mining sector was growing fast, but also the annual
average growth rate of industrial production was extremely high at 14.3 % (Lacroix 1967: 22).
This was also reflected in the evolution of the volume index of industrial production.
Between 1939 and 1957 the index grew by 622% for food, by 2843% for textiles, by 1251%
for chemicals and by 2489 % for construction (see table 2).

Table 2. Evolution of the volume index of industrial production (1939-1957)

Food Textiles Chemicals Construction Divers Total
1939 41 21 35 19 10 29
1940 44 25 44 15 9 30
1941 45 27 53 28 26 38
1942 59 27 75 30 27 46
1943 69 44 70 44 29 54
1944 72 42 71 54 32 59
1945 73 69 75 52 52 64
1946 79 67 81 58 60 71
1947 89 81 91 87 61 82
1948 100 102 76 105 95 99
1949 111 116 133 108 144 119
1950 124 160 145 201 147 147
1951 146 327 154 244 175 179
1952 158 392 196 283 218 206
1953 186 446 304 339 267 250
1954 212 524 330 413 280 280
1955 237 601 412 432 310 315
1956 272 697 448 462 336 349
1957 296 618 473 492 387 377
Total (%) 622 2843 1251 2489 3770 1200

13
The only exception was gold. Due to the fixed price imposed by the Bretton Woods
agreement, gold production rose only by 10% between 1946 and 1952 (Marthoz 1953: 71)
 Source: Centrale Bank van Belgisch-Congo en Ruanda Urundi (1959: 4).

Existing activities expanded rapidly. Existing companies had magnificent years with e.g. the
shoe industry, having a production volume of 3 million pairs of shoes in 1959, which
represented 25% of the production volume of Belgian shoe companies (Joye 1961 107). That
growing internal market saw also a lot of new activities started up. For example in 1947
Brasseries de Leopoldville founded a new company Bouteillerie de Leopoldville. The brewery
sector had a tremendous expansion with the foundation of breweries all over the country.
Textiles expanded further too (see also Moxhon 1953): Besides UtexLeo (spinning and
weaving of cotton; printing of fabrics), Socit Coloniale de Textiles (Socotex) (1946)
(blankets) and Tissaco (1947) (Filatures et Tissages de Fibres au Congo) (jute bags) were
founded in the region of Leopoldville. Especially foreign multinational companies came in
but also a lot of Belgian companies such as e.g. Eternit (Eternit-Congo, 1947). Indeed, as the
Congolese economy was booming Belgian exporters tried to aggressively develop all kind of
strategies to protect and increase the export of their products. They were actively supported
by colonial authorities. For example, in 1951, a commercial register was introduced,
protecting entrepreneurs from rogue competitors; the same objective was aimed at by
provisions to protect trademarks (Cleys 2002). The giant Belgian business organization
Fabrimetal opened up an office in Leopoldville. The growth of industrial production
between 1950 and 1957 was on average 14.3 % (Lacroix 21/22). The participation rate of
workers in the commercial economy stood at 59% (of which 30 % as workers), being
among the highest in Africa (Lacroix 1967: 26-28). Financial results were not disappointing
investors: the average return on investment (net profits/capital plus reserves) for industrial
companies was always situated above 12% during the 1950-57 period (CBBCRU 1959: 11).

Besides its expansion, industrial production was also becoming more capital intensive and
also productivity increased. This was mainly due to the exhaustion of labor and the
increasing wage level. As a result the number of industrial workers decreased from 134.466
(1950) to 121.232 (1957) although the totality of workers increased from 962.209 (1950) to
1.147.712 workers (1957) (CBBCRU 1959: 9).

2.2.4. Inga, Capital Flight and the war for independence (1958-1960)
Consumer goods were not the only industrial sector. In the mining centers of Katanga a vast
industrial conglomerate of industrial activities was expanding further. Construction activities
were booming; metal and chemicals were developed too. The Katanga region was a highly
developed industrial region, highly attributable to the UMHK activities and its extremely high
profits that allowed UMHK to be the major contributor to the Congo state finances. in the
period 1950-1960 only, UMHK tranfered the huge amount of 26.99 billion BEF in dividends

But industrial plans would not stop at the door of the UMHK. In the course of the 1950s
several far reaching ideas were developed to give a boost to the development of the
Congolese economy, especially from the side of development of heavy industries and
subsequent energy and transport requirements. Transport had been the prime focus of the
Ten Year Plan. Now it was time to turn to energy. Plans were envisaged for a petroleum
refinery near to Kitona at the Atlantic Ocean14. But the most important idea was in the field
of electricity provision. As stated earlier electricity power plants were highly developed
(mainly for UMHK) but rather unevenly distributed throughout the country. But now a giant
plan was under study: an enormous hydraulic power plant the INGA hydraulic power plant.
The site has one of the largest waterfalls in the world (Inga Falls), as the Congo River drops
96 meters; it has at that place a flow of 42,476 m/s on average. To develop an electric
power plant in such conditions was an old idea, with e.g. the Syneba Syndicate (Syndicat
dEtude du Bas Congo) already examining the issue in 1929 (see Willame 1986: 29-30). It was
to be developed on the Congo River near the Atlantic Ocean, some 40 km from Matadi. This
hydraulic power plant should be able to deliver enormous quantities of electricity, making it
possible to develop steel mills, aluminum mills and chemical industries. It was hoped that
once a minimal threshold level of firms was operating it would have a big catalytic effect on
attracting and/or founding other firms.

The colonial government founded the Inga Institute ( Institut National dEtudes pour le
dveloppement du Bas-Congo ) in 1957. A Belgian consortium was interested (Sydelinga)
including companies such as Traction-Electricit, Electrobel and Sofina, while also others like
the Cominire holding company were interested. In 1958 efforts were joined in Abelinga
( Association Belge pour lEtude de lamnagement hydrolectrique dInga ) (Mollin 1996).
Plans were developed, but the project was not realized during the colonial era. The Inga
project would only be realized after independence. From 1960 on other competitors came in
and the project met with several severe difficulties (see Willame 1986). But also the
conditions set under the predator practices of Mobutu, did not enable to realize the
industrialization jump of the Congo (Young 199415), notwithstanding a lot of plans and
advices (Lacroix 1966).

Section 3. Overall data on the Congo Industrialization

When examining the GDP of the Belgian Congo at the end of colonization, it can be seen that
perspectives are bright (table 3), although industrialization did not encompass all branches.
On a total GDP of 63 billion BEF, industrial production amounted to 9 billion BEF (about 15%).
This is impressive for an African colony.

Table 3. Composition of GDP (1958) (BEF) (added value by industry)

Sectors 1958

14
Later on, in 1973, Cometra Oil (former colonial company Compagnie Financire Africaine)
would have an agreement with the by then Zaire state to explore the territorial waters of
Congo in collaboration with the American Gulf Oil Company and the Japanese Teikoku Oil Cy.
15
The grandiose projects which were to make 1980 a rendez-vous with abundance - the
Maluku steel mill, the Inga-Shaba power line, and the Tenke-Fungurume copper mines,
among others - were spectacular disasters, (Young 1994a: 262). On their own, they were
also responsible for the buildup of the foreign debt of DRC, which, due to the accumulation
of rescheduling and arrears, evolved from about 3 billion originally to about 12 billion USD at
the beginning of the current decade, necessitating a huge debt reduction to make debt again
sustainable. See Marysse et al. (2011).
Agricultural Production (commercialized) 3.737.000.000
Agricultural Production (for export or industry) 7.679.000.000
Mining 5.031.000.000
Industrial production (export) 4.790.000.000
Industrial production (home market) 4.279.000.000
TOTAL 25.516.000.000
Transport 4.602.000.000
Electricity and water 1.040.000.000
Real Estate and Public Works 2.220.000.000
Administration, Education, Defense 8.590.000.000
Commerce 4.670.000.000
Other Services 4.062.000.000
TOTAL 25.184.000.000
Indirect Taxes 5.150.000.000
GDP (commercialized) 55.850.000.000
Non commercialized production 7.550.000.000
GDP 63.400.000.000
Source : Lacroix (1967: 30).

Taking into account that the population of the Belgian Congo and Belgium was in the same
order of magnitude at the end of the colonization, comparing data for those two countries
learn that in some fields the Belgian Congo was highly developed. Electricity was about 18.4
% of the Belgian production; this is perhaps the best indicator for the industrialization level
of the Belgian Congo (table 4).

Table 4. Comparing industrial production for Belgium and the Belgian Congo in 1957

Unity Belgium Belgian Congo %

Electricity Millions KWH 12611 2320 18.4
Sugar Tons 369335 19332 5.2
Beer 1000 hl 10185 1382 13.6
Water + lemonade 1000 hl 2966 320 10.8
Margarine tons 95253 669 0.7
Cigarettes millions 10546 4045 38.4
Cement tons 470500 463952 9.9
Lime tons 29249000 100460 0.3
Bricks 1000 2242933 293876 13.1
Ceramics 1000 m2 1625 137 8.4
Shoes 1000 pairs 12117 2851 23.5
Tissues 1000 m2 702105 52982 7.5
Blankets 1000 pieces 11768 1976 16.8
Source: Centrale Bank van Belgisch-Congo en Ruanda Urundi (1959).

But these high industrialized data show also some weaknesses. Indeed, industrialization is a
vast process, encompassing so many branches: Processing industries as a natural extension
of raw materials, service industries (repair shops, ..), light consumer goods industries
(cigarettes, soap, breweries ); ancillary industries (manufacturing commodities needed for
the export of raw materials); large scale consumer goods industries (textiles, footwear ..);
construction goods industries (bricks, cement .); other capital goods and industrial raw
materials industry (chemicals, steel, semi-manufactured iron) (Melville 1953 149-150). Of all
these branches some were lacking in the Belgian Congo, although towards the end of
colonization intentions were formulated to develop capital goods, based on the use of the
INGA project.

More important even was the human capital factor. Compared to other colonial powers
Belgium prevented that high skilled Africans came on the forefront during colonial times.
Not a single African was allowed to follow university courses until 1954, nor any of them had
the opportunity to acquire practical skills at a top job in administration, politics, the army or
business. As a result, it was extremely difficult for Africans to take over the Congo after 1960,
although at first the Belgians were prepared to stay for a while. As neo-colonial activity was
intervening and undermining the new born state, political instability grew and the Congo
would collapse.

Section 4. Summary and Conclusions

Investment in the Belgian Congo was mainly in mining and the transport sector (needed for
export minerals). Export of minerals and profits out of this activity were the main economic
objectives of colonization. Supporting activities for mining were developed such as cement,
electricity or chemicals, giving rise to the formation of certain industrial islands within the
Congo economy. Besides minerals attention went to tropical products such as cotton, palm
oil and coffee. Both activities put a major burden on African agriculture. Major profits were
made, exported to Belgium or used for financing the Colonial State. With the Second World
War some important changes can be observed in the Belgian Congo. This was mainly caused
by the explosive growth of the Congo economy during and after the war (due to her unique
position as a main supplier of minerals and tropical products for allied forces). As a
consequence, wages and consumption began to increase and a lot of new manufacturing
activities were developed. The internal market developed but so did the middle class. The
class structure changed, giving birth to an historical alliance between the new middle class
and the poor peasant population as well as industrial and mining workers in order to
overthrow the colonial domination.

The industrialization of the Belgian Congo went through different stages. The Belgian Congo
started industrialization around 1920. That industrialization was centered round two growth
centers: Leopoldville and UMHK (Katanga). The first one was highly centered on developing
consumer goods for the internal market; the second one was highly centered on consumer
goods as well as on intermediary products for mining. At the end of the colonial period big
expansion programs were developed, centered round the hydroelectric potential of the
INGA weir. Fast industrialization was realized by big investments from Belgian companies,
huge profits but also harsh exploitation of African labor, especially that of the countryside.
Colonialism separated (and impoverished) African agriculture from the fast growing
administrative capital and the mining regions. It was highly responsible for the uneven
development of the country.
Investments in human capital were made but were restricted to (at maximum) high skilled
technical jobs and lower level office jobs. Neither on the administrative side nor on the side
of entrepreneurial skills were Africans allowed to acquire the experience (and the instruction)
needed to assure successful leadership of the countrys resources. It contributed to the
collapse of the Congo economy after 1960, although other factors contributed as well.

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