Multi-Level Governance - Eduard Ongaro, Anthony Zito, Simona Piattoni PDF

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE:
THE MISSING LINKAGES

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
SECTOR MANAGEMENT
Series Editors: John Diamond and Joyce Liddle
Recent Volumes:
Volume 1: Emerging and Potential Trends in Public Management: An
Age of Austerity
Volume 2: Looking for Consensus?: Civil Society, Social Movements and
Crises for Public Management
Volume 3: European Public Leadership in Crisis?
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
SECTOR MANAGEMENT VOLUME 4
MULTI-LEVEL
GOVERNANCE:
EDITED BY
EDOARDO ONGARO
Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
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CONTENTS
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS ix
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD xi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xiii
PREFACE
Dorotheé Allain-Dupre´ and Luiz de Mello xv
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: THE MISSING

LINKAGES
Edoardo Ongaro 1
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, EU PUBLIC POLICY

AND THE EVASIVE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Anthony R. Zito 15
REVISITING THE ‘MANAGEMENT DEFICIT’: CAN

THE COMMISSION (STILL NOT) MANAGE EUROPE?
Hussein Kassim 41
THE INDEPENDENT EU COMMISSIONER: AN

ADMINISTRATIVE ANALYSIS
Adriaan Schout and Arnout Mijs 63
EU AGENCIES AND THE EUROPEAN MULTI-LEVEL

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
Edoardo Ongaro, Dario Barbieri, Nicola Belle´ and 87
Paolo Fedele
v
vi CONTENTS
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN AGENCIES,

NETWORKS, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN
EMERGING REGULATORY CONSTELLATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN
TELECOM SECTOR AND THE EUROPEAN PATENT
SYSTEM
Esther van Zimmeren, Emmanuelle Mathieu and 125
Koen Verhoest
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, THE EU AND CIVIL

SOCIETY: A MISSING LINK?
Simone Baglioni 163
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN THE

INTERGOVERNMENTAL SETTING: IMPACTS ON
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE FROM A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Sabine Kuhlmann 183
BRIDGING THE GAPS IN MULTI-LEVEL

GOVERNANCE: NEW SPACES OF INTERACTIONS
AND MULTIPLE ACCOUNTABILITIES IN ENGLISH
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Joyce Liddle 217
METAGOVERNANCE, RISK AND NUCLEAR POWER

IN BRITAIN
Keith Baker 247
POLITICS AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES IN

MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEMS
Duncan McTavish 271
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF HYDROPOWER IN

CHINA? THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPLANTING A
WESTERN CONCEPT INTO THE CHINESE
GOVERNANCE CONTEXT
Oliver Hensengerth 295
Contents vii
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: UNDERPLAYED

FEATURES, OVERBLOWN EXPECTATION AND
MISSING LINKAGES
Simona Piattoni 321
POSTFACE
Emanuela Prina and Madlen Serban 343
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES 347

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Simone Baglioni Yunus Centre for Social Business and

Health, Glasgow Caledonian University,
Glasgow, UK
Keith Baker School of Public Policy, Oregon State
University, Corvallis, OR, USA
Dario Barbieri BeP (bepconsulenza.it), Milan, Italy
Nicola Belle´ Department of Policy Analysis and Public
Management, Bocconi University, Milan,
Italy
Paolo Fedele Università di Udine, Gorizia, Italy
Oliver Hensengerth Department of Social Sciences and
Languages, Research Centre on
International Public Policy and
Management, Northumbria University,
Newcastle, UK
Hussein Kassim School of Politics, Philosophy, Language
and Communication, University of East
Anglia, UK
Sabine Kuhlmann Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
Chair for Political Science, Administration
and Organization II, University of
Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany
Joyce Liddle CERGAM, Institut de Management
Publique et Gouvernance Territoriale,
IMPGT, Aix-Marseilles Université, Aix en
Provence, France
Emmanuelle Mathieu German Research Institute for Public
Administration Speyer, Speyer, Germany
ix
x LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Duncan McTavish Department of Social Sciences, Media and

Journalism, Glasgow Caledonian
University, Glasgow, UK
Arnout Mijs The Netherlands Institute of International
Relations ‘Clingendael’, The Hague, The
Netherlands
Edoardo Ongaro Department of Social Sciences and
Languages, Research Centre on
International Public Policy and
Management, Northumbria University,
Newcastle, UK
Simona Piattoni Department of Sociology and Social
Research, University of Trento, Trento,
Italy
Adriaan Schout The Netherlands Institute of International
Relations ‘Clingendael’, The Hague, The
Netherlands
Esther van Zimmeren Faculty of Law Research Group
Government & Law, University of
Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
Koen Verhoest Department of Political Science, University
of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
Anthony R. Zito School of Geography, Politics and
Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle
upon Tyne, UK
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Graeme Chesters Muiris MacCarthaigh

Bradford University, UK Queens University Belfast, UK
Ricardo C. Gomes Ivan Maly

University of Brasilia, Brazil Masaryk University, Czech
Republic
Olivier Keramidas
Aix-Marseilles University, France Duncan McTavish
Glasgow Caledonian University, UK
Alan Lawton
Monash University, Australia Margaret Stout
West Virginia University, USA
Mike Macaulay
Victoria University of Wellington, Dina Wafa
New Zealand The American University of Cairo,
Egypt
xi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book stems from the High Level Seminar entitled ‘Multi-Level
Governance: The Missing Linkages’ that has been promoted and organised
by the International Public Policy and Management research centre
(IPPaM) of the Department of Social Sciences and Languages (Faculty of
Arts, Design and Social Sciences ) of Northumbria University. The seminar
was held at the Northumbria University premises in Newcastle Upon Tyne
on 17 18 October 2013 and benefited of the financial support of the
University of Northumbria at Newcastle and of the Public Administration
Committee of the Joint University Council of the Applied Social Sciences.
Not all of the participants did eventually prepare a book chapter for this
book (whilst others who could not attend but who were involved through-
out joined in contributing a chapter to this volume), but all of them greatly
contributed to make the event highly significant scientifically, and highly
enjoyable socially and humanly.
I want to thank all those who actively participated and contributed to
it, namely: Simone Baglioni, Keith Baker, Michael Bauer, Rachael
Chapman, Morten Egeberg, Howard Elcock, John Fenwick, Hussein
Kassim, Martin Laffin, Andrew Lewis, Joyce Liddle, Andrew Massey,
Duncan McTavish, Karen Miller, Arnout Miijs, Keith Shaw, Koen
Verhoest, Anthony (Tony) Zito.
I also wish to thank all those who made it possible, a long list out of
which I would like to mention at least: Mike Rowe, Liz Candlish,
Charlotte Branch, Suzanne Martin, Heather Robson, Katrina Hughes,
Seema Patel, Marta Pyrek.
xiii
PREFACE
Dorothée Allain-Dupré and Luiz de Mello
There has been increasing debate around the world about the importance of
multi-level governance (MLG) in policymaking. It has long been recog-
nised that coordination failures among stakeholders and an inability to
take into account local conditions and needs undermine policy design
and implementation, leading to suboptimal outcomes. Addressing these
failures depends on putting in place appropriate governance arrange-
ments not only across levels of administration national, sub-national
and often supra-national but also among the relevant policy actors.
This is nevertheless a challenging undertaking that calls for solid analyti-
cal frameworks, evidence-based analysis and concrete instruments for
implementation.
“Multi-Level Governance: The Missing Linkages” seeks to address this
challenge. It underscores the potential of MLG as an analytical framework;
it identifies the relevance of MLG in many policy domains, from territorial
planning to environmental or nuclear power policies; and it argues in
favour of its usefulness well beyond Europe, with a chapter on China, for
example. In addition to bridging gaps across disciplinary silos, this book
also contributes to strengthening the dialogue among academics and practi-
tioners, as well as with international organisations.
Two important trends have shaped the way public policies are designed and
implemented, and they help explain the emergence of MLG in the policy
debate. First, the actors in the policymaking sphere in addition to their
competencies have changed dramatically in recent decades. At one end
of the spectrum, sub-national governments, notably in Europe, Latin
America and parts of Asia, have been assigned increasing responsibilities as
a result of fiscal decentralisation. Today in the OECD, there are over
140,000 sub-national governments with key competencies in the areas of
economic development, green and inclusive growth. They represent more
than 40% of government spending and over two-thirds of investment,
xv
xvi PREFACE
which raises critical coordination challenges, not only between levels of

government but also across same-level jurisdictions (Allain-Dupré, 2011;
OECD, 2014). Indeed, the OECD has developed a methodology to assess
systematic coordination failures or “gaps” that may impede effectiveness of
public policies in decentralised contexts (Charbit, 2011). The impact of
coordination failures on growth notably in metropolitan areas can be
substantial (OECD, 2015a). For example, there are more than 1,300 local
governments in the Paris metropolitan area, almost 1,000 in Seoul and 540
in Chicago. Ensuring policy coordination at the relevant functional scale is
a critical challenge to deliver efficient and inclusive public policies.
Supra-national entities also play an important role. At the other end of
the spectrum, there is an increasing number of supra-national organisations
(more than 30, including the United Nations, the European Union or the
International Court of Justice) that are active in a wide range of policies in
almost all regions of the world. Yet, increasingly MLG goes well beyond
supra-national or local public actors: the involvement in policymaking of
non-state actors such as citizens, NGOs and the private sector is perhaps
the most significant change. The magnitude and consequences of their
involvement are still hard to assess, but public governance has clearly
evolved to a much more dynamic, networked and complex system of inter-
actions that require agile and flexible governance frameworks.
Second, global policy challenges, such as climate change and urbanisation,
have become increasingly complex, calling for more integrated approaches to
policymaking at all levels of government. Addressing these challenges
requires a better understanding of complementarities and trade-offs across
policy domains so that well-designed economic, social and environmental
actions reinforce each other rather than compete with one another. But
coordination does not take place spontaneously. Effective MLG arrange-
ments are required to manage these complementarities and trade-offs.
Failure to take account of the specific circumstances and needs of indivi-
dual regions can lead to unintended outcomes and undermine the success
of policy interventions.
For these reasons, identifying good practices in MLG has become a key to
overcoming coordination failures across levels of government and jurisdic-
tions, as well as among sectoral policies. The challenge is to translate general
principles into policy tools. In this respect, two distinct traps need to be
avoided. The first is to look for one-size-fits-all solutions or a governance
optimum that would apply to all regions and contexts. The degree of
decentralisation and administrative capacity, the institutional culture and
traditions, and the importance of formal versus informal coordination
Preface xvii
arrangements all shape the selection of instruments that can be used to

address coordination failures. But the second trap is precisely the opposite
of the first one; that is to say, an inability to identify good practices above
and beyond local contexts undermines efforts to operationalise MLG in
pursuit of policy goals. There is therefore a middle ground, which aims to
identify general guidelines for governments with a concrete menu of possi-
ble options and indications on which strategies may be most appropriate in
which contexts. Better quantitative measurement of certain challenges is
also increasingly possible due to larger datasets on SNG not least on
local finances, well-being and administrative fragmentation.
The OECD has integrated MLG in its analytical corpus. Since the late
1990s, through its committee on territorial development policies, the
OECD has extensively addressed place-based development policies and
MLG approaches. The novelty of these approaches is to manage mutual
dependency across levels of government, rather than to advocate a more
clear-cut, mutually exclusive allocation of roles, and to go beyond the con-
ventional debate in fiscal federalism about whether or not to decentralise or
centralise any given public function.
Public investment is a case in point. To address governance challenges in
this area, in 2014 the OECD adopted a Recommendation on Effective
Public Investment across Levels of Government providing governments with
a roadmap to assess strengths and weaknesses of public investment capa-
city from a multi-level perspective, which can apply regardless of a coun-
try’s institutional context. The Recommendation is accompanied by an
Implementation Toolkit that provides data and indicators on sub-national
investment for all OECD countries, as well as more than 200 examples of
recent developments and good practices (OECD, 2015b). There is indeed a
lot to learn from innovative MLG approaches, but knowledge of such
practices often remains within their national contexts, hence the need to cir-
culate them more broadly. Some examples are: platforms of dialogue and
investment prioritisation across levels of government (as in the Council of
Australian Governments); the use of state-region contracts to develop inte-
grated investment strategies (in France and Poland); or cross-sectoral
initiatives (the US Programme on Strong Cities, Strong Communities
which gathers 19 federal agencies and offers four mechanisms to assist local
governments). The Toolkit thus offers a concrete means for self-assessment,
capacity building and mutual learning. The next step is to identify instru-
ments that are most appropriate in each context through the identification
of “families of countries” sharing the same types of MLG challenges, and
to further measure the benefits of coordination systems.
xviii PREFACE
MLG has until recently been overlooked by policymakers. But the global
crisis and the coordination failures that have exposed by it, as well as increas-
ing complexity in the policy challenges facing the world, have all underscored
the need to put governance at the core of policy design and implementation.
Enhanced dialogue among analysts and practitioners, such as the one
developed in this book, is part and parcel of a mutual learning exercise that
will contribute to deepening our understanding of MLG and make it an
instrument to better fit policies to places.
REFERENCES
Allain-Dupré, D. (2011). Multi-level governance of public investment: Lessons from the crisis.
OECD Regional Development Working Papers, No. 2011/5, OECD Publishing.
doi:10.1787/5kg87n3bp6jb-en
Charbit, C. (2011). Governance of public policies in decentralised contexts: The multi-level
approach. OECD Regional Development Working Papers, No. 2011/04, OECD
Publishing. doi:10.1787/5kg883pkxkhc-en
OECD. (2014). OECD regional outlook 2014: Regions and cities: Where policies and people
meet. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2015a). The metropolitan century. Understanding urbanisation and its consequences.
OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2015b). Implementation toolkit, effective public investment across levels of government.
Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/effective-public-investment-toolkit/public-invest-
ment.htm
Edoardo Ongaro
ABSTRACT
Purpose The explanatory power of Multi-Level Governance (MLG)

has been and is being questioned. Two main criticisms have been raised:
first, that MLG is ultimately descriptive, not explanatory; second, that
MLG is a case of concept stretching, that it is ultimately an umbrella
notion rather than a theory. This chapter outlines what ripostes may be
provided to such critiques and argues that the progress of the study of
MLG and its usage in political science and public policy and manage-
ment may lie to an important extent in fostering the dialogue with other
streams of research (thus filling the gap of some ‘missing linkages’ in the
extant MLG literature), like network governance; policy learning; the
analysis of policy tools and the tools of government in complex systems;
models in strategic management like stakeholder analysis and others.
Methodology/approach This volume is a collective contribution by
authors from different disciplinary backgrounds who all address, from
different angles and by using a variety of research methods, the key ques-
tion of how to bring into the MLG research agenda a range of disciplines
and applied fields of inquiry that have so far only limitedly been used in
the MLG stream of research and literature more systematically.
Multi-Level Governance: The Missing Linkages

Critical Perspectives on International Public Sector Management, Volume 4, 1 14
Copyright r 2015 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004001
1
2 EDOARDO ONGARO
Findings It arises from the volume that theoretical frames like network
governance; policy learning; policy tools analysis; stakeholder analysis
and others have important potential to further the MLG research agenda.
A number of contributions address the transformation of MLG in the
European Union (EU), the polity where MLG arrangements where first
detected and labelled as such (Marks, 1993). Others apply MLG frames
to other institutional settings, including non-democratic regimes.
Research implications This volume is a collective attempt to suggest
‘cross-fertilisations’ from other disciplines or applied fields that may lead
to unleash more of the potential and promises of the MLG agenda. It is
hoped that this work lays some of the foundations for building bridges
between the MLG literature and disciplines and theoretical frames that
may be effectively brought into the MLG research agenda.
Practical/social implications MLG has long gone beyond the aca-
demic debate, to become an analytical lens employed by EU and other
institutions across the globe. MLG informs the practice of policy-
making. By addressing some key gaps in the extant literature and fur-
nishing perspectives to link MLG to disciplines that may provide theories
and models to further its analytical potential, this volume aims at contri-
buting to improving the practice of MLG.
Originality/value The volume is to our knowledge the first sys-
tematic attempt to bring into the MLG literature a whole range of the-
ories and models that may provide ways forward to the understanding
and usage of MLG.
Keywords: European Union; democracy; multi-level governance;
institutional theories; public policy analysis; intergovernmental
relations
Multi-Level Governance (MLG) is a highly influential, supple and ductile,

and (at least in many of its actual usages) quite loose framework for inter-
preting governance in complex polities. Criticisms have been formulated to
its allegedly overly ‘descriptive’, rather than interpretive/explanatory
power. It is, anyway, a central framework of reference in the analysis of
European Union (EU) governance, and beyond.
As an introductory definition, MLG can be intended as ‘[t]he term
which describes the simultaneous activation of governmental and
non-governmental actors at various jurisdictional levels’ (Piattoni,
Multi-Level Governance: The Missing Linkages 3
2010b) a term coined in the context of EU studies (to some extent in

order to move beyond integration theories, to better explain both what the
EU is and how it works), but apparently more and more applied also
elsewhere to capture dynamics in many fields and contexts. MLG theory-
derived frames have been applied to a wide set of issues spanning from
political mobilisation (politics) to policy-making (policy), to state restruc-
turing (polity).
A major typology in MLG, widely employed also throughout this book,
distinguishes between Type I MLG (characterised by general-purpose juris-
dictions, non-intersecting memberships, a limited number of levels and a
system-wide architecture) and Type II MLG (task-specific jurisdictions,
intersecting memberships, no limit to the number of jurisdictions, and a
flexible architecture) (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2010). The combined adop-
tion of the two types authors argue enables the employment of MLG
to the study of multiple systems: ‘local’; ‘national’, European (Union) and
other regionalisms; and global1 though a critique is that interpreted this
way the concept of MLG is overstretched (see Simona Piattoni’s chapter
‘Multi-Level Governance: Underplayed Features, Overblown Expectation,
and Missing Linkages’, and below in this chapter).
Various works have made major contributions to the systematic treat-
ment of MLG: a couple of exemplar culled out of a long list include the
Elgar handbook on MLG Enderlein, Wälti and Zürn (2010) and the Oxford
University Press book published by Piattoni (2010a); and of course any list
however short cannot forget to mention the outputs stemming from the
research programme carried out by Gary Marks (who famously coined the
term and introduced it into the academic debate, Marks, 1993) and Liesbet
Hooghe, a research agenda carried on over a very long time span, through
multiple research projects (e.g. Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2010).
Yet, the explanatory power of MLG has been and is being questioned.
Two main criticisms have been raised: first, that MLG is ultimately descrip-
tive, not explanatory; second, that MLG is a case of concept stretching
(Sartori, 1970), that it is ultimately an umbrella notion rather than a theory.
The question, at least for those who believe in the potential of MLG to
shed light on contemporary political systems and public governance, then
becomes: what responses (hopefully ripostes) can be given to such critiques,
and how to move on from here and progress in the theorisation of MLG?
One fruitful approach, we argue, for the progress of the study of MLG
and its usage in political science and public policy and management lies in
fostering the dialogue with other streams of research, that is by engaging
with the findings of research on themes like: network governance; policy
4 EDOARDO ONGARO
learning; the analysis of policy tools and the tools of government in com-
plex systems; models in public governance like stakeholder analysis and
others. To put it more rudely, there seem to be some missing linkages in
the study of MLG, and a way of furthering its explanatory power (and test-
ing whether MLG ultimately has explanatory power?) is by engaging with
them systematically.
One first step along this way has been to link more systematically the
‘European’ stream of research in MLG with the ‘American’ (US) strand of
scientific inquiry into the cognate topic of ‘Inter-Governmental Relations’.
This was the main purpose of two edited volumes the first one published
in 2010 by Edoardo Ongaro, Andrew Massey, Marc Holzer and Ellen
Wayenberg and titled Governance and Intergovernmental Relations in the
European Union and the United States: Theoretical Perspectives
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) and the second one published by the same
editors and publisher one year later and titled Policy, Performance and
Management in Governance and Intergovernmental Relations: Transatlantic
Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). The primary objective of the
two volumes was to build a bridge between the two academic communities
and their particular research streams. As outlined in the introduction of the
first volume, such an academic bridge was (is) designed to interconnect
the two sets of ‘cognitive maps’ employed by scholars on both sides of the
Atlantic with the ultimate goal of furthering our understanding of the rela-
tions among levels of government and governance, arguing that the public
sector society interfaces can be improved by bringing together the two
threads: ‘American’ IGR and ‘European’ MLG. A set of prominent scho-
lars from both sides of the Atlantic contributed to that effort of deepening
our knowledge and understanding of the core elements in IGR and MLG
and exploring the interconnections between the two.
That was a first, very important step. Yet the work, we argue, is unfin-
ished and other missing linkages need to be address if we are to further the
usability of the body of knowledge that goes under the label of Multi-Level
Governance.
In his aptly titled chapter ‘Multi-Level Governance, EU Public Policy
and the Evasive Dependent Variable’, Anthony R. Zito tackles the key
issue that what this approach is trying to explain has never been fully
agreed by the vast group of scholarship that references it: the MLG stream
of literature is still in search of its explanandum. The chapter then makes an
intellectually ambitious, and highly important, attempt to provide the
micro-foundations of MLG. Zito proposes that ideas and concepts from
three theoretical strands network governance, principal-agent (PA) and
learning can provide the necessary micro foundations for the MLG
approach.
All three these paths are very promising, and the reader will have the
chance to appreciate how each of them can contribute to shed light on our
understanding of MLG by reading Tony’s thorough argumentation. One
point to further highlight is that with Zito’s contribution learning is
brought into the picture: one key challenge to the MLG literature lay in the
question of whether MLG frames allow making sense of learning (or fail-
ures of learning) processes. The absence of a systematic dialogue with the
policy learning literature (e.g. Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013) was a major miss-
ing linkage of the MLG literature: Zito’s chapter furnishes a contribution
to start filling this gap and building a much-needed bridge.
In the final chapter titled ‘Multi-Level Governance: Underplayed
Features, Overblown Expectation, and Missing Linkages’ Simona Piattoni
also deals with the ‘evasive dependent variable’ critique to the MLG litera-
ture and, in a more normative tone, provides ways forward to make use of
MLG frames to solve extant policy problems. By placing some rather strin-
gent requirements to the adopted definition (notably the feature of the
simultaneous presence of more than two levels of government not just the
national and the international or supra-national, but also the sub-national
level or levels and the presence of non-governmental organisations and
social partners), the scope or ‘target domain’ the domain where MLG
may be employed becomes much better specified. This point is made clear
in a key passage: ‘there is no need to mobilize MLG unless […] we plan to
investigate how the internal articulation of the state is transformed by its
increasing interconnectedness with other states. And this is precisely why I
think that MLG needs to indicate relations among at least three levels of
government and it needs to also factor in the participation of non-
governmental actors’ Piattoni (this volume, italics in original). The more
stringent requirement adopted enables Piattoni to systematically deal with
both the antecedents of MLG what causes MLG arrangements to come
into existence in the first place and the consequences of MLG arrange-
ments, or at least some institutional consequences of MLG and how they
may affect public policy. Notably within the institutional consequences is
the argued full compatibility of MLG with democracy another crucial
issue often raised in the literature: we return on this point at the conclusion
of this chapter.
It is interesting to note that other chapters adopt more ‘conventional’
definitions of Type I and Type II MLG, and in doing so they end up
arguing about the limited explanatory as opposed to the highly
6 EDOARDO ONGARO
descriptive value of MLG (see, e.g. the chapter titled ‘Bridging the Gaps
in Multi-Level Governance: New Spaces of Interactions and Multiple
Accountabilities in English Sub-National Governance’ by Joyce Liddle
who resorts to stakeholder analysis to supplement MLG frames in explain-
ing the functioning of local enterprise partnerships in England under the
coalition government, 2010 2015; or the chapter titled ‘Metagovernance,
Risk and Nuclear Power in Britain’ by Keith Baker who ‘brings the govern-
ment back in’ through the concept of metagovernance to explain public
policy in the critical case of nuclear policy, a sector in which dealing with
high levels of risk and uncertainty is centre-stage). This is an important
path hopefully an avenue for future research: the more descriptive
usages of MLG may well adopt broader and looser definitions, whilst strin-
gent requirements like those outlined by Piattoni may lead to a more speci-
fic some would say ‘proper’ usage of MLG in explanatory fashion.
The first part of the book examines MLG and its missing linkages within
the institutional setting of the EU, the polity where MLG arrangements
where first detected and labelled as such (Marks, 1993). A first key issue in
EU MLG is the linkage with the transformations that have occurred in the
‘administrations at the top’ (upper level of governance), first and foremost
the European Commission (Commission). Between the early 1990s, when
MLG was first theorised, and the 2010s, the ‘global’ wave of New Public
Management-inspired administrative reforms have reached the
Commission, and major reforms have occurred to its administration.
Questions have been raised: what is the impact of administrative changes in
institutions located in a unique position in EU MLG, like the Commission,
on EU governance? Is a ‘managerialised’ Commission deprived of its entre-
preneurship, and if so less and less capable of acting as an autonomous
upper level of governance? The background to these questions is the issue
raised on the advent of the single market, in 1992, by Les Metcalfe: charged
with the daunting task of making the single market work, can the
Commission manage Europe? Hussein Kassim in the chapter titled
‘Revisiting the ‘Management Deficit’: Can the Commission (Still Not)
Manage Europe?’ deploys his vast knowledge of the transformation of the
administration of the European Commission to discuss this key issue. He
finds perhaps strikingly given the weakening of the Commission influ-
ence occurred since the heyday of ‘supranational EU’ in the early 1990s, a
period that many commentators see has having long gone that the
Commission is better equipped now than it was at the dawn of the single
market to ‘manage Europe’. This finding is also partly in contrast with
what academic observers and commentators from inside the organisation
have underlined: the weaknesses in the internal operation of the

Commission that allegedly inhibit its ability to perform this key administra-
tive function.
Adriaan Schout and Arnout Mijs in their chapter ‘The Independent EU
Commissioner: An Administrative Analysis’ also delve into the issue of
whether the Commission can manage Europe, notably focusing the key
role of the ‘independent’ Commissioner responsible for economic and
monetary affairs and the euro and in charge of monitoring Member States’
economic performance. They carry out an organisational analysis of the
conditions under which ‘independence’ is actuated by the Commissioner in
charge of economic and monetary affairs, and question the administrative
capabilities available that can be mobilised to support the role, providing a
more gloomy picture of the capacities of the Commission, in this regard, to
manage Europe.
Changes to the institutional-administrative bases of the EU have
occurred also beyond the Commission. Notable since the 1990s has been
the development of ‘public agencies’: from two in the early 1990s to over
forty at the onset of the 2010s, EU agencies have been entrusted significant
public functions, from food safety assurance to the management of
research programmes. Established for reasons that commentators ascribe
more to distributional conflict and political compromises amongst multiple
‘principals’ rather than functional imperatives, the very presence and opera-
tions of a layer of semi-autonomous administrative bodies at the suprana-
tional level of the EU MLG may have an important influence on the
configuration of the EU multi-level administration (Egeberg & Trondal,
2011). Some level of autonomy of the ‘supranational’ level of governance,
coupled with some form of functional differentiation across levels of gov-
ernance, is another way of characterising a system as an MLG system
(Zürn, 2010, applies this definition to qualify the conditions under which
global governance: can be interpreted with caution as a special form
of MLG: an interesting line of reflection that paves the way to the applica-
tion of MLG frames to at least certain interpretations of global govern-
ance). What is, then, the level of autonomy of EU agencies? This question
is addressed by Edoardo Ongaro, Dario Barbieri, Nicola Bellé and Paolo
Fedele, in their chapter ‘EU Agencies and the European Multi-Level
Administrative System’, who furnish fresh empirical evidence about the
profiles of autonomy of EU agencies.
The processes of ‘agencification’ of public sectors across the world have
only limitedly been considered in the MLG literature so far, and so has the
agencification of the EU. This other missing linkage is targeted by the
8 EDOARDO ONGARO
chapter written by Ongaro and colleagues. They notice that EU agencies

display a rather low level of managerial, especially financial, autonomy,
whilst conversely enjoying a relatively high level of policy autonomy.
Autonomy is an inherently relational notion (autonomy from whom, and
along what profiles): in the chapter, the authors explore the complementary
concept of steering and control (what kind of steering is exercised over EU
agencies, by what institutions and through what means), to then investigate
the frequency and contents of the multiple interactions that EU agencies
have with institutions and actors across all levels of EU governance. The
final part of their chapter, in fact, makes an attempt to map EU agencies in
the broader policy network where they operate.
The implications of agencies and policy networks2 for European public
policy is the subject of the chapter by Esther van Zimmeren, Emmanuelle
Mathieu and Koen Verhoest, titled ‘The Interaction between Agencies,
Networks and the European Commission in Emerging Regulatory
Constellations: A Comparative Analysis of the European Telecom Sector
and the European Patent System’. They analyse the evolution in the
European telecommunications sector and the European Patent System and
point out the significance of examining processes of integration (in low pol-
itics mode, that is below the level of major constitutional choices) and coor-
dination that are occurring across a number of policy sectors in Europe.
They make a call for strengthening the MLG Type I and II conceptual fra-
mework by balancing the analytical distinction between the two types with
developments about how Type I and Type II are often entangled and inter-
twined in each other rather than separated realities.
There is in the MLG literature and in the appropriation of it that has
been made by EU political institutions3 a strong emphasis on the invol-
vement of civil society. To recall and further expand the definition
introduced at the outset of this chapter, MLG can be defined as a class of
policymaking arrangements characterised by the simultaneous activation of
governmental and non-governmental actors at different jurisdictional
levels. The ultimate impact of these policymaking arrangements crucially
depends on the mobilisation capacity of all actors involved. As noticed by
Simone Baglioni, in the chapter ‘Multi-Level Governance, the EU and
Civil Society: A Missing Link?’, ‘[F]or more than two decades, civil society
has occupied a prominent position in the EU rhetoric’. In his chapter, how-
ever, Baglioni offers a critical appraisal of this rhetoric and adds confidence
to the studies that point out how ‘the link existing between the European
Union and local civil society organisations is a very thin one, one which is
limited to a very few, rich in resources, organisations. The rhetoric of civil
society as the connector of levels and types of actors in the multi-level gov-
ernance approach promoted by the EU should thus be mitigated. The
European policy process should be conceived of more pragmatically as an
arena where European institutions and member states still act as gate kee-
pers that select and decide which societal interest and voice should have a
place within the European agenda’ (Baglioni, chapter 7). In sum, there
seems to be factually a missing link in the interconnection between
civil society organisations diffused on the territories of the EU and the very
institutions of the EU. Whilst this may happen partly by design EU insti-
tutions and notably the Commission have limited administrative capacities
and need to simplify and narrow down to a manageable set their system of
relations it still bears some significance for the way in which we conceive
of the governance dimension of the EU MLG: the gap between rhetoric, on
the one hand, and decision and ‘facts’, on the other hand, might be larger
than commonly held.
Sabine Kuhlmann in the chapter ‘Administrative Reforms in the
Intergovernmental Setting: Impacts on Multi-Level Governance from a
Comparative Perspective’ addresses the question of how institutional
reforms affect and reshape MLG arrangements. She focuses notably decen-
tralisation and devolution, and de-concentration reforms, that have domi-
nated the rhetoric and (to a lesser extent) the practice of the governmental
agendas of many countries across Europe and beyond. Kuhlmann probes
into intergovernmental reforms in three European countries France,
Germany and UK/England and examines the implications they have had
for both Type I and Type II MLG arrangements. The evaluative criteria
employed in the chapter encompass effectiveness, efficiency, coordination,
democratic accountability and control, and equity in public services provi-
sion. It arises, not unexpectedly, a composite picture whereby decentralisa-
tion is no panacea, and contextual differences do interact with
intergovernmental reforms in shaping and re-shaping MLG arrangements.
Joyce Liddle in the chapter ‘Bridging the Gaps in Multi-Level
Governance: New Spaces of Interactions and Multiple Accountabilities in
English Sub-National Governance’ gauges the suitability of Type I and
Type II models of MLG as frameworks for analysing the operation of
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), a significant new kind of partner-
ships developed at the sub-national level of governance in England during
the UK coalition government 2010 2015. Her conclusion is that MLG
frames at least when used in a broader and looser way require being
supplemented by other, more explanatory in nature, frames. Significantly,
she resorts to models in strategic management, and notably to stakeholder
10 EDOARDO ONGARO
analysis, to draw the required conceptual resources. This way, Liddle

bridges two disciplinary areas that have so far very limitedly cross-
fertilised: MLG (whose roots lie mainly in political science) and manage-
ment. This is a very promising path of research, and one that may enable
overcoming another missing link in the MLG literature: the one with the
public management literature, notably its strands that more extensively
draw from the generic management literature.
Keith Baker in the chapter ‘Metagovernance, Risk and Nuclear Power
in Britain’ makes use of the ‘critical case’ of nuclear policy as a case of
high risk/uncertainty decision-makers have to face to test the explana-
tory powers of MLG frames, and he too concludes about the necessity of
supplementing or perhaps in that case supplanting MLG frames with
theoretical explanations more heavily weighted towards the role of govern-
ment in public policy. He examines nuclear policy in the United Kingdom
by connecting the literature on risk and the emergent literature on metago-
vernance. Metagovernance ‘involves the deployment of a range of policy
tools to shape and coordinate the behaviour of networked actors.
Successful metagovernance depends on government’s capacity to change
the common denominator within a network: the key value shared by all the
actors. The actors involved in nuclear power all consider their decisions in
terms of risk. Therefore, metagovernance of nuclear power is dependent on
the ability of government to influence through policy tools how risk is
assessed’. The tools of government (Hood & Margetts, 2007) and policy
capacity (Painter & Pierre, 2005) seen as a relational property heavily
dependent on government’s capabilities are brought to the foreground.
One actor (re)gains prominence: the state.
Baker’s chapter furnishes important contributions to our understanding
of MLG. First, it highlights the long-held but perhaps at times forgotten
argument that the applicability of MLG may significantly vary as a func-
tion of the policy sector (the EU cohesion policy the case whose observa-
tion initially triggered the speculation on MLG implies policy dynamics
very different from the energy, and notably the nuclear, policy sector).
Second, one differentiating factor is risk, and the management of risk: pol-
icy sectors inherently characterised by high risk/uncertainty may be less
amenable to being interpreted through the lenses of MLG frames. An actor
emerges as the one who may have the capability to manipulate and inter-
vene on the risk profiles of actors in the policy field in such a way to shape
their collective behaviour: the state, acting not so much through direct
means (direct provision of services, though that may too be a component),
rather by influencing the behaviour of networked actors.
Duncan McTavish in the chapter ‘Politics and Political Strategies in

Multi-Level Systems’ brings to the fore another link which, if not alto-
gether missing, is at least at times overlooked: political strategies and tac-
tics that actors deploy in multi-level systems. He focuses in particular the
nations without a state part of broader political unions in the United
Kingdom and across Europe, to highlight patterns of political strategies
deployed, notably, by national(ist) parties. The author highlights the
impact that such dynamics may have on local government and governance,
often diminished to the benefit of the regional government, usually firmly
in the grasp of the nationalist party, and the regional (or ‘meso’) level of
governance. The case of Scotland is then used to elaborate on the patterns
of political strategies and governance dynamics.
How does MLG fare when brought outside of its ‘home territory’ of
the EU, and notably in non-democratic jurisdictions? This is not a new
question, yet its significance can hardly be overestimated. Oliver
Hensengerth in the chapter ‘Multi-Level Governance of Hydropower in
China? The Problem of Transplanting a Western Concept into the
Chinese Governance Context’ attempts to evaluate the utility of applying
MLG outside of the EU and of the group of democratic countries, to
states that have defied the third wave of democratisation and that are
characterised by a so-called new authoritarianism. The jurisdiction is the
People’s Republic of China, and the case is policy making in the field of
hydropower with special attention to the issue area of environmental pro-
tection. The chapter argues that ‘if multi-level governance is to have utility
in other cultural contexts it needs to move away from a consideration of
pre-given scales as locus of authority and consider indigenous governance
concepts and notions of scale, and it crucially needs to map power rela-
tionships in the making and implementation of policies in order to reach
analytical depth. Although the Chinese polity appears to be levelled, the
process of policy-making strongly defies a view whereby territorial scales
are hierarchically ordered and reflect inclusiveness and authority of
decision-making. […] the view that authority to make decisions is formally
located within a specific geographical scale becomes difficult to maintain.
In China, authority might be formally located within a distinct geographi-
cal scale. However, the reality of decision-making is often different, with
informal networks working against a view of decision-making taking place
in nested hierarchies’.
From Hensengerth’s chapter, a key lesson that can be drawn from the
case of China is that ‘the fact that authoritarian regimes can be analysed
in terms of multiple levels as authoritarianism no longer automatically
12 EDOARDO ONGARO
implies strict top-down entities. Instead, autocracies can be highly frag-

mented and subject to complex decision-making processes that can arise
during processes of administrative reform. This can lead to vibrant and
reflexive systems of governance that exhibit adaptive skills necessary to
ensure regime survival amidst a continuously diversifying society and
changing external circumstances’. This finding is extremely significant, in
our view, showing how at least descriptively a combination of Type I
and Type II MLG frames may shed light on the dynamic reshaping of
governance in neo-authoritarian regimes. Leaving the final word again to
the author ‘As a consequence, a research programme looking at the new
authoritarianism from a Multi-Level Governance perspective has the
capacity to uncover and describe new forms of governance, by bringing
the concept into a conversation with indigenous governance concepts’.
The issue of the relationship between MLG and democracy surfaces not
only under the circumstances of new authoritarianism. The question of the
‘full compatibility’ of MLG with democracy has also been raised with
regard to the implications that MLG arrangements may have for accounts
of democracy. This issue is addressed in the final chapter by Simona
Piattoni, where she highlights that ‘the most important societal implication
[of MLG] is the impact that MLG arrangements have on how democratic
decision-making occurs, on what we mean by democracy, and on the socie-
tal perception of how contemporary democracies work’. In her argument
she states that ‘trying to apply to MLG arrangements democratic criteria
and standards that were developed for the unitary, distinctive and sover-
eign state is misleading and that we must rather develop an updated notion
of democracy appropriate for the interconnected, multilevel context in
which we live. The concept of “transnational democracy” is cursorily
offered as a promising direction for further reflection’.
Piattoni provides a set of suggestions to indicate pathways that may be
undertaken to move the MLG research agenda on. More broadly, this
volume as a whole is a collective attempt to suggest ‘cross-fertilisations’
from other disciplines or applied fields that may lead to unleash more of
the potential and promises of the MLG agenda. We hope this work has
laid some of the (in our view so necessary) foundations for building bridges
between the MLG literature and disciplines and theoretical frames that
may be effectively brought into the MLG research agenda. We look for-
ward to seeing this ‘construction yard’ to progress through the accumula-
tion of contributions linking the MLG agenda to those disciplinary fields
that may make it progress further.
NOTES
1. The application of MLG to the global level may occur under the non-trivial
assumptions that, first, the global level does enjoy a certain degree of autonomy,
that is is it more than intergovernmental coordination, and, second, that the glo-
bal level is part of a system characterised by the interplay of different levels rather
than work independently of other governance levels two-step authority relation-
ships and the lack of ‘central’ places for coordination being notable differentiating
features of global multi-level governance from MLG at other levels (see Zürn,
2010).
2. In the terms employed by the authors, the implications of ‘networked agencies’
and ‘agencified networks’.
3. MLG is indeed the framework of reference adopted by the Committee of the
Regions of the EU, as well as by EU agencies such as the European Training
Foundation (ETF) in the delivery of their services to countries partners of the EU,
within the frame of the Neighbourhood policy of the EU.
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Piattoni, S. (2010b). The evolution of the studies of European Union MLG. In E. Ongaro, A.
Massey, M. Holzer, & E. Wayenberg (Eds.), Governance and intergovernmental relations
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Elgar.
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE,
EU PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
EVASIVE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Anthony R. Zito
ABSTRACT
Purpose This contribution argues that there is a fundamental problem

for the multi-level governance (MLG) approach in that what the
approach is trying to explain has never been fully agreed by the vast
group of scholarship that references it. The chapter then examines and
proposes that ideas and concepts from network governance, principal
agent (PA) and learning can provide the necessary micro foundations
for the MLG approach.
Methodology/approach The chapter examines and critiques the origi-
nal MLG formulations and the later efforts at elaboration. It then
reviews the literature and concepts for three public policy approaches
that have been associated with European governance to see how core
explanations can be elaborated upon in a multi-level context: network
governance, principal agent (PA) and learning.
Findings This contribution suggests that co-ordination, and the
resources that help maintain this co-ordination, is the key dependent

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004002
15
16 ANTHONY R. ZITO
variable that underpins the MLG approach. With multiple principals

and multiple agents, operating at a number of levels of analysis,
direct authority and control is harder to evoke. The key explanatory
variable underpinning this MLG co-ordination is learning by the
participants.
Research implications Researchers need to concentrate both their the-
oretical and empirical efforts in understanding the conditions that sup-
port multi-level governance and that sustain its effort.
Practical implications The contribution outlines some of the key prac-
tical questions that policy-makers must face. Can they manage resources
and induce learning from all the relevant public and private stakeholders
to engage in the MLG effort?
Social implications Not only does an effective MLG process involve
engaging a wide range of societal stakeholders, these stakeholders have
to be persuaded to invest effort in learning about the nature of the gov-
ernance system, the challenges of the policy problem and the implications
of the efforts to resolve these problems.
Originality/value This chapter isolates the fundamental lacuna at the
heart of the MLG project and offers academics and practitioners a concep-
tual lens for building a clearer analytical structure for studying MLG.
Keywords: European Union; governance; network; principal agent;
problem-solving; learning; multi-level governance; co-ordination;
federal
INTRODUCTION
One of the most devastating and pithy, and particularly devastating

because of its very pithiness, political science critiques that I have heard
uttered was about the Correlates of War research programme. Whatever
the merits of this (anonymous) critique, it addressed the international rela-
tions (IR) study of conflict dynamics that was notable for its strong data-
base creation, which had been richly supported by grants. The quotation as
related to me went as follows: ‘Twenty years of grant money and data gen-
eration, and still no dependent variable …’. The study of multi-level gov-
ernance has had a very different trajectory in terms of its epistemology,
ontology and grant support, but the same fundamental issue arises.
MLG, EU Public Policy and the Evasive Dependent Variable 17
Multi-level governance was formulated by Gary Marks as a riposte to

the contemporary theoretical primacy of intergovernmentalism, particu-
larly as espoused by Moravcsik (1991), in theories of European integration
(Marks, 1993, pp. 392 407; Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996, p. 342). The
use of the multi-level governance (MLG) approach has expanded well
beyond the study of the European Union (EU). Its popularity reflects the
strong scholarly recognition that international, national and more local
political dynamics simultaneously matter, and that their ongoing interac-
tions also critically matter. Although a wide range of scholars has used the
concept, the empirical and practical implications of this conceptual agenda
remain unfocused. This contribution argues that the fundamental issue of
what the MLG approach is trying to explain has never been fully agreed by
the vast group of scholarship that references it. Further, public policy
approaches can provide that needed microstructure to help its empirical
investigation and secure the objectives of the MLG agenda. The argument
here follows an initial call by critics such as Rosamond (2000) to flesh out
MLG with more explicitly detailed theories. Accordingly, this contribution
focuses particularly on learning dynamics and the nature of co-ordination.
The next section examines the original MLG formulations and the later
efforts at elaboration. The third section explores the implications of the
arguments about network governance and the MLG programme, raising in
particular the issues of learning and co-ordination. The fourth section
investigates the insights that the principal agent (PA) and learning
approaches can provide for a micro basis to underpin MLG, in light of the
previous criticisms. The penultimate section develops a list of conceptual
propositions to guide further research on MLG phenomena. The core con-
clusion is that harnessing the extremely valid MLG identification of both
the multiple layers and the importance of their interactions together with
theories with greater micro traction strengthens our understanding of gov-
ernance. At the core of this argument is the question of how knowledge is
utilised to induce learning, and how co-ordination is maintained within a
set of very diverse actors.
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND ITS

PROPOSITIONS
The study of European integration has had a substantial impact on the field
of (particularly Anglo-American) IR; perhaps its most critical role has been
18 ANTHONY R. ZITO
to pose an alternative to the IR theoretical focus on the importance of

states, particularly the more powerful states, in driving the political
dynamics in any given transnational context. Neofunctionalism, as articu-
lated by Haas (1958), created a whole industry of regional integration stu-
dies in the 1960s. In a somewhat parallel fashion, Marks, who was more
focused on comparative national politics before contributing to Alberta
Sbragia’s 1992 edited volume, Europolitics (Marks, 1992), became dissatis-
fied with explaining the core dynamics that developed the (as it was called
at that time) European Community’s (EC’s) institutions solely by examin-
ing the politics dominated by member state bargaining. As Jordan (2001,
p. 201) rightly emphasises, this was not a particularly new viewpoint, even
in EU studies. For students of federalism, of which Marks is one, and of
intergovernmentalist-interorganisational perspectives in public administra-
tion (i.e. Rhodes, 1980), multi-level analysis is a longstanding approach in
the study of central local relations.
Marks’ (1993) piece focused on EC structural policy and its involvement
with regions within the state. His research suggested that both Commission
activity as well as the activities of the regions themselves, which were being
given the opportunity to work directly with the Commission (i.e. not
always through a national government gatekeeper), were important in their
own right. Marks defines the possibilities of this interaction as ‘multi-level
governance’: ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested govern-
ments at several territorial tiers supranational, national, regional and
local as the result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisio-
nal reallocation that has pulled some previous centralised functions of the
state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional
level’ (Marks, 1993, p. 392).
Importantly, the premise of Marks’ piece is NOT to dismiss the impor-
tance of the state or its role in the European integration process; rather he
suggests that a number of other political levels of analysis are also essential
and interacting/competing/strengthening state level politics and policy-
making. Also worth highlighting is the emphasis on an ongoing process.
Marks (1993, pp. 404 405) is also unequivocal that there is no one homo-
genous pattern of MLG interaction (a point often forgotten in its wide-
spread usage); thus, the national and subnational variations within the EC
member states will be considerable due to differences in power, etc.
The focus on the Commission’s entrepreneurship chimed closely with
the hypotheses of neofunctionalism (which focused on the role of suprana-
tional institutions in promoting loyalty shifts from national adherence to
supranational policy-making), but MLG moved beyond neofunctionalism
by recognising the importance of subnational territory, in this case regions.

Before assessing the expansion of both the MLG concept and its utilisa-
tion, it is worth recalling the chapter’s focus. This was a particular dimen-
sion of the public policy, namely the implementation of EC regional
policy. The argument’s context is a study of European integration, but at
the heart of MLG definition is an argument about the transformation of
the state, which shows the close linkages of the MLG approach to wider
governance trends, a point explored later. However, the 1993 piece does
not specify precise mechanisms by which this transformation of the state
occurs. On a separate note, various scholars (e.g. Bache, 1999; Jordan,
2001) have disputed the analytical and empirical thrust of Mark’s piece,
suggesting that the findings cover a limited set of interactions at a specific
time/context.
Nevertheless the MLG analytical agenda was launched and rapidly
spread. Partly it was carried by the explosion of interest in other areas of
political science and public policy. In parallel to this development of EU
integration studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, we see the IR field
examining the question of governance at the same time. This contribution
contends that the diffuse IR discussions about multi-layered governance
were partly responsible for moving MLG studies from the focus on the EU
integration debates (Rosamond, 2000). Rosenau (1992) framed his highly
salient governance discussion in terms of how international co-operation
was possible in the absence of both coercive global government and tradi-
tional state interaction. Rosenau asserted a ‘network of collaborative
arrangements’ as an important factor in the governance agenda (Rosenau,
1992, p. 25). A parallel discussion saw public administration and public
policy scholars, such as Rhodes (1996), argue that the discipline was wit-
nessing the ‘hollowing out’ of the state, with an ensuing loss of hierarchical
control, and increasing governing through networks. The notion of govern-
ance as being ‘multi-level’ features in Rosenau and other IR approaches,
suggesting the erosion of the state’s primacy in the international system
in favour of international organisations, networks and other actors
(Keohane & Nye, 1989). Although the works cited here do have a specific
agenda, the overall utilisation of MLG offered a (very successful) metaphor
rather than a clear set of propositions and variables (Rosamond, 2000).
From the starting point in regional policy, Marks and his most impor-
tant collaborator, Liesbet Hooghe, expanded the MLG argument from
regional policy to a whole range of ‘normal’ policy activities (i.e. those pol-
icy processes that do not involve salient issues, such as treaty negotiation,
where national executives retain more control) and to all the dimensions of
20 ANTHONY R. ZITO
the policy process (Jordan, 2001). Marks et al. (1996) is their furthest 1990s
effort to formulate the MLG dynamic and how it shapes EU integration.
Consciously borrowing from the broader governance tradition and linking
to the other perspectives considered here, the authors state the MLG
approach as involving: (1) decision-making powers are not the sole preserve
of national officials but shared across different levels by various actors;
(2) collective decision-making in an arena such as the EU leads to a loss of
executive control; and (3) various actors are interconnected with other
actors at different levels rather than nested and therefore contained within
those other levels (Marks et al., 1996, p. 346). This 1996 piece argues that
there are conditions where national elites may cede executive control to an
integration process, particularly if the payoffs from collective decision-
making are attractive in the political short-term and if the desire exists to
shift certain decision-making (to avoid responsibility or protect from politi-
cal horse trading). Once decisions have been moved to the EU level, Marks
et al. (1996) enumerate a whole range of possible conditions that might
limit the ability of national governments to control the EU process. This
includes asymmetric levels of information that may be possessed for
instance by the Commission. Interestingly, Marks et al. (1996, pp. 353 354)
note the potential of principal agent dynamics, which this contribution
explores later.
Nonetheless, this list, however persuasive and intriguing, remains a list
of potential conditions, rather than linked, systematised propositions that
focus on an integration process. The authors acknowledge, quite justifiably,
that it is very unclear where the integration process will lead (Marks et al.,
1996, pp. 372 373). In the focus on the possible changing motivation of
national executives, there is a hint of a learning process which echoes the
mechanisms in Haas’ neofunctionalism.
In arguably their most trenchant effort to systematise the MLG
approach, Hooghe and Marks (2003; and also Marks & Hooghe, 2004)
synthesise some of these dynamics, dichotomising two types of governance
which represent alternative responses to the co-ordination problems faced
by political systems. This step reveals the authors’ reasonable inclination to
move beyond EU integration. To accomplish this, they combined argu-
ments from EU, IR, federal/intergovernmental and policy studies. ‘Type I
Governance’ reflects the more traditional understanding of federal systems
(although the EU is mainly but not completely characterised by these ele-
ments) where authority is diffused across a limited number of general-
purpose jurisdictions (Marks & Hooghe, 2004, p. 19). The actual number
of jurisdictional levels will be relatively small: the smaller arenas nest within
larger ones while still sharing a similar basic institutional architecture

(Hooghe & Marks, 2003, pp. 236 237).
In contrast, ‘Type II Governance’ envisioned governing across a consid-
erable number of levels, in which actors may be members of more than one
jurisdiction and the borders between jurisdictions can be crossed (as
opposed to Type I where actors take on memberships that tend to be in
one jurisdiction). This is essentially a network of different jurisdictions.
These multiple jurisdictions are geared to specific, specialised functional
tasks and can evolve in response to changing circumstances, showing flex-
ibility and fluidity in contrast to Type I (Hooghe & Marks, 2003,
pp. 237 239; Marks & Hooghe, 2004, pp. 16 17). The EU forms an unu-
sual example of Type II as well as Type I; more common are functional sys-
tems of trans-border co-operation, or co-operation, for instance governing
environmental problems, that crosses national or transnational territorial
boundaries.
Hooghe and Marks emphasised that the chief benefit of MLG lies in its
flexibility across a number of levels of analysis, but this comes at the price
of co-ordination. Type I systems attempt to manage co-ordination problems
by limiting the number of autonomous jurisdictions and bundling compe-
tencies within general-purpose jurisdictions such as states. By comparison,
Type II systems should focus on functionally distinct competencies that
contain the costs and benefits of action within the jurisdictions and that
address specific policy problems. Both methods are attempts to deal with
the collective action problem (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, pp. 239 240).
However, the 2003 2004 formulation, although it has more precisely cate-
gorised some of the core dimensions of such systems, retains a more descrip-
tive character of the processes, rather than testable hypotheses. The closest
the 2003 2004 pieces come to the latter is suggesting that the institutional
design has consequences for co-ordination within the individual system.
In a parallel attempt to flesh out a transnational MLG perspective,
Rosenau (2004, pp. 41 42) distinguished between six types of transnational
governance that are defined by the degree that authority is formally estab-
lished versus the degree to which authority flows in a vertical versus hori-
zontal dimensions. All six dimensions involve a networking phenomenon,
including the more traditional understanding of international relations
involving the interaction between the states, transnational corporations
(TNCs) and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) as well as more for-
mal and hierarchical structures. Rosenau explicitly incorporates network
governance as a distinctive type, one where bargaining takes place among
equal (which means a non-hierarchical relationship between the actors),
22 ANTHONY R. ZITO
formally organised collectivities. These collectivities include governments,

IGOs, TNCs and business alliances, and other non-business international
NGOs.
The impetus for this governance interaction arises from common con-
cerns about particular problems a shared problem-solving focus.
Rosenau also conceptualised a governance pattern mixing formal and
informal processes; it combines a number of levels of analysis (and the
actors operating at each level, such as state governments, TNCs, NGOs,
IGOs, elites and publics) in a singular network (a ‘mobius-web’) that has
no starting or culmination point (Rosenau, 2004, p. 41). Rosenau’s presen-
tation again focuses on categorisation of interactions rather than the for-
mulation of explanations but it goes further to hint at a core dynamic,
namely problem-solving.
Assessing the MLG approach, Jordan (2001, p. 201) notes how the ana-
lytical programme ‘lacks a causal motor of integration or a set of
testable hypotheses’. It can explain how the MLG system will perpetuate
itself through the constraints enumerated in the 1996 piece, but the argu-
ment does not really identify how the MLG process was initiated originally.
Peters and Pierre (2004, p. 76) agree with this criticism; their MLG critique
teases out these dynamics further, noting how MLG suffers from a lack of
a clear conceptual analysis of governance and what processes and outcomes
are involved.
These authors take a key step in refocusing the governance concept to
encompass the following: ‘the process through which public and private
actions and resources are co-ordinated and given common direction and
meaning’. Therefore, multi-level governance ‘becomes a matter of integrat-
ing processes at different institutional levels with each other in ways which
promote the interests of the system overall’ (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 78).
This definition removes governance from the expectation that the state is
necessarily expected to be diminished in any governance development. For
Peters and Pierre, institutional structures as well as the state remain a fun-
damental part of the MLG perspective, but with an acknowledgement of a
wider range of actors. This range of actors operates across levels of govern-
ance and tends not to be ordered hierarchically. The array of actors is
embedded in the system rather than fixed in a hierarchical position,
enabling even locally based organisations to engage with global arenas.
Transnational actors, such as Nissan, can thus engage directly with local
economic development offices.
Although the scope for action may have increased for both subnational
and national actors in the global arena, Peters and Pierre (2004, p. 80)
rightly note that the constitutional definitions of institutional competences

have tended to remain unaltered despite the presence of MLG dynamics.
Because the MLG process often reflects only a partial and/or evolving con-
stitutional/legal foundation, actors must negotiate their mutual roles and
processes rather than invoke a legal/constitutional point of legitimacy.
Given the lack of a fixed constitutional basis for many of these relation-
ships, the question of the nature of governance roles and processes will be
ongoing and subject to iterated negotiations over time (Peters & Pierre,
2004, p. 81, pp. 83 84). This will tend to gravitate towards informal bar-
gaining and politics as opposed to formal bases of authority. This discus-
sion and the sources that Marks incorporates into his understanding of
governance both suggest the necessity of incorporating a wider governance
approach.
NETWORK GOVERNANCE
One of the intersection points that multi-level governance shares with pub-
lic policy studies is the network governance literature. This is partly
because there is a strong conceptual and empirical intersection between
these two approaches in explaining public policy. Both perspectives speak
to each other about how networks behave in a multi-actor analysis.
Networks can be seen as both the unit of analysis (the network works as an
actor connecting the multi-level process) and the arena in which the analy-
sis takes place (viewing a national intergovernmental, or a transnational
interaction of actors as a network; see Whelan, 2012). Network governance
is the more encompassing tradition, compared to MLG. Network govern-
ance has articulated a range of patterns, some of which Marks and others
have borrowed for the MLG analysis. This contribution highlights three
dynamics: the equal importance of horizontal as well as vertical interac-
tions, the importance of learning dynamics to the motivation and explana-
tion of networks and the problems of co-ordination within networks.
The first pattern is the horizontal versus vertical expansion of political
activity and space (Pierre, 2000). Network governance focuses on policy
interactions at all levels of governing, including global, regional (i.e. the
EU), national and subnational/local levels of governing. Many governance
approaches argue that these governing processes cross all of these levels;
MLG nests within this tradition. This vertical dimension to relations is
joined however by a horizontal interaction between actors in the private
24 ANTHONY R. ZITO
and public sphere. This includes a range of elected officials and civil ser-
vants, together with all groups, organisations and professions in civil
society. The learning and co-ordination dynamics are more conceptually
difficult and receive the greater attention in this contribution, but this first
reality is an essential elaboration of the MLG approach. It brings a number
of implications, including the fact that other subnational actors, such as
lobbying groups, will have significant roles with states and transnational
organisations (Jordan, 2001).
The second pattern focuses on the question of learning. Our starting
point is Rhodes (1996, p. 660), who highlighted two particular network
characteristics as being essential to defining governance: namely that net-
works are both self-organising and interorganisational (further discussion
below). Actors in the governance interactions will have the following char-
acteristics: they are interdependent, continually interacting, governed by
trust and a mutually defined set of rules of the game, and possessing a sub-
stantial autonomy from the state. This occurs in the contemporary context
of the rise of highly differentiated societies that contain complex functional
interdependencies and causal networks, resulting in a wide range of
exchange relations between an increasing array of actors with often unpre-
dictable direct and indirect effects (Kooiman, 1993, pp. 39 41; Mayntz,
1993, p. 16). Policy-making in this context will involve a transformation of
structures and transgression over traditional boundaries; popular trust,
embedded typically in traditional institutions, can no longer be taken for
granted in these new arrangements (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003, pp. 8 12).
With the recognition of this inadequacy of information and conse-
quently the capacity to dominate any governing model, the assortment of
actors (social actors, groups, forces, public or semi-public organisations
and so forth) learn about their interdependence and negotiate amongst
themselves to shape situations. Under certain conditions the capacity of
societal actors to act in a co-ordinated fashion can facilitate governing and
the ability to handle problems that result from social complexity. Most cri-
tical is having a ‘special form of organising the policy process to secure that
in the decision-making process not only information about the needs and
fears of actors in the policy field is taken into account, but more impor-
tantly also indications of side effects, interdependencies and emerging’
(Mayntz, 1993, p. 20). Here two forms of problem-solving/policy learning
operate: (1) recognition and realisation of the mutual dependency on others
and the need for network co-ordination, and (2) the requirement to have
greater knowledge of modern complex problems and causal linkages that
shape them.
In addition to the concept of steering, a number of the governance

approaches consider the question of ‘self-organisation’ of networks as
informing the governance system. Using the metaphor of the living organ-
ism, various scholars formulated an approach to social systems arguing
that humans have an inherent reflectiveness that informs social relations
and how society is steered; this, rather than the external environment, steers
societal behaviour (van Twist & Schaap, 1991, pp. 39 41). The metaphor
of a living organism able to produce and reproduce its elements entered the
study of organisations, and the notion of ‘self-referential systems’ (Kickert,
1993, pp. 199 200). At this approach’s heart is that the core organisational
developments are generated internally, rather than being shaped by the
environment. Thus, networks may be able to exert self-control and auton-
omy: ‘(T)he possibility of a network of autonomous subsystems to main-
tain itself and its organization when confronted with external disturbances,
its capacity to survive in a turbulent and complex environment is a vital
quality in an administrative situation where direct top-down government
control is more and more replaced by autonomy and self-regulation of
social institutions’ (Kickert, 1993, p. 200). Accordingly the core hypothesis
becomes that networks can develop the internal mechanisms to handle
complex environments (while maintaining their structure) and therefore
steer society more successfully through such problems than traditional gov-
ernmental action.
This argument raises several fundamental questions about the nature of
self-organising processes. One issue deals with the question of how far such
a system can be organised and co-ordinated to pursue collective aims. This
raises the question of whether a learning process needs to be made more
explicit. The logic of self-referential organisations seemingly focuses on net-
work actors seeking to pursue policy that reflected the interests of the net-
work rather than the wider good (Pierre & Peters, 2000, p. 20). Pierre and
Peters observed the dangers of having such network systems separate con-
trol and responsibility, as the network actors will resist policy change when
it seems to involve cut-backs to the policy sector. The public will also con-
tinue to hold the state accountable for actions taken by the network even if
policy decisions and responsibilities are now shared.
Metcalfe (1993, pp. 183 184) was more explicit about articulating a
learning dynamic within the governance framework. He argued that inno-
vative public management at a macro level required ‘an interorganizational
management process in which the various organizations and interests
involved in a public policy system share responsibility for managing struc-
tural change while retaining their autonomy in managing incremental
26 ANTHONY R. ZITO
change’ (Metcalfe, 1993, p. 183) . Organisations at a micro level can inno-

vate within their own systems, imitating innovations elsewhere. In order to
manage macro structural change, by contrast, organisations within the net-
work must engage in a joint problem-solving, collective-decision process to
redesign the rules of the game and redefine their mutual roles and responsi-
bilities around an agreed definition of public interests.
In arguing about the necessity for macro public innovation, Metcalfe
warned against academic tendencies to see this effort as self-organising. It
is not a natural outgrowth of the relationships that evolve among organisa-
tions seeking to protect and advance their own interests (Metcalfe, 1993,
pp. 183 184). The public management must involve the ‘diagnosing and
formulating systemic problems at the macro level and designing integrative
solutions based on common interests and collective goals’ (Metcalfe, 1993,
p. 184). However, such efforts face the public goods challenge as the resolu-
tion of structural problems concerns everybody but does not fall on any-
one’s particular responsibility. Thus, public management must prioritise
creating processes and institutions that can focus on addressing macro level
problems and structural change, and that re-frame participation in terms of
becoming joint problem-solving (Metcalfe, 1993, p. 184). Metcalfe rein-
forced this point, stating that the ‘political environment of public manage-
ment learning processes are especially difficult to maintain’, and the
practical difficulties of building learning capacities into an interorganisa-
tional system are ‘enormous’ (Metcalfe, 1993, pp. 187 188). Citing
Deutsch and others, Metcalfe (1993, p. 188) argued that the management
of structural change required the organisations that constitute the interor-
ganisational network to pool their adaptive capacities and work in concert
in a learning network.
Moving to Metcalfe’s third dimension, the network governance litera-
ture cited here suggests that governance trends are important at the most
micro levels of governing. Nevertheless, acknowledging the multi-level nat-
ure of this process provides the greatest challenge to network learning and
co-ordination. This reinforces the considerable value to the MLG agenda
in identifying the co-ordination problem, but without the framework pro-
viding a ready set of tools for resolving the quandary.
Here the interaction of interorganisational perspectives and governance
may have more purchase. In particular, Rhodes (1996, pp. 660 665) built
his view on governance out of his work in the interorganisational field. His
key governance argument was that the British public realm was witnessing
a process of ‘hollowing out the state’; this involved a fragmentation of the
public sector and the rise of complex interorganisational networks to
manage these services. Rhodes noted that the rise of these networks came
at a cost to the state’s ability to co-ordinate the governing mechanisms.
Fritz Scharpf provided the most systematic analysis of the co-ordination
dilemma. Scharpf (1978, p. 353) argued that there is a separate set of
dynamics at work in interorganisational interactions. He created two cate-
gories or levels of interactions. The first is the level where specific interac-
tions happen; these can be a one-off interaction or follow a longer term
pattern of interaction. Generally speaking, such interactions must be
mutually advantageous for both parties to participate. However, above this
engagement in specific interactions is another, more stable structural rela-
tionship among the various participants: here there is likely to be a history
of past experiences and expectation of future ones. In this longer term con-
text, particular interactions may disadvantage one party, but that party will
accept, expecting benefits from future interactions. Scharpf predicted that
the overall stable pattern of interactions between two actors was a relation-
ship of mutual dependence, in comparison to relationships where the par-
ties are relatively independent (relatively rare) or where one party is more
dependent on the other. Even where one party in a relationship seems to be
dominant through the exercise of authority or some form of resources, the
dominant party may have a dependence on information/skills or clientilistic
contacts involving the subordinate units (Scharpf, 1978, p. 359).
Scharpf later argued that subordinate actors have the incentive to exer-
cise ‘co-ordination from below’, where the subordinate actors are directly
affected by various government policies at a higher level (Scharpf, 1978,
p. 361). Given the high degree of functional differentiation and complex
provision of resource by different government bodies, subordinate clientele
have an interest in seeking to co-ordinate the efforts from above, making
use of information resources as well as access and co-operation on the part
of the actors within the subordinate group.
One of Scharpf’s most important insights for the study of governance is
his assertion that indirect co-ordination mechanisms have substantial
limitations (Scharpf, 1978, pp. 352 362). Actors can exercise direct co-
ordination involving strong ties and direct interaction, or indirectly
co-ordinate by harnessing relations to intermediary actors. Indirect co-
ordination occurs when one actor wishes to co-ordinate policy with another
actor, but lacks an established exchange relationship and therefore cannot
do so directly. Scharpf (1978, p. 361) argued that actors can get around the
problem of direct exchange by utilising an intermediary actor which is able
and motivated to influence the target actor. However, such steering is likely
to be expensive to incentivise the intermediary actor and therefore: ‘(a)s a
28 ANTHONY R. ZITO
consequence, chains of indirect influence over several intermediaries, while

theoretically possible, are probably hard to establish because the influence
potential which may be available initially is likely to be successively eroded
or discounted at each step’ (Scharpf, 1978, p. 362). The ability of any actor
to steer other actors indirectly becomes substantially limited when extended
beyond one chain of intermediary actors. This raises strong questions for
any attempt to steer actor behaviour indirectly within a multi-level govern-
ance chain of actors that are not in a hierarchical relationship. These objec-
tions suggest that evidence for the MLG propositions rests on a greater
understanding of how control and learning work.
PA APPROACH AND POLICY LEARNING
The PA approach offers several advantages to MLG, particularly the

emphasis both on institutions and on the problems of co-ordination and
control, which trouble the MLG literature. The PA argument centres on
the core relationships between bureaucratic organisations (the agents) and
the principals (the political authorities). Bureaucrats may have personal
preferences that conflict with the principals’ priorities; the delegation of
authority to agents gives the bureaucrats information advantages
(McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987). PA theorists conceptualised politi-
cians as principals who recognise the scope for bureaucratic manipulation
and protect their long-term control over their agents by setting various con-
trol mechanisms (McCubbins et al., 1987).
To avoid prohibitive costs of monitoring and sanctioning agents, the
principals develop mechanisms that constrain the bureaucratic process, but
do not involve specifying or even knowing the detailed policy outcomes
that bureaucrats pursue (Calvert, McCubbins, & Weingast, 1989). Agent
discretion occurs when the agent manages to select a policy that differs
from the principals’ expectations and control mechanisms (Calvert et al.,
1989, pp. 604 607). PA approaches label this ‘shirking’: that is an agent
engages in opportunistic behaviour that involves selecting more costly
alternatives for the principal (Kassim & Menon, 2003, p. 122).
Elsewhere I have argued that the PA approach, although it explains a
central co-ordination and control dynamic, has been too narrowly formu-
lated to provide the true range of analytical possibilities, and this is cer-
tainly the case concerning the MLG perspective (Zito, 2009). Waterman,
Rouse, and Wright (2004, pp. 24 46) explore the various scenarios that
result when one relaxes both fundamental PA assumptions (i.e. conflicts

between goals are inevitable and that agents tend to have more information
than principals). Table 1 consolidates the different scenarios. The key thing
to take from this table is the conditionality of the interactions shaped by
the particular governance context.
Table 1 illustrates how the PA model, scenario 2, is only one possibi-
lity (Waterman et al., 2004, pp. 24 31). We must not dismiss this classic
scenario, however: not only is this classic scenario frequent, it also raises
the greatest challenge for maintaining political control over bureaucracy.
Taking the other scenarios scenario 1 suggests that there may be cer-
tain issues where knowledge for both agents and principals are incidental
to the decision, such as the argument about whether the Judeo-Christian
heritage should be incorporated in an EU Constitution. Here the bureau-
cracy stays in the background as it is merely one interest among many in
the discussion. The third (advocacy coalition) outcome illustrates the case
where the particular agent is allied with a strong supporting coalition
informed to the same relative degree, but is countered by another coali-
tion with equivalent knowledge. Scenario 4 highlights the possibility that
the principals have the key information advantage and restrict the
bureaucracy to menial tasks.
The PA tends to give less attention to the possibilities of consensus
existing between government and bureaucracy. Scenario 5 suggests the
marginalisation of the bureaucracy as they largely become supporters for
the ideas that the politicians push. Where information asymmetry favours
the agent, we see the classic depiction of bureaucracy as technocrats with
Table 1. Principal-Agent Scenarios.

Goal Conflict Agent’s Comparative Principal’s Comparative Scenario
versus Goal Level of Information Level of Information
Consensus
Goal conflict Little Little 1. Bumper sticker politics

Goal conflict Much Little 2. Classic PA model
Goal conflict Much Much 3. Advocacy coalition
Goal conflict Little Much 4. Patronage system
Goal consensus Little Little 5. Theocracy
Goal consensus Much Little 6. Politics versus
administration
Goal Consensus Much Much 7. Policy subsystem
Goal consensus Little Much 8. Plato’s Republic
Source: As Adapted from Waterman et al. (2004, p. 25).

30 ANTHONY R. ZITO
expertise granting them considerable autonomy as long as they generate

preferred results. The policy subsystem illustrates the scenario where all the
actors share information and there is a consensus on the goals, leading to a
stable network or ‘iron triangle’. The final scenario best fits political sys-
tems with little administrative capacity; the label, Plato’s Republic, that
Waterman et al. use is arguably an oversimplification of Plato’s vision, as is
the use of the label theocracy in scenario 5.
There are different implications for agency discretion in these scenarios.
In the top half of the table, bumper sticker politics and patronage represent
scenarios where the agent does not have the advantage of knowledge to
exploit in exercising discretion, and indeed in the latter the principal has
the greater policy command because of its knowledge. The principal agent
scenario suggests that the agent will exploit its expertise to shirk and amass
greater resources that the principal would like. In contrast the coalition sce-
nario suggests that there will be principals with a greater policy knowledge
supporting and opposing the agency. With the condition of consensus oper-
ating in four scenarios in the bottom half of Table 1, the issue of discretion
is not at issue, as it is within the parameters of what the principals desire.
Bureaucratic discretion and autonomy is most problematic and contested
in the principal agent and advocacy scenarios.
A further step to complicating the PA picture is to drop the assumptions
of a single principal and/or a single agent. The PA approach makes the
assumption that the principals can pre-commit to a particular arrangement,
but what happens when there are multiple principals who cannot decide?
Moe (1989) makes this case very forcefully, asking how reasonable it is
expect to find the political elite unified over interests, let alone concentrated
in complex MLG systems such as the United States and the EU.
Furthermore, the possibility that the agency itself is riven with conflicts
also challenges the basic model with additional complexity (Waterman
et al., 2004, pp. 36 37). The scenarios in Table 1, particularly the advocacy
coalition and bumper sticker politics, encompass the possibility that there
will be competing principals as well as competing agents. Neither the prin-
cipals nor the agents are likely to be unitary in outlook, and this very much
reflects the MLG expectations.
This governance reality underlines the importance of coalitions. Agents
have incentives to ally themselves with principals who share goals and pol-
icy outlook. Agents and other interest groups have a strong incentive to
share information to likely supporting coalitions; the situation of informa-
tion asymmetry accordingly decreases. This leads Waterman et al. (2004,
pp. 37 42) to conclude that information and learning is a core dynamic
that transforms the PA relationship: both sets of actors learn over time
about policy, politics and their own organisations.
Dunlop and James (2007) argue for the principals’ ability to recognise
that they are in complex relationships with their agents and to learn how to
better operate. Particular conditions may spur or inhibit learning, such as
the organisational culture of the agent organisation and the degree to
which the principals use organisational change to reshape that culture.
Nevertheless, unforeseen crises and particular cognitive blinders on the
part of the principals may lead the principals to lose control of the learning
process.
Equally important is the opposite possibility: agencies and their leader-
ship learning about coalitional and public policy possibilities. Carpenter
(2001, pp. 14 35, pp. 353 367) has explored how bureaucracy can culti-
vate autonomy and direct links to the public and civil society.
Bureaucracies require stable legitimacy for themselves, and not just for the
policies. Accordingly they push policy innovation and entrepreneurship
(Carpenter, 2001, pp. 14 18). Genuine autonomy exists when agents take
the decisive first moves towards a new policy, establishing an agenda for
the most popular alternative, which the politicians and organised interests
cannot ignore.
Agents can alter the preferences of the principals (the public, organised
interests, and politicians). This need not constitute shirking because the
agent transforms the systems and the principals’ perspective. Agents operat-
ing with discretion may pursue bureaucratic entrepreneurship (Carpenter,
2001, pp. 30 31): the agent leadership experiments with new programs and
introduces innovations to existing programmes while gradually convincing
the diverse political actors and coalitions to value the new innovation and
the agencies themselves. To secure this transformation, agents harness
recognised legitimacy in the policy area, by building stronger ties to the
public and/or establishing reputations for impartiality or the pursuit of
public good. Agents operating in the classic PA scenario will seek to
develop advocacy coalition scenarios or even more secure policy subsystem
and technocracy relationships where there is stability, recognition and
legitimacy for the agent role.
It is important at this juncture to define learning, which Table 2 does,
adapting Bennett and Howlett (1992, pp. 278 288). The table moves from
the learning processes that involve the greatest reconceptualisation of pol-
icy to the least. The first type of learning, ‘social learning’, represents actors
developing new worldviews and outlooks leading to radical shifts in policy
paradigms. The second, ‘lesson drawing’, denotes how programmes change
32 ANTHONY R. ZITO
Table 2. Learning Modes.

Learning Types Learns What To What Effect
Social learning Ideas, worldviews Core paradigm, value shift

Lesson drawing Instruments Programme change
Government learning Process-related behaviour and Organisational change and
strategy political positioning
Blocked learning Cognitive change occurs but Learning remains at individual
structures, interests and or group level, and is not
current worldviews block embedded into organisation
behavioural change and network routines
No learning No change in cognition and Actors in process are satisfied
behaviour with status quo
by learning about new instruments and tools to fulfil given policy objec-
tives. ‘Government learning’ focuses on the understanding the administra-
tive process aimed at organisational change and assessing relations to
internal and external actors. The two lower categories in Table 2 emphasise
the contingent nature of learning, depending on not only the act of cogni-
tion but actual behavioural change as a consequence.
This chapter assumes that agent actors see themselves as seeking to fulfil
aims and to set evolving aims. There is some evidence to question this
assumption; see, for example, West (1988) and McGarity (1991).
Nevertheless, allowing for this complexity, agents will tend to value greater
discretion and autonomy to pursue their objectives. Agents are seeking to
expand resources, including knowledge, to fulfil their goals. This may
involve all three types of learning featured in Table 2. Agents need to learn
how to build alliances with others, or to convert the principals to the
agent’s preferred consensus. Agents also need to better understand their
tasks in terms of wider understandings and instruments. Table 3 outlines
some of the possibilities for learning and coalition building.
Situation A expects incremental adaptation or limited lesson drawing
that does not modify the organisational strategy and worldview that is
an absence of social learning. There may be some tactical adjustments and
increased peripheral knowledge in order to maintain the agency position in
relation to the inner core principals and constituencies. Blocked or no
learning (either actively blocked by particular actors or the absence of an
agency impulse) is also possible in this scenario. The classic PA scenario
would expect this scenario to dominate future agent performance; any dis-
cretion takes the mild form of shirking. Situation B expects a similar out-
come although incremental adjustments to political strategy are more
Table 3. Learning Strategies.

Dimensions of Agent Maintain/Safeguard Arena Expand Political Arena
Activity
Innovation is stable (A) Iron triangle, policy (B) Political engagement and
community or classic advocacy coalition building on
Principal Agent: limited entrenched ideas: government
learning learning and perhaps some
lesson drawing
Innovation is pushed (C) Internal coalitional (D) Expansive advocacy coalition
learning and organisational entrepreneurial learning: all
learning three forms of learning
Source: From (Zito, 2009).
likely. This scenario occurs in changing political circumstances when power

is shifting (e.g. changes in government) or the actor coalitions are more
fluid. Instrumental and organisational learning can occur in this scenario,
but social learning does not.
Situation C suggests substantial coalition innovation through endogenous
processes although exogenous pressures also may appear. Organisational
changes or lesson drawing may occur that seek to improve agency perfor-
mance, but there is no focus on transforming the wider context. Social
learning is less likely. Situation D encapsulates Carpenter’s entrepreneurial
learning concept where agents actively push innovation and seek a wider
actor coalition to embrace this knowledge and embed it into their own
routines, rules and behavioural norms. All three forms of learning may occur
in this situation, but social learning is most expected to transform the under-
standing of the principal and the agent. By differentiating learning, we gain
some understanding of the mechanisms that underpin the assumptions of
network governance and MLG.
MLG PROPOSITIONS
Having reviewed three extensive literatures, the best way to synthesise this
material is to develop more concrete analytical propositions for further
research. Coming to the fundamental question raised by the chapter title
(the missing dependent variable), the most promising avenue is to focus on
an enduring (MLG) problem-solving that co-ordinates itself to confront
34 ANTHONY R. ZITO
particular policy choices. This formulation, which aligns this contribution

to Peters and Pierre (2004), takes the argument away from MLG hypoth-
eses expecting the transformation of the state. Thus, no institutional end-
point is expected; indeed that constitutes a proposition in and of itself.
This point suggests the first proposition: institutions with constitutional
and treaty basis, authority and legitimacy continue to play key roles in gov-
ernance, but ‘nested’ policy problems (i.e. those problems that are linked and
impact on other policy problems and priorities) and ‘wicked’ policy problems
(i.e. those problems that are resistant to resolution due to issue uncertainty
and complexity) are forcing a range of private and public policy actors
(across all vertical policy levels and horizontal patterns of relationships) to
become involved in more informal policy-making processes (Proposition 1).
This articulates more fully the ‘functional’ imperative that Hooghe and
Marks (2003) associate with the rise in Type II MLG systems. The point in
the last set of brackets within Proposition 1underlines the point that multi-
level governance involves vertical interactions, but equally important are
the horizontal interactions between a wide range of actors. This reflects the
arguments of Peters and Pierre, Jordan and Rosenau that horizontal rela-
tions require equal emphasis to vertical relations in the MLG concept.
The core explanatory variable that underpins the MLG problem-solving
mode is learning (Proposition 2). Referring to the distinctions made in
Table 2, social learning is vital in the first instance to frame the policy pro-
blem and to orientate actors into both the resources that they have avail-
able and the resources existing in other actors that are required. Lesson
drawing and organisational learning may be required to implement the
solutions that the MLG network develops. Actors who are involved in the
MLG process will buy into both the content of the social learning and to
the informal roles.
The learning and governing process can maintain some cohesion within
small policy sub-sectors or subsystems where there is a degree of trust and
familiarity over time. However, the broader the governance network at each
horizontal level and the further stretched vertically, the more likely such trust
and the agent-principal dynamic will be limited (Proposition 3). Many more
actors will be both principals and agents within this MLG system. Not all
of them may share the same sense of a common good, as opposed to a par-
ticular interest in the policy problem. At this point, a collective entrepre-
neurial effort, which is more likely to involve some public institution or
organisation with some grounds in constitutional legitimacy as well as organi-
sational resource, will be required to ensure learning and co-ordination around
a set of objectives/outcomes (Proposition 4). This follows from Metcalfe’s
argument for the need for some public management at a macro level to
facilitate co-ordination. It is those macro institutions which may be more
able to exercise indirect co-ordination of a range of actors. At the core of
these relationships, there is likely to be some form of mutual dependence
between the actors.
Nevertheless, even institutions with transnational presence and resources,
such as the EU institutions (e.g. the Commission) may need to design specific
policy instruments and processes that provide sufficient inducement for actors
to co-ordinate their actions (Proposition 5). Institutional design will be a cri-
tical variable at both a macro and micro level for actors within the MLG
to co-ordinate a policy response. However, this has its own implications as
Peters and Pierre suggest: a likely mismatch between the elected governments
at the subnational and national level, which retain constitutional and electoral
legitimacy to the degree that it exists, and the degree to which these govern-
ments can exercise some level of control over the other MLG actors which
may constitute both principals and agents (Proposition 6).
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: WHERE TO TAKE THE

MLG AGENDA?
Readers at this juncture (and before) may feel cheated that this piece has
offered, as a response to the MLG perspective, yet more verbiage and
analytical abstraction. Nevertheless, I hope this contribution has taken
the step of suggesting the key dynamics that need to be understood in
any empirical exploration of MLG. In order for a MLG structure to
maintain a meaningful functional presence over time, it can partake of
the traditional multi-level dynamics of power and legitimacy, namely the
modern state. However, as the governance literature demonstrates persua-
sively, the nature of public policy and the modern challenges means that
states are increasingly enmeshed in wider MLG structures themselves, the
EU being a classic example of a formal (i.e. international treaty-based)
version of this.
This contribution suggests that co-ordination, and the resources that
help maintain this co-ordination, is the key dependent variable that MLG
scholars need to understand. With multiple principals and multiple agents,
operating at a number of levels of analysis, direct authority and control is
harder to evoke. The key explanatory variable that seems to underpin this
MLG co-ordination is some form of learning. As suggested above, at some
36 ANTHONY R. ZITO
level social learning has to happen: that is state and other actors realise the
policy challenge is such that a wider array of actors must be engaged, as
well as a recognition that these actors may have a stake and valuable role
to play. There must be a problem identification, as well as an identification
of a wider set of actors and instruments needed to address this problem.
This suggests that scholars need to focus on the appearance and use of
knowledge in the governance processes to isolate MLG dynamics. Do these
dynamics sufficiently explain the co-ordination that exists over time in a
MLG process, or do other variables matter more? Is learning in fact suffi-
cient or are there intervening variables (particular institutional configura-
tions, for example) that are of equal necessity to sustain this governance?
In thinking about empirical exploration, it is illuminating to consider
whether the EU is an easy or challenging case for MLG analysis. There is a
strong thread in the European Union literature to suggest that the EU
stands out as a system involving multiple levels of actors without nation
states being the sole determinant of the process of integration and normal
policy-making. Hooghe and Marks (2003) highlight the EU as a significant
example of both a Type I and Type II system. In a world where states are
facing increasing difficulties in steering in the face of complexity, network
governance scholars by contrast view the EU as thriving in the co-
ordination of multiple actors and approximating their interests (Kohler-
Koch, 2002). The focus on networks of actors engaged in solving policy
problems and involving a wide set of actors in a consensus becomes a more
necessary focus because of the lack of a unifying European identity and/or
ideology.
However, although network relations do exist across EU levels of gov-
ernance, the EU, as is the case with its member states, relies significantly on
the more hierarchical mechanisms to pursue policy goals (Börzel, 2010).
Two concrete examples should underline this complexity. With its horizon-
tal network connections and interaction with other EU statistical bodies,
and its vertical interaction with international organisations, non-EU states
and various principals including the Commission and Council, the
European Environment Agency is a model of MLG (Zito, 2009). One can
even discern learning by the Agency; nevertheless the actual governance
impact of this body is heavily constrained. An act of politics and policy
that seems much more significant is the 2014 selection of the Commission
President and the future EU policy direction. Here one can discern some
learning, alliance building and entrepreneurship, particularly from certain
European Parliament leaders; however much of this complex governance
web seems to have been driven by the lack of co-ordination and unintended
consequences found in nation politics and the acts of national leaders.

Given the complex chains of policy-making it contains, the EU suggests a
range of co-ordination interactions that will test the MLG perspective to
the maximum extent.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I thank Edoardo Ongaro, Hussein Kassim and the other participants who
commented on the earlier version of this chapter, presented at the High
Level Seminar, ‘Multi-Level Governance: The Missing Linkages’,
Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, 17 18 October, 2013.
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REVISITING THE ‘MANAGEMENT
DEFICIT’: CAN THE COMMISSION
(STILL NOT) MANAGE EUROPE?
Hussein Kassim
ABSTRACT
Purpose The aim of the chapter is to examine whether the challenges

to administering the EU outlined by Les Metcalfe in his famous article,
‘After 1992, can the Commission manage Europe?’ have now been met.
Metcalfe not only identified a ‘management deficit’ in the implementation
of the single market programme arising from an oversight among policy
makers, but highlighted a neglect of the administrative dimension of
European integration among scholars.
Methodology/approach The chapter draws on primary and secondary
literature to track developments in respect of the three elements identified
by Metcalfe: the small size of the European Commission, its poor inter-
nal coordination and weak leadership; the responsiveness of administra-
tive bodies in the member states to the need for inter-organizational
coordination; and the network-building and management capacity of the
Commission.

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004003
41
42 HUSSEIN KASSIM
Findings Despite changes, such as further enlargement, agencification

at national and EU levels, and the expansion of EU competencies that
have exacerbated the management challenge confronting the EU, there
have been significant developments that have closed the deficit. First, the
Commission has become far better integrated, coordination upgraded,
and leadership strengthened. Second, through networking, cooptation
and other strategies the Commission has sought to assure the effective
implementation and enforcement of the single market rules. Third, mem-
ber state governments, ministries and agencies have sought to cultivate
networked relations that have increased the manageability of EU
administration.
Research implications To the knowledge of this author, this is the first
attempt to revisit Metcalfe’s diagnosis and to review the extent to which
the management deficit he identified has been addressed subsequently.
Practical implications The chapter has implications for how inter-
organizational coordination within the EU administrative system could
be improved.
Social implications The chapter bears on the administrative capacity
of the EU to deliver the policies decided by EU policy makers.
Originality/value As well as offering an assessment of the extent to
which progress has been made in addressing the management deficit iden-
tified by Les Metcalfe in his classic article, this chapter conceptualizes
the EU administration as an entity that encompasses both EU institu-
tions and administrative bodies in the member states. It advances the
concept of the EU as a multi-level administration.
Keywords: Networks; European administration; management deficit;
inter-organizational coordination; multi-level administration
Although the centrality of the European Commission to policy and policy

making in the EU system has rarely been in doubt, the organization’s capa-
city in a complex multi-level polity to carry out the executive and manage-
rial responsibilities entrusted to it by the founding treaties has regularly
come under scrutiny. While highlighting the scale of the task of managing
Revisiting the ‘Management Deficit’ 43
relationships with diverse actors at multiple territorial levels, academic

observers and commentators from inside the organization have underlined
weaknesses in the internal operation of the Commission that inhibit its abil-
ity to perform this key administrative function.
Curiously, however, while scholars of public administration are intensely
aware that the first depends to a large degree on the second, the same con-
sciousness appears not to be shared by integration theorists or scholars of
EU policy making. Neglect of the EU’s organizational dimension in the
multi-level governance literature is particularly surprisingly, given its
emphasis (and the work conducted by one of its leading proponents) on the
Commission, the declining capacity of the Keynesian state and its focus on
sub-national actors. Yet, as a number of studies have argued (see,
e.g. Streb, 2008), multi-level governance is essentially an actor-centred
model that lacks sensitivity to the institutional (or constitutional) context
in which actors interact or exchange resources.
In line with the central ambition of the current volume, this chapter
aims to address the organizational dimension that is overlooked by the
multi-level governance approach. It does so by examining the role of the
Commission in the multi-level polity and focusing in particular on its capa-
city to manage. The Commission’s managerial responsibilities are arguably
nowhere more important than in the single market. As Hans von der
Groeben, one of the draughtsmen of the Rome Treaty and the first
Commissioner for competition, made clear in his later reflections on the
foundation of the European Economic Community (1987, pp. 24 25), the
ambition was not to displace national economies with a single European
economy, but to introduce and enforce common rules across the member
states. The task was therefore as much about management and coordina-
tion between the Commission and national actors as it was about the adop-
tion of legislation.
If Les Metcalfe’s article, ‘After 1992, can the Commission manage
Europe?’, published on the eve of the launch of the single internal market,
can be regarded as offering the definitive diagnosis of the Commission’s, or
more broadly the EU’s, predicament, the intervening period has only seen
an increase in the magnitude of the challenge that confronts the organiza-
tion. Fifteen new members have joined, significantly expanding the territory
of the EU and, with the addition of fifteen varied economies and societies,
legal traditions, and political systems, seriously complicating the task of
governance. The emergence and multiplication of EU agencies (Ongaro,
Barbieri, Bellè, & Fedele, 2015), meanwhile, has created new complexities.
44 HUSSEIN KASSIM
At the same time, however, there have been important organizational

changes within the Commission, as well as developments elsewhere, that
arguably have increased the manageability of the EU system. In the light of
these changes, it is timely to review the Commission’s ability to manage
Europe. This chapter re-examines Metcalfe’s original analysis, as well as
limitations noted by other commentators. It considers developments that
have taken place since Metcalfe’s article first appeared and re-assesses the
‘management deficit’. It argues that, although some problems remain, most
notably in the willingness of member state governments to work towards
the creation of the infrastructure necessary to assure effective management
within the EU system, the Commission’s organizational capacities have
been significantly strengthened and that it is better placed to carry out its
managerial responsibilities than is often thought.
THE METCALFE CRITIQUE

Published some months before the 1 January 1993 single market launch date,
Metcalfe’s article sought to draw attention to managerial weaknesses in the
EU system. Although frequent reference had been made to the ‘democratic
deficit’ of the European Communities, Metcalfe exposed a ‘management
deficit’ which, he argued, had ‘been seriously neglected, if not entirely ignored’
(1992, p. 117). Although legal competences had been transferred and
Europe’s political leaders had focused on the regulations necessary to create a
single market, they had not paid similar attention to developing the adminis-
trative capacity within the EU to construct, manage and enforce such a
complex cross-national undertaking. As Metcalfe observed, this was an
important omission since ‘integration is not an automatic process. It must be
deliberately managed’ (1992, p. 117). The problem was exacerbated in the
case of the EU since ‘ready-made solutions to the problems of managing inte-
gration’ were not available, nor was there ‘a tradition within the EC of creat-
ing new administrative capacities in step with … policy objectives’. It was
exacerbated further, because the tasks set by the EU were ‘quite new and
unprecedented’. They involved the construction of a market across sovereign
nation states and management involving multiple actors at different territorial
levels.1 ‘Neither its own history, nor other integration experiments provide[d]
a model to imitate’ (1992, p. 117).
Metcalfe’s account of the managerial deficiencies of the EU began with
the European Commission. Located at the heart of the EU system, with
executive and management responsibilities, the ‘key supranational agency

of public management in the EC’ the body ‘on which future performance
depends so heavily’ was small and not itself well integrated. With a
workforce of 15,000 a figure that overstates its operational size, the
Commission was understaffed relative to the scope and scale of its responsi-
bilities and its exiguous staff compared unfavourably with national govern-
ments: ‘Even in small countries a single ministry may be much larger than
the whole Commission with its wide-ranging functions, to say nothing of
individual DGs with their staff of only a few hundred. In addition, consti-
tutional provisions and informal norms served only to ‘weaken’ [the
Commission’s] capacity to provide the leadership and management that the
organisation requires’. Furthermore, the Commission lacked ‘a good record
of administrative modernisation’ (1992, p. 117).
Yet the limitations of the Commission were only part of the story: ‘the
Commission alone could not be solely responsible for managing EC poli-
cies’, as ‘[i]n a multilevel and multinational system of government, responsi-
bilities are shared (Franz, 1991)’. The Commission might have ‘a unique
responsibility for ensuring effective coordination among the other organisa-
tions involved’, but ensuring the responsiveness of these organizations, still
less requiring them to adapt to the needs of inter-organizational coopera-
tion, lay beyond its reach. The Commission had responsibility, but not
power. Nor could it be sure that either the organizations concerned or the
authorities on which they depended had the resources or the inclination to
undertake the necessary adjustments. Although ‘the crucial factor in deter-
mining the character of the Commission as an organisation and the key to
its effectiveness is its ability to develop networks of cooperation and colla-
boration across organisational and national boundaries’, ‘Managing
Europe’ would be ‘a joint effort, an interorganisational process (Metcalfe,
1992, p. 125)’.
In summary, according to Metcalfe, the EU’s ‘management deficit’
derived from two sources, both of which were re-affirmed by later authors.
The first was the institutional weaknesses of the Commission its small
size, weak coordination and leadership, and outdated instruments and
mechanisms. Others, such as Laffan (1996) and Hooghe (2002) have added
the low priority attached by Commission staff to policy management and
administration as opposed to policy conception and initiation. The second
source was the complex universe of organizations, which the Commission
was charged with coordinating (Peters, 2000). However, although it was
entrusted with management and oversight responsibilities, it was not given
power.
46 HUSSEIN KASSIM
THE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE: DEVELOPMENTS

SINCE 1992
If the challenge that faced the Commission on the eve of the single internal
market was considerable, it has grown even more substantial in the inter-
vening period. The single market has both deepened and widened since the
early 1990s. In sectors, such as aviation, gas, electricity and telecommunica-
tions, EU regulatory regimes have progressively been extended. The single
market has also expanded to include new areas services in general and
financial regulations in particular (though see Young, 2010). Rules on con-
sumer protection have evolved considerably, the EU has increasingly
addressed the issue of intellectual property and action has been taken to
harmonize the business environment. As the states that acceded to the EU
in 2004, 2007 and 2013 have discovered, the corpus of single market legisla-
tion is forbidding. At the same time, there is considerable variation in the
maturity of the regulatory regimes that make up the single market, as well
as their governance. While some sectors, such as aviation and telecommuni-
cations, have progressed through four or five generations of legislation,
others have developed much more slowly.
Fourth, as noted above, institutional differentiation within the EU sys-
tem has become even more complex and more pronounced since the early
1990s. At the system level, enlargements in 1995, 2004, 2007 and 2013 have
seen the EU grow from 12 to 28 member states. It was not only the number
of member countries that increased the scale of the logistical challenge con-
fronting the Commission, but the range and variety of administrative mod-
els, traditions and cultures that the accession of countries from
Scandinavia, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe brought into the EU
(see Painter & Peters, 2010).
Furthermore, the organizational complexity of the EU system also
increased, notably as a result of agencification. In the member states, albeit
unevenly, public administration underwent major changes with a shift
away from the ownership state (Majone, 1994, 1996), which led to the
creation of a battery of independent regulatory agencies. It also coincided
with the implementation of the new public management (Christensen &
Lagreid, 2010; Hood, 1991). The outcome was a fragmentation of the
machinery of the state, which created new and more challenging problems
of coordination without securing the anticipated benefits of delegation
(Christensen, 2012; Christensen & Laegreid, 2007a, 2007b, 2012; Halligan,
2010; Lodge & Gill, 2011).
At the EU level, meanwhile, there was increasing resort to the creation

of agencies as a device to improve coordination between multiple specialist
actors in the member states in pursuit of the coherent implementation and
enforcement of EU rules (Barbieri & Ongaro, 2008; Busuioc, Groenleer, &
Trondal, 2012; Dehousse, 1997; Kreher, 1997; Rittberger & Wonka, 2011;
Verhoest, van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Laegreid, 2012; also Ongaro et al.,
2015). The years between 1990 and 2015 saw an increase from two agencies
to more than forty. As with enlargement, however, it was not only the
number of these new bodies that posed a challenge. Agencies were created
for different purposes and vary in size, structure, power and responsibility,
and internal operation (Commission, 2009). Moreover, their creation was
often contested, sometimes by the Commission, at times by the member
states. More generally, it was assumed that agencies at both levels were
self-interested, hostile to the Commission and unlikely to cooperate will-
ingly with the organization.
With the proliferation at national and EU levels of bodies responsible
for the implementation and enforcement of EU rules, the management task
facing the Commission became increasingly formidable. Although the
power to impose fines on member states that failed to comply with their
obligations under the treaty did represent a major new power for the
Commission and gave it greater leverage over member governments than
previously, the EU did not acquire the authority to compel member states
to impose a particular shape or model on their administrations. Indeed, the
principle of institutional autonomy has remained largely unimpugned in
theory, although in practice the EU has been able to lever preferred
arrangements as a result of the fiscal crisis in some Eurozone countries (see
Ongaro, 2014; see also Bauer & Becker, 2014).
REVISITING THE ‘MANAGEMENT DEFICIT’
Managing a market across multiple jurisdictions is a forbidding task and

Metcalfe’s pessimism on the eve of 1993 appeared to be entirely justified.
The Commission was a fragmented institution, where leadership was weak.
While it had long interacted with national administrations on the policy
input side, its capacity to collaborate with them on the policy output side
was largely untested. Moreover, there seemed little appreciation on the part
of national governments of the organizational effort that would be neces-
sary to sustain such an ambitious undertaking.
48 HUSSEIN KASSIM
Since the early 1990s, however, there have been developments in all three
areas. First, the Commission has become a far more integrated institution.
Political authority has been centralized in the Commission Presidency and
the administrative capacity of the organization has been considerably
enhanced. Second, the Commission has through networking, cooptation
and other strategies sought to assure the effective implementation and
enforcement of the single market rules. Third, not only has it become clear
that new actors, particularly agencies at EU or national level, are not in
practice hostile to the Commission, but that they and other actors have
been prepared to cooperate to improve the manageability of single market
governance.
The Commission: The Internal Dimension
Metcalfe’s assessment of the Commission echoed the image presented in

earlier analyses (Coombes, 1970; Spierenburg, 1979) a picture also lar-
gely re-affirmed by academic observers subsequently (Cini, 1996; Hooghe,
2002) and Commission insiders (see, e.g. Brittan, 2000; Tugenhadt, 1986)
until into the twenty-first century (see also Trondal, 2012; Trondal,
Marcussen, Larsson, & Veggeland, 2012). The Commission was small given
the scope of its responsibilities. Leadership of the organization was weak
and precarious. Although the Commission President was primus inter pares,
the office was weak it was memorably described by a biographer of one its
incumbents as ‘scarcely an office at all’ (Campbell, 1983) lacking the politi-
cal, procedural or administrative resources that prime ministers in a domestic
setting are typically able to mobilize (Kassim, 2012). Commissioners were
effectively appointed by member governments, and only unusually united by
ideology, programme or purpose. Since the Commission President had
‘limited power to influence appointments or the allocation of responsibilities,
let alone the authority to discipline or dismiss … it [was] difficult to build
teamwork or establish strong collective leadership’ (Metcalfe, 1992, p. 120).
Although his cabinet was larger than those of other Commissioners, the
Commission President had limited personal resources. The Secretariat
General, the central coordinating body in the Commission, was formally
accountable to the Commission President, but was more the guardian of
collegiality than the personal office of the Presidency.
In the absence of a strong political centre, the administrative capacity at
the Commission’s heart was limited. The Secretariat General was itself con-
strained by the principle of collegiality, unable to steer, still less to impose
solutions on, the line departments. Functions, such as budget and human
resources, which are centrally located in most administrations, were outside
the President’s control in the Commission (Coombes, 1970). Individual
Directorates-General had been able to develop substantial autonomy, pro-
ducing the ‘baronies’ and ‘silos’ that characterized the organization, with
the Commission’s central bodies lacking the authority to re-assert control.
In addition to interdepartmental rivalries, the Commission was riven by
competition between the cabinets, often reflecting the interests of the
Commissioner’s home member states, and by tensions between the cabinets
and the services.
As an administration, the Commission was also somewhat antiquated.
In contrast to most national public administrations, the Commission had
not undergone a major reform since its creation in 1958. In key elements of
its functioning and operation, the organization retained its original prac-
tices, untouched by changes in administrative fashion or any impetus to
modernization. Moreover, the Commission’s administrative culture priori-
tized policy initiation, which it identified with the organization’s mission,
over other responsibilities.
From the Santer Presidency, which took office in 1995, to the Juncker
Presidency that began in 2014, the internal operation of the Commission
has changed very considerably. First, the Commission Presidency has
evolved into a powerful office with far-reaching authority. The incumbent
is no longer a primus inter pares, but the pre-eminent figure within the
institution, with a personal mandate, authority for determining the
Commission’s policy programme and the organizational resources to steer
the College and the administration.
The transformation of the presidential office is partly a consequence (lar-
gely unintended) of decisions taken by member governments at successive
intergovernmental conferences2 and partly due to institutional building on
the part of José Manuel Barroso over the course of a decade heading the
EU executive. Reforms enacted at Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice
strengthened the personal mandate accorded to the Commission President.
They not only gave formal recognition to the primacy of the Commission
Presidency by giving the incumbent responsibility for political guidance
over the College (Treaty of Amsterdam) and the authority albeit, shared
with the member states acting by qualified majority and the EP, which
must approve to appoint the other members of the Commission (Treaty
of Nice), but allowed him to allocate and re-allocate portfolios among
members of the Commission (Treaty of Nice), and to require the resigna-
tion of individual members of the Commission (Treaty of Nice).
50 HUSSEIN KASSIM
Assuming office in November 2004, Barroso was the first Commission

President to make use of the new powers granted under the Treaty of
Nice.3 Following his nomination, Barroso had emphasized the need for
strong presidential leadership, first, because the expansion of the College to
28 members in the wake of the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 1 May 2004 could
otherwise undermine its effectiveness and second, because in a climate of
increasing hostility on the part of member governments towards ‘Europe’,
he considered it vital not to antagonize national capitals with unnecessary
proposals and for the Commission to speak with a single voice to the out-
side world.
In office, Barroso was the beneficiary not only of new constitutional
powers, but of the personal pre-eminence that they gave him. In line with
his new conception of the Commission Presidency, the former Portuguese
Prime Minister turned the Secretariat General into an office of the
Commission President, an ambition that he achieved largely following the
appointment of Catherine Day as Secretary General in November 2005.
The change in the status of the Secretariat General delivered to the
Commission President both substantial administrative resources and an
extended reach into the services. The overall result has been a level of con-
trol over definition of the Commission’s strategic priorities and pro-
gramme, debate within the College, and processes of policy formation and
decision within the Commission scarcely enjoyed by previous Presidents.4
The Commission’s personal pre-eminence is symbolized by the annual
State of the Union address, introduced by President Barroso.
Although there is some ambivalence within the organization at both
political and administrative levels towards the presidentialization of
authority in the Commission, there is little doubt that its workforce con-
sider the Commission presidential. In interviews with Commissioners, cabi-
net members and managers conducted in 2014 by a team led by the current
author and Sara Connolly as part of the project, ‘The European
Commission: Facing the Future’, the overwhelming majority of interviews
characterized the Commission in this way. This was the view of a majority
of the nine Commissioners, 22 of the 24 cabinet members, 12 of the 15
Directors General, and 69 of the 92 middle and senior managers who
answered the question. The approach taken by Jean-Claude Juncker,
Barroso’s successor as Commission President, of exercising personal con-
trol over the policy agenda and organizing the work of the Commission
through policy teams of Commissioner, each supervised by a Vice
President, and with a reinforced Secretariat General, suggests that he will
continue the trend towards greater presidentialization of Commission

leadership.
The strengthening of the Commission Presidency responded directly to
one of the main weaknesses identified by Metcalfe. With changes to how
Commissioners are appointed and to the system of assigning responsibil-
ities, and with the new authority of the Commission President to re-shuffle
responsibilities, as well as to dismiss individual members, the Commission
President is now able to exercise leadership over the organization and to
direct coherent action on the part of the organization in a way that was not
possible previously.5 The elusive conditions for strong collective leadership
no longer need to be fulfilled as personalized leadership has become
possible.
Second, the Commission’s administrative capacity has been considerably
enhanced since the early 1990s. Responding to the lack of long-term think-
ing alleged by the Committee of Independent Experts appointed by the
European Parliament as a result of the crisis that beset the Santer
Commission, the comprehensive reform programme introduced by Neil
Kinnock led to the creation of a new strategic planning function and
machinery in the Secretariat General of the Commission. Strategic
Planning and Programming (SPP) established a central capacity for setting
priorities, allocating resources and monitoring action across the organiza-
tion that had not previously existed (Kassim, 2004, 2008; Schön-Quinlivan,
2012). In addition, the Commission reacted to criticisms from member gov-
ernments about over-regulation and tying business in ‘red tape’ by introdu-
cing an impact assessment system for prospective legislative actions
(Meuwese, 2008; Robertson, 2008). The effect of the procedure has been to
further centralize control within the Secretariat General, which oversees the
operation of impact assessment (Radaelli & Meuwese, 2010).
More generally, the Secretariat General has grown in authority and
power. David O’Sullivan, Secretary General under the Prodi Commission,
played a large part in the design, introduction and enforcement of the new
internal rules and procedures introduced as part of the Kinnock reforms
(Kassim, 2006). As ‘the service at the service of the services’, the Secretariat
General gradually accrued more responsibilities and powers in the
Commission’s administrative processes. Coordination became more
strongly routinized, partly as a result of the introduction of IT systems
which require documents to be circulated and signed-off electronically.
Under Catherine Day, the Secretariat General has become even more pro-
minent (Kassim, 2012; Kassim et al., 2013, chapters 6 and 7). Backed by
52 HUSSEIN KASSIM
President Barroso, the Secretariat General has taken a more interventionist

approach to policy coordination. Beyond ensuring that all interested
departments are consulted on draft proposals, the Secretary General has
sought to encourage early and more strategic coordination. Strengthened
by its transformation into a service of the Commission President, the
Secretariat General has also become pro-active in advancing the
Commission President’s policy agenda, steering policy or imposing solu-
tions that conform to his priorities and preferences.
As in the case of the Commission President, opinion within the organi-
zation is somewhat ambivalent both about the new status and the activist
stance of the Secretariat General. Though acknowledging that action on
the part of the Secretariat General has helped improve interdepartmental
coordination within the organizations, there are some reservations both
about its identification with the Commission President and its intervention-
ist approach. Despite the feelings of some, evidence from the first months
of the Juncker Commission suggests not only that the centrality of the
Secretariat General will continue, but that, with the addition of new staff,
it will be reinforced.
Presidentialization and the strengthening of the Secretariat General have
created a centralized capacity in the Commission that was previously
absent. Leadership is no longer elusive, key functions have moved to the
centre of the organization, and strong central authority makes effective
coordination possible. Individual departments can no longer strike out
independently and Commissioners are subordinate to the Commission
President. The move to greater coherence has been assisted by a series of
measures that have reduced the friction and fragmentation caused by the
tendency of cabinets to act as a voice for the national capital of the
Commissioner. Under Santer, Prodi and Barroso a number of reforms
have brought about a denationalization in the composition of cabinets
(Egeberg & Heskestad, 2010) that has contributed to a functional denatio-
nalization of their role.
Evidence from both ‘The European Commission in Question’ and
‘Facing the Future’ confirms that cabinets assign a relatively low priority to
promoting the interests of their Commissioner’s member government and
are far more preoccupied with his or her portfolio responsibilities. In the
interviews conducted in 2008 for ‘The European Commission in
Question’,6 cabinet members were asked to indicate the level of importance
attached to each of the following tasks by the cabinet as a whole: Assisting
the Commissioner in overseeing the Directorates-General for which he or
she is responsible, Ensuring that the interests of nationals from the
Commissioner’s home state are appropriately safeguarded in appointments

and promotions, Managing the political dimensions of dossiers falling
within the Commissioner’s areas of responsibility, Providing a link to the
Commissioner’s home state. ‘Managing the political dimensions of dossiers
falling within the Commissioner’s areas of responsibility’, ‘Providing sup-
port for the Commissioner’s portfolio responsibilities’, and ‘Providing support
for the Commissioner’s role as a member of the College’ were the three most
important. ‘Providing a link to the Commissioner’s home state’ or ‘Ensuring
that the interests of nationals from the Commissioner’s home state are appro-
priately safeguarded in appointments and promotions’ were less important.
Similarly, in the interviews conducted for ‘Facing the Future’,7 ‘Managing the
political dimensions of dossiers falling within the Commissioner’s areas of
responsibility’, ‘Providing support for the Commissioner’s portfolio responsi-
bilities’, and ‘Providing support for the Commissioner’s role as a member of
the College’ were as the most important responsibilities cited respectively by
27, 26 and 26 interviewees.
Third, the Commission was for many years an outlier among public
administrations in public administration in personnel policy, financial man-
agement and control, and auditing methods (Kassim et al., 2013, chapter
8). However, largely as a result of the Kinnock reforms, but also following
adoption of other measures, the Commission has become a more modern
organization. There is a debate about whether the post-reform Commission
is best characterized as New Public Management or neo-Weberian (see,
e.g. Connolly & Kassim, in preparation; Ongaro, 2015; Pollitt &
Bouckaert, 2011), but there is little argument that it is no longer an anti-
quated continental bureaucracy. In the recruitment of personnel, perfor-
mance management, financial control, and audits, the Commission is far
closer to practices employed by national administration. Although some
issues remain management and some areas of personnel policy are still
problem areas the Commission is much less the sui generis institution it
was as late as the early 1990s.
Fourth, the Commission’s workforce has doubled in size since the early
1990s. Whereas Metcalfe wrote of a staff of ‘around 15,000’ (1992, p. 120),
the Commission in 2015 has a staff of around 33,000. Given its wide-
ranging responsibilities, the Commission still remains a relatively small
organization, even if ‘the terrifying image of a predatory and everexpand-
ing “Brussels bureaucracy”’ still ‘looms … large in anti-EC political rheto-
ric’ (1992, p. 121) now as it did two decades ago. The Commission is
understaffed and having pledged in the wake of the financial and economic
crisis and in the face of pressure from national capitals to further
54 HUSSEIN KASSIM
reduce its workforce, will remain so for the foreseeable future. However,
the Commission leadership has long been reconciled to the fact that it is
unlikely that its staff needs will be met and has sought through a variety of
methods ‘externalization’ (i.e. delegation to agencies), changes to person-
nel policy, and cooptation (see below) to outsource tasks in order to pre-
vent itself from become too overburdened.
Finally, there has been an important change in values among both lea-
dership and staff in the Commission. In an organization that was created
to serve as the ‘motor of integration’, policy initiation has long been
regarded as the most valued activity. Commissioners were determined to
leave a legislative stamp on their term in office, while Commission staff
considered producing policy proposals as their key vocation. However, at
least three Commission Presidents Santer, Barroso and now Juncker
have sought to limit the EU’s legislative output. As Dehousse and
Rozenberg (2015) have shown, legislation has been declining since 1996
and dropped dramatically since 2010. Moreover, the Commission has
sought through a series of initiatives, including ‘better regulation’, ‘smart
regulation’ and ‘REFIT’ not only to simplify EU legislation, but to
improve it hence. Furthermore, staff seem increasingly to accept the impor-
tance of policy management, when historically policy initiation alone was
regarded as the Commission’s noble purpose.
The Commission: External Strategizing
Although he highlighted the importance of internal factors, Metcalfe also

emphasized the importance of external action. Leadership and cohesion
would only take the organization so far. ‘Efficient internal management is
not unimportant. But the Commission cannot be effective if it operates in
an introspective self-contained way. Efficient internal management should
contribute to the effective management of external relations and the inter-
governmental networks that deliver European policies. Managing networks
poses different and less familiar challenges from managing hierarchies’.
The Commission would need to ‘develop networks of cooperation and col-
laboration across organisational and national boundaries’ (1992, p. 125).
A similar conclusion was reached by a former Commissioner for compe-
tition (Sutherland, 1992). The ‘Sutherland Report’ was published in the
same year as the article by Metcalfe. It raised the same questions and pro-
posed much the same solutions (Hancher, 1996). Sutherland argued, since
the member states already had agencies in the sectors regulated by single
market rules that they would be unwilling to give up and because member
governments were unlikely to agree to the creation of powerful EU level
regulators, interactive networks were the best available solution to ensure
the coherent implementation of EU rules albeit a solution of second
best.
Over the intervening years, Commission departments have formed close
relations with the sectoral and sub-sector networks that bring together
national regulatory agencies. Examples include the Committee of European
Securities Regulators, the European Regulators Group for
Telecommunications, the European Regulators Group for Electricity and
Gas, the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions’
Supervisors, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, and
European Platform of Regulatory Authorities (broadcasting) (Coen &
Thatcher, 2008; Thatcher & Coen, 2008). Though some of these networks
have been superseded by network-agencies, the close relationship still
remains.
The Commission has also created and cultivated networks between pub-
lic authorities. The Internal Market Information (IMI) system, for exam-
ple, is a multilingual instrument that connects responsible authorities
across the member states, enabling them to exchange information. SOLVIT
similarly links responsible authorities in national administrations. It was
formed in 2002 as a mechanism to ensure that the benefits of the single
market can be directly enjoyed by consumers. SOLVIT’s purpose is to iden-
tify and remedy cases where EU rules are misapplied and consumers or
businesses are disadvantaged.
Despite their shortcomings and limitations, networks of both sorts have
created infrastructural underpinning for the single market. Given the sensi-
tivities involved are perhaps no longer considered solutions of second best.
In the area of competition policy, for example, the creation of a network
has proved an effective way of co-opting external expertise and personnel
resources at a time of pressure on manpower. With the looming prospect of
enlargement to central and Eastern Europe, the Commission chose to give
up its monopoly over the enforcement of anti-trust rules and to decentralize
authority to competition authorities in the member states not only to apply
EU anti-trust rules, but to grant exemptions. At the same time, it created
the European Competition Network (Kassim & Wright, 2009), which links
DG COMP with national competition authorities and other regulators
with competition policy responsibilities, to ensure uniformity in the appli-
cation of anti-trust and abuse of dominance rules across the territories of
the member states.
56 HUSSEIN KASSIM
The externalization of tasks to outside agencies has been a second strategy

that the Commission has pursued. Historically, the Commission saw the crea-
tion of agencies and other bodies with administrative responsibilities as a
challenge to its prerogatives as the EU executive (see Dehousse, 1997 on the
Meroni doctrine). However, it has progressively retreated from this position
(Curtin & Dehousse, 2012). The externalization of non-core functions to
EU agencies, subject to appropriate mechanisms of control, was an objective
of the Kinnock reforms. Although the ‘agencies phenomenon’ (Busuioc et al.,
2012) saw a rather uncontrolled proliferation of bodies, following a major
review, the Commission outlined a strategy for making agencies ‘more
coherent, effective and accountable’. A policy paper in Commission (2008)
was followed by a series of analyses (Commission, 2009, 2010), culminating
in the common approach and roadmap agreed with the Council and the
European Parliament in 2012 (European Commission, 2008, 2012a).
A third strategy has been exhortation and naming-and-shaming. The
Commission adopted a number of single market action plans, designed
not only to identify areas where further legislation was necessary, but
also to improve the implementation and enforcement of single market
rules by national administrations. The single market scoreboard, which
reports on transposition per member state, as well as employing EU-wide
measures, such as a fragmentation index to report on the implementation
of rules across the entire EU, has been extremely successful. While in
1992 more than a fifth of directives had not been transposed into
national law and for three out of every ten directives at least one member
state had failed to take the require action, twenty years later in 2012 on
average only 1 out of 100 directives has not been transposed and 6 out
of 100 were not effective throughout the EU (European Commission,
2012b, p. 46).
Not all initiatives have proved successful, however. Despite the
excitement that it aroused, for example, the new governance project
conceived by the Prodi Commission proved to be a non-starter. The idea of
‘self-governing’ networks, as Jordan and Schout (2006) showed, proved
more difficult to achieve in practice than in theory.
Manageability within the Single Market
The third major challenge identified by Metcalfe concerned the organiza-

tion of EU administrative space. Metcalfe was concerned that unless in the
design of policy management requirements were taken into account, the
institutional infrastructure needed to coordinate the single market would

not be developed. The difficulty was that, although the Commission had
overall managerial responsibility, it lacked the formal power or influence to
ensure that the necessary structures were put in place.
As the above discussion has contended, the Commission has had more
influence and been able to exercise more leverage than Metcalfe antici-
pated. However, a number of factors have made the task less formidable.
As a result, the EU administrative space has been considerably more man-
ageable than it looked in 1992.
First, although there were concerns that national agencies on the one
hand and EU agencies on the other would be rivals of the Commission,
these have proved unfounded. Egeberg and Trondal (2009) discovered, for
example, that staff in domestic agencies see the Commission as a partner
(see also Ongaro et al., 2015). Similarly, the same authors (Egeberg &
Trondal, 2011) found that staff in EU agencies also regard the Commission
as an ally.
Second, national governments or departments and agencies at the sec-
toral or sub-sectoral level have incentives to make the single market
work. Heidbreder (2014) maps the formation and operation of horizontal
networks in three areas of the single market. Although their influence and
capacity is uneven, the development of these networks shows that the uni-
verse of national actors includes a number that are motivated to cooperate
across national borders.
Third, the scope for institutional autonomy is perhaps diminishing.
Beyond the general obligation that member states have a duty to enforce
EU rules, EU legislation is becoming more stipulative in particular fields.
In competition policy, as well as the regulation of energy and telecommu-
nications, EU legislation requires that national authorities are appro-
priated resourced so that they can carry out their functions (see the
accounts by van Zimmeren, Mathieu, & Verhoest, 2015). Including provi-
sions of this sort in legislative proposals is perhaps the closest that the
Commission will get to ‘managing by design’ (Metcalfe & Richards,
1990).
Again, there are important limitations to the manageability of EU
administrative space. Member governments do not necessarily view the suc-
cess of the single market as a priority, especially during hard times. Indeed,
since the financial and economic crisis, and arguably before, key govern-
ments have become increasingly critical of the EU and some obstructionist.
For the single market to work effectively, member states need actively to
own it (Barroso, 2014).
58 HUSSEIN KASSIM
CONCLUSION
Metcalfe’s article on the challenge that faced ‘Europe’ on the eve of the sin-
gle internal market was a prescient appraisal of a dimension of EU govern-
ance that few had foreseen amidst the euphoria associated with the 1993
project. In the intervening years, the magnitude of the task has grown with
the widening and deepening of the single market, the enlargement of the
EU to 28 member states, and increasing institutional density at EU and
national levels.
At the same time, in each of the problem areas that Metcalfe identified
there have been important developments. First, the Commission has
become an integrated organization with a strong centralized leadership
capacity. Second, the Commission recognized the potentiality of networks
to encourage cooperation between decentralized public authorities and
agencies. It interacted closely with national regulatory agencies and engi-
neered structural links between public administrations. Third, although the
EU administrative system has developed in a disorderly fashion, partly as a
consequence of agencification at both national and EU levels, it has proved
more manageable than might have been anticipated. At an administrative
level, government departments have recognized the value of horizontal
cooperation and coordination.
Metcalfe’s diagnosis of the ‘management deficit’ did not only address an
important practical problem in the governance of the European Union; it
also revealed an important gap in EU scholarship. The relaunch of
‘Europe’ represented by the Single European Act created a new interest in
European integration. However, scholars focused either on theorising
European integration or on the dynamics of decision making. The organi-
zational dimension was largely neglected. Even today, it remains a missing
link in thinking of the EU as a system of multi-level governance.
NOTES
1. This claim can be debated. Fligstein and Mara-Dita (1996) has famously com-
pared the creation of a single market in the EU with the US experience. Anderson
(2012) has looked also at Australia, Canada and Switzerland.
2. Their main purpose for personalizing the nomination of the Commission
President was to address the ‘democratic deficit’, while the motivation for strength-
ening the Commission President vis-à-vis other members of the Commission was to
avoid a repeat of the circumstances that had brought down the Santer Commission.
3. The Treaty of Nice came into operation on 1 February 2003, when Romano
Prodi was still Commission President. Barroso took office in November 2004.
4. Delors’s leadership style was also presidential, but managed through his chef
de cabinet who mobilized networks of like-minded supporters throughout the
Commission (Ross, 1995).
5. ‘A number of constitutional factors militate against the cohesion of the
College of Commissioners and weaken its capacity to provide the leadership and
management that the organisation requires’ (Metcalfe, 1992).
6. This chapter draws on data collected as part of ‘The European Commission in
Question’, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (grant no.
RES-062-23-1188) and conducted by Hussein Kassim (PI), Michael Bauer, Sara
Connolly, Renaud Dehousse, Liesbet Hooghe, John Peterson and Andrew
Thompson. For further information, visit http://www.uea.ac.uk/psi/research/
EUCIQ
7. The research team included Michael W. Bauer, Renaud Dehousse and
Andrew Thompson. Research assistance was provided by Henry Allen, Stefan
Becker, Vanessa Buth, Suzanne Doyle, Helen Fitzhugh and Nick Wright. Although
endorsed by the European Commission, the project was conceived, designed and its
analyses undertaken with full academic autonomy.
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THE INDEPENDENT EU
COMMISSIONER: AN
ADMINISTRATIVE ANALYSIS
Adriaan Schout and Arnout Mijs
ABSTRACT
Purpose This chapter provides a framework for organisational analy-

sis of the newly created position of ‘independent’ Commissioner, espe-
cially whether it is sufficiently backed by administrative capacities.
Methodology/approach In the many variables that determine organi-
sational behaviour (Mintzberg, 1989), this approach follows Olsen
(2005) in its analysis through communication structures and strategic
directions, and adds procedures (networks) and personnel to this. The
chapter is primarily based on interview data in addition to literature and
document analysis.
Findings This chapter acknowledges the ‘stickiness’ of institutions and
the difficulties in reorganising (formal) institutions. The conclusion
shows that there are multiple problems in the current process of institu-
tionalisation of the independent Commissioner. Generalising the findings
to the use of an administrative approach, the frugal framework used here
indicates that ‘independence’ cannot simply be proclaimed but also

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004004
63
64 ADRIAAN SCHOUT AND ARNOUT MIJS
demands attentions for organisation design. Organisational analysis

helps to understand the organisation and the organisational weaknesses
behind the policy objective.
Research implications As is often the case with MLG it gives a per-
spective on governance, but must be complemented with an approach for
analysis, in this case organisational design. In the chapter the approach
is limited to organisational values, personnel and communication lines. It
provides a basic framework to evaluate one of the key elements of
European integration independence. However, additional work is
needed to further develop this framework as well as other components of
the organisational behaviour of the Commission.
Practical implications This chapter comes up with suggestions for
organisational redesign of the Commission in order to restore trust in its
tasks and responsibilities. With the instalment of the new Juncker
Commission these findings might provide useful insights for the ongoing
process of reorganisation of the Commission.
Social implications The new economic legislation and the role of the
independent Commissioner have a direct impact on member state budgets
(cuts), with a far reaching societal impact. Therefore, the level of (pub-
lic) trust is critical in the acceptance of the process. Trust is established
inter alia by the organisational implementation of principles of good
administrative behaviour such as transparency, capability, independence,
etc.
Originality/value The chapter uses the MLG perspective in order to
get a comprehensive picture of the organisational implications to effec-
tively embed the ‘independent’ Commissioner in the organisation. The
added value is based on the extensive amount of interviews over a longer
period of time (2011 2014) during the operationalisation of the
European semester.
Keywords: EMU; independent Commissioner; DG ECFIN;
country-specific recommendations; economic governance
INTRODUCTION
On 29 October 2011, the President of the European Commission Barroso

took the decision to appoint ‘Mr. Olli Rehn [as] Vice-President of the
The Independent EU Commissioner: An Administrative Analysis 65
Commission. He will be the member of the Commission responsible for

economic and monetary affairs and the Euro’ (Commission, 2011a). The
Minutes of the Commission stressed the ‘“independent, objective” exercise
of the Commission’s powers with regard to the evaluation, surveillance,
coordination and implementation of economic and budgetary policies,
and … [the need] to anchor the euro in the Community method and institu-
tions’ (Commission, 2011b, pp. 25 26). This deepening of the EU’s eco-
nomic governance toolbox followed a period of intense euro-crisis
negotiations in 2011 in meetings of the European Council (23 and 26
October), Heads of State or Government of the euro area (26 October),
and the G20 (Cannes, 3 and 4 November). A new, independent,
Commission position was created, also known as the ‘budget tsar’
(Financial Times, 2011), to monitor Member States’ economic performance
more vigilantly.
Driven by the economic and political turmoil, the Commission, the
European Council and the European Parliament worked hard to get eco-
nomic governance instruments, including the independent Commissioner,
up and running (the famous Six-pack and Two-pack). This study looks
how the independence of the Vice-President for economic and monetary
affairs is being implemented within the organisation of the Commission.
The political momentum is clear, but is this function becoming appropri-
ately embedded within the organisation, backed by sufficient administrative
capacities, so that it can operate independently (compare Chandler’s, 1962
notion that structure has to follow strategy)? Structural changes following
major policy changes in the EU have also been studied in other areas, such
as food safety (Buonanno, Zabltoney, & Keefer, 2001) and environment
policy (Jordan & Schout, 2006). These studies delivered mixed results.
Studies of, inter alia, the Commission’s better regulation reforms (Ongaro,
2013) and the upgrading of Eurostat show that reforms have been possible
(ECA, 2012; Levy, Barzelay, & Porras-Gomes, 2011) although evaluations
of EU-related reforms are rarely unconditionally positive (Euractiv, 2014).
Organisations have their formal and informal institutional practices and
patterns (path dependency, North, 1990) so that success of reform is not
ensured ex ante.
The focus here is on the emerging design of processes that the country-
specific recommendations go through in the Commission’s DG for
Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) and in the College of
Commissioners. Changes are tracked regarding the way the independent
Commissioner gathers information, drafts the economic recommendations
and issues corrective measures. In addition, officials’ and experts’
evaluative impressions regarding the new procedures were collected during

interviews.
Given that this is an exploratory study of ongoing changes, no solid con-
clusions can be drawn yet. As underlined by Kassim and Le Galès (2010)
in their elaboration of a sociological view on the ‘career’ of instruments,
effective ‘institutionalisation’ of new instruments is not guaranteed ex ante
due to pulls from the various stakeholders. Nevertheless, an impression can
be formed of whether a match is emerging between ambitions and capabil-
ities. Organisational adaptation (or learning) is needed but this is not one
of the stronger points of EU policy-makers (Zito, 2009). Policy-makers
often assume that instruments are off-the-rack whereas the choice of instru-
ments and of the related organisational design are not rational processes
but result from political negotiations (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007).
However, the danger with incremental organisational learning is that new
instruments may fail (Schout, 2009). Research is needed at different points
in time to trace the actual adaptations.
By way of background, the section ‘Changing the Parameters of
Economic Governance’ briefly presents the policy innovations that define
the work of the independent Commissioner. It discusses some of the (orga-
nisational) limitations of the earlier Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and
the economic convergence programme (‘Lisbon Process’). To allow for gen-
eralisation of the relevance of organisational analysis, the section ‘The
EU’s Ambitions and Administrative Capacities’ makes the case for an
administrative science approach as part of the interdisciplinary study of the
instrumentation of economic governance in addition to mainly economic
and political science approaches (Connolly, 1995; Eichengreen, 1992;
James, 2012). Given the great many variables that influence organisational
behaviour (Mintzberg, 1989), this study can only be modest and is limited
to exploring changes in organisational values (mission statements, the sec-
tion ‘Organisational Capacity I: Independence as Operational Value’), per-
sonnel (numbers and organisational roles) and communication lines (the
section ‘Organisational Capacity II: Operating Procedures of the
Independent Commissioner’). The conclusions are presented in the last
section.
Fifty-three people were interviewed: eighteen from the European
Commission, five from other EU institutions, three national MPs, twenty-
three officials from France and the Netherlands, and four experts.
Interviews were conducted between 2012 and 2014, and some were inter-
viewed on different occasions. Of these interviews, 16 were part of
a research project for the Dutch government (Mijs & Schout, 2013).
The interviews were transcribed and the findings of the study were dis-
cussed in a workshop with national officials and seconded EU semester
officials. A draft was commented on by a senior Commission official. The
feedback has been incorporated.
There were major variations in how officials described and assessed the
new procedures during the interviews. As readily admitted in the inter-
views, some of the differences stemmed from the fact that few oversee the
entire process. Some officials clarified that they rather stuck to a formal
line, while others openly discussed procedures and challenges. For example,
interviewees 16, 18 and 26 emphasised that, formally, national governments
have no advance insight into country-specific recommendations before the
Commissioner presents his findings in spring, whereas others did not know
whether governments are informed or explained that, regarding draft con-
clusions, contacts existed at different levels. Similarly, when newspapers
were reporting on the clash between Hollande and Barroso over the draft
recommendations for France (Euractiv, 2013), interviewees 12 and 49 opted
to reply ‘I do not know’ to the question of whether political influencing
was involved, whereas interviewee 48 referred to the political influence the
Dutch government had in 2013. In such a sensitive new development where
confidentiality, political loyalty, possibly professional fear to act beyond
one’s remit, and national sovereignty are at stake, the willingness to talk
freely apparently varies, and an overview is lacking. Therefore, our assess-
ments were needed, which were corroborated in the workshop and by offi-
cials with whom the findings were discussed. Given the newness of the new
position and the sensitivities surrounding this type of case study, further
studies are needed to track the subsequent reforms and to fine-tune the
assessments.
CHANGING THE PARAMETERS OF ECONOMIC

GOVERNANCE
The crisis in the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was a disas-
ter waiting to happen (Hodson, 2011). Among others, the economic (politi-
cal) ‘leg’ of the monetary union was lacking from the beginning (Delors
quoted by Grant, 1988) and (micro)economic convergence failed (Marsh,
2011). To support monetary and economic adaptations, the SGP was
adopted in 1997, built around the stability programmes (for euro members)
and convergence programmes (for potential candidates) that governments
had to draw up. The maximum budget deficit (3% rule) and the criterion
to start the excessive deficit procedure (EDP the SGP’s corrective arm)
obliged Member States to take action (TFEU, Art. 126). The most telling
and researched example of the weaknesses of the SGP was the political
pressure of budget sinners France and Germany, preventing the adoption
of Commission recommendations at the Ecofin meeting of 24 25
November 2003. By then, Commission President Prodi had already called
the 3% norm ‘stupid’ in Le Monde. The political resistance led to reforms
in 2005, making the SGP more flexible in relation to possible growth but
also taking much of the bite out of the system (Heipertz & Verdun, 2010).
To stimulate economic convergence, coordination was needed in policy
areas where Member States had remained sovereign. Hence, a large-scale
open method of coordination (OMC) (Lisbon Process) was created
(European Council, 2000; Arts. 121 and 148 TFEU), aimed at turning the
EU into the most competitive economy in the world. Even after its reform,
the Lisbon Process, the predecessor of the Macroeconomic Imbalance
Procedure (MIP), was described by a national official (interview 16) as an
overly complicated ‘multi-headed monster’. Member States used national
reports mainly as a way of stating what they were doing already, rather
than as a learning instrument (Commission, 2010a; De la Porte, 2011).
Following the Kok Report (2004) and the ensuing reforms, the rede-
signed Lisbon Process used more focused indicators (Commission, 2005)
and was supported by national reform programmes (NRPs) produced by
the governments and which were assessed by the Commission. Still, peer
review remained mostly restricted to sessions of one hour per country
about which Mosher and Trubek (2003, p. 78) concluded: ‘It is hard to
imagine that so truncated a session could produce an in-depth assessment
or offer very much useful feedback’. Hence, despite some important results,
the effectiveness of the Lisbon Process was limited (Heidenreich & Zeitlin,
2009).
A range of explanations has been given for its limited success (Zeitlin,
2011; Zito, 2009). However, there were also administrative deficiencies
within the Commission. The Commission suffered from a shortage of staff
and expertise to analyse the country reports and write recommendations.
Within DG ECFIN, for example, two people followed Ireland as part of
their other tasks (interview 39) and the profound weaknesses of Ireland,
and of other countries, remained unidentified despite press reports on bub-
bles (interviews 19, 32 and 33). Moreover, DG ECFIN staff was highly
dependent on reports from the Member States and on information from
organisations such as the OECD (which, in turn, built on information from
the Member States). The quality and relevance of this national input was
an issue (interviews 17 and 25). For example, The Commission criticised
the Netherlands on road pricing (Commission, 2011c) and Germany on
railroads (Commission, 2011d) since these issues were raised in national
reports (interview 25 and 35) although they hardly classified as relevant
European problems.
Moreover, the organisation of the reporting process involved ample poli-
tical bargaining between DGs and between Commissioners. DGs bargained
over the amount of attention for particular topics, which areas should
receive priority, and (conflicting) recommendations (interview 2), and,
moreover, Commissioners were reported to make adjustments with a
‘national pen’ (interview 24; Egeberg, 2006). Commissioners would routi-
nely discuss draft recommendations with their home countries. As one offi-
cial described the pre-2011 situation: ‘… once the Chefs de Cabinet come
into play; they are not analysts but pure politicians’ (interviewee 14; simi-
larly 6 other interviewees). The final writing of the recommendations was
largely coordinated by the Secretariat-General, ensuring internal negotia-
tions between DGs, while national policy-makers were continuously look-
ing over the Commission’s shoulder (interviews 20 and 24). This was the
political haggling that the independent Commissioner had to address.
Finally, in 2008, the new Greek Prime Minister Papandreou reported
much higher budget deficits. This proved that the European statistics com-
piled by the Commission’s Eurostat (and provided by the Member States)
were corrupted (Featherstone, 2011) a problem that had been on the
radar for some time (Schout, 1999).
Despite the media’s severe criticism of the Council doing nothing, the
Heads of State brought about major changes in economic governance via
the Six-pack, Two-pack and Fiscal Compact. As regards the SGP, the new
rules (e.g. Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011) increased control in both the
preventive and the corrective arms of the Excessive Deficit Procedure
(EDP) through the medium-term objectives for debt reduction, while the
Fiscal Compact imposed a 20-year reduction period (Treaty on Stability,
2012). Secondly, the new EDP provided a clearer approach towards sanc-
tions and included fines for manipulation of the debt or deficit data.
Finally, important steps in the preventive and corrective arm are now sub-
ject to reversed qualified majority voting in the Council (Regulation No
1173/2011, preamble 7).
New in the economic governance structure is the Macroeconomic
Imbalance Procedure (MIP) (Regulation No 1174/2011; Regulation No
1176/2011), which uses a scoreboard to identify structural imbalances and
pre-empt bubbles (Knedlik & von Schweinitz, 2012). The MIP resembles
the structure of the SGP’s preventive and corrective arms. However,
because it examines general economic trends, it leaves more room for poli-
tical manoeuvre in terms of voting as well as discussions about interpreta-
tions of trends. In essence, the MIP involves qualitative analysis whereas
the 3% EDP is a hard target (Salines, Glöckler, & Truchlewski, 2012). If
countries do not bring down their deficits, the Commission can impose eco-
nomic reforms (corrective steps resembling the EDP).
Furthermore, in parallel to the independent Commissioner (Commission,
2011a), national governments are now also obliged to have ‘independent
bodies’ with ‘functional autonomy vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities’ (Council
Directive 2011/85/EU). As now underlined in many policy documents, the
national and EU economic institutions are expected to be reinforced with
independent authorities.
THE EU’S AMBITIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE

CAPACITIES
The present economic governance system builds on the unsuccessful SGP

and the Lisbon Process. The history of European integration is paved with
(generally) applaudable momentous ambitions, including a shock therapy
to ‘complete’ the internal market (1992 programme), a big-bang enlarge-
ment with ten new countries in 2004, far-reaching environmental objectives,
etc. Acknowledging the vital relevance of politics, power and personalities
(Allison, 1971; Dawson, 1992), it is questionable whether the national and
European administrative capacities have received adequate attention in
relation to the objectives (compare Metcalfe & Richards, 1987; The
Economist, 1997).
Administrative considerations are often not of immediate interest to
policy-makers or students of policies and political processes. As discussed
in the (European) literature, political attention for policy seems to have
priority over organisational capacities. Pressman’s and Wildavsky’s (1973)
conclusion that decision-makers and takers are usually happy to focus on
policies but are less concerned with implementation, probably equally
applies to EU policies. Moreover, organisational difficulties are sometimes
deliberately (possibly even maliciously) downplayed. For instance, the famous
Cecchini Report (1988), which was part of the Commission’s marketing of
the internal market programme, stressed: ‘For all the complexities, the
essential mechanism is simple. The starting point of the whole process

of economic gain is the removal of non-tariff barriers’ (1988, p. xviii;
emphasis added). In other words, if only markets function, the rest will
follow suit.
Attention for implementation and other public management questions
has been slow to emerge in the EU (Jordan & Schout, 2006; Trondal,
2010). Crises, such as faltering implementation in the 1980s (Börzel,
Dudziak, Hofmann, Panke, & Sprungk, 2007; Siedentopf & Ziller, 1986) or
the food safety crises in the 1990s (Everson, Majone, Metcalfe, & Schout,
1999), brought organisational questions in specific areas to the fore.
Similarly, the complaints about Commission policies and the quality of
Commission outputs resulted in reorganisations, better planning in the
Commission, and upgrading of its Secretariat General and personnel policy
(Ban, 2013; Cini, 2007; Kassim et al., 2013; Ongaro, 2013). In addition,
poor performance regarding ambitious objectives, such as the ambition to
‘integrate environment into other policy areas’ (Jordan & Schout, 2006)
and the provision of ‘reliable statistics’ sparked major organisational and
interorganisational inquiries (Commission, 2010b).
Trondal (2010) rightly notes an ‘administrative turn’ in European inte-
gration literature, as it now pays more attention to organisational struc-
tures. However, a certain shift away from organisational interests can also
be seen. One major development over the past decade or more has been the
growing interest in governance processes rather than in government struc-
tures (Jachtenfuchs, 2001; Kooiman, 1993). Even a certain dislike of orga-
nisational design can be noticed from time to time, for example, in the field
of environment, about which the Commission stated, while arguing for
more informal learning instruments: ‘Too often in the past attempts to [for-
mulate ambitious objectives] have resulted in bureaucratic and mechanistic
requirements which have failed to deliver’ (Commission, 1998, emphasis
added). Importantly, discussing administrative requirements has been sensi-
tive or even taboo (Schout & Jordan, 2008) as it involves criticising each
other’s administrative systems. Hence, for example, the long painful pro-
cess of setting up effective statistical systems in the EU (ECA, 2012).
This study is based on the assumption that organisations matter.
Following Olsen (2005; see also March & Simon, 1958), through
communication structures and strategic directions (mission statements),
organisations facilitate the focus of the attention, lower coordination costs
and determine the way in which inter-sectoral conflict is handled. Yet,
organisational design needs to be seen in relation to wider political pulling
and hauling and to the ambitions and limitations of individuals (Allison,
1971). Evidently, organisations do not explain everything. Due to the many

interfering variables, the understanding of the link between administrative
structures and administrative behaviour has remained modest partly
because organising empirical proof to distil the influence of administrative
structures is a major challenge (Egeberg, 2003, 2012).
ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY I: INDEPENDENCE AS

OPERATIONAL VALUE
One design mechanism that determines organisational behaviour is the

internal value system as expressed in mission statements and management
speeches. Mission statements can be powerful if incorporated into the oper-
ating culture of the organisation (March & Simon, 1958) but they can also
remain expressions of good intentions disconnected from the further design
(Schein, 1985). Irrespective of effectiveness or mere symbolic, mission state-
ments are the starting point for analysing formal objectives.
Our interest concerns independence as part of the Commission’s core
values. An immediate problem with ‘independence’ in Eurospeak is that
the term is widely used but hard to specify. Majone (2012) therefore
pointed to the need for consensus on the institutions’ overall objectives (see
also Goetz, 2012). For example, as he points out, the ECB’s independence
came under attack because the euro crisis created a situation for which the
ECB was not designed. As it seems, independence in everyday politics is
relative.
To interpret what the Commission might mean by independence, at least
two types of independence have to be distinguished (both are presumably
implied). First, the budget commissioner is supposed to be independent
from the Member States probably only meaning independent in terms of
analysis and conclusions, not as regards cooperation in fact finding. The
second, functional, type of independence that seems implied concerns the
separation between analysis and political decision within the Commission.
Independence from the Member States is of course related to the general
independence which the Commission has to safeguard. Independence is
mentioned in the Treaty (Art. 245, TFEU, 2008), although, in fact, the
Commission operates at the intersection between political institution (in
relation to the Member States) and independent administration (Nugent,
2001). The Commission, and some of the Member States, have been
emphasising this ‘complete independence’ (ECSC Treaty, 1951, Art. 9) ever
since the 1950s and this quest for independence continued under Barroso.
He reinforced overall independence, among others, through the new
‘solemn declaration’ that Commissioners have had to make before the
Court of Justice (introduced in 2010), which says: ‘I solemnly undertake ….
to be completely independent in carrying out my responsibilities, in the
general interest of the Union’ (Commission, 2010c). However, as under-
lined by Wille (2013), the Commission is becoming increasingly political.
As regards functional independence, attention for fact finding and analy-
sis gained ground, among others, with the ‘new’ governance interests in
separating scientific inputs from actual policy-making (Everson & Vos,
2009; Majone, 1996, 2000). Independence in fact finding and analysis cre-
ates visibility of conflict, hence raising awareness, and increases reliability
(Majone, 1989, p. 4). The ultimate goal has been to restore trust (‘legiti-
macy’) in the EU’s policies (Commission, 2001; Majone, 2000). Hence, the
quest for functional independence is an effort to create an environment of
‘speaking truth to power’ (Wildavsky, 1979) where highly trained analysts
focus on facts while leaving value choices to politicians.
Over the past two decades, the Commission has worked hard to produce
reliable information. Its better legislation policy emphasises that ‘all policy-
decisions should be based on sound analysis supported by the best data
available’ (Commission, 2009, p. 6). Similarly, the Commission has created
an internal quality control mechanism (Impact Assessment Board) where
‘the members of the Board shall act independently in the interest of the
institution and their role is to provide expertise on the quality of the impact
assessments. They shall act … on the basis of professional expertise’
(Impact Assessment Board, 2006, Art. 3). References to independent infor-
mation and processing systems have mushroomed in relation to the EU’s
better regulation policies, network of competition authorities (Kassim &
Wright, 2010), creation of EU agencies, etc.
‘Independence’ is now also explicitly linked to economic governance.
Apart from a genuine interest in fostering functional independence, there
were also major political motives for creating the independent
Commissioner. The Commission was forced by, in particular, the
Netherlands and Germany to establish an independent economic monitor-
ing role (Visser, 2012) but the Commission also had power motives. The
economic governance emerging around 2011 was mostly intergovernmental
and new instruments were located outside of the Commission: banking
supervision went to the ECB, the Commission was mistrusted in the super-
vision of programme countries to the extent that the IMF was added to the
Troika, and the European Financial Stability Facility went to Luxembourg
as a special purpose vehicle (Council of Ministers, 2010). To characterise

the mood, a senior national official explained in early 2012 that ‘Barroso
typically operates like a Southern European’ (interviewee 28; similarly
interviewee 13). Merkel, in the meantime, had developed a personal dislike
to Barroso (Der Spiegel, 2014), and France was traditionally disinclined to
allow the Commission powers in economic governance (Krop, 2014).
The quest for independence of the ‘budget tsar’ has to be seen in
relation to competing developments and mission statements within the
Commission. One of the parallel change processes that should be men-
tioned here concerns the efforts to reinforce the Commission’s collegiality
(Kassim et al., 2013; Trondal, 2012). After major public differences between
Commissioners and given the challenges of managing an ever-expanding
Commission of now 28 Commissioners, Barroso had to re-emphasise, and
partly re-establish, collegiality as an organisational basis. Commissioners
starting in Barroso II had to sign an agreement recognising that ‘collegiality
is central to how the Commission works’ (Barroso, 2009).
Another parallel development is the Commission’s presidentialisation
(Bonarjee, 2008). To enhance the Commission’s profile, Barroso was pre-
sented as central leader. He worked on strengthening the internal planning
and reinforced the Commission’s Secretariat (Peterson, 2009). This ‘presi-
dentialisation’ seems quite successful, and cooperation between DGs has
improved (Kassim et al., 2013). As part of the ‘personalisation’, the
Commission’s communication was ‘centralised’ (Euractiv, 2010). This
explains, for example, the prominent role of the President in press confer-
ences where country-specific recommendations are presented, and incipient
references such as in the Minutes cited above on the independent
Commission operating ‘under the authority of the President’ (Commission,
2011b, point 5.7). Similarly, the President’s Decision underlined that Rehn
shall ‘assist’ the President in matters related to the European Council and
‘coordinate’ Commission matters in relation to Ecofin and the Eurogroup
(Commission, 2011a, Preamble 2).
There have also been developments in the interinstitutional balance
between European Commission, EP and Council that affect the
Commission’s independence (Trondal, 2012). The eurocrisis and the crea-
tion of the President of the European Council have emphasised the more
general presidentialisation of EU decisions. This has demanded a stronger
and more coordinated presence from the Commission President also in the
field of economic governance given the, sometimes stormy, discussions on
country reports at European Council meetings. In addition, the EP elec-
tions of 2014 under the slogan of ‘This time it’s different’ may also lead to
a more personal legitimation of the Commission President due to his

increased political status (Spiegel, 2014).
The values of collegiality, presidentialisation and parliamentarisation
compete with the independence of the Economics Commissioner. As a
result, confusion over the Commission’s independence never seems far
away. The new ‘independent’ scientific advisor to the Commission
President (introduced in 2011), who monitors, among others, impact assess-
ments, has complained that the Commission often still presents political
wishes as evidence, that the Commission is biased, and that its reports are
‘often branded as “independent”’ (Euractiv, 2014). Politics never seems far
away in the Commission, as also appeared in discussions between Dutch
and EU officials and experts (Commission, 2014) in which DG ECFIN offi-
cials stressed their thorough analysis and Dutch experts criticised the
monotonous concern with budget discipline.
Competing values need not be a problem as organisations are always
sets of organised conflict (March & Simon, 1958). The question, however,
is whether independence, defined here as the separation between analysis
and policy-making, is sufficiently guaranteed within the organisation.
ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY II: OPERATING

PROCEDURES OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSIONER
Olli Rehn’s first year was in many ways a success, but the second and third
year were marked by considerable criticism. Economists, journalists and
even other Commissioners publicly doubted Rehn’s analyses and methods.
Some of the criticism concerned content and related to the austerity
agenda. Leading economists such as Krugman (2013) talked about the
‘Rehn of Terror’. Other criticism centred around the alleged political nat-
ure of the advice. Dutch newspapers concluded that Rehn’s recommenda-
tions, particularly the granting of a two-year delay to France, were a result
of high-level political lobbying (Financieele Dagblad, 2013). Similarly,
interviewees 20 and 37 commented on pressure from France (Deen &
Wishart, 2014) and clashes that had taken place between Barroso, Rehn
and Hollande. Concerning the Dutch advice in 2013, insiders, experts (Ten
Broeke, 2013) and the Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB),
on which DG ECFIN’s advice was partly based, thought the recommenda-
tions were damaging the economy (CPB, 2013; IMF, 2013). A high-ranking
official involved (interview 48) explained that the Dutch had demanded
higher cutbacks from the Commission in line with the political preferences
of the Prime Minister. With hindsight, the more lenient advice from the
CPB seemed more suitable given the rather favourable structure of the
Dutch economy. Such incidents created public doubts concerning the inde-
pendent Commissioner.
To unravel the administrative process of the MIP and SGP, we use the
policy cycle analysis of Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009) and focus on pol-
icy preparation (data and information supporting the recommendations),
decision-making (writing of recommendations by DG ECFIN) and decision-
taking (finalisation of recommendations by the College). These phases
cover the annual cycle of the European semester. Evidently, any separation
in phases is a heuristic tool due to evident feedback in the process.
Policy Preparation
Starting with statistics, the past severe irregularities have resulted in a qual-
ity programme ensuring that EU statistics meet the criteria of ‘professional
independence, impartiality, objectivity, reliability, statistical confidentiality
and cost efficiency’ (Regulation 223/2009, Art. 2). With this new statistical
Regulation and the Six-pack (Council Directive 2011/85/EU, Art. 3),
Eurostat now has more control over the quality of statistics in the Member
States, although the statistical system still does not fill the requirements
(ECA, 2012). Eurostat has remained a directorate-general (now under the
political responsibility of the Commissioner for Audit). Before the Six-
pack, it came under the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary
Affairs. This slight shift was defended as a recognition of the problem of
independence (interviewee 28). For a long time the Commission has been
considering turning Eurostat into an agency so as to safeguard indepen-
dence (Commission, 1997). Moreover, since Barroso’s efforts to make the
Commission more ministerial (Barroso, 2012), the idea of creating a sort of
‘minister for information’ seems questionable. Explanations for the
Commission’s long-standing opposition against making Eurostat indepen-
dent include, among others, the change in personnel conditions which this
would imply for Eurostat officials (Schout, 1999). Member States are
expected to have independent statistical offices, but the Commission has
kept Eurostat under its wings.
Preparation of reports also requires agreement over methodologies and
indicators. The methodology behind the country reports is based on firm
debates on the indicators in the MIP and whether these are able to signal
potential crises (Knedlik & von Schweinitz, 2012; interviews 17 19). The
Member States on the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) decide upon the
methodology further to a proposal by the Commission this is a process
of continuous updating in the light of economic and political changes.
External experts do not validate the methodology, which means that the
methodologies originate from the traditional technocratic/political negotia-
tions between Commission and Member States. The important 60% and
3% objectives have not been analytically legitimised and have been severely
criticised. For instance, they represented budget and public deficits in
France and Germany when the SGP was negotiated (Heipertz & Verdun,
2010). Both indicators are criticised for different reasons (including their
rigidity and the optimism about 3% while long-term growth figures are fall-
ing, Frankel & Schreger, 2013). Similarly, MEP Bas Eickhout tweeted:
‘Rehn is of course completely political and already for a long time.
Which indicators he uses is purely politics’ (22 February 2013).
Furthermore, the format of the recommendations is not in line with the
Commission’s own better regulation agenda in which different options
have to be presented (Commission, 2009). The recommendations’ format,
particularly when countries are in the deficit procedure, is strict and offers
only one path towards improvement of public finances. This suggests a
one-size-fits-all solution that is easily dismissed as a one-size-fits-none
approach (Nechio, 2011; interviews 5 and 39).
Writing of the Recommendations by DG ECFIN
According to the Commission’s own standards, information must be

beyond doubt (Commission, 2009). At this stage, data is transposed into
information (and information is always an interpretation, Singh, 1999).
DG ECFIN’s country desks write the recommendations in two phases.
First, they draw up recommendations for the SGP and MIP. They collect
the data and information from countries to write their country reports,
country-specific recommendations and recommendations for possible sanc-
tion procedures. The second phase involves coordination between the DGs.
The Commission’s reports are generally recognised as solid (Cabanillas &
Terzi, 2012; interviewees 2, 4, 21, 22 and 25) but also spark heated
debates, particularly concerning the timing and level of austerity measures
(also in the EPC, interviewee 14). In discussions, national and EU officials
even go so far that many Member States cannot deliver economic analyses
of an appropriate level and rely increasingly on DG ECFIN (among others,

interviewees 45, 37 49).
DG ECFIN has invested considerably in capacity. The number of staff
working on the Economic and Monetary Union has expanded by almost
30% from 2008 to 2011 (Annual Activity Reports 2008 2011, Annex 1).
Yet, further investments and quality checks are necessary (according to
interviews 2 and 3). The desks consist of administrators with a particular
national expertise, recruited from, e.g. central banks and finance minis-
tries, and administrators who come from other Member States to ensure
the country desks’ independence. The Dutch desk, for instance, now has
three full-time administrators as opposed to two in the past. The French
desk also has three administrators. In addition, the Commission now also
relies on a European Semester Officer in each capital. Country desks
receive their information from the Member States and other DGs and
rely on input from institutions such as the OECD, IMF and ECB. Desks
are in close contact with the Member States via e-mail and fact-finding
missions. They visit experts, trade organisations (e.g. pension funds and
construction organisations) and ministries. To be less dependent on the
Member States, the Commission started to recruit European Semester
Officers from their representations in the Member States, and these
economic capacities were expanded in 2014 to have more hands-on
insight into economic developments in the Member States (interviews 47
and 49).
DG ECFIN has remained dependent on information from other DGs,
which do not operate under the Independent Commissioner, and intervie-
wees (e.g. 2, 3 and 39) doubted the objectivity of information from other
DGs. Underlining the work in progress, these interviewees concluded that
DG ECFIN should employ more in-house capacity to be independent from
other DGs.
It is unclear which DGs are directly involved, and so far this has chan-
ged each year. The core group for 2013 consisted of the Secretariat
General, DG ECFIN, DG Employment and Social Affairs and DG
Taxation and Customs Union. In 2012, DG Industry was also involved.
The coordination is in the hands of DG ECFIN. In the case of the SGP,
the data and inputs are better defined and measurable, and involve DG
ECFIN, DG Eurostat and the Internal Audit Service, which fall under the
responsibility of the Commissioner for Taxation and Customs. However,
regarding the MIP, the country-specific recommendations include different
policy fields. From time to time, the political differences between the DGs
are visible even in the European media. For example, Rehn accused the
2011 Berlusconi government of not respecting its commitments. His Italian

colleague, Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry Antonio Tajani,
immediately reacted with: ‘I regret and dissociate myself from the statement
on Italy of my colleague Rehn, which risks raising the appearance that the
Commission is not independent’ (Fox, 2013). Rehn replied that it was a
purely analytical observation. It is not just that Rehn is being openly criti-
cised by his colleagues, but such internal differences also determine the lines
on which the officials from the DGs involved have to agree. Moreover,
Barroso has also publicly criticised Rehn’s decisions from time to time (The
Wall Street Journal, 2013).
Decision-Taking in the College
DG ECFIN submits its draft recommendations to the College (at the

weekly meeting of Heads of Cabinet). Formally, DG ECFIN’s recom-
mendations have the same status as Competition Reports, and other
Commissioners are not expected to intervene (Commission, 2011a). As a
result of this phase, DG ECFIN’s country desks lose sight of possible
changes that are made along the way, and the actual independence of the
semester Commissioner vis-à-vis the rest of the College has remained
somewhat unclear also to DG ECFIN staff (interviews 6, 22 and 39).
The Commission decision ‘shall include the Commission’s qualitative
assessment based on the analytical document …, shall be adopted by the
Commission in the written procedure, on the initiative of the Vice-
President responsible for economic and monetary affairs and the Euro’
(Commission, 2011a, Art. 6.3). The written procedure was amended to
accommodate the new economic governance procedure (Commission,
2011e) so that any Commissioner can send a ‘… reasoned request to the
President, explicitly indicating the points in the draft decisions to which
it relates. The President will require that such reasons be based on an
impartial and objective assessment of the timing, structure, reasoning
and/or result of the proposed decision’ (Commission, 2011e, Art. 1).
These stricter rules of procedure confirm the search for objectivity and
impartiality, but the interviews indicate that Commissioners apparently
find ways to put the draft decisions up for discussion, which occasionally
leads to (nationally influenced) alterations of the text (interviews 14 and
24). The fight over the French recommendations that eventually emerged
out in the open confirms that politics has not been excluded.
The fact that the President deals with requests for suspension and for
discussion of the draft decisions indicates that a considerable amount of
power has remained centralised, or as interviewee 49 emphasised: ‘the pro-
cess remains political, and Barroso is the President’. Interviewee 37 clarified
that the spin on Rehn’s presentations therefore also differed per presenta-
tion in the Member States. To support the President in his own decision-
taking, the Commission has created the position of Chief Economic
Analyst (CEA) (Commission, 2011a). The CEA ‘shall act independently
from any member and service of the Commission, including DG ECFIN’
(Commission, 2011a, Art. 7.2). The CEA is responsible for verifying the
analytical base of draft decisions. He can initiate research on his own or
can be asked for an opinion by the Vice-President for Economics or by the
Commission President. As indicated by interviewee 37, the political invol-
vement of the President may actually grow if the EP succeeds in gaining
stronger political control over the Commission following the elections of
2014 (see also Euractiv, 2014).
The recommendations are published after a decision has been made in
the College. Because drafts leaving DG ECFIN are not publicly available,
it can, as yet, not be established whether the College influences the recom-
mendations. In fact, interviewees 20, 22 and 39 had been surprised by the
recommendations because they departed from the text that had left their
country desk.
To assess the independence at College level, it also has to be understood
that the independent Commissioner wears multiple hats. He is independent
in his role of ‘budget tsar’ but is also a normal member of the College and
responsible for areas for which he has no special status. As such, Rehn
commented politically, for example, on the EU’s multiannual budget (find-
ing it insufficient). Hence, the Commissioner is multi-hatted so that his
independence is, by definition, contaminated.
CONCLUSIONS
On specific request of the Member States, the famous Six-pack introduced
the independent Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and
the Euro. Acknowledging the ‘stickiness’ of institutions and the difficulties
in reorganising (formal) institutions, this chapter addressed the question of
how this ‘independence’ is now being backed by administrative capacities
in the form of mission statements, procedures and resources. As it appears,

there are three problems in the current process of institutionalisation of the
independent Commissioner.
The first problem in the emerging design of the new Commissioner is
that ‘independence’ is frequently used in and is part of wider good gov-
ernance discussions but has attracted limited attention in terms of defini-
tion or implementation. The second problem concerns the relations with
other DGs and within the College. On paper, the Economics
Commissioner is responsible for analysis, the formulation of recommen-
dations and supervision. In reality, he and his DG ECFIN staff coop-
erate with other DGs, and traditional bureaucratic pressures in the
organisation and in the College persist. Once reports are sent from the
country desks at DG ECFIN to the College and are finally published, it
is unclear who decided on what and what the influence of the College
has been.
Third, the new Commissioner is responsible for methodologies, ana-
lyses of economic trends, policy advice, supervision and enforcement
although principles of good governance imply separating policy-making,
policy-taking and enforcement. Moreover, the independent Commissioner
wears different hats, being a ‘normal’ Commissioner in the College and,
at the same time, an independent Commissioner for economic affairs. As
a corollary, journalists, the wider public and (national) politicians are
never sure which hat he is wearing. His general reputation is therefore
unclear.
This leads to preliminary recommendations for redesign in order to
enforce its trustworthiness. With the Six-pack, the Member States are sup-
posed to have separate and independent statistical offices and budgetary
authorities, but the Commission has kept all tasks in this field within the
College. It seems necessary to also apply the Six-pack to the Commission
and to separate both Eurostat and the analytical parts of DG ECFIN from
the Commission. This would help clarify communication lines and respon-
sibilities and increase the transparency of DG ECFIN’s reports. Moreover,
it might help prevent the impression, even within the Commission, that
‘DG ECFIN is pure politics’ (interview 4).
Generalising these findings to the use of an administrative approach, the
frugal framework used here indicates that ‘independence’ cannot simply be
proclaimed but also demands attention for organisational design.
Organisational analysis helps to understand the organisation and the orga-
nisational weaknesses behind the policy objective.
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EU AGENCIES AND THE
EUROPEAN MULTI-LEVEL
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
Edoardo Ongaro, Dario Barbieri,

Nicola Bellé and Paolo Fedele
ABSTRACT
Purpose The chapter furnishes empirical evidence about the extent
and profiles of autonomy of EU agencies, the modalities whereby they
are steered and controlled, and the interactions they have in EU policy
networks. It thus provides the bases for a more complete picture of the
EU multi-level administration.
Methodology/approach The research is a survey-based design. A
questionnaire was administered between July 2009 and April 2010 to 30
EU agencies included in the study population. The questionnaire was
sent to the executive director of all the agencies included in the study.
Questions were closed-ended, either in the form of multiple choices
with one answer or with check-all-that-apply and an option for ‘other’
to be filled or in scale format. The resulting data set included ratio,
interval, ordinal, and nominal scales. The reference model employed for
the investigation relies on the analytical model developed within the

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004005
87
88 EDOARDO ONGARO ET AL.
framework of the research project COST Action IS0651 CRIPO

(Comparative Research into Current Trends in Public Sector
Organization see also ‘Acknowledgements’) for the study of public
agencies in Europe (Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Lægreid,
2012).
Findings EU agencies display a rather low level of managerial, espe-
cially financial, autonomy; conversely, they enjoy relatively high policy
autonomy. As to the way in which multiple ‘parent’ administration steer
EU agencies, it emerges a composite picture, in which the crossroads of
steering and control by the parent administrations and accountability by
the agency lies in the executive director. In terms of interactions within
policy networks, EU agencies interact in a significant way with the
European Commission, with national-level agencies in the pertinent pol-
icy field, and with specific technical bodies where they are part of the
configuration of the policy sector, whilst interactions with national minis-
tries as well as with other EU agencies are rare. No single model can
capture in full the overall features of EU agencies, although the ‘commu-
nity level institution’ model seems to capture a number of the profiles of
these agencies.
Research implications Both the literature on EU multi-level admin-
istration and research agendas in public management can benefit from
inclusion of and in-depth empirical knowledge about EU agen-
cies. The chapter provides important empirical evidence to these
purposes.
Practical/social implications EU agencies are actors in European pub-
lic policy-making, albeit to a varied extent depending on the sector. The
extent of autonomy and the way in which they are held to account are
crucial aspects for an enhanced understanding of their influence on
European public policy-making, as is their location in European policy
networks.
Originality/value Research presented in this chapter is the first sys-
tematic empirical investigation of EU agencies encompassing network-
ing, steering and control and autonomy of EU agencies, based on
primary data.
Keywords: Multi-level administration; EU administration;
EU agencies; policy networks; agency autonomy; agency control
EU Agencies and the European Multi-Level Administrative System 89
EU AGENCIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EU

MULTI-LEVEL ADMINISTRATION
Does the European Union (EU) have the agency fever too? Pollitt,
Bathgate, Caulfield, Smullen, and Talbot (2001), in critically analysing the
diffusion of governance through agencies at the national level, asked the
question whether there was an ‘agency fever’ spreading across the globe. Is
such the case in the EU polity as well? In some sense, the answer may be
affirmative. Since the 1990s there has been a consistent growth of EU agen-
cies: there were just two, excluding EURATOM agencies, in 1990 and over
forty, if all kinds of public organizations disaggregated from ‘core EU insti-
tutions’ are included, can be found in the second decade of the 2000s. The
EU administration is no more centred exclusively on the Commission (and
its interconnections with the Secretariats of the Council and the
Parliament): a larger, less monolithic and more complex system of adminis-
trations composes the executive order of the EU (Egeberg, 2006; Egeberg &
Trondal, 2009; Trondal, 2009, 2010) and contributes to dynamically shaping
the broader European administrative system (Bauer & Trondal, 2014).
The investigation of EU agencies their degree of autonomy, modalities
of interaction with their parent administration(s), influence on European
policy networks may enhance our knowledge of the overall EU multi-
level administrative system. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide
empirical knowledge and interpretations about how EU agencies can be
located in EU multi-level governance: their autonomy and extent of control
wielded over them; the multiple ways in which they interact with public
administrations and other actors across levels.
Various arguments have been proposed about the significance of EU
agencies. Policy arguments include, first, that the main task traditionally
delegated to agencies, that is regulation through information (Majone,
1997), is specific but far from irrelevant. Agencies establish and run net-
works that bring together regulatory players1 in a given policy area. The
establishment of networks at the EU level favours the consistency of infor-
mation among players and develops shared ‘behavioural standards and
working practices’ (Majone, 1997). Since policies are mainly implemented
at the national level, shared definition of regulatory problems facilitate the
consistent implementation of policies across national domains: as high-
lighted by Majone (1997), regulation through information can be as power-
ful a tool in contemporary policies as traditional command and control
governance arrangements. The second main reason why EU agencies are
an influential presence in European policy-making is due to the considera-

tion that the range of tasks executed by these bodies has by far enlarged
since the seminal studies of Majone and colleagues.
In this chapter we are especially interested in another argument about
the significance of EU agencies, that is focused on a broader and more fun-
damental issue: the transformation of the European executive order
(Egeberg & Trondal, 2011, p. 868) and its implications for European multi-
level governance (Guy Peters & Pierre, 2008; see also Pierre & Guy Peters,
2000) and the European administrative system (Bauer & Trondal, 2014).
According to this argument, EU agencies contribute to system transforma-
tion to the extent they act relatively independently of member states gov-
ernments or the Council (Egeberg & Trondal, 2011, p. 868), on one hand,
and interact closely with the European Commission, the ‘executive’ in EU
governance, on the other hand. In this perspective, since agencies might
weaken the intergovernmental order, their development could be analysed
as a hard case of institution-building at the supranational level of govern-
ance an even more interesting case to consider if contrasted with the cir-
cumstances that the entire European institutional, political and economic
setting in the form it acquired during the season of the treaties started in
1986 is put in question (as is the case since the burst of the financial, eco-
nomic and fiscal crises in the euro-zone). Whether the ‘glue’ of interconnec-
tions established around EU agencies and between them and their parent
administrations contributes to the capacity of the EU to resist (by adapting
itself) as a form of governance under huge environmental pressures is a sig-
nificant question, to which this chapter aims to contribute by investigating
empirically the form that such set of interconnections has taken.
There are at least two communities of scholars that will find an interest
in the findings of the research reported in this chapter. The first group
encompasses scholars in the field of EU studies (European politics,
European public policy and European administration). So far, EU agencies
have been examined in relation to the impact on specific policy domains
(Coen & Thatcher, 2008; Dehousse, 1997; Eberlein & Grande, 2005), or the
impact on executive politics and issues of accountability along principal-
agent lines in regulatory policies and frameworks (Borrás, Koutalakis, &
Wendler, 2007; Krapohl, 2004). A systematic analysis of the administrative
dimension of EU agencies, along the lines of the many works on the
Commission and its transformation (e.g. Ban, 2013; Bauer & Ege, 2012;
Kassim et al., 2013; Ongaro, 2012, 2013; Trondal, 2012; Wille, 2012), is a
task still to be accomplished. This chapter provides fresh empirical evidence
on a still under-analysed phenomenon (for exceptions, see Busuioc, 2010;
Groenleer, 2009; Rittberger & Wonka, 2011; Trondal, Busuioc, &

Groenleer, 2012).
The ‘agencification’ of the EU public sector is a phenomenon that can
be appreciated also by taking into account the larger picture: the global
trend towards specialization within large monolithic bureaucracies resulting
in the establishment of single purpose semi-autonomous organizations.
Though with deviations and exceptions, the growth in number and signifi-
cance of the tasks executed by public agencies has been a major trend, and
this has attracted academic attention amongst the community of scholars
in public administration and public management. A host of research works
has investigated the profiles and the determinants of autonomy of public
agencies (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Verhoest, Peters, Bouckaert, &
Verschuere, 2004; Verhoest, Verschuere, Peters, & Bouckaert, 2004), the
modalities of steering and control (Lægreid & Verhoest, 2010; Pollitt,
2006), managerial innovation (Lægreid, Roness, & Rubecksen, 2007) and
the broader implications of agencification on the governance and the func-
tioning of the public sector (Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Pollitt, Talbot,
Caulfield, & Smullen, 2004; Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Lægreid,
2012). The empirical basis of such analyses, however, has to our knowledge
never encompassed in a systematic way the agencies of the EU (an
exception is the chapter by Ongaro, Barbieri, Bellé, & Fedele, 2012 in
Verhoest et al., 2012). This is a limitation in a number of respects, both from
a theoretical and from a policy standpoint. The EU is a unique polity,
combining supranational and intergovernmental institutions, involving
multiple centres (multiple parent administrations for EU agencies) and a
peculiar (though in our view not exhaustive of its scope) focus on regulation
(a ‘regulator polity’, in Majone’s approach). Do these features make any
difference in the study of public agencies? Or are general findings of previous
research works on national-level and local-level public agencies applicable
quite straightforwardly to EU agencies? These questions are crucial for the
advancement of the research on public agencies. This chapter purveys
elements, in terms of both empirical evidence and theoretical interpretations,
for starting to address such questions, thus also providing a contribution to
the research in public management on the phenomenon of public agencies.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Research on EU agencies has largely dealt with institutional design, trying

to explain why politicians establish agencies and what explains the design
of their organizational form. Other research works have focused the images
of governance by officials in EU agencies (Rittberger & Wonka, 2011), pro-
vided account of agencies’ longitudinal trajectory in terms of their auton-
omy (Groenleer, 2009), or the accountability of EU agencies (Busuioc,
2010, 2011). This chapter furnishes a complementary picture, by providing
empirical evidence about a wide range of features of EU agencies: it
describes and analyses the profiles of autonomy, steering and control, and
networking of EU agencies. Three research questions are addressed.
RQ1. What are the main features of EU agencies?
The first research question is mainly empirical. This research adds to
existing knowledge by investigating in a systematic way EU agencies as an
administrative phenomenon, and it does so on the basis of primary sources.
Previous research works have either analysed one specific feature of the EU
agencies landscape (autonomy, or accountability, or images of agency gov-
ernance), or a limited number of agencies; or, in the attempt to encompass
a large number of agencies, they tend to rely exclusively or almost exclu-
sively on secondary data (see, e.g. Barbieri & Ongaro, 2008; Christensen &
Nielsen, 2010; Rittberger & Wonka, 2011). This chapter provides first-
hand, primary empirical evidence that complements previous works in
many ways. It discusses the autonomy of EU agencies and different profiles
of the way the steering and control by multiple parent administrations is
wielded, and its interconnections with the accountability of EU agencies.
A remarkably little examined profile is the way in which EU agencies
are embedded into policy networks, a ubiquitous feature of EU politics and
policy-making (Peterson, 2008), and an especially significant one for the
study of the EU multi-level administration (and Multi-Level Governance).
This chapter provides novel empirical evidence about the extent to which
EU agencies are embedded into European policy networks. The second
research question has been formulated as follows:
RQ2. How are EU agencies embedded in European public policy
networks?
The empirical findings pave the way for discussing the argument elabo-
rated by Michael Bauer, Morten Egeberg, Jarle Trondal on the reconfigur-
ing of the European administrative system from the specific standpoint of
the features of EU agencies (Bauer & Trondal, 2014; Egeberg, 2006;
Egeberg & Trondal, 2011; Trondal, 2010).
Turning to the third research question, it faces the problem of ‘the quest
for a model’ (in both descriptive/analytic and normative terms): how can
the main traits of EU agencies be captured if at all by a model, and if

so are models employed for the study of national-level agencies useful
(e.g. the tripod model as first theorized by Pollitt et al., 2004), or do we
need specific models fitting the peculiar EU governance (Trondal &
Jeppesen, 2008), or none of the available models actually fits? The third
research question has been formulated as follows:
RQ3. Is there a prevailing model (ideal type) of EU agency, and what
are its traits?
Addressing RQ3 requires contrasting the features of EU agencies as they
emerge from empirical evidence collected with some well-known formats of
agencies described in the literature on agencies, at both the national and at
the EU level. We have selected four comparators: the so-called ‘tripod
model’ (Pollitt et al., 2004); the ‘policy agency’, here called also autono-
mous administrative space (Pierre, 2004; Trondal & Jeppesen, 2008); the
epistemic network model (Majone, 1997; Trondal & Jeppesen, 2008); and
the so-called community level institution model (Trondal & Jeppesen,
2008). Ideal typical models of agency are discussed in the next section,
whilst research methods are reported in the appendix.
IDEAL TYPICAL MODELS OF AGENCIES AND

COMPARISON
In order to address the question about whether there is a model of
European agency, some comparators are required. They are not intended
here as normative models (i.e. how agencies should be) but as analytical
devices. In other terms, their (somewhat stylized) features are used to sys-
tematically elaborate on EU agencies features. The comparators employed
in the analysis are: (a) the so-called tripod model (Pollitt et al., 2004) and
(b) its ‘rival’ ideal type of the policy agency (Pierre, 2004), which presents
features similar to the autonomous administrative space conceptualized by
Trondal and Jeppesen (2008) in reference to EU agencies; (c) the epistemic
network model, formulated by Trondal and Jeppesen (2008), which resem-
bles the basic model of EU agencies presented in Majone’s (1997) seminal
article in the 1997 Journal of European Public Policy special issue edited by
Kreher (1997); and (d) the so-called community level institution, the third
one of the ideal types of agencies elaborated by Trondal and Jeppesen
(2008). These models are here used for analytical purposes.
The so-called tripod model enjoyed quite a large popularity especially

during the 1990s among policy makers as the prototype of the New Public
Management (NPM) agency, and it has been recognized as such and con-
ceptualized as an ideal type (and given the name) by Pollitt et al. (2004).
Although it has some underpinnings in the new institutional economics, the
tripod is mainly a practitioner model. Policy advisors and grey literature
have, in fact, largely contributed to spread the tripod model in its norma-
tive version (how the ‘modern’ agency should be). In the ‘real’ world, the
experience that probably most closely resembles such model is the Next
Steps executive agency introduced in the British administrative system at
the end of the 1980s (Greer, 1994). As the name implies, the tripod model
is based on three pillars. First of all, structural disaggregation, which
reflects the idea that agencies are created through the splitting up of a lar-
ger ministerial body into new more specialized bodies who operate at arm’s
length from the ministerial department. The guiding idea is the split of pol-
icy and operations: the agency should focus on operations, while the com-
petence of policy formulation remains at ministerial level. Second comes
autonomization, which reflects the presumption that establishing a separate
body is not enough, as it needs to be given some autonomy to ‘better’ exe-
cute its functions. Managerial autonomy the autonomy that the agency
executives enjoy in deciding on the use of financial and personnel resources
(‘capital’ and ‘labour’ as the main production factors) is high in this
model of agency. Associated to managerial autonomy is ‘re-regulation’,
that is the doctrine according to which rules and standard operating proce-
dures previously in use in the ministry/department should be different for
agencies, in order to create different conditions for managers to run such
agencies (Talbot, 2004). The third element in the model is contractualism,
that is the idea that the relationship between the agency and the ‘parent’
administration can be steered through some form of performance contract,
using performance measures and incentives instead of command and
control.
Another well-known ideal type of agency is the ‘policy agency’. As for
the tripod, a somewhat stylized version of this model will be used as an
analytical device to contrast the observed features of EU agencies. In this
model, agencies are not the result of structural disaggregation of previously
existing ministries; furthermore, they are not created to manage operations
more efficiently; rather, they are neutral, highly professionalized bodies,
whose main role is policy advice. Consequently, their managerial autonomy
may be assumed to be low (or anyway the level of managerial autonomy is
not a constitutive trait of such agency model), while they enjoy a
considerable degree of policy autonomy, in the sense of being influential in

the formulation of policy goals. The nature of this agency is also reflected
on the forms of steering and control: contractualism, that is performance
contracting and steering by numbers are not present here since there are no
‘operations’ to be steered and supervised by the parent administrations
through some kind of contract. Oversight takes place through more tradi-
tional forms, such as the appointments procedures or the control over the
budgetary process. The head of the agency is likely to be a career unelected
official who is required to operate in according to the criterion of neutral-
ity, and to provide disinterested policy advice. The experience that seems to
somehow resemble the model is the case of Swedish agencies (Pierre, 2004;
the model is also discussed, with specific regard to the case of Italian public
agencies, in Fedele, Galli, & Ongaro, 2007; Ongaro, 2006).
What we have so far described is a model derived from the literature on
agencies at the national level. A very similar stylization is provided by
Trondal and Jeppesen (2008) in reference to EU agencies. They derive, in
theoretical, speculative fashion, three images of agency governance which
are based both on structural-organizational features and on staff percep-
tions regarding their own role and the agency’s role. Agency governance,
according to this approach, is partly determined by how trade-offs between
alternative models of governance are regarded by individual officials. Here
we will consider only the structural-organizational features as analytical
lenses and specifically: the financial base of agencies’ revenues, the compo-
sition of the management board and the type of organizational specializa-
tion across level of government. The first ideal type proposed by Trondal
and Jeppesen is the one that identifies EU agencies as ‘autonomous admin-
istrative spaces’ which enjoy a high degree of autonomy and independence
vis-à-vis the Community institutions as well as member states governments
and other actors. Independence is likely to be stronger if agencies are
financed by their own revenues, their board is dominated by agency staff
and their organizational structure is incompatible vis-à-vis the Community
bodies. It resembles quite extensively the policy agency model outlined
above.
The second ideal type of EU agency they propose (third model used as
comparator in our taxonomy) is the ‘multi-level epistemic networks’, whose
primary aim is integrating webs of independent actors (experts, industry
representatives, NGOs, research institutes). It is the one that probably
most resembles Majone’s conception of EU agencies as having a role of
‘regulation by information’: they gather, provide and disseminate informa-
tion, without holding enforcement powers (Majone, 1997). Traits of this
model of agency may be described as follows: the board is dominated by

external representatives; there are multiple funding sources; and the organi-
zational structure is based on multiple horizontal and vertical specialization
principles.
The last ideal type reflects the vision of agencies as ‘EU level
Community institutions’ (Trondal & Jeppesen, 2008). According to this
perspective, agencies become a full-fledged component of the EU institu-
tional machinery in case they match the following criteria: they are finan-
cially dependent on the Community and on the European Parliament
decision to approve the annual agency budget; the board is mainly formed
by Community representatives; and their organizational structure is com-
patible with the Commission.
Table 1 summarizes the traits of the four models of agencies introduced
and contrasts them with the profile detected for the observed EU agencies.
It is now time to turn to presenting the empirical evidence collated about
EU agencies. We commence from the autonomy dimension, to then
develop on the steering and control, to eventually turn to the profile of the
networking of EU agencies, to comment on the place of EU agencies in
European multi-level administration and address the research questions.
THE AUTONOMY OF EU AGENCIES
Agency autonomy is a central issue in public management literature

(Lægreid & Verhoest, 2010; Pollitt et al., 2004; Verhoest, Peters, et al.,
2004; Wettenhall, 2005; Yesilkagit, 2004; Yesilkagit & Van Thiel, 2008).
When it comes to the EU and its agencies, however, the scientific literature
is much less abundant, and encounters the main limitation of relying on
secondary source. Barbieri and Ongaro (2008), Christensen and Nielsen
(2010), and Groenleer (2009) have addressed the issues of the autonomy of
EU agencies, but either relying mainly on public sources or by focusing the
analysis on a selected number of cases only.2 This chapter aims to expand
the empirical base for the study of the autonomy of EU agencies.
The concept of autonomy we employ is the level of decision-making com-
petencies of the agencies (Verhoest, Verschuere, et al., 2004; Verschuere,
2007): it concerns the perception by the agency staff on their de facto auton-
omy. Studies have shown that it is not only the legal form of an organiza-
tion to determine the degree of autonomy (Verhoest, Verschuere, et al.,
2004; see also Lægreid & Verhoest, 2010; Verhoest, Roness, Verschuere,
EU Agencies and the European Multi-Level Administrative System
Table 1. The Ideal Typical Models of Agencies.
Ideal Type Managerial Policy Financing Steering and Steering and Control: Steering and
Autonomy Autonomy Control: Appointment of Agency Control:
Performance Executives Accountability
Contract Bases
Tripod model High Low Parent Performance The principal appoints; Economy, efficiency,
administration contract fixed term effectiveness
budget
Policy agency or Low High Own revenues No performance The board appoints; Effectiveness,
Autonomous contract mainly agency staff legality, neutrality
administrative
space model
Epistemic Low (not relevant) Multiple sources No performance The board appoints; Effectiveness
network model Low contract external
representatives
Community level (not relevant) (not relevant) Parent No performance Commission appoints; Economy, efficiency
Institution Low Low administration contract community
model (EU) budget representatives
Observed EU Average to High Primarily from No performance Board plus Commission Effectiveness
agencies low EU budget contract
97
Rubecksen, & MacCarthaigh, 2010; Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 2002; Thynne,
2004; Yesilkagit, 2004; and on EU agencies, Barbieri, Bellé, Fedele, &
Ongaro, 2010). The specific object of this study is to analyse to what extent
the decision-makers in the agency are entrusted with the leeway to make
certain decisions, and behave consequently. For instance, if an agency can
decide on the promotion of an employee (or group of employees), such
organization will be, ceteris paribus, more autonomous than another
organization in which decision-makers do not perceive to be entitled to
make such decisions.
We adopt a multidimensional concept of autonomy. Following
Verhoest, Peters, et al. (2004), we distinguish between managerial and pol-
icy autonomy. Managerial autonomy refers to the leeway in acquiring and
employing personnel and financial resources; policy autonomy refers to the
extent to which the agency executives may decide on the objectives of the
policy or the instruments to implement the policy in the domain in which
the agency operates. Managerial autonomy concerns the basic processes of
acquisition and employment of the two principal kinds of resources an
organization needs: capital and labour. Financial autonomy concerns the
possibility to take loans, or set tariffs for the products of the agency etc.; in
general terms, to acquire and dispose of financial resources outside the pro-
vision and the authorization by the parent administration. Personnel
autonomy regards the possibility to make decisions on human resources,
like setting the remuneration of employees, promoting and appointing
them at given positions, etc., without specific constraints (other than the
general constraints set by the law) set by the parent administration.
Policy autonomy regards the leeway decision-makers in the agency are
entrusted as regards the selection of the goals to be pursued in the policy
sector in which the organization operates, or the instruments to pursue the
policy goals. It is linked to the ‘degree of freedom’ of the agency in the pol-
icy domain, hence representing also an indication of its potential influence
on the policy process.
Personnel Autonomy
The study has investigated the extent to which executives in EU agencies

report to be autonomous in deciding on personnel management issues, as
opposed to being unable to decide unless consent by parent administration is
given, or being unable tout court to make such decisions. It arises that EU
agencies generally cannot autonomously decide on the level of salary of their
staff (70% of respondents reported such to be the case). Similarly, regarding

decision powers on staff promotions, 30% of respondents report on being
able to decide autonomously, whilst an equal proportion reports not to be in
such a condition, with the highest percentage of cases (40%) contemplating
the intervention of other EU bodies in the staff promotion process. As
regards decisions concerning staff evaluation, agencies report this to be a
competence of them, and in 82% of the cases agencies have declared full or
partial autonomy in running the process of evaluating their own staff.
The decision on upsizing/downsizing the organization is usually in the
hands of the agencies, though in the majority of cases with a strong invol-
vement of other EU bodies (55%). This is not the case for the specific cate-
gory of the executive agencies, agencies established for the execution of
programmes entrusted to the European Commission which do not pos-
sess autonomy in the decisions on upsizing or downsizing the organization.
Decision autonomy on staff size is usually restricted, even though one quar-
ter of respondents reports to enjoy such autonomy.
Financial Autonomy
Financial autonomy is a sensitive issue in the communitarian institutional

setting. This is perhaps reflected also in the impossibility for EU agencies
to take loans. On the contrary, agencies (with the exception of the executive
ones) have some degree of autonomy concerning the decisions on setting
tariffs for services or products (half of the respondents), but only in 16% of
the cases this can be done without the consent of other EU bodies. The
possibility to take decisions on engaging in participations in private law
legal persons are almost always denied to the EU agencies.
An important profile of financial autonomy concerns the possibility to
take decisions on the budget. If we look at the decisions on shifting
between budgets for personnel and running costs, the majority of the agen-
cies (61%) can take decisions on this issue. Other EU bodies are to be
involved in such kind of decisions only in the 22% of the cases. A similar
picture, with lower levels of autonomy, is reflected in the possibility for the
agency to shift between the budget for personnel and running costs, on one
hand, and investments, on the other hand: about half of the policy agencies
can (autonomously) take decisions on shifting the budget.
The degree of financial autonomy is lower when we turn to decisions
like the possibility to shift between budgets of different years, which may
have larger implications also for the community budget (although in
absolute values EU agencies consume a very limited portion of the commu-

nity budget). Agencies owning a (full) autonomy on this kind of decisions
are a limited portion: only 26% of the respondents report to be in the con-
dition to take these decisions.
An important indicator of financial autonomy is represented by the
source of revenues. The financial self-sufficiency of an agency may be an
indicator of autonomy vis-à-vis the Commission. On the contrary, if an
agency fully depends on the transfer of funds from the Commission
budget every other thing being equal it may be assumed to have a
lower autonomy. It is interesting to notice that most of the agencies
depend, for more than half of their budget, on the direct budget allocation
by the Commission. The only typology in which another source of
revenues other than the allocation by the European Commission
represents more than 50% of the entire budget is the self-generated income
in the form of fee-derived revenues. In five cases in our cluster the primary
source of income is self-generated and, when such is the case, it represents
more than half of the budget. It means that in the cases in which an agency
can charge a fee to purvey a service (e.g. trademark registration, evaluation
of a pharmaceutical for approval, and so on), it relies almost fully on its
own resources.
Policy Autonomy
Next to managerial autonomy, our study has investigated certain profiles

of what we have labelled ‘policy autonomy’, encompassing decisions on the
objectives of the policy as well as on the instruments through which to pur-
sue the policy objectives. EU agencies, with the significant exception of the
executive ones, are always involved in the setting of their own goals, a
datum which significantly characterizes EU agencies as administrations
that are far from being mere executors of externally allocated goals. More
precisely, it is the agency itself to set the goals in the 56% of the cases,
whilst in the other 44% the decision-making process involves consultation
with other institutional actors (usually the Commission).
As concerns what we have labelled, respectively, the choice of the target
groups of the policy, the instruments to put into effect the policy, and the
ways to fulfil the tasks, in the survey we have examined the degree of invol-
vement of the agency in these three types of decision processes. Starting
from the choice of the target groups, almost half of policy agencies take
most of the decisions themselves, only limitedly restrained by other EU
bodies. It never happens that decisions on the target group are taken inde-
pendently of the agency.
If we look at the choice of policy instruments, the level of autonomy is
quite well distributed across the whole of the spectrum. EU agencies dis-
play quite a significant variance along this dimension of autonomy. As
regards policy autonomy concerning the fulfilment of the tasks, that is
asked the question ‘within the legal framework that applies, which actor
makes decisions concerning the fulfilment of the tasks (the way the tasks
are implemented, the exact prioritization of activities within the tasks) that
your organization executes’, agencies report to have on average a high level
of autonomy.
Summative Indexes of Autonomy and Discussion
In conclusion we employ indexes of autonomy as summative descriptors of

the profiles of EU agencies in terms of their autonomy. The adopted defini-
tion of autonomy is centred on the distinction between managerial auton-
omy, concerning the acquisition and use of resources, and policy
autonomy, concerning the room for manoeuvre of the agency in the policy
domain where it operates. Two indexes of autonomy can thus be contrived:
one of managerial autonomy and one of policy autonomy. Managerial
autonomy (MANAUT) refers to the combination of the personnel manage-
ment autonomy (HRAUT: degree of autonomy of the organization in: the
determination of the wage increases for individual employees; the promo-
tion of individual employees; the evaluation, recruitment and dismissal of
individual employees; the possibility for the organization, within or without
rules or conditions set from other EU bodies and with or without prior
approval from other EU bodies) and the financial autonomy (FINAUT:
degree of autonomy of the organization: to manage and raise financial
resources; to make loans for investments; to set tariffs/prices for products
and services; to set fees and charges; to conclude legal contracts/agreements
with private sector entities). Policy autonomy (POLAUT) refers to the
agency being autonomous in the choice of the target group, the selection of
the instruments to implement the policy, and the definition of the target
groups of the policies.
The index of Managerial Autonomy is created by summing up HRAUT
(Personnel Management Autonomy3) and FINAUT (Financial Autonomy4)
divided by two (which entails that the two dimensions of managerial auton-
omy are equally weighed). The result is an index MANAUT, ranging from
Table 2. Autonomy Indexes for the EU Agencies.

Overall Cluster (Mean) Policy Agencies (Mean) Executive Agencies (Mean)
HRAUT 0.48 0.50 0.22

(0 1)
FINAUT 0.32 0.35 0.22
(0 1)
MANAUT 0.4 0.42 0.22
(0 1)
POLAUT 2.113706006 2.99 1.85
(0 7)
.0 to 1, as its component indices. The index of Policy Autonomy (POLAUT)

is given by the weighting of three sub-indexes: POLTARG (Policy
Autonomy on Target Groups), POLINST (Policy Autonomy on Policy
Instruments), and POLTASK (Policy Autonomy on Fulfilment of Tasks).
The result is the index POLAUT,5 ranging from .0 to 7.
The levels of autonomy so obtained are summarized in Table 2, which
also provides an input to the discussion of whether there is a prevailing
model of EU agencies. Findings point to a relatively low managerial auton-
omy and a relatively high policy autonomy (the score 7 meaning absence of
autonomy, and 0 the highest level of autonomy).
As average values, such figures are hardly compatible with the tripod
model of agency, because of the restrained managerial autonomy, whilst
they are more in line with the autonomous administrative space model
(also referred to as the ‘policy agency’ ideal typical model of agency),
because of the quite substantial policy autonomy. This datum is more diffi-
cult to reckon as regards the ‘epistemic community’ model of public agency
as well as the ‘community level institution’ model of agency, as they both
tend to leave this profile unspecified.
THE STEERING AND CONTROL OF EU AGENCIES

What happens after an agency has been established and given a certain
extent of autonomy? Part of the answer lies also in the dynamics of the
relationships that will be developed between the agency and its parent
administration(s). There are two broad conceptual frameworks within
which such relationships may be analysed: one lies in conceiving of such
relations in terms of accountability, of the relationship between an
accountor and accountees; the other one lies in conceptualizing such rela-
tionships in terms of steering and control. Accountability ‘consists of ascer-
taining after the fact whether the actor has acted within the boundaries
specified by the mandate and has complied with its obligation’ (Busuioc &
Groenleer, 2012, p. 131); more specifically, accountability refers to the
‘relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has the obli-
gation to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose ques-
tions and pass judgment, and the actor might face consequences’ (Bovens,
2007, p. 452; see also Bovens, Curtin, & Hart, 2010; Busuioc, 2010;
Ongaro, 2003; Pezzani, 2003; Steccolini, 2003). Steering and control, on the
other hand, deals with the transmission of objectives, or at least of ‘signals’,
whereby the parent administration wields an influence on the actual beha-
viour of public agencies, steers their action before or while it is unfolding
as well as controlling it afterwards.6 Summing up, accountability is ex post
(it amounts to information, explanation and justification after the fact,
Busuioc & Groenleer, 2012, p. 131), steering and control is across all three
the phases (ex ante, in itinere and ex post); accountability preserves the
agency’s mandated level of autonomy, steering and control inherently con-
strains the agency’s autonomy; accountability is non-intrusive, steering and
control is intrusive.
Knowledge about EU agencies behaviour and its consequences may be
gained from the application of both frameworks to the study of EU
agencies. In this chapter we complement the investigation conducted
the accountability of EU agencies (Bovens et al., 2010; Busuioc, 2010;
Busuioc & Groenleer, 2012) by shedding light on the so far under-
investigated dimension of the steering and control of EU agencies by their
parent administrations, as well as on a number of profiles of the account-
ability of EU agencies about which empirical evidence is provided.
Control is a key dimension of structurally disaggregated public sector
organizations. The steering and control by the parent administrations
over an agency may be wielded in manifold ways. Schematically, two
approaches to steering and control may be identified: through governance
arrangements, and via performance appraisal (the latter partly overlaps
with accountability, and in this respect this work furnishes further empiri-
cal evidence about the accountability of EU agencies). The two are dee-
ply interconnected (Verschuere, 2007; Verschuere & Barbieri, 2009), and
they are empirically investigated together in this chapter, in order to pro-
vide the empirical evidence for addressing the research questions about
the features of EU agencies, and whether a ‘model’ of EU agency may be
detected.
A key component of the governance configuration concerns decision

powers in the process of appointment of the executive director. The most
frequent option is that of an appointment by the management board/
governing board on the Commission´s recommendation (46%), and some
sort of involvement on the part of the European Parliament, as it plays a
role in 31% of the appointments, in the examined cluster. As it has been
aptly observed (Busuioc & Groenleer, 2012, p. 135), the actual unfolding of
the procedure much depends on how actively the various institutional
players perform their roles. Moreover, if the procedure concerns the
renewal of the incumbent director in her/his stint (appointments are typi-
cally renewable once, the term of office usually lasting five years), it is likely
that the director herself/himself will be a key actor in the process: s/he may
be actively lobbying for renewal, or not (as it occurred in certain occasions
where the incumbent preferred to go back to her/his home country).
Working procedures facilitate it, since founding regulations are generally
silent about whether the incumbent director has to re-apply for the post
and a full selection procedure has to take place (shortlisting candidates by
the European Commission, decision by the agency board), or whether the
appointment of the executive director can simply be extended (the latter
procedure obviously giving the incumbent a strong advantage over any
potential competitor).
A second component concerns the appraisal of the executive director,
once s/he has been appointed. It emerges from our survey that executive
directors are most often appraised by the governing boards and the
Commission. The Council and the Parliament have a say in a more limited
number of instances.
What are the criteria on which executive directors are evaluated? It
arises that effectiveness as well as compliance with the rules (legality) are
the most important criteria for control (the question has been formulated
as: ‘On what ground is the organization accountable to the oversight
authority?’). Interestingly, effectiveness and goal attainment is the single
most important criterion for the majority of respondents. Legality is evenly
reported as either the first or the second more important bases on which
the executive director perceives to be held accountable. Efficiency is most
often considered as a third basis of accountability, whilst both economy
and equality are probably perceived as something ‘to be taken for granted’,
hence not prioritized as a basis of accountability.
The steering and control occurs also through a range of other instru-
ments. These include the approval of the agency general and specific goals,
usually contained in an annual work plan and in a longer-term strategic
plan (or similar denomination), although also budgetary allocation docu-

ments and others may contain some forms of ‘assignment of objectives’ to
the agency. General goals are most often laid down in the founding regula-
tion and budgetary allocation documents and, typically, these do not spe-
cify targets, much less so measurable targets. The majority of EU agencies
are held accountable for the attainment of the goals defined in these docu-
ments. More specific goals are established in internal and other documents,
rather than the founding regulation, and in most of these documents agen-
cies adopt targets that are measurable in nature and allow potentially for
ex post control. In a 10% of the cases agencies specify concrete goals with
measurable targets in the budgetary allocation; and another 10% of the
agencies also adopt measurable targets in a document that focuses specifi-
cally on the executive director. A form of control is also exercised through
budgetary discharge procedures; such responsibility usually lies with the
Parliament, more often on Council recommendation.
A range of other, mostly ex post forms of control are exercised by
administrative, executive, parliamentary and judiciary bodies. Beginning
with judicial control, all agencies are subject to judicial control (one excep-
tion, statutorily, is Europol), by the Court of Auditors and the European
Court of Justice. Agencies may also be accountable to OLAF and to the
national court systems (although not in all instances). Agencies are also the
subject of systematic evaluations, usually every five or ten years. In 2009, a
major evaluation of all EU decentralized agencies was conducted
(Ramboll/Eureval/Matrix, 2009).
All surveyed agencies also have reported to measure their activities by
way of performance indicators (PIs), and most report on their results on a
yearly basis, although in many instances reports are more frequent (two
respondents state to report every month on certain dimensions of their
activities, as measured by means of performance indicators). According to
the respondents, results control is the most commonly reported use of PIs,
followed by resource allocation-related reasons. It should be also observed,
however, that only less than half the respondents reports to use PIs ‘to a
large extent’.
It emerges a composite picture, in which the crossroads of steering and
control by the parent administrations and accountability by the agency lies
in the executive director. Both governance arrangements and performance
appraisal, centred on the figure of the director, reinforce such role. At the
same time, however, multiple channels are opened for the transmission of
objectives, and a complex system of signalling (mainly, though not exclu-
sively, in the direction from the parent administrations towards the
agencies) is brought about by the systematic resort to periodic evaluations,

that have more often than not paved the way to modifications of the regu-
lation of the agency, hence its governance architecture and/or attributed
tasks.
This evidence, whilst reflecting aspects of the three models of EU agen-
cies as delineated by Trondal and Jeppesen (2008), provides a picture in
which performance information is a widespread currency in the relation-
ships between EU agencies and their parent administrations, perhaps to a
much larger extent than what is provided for by those models (that tend to
overlook the dimension of performance information). However, the use of
performance measures is more as background information, rather than
being centre stage in decision-making patterns (at least for what can be
judged on the basis of the reasons reported by respondents for the usage of
performance measures). Moreover, the use of a performance-contract logic
is clearly excluded from the picture.
In sum, regarding the profiles of steering and control, EU agencies
appear difficult to classify neatly into any of the models of agency outlined,
although they tend to be somewhat closer to the policy agency model
and surely do not fit the tripod model of public agency.
POLICY NETWORKS AND AGENCIES IN THE EU:

MAPPING THE INTEGRATION/DISINTEGRATION
MOSAIC
Policy networks represent a ubiquitous feature of European public policy

and administration (Metcalfe, 1996; Peterson, 2008; Wallace, Pollack, &
Alasdair, 2010). Where is the ‘position’ of EU agencies in European policy
networks? What influence do they have on the policy process? This section
addresses such questions, central to the understanding of the European
multi-level administration, based on the evidence furnished by the survey.
EU Agencies in Policy Networks
In order to provide a picture of the ‘location’ of EU agencies in the relevant

policy networks how they are embedded we have focused the fre-
quency of interactions our focal organizations have with the key actors in
the policy process. To this purpose, the survey delineates a range of types
of interactions, defined on the basis of the contents characterizing the inter-

action (what the interaction is about), and investigates the frequency with
which EU agencies interact with other actors such as: the European
Commission; other EU agencies; national-level public agencies, national
ministries (as distinct from national agencies), research centres and focal
points; and interest groups and stakeholders.
More in detail, the contents of the interactions that have been detected
through the survey-based research are the following ones. First, exchange
of data between the agency and the other institutions in the European.
Second, exchange of advice, further distinguishing whether this is addressed
from the Agency to the institution (e.g. advice that the EU agency provides
to the Commission), or vice versa (i.e. advice that the Commission provides
to the agency). Third, the transmission of mandatory instructions, occurring
from the institution to the agency; this type of interaction does not apply
with non-institutional actors (interest groups, stakeholders). Fourth, con-
sultation as the content of the interaction, characterized by its two-way
relationship. Fifth, audit, evaluation and control, further distinguishing
whether this process is conducted by the agency on the institution or by the
institution towards the agency. Lastly, it has also been detected whether
rewards or sanctions are put into effect as a consequence of such control
function. Operationally, it has been mapped the yearly frequency of inter-
actions (on average: how many interactions per year).
Starting from the interactions of EU agencies with their ‘main’ parent
administration, that is the Commission, it emerges (Fig. 1) that the
most intense interactions are those whose content is consultation, followed
by those whose content is the exchange of data. Also important are
interactions centred on the taking and giving of advice, although of a
‘formal-institutional’ nature, given that these ones take the shape of inter-
organizational/inter-institutional relations.
It may observed a not irrelevant presence of interactions whose content
is the transmission of mandatory instructions from the Commission to
agencies, pointing to a potentially ‘double-nature’ of the interaction agen-
cies have with the Commission: on an equal footing in a number of
respects, on a ‘subordinate’ basis in other respects, at least for certain
agencies.
Much less intense, in absolute value, are the interactions of EU agencies
amongst themselves for the running of their operations. This may be inter-
preted as corroborating the evidence that agencies tend not to overlap in
their lines of activities. In another question included in the questionnaire,
when asked about the presence of other organizations (of whatever nature
Consultation
Data Exchange
Advice to the Commission
Advice from the Commission
Mandatory Instructions
Audit by the Commission
Audit on the Commission
0 10 20 30
Yearly Frequency
Fig. 1. Average Number of Interactions per Year between the EU Agencies and
the European Commission, by Type of Interaction.
and legal status) delivering similar products or services, respondents in EU

agencies, though recognizing in some cases the existence of other organiza-
tions delivering similar products/services, stated that they do not perceive
themselves as in competition with any other organization.
Intense are also the interactions of EU agencies with national-level agen-
cies (Fig. 2), thus pointing at a ‘system’ formed by the European
Commission, EU agencies and national agencies that appears to have a
high level of mutual interactions and continuous interchange.
This system, however, might display a tendency to be somewhat separate
from the national-level administrative system operating in the related policy
sector. One datum from the survey seems to corroborate this proposition.
In fact, even though it is not unexpected from a theoretical point of view
that interactions between EU agencies and national ministries are very lim-
ited (see the argument elaborated by Egeberg, 2006, 2010, discussed later in
this chapter), nonetheless it is striking how limited in absolute value is the
frequency of such interactions. Only data exchange, a relatively ‘technical’
type of interaction7 when contrasted with interactions like the exchange of
advice or the conduction of evaluations, reaches a yearly average frequency
(a)
Data Exchange
Consultation
Advice from National Agencies
Funding to National Agencies
Advice to National Agencies
Audit on National Agencies
Audit by National Agencies
Sanctions/Rewards for National Agencies
Funding from National Agencies
0 10 20 30
Yearly frequency
(b)
Data Exchange
Consultation
Advice from National Ministries
Advice to National Ministries
Funding to National Ministries
Audit by National Ministries
Audit on National Ministries
Funding from National Ministries
Sanctions/Rewards for National Ministries
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Yearly frequency
Fig. 2. (a) Average Number of Interactions per Year between the EU Agencies
and National-Level Agencies, by Type of Interaction; (b) Average Number of
Interactions per Year between the EU Agencies and National Ministries, by Type
of Interaction.
close to five per year, whilst interactions centred on consultation or the

exchange of advice do not reach the figure of two per year.
More important in absolute values is the intensity of interactions with
specific organizations (research centres and focal points) with which certain
EU agencies tend to have an important set of interdependencies in the
execution of their operations. Such interactions occur with a relatively
important frequency (in the order of 10 15 interactions per year) as
regards two types of contents: the exchange of data, and consultation. This
is not unexpected, given the ‘technical’ nature of the interactions EU agen-
cies have with such organizations, set up for the execution of specific tasks
in the field of data gathering/data treatment.
Turning to the interactions with interest groups and stakeholders (the
former intended as the more organized groups, the latter as a larger cate-
gory of social groups to a smaller or larger extent affected by the action of
the agency), the questionnaire was restricted to only three categories of
interaction: data exchange, exchange of advice (from and to the agency),
and consultation. It emerges not unexpectedly given the significance
attributed in the EU to consultation processes that consultation with sta-
keholders is the most frequent type of interaction in this case, and that in
general EU agencies tend to have more interactions with stakeholders at
large than with organized interests.
Operating through networks is also a necessity for EU agencies, since
they need to acquire resources beyond those available in terms of financial
and personnel endowments, in order to carry out their tasks and pursue
their goals. This consideration raises the issue of the expansion of capacities
through network resources. In particular, an important number of agencies
rely on the expertise of professionals and scientists for carrying out their
duties; as examples, one may think of the issuing of science-based opinions
in the pharmaceutical or food safety fields, or the issuing of authorizations
in the aviation safety sector. A first profile in the management of profes-
sionals is the quantitative one: how many EU agencies do engage experts?
And how many experts are engaged by those agencies which do resort to
professionals? It arises that it is about one-third of agencies that resort to
experts, whilst two-thirds do not operate this way. Those that do it, how-
ever, engage experts in numbers that may span from one/two thousands to
as many as more than 8,000 experts that are involved in the activities of the
organization. For those agencies, the human resources that they actually
deploy in the execution of their tasks go well beyond the hired staff through
the network of experts that is established by the agency (larger agencies do
not go beyond 600/700 people). The establishment of such networks
represents a condition for the agency to be in the condition to carry out its
assigned tasks.
Summing up, it arises a picture in which EU agencies interact in a signif-
icant way (for the range and the frequency of the interactions) with the
European Commission, with national-level agencies in the pertinent policy
field, and with specific technical bodies (research centres/focal points)
where they are part of the configuration of the policy sector, whilst interac-
tions with national ministries as well as with other EU agencies are rare.
From this picture, it appears that a system centred around the Commission
(as the only actor of those considered to operate throughout policy
sectors) and coalescing European-level and national-level agencies and
other bodies, but not national ministries/departments, is forming through-
out the European multi-level administration, perhaps with an impact on
the cohesion of national administrative systems. We develop further this
consideration in the final section of the chapter.
Where’s the Influence? Involvement of EU Agencies in European Public

Policy Processes
There is little doubt that agencification at the EU level has had an impact
on policy processes, although it may be questioned the extent and scope of
it. Ascertaining the kind of ‘influence’ EU agencies may have on European
policy processes is no easy task, and lies outside of the scope of this chapter
focused on the reconfiguring of the EU multi-level administration than on
European public policy. However, an aspect examined in the survey
touches on a profile that may be of interest for this question, that is, the
kind and the intensity of involvement of EU agencies in different activities,
belonging to different phases, of European policy processes. Specifically,
one question of the survey aimed at detecting the degree of involvement of
EU agencies in the policy process, as an indirect measure of the influence
agencies may wield on European public policy processes. Results are
reported in Fig. 3.
It emerges that the organizational apex of EU agencies perceives to have
a significant involvement in the definition and formulation of guidelines for
implementing European public policies; an important role in the implemen-
tation of decisions and policy measures; a relatively more limited role in
activities related to the assessment/feedback on the effectiveness of public
programmes, regulations, measures; and a definitely more limited role in
activities related to supporting political initiatives. They are also involved,
Formulation of guidelines
Definition of guidelines
Services to the Council
Policy implementation
Answering parliamentary questions
Programme evaluations
Briefing the Commission
Commenting draft legislation by the Council
International negotiations
Supporting political initiatives
0 1 2 3 4
0 = No involvement; 4 = High involvement
Fig. 3. Average Degree of Involvement of the EU Agencies in Policy Processes, by

Type of Involvement.
directly or by briefing the European Commission, in the answering of par-

liamentary questions posed by the European Parliament.
In sum, in those policy domains where an EU agency is established, it
tends to ‘play a role’ in a plurality of phases of the policy process, some-
times a prominent, and pre-eminent, role, other times the more complemen-
tary role that might be expected of it being an organization designed as
instrumental to the pursuit of goals set by the ‘political’ institutions of the
EU. It is thus sensible to assume that EU agencies have a composite influ-
ence on the dynamics of the policy process, a finding in line with main-
stream literature on the topic (Busuioc, Groenleer, & Trondal, 2012;
Martens, 2010; Zito, 2009).
Another standpoint from which to look at the influence that EU agen-
cies may have on the policy process is by considering the outputs delivered
by the agency, and the users of such outputs. Asked about the main target
groups of the activities, services and/or products delivered by the organiza-
tion, EU agencies riposte identified national governments as the main tar-
get group, followed by the European Commission in its various units
(DGs, Services). Private enterprises and individuals are the subsequent
more important recipients of the outputs delivered by EU agencies,
followed by a wide set of target groups, ranging from national-level agen-

cies, to regional/local governments, employers’ associations, etc. In sum,
and here again not unexpectedly, EU agencies more frequently deliver
directly to their constituents: the national governments and the
Commission. Many agencies, however, deliver their outputs to a wider
category of actors, ranging from other units of the public sector to, more
often, citizens, in their different capacities (as individuals, as entrepreneurs
and employers, as associated in voluntary organizations, and the like).
ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
With reference to the first research question, the empirical investigation has
allowed delineating the main profiles of autonomy, steering and control,
managerialization and ‘embeddedness’ into policy networks of EU agen-
cies. It emerges that EU agencies do enjoy a certain degree of autonomy,
higher as regards the management of personnel than financial resources,
where their scope is more severely baffled. They also enjoy quite significant
policy autonomy, meaning their room for manoeuvre in choosing the target
groups of the policy, or the instruments to implement the policy.
It has also been observed that, in the relationship with the parent admin-
istrations (chiefly the European Commission), performance indicators are a
widespread currency although their usage appears to be more as back-
ground information rather than for decision-making; also the absence of
any form of performance contracting is notable. Governance arrangements
appear to constitute the bulk of the arrangements whereby steering and
control is carried out.
Regarding the second research question about the configuration of the
way in which EU agencies are embedded into European policy networks
(or at least some significant segments of them), our findings show that they
have a wide range of interactions with a variety of actors in the EU: the
extent to which EU agencies are embedded into policy networks is notable.
It also emerges that relations are especially intense with the European
Commission and the national public agencies, and much less so with
national ministries, pointing to a set of organizations composed by the
Commission and EU as well as national agencies as forming a cohering sys-
tem, partly detached (detaching?) from national administrations.
Turning to the third research question about whether a model can cap-
ture the main traits of EU agencies, the answer can only necessarily be
nuanced. Regarding autonomy, the observed sample of EU agencies is

close to the policy agency model. Regarding the steering and control, espe-
cially if this profile is complemented with observations on how EU agencies
are embedded into European policy networks, observed EU agencies are
somewhat in-between the two models of the community institution (in
reference to their networking profile) and policy agencies (with reference to
certain profiles of the steering of control). No model can capture in full the
overall features of EU agencies, although the ‘community level institution’
model seems to capture a number of the profiles (as average value) of the
agencies for which empirical evidence could be collected in this study.
Also the ‘multi-level epistemic network’ model is, prima facie, very sig-
nificant, but only for a certain portion of the population of EU agencies.
An empirical finding that emerges is that certain agencies, perhaps very
influential in their policy field but limited in number, may be singled out
for their feature of being the hub of wide networks that may be associated
to epistemic communities. This finding reinforces Trondal and Jeppesen
interpretation at least for certain EU agencies, at least for part of their
overall organizational form as multi-level epistemic networks.
Another finding is that the tripod model does not capture almost any of
the features that EU agencies display; however, fashionable is may have
been as ‘the’ (normative) model for the ‘modern’ public agency, it has
surely not found its way at the supranational, EU level of governance (this
finding further corroborates the argument proposed by Pollitt et al., 2004,
about such model being but one of a variety of agency forms detectable in
the real world of public agencies).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: EU AGENCIES IN THE

EUROPEAN MULTI-LEVEL ADMINISTRATIVE
SYSTEM
The formation of a ‘supranational layer’ of EU agencies plays an important

role in a perspective to the analysis of the transformation of the executive
order in the European Union to which we will here refer to as the ‘integra-
tion/disintegration perspective’, that has more fully been theorized by
Morten Egegerg and Jarle Trondal (Egeberg, 2006, 2010; Egeberg &
Trondal, 2009; Trondal, 2009, 2010; early works include Kreher, 1997) and
is further elaborated through the notion of European administrative system
developed by Bauer and Trondal (2014). The starting point is the multi-level
profile of the EU administration. The argument may be summarized as fol-

lows: a multi-level administration is emerging in Europe, partly incorporat-
ing parts of national administrations, through the re-coupling at EU level of
what has been decoupled at the national level (through processes of dissolu-
tion of national governments as coherent states).
This transformation of the executive order in Europe rests on two pre-
requisites: first, the consolidation of the European Commission as an
executive body capable of providing a new ‘centre’ for the process of centre
formation at the supranational level; second, the occurrence of significant
processes of agencification in national governments (Verhoest et al., 2012).
The process operating in the direction of transforming the European execu-
tive order has its impulse in national agencies working closely with both
the European Commission, that in its being impeded to have any territo-
rially deconcentrated offices in the territory of the Union8 may tend to
‘adopt’ national agencies as technical structures operating on the territory
in the development of European public policies, and with EU agencies, that
tend to become hubs of networks in which the relationships between
European- and national-level agencies tend to intensify and in important
respects to ‘bypass’ the direct relationships between national agencies and
their parent ministries (Egeberg, 2006). The process may further be rein-
forced by national representatives in the management boards coming to a
large extent from national agencies rather than national ministries, hence
further strengthening the interactions between agencies national and
European partly to the detriment of national administrations in every-
day’s operations.
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter only indirectly provides
additional evidence of interest for confirming or disconfirming this argu-
ment, as data about the interactions between national agencies and their
parent administration were not part of the scope of the research. However,
by detecting the intensity of interactions between European and national
agencies as well as between EU agencies and the Commission, on one
hand, and between EU agencies and national ministries, on the other hand,
it seems to provide a picture that adds confidence to the argument pro-
posed by Egeberg, in the sense that there seems to be a system composed of
the European Commission, EU agencies and national agencies9 that have
very frequent mutual interactions10 and seem to form (to be on the way of
forming?) a cohering administrative system. Thus, if we assume this per-
spective, one of the most important and long-term impacts of agencifica-
tion at the EU level may be to contribute in a decisive way to a process of
administrative (and political?) integration at the European level paralleled
(and caused) by a contemporaneous process of disintegration at the level

beneath undoubtedly a key issue for European multi-level governance.
NOTES
1. In the broadest sense, not necessarily endowed with authoritative powers.
2. Busuioc and Groenleer (2012), in an analysis of the conditions under which
the directors of EU agencies operate and behave, examine the autonomy of EU
agency heads based on the consideration of selection criteria and appointment pro-
cedures of executive directors, their term of office and renewal, the decision powers
they hold; the authors, however, do not directly examine the autonomy of EU agen-
cies as individual organizations.
3. The index of personnel management autonomy HRAUT represents the sum
of scores of five questions divide by five in order to have an index ranging from .0
to 1 (Question: Can your organization decide on the following issues (Yes without
prior other EU bodies’ approval = 1; Only with prior other EU bodies’ approval =
0.5; No = 0): The level of salaries for groups of staff; Conditions for promotions for
groups of staff; Way of evaluating personnel for groups of staff; General criteria of
upsizing/downsizing in the organization; Set staff number, within budgetary limits).
4. The index of Financial Autonomy (FINAUT) is the sum of scores on six
questions divide by six. Also this index range is .0 to 1. (Question: Can your organi-
zation decide on the following issues (Yes without prior other EU bodies’ approval
=1; Only with prior other EU bodies’ approval = .5; No = 0): Take loans for invest-
ments; Set tariffs for services; Engage in participations in private law legal persons;
Shift between the budgets for personnel and running costs; Shift between the bud-
gets for personnel or running costs on the one hand and investments on the other
hand; Shift between the budgets of different years).
5. More in detail, POLTARG concerns the actor making the exact delineation/
choice of the target group of the policy that the agency executes; POLINST con-
cerns the actor making the choice/selection of the policy instruments of the policy
that the agency executes; POLTASK concerns the actor making decisions concern-
ing the fulfillment of the tasks (the way the tasks are implemented, the exact priori-
tization of activities within the tasks) that the agency executes. Possible answers are:
Organization takes most of the decisions itself, other EU bodies are not involved in
the decision-making process and sets no restrictions; Organization takes most of the
decisions itself, other EU bodies are is only slightly involved in the decision-making
process and sets only minor restrictions; Organization takes most of the decisions
itself, after having explicitly consulted other EU bodies; Organization takes most of
the decisions itself under explicit conditions or restrictions set by other EU bodies;
Other EU bodies take most of the decisions, after having consulted the organiza-
tion; Other EU bodies take most of the decisions, independently of the organiza-
tion; Nor other EU bodies, nor the organization decides on this matter, since the
involved regulation leaves no room for discretion on that matter.
6. It may be observed that accountability relationships may encompass other
actors beyond the parent administration, whilst steering and controlling is predi-
cated of the parent administration towards the agency.
7. Although it is nowadays acquired common wisdom that information in orga-

nizations, both within and between organizations, is never ‘innocent’ (‘information
is power’) and even its same exchange does affect inter-organizational dynamics.
8. With the only exception of the representations the European Commission has
in each member state; however, they are mainly confined to a representational role,
and have very limited tasks to execute in policy processes.
9. Where pertinent, that is where national agencies, first, have been established
and, second, operate in a policy field nowadays characterized by the presence of an
EU agency.
10. In itself only one indicator of ‘administrative integration’, of course.
11. An important antecedent to this initiative is the ‘COmparative public organi-
zation data Base for Research and Analysis COBRA network’, which is an aca-
demic research network in the field of public management. It has been initiated at
the Public Management Institute of the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven by pro-
fessors Geert Bouckaert and Guy Peters (from the University of Pittsburgh, USA)
in 2001. The aim of the network is threefold: bringing together top level scholars in
the field of public management, jointly discussing ways in which research data on
the topic can be gathered, and analysing these data and reporting on research
results via publications. Since its creation, the COBRA network has focused its
efforts on the definition of a common framework for the systematic collection of
comparable data across polities for the purpose of enhancing the standards in com-
parative research in public management.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research presented in this chapter was made possible by the financial
support of the Research Division of SDA Bocconi School of management;
the research work was carried out within the frame of the COST-CRIPO
Action IS0651 ‘Comparative Research Into Public sector Organisation’,
chaired by Prof. Geert Bouckaert11 (Chair, K. U. Leuven) and Prof. Per
Lægreid (Vice-chair, Bergen University) and coordinated also by Prof.
Koen Verhoest (K. U. Leuven and Antwerpen University) and Prof.
Sandra Van Thiel (Radboud University).
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APPENDIX: THE DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH
Between July 2009 and April 2010, we administered a questionnaire to 30

EU agencies included in the study population. The questionnaire was sent
to the executive director of all the agencies included in the population.
Each agency was asked to identify the role of the respondent if different
from the Director (in all instances, answers to the questionnaire were vali-
dated by the Director in order to safeguard an appreciable level of unifor-
mity in the interpretation of the answers). The Director or his/her
delegated respondent was asked to respond on behalf of the agency as a
whole. Twenty agencies sent the questionnaire back, resulting in a response
rate of about 66%. Surveyed agencies range from less than 100 to more
than 600 staff, and from a few to over 300 million euros in terms of annual
budget size.
The questionnaire consisted of 53 questions divided into two sections.
The first section featured 32 questions regarding publicly available informa-
tion (e.g. organizational characteristics, mission and activities, funding,
governance and accountability mechanisms) along with pre-filled answers
that respondents were asked to amend or validate. The second section con-
sisted of 21 questions regarding information that could not be retrieved
from public sources. A sub-set of these questions were about the agency
perceived level of autonomy in management and policy matters as well as
in the identification of its clients and target groups. A significant block of
questions in section two was aimed at mapping the agency networks by
asking information about the type and frequency of the interactions with
the European Commission, national agencies, research centres/focal points,
national ministries, other EU agencies, interest groups and stakeholder at
large, as well as international organizations. The remaining questions were
intended to get primary data on internal performance management prac-
tices, personnel administration as well as external reporting accountability
requirements.
To maximize comparability across the sample organizations, all the
questions were closed-ended, either in the form of multiple choices with
one answer or with check-all-that-apply and an option for ‘other’ to be
filled or in scale format. The resulting data set included ratio, interval,
ordinal, and nominal scales.
The reference model employed for the investigation relies on the analyti-
cal model developed within the framework of the research project COST
Action IS0651 CRIPO (Comparative Research into Current Trends in
Public Sector Organization see also ‘Acknowledgements’) for the study

of public agencies in Europe (Verhoest et al., 2012), and it makes reference
to a number of studies (including Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Ongaro,
2008, 2009; Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Pollitt et al., 2004; Verhoest,
Verschuere, et al., 2004; Verschuere, 2007; Verschuere & Barbieri, 2009;
Wettenhall, 2005).
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
AGENCIES, NETWORKS, AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN
EMERGING REGULATORY
CONSTELLATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
EUROPEAN TELECOM SECTOR
AND THE EUROPEAN PATENT
SYSTEM
Esther van Zimmeren, Emmanuelle Mathieu and

Koen Verhoest
ABSTRACT
Purpose Many European-level networks and regulatory constellations

in different sectors (e.g., energy, telecommunications) without clear
anchorage into the European Union (EU) institutional landscape have

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004006
125
126 ESTHER VAN ZIMMEREN ET AL.
been subject to increasing efforts by the EU institutions to tie them closer

to the EU. They are serving increasingly as platforms for preparing EU
policy or for implementing EU decisions, which may result in closer insti-
tutional bonds with the EU. This chapter aims at examining the differ-
ences and similarities between the process towards more EU-integration
in two different domains (i.e., telecommunications and patents) and reg-
ulatory constellations (i.e., supranational and intergovernmental).
Methodology/approach The chapter analyzes the evolution in the
European telecommunication sector and the European Patent System
and juxtaposes this analysis with the literature on institutionalization,
Europeanization of regulatory network-organizations, and multilevel
governance (MLG). It focuses on the role of the European Commission
and the interaction with the national regulatory agencies (NRAs) and
networks within the institutional framework.
Findings Irrespective of the particular regime (intergovernmental/
supranational) in a certain domain or sector, a common trend of closer
coordination and integration prompted by the Commission is taking
place, which triggers a certain resistance by the national bodies regulating
that domain. As long as a specific competence is considered instrumental
in the creation of the single market, the Commission has strong incentives
to strengthen its influence in this field, even if those competences have
been regulated through an independent intergovernmental regime.
Research implications The dynamic described in this chapter allows
us to reflect upon the MLG conception as developed by Marks and
Hooghe (2004), which distinguish between two types of MLG. Type I
MLG refers to different levels of governments, more specifically to the
spread of power along different governmental levels and the interactions
between them. Type II MLG refers to jurisdictions that are both task-
specific and based on membership that can intersect with each other.
They respond to particular problems in specific policy fields (Marks &
Hooghe, 2004). Our analysis shows that the increase in coordination and
integration are the outcome of both MLG Type II processes (coordina-
tion between two issue-specific bodies) and of MLG Type I processes
(tensions between two governmental levels). Furthermore, the negotia-
tion dynamics regarding this increased coordination and integration
reveal that the tensions typical of MLG Type I took place as a conse-
quence of the increased coordination between Type II bodies. Put differ-
ently, multi-level coordination and integration mechanisms in the EU can
Interaction between Agencies, Networks, and the European Commission 127
be seen as both Type I and Type II processes. They combine features of

both categories and reveal that their Type I and Type II features are
interdependent.
Practical implications The analysis in this chapter shows a need for
further strengthening the MLG Type I and II conceptual framework by
balancing the analytical distinction between the two types with develop-
ments about how Type I and Type II are often entangled and intertwined
with each other rather than separated realities.
Social implications The chapter describes and compares the dynamics
in the European telecommunications sector and the European patent sys-
tem with interesting observations for NRAs and the European
Commission with respect to coordination and integration.
Originality/value The original nature of the current chapter relates to
the two selected areas and the addition to the literature on MLG.
First, with respect to the areas investigated the dynamics of the
European telecommunications sector have been analyzed also by other
authors, but the European patent system is an area which is relatively
unexplored in terms of governance research. The combination of the two
sectors with a detailed analysis of similarities and differences is highly
original and generates interesting lessons with respect to coordination
and integration in supranational and intergovernmental regimes.
Second, Marks and Hooghe (2004) distinguish between the two types of
MLG as if they are two different constructs that are not related to each
other. Our cases and argument cover both types of MLG and show the
interconnection between the dynamics taking place in the two types of
MLG.
Keywords: Institutionalization; Europeanization; regulatory network-
organizations; European Commission; telecommunications; patent
administration
INTRODUCTION
Many European-level networks of national regulatory agencies and regula-

tory constellations in different sectors (e.g., energy, telecommunications)
without close institutional links to the EU have been subject to increasing

efforts by the EU institutions to tie them closer to the EU. They are serving
increasingly as platforms for preparing EU policy or for implementing EU
decisions which may result in closer institutional bonds with the EU. This
integration process was characterized by a growing influence of the
European Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”) in the regulatory
environment.
In the European telecom sector, the trend towards increased liberaliza-
tion by the EU has been accompanied by a gradual “integration” of an
informal, bottom-up network of NRAs1 into a European-level regulatory
network2 which was strengthened and formalized since 2009.3 This integra-
tion process was accompanied by a growing influence of the Commission in
the telecommunications sector and the regulatory environment.
Due to regulatory reforms in the patent area, different actors within the
European Patent System are progressively moving closer as well. However,
the institutional links in this area are slightly more complex than in certain
other fields. In fact, apart from national patent offices, an autonomous
intergovernmental organization, the European Patent Organisation
(EPOrg) has been administering “European patents”. In addition, the EU
has gradually intensified its regulatory activities in the patent domain
resulting in the adoption of the so-called “Patent Package” (2012), which
created a new level of “unitary” patent protection. In view of the imple-
mentation of the Patent Package, the EPOrg and the EU have started to
collaborate more closely, at the time this book goes to press, as the
European Patent Office (EPO), one of the organs of the EPOrg, would be
administering the unitary patent on behalf of the EU. The EPOrg and the
EU would, hence, become integrated to a certain extent. Although the
intergovernmental status of the EPOrg is not expected to be modified, its
relations with the EU are shifting towards more collaboration and poten-
tially more influence by the EU. In parallel, a European network of
national patent offices and the EPO has emerged without intense regulatory
implications.
This chapter aims at examining the differences and similarities between
the process towards more EU-integration in these two different domains
and regulatory constellations. The chapter analyzes the evolution in the
European telecom sector and the European Patent System and juxtaposes
this analysis with the literature on institutionalization and Europeanization
of regulatory network-organizations. It focuses on the role of the European
Commission and the interaction with NRAs and the related European net-
works within the broader institutional framework.
Our basic narrative in this chapter is that irrespective of the particular

regime (intergovernmental/supranational) in a certain domain or sector
a common trend of closer coordination and integration prompted by the
Commission is taking place, which triggers a certain resistance by the
national bodies regulating that domain. In the next section, we will first
develop our analytical framework to substantiate this argument (the section
“Analytical Framework”) followed by an analysis of the developments in
the telecommunications sector (the section “The Role of the Commission
and Regulatory Networks in the European Telecom Sector”) and the
patent domain (the section “The Role of the Commission and Regulatory
Networks in the European Patent System”). In the section “Comparative
Analysis,” we will compare the results of the sections “The Role of the
Commission and Regulatory Networks in the European Telecom Sector”
and “The Role of the Commission and Regulatory Networks in the
European Patent System” and finally we provide some provisional conclu-
sions and suggest topics for further research (the section “Conclusions”).
Throughout this chapter we use different concepts, which require
further definition. We refer to coordination and integration which are
strongly related concepts, and are seen by several authors as elements on
the same continuum. Coordination in the public sector is defined here as
the instruments and mechanisms that aim to enhance the voluntary or forced
alignment of tasks and efforts of organizations in order to create greater
coherence, and to reduce redundancy, lacunae and contradictions within and
between policies, implementation or management (Bouckaert, Peters, &
Verhoest, 2010; based on Alexander, 1995; Thompson, 1967). Integration
is considered here as a more extreme form of coordination, in which
organizations evolve towards joint activities and organizational mergers
(6, 2004). In the literature on EU integration we find several definitions
like Haas’ “traditional” notion in terms of “the process whereby political
actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing states.
The end result of a process of political integration is a new political com-
munity, superimposed over the pre-existing ones” (Haas, 1961). Later,
Lindberg (1963) introduced a looser (and weaker) definition of integration
as “(1) the process whereby nations forego the desire and ability to con-
duct foreign and domestic policies independently of each other, seeking
instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process
to new central organs: and (2) the process whereby political actors in sev-
eral distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political
activities to a new centre.” Another set of concepts is supranational ver-

sus intergovernmental arrangements. Typically, supranational arrange-
ments are regarded as arrangements whereby nation states work with one
another in a manner that does not allow them to retain complete control
over developments (states may be obliged to do things against their pre-
ferences and their will because they do not have the power to stop deci-
sions). Supranationalism, thus, takes relations between states beyond
cooperation and into integration and involves some loss of national
sovereignty (Nugent, 2006). Intergovernmental arrangements, on the other
hand, refer to arrangements whereby nation states cooperate on matters
of common interest in situations and conditions they can control. The
existence of control, which allows all participating states to decide the
extent and nature of this cooperation, implies that national sovereignty is
not undermined (Nugent, 2006).
One methodological limitation is that we regard organizations, such as
the Commission and national regulatory agencies as “unitary” actors pur-
suing a consistent course of action over time (irrespective of change in key
posts, internal turf war, inconsistencies in internal decision-making, etc.).
In this way we “personify” organisations. Personification of organizations
has its benefits but also its limitations (Peters, 1999).
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In view of the implementation of the Single European Act, from the mid-
1980s onwards, the EU has been very much focused on the completion of a
European single market. However, the use of the Community method con-
sisting in a combination of centralized legislation and decentralized imple-
mentation has been considered problematic, because it allowed for
divergent implementations by the Member States, preventing the develop-
ment of cross-border exchanges. EU regulatory networks have emerged as
a convenient solution; while preserving the prerogative of national adminis-
trative bodies, they would allow for exchanges of information and sociali-
zation among national administrations which was expected to help a
gradual process of regulatory convergence (Dehousse, 1997). In many sec-
tors, these networks have evolved over time towards increased centraliza-
tion and formalization (Thatcher & Coen, 2008), which in a number of
cases has also led to their transformation into EU regulatory agencies
(Levi-Faur, 2011; Ottow, 2012).
This development has been interpreted as an increased institutionaliza-

tion of such actors, in which loosely coupled regulatory networks become
more agencified and integrated in a vertical hierarchy, leading to “agenci-
fied networks” or “networked agencies” (Levi-Faur, 2011). Levi-Faur
(2011, p. 813) defines “an agency as an administrative organization with a
distinct, formal identity, an internal hierarchy, functional capacities, and,
most important, at least one principal” (cf. Christensen & Lægreid, 2006;
Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Laegreid, 2012).
A network, on the other hand, is a “set of relatively stable relationships of
a non-hierarchical and interdependent nature which link a variety of actors,
which do not have principals or administrative and independent financial
capacities, and whose decision rules are flexible and informal, and member-
ship of them is voluntary (Levi-Faur, 2011, p. 813).” In aviation safety, a
well-established regulatory network was dismantled and replaced by an
agency established by the Commission (Levi-Faur, 2011, see also Pierre &
Peters, 2009 for an account of the process of dismantling and re-
institutionalizing in a different form). In many sectors, regulatory networks
have been transformed into agencies (Ottow, 2012), becoming thus “agenci-
fied networks” (Levi-Faur, 2011). This trend could be seen for example in
the energy sector with the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators
(ACER) and in the financial and securities sectors with the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR), the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and the Committee of European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions supervisors (CEIOPS).4
Levi-Faur (2011, p. 812) in his survey of European regulatory spaces
observes “agencification as the major instrument of choice in the EU gov-
ernance system as well as the deliberate institutionalization of dependent
networks by the agencies and the Commission.” The Commission has
induced a process of organizational coordination and even integration in
order to streamline regulation of the internal market across countries
(Ottow, 2012; Thatcher & Coen, 2008). In their argument about multi-level
administration Egeberg and Trondal (2009) argue that the Commission is
forming a new “executive center” which strengthens its ties with and influ-
ence on national (regulatory) agencies. The Commission uses this executive
center as its implementing body. Fragmentation (in the form of agencifica-
tion) at the national level and coordination and integration at the suprana-
tional level are regarded as a mutually reinforcing combination.
It has been argued that the participation of national regulatory agencies
(NRAs) in supranational fora triggers centrifugal dynamics within national
administrative structures (Egeberg, 2006). As they interact with other
NRAs and with the Commission, NRAs would gradually adopt a more
“European” viewpoint of regulatory needs, specifically regarding the need
to create a single market. While such a shift may help to achieve more har-
monization across Member States (Majone, 1997), it may also downgrade
national regulatory concerns (Eberlein, 2008). NRAs have thus been said
to take up a “dual-hatted role.” Operating in close collaboration with the
Commission in the stage of policy implementation, they nonetheless remain
a part of national governments, as they assist their minister regarding the
formulation of policy and the transposition of Directives into national leg-
islation. This may create dilemmas for NRAs, if confronted with contra-
dicting demands from their minister and from the Commission (Egeberg,
2006). The participation in the network does not only draw NRAs prefer-
ences further away from their governments, it does simultaneously increase
the capacity of NRAs to defend their positions against their governments
and parent departments.
However, this argument surpasses to some extent the fact that in some
fields the NRAs and their networks are not so keen on getting too closely
linked with the Commission and on further empowering regulatory net-
works in order to preserve their national prerogatives (Boeger & Corkin,
2012; Thatcher & Coen, 2008; Coen & Thatcher, 2008). In several fields
NRAs and their networks resist efforts by the Commission to get more
influence in the networks, or to substitute the networks by full-fledged
agencies. A major example is the sector of telecommunications. In this sec-
tor, the Commission has tried to achieve further integration by creating a
strong EU agency, but failed due to resistance from NRAs and their EU
level networks (Boeger & Corkin, 2012). So, NRAs are not just passive,
obedient actors in this game for regulatory power. The Commission fre-
quently had to adjust its ambitions for a closer integration of a specific reg-
ulatory space because of resistance of the NRAs and their regulatory
networks.
This process can be regarded as a struggle for regulatory power between
different players. Fig. 1 gives a stylized representation of this game.
Member States have delegated the capacity to adopt legislation to create
the internal market to the EU. However, the authority and administrative
resources to implement this legislation have remained at the national level
(Dehousse, 1997; Kelemen, 2002, 2005). In order to overcome this “govern-
ance dilemma” (Keohane, 2001), the Commission has tried to use other
forms of regulatory governance. The Commission collaborates with NRAs
in order to influence them to streamline implementation of European regu-
lations as well as to use their expertise to increase its policy capacity
Fig. 1. Stylized Representation of Actors and Dynamics in the Struggle for

Regulatory Power at the EU Level.
(Dehousse, 1997; Eberlein & Grande, 2005). These NRAs are partly inde-
pendent from their parent ministries and can act to some extent with a sub-
stantial amount of discretion.
The pressure for harmonization can occur in two different manners. On
the one hand, these NRAs may have an inherent impulse to harmonize
their regulatory actions and to form a self-standing network or a coordinat-
ing body. In that case, the Commission will aim to strengthen its links with
this network or body and gradually extend its influence over it. This is
accompanied by a gradual institutionalization of that network into an
agency-like form, which is more closely linked to the Commission. On the
other hand, the Commission may on its own initiative bring together
these national actors in European regulatory networks, or directly initiate
the policy process to create an agency which has intense interactions with
these national players. In both cases, the Commission prompts a process of
increasing organizational coordination and integration. However, NRAs
may resist these efforts for integration as the process of integration might
endanger the reasons for their continued existence in the long run. NRAs
will then try to slow down this process of institutionalization and integra-
tion, or strive for integration forms which provide them with alternative
tools to influence the decision-making process. Hence, hybrid forms like
agencified networks5 or networked agencies6 at the EU level appear as a
kind of temporary equilibrium in these struggles for regulatory power

(Levi-Faur, 2011).
One would expect to observe these dynamics in particular in those
domains which are linked to the creation of the European single market
and which are addressed, at the international level, by the European
Union. However, what happens in domains where certain national compe-
tences are (indirectly) linked to the single market, but where harmonization
has at least partially been achieved through an intergovernmental
regime, distinct, and independent from the European Union? Do we then
observe similar evolutions in terms of the Commission trying to strengthen
its influence over these regimes through organizational coordination and
integration?
Our basic narrative is that irrespective of the particular regime (inter-
governmental/supranational) in a certain domain or sector a common
trend of closer coordination and integration prompted by the Commission
is taking place, which triggers a certain resistance by the national bodies
regulating that domain. As long as a specific competence is considered
instrumental in the creation of the single market, the Commission has
strong incentives to strengthen its influence in this field, even if those com-
petences have been regulated through an independent intergovernmental
regime. As a consequence, such an intergovernmental regime may seem to
evolve into a “de facto” supranational regime or a “hybrid” arrangement,
an intergovernmental regime with certain supranational characteristics.
In order to explore this narrative, in this chapter we compare the
dynamics in a “traditional” EU supranational regulatory regime, the regu-
lation of telecommunications, with a mixed intergovernmental and supra-
national regulatory regime, the regulation and administration of patents.
We detect “echoes” of the dynamics in the telecommunication sector in the
recent developments regarding the regulation and administration of
patents. Because of the instrumentality of patent regulation in cross-border
trade and in creating and enhancing the EU internal market, the
Commission will likely continue its efforts to gradually enlarge its influence
with respect to the EPOrg and the emerging network of patent offices.
However, these efforts evoke resistance from national patent offices that
have been losing ground throughout the process of patent harmonization
by the EPOrg and the EU.
Framing integration, not as the formal shift of competences from the
member states to the EU level, but rather as the development of far-
reaching processes of multi-level coordination for policy implementation,
this chapter is embedded into the “governance turn” (Jachtenfuchs, 2001)
and “public administration turn” (Trondal, 2007; 2008) of EU studies.

Hence, the dynamics described here allow us to reflect upon the MLG con-
ception as developed by Marks and Hooghe (2004), which distinguish
between two types of MLG. Type I MLG refers to different levels of gov-
ernments, more specifically the spread of power along different governmen-
tal levels and the interactions between them. It is intellectually rooted in
federalism and international relations. Governmental levels are jurisdiction
characterized by their general purpose and non-intersecting membership
(Marks & Hooghe, 2004). Type II MLG is just the opposite perspective on
the phenomenon of power dispersion. This analytical category refers to jur-
isdictions that are both task-specific and based on membership that can
intersect with each other. They are the result of specific problems in specific
policy fields: institutions and regimes are created in order to deal with this
specific problem only. Several countries (or organizations) may be partici-
pating in it, and they can also, in parallel, be involved in other jurisdictions
created to solve other types of problems (Marks & Hooghe, 2004).
Our cases and argument cover both types of MLG. Moreover, they
show the interconnection between the dynamics taking place in the two
types of MLG. This interconnection is ignored by Marks and Hooghe
(2004) who makes a sort of neat distinction between the two types as if
they were two different constructs that are unrelated. We return to this
issue at the end of the discussion section.
THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION AND

REGULATORY NETWORKS IN THE EUROPEAN
TELECOM SECTOR
The telecommunications sector has traditionally been managed by large

national state-owned monopolistic companies. The wave of rapid technolo-
gical innovation starting in the 1980s provided the main rationale for liber-
alizing the sector. With a demand going up and prices going down, the
situation was becoming favorable to market competition. The Commission
seized this opportunity to enter the sector justified by its single market pro-
gram adopted in the mid-1980s.
Subsequent legislative developments can be clearly divided in three peri-
ods. A first regulatory framework emerged out of the compilation of many
pieces of legislation adopted throughout the 1990s. It is in this first period
that the national regulatory agencies were set up and that they started to
meet regularly under the premises of the IRG, an independent regulatory

network (see the section “First Phase Regulatory Reforms: NRAs and the
IRG (1990s)”). This first framework was deeply reformed in 2002. These
changes were accompanied with the creation, by the Commission, of the
ERG, a second regulatory network which, unlike the IRG, was anchored
in the EU institutional framework and allowed the participation of the
Commission. The major reason for creating the ERG was the need for
regulatory coordination among NRAs in order to foster regulatory con-
vergence (see the section “Second Phase Regulatory Reforms: The
Establishment of the ERG (2002 2009)”). In order to push the integration
process further, the second framework was revised in 2009 and the ERG
was replaced by BEREC, an atypical two-tier structure composed of two
bodies: the Board of Regulators, responsible for decision-making, and the
Office, a very small EU agency in charge of providing administrative assis-
tance to BEREC (see the section “Third Phase Regulatory Reforms: The
Shift to BEREC and the Office (2009 Present)”).
First Phase Regulatory Reforms: NRAs and the IRG (1990s)
It all started with the Commission issuing a Green Paper in 1987 on the
Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services
and Equipment.7 The Green Paper was followed by the adoption of numer-
ous legislative acts in the subsequent years. Backed by the monopolistic
companies, which were eager to conquer the new markets promised by
technological innovation,8 the Commission managed to push through a
gradual liberalization and re-regulation process throughout the 1990s.
The resulting EU regulatory framework left a wide margin for imple-
mentation to the Member States (Thatcher, 2001) and referred to NRAs as
the appropriate national body for policy implementation. Back then, it was
not required that NRAs were independent from governments; the impor-
tant criterion was their legal and functional separation from the telecom-
munication incumbents.9 In this first phase, the main concern of the
Commission was, indeed, to dissociate regulatory from commercial activ-
ities which used to be exercised together through the tandem incumbents-
national ministries.10
The newly created NRAs quickly realized that they had important com-
mon characteristics and interests. They were all constructed in the light of
the EU framework, they constituted a new type of actor in the telecommu-
nications sector, they had to apply the same legislation and they were
facing the same challenges, such as creating a certain distance between

themselves and their intrusive incumbent. On the initiative of the French
NRA, the NRAs started to meet, share their experiences, discuss how to
interpret and apply the European regulatory framework, and learn from
each other.11 In 1997, this initiative resulted in the formation of the
Independent Regulators Group (IRG).
Given the wide discretion left to NRAs in the implementation of the reg-
ulatory framework, its application remained uneven; the NRAs interpreted
and applied the regulatory framework differently. The resulting regulatory
divergence among Member States was seriously hindering the creation of
an EU-wide telecommunications market.12 This was particularly proble-
matic with respect to licensing. In order to be able to offer telecommunica-
tion services, a company willing to enter the market needs to obtain a
license from the authorities. Yet the conditions under which the licenses
were delivered varied widely from one Member State to another. In addi-
tion, the national licensing regime could be used to erect barriers to market
entry (Kiessling & Blondeel, 1998). The Commission thus tried twice (in
1992 and in 1996) to convince the Member States to create an EU level
body to foster the coordination of license attributions. However, Member
States rejected both attempts arguing that the establishment of such an
agency would violate the subsidiarity principle (Kiessling & Blondeel,
1998).
Second Phase Regulatory Reforms: The Establishment of the ERG

(2002 2009)
In the early 2000s, EU policymakers decided to reform the regulatory fra-

mework for telecommunications for a number of reasons. First, in spite of
the liberalization, many incumbents had kept their dominant positions on
the (national) markets. Second, technological innovation had led to techno-
logical convergence: a single service could be delivered through different
networks. Making a phone call, for example, could be done via a fixed tele-
phone network, a mobile telephone network or a cable network. But the
different networks and technologies corresponded to different regulatory
regimes, hampering competition for a given service. Third, no EU-wide tel-
ecommunications market had emerged, which the Commission attributed
to the divergence in how the Member States were implementing EU
regulation.13
The Commission thus proposed and managed to pass an ambitious reg-

ulatory reform. The early 2000s were a moment of great expectations for
the information and communication technology (ICT) sector, which condi-
tioned the Member States positively towards the Commission’s proposal.14
The second regulatory package, adopted in 2002, features three important
changes. First, it establishes the principle of technological neutrality. The
sector is regulated per service, independently from the technology involved.
Second, services are regulated through the new market analysis procedure,
a sophisticated regulatory approach inspired by EU competition law.
Third, in order to foster regulatory convergence, the Commission is given a
predominant role in the market analysis process and a new regulatory net-
work is set up, the European Regulators Group (ERG).
The new market analysis procedure is composed of three steps: market
definition, market analysis and the choice of remedies. While the whole
market analysis process is done by the NRAs, the second regulatory pack-
age provides the Commission with a veto power on the first two steps (mar-
ket definition and market analysis) and the possibility to issue
recommendations with respect to the third step (choice of remedies).15 In
order to control how the Commission is using these new regulatory powers,
a new Comitology committee was created, the Communications Committee
(Cocom).
The Commission aimed at creating a regulatory network to foster regu-
latory coordination among NRAs and to serve as a platform for discussion
regarding the implementation of the framework with NRAs. In particular,
because the Member States had refused to grant a veto power to the
Commission in the third step of the market analysis process (choice of
remedies), voluntary coordination was required to bring about some degree
of regulatory convergence in this field. The IRG was considered
unsuitable for this purpose, as it had no anchorage in the EU institutional
framework and was set up as an association under Belgian private law.
Besides, the NRAs did not tolerate the Commission within the IRG; they
wanted to remain independent from the EU institutions and, in particular
from the Commission. However, the Commission was eager to interact
with the group of NRAs as they had become the key actors in implement-
ing EU telecommunications regulation. The Commission thus decided to
create the ERG taking responsibility for the secretariat and securing a posi-
tion in the group as a member without voting rights.16
The Commission’s objective was for the ERG to foster regulatory har-
monization through voluntary cooperation. The ERG would adopt com-
mon positions on specific issues and would be based on a peer-review
approach to ensure the application of those common positions. These

objectives have, however, been frustrated by NRAs’ resistance. In order to
maintain their independence and discretion, they refused to implement the
peer-review approach. Nonetheless, Commissioner Reding’s ambition to
transform the ERG into a powerful EU regulatory agency convinced the
NRAs to adopt the so-called “Madeira agreement” in October 2006.
According to this agreement, the ERG’s common positions would be moni-
tored by the NRAs. The effectiveness of this monitoring process may, how-
ever, be questioned because of the ERG’s tendency to adopt vague
positions. Indeed, as common positions tended to allow many exceptions,
the NRAs could continue to regulate their market as they wanted while still
complying with the common position.17
The Commission hoped that the creation of the ERG would render the
IRG redundant. But the NRAs were very reluctant towards the
Commission’s integration efforts. They preferred to keep their indepen-
dence and the IRG remained a central venue for their discussions. The
topics dealt with in both networks were, thus, completely overlapping. The
NRAs initially tended to privilege the IRG for their discussions and to
minimize their exchanges with the Commission within the ERG platform.
Over time, however, they gradually accepted to devote more time to their
meetings with the Commission. De facto, the IRG became a body used by
the NRAs to coordinate among themselves before starting discussions with
the Commission.18
Third Phase Regulatory Reforms: The Shift to BEREC and the Office
(2009 Present)
Three years after the entry into force of the 2002 package, the Commission
started to consider the necessity of reforming the 2002 regulatory frame-
work.19 The ERG was a weak and loose body that did not bring about the
desired regulatory harmonization required to create a pan-European tele-
communications market.20 In 2007, Commissioner Reding then put a very
ambitious proposal on the table.21 The idea was to delegate to the
Commission a veto power on the choice of remedies in the market analysis
and to create a large EU regulatory agency that would absorb the ERG,
the already existing European Union Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) seated in Crete, and receive significant powers on radio
spectrum management, an area the Member States had systematically
refused to transfer to the EU.22 This proposal completely ignored the
interests of the Member States, which fiercely opposed the creation of an

agency in the telecommunications sector, the delegation of radio spectrum
management competences to the EU, and the removal of ENISA from
Greece. The Member States thus formed a front against the Commission’s
proposal and managed to significantly limit the scope of the reforms, which
were ultimately adopted in 2009.23
The proposed merger with ENISA and the Europeanization of radio
spectrum management were abandoned by the Commission. Moreover, the
Member States managed to avoid the delegation of veto power related to
the remedies in the market analysis procedure to the Commission. The
decision on the remedies remains a competence of the NRAs, although this
decision is now subject to a complex and heavy decision-making procedure,
involving the Commission and the group of regulators, which is expected
to increase peer pressure.24 Finally, while the Member States acknowledged
the necessity to reinforce the ERG and to replace decision-making by
unanimity by a process of decision-making by majority, they did not want
to transform the ERG into an EU agency. However, the attribution of a
budget and a permanent secretariat implied the creation of an “agency type
of body.” So, in order to avoid the agencification of the network, a two-tier
structure was created, composed of the Body of European Regulators for
Electronic Communications (BEREC) which replaces the ERG, and the
Office, a very small EU agency to assist BEREC. BEREC with the support
of the Office now resembles an agencified network, one of the hybrid types
of regulatory governance identified by Levi-Faur (2011).
BEREC’s main task is to increase coordination among NRAs in order
to foster regulatory convergence. This is particularly important regarding
the choice of remedies where the NRAs have kept an important margin of
discretion unencumbered by any veto powers of the Commission. In case
the Commission has doubts regarding the remedies an NRA considers to
impose, BEREC may intervene and comment on the NRA’s decision.
Furthermore, BEREC can comment on the NRA’s decision project about
market definition and market analysis, whenever the Commission considers
using its veto rights. Under the 2002 framework, the Commission’s use of
the veto power was preceded by an opinion of the Cocom. Given that the
Cocom lacked expertise and competences regarding market analysis, this
responsibility has now been transferred to BEREC.25
While the NRAs used to avoid the peer-review approach, it is now one
of their mandatory tasks. For the Commission, this is a very important
development,26 as it obliges the NRAs to make a clear joint decision, which
will gradually develop into a common doctrine, which was missing in the
Interaction between Agencies, Networks, and the European Commission
Table 1. Role of the Different Actors in the European Telecom Sector.
Phase NRAs Commission IRG ERG BEREC
Pre-liberalization N/A (Monopolistic N/A N/A N/A N/A

(until 1980s) regime)
First phase (1990s) Creation of NRAs but Few competences Creation of IRG by N/A N/A
not so powerful yet; NRAs to exchange
uneven national information;
regulatory independent from
implementation Commission
Second phase NRAs become key Veto power on Used by the NRAs as a Creation of the N/A
(2002 2009) players, still market platform for NRAs to ERG by the
divergence with definition and discuss without the Commission;
remedies market Commission develops
analysis guidelines, but
seen as ineffective
(unanimity voting)
Third phase More independence Increased Role redefinition Replaced by Develops guidelines,
(2009 present) from national involvement in BEREC comments on NRAs
governments remedies (but decisions, advisory
without veto body for EU
power) institutions (qualified
majority voting)
141
ERG. This process is further reinforced by the new role of BEREC as an

advisory body for EU institutions: the Commission must consult BEREC
before acting in several instances and the Council and the European
Parliament have the possibility to formally consult the NRAs through
BEREC.27
Finally, the new legislation labels BEREC as the “exclusive forum for
cooperation among NRAs.”28 The Commission, hence, expected the disin-
tegration of the IRG. At the time this study was finalized (Spring, 2014),
the IRG still existed, although it has been engaged in a process of re-
thinking its purpose and role in the new institutional setting.
Table 1 summarizes the main phases of institutional development in
terms of regulatory governance for the European telecommunications sec-
tor, as well as the position of the main actors and the dynamics between
these actors (see also Fig. 1).
THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION AND

REGULATORY NETWORKS IN THE EUROPEAN
PATENT SYSTEM
The European patent system is a complex multilevel governance framework

consisting of national patent systems, on the one hand, and, as a result of a
gradual centralization process, two emerging European patent “pillars,” on
the other hand. The first patent pillar was aimed at the creation of a single
patent with unitary and autonomous effects in all the European Economic
Community (EEC) Members States. It has been under construction with
regular initiatives for draft patent conventions since the Treaty of Rome
established the EEC in 1957 (the section “Second Phase Regulatory
Reforms: Negotiations on the Community Patent (1990s 2005)”). Until
the adoption of the EU Patent Package in December 2012 (see the section
“Third Phase Regulatory Reforms: The Adoption and Implementation of
the EU Patent Package (2006 present)”), these centralization initiatives
were unsuccessful. The second patent pillar was slightly less ambitious aim-
ing at the establishment of a European patent office, which would only
grant a “bundle of national patents”29 and for which membership would
also be open to non-EEC countries. This second project proved to be more
realistic and resulted in the establishment of the EPOrg (see the section
“First Phase Regulatory Reforms: The Establishment and Functioning of
the European Patent System (1950s 1980s)”).
Over time, national patent systems, the EPOrg and the EEC existed next
to each other with only limited interaction between the levels and pillars.
The recent adoption of the so-called “Patent Package” will likely have a
significant impact on the regulatory constellation of the European patent
system and the interaction between the EPOrg and the EU institutions. In
the next sections, we will first provide a brief historical context to explain
the move from the national to the European level (the section “Historical
Context: From Divergence to Convergence (until 1940s)”), followed by a
description of the establishment of EPOrg (the section “First Phase
Regulatory Reforms: The Establishment and Functioning of the European
Patent System (1950s 1980s)”), various attempts to introduce a
“Community Patent” (the section “Second Phase Regulatory Reforms:
Negotiations on the Community Patent (1990s 2005)”) and, finally, the
adoption of the Patent Package (the section “Third Phase Regulatory
Reforms: The Adoption and Implementation of the EU Patent Package
(2006 present)”).
Historical Context: From Divergence to Convergence

(Until 1940s)
In Europe, the early decades of the 20th century were a period of consoli-
dation and growth of national patent offices, which developed their own
approach to patent regulation. Therefore, the principal feature of
European patent administration in the first half of the 20th century was its
diversity: European states had discretion over patent law standards, the
interpretation of those standards and their administration (Drahos,
2010).30 Gradually, national patent offices were confronted with increased
numbers of patent applications to examine, and increased complexity of
patent claims in the applications. This resulted in backlogs and delays in
issuing examination decisions (Drahos, 2010). After the second world war
(WWII), European countries began to work towards an ideal of a coopera-
tive Europe bringing peace and economic prosperity. Interestingly, patent
administration and patent law became part of the broader trend towards
integration and cooperation. This development highlights the general per-
ception of the importance of patent regulation, which is readily under-
standable in the light of the dominant United States (US) presence after
WWII, on the one hand, and the interest of establishing a “genuinely tech-
nological Europe,” on the other hand (Drahos, 2010).
First Phase Regulatory Reforms: The Establishment and Functioning

of the European Patent System (1950s 1980s)
After the creation of the EEC in 1957, the EEC started working on a
European Community Patent. A first draft convention was produced in
1962, but failed due to broader European political developments related to
the French refusal to allow the United Kingdom to enter the Community.
In May 1965, the Ministerial Council of the European Free Trade
Association established a working party to study a first draft convention
(Thompson, 1973). This working party produced a draft with two parallel
systems. First, a system in which a European patent office would grant a
“bundle of national patents.” Membership of this system would be open to
EEC and non-EEC countries. Second it provided a draft for an EEC patent
for members of the EEC.
In 1969, 21 states entered the intergovernmental process that produced a
draft European Patent Convention (EPC) opened for signature in 1973. At
this point in time, the EEC countries still had the intention to adopt a sec-
ond convention parallel to the EPC referred to as the draft Convention for
the European patent for the Common Market (Community Patent
Convention (CPC)), which would go beyond the effects of the EPC and
would have unitary and autonomous effects in all the EEC Member States.
The CPC was signed in 1975, but never entered into force. In 1989 an
attempt was made to revive the CPC: the 12 EEC Member States signed
the Agreement Relating to Community Patents, but because some States
failed to ratify the agreement, this revival was unsuccessful as well. The
main reasons for the failure were concerns about the workability of the
associated centralized patent litigation mechanism, the distribution of fee
income and obligations to translate patents into the different EEC lan-
guages (Ullrich, 2002).
The EPC entered into force on October 7, 1977. At that time seven
Member States were involved (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). In the meantime,
EPC membership has been expanded to 38 states.31 The EPOrg established
on the basis of the EPC is an intergovernmental organization and falls
beyond the institutional framework of the EU. The EPO is the primary
executive actor that issues and refuses patents. The Administrative Council
supervises the EPO’s activities and has some regulatory powers. The mem-
bers of the Administrative Council are mostly representatives of the
national patent offices.
A puzzling element of the EPOrg is that once the EPO has granted a
European patent, the patent turns into what has been referred to earlier
as a “bundle of national patents.”32 Patent owners will need to validate
the patents at the national level within each and every designated
Member State. National validation will generally require the involvement
of local patent attorneys and translation services.33 After a certain period,
the patent owner will also need to start paying national renewal fees.
This brings along significant administrative, translation and renewal
costs.
With respect to the renewal fees, it is important to note that national
patent offices are not allowed to keep the full renewal income related to the
European bundle patents. It was agreed that national patent offices and the
EPO would share this income.34 For national patent offices this financial
arrangement provides a serious constraint on their fee income (and their
capacity to expand) to the extent that European patents have increasingly
been replacing national patents (patents filed directly at the national patent
offices).
Second Phase Regulatory Reforms: Negotiations on the Community

Patent (1990s 2005)
Despite the failure of the CPC of 1975 and the Agreement relating to
Community Patents of 1989, during the 1990s the European Commission
revived its attempts for the establishment of a Community Patent.35 The
Commission realized that the level of harmonization of the patent laws of
the EEC Member States achieved by the EPOrg was insufficient to pro-
mote innovation. This realization was triggered by the belief that global
competition with the US and Japan is fueled by innovation and that
patents are a crucial factor in promoting innovation. The US and
Japanese system are less complex and cheaper than the European patent
system and their unitary systems safeguard enforceability and legal cer-
tainty. In 2000, the Commission issued a proposal for a Council
Regulation on the Community Patent.36 However, debates about the need
for translations in all the official languages of the EC continued to
obstruct the Commission’s Community Patent project. Meetings of
the Competitiveness Council of Ministers in 200437 were unable to make
progress on the issues and the negotiations on the Community Patent
stalled.
Interestingly, the reasons for disagreement that stalled the Community

Patent initiatives were never really about the core features of the design of
the patent. In the early days, protectionism among Member States impeded
progress on the matter (Beier, 1969). More recently, primarily discord
about formal issues, such as the language and translation requirements and
the re-allocation of fees between the EPO and national patent offices,
blocked the decision-making process. In particular, national patent offices
have had a strong voice in the process both through representatives in the
EU Council of Ministers, as members of the EPOrg Administrative
Council and as members in several preparatory committees.
The increased interest of the EU institutions in the 90s and the beginning
of the 21st century in regulating the patent domain is also reflected in the
initiatives to harmonize national patent regulation in particular research
areas, including the failed negotiations on an EU directive for computer
implemented inventions and the adoption of an EU directive on the legal
protection of biotechnological inventions (1998) after 10 years of negotia-
tions. These harmonization efforts have led to considerable controversy at
the European and national level. Nonetheless, in the relationship between
the EU and the EPO, the adoption of the EU Biotechnology Directive
resulted in increased convergence. The EPO actually decided to implement
the EU Directive in its regulations even though formally it is not obliged to
do so, as it is not part of the EU institutional framework. In this way, the
EU Biotechnology Directive contributed to closer cooperation between the
EU and EPOrg.
Third Phase Regulatory Reforms: The Adoption and Implementation

of the EU Patent Package (2006 Present)
In 2006, the Commission revitalized its efforts for the creation of an EU

patent with a centralized patent litigation system with a consultation and
public hearing on future patent policy in Europe.38 In July 2007, the con-
sultation was followed by a communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council exploring how the patent system in
Europe could be enhanced.39 In December 2009, there was a political
breakthrough and the Council unanimously adopted conclusions on an
enhanced patent system in Europe.40 Notwithstanding this move forward,
the translation arrangements remained a vexed question. The translation
arrangements proposed by the Commission and the compromise solutions
offered by the Belgian Presidency in the second half of 2010 could not
convince all Member States. Notably Italy and Spain strongly resisted
any solutions based on the trilingual regime of the EPO (English, French,
German). Due to this resistance by Italy and Spain, the proposal had a
rather turbulent and unusual course. In fact, in December 2010, 25 out
of the 27 Member States decided to create a patent with unitary effect in
the participating Member States on the basis of the so-called “enhanced
cooperation procedure.”41
The utilization of the enhanced cooperation procedure allowed the parti-
cipating Member States to move on to some other outstanding political
issues (i.e., location of the Unified Patent Court (UPC), the competence of
the Court of Justice of the EU vis-à-vis the UPC) finally culminating in a
political compromise between the EU institutions on the Patent Package in
December 2012. The “package” consists of three components: it creates a
third layer of “unitary” patent protection, establishes the applicable trans-
lation arrangements and sets up a system of centralized patent litigation,
the UPC.
For the current analysis, in particular the first element of the Patent
Package, the “unitary patent” and its impact on the working relationship
between the EU and the EPOrg is interesting. As the EPO will be adminis-
tering the unitary patents for the EU, the intensity of the cooperation
between the two organizations will increase further. According to the regu-
lation creating unitary patent protection (hereinafter “RUPP”), the
European Commission shall establish a “close cooperation” through a
working agreement with the EPO in the fields covered by the RUPP (Art.
14 RUPP).
The three components of the package will only enter into force after a
number of outstanding issues will be resolved. The three major outstand-
ing issues relate to the ratification of the UPC Agreement, the rules of
procedure of the UPC and the implementation rules for the EPO. In the
framework of the current chapter, in particular the third issue is perti-
nent.42 After the entry into force of the package, patent applicants will
continue to file patent applications at the EPO as they have been doing
for decades. If the EPO decides to grant a European patent, the applicant
can request that the patent is given unitary effect for the territories of the
participating Member States. The EPO will be responsible for the admin-
istration of requests for unitary effect, the management of the register,
the publication of translations and the collection of fees. For the supervi-
sion and governance of these activities a Select Committee of the
Administrative Council of the EPO (consisting of representatives of the
participating Member States and a representative of the Commission) has
been set up. This Committee is tasked with the setting of the level of the
renewal fees for the maintenance of the patent with unitary effect and the
establishment of a “distribution key” for the renewal fee income.
These matters are one of the most controversial outstanding issues, in
particular because of the interests of the national patent offices in this
respect. The controversy is related to the fact that the level of the fees will
be decisive for the use of the system and the accessibility for SMEs, indivi-
dual inventors and universities. Therefore, it is important to agree on rea-
sonable fees with special discounts for SMEs, individual inventors and
universities. At the same time, the level of the fees is important for the par-
ticipating Member States, as the EPO will keep 50 percent of the fees for
the administration of the unitary patent and the remaining 50 percent of
the renewal income will be redistributed amongst the national patent offices
of the participating Member States according to “fair, equitable and rele-
vant criteria” (Art. 13 RUPP). The rationale for this redistribution is that
the expected shift of patent applicants from the European bundle patents
to the unitary patent will likely have a further impact on the budget of the
national patent offices. Taking into account the earlier shift from national
patents to European bundle patents, most national patent offices have
become quite protective of their vested interests in maintaining the national
patent offices and safeguarding their long-term survival. The discussion on
the level of the renewal fees and the distribution key has started in autumn
2013. In view of the budgetary constraints of many EU Member States in
the aftermath of the financial crisis, the discussions on the fees and the dis-
tribution key will likely remain one of the potential stumbling blocks for
the implementation of the patent package.
Parallel Development: The Formation of the European Patent Network
Different from the telecommunications sector, in the patent context a net-

work of national patent regulators has developed in parallel to the above-
mentioned regulatory developments. The network has not been formally
integrated within the regulatory patent framework.
At the time of negotiating the EPC, it was anticipated that the national
patent offices in the Member States of the EPOrg would eventually close
down. In reality, none of the patent offices closed, but some have trans-
formed their “business model” by focusing more on supporting national
industry in filing patent applications (e.g., Dutch Patent Office) or by
embarking on examination work for other offices (e.g., Danish Patent
Office, Austrian Patent Office). Other national patent offices, such as the
German Patent Office and the UK Patent Office remain important offices
in terms of national patent filings. In view of this diversity amongst the
national patent offices, they have very different interests and perspectives.
Some national patent offices are much more in favor of centralization and
cooperation at the European level, whereas others pursue a more competi-
tive approach (Drahos, 2010). In 2002, the EPO concluded that national
patent offices could play a much greater “filtering” role and could support
the EPO in dealing with its increased workload (Drahos, 2010). In 2004,
the Administrative Council started a debate exploring strategies for the
future of the European patent system based on the idea that the EPO and
national patent offices would begin to operate more as an integrated
network.
In 2006 the European Patent Network (EPN) was set up by the EPO
Administrative Council as a result of this strategy debate.43 The Network is
primarily designed to improve the efficiency of the European patent system.
According to the Joint Statement amongst the members of the network,
closer cooperation between the EPO and national patent offices is neces-
sary to increase the competitiveness of the European patent system. The
starting point of the cooperation is that the EPO should “stick to its core
business” and should abstain from involvement in training, education, pro-
motion and marketing. The EPO should recognize and accept the specific
responsibilities of the national patent offices and their role as part of the
EPN and should accept the principle of subsidiarity in relation to the con-
tribution of the national patent offices.44 In order to take advantage of
each other’s competences and to avoid duplication of work, the network
model is based on the following principles: (i) free choice of patent office
for applicants; (ii) no compulsory outsourcing; (iii) no automatic utilization
by the EPO of the work of the national patent offices; (iv) equal treatment
of all Member States; and (v) introduction and assurance of equal quality
standards.45
On the face of it, the network constellation has arrived within the
European patent system. However, until now the network seems to be
mainly a platform for competition with only limited cooperation with
respect to the prevention of the duplication of work and no extensive invol-
vement in the regulatory process. The EPO has not taken up a strong coor-
dinating role and there seems to be no interaction with the European
Commission.
Table 2 summarizes the main phases of institutional development in
terms of regulatory governance for the European patent system, as well as
150
Table 2. Role of the Different Actors in the European Patent System.
Phase National Patent Offices EPOrg/EPO EU/European Network
Commission
Pre-centralization Divergence and N/A N/A N/A

(until 1940s) “Competition” between
national patent offices
First phase Decrease role of national Establishment EPOrg Various attempts for N/A
(1950s 1980s) patent offices, but popularity filing Community Patent
validation on national applications at EPO Conventions failed
level increasing
ESTHER VAN ZIMMEREN ET AL.

Second phase Blocking decision-making Competition national patent Various attempts for N/A
(1990s 2005) on Community Patent offices versus EPO Community Patent
Implementation of EU- Regulation failed
Biotech Dir. EU-Biotech Dir.
Third phase Strong voice in Implementation and Adoption and European Patent
(2006 present) implementation debate on Administration of Patent Implementation of Network
Patent Package Package Patent Package
position of the main actors and the dynamics between these actors (see also
Fig. 1).
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
As mentioned earlier, we argue that irrespective of the particular suprana-

tional or intergovernmental regime dominating a certain domain or sector,
the Commission seems to be pushing for closer integration and coordina-
tion. As long as a specific competence is considered instrumental in the
creation of the single market, such as for telecommunications and patents,
the Commission has strong incentives to expand its influence in this field,
even if those competences have traditionally been regulated through an
independent intergovernmental regime, In order to evaluate this argument,
in this chapter we have compared the dynamics in a “traditional”
European supranational regulatory regime, the regulation of telecommuni-
cations, with a mixed intergovernmental and supranational regulatory
regime, the regulation and administration of patents. We disentangle this
argument in different steps and look for similarities and differences
between both sectors.
First, in the telecommunications sector and the area of patent regulation
and administration, a gradual process of harmonization by the EU institu-
tions has indeed been taking place. These harmonizing initiatives are clo-
sely related to the establishment of the single market for the benefit of EU
citizens.
Second, irrespective of the particular regulatory constellation (intergo-
vernmental vs. supranational or mixed) which is prevalent in a certain sec-
tor or domain, a common trend of closer coordination and integration
prompted by the Commission is observable. Although the pace and the end
result are clearly different, this common trend is visible across the two
sectors.
In the telecommunication sector, the Commission managed to increase
its influence and to Europeanize the group of regulators throughout the
various regulatory reforms. The second regulatory package was particularly
successful in terms of shifting powers to the EU level leading to a further
loss of control and sovereignty by the Member States. In spite of its relative
failure to push big changes through in the last round of reform
(2009 present, see Table 1 and the section “Third Phase Regulatory
Reforms: The Shift to BEREC and the Office (2009 Present)”), overall the
Commission managed to gradually reduce the influence of the IRG shifting

towards a “new center,” BEREC. BEREC, an EU body at the crossroads
between a regulatory network and an EU agency, has increasingly shown a
capacity to overcome the divergences among NRAs and produce opinions
on its own. In sum, besides having led to a net gain of competence for the
Commission, the successive reforms have also, very importantly, gradually
strengthened the coordination between NRAs and increased the role of the
Commission in this coordination mechanism.
Conversely, in the patent domain it took the Commission more than 50
years to put a new regulatory framework for a unitary patent in place. This
new framework will, however, not create a truly new regulatory center. It
will exist in parallel with the national patent systems and the EPOrg. Spain
and Italy are not participating. Throughout various decades of negotia-
tions, national patent offices have played a significant role in blocking the
decision-making process invoking various pragmatic issues, such as the
importance of translations in all the official EU languages and the need to
redistribute the renewal fees. The increased centralization of patent admin-
istration from the national to the European level appears to have led to
growing tensions and budgetary concerns amongst national patent offices.
In the end, a compromise was reached and the two opposing Member
States, Spain and Italy, were left behind (even though they are still free to
join in a later phase). However, the effective progress in implementing the
Patent Package is still hindered by lingering national patent offices. At the
same time, the EPO and the Commission are entering into a phase of closer
cooperation without fully integrating the two pillar structure. This is also
reflected in the move by certain high level staff members of the
Commission to the legal division of the EPO.
The difference in pace and the level of coordination and integration
prompted by the Commission seems to be related to the nature of the regu-
latory regimes. In fact, the liberalization of the telecommunication market
manifested itself in most European countries because of pressure by the EU
and its subsequent regulatory reform packages. The creation of the NRAs
mainly occurred because of this liberalization trend. In telecommunications
no real intergovernmental regime has been created independently from the
EU. The regulatory regime as it arose in telecommunications since liberali-
zation is in essence a supranational regime. However, in the patent sector
the EPOrg was created in parallel to centralization efforts initiated by the
EU. This intergovernmental regime also involved a number of non-EU
countries. These specific features of the European patent system made it
harder for the Commission to actually increase its influence on the EPOrg.
However, with the implementation of the Patent Package the two systems
will be intensifying their cooperation to a certain extent resulting in more
convergence and additional opportunities for the Commission to have an
impact on European patent governance. Both sectors thus share a trend
towards increased coordination between the Commission and the major
regulatory body of the field, independently from whether this body belongs
to the EU supranational regime (BEREC in telecommunications) or to an
independent intergovernmental regime (EPOrg for the patent sector).
Third, in both sectors, the drive towards an increased role of the EU and
(de facto) supranationalism tends to be perceived by the national agencies
as a threat to their role and existence, which explains perhaps why these
national actors have tended to oppose the integration processes. The
national patent offices fear the impact of the unitary patent on the current
practices to validate European bundle patents. This validation process
ensures a significant part of their income through renewal fees. Moreover,
the requirements for translations in the various official languages of the
Member States have created vested interests amongst the national patent
communities. The unitary patent will simplify the translation arrangements,
which will decrease the need for local translations. It must, however, be
noted that not all national patent offices oppose the evolutions brought
about by the patent package. While there is a general tendency towards
defiance, some national patent offices perceive the evolution as an
opportunity.
National telecommunications regulators have also shown a defensive
attitude towards the Europeanization of telecommunications regulation in
order to preserve their role and mandate. The NRAs perceived the liberali-
zation trend as a threat to their powers and sovereignty. While the nature
of the threat differs from the patent sector, the mechanism takes the form
of a zero-sum game in both sectors. The delegation of regulatory compe-
tences and authority to the Commission or to the regulatory network does,
automatically, limit the discretion of NRAs for regulating their national
markets. Here as well, the protection of national economic interests may
sometimes play a role in the opposition of NRAs to centralization towards
the EU center. For instance, in some countries national incumbents are still
quite influential and enjoy a certain degree of protection from their NRAs.
Yet, similar to the patent sector, the “competition” for power between
NRAs and the EU level does not lead to a uniform opposition posture
among the NRAs.
Fourth, in both sectors regulatory networks exist, but their role in the
power struggle between the different actors is clearly different. For the time
being, the function of the EPN is incomparable to the role of the ERG and
BEREC in the telecommunications sector. Whereas the EPN is mainly
aimed at clarifying the work division between the EPO and the national
patent offices and at preventing the duplication of work, the ERG/BEREC
are effectively part of, and integrated into, the regulatory framework.
Moreover, the role of the Commission in the EPN is virtually non-existent,
whereas the powers of the Commission vis-à-vis IRG, ERG and, subse-
quently, BEREC have gradually increased. In telecommunications there
was and is an independent regulatory network, IRG, which has more and
more become an arena where national regulators prepare their common
viewpoints against propositions and demands from the Commission. The
later networks/networked agencies (ERG and later BEREC) were rather
meant as instruments for more control and harmonization by the
Commission. Differently, in the patent sector, the EPO is part of an inter-
governmental organization and created the EPN in order to get assistance
from the national patent offices. The network itself mainly has a supporting
function in terms of managerial functions for the EPO and does not seem
to serve as a regulatory platform nor as a stage for organizing resistance
amongst the national patent offices against the increased centralization of
the European patent system.
Fifth, the ERG/BEREC and the EPO differ significantly in terms of
their nature, structure and, therefore, in their preference towards further
integration with the EU. In the telecommunications sector, in spite of the
creation of the Office, BEREC is still very much a regulatory network.
The balance between the Office, which is the true supranational structure
within BEREC, and the board of regulators, which is the group of NRAs,
largely favors the group of regulators. The role of the Office has, indeed,
been limited to that of an administrative assistant. All relevant decisions
are made by the Board of Regulators. The situation was even more
extreme with the ERG, which acted merely as a group of regulators with-
out the involvement of any supranational satellite body or organ. As a
consequence, the preferences of BEREC and, previously of the ERG, are
still closely aligned with the preferences of the NRAs because they are not
counter-balanced by a powerful supranational/intergovernmental organ.
This balance of power and the role of the NRAs is different in the patent
sector: within the intergovernmental organization (EPOrg) the national
patent offices are well represented in the Administrative Council and at the
supranational level the national patent offices often have a voice through
the Council of Ministers or in committees responsible for implementing the
Patent Package. However, the powers of the national patent offices are
limited to the restricted competences of the Administrative Council and the

ongoing implementation process of the patent package. As a result, on a
long-term basis the preferences of national patent offices appear to be less
important in the formation of the preferences of the EPO in comparison to
the telecommunications sector. Put differently, whereas the EPO is an
autonomous actor, operating relatively independently from national patent
offices, BEREC is little more than the group of NRAs.
This difference seems to have played a role in the formation of the pre-
ferences of the EPO and the ERG in the centralization process. The EPOrg
had an “agenda,” which collided with the interests of national patent
offices: the adoption of the Patent Package was an interesting opportunity
resulting in increased competences and budget. One could consider the
EPO and the Commission to have at least partially aligning interests, as for
the Commission the EPO is the preferred implementer of the Patent
Package, which benefits both the EPO and the Commission. On the other
hand, in telecommunications, the ERG served as a channel to voice the
views of the NRAs and was, therefore, unable to fully position itself as an
ally of the Commission or as an active stakeholder in the deepening of the
integration process.
As said, in the theoretical part, the dynamics described in this chapter
also allow us to reflect upon the two types of MLG distinguished by Marks
and Hooghe (2004). Our cases and argument cover both types of MLG.
Moreover, they show the interconnection between the dynamics taking
place in the two types of MLG. This interconnection is ignored by Marks
and Hooghe (2004) who make a sort of neat distinction between the two
types as if they are two different constructs that are not related to each
other.
The interaction with and “capture” by the Commission of the IRG
for telecommunications and of the EPO can be considered as referring to
Type II MLG. Both the IRG and EPO can be considered as typical Type
II institutions, as they are purpose specific and have an intersecting mem-
bership. The Commission itself can also be considered as a central node in
a disparate set of Type II MLG arrangements across policy sectors. The
“capture” by the Commission in both cases leads to two distinct Type II
MLG structures to interact with each other, joining forces in a way.
The subsequent reluctant reaction of NRAs in the telecommunications
sector and national patent offices is in line with Type I MLG dynamics.
One can interpret this reluctance as a battle of power between the national
level and the EU level which are two general purpose and non-intersecting
membership jurisdictions.
The increase in coordination and integration presented here are thus the
outcome of both MLG Type II processes (coordination between two issue-
specific bodies) and of MLG Type I processes (tensions between two gov-
ernmental levels). Furthermore, the negotiation dynamics regarding this
increased coordination and integration reveal that the tensions typical of
MLG Type I took place as a consequence of the increased coordination
between Type II bodies. Put differently, multi-level coordination and inte-
gration mechanisms in the EU can be seen as both Type I and Type II pro-
cesses. They combine features of both categories and reveal that their Type
I and Type II features are interdependent. This leads us to call for strength-
ening the MLG Type I and II conceptual framework by balancing the ana-
lytical distinction between the two types with developments about how
Type I and Type II are often entangled and intertwined with each other
than separated realities. Further endeavor to dig into this missing link will
certainly make an important contribution to our understanding of multi-
level governance.
CONCLUSIONS
The push for completing the single market has led the EU to come up with
organizational and institutional solutions in order to increase regulatory
harmonization. This phenomenon has been widely covered by the EU regu-
latory governance literature based on studies performed on traditional EU
regulatory sectors such as utilities and financial markets. The general trend
observed in these sectors is that the NRAs have formed EU regulatory net-
works either on their own initiative or on the initiative of the Commission.
These networks have gone through a gradual process of institutionalization
and centralization, including closer integration into the EU regulatory pro-
cess for those networks that had been set up independently from the EU
institutional framework. This process of institutionalization and centraliza-
tion of regulatory networks has met with resistance from the NRAs willing
to preserve their vested interests.
The telecommunications sector provides an excellent illustration of this
narrative. While the NRAs first created the IRG, an independent net-
work, the Commission then set up the ERG, a second network in order
to anchor the group of regulators into the EU institutional landscape.
The ERG was subsequently transformed into BEREC which can be seen
as a mix between a regulatory network and an EU regulatory agency.

NRAs have been particularly reluctant to these reforms because they
would risk losing their discretion for regulating their national markets.
In this chapter, we have confronted this narrative related to EU regula-
tory networks, their institutionalization and centralization, and the resis-
tance of NRAs to a policy sector organization that does not fall within the
traditional EU regulatory sectors category. In the patent context, the most
significant European regulatory layer is not the EU but a distinct intergo-
vernmental regime, EPOrg, an international organization that is organiza-
tionally and functionally completely independent from the EU. The role of
the EU in the patent area has, until recently, remained quite modest.
However, in 2012, the Commission managed to push through the adoption
of an ambitious reform package which will have the effect of significantly
increasing the role of the EU in European patent regulation. Lacking the
appropriate organizational structure, the Commission mandated the EPO
with the implementation of the new legislation, thereby integrating this inde-
pendent body into the EU regulatory process. This evolution has spurred
concerns amongst national patent offices, above all because they fear that
the changes will have a negative impact on their budget and sustainability.
Although the details of the narrative have manifested differently in the
two sectors, important common points could be identified. The internal
market pressure led to the adoption of EU regulation which required the
integration or involvement of a previously independent body into the EU
regulatory process; an evolution generally contested by national regula-
tory bodies with concerns about their survival. This suggests that it can
be relevant to extend the argumentation put forward within the EU regu-
latory governance literature beyond the EU and to examine other inter-
national/European regulatory regimes and their relationship to the EU
more closely. Other examples of such integration of international bodies
into EU regulatory process certainly exist in other sectors and it would
be very interesting to study to what extent and how the EU has been tak-
ing advantage of other pre-existing international organizational struc-
tures. More generally and beyond the scope of the EU, highly complex
MLG patterns, regulatory regimes tend to overlap, intersect, but also
interact and coordinate with each other. These movements are necessarily
accompanied by a certain degree of changes at the level of the respective
organizational constellations, where some bodies belonging to one institu-
tional regime can be called upon to intervene in another regulatory
regime. This surely constitutes a very promising line of new research.
NOTES
1. We refer here to the Independent Regulatory Group (IRG) established by

National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs) to share experiences in interpreting and
applying the European Regulatory Framework and learn from each other (see the
section “First Phase Regulatory Reforms: NRAs and the IRG (1990s)”).
2. This relates to the establishment of the European Regulators Group (ERG),
which was set up by the European Commission (see the section “Second Phase
Regulatory Reforms: The Establishment of the ERG (2002 2009)”).
3. A two-tier structure was set up composed of the Body of European
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), which replaced the ERG,
and the Office, a small EU agency supporting BEREC but independent from an
organizational perspective (see the section “Third Phase Regulatory Reforms: The
Shift to BEREC and the Office (2009 Present)”).
4. But part of the competences were moved to an already existing and inde-
pendent rather than semi-autonomous organization like the European Central
Bank.
5. Agencified networks refer to the fact that “agencies compete with networks
and are often able to create, employ, and control them” (Levi-Faur, 2011, p. 286).
Provan and Kenis (2008) would refer to this as networks creating an administrative
organization to support them.
6. The “networked agency” refers to agencies that create networks to empower
them (Levi-Faur, 2011; Zito, 2009) and to the mode of “lead organization network”
(Provan & Kenis, 2008).
7. Commission (1987).
8. Interview with an official of the Commission (May 2012).
9. Article 2 of the Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of December 13, 1995 on the application of open network provision (ONP)
to voice telephony.
10. Interview with an official of an NRA (June 2012).
11. Interviews with an independent expert and with an official of the IRG (May
2012).
12. Commission (1999b).
13. Commission (1999b, p. 9).
14. Interview with an independent expert (June 2012).
15. See Article 7 of Directive 2002/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of March 7, 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic com-
munications networks and services (Framework Directive).
16. Interviews with an official of the Commission and with an independent expert
(May 2012).
17. Interviews with an independent expert and with a representative from a tele-
communications company (May 2012).
18. Interviews with officials of NRAs and with an official of the IRG (May
2012).
19. Interview with a member of a national permanent representation to the EU
(May 2012).
20. Interviews with various officials of the Commission (May 2012).
21. Commission (2007b).

(May 2012).
(May 2012).
25. Interviews with officials of the Commission (May 2012).
27. Article 2 Regulation (EC) No. 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of November 25, 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators
for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office (hereinafter “Regulation
No. 1211/2009”).
28. Recital 6 Regulation No. 1211/2009.
29. For an explanation of the concept of a “bundle of national patents,” see the
section “First Phase Regulatory Reforms: The Establishment and Functioning of
the European Patent System (1950s 1980s)”.
30. For instance, many countries had a registration system (e.g., France) where
only a formalities examination of the patent application was undertaken. Some
countries (e.g., Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands) carried out a thor-
ough substantive examination of the compatibility of patent applications with
patent law standards.
31. http://www.epo.org/about-us/organisation/member-states.html
32. Articles 2(2) and 66 EPC.
33. See Article 65(1) EPC. We note, however, that the problem of the translation
costs is partially dealt with by way of the (optional) Agreement on the Application
of Article 65 EPC (London Agreement).
34. See Article 39(1) EPC and Decision of the Administrative Council of
08.06.1984 on the proportion of renewal fees for European patents to be remitted to
the EPO (OJ EPO 1984, 296).
35. Commission (1997, 1999a).
36. European Commission (2000), OJEC CE337/278.
37. Results of Competitiveness Council, Brussels, May 17 18, 2004, MEMO04/
117, Brussels.
38. Commission. Consultation and public hearing on future patent policy in
Europe: Questionnaire On the patent system in Europe (09/01/2006), the results of
the consultation and information on the public hearing are available at: http://ec.
europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/consultation_en.htm
39. Commission (2007a).
40. Council of the EU (2009).
41. Enhanced cooperation is a special procedure in the EU treaty allowing a
group of countries to adopt new common rules when EU-wide agreement cannot be
reached within a reasonable period of time. In principle, at least nine states must be
involved in enhanced cooperation, but it remains open to any state that wishes to
participate. The use of this procedure may not result in discrimination between the
participating Member States and the other states. Moreover, enhanced cooperation
must contribute to the realization of the objectives, to the protection of EU interests
and to the EU integration process. This procedure may, hence, only be used in
limited circumstances and as a last resort. In fact, it was only the second time that it
was employed since its introduction in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.
42. With respect to the other issues we note, first that as the UPC Agreement is
an international agreement, it needs to be ratified by the participating Member
States. Ratification by at least 13 Member States is required, including the three
Member States with the highest number of European patents (Germany, the United
Kingdom, and France). Second, the UPC requires the creation of a new, indepen-
dent international judiciary. The participating Member States have to set up a new
judicial system without being able to utilize the institutional framework of the EPO
or the EU. The set-up of a complete new court system is a major endeavor requir-
ing, amongst other things, new facilities, a governance structure, the election of
judges, the recruitment of staff, the training of judges, the setting of a budget and
drafting the rules of procedure. A Preparatory Committee has been established with
representatives from all the Member States to prepare the practical arrangements
and to design a roadmap for the establishment and operation of the UPC.
43. EPOrg Administrative Council. Joint Statement on the European Patent
Network, June 2006, available at http://www.dkpto.org/media/20485160/epo_ca_
169_05.pdf
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
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MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE,
THE EU AND CIVIL SOCIETY:
A MISSING LINK?
Simone Baglioni
ABSTRACT
Purpose This chapter examines the relations between local civil

society organizations and the European Union as a way to assess the
functioning of multi-level governance in the field of employment policy.
Methodology/approach The chapter draws on primary organizational
survey data collected in the EU FP7 funded project entitled ‘Youth,
Unemployment and Exclusion in Europe’ (Younex, grant agreement
n.216111) and for the approach it places itself in the tradition of critical
civil society EU relations research.
Findings For more than two decades, civil society has occupied a pro-
minent position in the rhetoric of European Union multi-level govern-
ance. The EU rhetoric conceives of the inclusion of civil society in policy
making as a necessary step towards linking the various levels of govern-
ment (from local to European) as well as the different societal and
institutional actors implied by a multilevel governance approach.
Moreover, the rhetoric of civil society also serves the goal of tackling the

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004007
163
164 SIMONE BAGLIONI
multi-faceted issues of a democratic ‘deficitaire’ EU. This chapter, how-

ever, offers a critical appraisal of such a rhetoric by confirming what
other studies had unveiled: access to European institutions requires sub-
stantial human (‘capital in knowledge’) and economic resources and as
such the link existing between the European Union and local civil society
organizations is a very thin one, one which is limited to a very few, rich
in resources, organizations. The rhetoric of civil society as the connector
of levels and types of actors in the multi-level governance approach pro-
moted by the EU should thus be mitigated. The European policy process
should be conceived of more pragmatically as an arena where European
institutions and member states still act as gate keepers that select and
decide which societal interest and voice should have a place within the
European agenda. What consequences this has for the overall democratic
quality of the European policy process is an issue which should concern
us all.
Research implications The chapter allows scrutinizing horizontal and
vertical dimensions of multi-level governance while expanding knowledge
on civil society at both local and European level. Although multi-level
governance has become a popular concept it still lacks a consistent
empirical assessment, which is something the data discussed here do.
Thus, the chapter has implications for research on civil society and citi-
zens’ engagement in public affairs but it is also relevant for scholars
working on EU policy-making issues.
Practical implications Civil society organizations could contribute
improving the quality of policies at European level as well as strengthen-
ing EU legitimacy to rule. The findings contribute explaining which fac-
tors limit civil society access to EU institutions and how these could be
overcome.
Societal implications The chapter corroborates critical views of the
EU civil society relations, the findings suggest that the EU should work
with further commitment to offer local civil society organizations and
citizens groups real opportunities for their voices and expertise to be
heard and considered.
Originality/value The chapter adopts a critical view of EU civil
society relations challenging the EU multi-level governance rhetoric and
discusses the features obstructing civil society actors’ engagement with
policy making at the EU level.
Keywords: Multi-level governance; civil society; youth unemployment
Multi-Level Governance, the EU and Civil Society: A Missing Link? 165
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE

RHETORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Civil society is considered to be an established, acknowledged component

of policy making in the rhetoric of the European Union. The EU sub-
scribes, in fact, to the Tocquevillean conceptualization of democracy built
on the active engagement of citizens through civil society associations.
Initially, in the 1990s, the EU, and in particular the Commission concep-
tualized civil society mainly in terms of ‘social partners’ (employees’ and
employers’ representatives involved in consultation procedures on a range
of social and employment issues) or as associations involved in the ‘civil
dialogue’ (Smismans, 2003). In both cases, civil society associations were
invited to contribute to, and thus legitimize, European intervention on
social and employment policies, an intervention that member states did not
always appreciate (ibid.).
However, at the end of the same decade (1990s) the heavy involvement
of civil society in the democratization processes in Eastern Europe on the
one hand, and European citizens’ disaffection with ordinary decision mak-
ing models (including the EU) on the other hand, have led the EU to
embrace a more cross-policy, systemic, approach to including civil society
in policy-making. Social movements and civil society had been the key-
actors in the velvet revolutions, having dismantled authoritarian regimes in
Central and Eastern Europe and in some of these countries, civil society
leaders became prominent politicians. Hence, the EU could not have found
a better period to borrow the ‘civil society as a school for democracy’ argu-
ment and make it an internal policy making principle. Furthermore, as
pointed by Van Deth (2008), in this exercise of the inclusion of civil society
in European politics and policy the Commission was aided by the reso-
nance in both academia and amongst political elites of studies pointing to
social capital (reciprocity and cooperation; social and political trust gener-
ated by a vibrant civil society) being the elixir to make democracy work
(Putnam, 1993, 2000).
The EU interest in civil society was also grounded on very pragmatic
issues. Civil society was, in fact, instrumental to the EU particularly the
Commission policy strategy on various fronts: civil society was a ready-
to-use rhetorical tool to counter criticism about the democratic deficit of
the European decision making process; it could be used to raise EU aware-
ness and support among citizens, sometimes despite their respective govern-
ments; and, as such, civil society could strengthen the legitimization of the
EU; while also securing a locus of lobbying from ‘within’ reluctant member
states.
166 SIMONE BAGLIONI
The ‘systemic’ inclusion of civil society in EU affairs culminated in 2001

with the adoption of the White Paper on European Governance (European
Commission, 2001a, 2001b). In the White paper, civil society organizations
were given, again, rhetorically, a pivotal role in the EU policy framework
in recognition of the fact that with their participation policy making would
become more inclusive and accountable (Smismans, 2003). Thus, it was due
primarily to the participation of civil society that key principles of good
governance such as openness, participation, transparency and accountabil-
ity could be implemented (Kohler-Koch, 2008).
Moreover, civil society was considered to be a much needed actor in the
logic of multi-level governance as CSOs would facilitate the connections
necessary between the various levels of government (local, national and
European) (Van Deth & Maloney, 2008). In addition, because the White
paper adopts a broad definition of civil society, ranging from trade unions
and employers organizations to NGOs, charities, professional associations,
churches and so on, it encourages the establishment of civil society as the
force bridging those different institutional actors, just as the governance
approach implies (at least in the discourse propounded by its advocates).
The rhetoric of civil society participation in the EU policy making pro-
cess applies to various policy fields, including employment, and in particu-
lar youth employment, which are the policy fields where the CSOs
discussed in this chapter operate. In 2011, triggered by the dramatic rise of
youth unemployment rates (Lahusen, 2014), the European Commission
explicitly invited civil society representatives to contribute not only to
implementing youth (employment) policies but also contributing towards
designing them (European Commission, 2011). Ad hoc political opportu-
nity structures in the forms of open consultations and debates were created
where civil society associations could propose and discuss youth issues and
youth employment policies. As a consequence, CSOs like the European
Youth Forum became partners for EU institutions (Lahusen, 2014).
Several studies have nonetheless challenged the White paper rhetoric
and have pointed towards a gap between the official EU discourse on civil
society and its implementation. Scholars have argued that civil society is
confined by the EU to an ancillary role of mainly policy implementation
rather than policy inspiration and design. Moreover, such an ancillary
function has created a sort of vicious circle corroding the very character of
civil society. Making civil society or at least certain manifestations of
civil society dependent upon the EU for funding and survival has, for
example, reduced civil society autonomy as well as its capacity of voice
(Warleigh, 2001). Hence, according to such a view, the EU would in fact
favour ‘tame associations’ (ibid.). In contrast, the highly technocratic

modus operandi of Brussels has turned a few, large NGOs into an elite of
professionals mainly concerned by policy lobbying (Greenwood, 2007) in
the name of very specific and sometimes contingent, vested interests.
Others have reached the conclusion that a European civil society does not
actually exist given that civil society organizations are nationally bounded
(Van Deth, 2008) and as such, the official EU rhetoric qualifies as a ‘parti-
cipatory myth’ (Smismans, 2006 as in Van Deth, 2008).
In this chapter I shall join the group of scholars that have challenged the
EU rhetoric about civil society and its key role in the EU policy making by
discussing the relationship between the European Union and local civil
society organizations (CSOs) working in the field of employment policies,
and in particular youth employment. The data presented and discussed in
this chapter emanate from a three-year long research project entitled
‘Youth, Unemployment and Exclusion in Europe: A Multidimensional
Approach to Understanding the Conditions and Prospects for Social and
Political Integration of Young Unemployed’ (Younex). This project,
funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework
Programme,1 has investigated policies and practices of youth unemploy-
ment at three levels: local (in seven cities: Cologne, Geneva, Karlstad,
Kielce, Lisbon, Lyon and Turin), national (in France, Germany, Italy,
Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland) and European. Part of the pro-
ject has been devoted to study, by means of an organizational survey and
additional face to face interviews, how civil society deals with unemploy-
ment issues at the local level. This chapter draws upon this part of the
study focusing upon the section of the organizational survey dealing with
European issues.2
While the focus of previous research has either been on national and
supranational associations or on interest groups (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007a,
2007b; Eising, 2004; Saurugger, 2008), there is scarce research focusing
upon local civil society and the EU (an exception being Maloney & van
Deth, 2010; Van Deth & Maloney, 2008). However, expanding the analysis
of civil society-EU relationships to local CSOs is crucial in order to under-
stand the functioning of European multi-level governance as a mechanism
which involves ‘a wider range of actors, from varying institutional and ter-
ritorial levels i.e. from Eurogroups to local groups’ (Van Deth &
Maloney, 2008, p. 241). In fact, an EU policy making process which was
limited, in its way to liaise with civil society, to large federations of civil
society associations or to Brussels-based unions and private sector repre-
sentatives would not qualify as a proper system of multi-level ‘governance’.
168 SIMONE BAGLIONI
It would rather resembles a surrogate of governance, a community of elites

bound together by a mutual legitimating process in which the more genu-
ine, grassroots-level, civil society actors would likely be excluded. And
hence, one where links among levels and actors of governance would be
very weak.
Building upon the ‘critical literature’, this chapter presents the following
overarching hypothesis: The EU modus operandi is not ‘inclusive’ vis-à-vis
civil society as much as its rhetoric would suggest, on the contrary it is
rather selective given that:
(a) It requires substantial human (‘capital in knowledge’) and economic
resources from local CSOs, thus, the ‘link’ will depend upon civil
society possessing such resources or upon their membership of
umbrella organizations;
(b) It appeals mainly to CSOs interested in delivering paid services and
could thus become prone to EU authority whilst more critical CSOs,
such as those dealing with voicing citizens’ concerns and claims, or
advocacy-type CSOs would de facto be less involved in EU policy
making.
To discuss such hypotheses, this chapter employs a set of questions from
the Younex project organizational questionnaire which allow us to assess
the existence, and eventually, the intensity of interaction between local
CSOs and the institutions of the European Union. It then contrasts such
contacts and interaction with the resources of CSOs (human and economic;
as well as relational) as well as with the willingness of CSOs to act as a
voice (which we describe as ‘policy-oriented’) or as a service delivery
instrument.
Firstly, the chapter presents how organizations have been mapped and
interviewed in the Younex project; it then provides the results from the
organizational survey illustrating how CSOs and the EU are related.
Finally it discusses the implications of such findings for scholarship focus-
ing upon civil society-EU links.
MAPPING ORGANIZATIONS3
Following the methodology used by previous research on local organiza-

tions (Baglioni, 2004; Baglioni, Denters, Vetter, & Morales, 2007; Font,
Geurts, Maloney, & Berton, 2007; Kriesi & Baglioni, 2003), a two-step
approach was adopted in the general design of the study. Firstly, in each
city we compiled an inventory of all associations active in the field of unem-
ployment, youth unemployment and related welfare sectors. Secondly, we
carried out face-to-face interviews based on a common questionnaire with
those associations that agreed to participate.
To be included in our inventory, organizations needed: (1) to not be part
of a public agency and not be a branch of the local government (although
we included organizations receiving grants and other types of support from
public governing bodies provided that their official (legal) status was the
one of a civil society actor); (2) to not be profit-oriented or have business
as their core activity4 and (3) to be visible, that is, having a name and being
active and recognized by different sources as active during the period of the
research.
We have included both formal and informal organizations because the
range of organizations active in our field is highly diversified. Besides for-
malized and institutionalized organizations such as trade unions or reli-
gious organizations, there are also rather small and unorganized groups
that play or could play a significant role. In fact, part of the literature on
civil society organizations stresses that informal organizations are more
adequate settings for people to do things collectively than formal ones
(Bang & Soerensen, 2001; Torpe & Ferrer-Fons, 2007). Therefore, restrict-
ing our research to fully formalized groups would have resulted in losing
important social actors. As a consequence, the absence of a formal statute,
of a formal headquarters, of formalized procedures for decision making
were not considered as criteria for exclusion. This decision was inspired
also by the path-breaking research of Salamon, Wojciech Sokolowski, and
List (2003, p. 7 8) which focused on organizations that: ‘have some struc-
ture and regularity to their operations, whether or not they are formally
constituted or legally registered. This means that our definition embraces
informal, i.e., nonregistered, groups as well as formally registered ones.
What is important is not whether the group is legally or formally recog-
nized but that it has some organizational permanence and regularity as
reflected in regular meetings, a membership, and some structure of proce-
dures for making decisions that participants recognize as legitimate’ (2003,
p. 7 8).
In sum, we included organizations existing de facto even if they were
not formally recognized or legally registered, that is organizations and
groups arranging or taking part in meetings, rallies, marches, etc. or
those publishing and disseminating leaflets and similar documents offline
and online.
170 SIMONE BAGLIONI
The mapping was carried out using different sources: (1) interviews
with key informants (academics, grassroots activists, local civil servants); (2)
document analysis of local authorities and umbrella organizations leaflets,
newsletters, and similar information tools and (3) detailed searches of offi-
cial organizations directories, of local governmental offices and of websites.
The mapping phase allowed us to identify in each city the associations
active in our field. However, we are aware that we cannot claim of having
found all associations working on unemployment, youth unemployment
and related welfare domains. We do believe, still, that the organizations we
interviewed provide a quite exhaustive picture of the organizational ecology
of unemployment in our cities.
At the end of this process, mapped organizations ranged from 13
(Karlstad) to 50 (Turin) (Table 1 gives an overview of the different organi-
zational universes and the number of interviewed organizations). The rela-
tively large discrepancy between mapped organizations (universe) and
interviewed organizations (sample) of some of our cases, like Cologne,
Geneva and Turin, are due to a mixture of reasons including: organizations
not existing anymore, organizations having refused because of a lack of
time available for their personnel to participate or because of ‘research fati-
gue’ (often reported in Cologne where several social scientists have
explored local civil society during previous research, leaving a legacy of
‘fatigue’ among civil society activists, cf. Grimmer & Lahusen, 2009) but
also, among the more radical organizations/movements, because of ‘lack of
trust’ in the overall aims of the research. Thus, although our research was
comprehensively welcomed among organizations in all cities and perceived
to be a useful tool to increase knowledge, networking and eventually gain
visibility at subsequent research dissemination events, we did meet also
with more sceptical interlocutors who preferred to not open their organiza-
tions’ doors to us.
The organizational universes of our cities differ not only in terms of
numbers but also in their degree of heterogeneity. According to our sample
criteria and definition, the organizational study could include civil society
Table 1. Organizational Universes and Mapping across Selected Cities

(Figures are Numbers).
Cologne Geneva Karlstad Kielce Lisbon Lyon Turin
Universe 50 36 13 28 30 24 50
Sample 28 21 13 26 30 21 35
organizations strictu sensu that is volunteering based organizations outside

the direct influence of both the state and the market, but also social move-
ment organizations and religious organizations. We could not, however,
neglect trade unions who play a key-role in unemployment issues, as well
as political parties due to their role as contributors to policy-making and
key-interlocutors in the field. All of these organizations either worked pri-
marily or exclusively on (un)employment issues, accordingly, for the more
generalist organizations, including political parties and religious organiza-
tions, we have focused interviews with those branches/people working
exclusively on (un)employment. Moreover, we also included other organi-
zational types that were identified during the mapping phase as important
actors in the unemployment field (social cooperatives, not for profit service
centres, for profit service centres) although only in specific cities, where
they were considered as belonging to the general residual category ‘other’.
Table 2 presents the distribution across the cities of our sample by type
of actor. In most of the cities, apart from Karlstad and Turin, more than
half of the sample is composed of civil society organizations strictu sensu
(in Geneva and Lyon this rises to over two thirds of the sample), although
a range of other types of actors such as social cooperatives, social move-
ments as well as economic associations are included, reflecting the complex-
ity of our field.
Organizations have been interviewed face-to-face in all of the cities
(usually involving a member of the board or the head of the organization)
using a questionnaire which included 57 questions distributed across three
main sections: (a) introductory questions about the organization (e.g. date
of creation; legal status; place and scope of activity; etc.); (b) mission
Table 2. Distribution of Types of Organizations across Selected Cities

(Numbers).
Cologne Geneva Karlstad Kielce Lisbon Lyon Turin
Civil society organization 14 16 3 15 17 17 8

Cooperative 0 1 0 0 2 0 3
Public institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Political party 5 3 6 4 2 2 9
Trade union 3 0 0 2 6 1 8
Economic association 1 0 4 0 0 0 0
Social movement organization 3 0 0 0 1 1 7
Church-related organization 2 0 0 5 2 0 0
N 28 21 13 26 30 21 35
172 SIMONE BAGLIONI
statement, internal features (e.g. size, decision making mechanisms) and

activities and (c) networks.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE

EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE
The organizational questionnaire of the Younex project included a battery
of questions allowing us to study the relationship between the EU and
CSOs. The first question we shall analyse asked organizations to qualify
their relationship with institutions at various levels of scope (local, regional,
national, European, and international that is, outside the EU) choosing
from a list of statements ranging from a vibrant collaboration actively
sought by both sides (public and CSOs) to a complete absence of any rela-
tionship.5 An initial result presented by Table 3 is in sharp contrast with
the EU rhetoric regarding the centrality of civil society in the EU govern-
ance system: two out of three of the local CSOs in Younex have poor or no
contact at all with the EU. Only a tiny minority (14%) acknowledges hav-
ing positive relationships with European institutions. The same Table 3
shows that the majority of civil society organizations have contacts with
those levels of government which are closer to their scope of activity (local
and regional governments), a result which suggests that in the policy field
of youth unemployment the ‘multi-level’ dimension of governance in which
civil society participates stops short: at the local level.
The picture does not change significantly if we adopt a comparative per-
spective: Table 4 shows the percentages of CSOs having positive and good
Table 3. CSOs Interactions with Different Levels of Government

(Percentages).
Type of Interaction Level of Government
Local Regional National European International

(outside the EU)
No/poor interaction 15 22 40 62 70
Mixed 13 10 13 4 1
Positive /vibrant interaction 67 60 35 14 7
DN/refusal 5 8 12 20 22
Total(%) 100 100 100 100 100
N 146 146 146 146 146
Table 4. CSOs having Positive Contacts with the EU per City

(Percentages).
City %
Lyon 24
Lisbon 22
Kielce 12
Turin 12
Cologne 11
Geneva 10
Karlstad 0
Note: N = 146.
contacts with European institutions across the seven cities included in the
study. It is only in Lyon and Lisbon that an appreciable share of CSOs
(almost a quarter) have positive relationships with the EU, while in the
other cities only one in ten organizations declare having contacts with the
EU, indeed in the Swedish city of Karlstad none of the organizations have
any contact.
Overall, contacts between local CSOs and European institutions are
rare, revealing a worrying gap between the European rhetoric of multi-
level/multi-actor governance and the empirical evidence. However, despite
this, to a limited extent, some contacts do exist, and we shall understand if
there are specific reasons making some organizations more ‘Europeanized’
in the sense of having relations with the EU, than others. Earlier in this
chapter, following the literature that has stressed the ‘exclusive’ and very
selective nature of the European Civil society relationships, we have put
forward the hypothesis that to establish and maintain contacts and rela-
tionships with the European Union, a civil society organization needs
resources and that only larger, highly professionalized CSOs can achieve
this with Brussels. In fact, EU policy making, and more generally,
European issues and discourses, require not only logistic resources but also
specific knowledge from those who want to join such policy making pro-
cesses and relative discussions. Knowledge which ranges from foreign lan-
guage proficiency and digital literacy, communication skills, capacity to
join and contribute towards a network of societal actors across borders as
well as a clear understanding of the specificities of the policy field in which
the organization aims to engage with. Such capital in knowledge is obtain-
able by CSOs provided that they possess resources. Hence, the multi-level/
multi-actor governance underpinning EU discourses is one which may not
174 SIMONE BAGLIONI
include most of the organizations active in the field, such as in our case, of
youth unemployment, but only those possessing a certain, rather conspicu-
ous, amount of resources (human and material) to secure what is defined
here as capital in knowledge.
To assess whether or not this hypothesis has an empirical foundation we
contrast the type of contacts CSOs have with the EU by two specific orga-
nizational features which are considered reliable proxies of the organiza-
tional degree of professionalization: the number of full-time staff and the
operational yearly budget. If the hypothesis is correct then the larger the
CSO is in terms of personnel and budget, the more likely it is to have posi-
tive contacts with the EU. Moreover, to strengthen our understanding of
the ‘governance’ linkages we have also included in the picture the intensity
of contacts CSOs have with local governments (by their resources as speci-
fied earlier). The inclusion of the local level of government provides us with
a term of reference to understand the weight of human and economic
resources in the interaction of CSOs with political institutions.
Fig. 1 presents percentages of CSOs that have positive and constructive
relationships with the European Union (the left-hand side of the figure)
and the local government (the right-hand side) by their number of full-time
staff. The size of CSOs range from organizations having no full time staff
90
80
70
60 No staff
50 <5
< 25
40
< 100
30 100
20
10
0
EU Local Government
Fig. 1. Contacts with the EU and Local Government by Number of Staff.

Note: Cramer’s V for contacts with the EU = .27, Sig.00. Cramer’s V for contacts
with local government =.29, Sig.00.
at all, to organizations with more than a hundred people working full time.
If we consider the relationship between organizational size and contacts
with the EU, Fig. 1 unveils a clear linear ascending trend: positive and con-
structive relations between CSOs and the EU increase when human
resources measured in numbers of full-time staff enlarge. The larger the
full-time staff, the more frequent is their contact with the EU. If we now
turn to contacts between CSOs and local government, Fig. 1 shows that
there is not such a clear linear ascending trend between organizational
resources and organizational capacity to establish links with political insti-
tutions. Thus, Fig. 1 suggests that when contacts with local government are
at stake, organizational size does not matter, or it does not matter in the
way that it does when interaction with the EU is at stake.
The results are corroborated by the analysis of the overall picture of
contacts with the EU and local government across the various organiza-
tional dimensions in terms of full-time staff. In fact, if we also consider the
percentages of organizations with poor contacts with the EU and with local
governments, we find that size matters when the EU is at stake: the larger
the organizational staff, the smaller the number of the organization with
poor or no contacts with the EU (table not presented here). In other words,
we could say that while access to local government and local policy making
processes on unemployment issues can be achieved even by organizations
with smaller infrastructures, targeting European institutions requires a
stronger organizational capacity.
We find a very similar pattern if we consider the degree of professionali-
zation of an organization by taking its annual operating budget into
account. As demonstrated in Table 5 CSOs with small economic resources
(for example those whose annual budget does not exceed h10,000) have no
or very seldom contacts with the EU whilst one in every two of them man-
age to keep in contact with local governments. To find a more positive per-
centage of CSOs interacting with European institutions we have to scale up
to those organizations whose budgets exceed h200,000 (the last column of
Table 5). This finding confirms earlier studies which have stressed the pre-
dominance of well-established and well-funded CSOs amongst the ‘profes-
sionalized association elites’ that manage to bring the spirit of civil society
to Brussels (Greenwood, 2007).
Another component of the stock of ‘resources’ CSOs must have to main-
tain an active role at the EU level is related to its ‘relational’ capital: for
this chapter I’ve used the belonging of CSOs either to a national or to an
international umbrella or federation as an indicator of further resources
allowing local CSOs to remain active at the supranational level. Table 6
176
Table 5. CSOs Contacts with the EU by Annual Budget (Percentages).
Type of Contacts Annual Operating Budget (in Euros)
<h5,000 <h10,000 <h50,000 <h100,000 <h200,000 More than

h200,000
EU Local EU Local EU Local EU Local EU Local EU Local
Poor 73 27 100 0 59 37 70 0 67 18 51 7
Mixed 0 27 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 11
Good 7 47 0 50 18 56 8 54 8 35 17 75
Dk/refusal 20 0 0 0 24 6 23 46 25 36 25 8
N 15 15 4 4 17 16 13 13 12 11 65 64
Total(%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
SIMONE BAGLIONI
Table 6. CSOs Contacts with the EU by Relational Capital (Percentages).

CSO Part of Difference CSO Part of Difference
a National an
Organization International
Organization
No Yes No Yes
No/poor contacts 73 56 −17 68 55 −13

Mixed 3 2 3 0
Positive contacts 13 21 +8 12 33 +11
Dn/refusal 11 22 17 13
Total(%) 100 100 100 100
N 70 54 10 24
presents the differences in terms of capacity to interact with the EU

between those CSOs who are nationally or internationally bounded and
those who are not. The results point to a clear difference in favour of CSOs
belonging to either a national or international platform or umbrella: local
CSOs that are part of a national umbrella outnumber those that are not by
8% in their capacity to interact with the EU; and local CSOs that are part
of an international umbrella exceed by 11% those that are not. Hence,
being part of a network is a resource that can certainly make a difference
to the actions taken by civil society organizations at the European level: a
confirmation of previous research that has pointed to the EU preference
for big, umbrella or federation CSOs, neglecting direct contacts with local
CSOs.
Finally, according to the literature the conditions established by the EU
for civil society organizations to be considered and included in its policy
making process have prioritized organizations delivering services which are
lured by access to EU funding at the detriment of those more interested in
voicing concerns (Warleigh, 2001). Thus, we should expect more capacity
to deal with EU affairs among service-oriented organizations than among
CSOs who focus on mobilization or voice (those whom we describe here as
‘policy oriented’ CSOs). Table 7 presents the percentage of CSOs interact-
ing with the EU (as well as with local government) across the two types:
service and policy devoted. The former demonstrate a more vibrant capa-
city to deal with governments at both levels, which is to be expected given
their function of policy delivery. However, there is no significant difference
between the two categories if we consider their interaction with the EU
178 SIMONE BAGLIONI
Table 7. Contacts with the EU by Type of CSOs (Percentages).

Type of Contact Policy Difference Service Difference
EU Local EU Local
Poor 50 28 −22 66 9 −57

Mixed 10 17 2 11
Good 12 48 +36 15 77 +62
Dk/refusal 29 7 18 4
Total(%) 100 100 100 100
N 42 42 104 101
level: service-oriented organizations are only more engaged with the EU by

3 percentage points (12% vs. 15%).
CONCLUSION
For more than two decades, civil society has occupied a prominent position
in the rhetoric of European Union multi-level governance. Drawing upon
the Tocquevillean idea of civic engagement as a school for democracy, the
EU, and in particular the Commission, have designed a set of institutional
opportunities for civil society to express their ideas, inspire policy innova-
tion, and participate in policy implementation. The EU rhetoric conceives
of the inclusion of civil society in policy making as a necessary step towards
linking the various levels of government (from local to European) as well
as the different societal and institutional actors implied by a multilevel gov-
ernance approach. Moreover, the rhetoric of civil society also serves the
goal of tackling the multi-faceted issues of a democratic ‘deficitaire’ EU. By
subscribing to a normative, acritical discourse, the EU has treated civil
society as a sort of panacea to solve key public policy conundrums: from
environmental to social and employment issues, each time there is a policy
crisis, civil society is invited to provide a solution. In this sense, we could
argue that the current EU discourse emphasizing the capacities of social
entrepreneurship and social innovation to solve problems related to youth
unemployment or cuts to the welfare state is nothing new but is instead a
semantic evolution of the pre-existing discourse concerning the virtues of
civil society (cf. Sinclair & Baglioni, 2014).
Such a rhetoric has been lured by a flamboyant academic literature
which has stressed the virtues of a system of decision making spreading
across various levels of government and actors (the vertical and horizontal
dimensions of multi-level governance) (Bache & Flinders, 2004; Hooghe &
Marks, 2001; Ongaro, Massey, Holzer, & Wayenberg, 2010). However, as
this chapter has shown, empirical evidence unveils the existence of missing
links among actors but also among levels (civil society organizations active
at European level, for example, do not always connect with their branches
active at lower levels), missing linkages which call for a more cautious eva-
luation of multi-level governance.
Several studies have in fact questioned the official EU rhetoric regarding
civil society and governance. Scholars have provided evidence which allows
for the adoption of a more sceptical view regarding the contribution being
asked of civil society in European governance-based policy making. Firstly,
it has been noted that only a limited group of CSOs have access to
European institutions. Thus, the participation of civil society in European
policy making is a very selective, exclusive, process. A process driven by
the EU itself: its modus operandi has established a framework of technical-
ities, bureaupolitics and personal ties, the output of which has been the
creation of a Brussels-based elite of professionalized, primarily umbrella or
federation NGOs, mainly devoted to policy lobbying or service delivery
(Greenwoord, 2007; Lahusen, 2014; Van Deth, 2008). Secondly, such a pro-
cess has discouraged the development of voice among civil society associa-
tions (or, we could say that those CSOs devoted to voice and advocacy
have had to be more determined in their everyday activities to make their
voices heard) (Warleigh, 2001). Thirdly, the lure of economic resources pro-
vided by the EU has undermined civil society autonomy (ibid.).
This chapter has corroborated such critical approaches towards
EU civil society linkages by providing new evidence based upon an orga-
nizational survey of local CSOs working in the field of youth employment
across seven European cities. The survey has confirmed that access to
European institutions is an issue which requires substantial human (‘capital
in knowledge’) and economic resources: our data has demonstrated a lin-
ear, ascending, trend linking resources to linkages with the European
Union: the larger the resources, the more vibrant and robust the connec-
tion. Another relevant resource for civil society to access the EU is what
I have called ‘relational capital’, that is the belonging of the association to
a network through being part of an umbrella or a federation of associa-
tions. Finally, we could not find solid enough evidence to support the argu-
ment that policy or advocacy-voice type associations have fewer EU
linkages than service-delivery type associations. The difference existed but
it was not significant.
180 SIMONE BAGLIONI
The rhetoric of civil society as the connector of levels and types of actors
in the multi-level governance approach promoted by the EU should thus be
mitigated. The European policy process should be conceived of more prag-
matically as an arena where European institutions and member states still
act as gate keepers that select and decide which societal interest and voice
should have a place within the European agenda. What consequences this
has for the overall democratic quality of the European policy process is an
issue which should concern us all.
NOTES
1. Grant agreement no. 216122.
2. In the Younex project, and as a consequence also in this chapter, the concept
of civil society has been used, like in the EU White paper on governance, in an
inclusive sense applying it to a range of societal organizations (including trade
unions and political parties). The acronym CSOs is used in this chapter with refer-
ence to such a range of diverse societal organizations.
3. This section relies on Baglioni and Giugni (2014).
4. However, in some countries, such as Sweden, for profit organizations play a
crucial role in addressing unemployment issues at a local level, hence the Swedish
team’s decision to include for profit organizations in their survey.
5. The statements were the following: (a) The public authorities frequently seeks
the advice of our organization; (b) The public authorities are friendly to our organi-
zation, but our organization initiates most of the contact; (c) The public authorities
sometimes receive our organization with hostility and other times are welcoming
depending upon the issue/s or department/s involved; (d) The public authorities
hardly listen to our organization although our organization does try to influence
them; and (e) Our organization doesn’t seek any contact with the public authorities.
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ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
SETTING: IMPACTS ON MULTI-
LEVEL GOVERNANCE FROM A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Sabine Kuhlmann
ABSTRACT
Purpose This chapter is aimed at contributing to the question of how
institutional reforms affect multi-level governance (MLG) capacities
and thus the performance of public task fulfillment with a particular
focus on the local level of government in England, France, and Germany.
Methodology/approach Drawing on concepts of institutional
evaluation, we analytically distinguish six dimensions of impact assess-
ment: vertical coordination; horizontal coordination; efficiency/savings;
effectiveness/quality; political accountability/democratic control; equity
of service standards. Methodologically, we rely on document analysis
and expert judgments that could be gleaned from case studies in the three
countries and a comprehensive evaluation of the available secondary data
in the respective national and local contexts.

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004008
183
184 SABINE KUHLMANN
Findings Institutional reforms in the intergovernmental setting have

exerted a significant influence on task fulfillment and the performance of
service delivery. Irrespective of whether MLG practice corresponds to
type I or type II, task devolution (decentralization/de-concentration)
furthers the interlocal variation and makes the equity of service delivery
shrink. There is a general tendency of improved horizontal/MLG type I
coordination capacities, especially after political decentralization, less in
the case of administrative decentralization. However, decentralization
often entails considerable additional costs which sometimes overload
local governments.
Research implications The distinction between multi-purpose territor-
ial organization/MLG I and single-purpose functional organization/
MLG II provides a suitable analytical frame for institutional evaluation
and impact assessment of reforms in the intergovernmental setting.
Furthermore, comparative research into the relationship between MLG
and institutional reforms is needed to reveal the explanatory power of
intervening factors, such as the local budgetary and staff situation, local
policy preferences, and political interests in conjunction with the salience
of the transferred tasks.
Practical implications The findings provide evidence on the causal
relationship between specific types of (vertical) institutional reforms,
performance, and task-related characteristics. Policy-makers and gov-
ernment actors may use this information when drafting institutional
reform programs and determining the allocation of public tasks in the
intergovernmental setting.
Social implications In general, the euphoric expectations placed upon
decentralization strategies in modern societies cannot straightforwardly
be justified. Our findings show that any type of task transfer to lower
levels of government exacerbates existing disparities or creates new ones.
However, the integration of tasks within multi-functional, politically
accountable local governments may help to improve MLG type I coordi-
nation in favor of local communities and territorially based societal
actors, while the opposite may be said with regard to de-concentration
and the strengthening of MLG type II coordination.
Originality/value The chapter addresses a missing linkage in the exist-
ing MLG literature which has hitherto predominantly been focused on
the political decision-making and on the implementation of reforms in
the intergovernmental settings of European countries, whereas the impact
Administrative Reforms in the Intergovernmental Setting 185
of such reforms and of their consequences for MLG has remained largely
ignored.
Keywords: Public administration; decentralization; institutional
reforms; local governments; intergovernmental setting
INTRODUCTION
“Multi-leveledness” is a fundamental characteristic of the modern state
(Bohne, Graham, & Raadschelders, 2014). However, it may show different
facets with varying consequences for the quality of governance (Kuhlmann,
Bogumil, & Grohs, 2014). In this chapter, we wish to assess the impacts of
recent institutional reforms in the intergovernmental setting on local gov-
ernance capacities. We draw on an analytical understanding of “multi-level
governance” (MLG; see further below) that refers to the steering and coor-
dination function and the capacity of governance (see also Marcou, 2006,
et seq. Wollmann, 2006, p. 118; Wollmann & Bouckaert, 2006) in distinc-
tion to the prescriptive-normative notion of governance (see Benz, 2004;
Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). Our aim is to contribute to the question of
how institutional reforms affect MLG capacities and thus the performance
of public task fulfillment. Doing so, we wish to address a missing linkage in
the existing MLG literature which has hitherto predominantly been focused
on political decision-making and on the implementation of reforms in the
intergovernmental settings of European countries. However, the assessment
of the impact of such reforms and of their consequences for MLG capaci-
ties has remained largely ignored. Against this background, the present
contribution is meant to set a noteworthy step toward enhancing our
understanding on MLG-related reform effects and toward conceptually
and empirically promoting the impact assessment of institutional reforms
in the intergovernmental setting.
The empirical basis of our analysis is a three-country comparison of
France, United Kingdom/England,1 and Germany, which represent rele-
vant cases for research into institutional reform impacts for at least two
reasons. First, over the past two decades, fundamental restructurings of
intergovernmental relations have been pursued in all three countries.
Second, these countries are typical (most different) cases of intergovern-
mental organization and MLG in Europe. They started their reforms from
quite different points of departure which allows us to analyze crucial
186 SABINE KUHLMANN
changes of national MLG patterns and their consequences for local institu-
tional performance.
The chapter proceeds in six steps: First, we outline different (horizontal
and vertical) tracks of institutional reforms in the intergovernmental set-
ting (section “Institutional Reforms in the Intergovernmental Setting:
Vertical and Horizontal Tracks”). Secondly, two ideal types of subnational
governmental organization and MLG are introduced (section “Ideal Types
of Subnational Organization and MLG”) which we use as conceptual
frames for our institutional impact analysis. Subsequently, we scrutinize
the institutional changes that have resulted from recent vertical reforms
(decentralization/de-concentration) from a comparative perspective (section
“Theoretical Assumptions about Impacts of Institutional Reforms”).
Drawing on pertinent evaluation criteria, the section “Do Intergovernmental
Reforms Make a Difference for MLG? Analyzing Institutional Changes”
presents our empirical findings of reform impacts on local MLG capacities
and performance in two selected policy domains making a distinction
between the dimensions of effectiveness, efficiency, coordination, democratic
accountability, and equity of service delivery. Finally, we summarize our
results and draw some general conclusions on the relationship between
MLG, institutional reforms, and performance (section “Summary and
Conclusion”).
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE

INTERGOVERNMENTAL SETTING: VERTICAL AND
HORIZONTAL TRACKS
Institutional reforms in the intergovernmental setting can be grouped along

two dimensions: a horizontal and a vertical dimension.
(1) Horizontal territorial organizational reforms have been pursued in

European countries essentially in two variants. For one, in a group of
countries which has been identified as representing a “North
European” pattern (see Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014, 150 et seq.
Norton, 1994, p. 40) territorial organizational consolidation has been
effected by the amalgamation and merger of the existing (historically
grown small size) municipalities at the lower level and also
counties at the higher level. The reform strategy has been directed at
extending the “territoriality” of municipalities (and counties) in order
to expand and strengthen their spatial and demographic base for carry-
ing out their role as democratically elected multi-functional local gov-
ernment. In the other country group, which has been labeled “South
European”, the historically grown small size and highly fragmented ter-
ritorial structure of the municipal level has been largely retained, while,
at the same time, a new layer and set of intermunicipal bodies has been
created, which are destined to operationally support the municipalities
on a single-functional or plural-functional formula. The intermunicipal
bodies operate formally outside the elected local government proper
and they are meant to primarily fulfill certain specific functions (single
purposes). Therefore, they can be interpreted as institutionally embody-
ing the “functionality principle” (see below).
(2) Vertical institutional reforms that pertain to the devolution of public
functions and responsibilities from central government to the regional
or meso-level (by way of federalization, quasi-federalization or “sim-
ple” regionalization) as well as from upper government levels to the
local level. Three major types of decentralization/de-concentration
must be distinguished (cf. also Benz, 2002, p. 209; Kuhlmann,
Bogumil, Ebinger, Grohs, & Reiter, 2011; Wollmann, 2006). Political
decentralization is the complete transfer of state functions to local
administrative bodies. In this process, a democratically elected local
representative body is given full responsibility over planning, finan-
cing, and administration of the new task. Administrative decentraliza-
tion involves a more moderate method of restructuring
intergovernmental relationships. In this case, elected local councils do
not receive autonomous decision-making competencies over the trans-
ferred functions. Although the local authorities can decide on the
organization and processes of execution, they function as “agents of
the state” with respect to these policies. They continue to be subject
to the strict supervision and control of the state. De-concentration
involves the transfer of (central) government functions to locally oper-
ating state agencies, field offices, or independent administrative bodies
(“Quangos” quasi-non-governmental organizations), which are
located at the subnational/local administrative level but continue to
be part of the organizational structure of the state/(central) govern-
ment or are placed directly under the authority of the (central)
government (Skelcher, 1998) (Fig. 1).
In this chapter the analytical focus will be on vertical institutional

reforms (decentralization/de-concentration) and their impacts on MLG.
188 SABINE KUHLMANN
Institutional
Reforms
External Internal
Reforms Reforms
Re-organizing
administrative
Intergovernmental Intersectoral structures
Modernizing
processes and
steering
instruments
Vertical Horizontal Privatization,
(De-/recentralization (territorial reforms, out-/in-sourcing,
regionalization, intermunicipal PPP, Innovations in
devolution) cooperation) remunicipalization Human Resource
Management
Fig. 1. Institutional Reforms in the Intergovernmental Setting. Source: Adapted

from Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2014, p. 39).
IDEAL TYPES OF SUBNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

AND MLG
In order to assess the impacts of institutional reforms on MLG, we draw

on a typology of governmental organization well-known in administrative
sciences, which makes a distinction between multi-purpose territorial orga-
nization and single-purpose functional organization (see Benz, 2002;
Ebinger, Grohs, Reiter, & Kuhlmann, 2010; Kuhlmann, 2010a, 2010b;
Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2011; Wagener, 1976; Wollmann, 2004;
Wollmann & Bouckaert, 2006). These two ideal types of organization pro-
vide a useful analytical frame for institutional evaluation and impact
assessment of institutional reforms.
(1) Within the ideal-type multi-purpose model, all functions of the local
level are the responsibility of local governments acting as politically
responsible all-purpose institutions. Local governments institutionally
bundle all locally incurring tasks and have a territorially comprehensive
mandate of decision-making and service provision. This model thus
refers to a horizontal, territory-related administrative organization, in
which a municipality as a territorial unit combines and executes all

tasks relevant to the local community in its own responsibility.
According to the MLG typology proposed by Hooghe and Marks
(2001, 2003) the territorially based multi-purpose model represents
“type I” of MLG as it operates on a local arena which constitutes the
lower level in the multi-level structure of the state (see Kuhlmann &
Wollmann, 2011, p. 489). Democratic legitimacy and political account-
ability are guaranteed by way of democratic elections of the local coun-
cils, partly complemented by further elements of democratic
participation (e.g., referenda, consultations, etc.). The multi-purpose
local government has the mandate to define the common good for the
local community and thus to balance multiple single-purpose actors
with specific interests. The multi-purpose model or “type I” MLG is
predominantly based on “territorial rationality.”
(2) The single-purpose model represents a vertical, function-based adminis-
trative organization, in which a task-specific organizational structure
exists from the (centralized) state to the local level, and the political
responsibility for the locally administered task lies outside of local gov-
ernment. Political accountability and administrative execution are insti-
tutionally separated and local functions are horizontally “unbundled”
and transferred to mono-functional actors. Drawing again on the
above-mentioned MLG typology (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2003) this
functionally oriented single-purpose model corresponds to “type II” of
MLG because its operational space is defined by specific functions and
may be overlapping. In contrast to “type I”, the voluntary agreement of
particular actors is the bases of legitimacy and decision-making, instead
of (direct) democratic legitimacy. By and large the single-purpose model
or “type II” MLG is premised on “functional rationality.”
The criteria juxtaposed in Table 1 may serve as “measuring rods” in

assessing/evaluating the impact of reforms on the institutional setting.
The institutional effects of reforms in the intergovernmental setting can
either strengthen the multi-purpose/type I form of MLG or rather the
single-purpose/type II version of MLG. In a first step, we therefore ask as
to whether and to what extent reforms have changed local governments
positioning between these two poles or types of MLG. Is there a convergent
trend toward a multi-function model of local government based on “terri-
toriality” or more to a single-purpose model based on “functionality”?
Regarding the starting conditions (prior to the reforms) the following pic-
ture arises (Fig. 2).
190 SABINE KUHLMANN
Table 1. Features of Type I MLG/Multi-Purpose Model and Type II

MLG/Single-Purpose Model.
Features Type I MLG/Multi-Purpose Type II MLG/Single-Purpose
Model Model
Definition of Defined by territory within the Defined by function/functionality

operational space multi-level/intergovernmental space (“de-territorialised”)
(federal or unitary) state
Legitimacy Direct election (of local council) No (direct) democratic legitimacy
Functional profile General purpose/multi-functional Specific (possibly single) functions
Action orientation Pursuit of “common good” Pursuit of specific functions,
particular interests
Coordination By council (majority) vote, By negotiation, compromise, and
“hierarchical” so on among equal-positioned
actors, “interaction”
“Rationality” “political rationality” “functional rationality”
Theoretical frame of Political theory (on democracy and Functionalist, economic, and so
reference so on) on theory (such as public choice
theory)
Source: Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2011, p. 489).
Multi-Purpose Model/Type I MLG Single-Purpose Model/Type II MLG
- Territoriality Characteristics of - Functionality

Intergovernmental
- Functional integration - Functional differentiation
Organization and
- Unity of administration Governance - Sectoralization of administration
Germany UK/England France
Fig. 2. Starting Conditions of Reforms. Source: Adapted from Kuhlmann et al.

(2011, p. 24).
THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT IMPACTS OF

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
The conceptually as well as empirically more demanding step of analysis

refers to the performance impacts of observed institutional changes. It
should be called to mind that institutional reform policies particularly in
their orientation on “performance” reform and on “outcomes” are
typically led by a plurality of goals which may in part be conflicting.

Thus, impact assessments are challenged to identify the trade-offs which
underlie such reforms. Therefore, we are faced with the task to put for-
ward a balance sheet of, as a rule, complex and ambiguous reform mea-
sures. However, to still approach the performance question, we
analytically distinguished six dimensions of assessment: vertical coordina-
tion; horizontal coordination; efficiency/savings; effectiveness/quality; poli-
tical accountability/democratic control; equity of service standards. When
analyzing these six dimensions, one has to bear in mind, however, that
they are to some extent interrelated. For example, horizontal and/or verti-
cal coordination understood here as interorganizational systems of col-
lective actors aimed at concerting “the decisions and actions of their
subunits or constituent organizations” (Alexander, 1993, p. 331) can be
instrumental or conditional to efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. Thus,
the latter are likely to be influenced by changes in coordination practices.
Therefore, we analytically perceive coordination as an element of
“throughput legitimacy” (Zürn, 2000) whereas efficiency, effectiveness,
and equity will be considered as dimensions of “output legitimacy” and
democratic control/accountability as dimensions of “input legitimacy”
(Scharpf, 1999, pp. 6 20). The analytical framework for measuring per-
formance impacts can be represented in a somewhat simplified manner in
the following way (Kuhlmann, 2010b; Reiter, Grohs, Ebinger, Kuhlmann, &
Bogumil, 2010; Table 2).
Drawing on the typology of the single-purpose and the multi-purpose
models or type I/type II MLG, respectively, the following theory
can be put forward (see Grohs, Bogumil, & Kuhlmann, 2012, 126 et seq.;
Kuhlmann et al., 2011, pp. 29 42; Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2011, 490
et seq.; Treisman, 2007, pp. 1 14). Democratic control and horizontal
coordination (cross-policies and territory-based) are likely to increase in
proportion to the degree to which functions and decision-making powers
are vested in politically accountable local self-government (multi-purpose
model/type I MLG; Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Kuhlmann et al., 2011, p. 30;
Wagener, 1979; Wollmann, 2004, 2006). Owing to lower specialization
levels, however, policy effectiveness and the single-sector quality of service
delivery are reduced and the principle of “territoriality” leads to more
variance and disparities between local communities (Kuhlmann et al.,
2011, p. 39; Segal, 1997; Wagener, 1979, p. 238). Vice versa, it can be
assumed that the single-purpose model (type II MLG), under which poli-
tical responsibility lies outside the local authority, reduces the democratic
accountability and transparency of public action as well as the proximity
192 SABINE KUHLMANN
Table 2. Analytical Dimensions and Indicators for the Impact Analysis of

the Administration Reforms.
Performance Criteria Possible Dimensions/Indicators
Output legitimacy
Resources, costs, output Expenditures, resources (personnel, time, finances)

Achieved savings
“Produced” output
Relation between input output
Professional/and legal Professional quality, adherence of policy standards
quality/achievement Legal correctness; litigation
of objectives Proximity to citizens/customer orientation/service quality
Effectiveness/efficiency, target group coverage
Coordination and steering
Vertical and horizontal Cross-departmental coordination

coordination Intermunicipal cooperation
Cross-level coordination; friction losses
Controls/intervention “from above”
Compliance/subversion/opposition “from below”
Input legitimacy
Democratic controls Involvement of the local council

Citizen participation; user democracy
Outward transparency
Institutional and regional variance; performance differences
Source: Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2014, p.43).
to citizens. Although greater vertical (or MLG II) coordination within a

given policy area can help increase single-policy effectiveness and diminish
interlocal heterogeneity in service delivery, it can bring deficiencies in hor-
izontal cross-policies (or MLG type I) coordination, which is to the detri-
ment of a comprehensive community development and territory-based
steering in the localities. In local government systems with a multi-
purpose organization the efficiency of service production can be expected
to increase and cost savings are likely to occur, because the financing
responsibility and the service provision function are institutionally inte-
grated and public spending is under the immediate democratic control of
the local electorate (Grohs et al., 2012, p. 127; Oates, 1972; Tiebout,
1956). The single-purpose organization, by contrast, separates financing
and service provision functions and withdraws public spending from

direct democratic control. It furthers the maximization of policy interests
leading to institutional inflation of single-purpose authorities to a degree
far beyond what can be considered as functionally necessary and appro-
priate. This tendency does not only make for higher outlays, it also
increases sectoral fragmentation and reduces horizontal (MLG type I)
coordination to the detriment of overall institutional efficiency. The
purpose of the following analysis is to provide empirical evidence on
the relationship between institutional changes and performance from a
three-countries-comparative perspective. From a theoretical viewpoint,
this relationship can be assumed being as shown in Table 3.
The purpose of the subsequent analysis is to explore the impact of insti-
tutional reforms on MLG capacities and relevant performance parameters
from a three-country comparative perspective. Our approach is not meant,
however, to presume a deterministic relationship between institutional
changes and performance, since we are well aware that inter alia the
nature of the policy under consideration is expected to matter. From the
perspective of the public and stakeholders, policies differ in political sal-
iency and hence face varying demands regarding input output standards
of legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999). As a result of this, decentralization of service
delivery functions that immediately affect the local citizens might have a
more straight forward positive impact on the institutional performance
than, for instance, the devolution of technical or environmental functions
which cover a broader territorial scope and are likely to produce numerous
“supra-local” impacts. Therefore, we will concentrate on specific devolved
tasks in order take account of policy properties and when explaining
reform impacts.
Table 3. Presumed Relation between MLG Type and Performance.

Performance Criterion Multi-Purpose Model/ Single-Purpose Model/
Type I MLG Type II MLG
Policy effectiveness/quality − +
Efficiency of service delivery + −
Horizontal or MLG type I coordination + −
Vertical or MLG II coordination − +
Political accountability + −
Interlocal variance + −
Source: Adapted from (Kuhlmann, 2010b, p. 4).

Note: +: high; : low.
194 SABINE KUHLMANN
DO INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORMS MAKE A

DIFFERENCE FOR MLG? ANALYZING
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
In the following section, we present a comprehensive summary in a very

condensed form of the case studies conducted.2 Herein, the effects of ver-
tical institutional reforms will be analyzed by, in a first step, looking at the
general institutional changes, and in a second step (see further below), by
scrutinizing the performance impacts in specific task areas.
France: Two Waves of Political Decentralization
France experienced two waves of decentralization: “Acte I” starting in

1982 and “Acte II” from 2003 onward. The French initiatives of state-local
reorganization can be considered a prime example of political decentraliza-
tion rewarding local councils with new political decision-making competen-
cies and major functional responsibilities (for details see Kuhlmann, 2008).
As a result of the two rounds of decentralization, local authorities (collecti-
vite´s territoriales/locales) have clearly been strengthened also vis-à-vis
locally operating state agencies and the prefects. With the constitutional
amendment of March 2003, decentralization has, moreover, gained consti-
tutional status for the first time in the French history, and the devolution
of tasks from central government to the de´partements and the regions was
even intensified (Acte II). Their portfolio has considerably been extended,
particularly in social service delivery now completely discharged, also finan-
cially, by the de´partments. A particularly important process within the
scope of the more recent “Acte II” was the transfer of competencies for the
minimum income scheme Revenu minimum d’insertion (RMI) from the state
to the departments in December 2003.3 With the complete transfer of the
RMI onto the departments more precisely to the Conseils geńe´raux (con-
secutively: general councils) and their presidents at the end of 2003, the
French legislator terminated a long period of “co-governance” (co-gestion)
dating back to the establishment of the RMI in 1988 (Cyntermann &
Dindar, 2008). Against this background, the decentralization or “départ-
mentalisation” of the RMI used to be conceptualized as a “Big Bang”
(Reiter & Kuhlmann, 2015) by the changing central governments since the
beginning of the 1980s.
However, decentralization comes against limits since the deeply
ingrained French “localism” (rooted in the “Girondist” heritage and
running counter to Jacobin centralism) prevents the creation of more effi-

cient (large-scale) local authorities through territorial amalgamations. This
historical heritage is safeguarded institutionally by the accumulation of
local and national mandates and the common practice of multiple office
holding (cumul des mandats). Against this background, it is hardly surpris-
ing that central government with its numerous single-purpose authorities
(services exte´rieurs) is still very much present at the local level and often
competes with municipal, de´partement and intermunicipal institutions as
well as with other de-concentrated state agencies operating at the local level
(Thoenig, 2005). However, the trend of municipal cooperative grouping
(e´tablissements publics de coope´ration intercommunale EPCI), provoked
by the act of 1999 (Loi Cheve`nement) and amounting to what has been
called an “inter-municipal revolution” (see Borraz & Le Galès, 2005), gen-
erated a new dynamic in France.4
England: “Agencification” and “Quangoization” as

Administrative De-Concentration
England5 offers a strong contrast to France and numerous other Western

European countries, since it has not followed the international trend
toward strengthening local governments. In contrast to France, a strategy
of administrative de-concentration was pursued that resulted in central
government hitherto limited to Whitehall under the “dual-polity”-tradi-
tion becoming institutionally more and more entrenched in local
policy-making and implementation. Against this background, England
has become a more or less unique example in Europe of central govern-
ment interventionism and an institutional defeat of local autonomy. After
major local government functions had been nationalized soon after the
Second World War (National Health Service, gas, electricity, social wel-
fare), later to be partly privatized, central government intervention at the
local level intensified in the course of the “Thatcherist Revolution”, which
thoroughly revamped Britain’s traditionally “strong” local government
model. Central government agencies and a multitude of quasi-non-
governmental organizations (quangos) operating at the local level dis-
placed the politically accountable and democratically responsible local
councils which were more and more “hollowed out” and disposed of their
traditional functions and tasks. “Quangoization”6 has attained consider-
able proportions: there are now 5,000 such bodies in England, managed
by 50,000 government-appointed board members. This compares with
196 SABINE KUHLMANN
only 500 district and county councils with a total of 23,000 elected counci-
lors (Winchester & Bach, 1999, p. 32). Furthermore, central government
severely restricted local finances by setting limits to local budgets, by with-
holding allocations in the case of budget overruns, and by capping rates.
The arrival of New Labour in government in 1997 brought only a slight
shift in policy. Although “privatization at any price” was no longer the
watchword as under the Tories (see below), and the Local Government Act
of 2000 diluted the traditional “ultra vires”-doctrine by introducing a form
of the Continental European “general competence”-concept, central gov-
ernment interventionism was further strengthened despite all discussion
about “new localism.” “Marketization” has been replaced by a tightly-knit
system of centralist regulation, control, and sanctioning of local govern-
ment activities. The comprehensive system imposed by central government
on local authorities of performance measurement, monitoring, and control-
ling (“Best Value Regime BV”; later “Comprehensive Performance
Assessment CPA”) is also fully in line with the trend toward central gov-
ernment interventionism. The coalition government formed in May 2010
by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats began to reduce the number
of existing quangos (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014, 143 et seq.). In doing
so the Conservatives aimed at cutting back the public sector and slashing
the public deficit. To date, around 80 (of a total of about 1,000) quangos
have been dissolved.7
Regarding the special planning system (which we treat as case in point
here; see further below), the groundbreaking Planning and Compulsory
Purchase Act of 2004 fundamentally changed the existing system (see
Kuhlmann et al., 2011; Wollmann, 2006) in the following ways: The
Structure Plans at the county level were abolished and the previous Local
Plans, Unitary Development Plans and Structure Plans were replaced by
Local Development Frameworks (LDFs), which had to comply with the
new regional planning system.8 LDFs gathered various planning docu-
ments in the form of a portfolio based around the focal document of the
Core Strategy.9 For counties, this meant the loss of competence for struc-
tural planning.10 Districts, in contrast, gained more freedom and discretion
in local planning in comparison to the old system, although plans were
now subject to the approval of the Planning Inspectorate. The material core
of the reform was a move away from pure land use planning to strategic
planning approaches (Spatial Planning), both at the local and the regional
level. This entailed a significant revaluation of sustainability goals and a
shift away from the paradigm of functionally separate land use toward
mixed uses (see Grohs, 2012; ODPM, 2004b).
Germany: “Functional Reforms” as Administrative Decentralization
In Germany, territorial re-organizations as well as the devolution of state

tasks have considerably strengthened the traditional multi-purpose profile
of local governments. After a first wave of so-called “functional reforms”
in the 1970s in West Germany, in the course of which major state (Länder)
functions have been devolved from the Länder governments to the local
level, German reunification and recent devolution projects of most of the
German Länder have initiated further decentralization. The state of Baden-
Württemberg has played a pioneering role with its major re-organization
and a complete re-distribution of tasks between state and local government
in 2005. This reform was a prelude to a whole series of equivalent initiatives
in other German states. The core element was the complete dissolution of
350 of a total of 450 special-purpose state authorities, whose functions and
personnel were transferred to the 35 counties and 9 county-free cities (see
Bogumil & Ebinger, 2005). According to first implementation studies
(Bogumil & Ebinger, 2005, p. 36; Kuhlmann et al., 2011, p. 98), counties
have meanwhile just about doubled their staff, which is to be regarded as a
substantial upgrading of the county level in terms of personnel and compe-
tencies. At the same time, the State government in Baden-Württemberg is
being rolled back to “core functions,” and will maintain own de-
concentrated single-purpose administrative units only in the fields of tax
administration, police and justice. The reform package has thus resulted in
a clearer institutional separation of State functions and local government
tasks. It has notably contributed to simplify and streamline the subnational
institutional landscape in Germany (Table 4).
Nevertheless, the reform in Germany is primarily an administrative
decentralization referred to as a “pseudo” or “false” decentralization by
some observers (see Wollmann, 2008). Local councils are not granted any
rights of political decision-making and control regards the new tasks trans-
ferred to them by State governments. Their “Janusface” was not removed,
yet clearly confirmed. They continue to have a double-function, acting
as de-concentrated State agencies on the one hand and local self-
government institutions on the other hand. Furthermore, the intermediate
level of State administration located in the four administrative districts
(Regierungspräsidien) has been maintained and even strengthened in
Baden-Württemberg. Moreover, German decentralization policies are lar-
gely counteracted by the acute fiscal crisis at the local level, which obliges
local authorities to reduce non-mandatory services and, in extreme cases,
limits them to discharging delegated State functions (for more detailed
198 SABINE KUHLMANN
Table 4. Impacts of Institutional Reforms on MLG.

Decentralization Germany France United Kingdom/
Effects on MLG England
Institutional Withdrawal of de- Weakening of de- Inflation of de-

changes in the concentrated state concentrated state concentrated
intergovernmental administration; administration; state
setting dissolution of state however, institutional administration;
authorities persistence agencies/
quangos
Territoriality/ Strengthening of Strengthening of the Weakening of the
functionality territorial territorial territorial
organization; multi- organization; multi- organization;
purpose, but local purpose, but units are single-purpose
fiscal crisis too small
Local democracy/ Formal non-political Political Administrative de-
political (administrative) decentralization, in concentration;
accountability decentralization, but fact strengthening of weakening of
in fact politicization local executives local councils
of transferred tasks (mayors)
MLG type Type I MLG Type I MLG developed, Type II MLG
strengthened; Type II MLG developed, Type
however, political/ weakened I MLG
democratic weakened
component of
reforms weak
Source: Author’s own representation.
empirical evidence on the fiscal crises and cutback management at the local
level in Germany refer to Boettcher, 2012; Diemert, 2013; Grohs & Reiter,
2013; Mäding, 2013).
REFORMING FOR THE BETTER OR THE WORSE?

ANALYZING IMPACTS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ PERFORMANCE
In the following section, we analyze the performance impacts of vertical

institutional reforms in the three countries according to the aforementioned
six performance dimensions. For France: the social welfare assistance
program for the long-term unemployed (RMI) and urban planning; for
Germany (Baden-Württemberg): the integration assistance program for
people with disabilities in and the environmental administration/emission
control in Germany; for England: local planning and school administration
(see also Ebinger, Grohs, & Reiter, 2011; Ebinger, Grohs, Reiter, &
Kuhlmann, 2011; Grohs, 2012; Grohs et al., 2012; Kuhlmann et al., 2011;
Kuhlmann et al., 2014; Reiter et al., 2010; Reiter & Kuhlmann, 2015).
Even if no hard comparative performance data can be gathered on all
dimensions, a qualitative assessment of the developments is possible. To do
so, we rely on document analysis and expert judgments that could be
gleaned from case studies in the three countries and a comprehensive eva-
luation of the available secondary data in the respective national and local
contexts. Several different stakeholder groups (local heads of departments,
state supervisory boards, local interest groups and so on) were included in
the sample of interviewees. In the course of the field research, a total of 80
interviews were conducted with selected experts on the local level and in
upper-level state agencies in the years 2007 2009.11
Effectiveness
Regarding effectiveness, we are first concerned with questions of profes-

sional quality, substantive goal attainment, and improved citizen
orientation.
France
According to our research results, the French political decentralization has
on the one hand led to improvements. This particularly applies to technical
and spatially oriented fields of local service, such as urban planning.
However, this positive finding can also be partly explained by the time that
has passed since decentralization in the 1980s which has allowed for the
growth of administrative professionalism in big and medium-sized French
cities. In the field of personal services, by contrast, political decentralization
efforts have led to improvements in effectiveness only under certain locally
specific conditions. In the RMI case in France, the effectiveness of decen-
tralization cannot be explained independent of the parallel policy reform.
The problem was essentially linked to the fact that the de´partements needed
to reorganize and undertake drastic organizational and skills-oriented mea-
sures in order to reconcile their parallel engagements in both institutional
and policy reform processes. All in all, the impacts of RMI decentralization
200 SABINE KUHLMANN
on effectiveness and quality (but also on efficiency and savings, see further
below) fell short of the expectations formulated prior to the reform. Thus,
from an empirical standpoint, no significant improvements (but also no ser-
ious deterioration) in the effectiveness of service delivery can be observed
resulting from the reform initiatives in this case (see also Reiter, 2010;
Reiter & Kuhlmann, 2015).
England
In England, certain aspects of the new local development frameworks (LDF)
for the districts are defined as political decentralization as they unify the
formerly two tier local planning administration in one responsible political
body on the lower district level (Ebinger, Grohs, & Reiter, 2011; Ebinger,
Grohs, Reiter, & Kuhlmann, 2011). According to our empirical investiga-
tion of decentralization of local planning in England (local development
frameworks LDF), the effectiveness of planning administration at the
district level has improved because they managed, in effect, to use their
increased autonomy in favor of a more professional and outcome-oriented
planning practice. However, a rather disappointing balance sheet results
from the administrative de-concentration in the case of English schools
that have not gained much more (single purpose) autonomy after the
reforms in the education sector. As a consequence, the reform objectives of
promoting homogenization of school quality, that is increasing quality
levels of poorly performing schools while keeping (or even enhancing) per-
formance standards in well performing school, have not materialized (see
further below on the dimension of “equity”).
Germany
In the field of personal services (integration services for disabled people in
Baden-Württemberg), the reforms have led to rather uneven effects.
Decentralization efforts have led to improvements only in those cases
where the political support vis-à-vis the transferred task was high, the fiscal
stress was low and the staff and professional situation appropriate to fulfill
the new task. Under these conditions local governments were able to intro-
duce case-management capacities, tighten relations with all actors involved
in the support of disabled citizens, improve controlling mechanisms and
refine the range of services offered by third-party providers (Ebinger,
Grohs, & Reiter, 2011; Ebinger, Grohs, Reiter, & Kuhlmann, 2011). By
contrast, in local governments with budget constraints, fiscal/staff problems
and low political support no increases in effectiveness could be observed,
rather the opposite. Regarding the field of emissions control, our empirical
findings clearly suggest a decreasing implementation quality. These short-

comings appear to have resulted from a remarkable loss in professional
competence when constituencies’ size falls below a minimum threshold
mass. The necessary talent, breadth of knowledge, and capacity to adjust
to the relevant managerial roles as required cannot be expected under such
circumstances.
Efficiency
Decentralization programs are often pursued with high expectations

regarding potential cost reductions, savings and economies of scope.
However, the empirical evidence is somewhat ambiguous. In the following,
our aim is to concentrate on resource increases and the probability of cost
reductions.
France
The decentralization of the RMI in France was accompanied by enormous
cost increases. The problem resulted from the fact that the national govern-
ment, in addition to transferring the responsibility for the program’s
execution to the De´partements, also passed along a whole series of other
task-related risks. Moreover, the cost explosions resulted from the declared
political will of most of the Conseils Geńe´raux. In order to be able to meet
the requirements, it became necessary for most of the de´partements to
invest in additional personnel and to take measures to readjust their inter-
nal management processes and technical capacities to ensure the successful
accomplishment of their duties. The decentralization of urban planning in
France had similar effects. New instruments (SCoT, PLU) in the urban
planning sector led to significant staff increases, particularly in intermunici-
pal bodies (e´tablissements publics de coope´ration intercommunale EPCI)
that are responsible for urban planning matters. These bodies were in need
of new experts and specialists for the proofing and permission work.
Compensation payments by the state were no longer sufficient to cover
these additional costs. Overall one may conclude that in these areas of
decentralization significant cost increases have occurred and that the
expected savings have not been realized.
England
The reform of local planning processes in England resembles the French
experiences since the task transfer to the district level produced the
202 SABINE KUHLMANN
inevitable need to increase the existing personnel pool considerably in the

starting phase. It remains to be seen whether the promise of efficiency gains
can be realized though they are expected, especially from the reduced
need for coordination in the daily routines underlying planning and build-
ing permit procedures. As far as the administrative de-concentration within
the English schools sector in concerned, efficiency improvements remain
controversial. Most of the cost savings cannot be ascribed to functional
changes but rather to the new flexible budgets, which are independent of
de-concentration measures (see Grohs et al., 2012; Levacic, 1994). In spite
of this, higher administrative costs and a de-professionalization have
resulted from the internalization of administrative functions (such as per-
sonnel management or the maintenance of buildings) into single schools.
Germany
A similar situation as in France and England is seen in the integration pro-
gram for the disabled in Germany. Also in this case additional costs arose
as a result of the reforms because short-term investments were required to
create case-management capacities and individualized care arrangements. It
is true that these investments might lead to cost reductions in the future.
Yet, due to the uneven distribution of qualified personnel and fiscal
resources among the local governments, the starting conditions for over-
coming the decentralization-induced cost explosions vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction and must in general be assessed inappropriate. Regarding
the transfer of emissions control in Germany, the local councils accepted a
20 percent decrease in the state’s share of the costs. These savings were
often secured through downsizing professional teams. While large adminis-
trations were able to cope with such a downsizing of personnel and thus to
generate real efficiency improvements, the smaller counties are confronted
with structural problems. All in all the balance sheet shows however a posi-
tive tendency of achieved savings in this sector.
Horizontal or MLG Type I Coordination Capacities
It is expected that decentralization measures will produce a highly inte-

grated and synchronized system of coordination that covers the entire terri-
torial area and transcends a single-policy orientation. We continue our
analysis below by concentrating on this aspect of intersectoral coordination
that also corresponds to the predominant rationale of MLG I.
France
In France, improvements in horizontal coordination result from the de´par-
tements to be relieved from the previously highly constraining and hinder-
ing “partnerships” with state-agents. Multi-level-entanglement in line with
the single-purpose rationale of MLG II has been reduced considerably. The
French “multi-level state” tends to move toward MLG I, instead of its tra-
ditional (Napoleonic) logics of MLG II (see section above). Consequently,
frictional losses were reduced and local-level coordination across policy sec-
tors were strengthened in the General Councils. Within the area of plan-
ning, French local governments profited from well-established and
functioning relationships among local planning offices, construction admin-
istrations and operators in other connected fields. After the new planning
legislation came into effect in 2000 this collaborative synergy across the
professions deepened and intensified.
England
The decentralization of planning functions to the district level in England
can also be positively assessed. Intersector coordination among the various
professions has improved considerably, especially in the field of develop-
ment control. Speculative predictions of a likely deterioration in consulta-
tion practices among the counties turned out to be unfounded. Moreover,
the creation of a single statutory agency to oversee all planning functions
has positively impacted the coordination patterns among the local govern-
ments. By contrast, the administrative de-concentration regarding the
English schools has generated clear losses in horizontal coordination.
Instead of cooperating with one another, it has now become the rule for
schools to compete for personnel and the use of public goods, reminiscence
to the US adversarial system government. We heard regular reports of
poor coordination activities among schools and local authorities affecting
access to such key services as youth welfare, crime prevention, planning,
recreation, and sporting activity services.
Germany
In Germany, too, positive impacts can be seen arising from the horizontal
bundling of most locally operating social services like welfare, health, and
youth services that was made possible for the first time. With the decen-
tralization, case-management systems were established and the territorially
based collaboration with local service providers was strengthened.
However, the need to reconcile the viewpoints and standard practices of
the different counties requires intensive interlocal negotiations, which lead
204 SABINE KUHLMANN
to friction losses. Regarding the Emission Control Authority in Germany,

specialists in the field emphasized potentials for improving cross-policy
consultations between neighboring departments. Yet, contrasting opinions
pointed to the fact that the level at which tasks are fulfilled does not mat-
ter for performance. Furthermore, there are often internal conflicts, which
tend to hamper horizontal coordination within the county administration.
Therefore, our evaluation yields a quite ambiguous empirical picture,
which supports the explanatory power of actor-related and situational
factors.
To summarize, our findings indicate that in nearly all country and policy
cases the (political) decentralization has produced improvements in hori-
zontal, cross-sectoral coordination, thereby strengthening MLG I. By con-
trast, in Germany the findings for in the emissions control sector are a bit
ambiguous, and the administrative de-concentration of English schools has
clearly made horizontal or MLG type I coordination capacities decrease.
Vertical or MLG II Coordination Capacities
Vertical or MLG II coordination describes the capacity of institutional

actors to find policy-specific solutions to single-purpose problems across
multiple administrative levels. Typically, decentralization measures have
been assumed to impact this performance dimension negatively.
France
In the case of RMI as well as that of urban planning, political decentraliza-
tion measures in France have contributed to shrinking vertical coordina-
tion capacities between the local government entities and the state. In the
case of the RMI, this has proven to be detrimental, because the three sub-
national levels (regions, de´partements, communes) still lack any kind of
clear hierarchy and formal subordination between one another. Informal
methods of cooperation between the territorial levels could not compensate
for this deficiency, which has led, in turn, to friction losses and partially
limited the capacity for action in the subnational space.
England
Looking at planning at the local level in England reveals that district coun-
cils are still subject to vertical interventions, in spite of their increased
autonomy and the diminishing discretionary power of the state. The
launching of the urban planning measures was closely supervised by the
Government Offices12 and is monitored by state planning inspectors. This

coordination has proven particularly problematic whenever political differ-
ences over planning decisions have surfaced. For the schools we observed
that the scope of institutional linkages between central government repre-
sentatives and individual schools, as well as local authorities, has become
much greater. Interventions and interferences by the central government
have increased, as can be seen in the rigid system of inspections, perfor-
mance management standards, rankings, and benchmark tests.
Germany
In the aftermath of the reforms in the integration assistance program, verti-
cal coordination activities have been reduced almost exclusively to relation-
ships between the different local government levels. Consultations occur
regularly between local government units and the Association of Local
Authorities for Youth and Social Welfare (KVJS) a single-purpose coop-
erative body of local authorities. After the decentralization, the KVJS
found itself deprived of much of its original power, and it now operates pri-
marily as a service unit. Thus, MLG type I coordination capacities have
been reduced to a remarkable extent. Regarding emissions control, too, the
reforms have made state-local coordination capacities decrease. The admin-
istrative district authorities (Regierungspräsidien) are not in a position any
more to offer their own capacities to meet the professional needs of the
local governments. They have relinquished their active role as a supervisory
agent, which has proven to be functionally unsatisfactory for the support
needs of the local governments.
A summary of our empirical observations reveals that decentralization
strategies have predominantly resulted in the weakening of MLG II capaci-
ties. This posed no problems as long as informal communications between
skilled professionals continued. Nonetheless, the process was still accompa-
nied by some problems, such as in those cases where formal legislative
directives were unclear or when supervisory and support functions were no
longer sufficiently provided by the state government level. The de-
concentration in the English schools sector, by contrast, contributed to
increasing MLG II capacities.
Democratic Control and Accountability
Political accountability and a precise political mandate, guaranteed by

transparency of decision-making and democratic participation in the
206 SABINE KUHLMANN
territory, are major features of MLG I. To what extent have these been
changed by decentralization policies?
France
The political decentralization of the RMI and of urban planning in France
led on the one hand to a strong local-level politicization of the respective
tasks. Local actors had major political stakes in these fields and were
strongly interested in guaranteeing an effective and efficient task fulfillment
to their voters. On the other hand, the involvement of citizens or interest
groups turned out to be minimal. The task transfers thus predominantly
served to strengthen the power of local executives (mayors), who are well-
known in France for their tendency to marginalize the elected council and
to behave as “local monarchs” without an effective system of “checks and
balances.”
Germany
The integration assistance program in Germany, the formal authority over
which has been transferred to the local councils, meets the problem that the
actual leeway to politically form and shape this task turned out to be rather
limited. Local councilors are restricted to make decisions on the implemen-
tation of case-management and care facilities and on determining the
respective budget, which they usually assess as rather “un-political” and
even unattractive aspects of their portfolio and thus attribute a low politi-
cal salience to. Although people with disabilities now have in theory greater
opportunities to voice, they are in practice constrained by the fact that the
decision-making processes have become even less transparent than before
the reforms. In most constituencies, professional charities tend to monopo-
lize the existing representative mechanisms for their own ends, which
reduces political accountability and the participatory openness of this pol-
icy arena. Therefore, instead of the expected improvement we rather
observe a decrease of democratic accountability and political control in this
task area. The analysis of the local Emission Control Authorities in
Germany reveals that local political interests exercise considerable influence
on decision-making. There is a permanent struggle between legal regula-
tions and the local actors’ interests. However, administrative decentraliza-
tion of emissions control functions in Germany does not legally prescribe
any political decision-making powers of the local councils, but leaves the
political accountability with the state (Länder). Against this background,
the local councils’ interference and the local politicians’ intervention into
this task domain (that frequently determines the final decision) must be
regarded with criticism, at least from the angle of democratic legitimacy,

political accountability, and transparency of competencies, all of which
have become much more blurred after the reforms.
England
A similar assessment can be made regarding the effects of administrative
de-concentration in the English schools sector. Accountability is on the one
hand blurred by the creation of advisory boards to support the autonomy
granted to schools. On the other hand, there is an obvious weakening of
the elected councils with regard to educational policy-making which was
once one of the core tasks of English local authorities. In the area of local
planning (LDF), by contrast, the local councils have clearly gained more
room for maneuver after the reforms. Thanks to the increased discretionary
power of individual councils to pursue their own planning needs and to
coordinate their actions with those of neighboring regions, the local coun-
cils’ political influence in planning matters and thus the democratic
accountability has augmented in this task area.
Summing up, after the reforms improvements concerning democratic
legitimacy, political accountability and participatory quality tend to be lim-
ited in most of the task domains under scrutiny here. On the one hand,
some of the politically decentralized tasks leave very little room for discre-
tionary decision-making. On the other hand, policy implementation
depends to a great extent on the policy preferences of local actors. This has
contributed to the diminishment of the power of elected councils. In many
cases, executive actors or individuals with corporate interests have tended
to become the ones who profit mostly.
Equity of Service Provision
Decentralization strategies are often seen as a reason for growing dispari-

ties among local governments and regions. A common normative counter-
claim is the equal treatment of citizens. The question here is to what extent
can decentralization and equity be made compatible?
France
The political decentralization of the RMI integration policy in France has
further widened preexisting regional disparities in social standards.
De´partements suffering from budgetary problems and/or high levels of
unemployment had a tough time to fulfill the newly obtained competences.
208 SABINE KUHLMANN
This contributed to an increase in disparities between the de´partements in

terms of social services and the investment in the “action sociale” and still
furthered the need for a re-investment of the state in this field of public
action so as to counteract the risk of unequal public services for the French
citizens which the Balladur-commission had bespoken in 2009. In the case
of urban planning, too, an increasing variation in planning instruments
and in the density of planning activities was to be observed. These increas-
ing disparities in the field of local welfare as well as planning policies must
also be explained in light of the already existing demographic and struc-
tural differences between French localities.
Germany
In Germany variance among local governments has likewise intensified
over time. In the case of the integration assistance for disabled people this
is mainly due to differences in the fiscal and staff conditions on the one
hand and diverging management philosophies on the other hand. Whereas
the majority of the counties attempted, in general, to strike a balance
between an acceptable level of service and cost savings, others confined
themselves exclusively to short-term measures. This finding applies even
more to the Emissions Control Authorities in Germany, whose interlocal
variance in task performance has heightened enormously. Unequal political
support, varying resources, access to advanced training possibilities, and
distribution of informal networks are seen as responsible for the further
diverging performance levels.
England
Performance heterogeneity has also increased among English schools as
well as among municipalities. Although there is an overall slight trend
toward improved performance resulting from stronger competitive incen-
tives and attempts have been made to equalize the performance of schools
by means of uniform learning standards, the de-concentration has never-
theless intensified preexisting differences between schools. These differences
appear still to be a product of the social backgrounds of the school children
rather than the actual capabilities of the schools. Therefore, there are no
overall signs of improvements in effectiveness which can be credited to the
process of de-concentration in the educational sector, but rather different
performance trends depending on the social and economic situation of the
schools. There was also considerable variance in planning activities in
England. Huge dissimilarities in implementation quality and density
throughout the country existed. These are reinforced by political resistance
against the planning objectives imposed by the central government, particu-

larly in the conservative South.
Regardless of national and policy-specific features, the reforms have in
general resulted in the intensification of performance differences among
local authorities. The principal causes of this development could be traced
to unfunded mandates and insufficient fiscal resources of local governments
and a lack of political will to achieve alignment in local service delivery.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Regarding the institutional effects of the reforms on the predominant

MLG type, our empirical findings show that in two countries (France and
Germany) MLG type I (multi-purpose model) has been strengthened,
whereas in one country-case (England) MLG type II (single-purpose
model) has been enhanced. However, the performance impacts of these
changes differ widely (across policies and nations) and are not always con-
sistent with our theoretical expectations. The findings of our study can be
summarized as shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Reform Impacts from a Comparative Perspective Summary of

the Empirical Findings.a
Performance France England Germany
Dimension
Technical Person- Technical Person- Technical Person-
planning related planning related planning related
task task task task task task
Effectiveness + 0 + − − +/−
Efficiency − − − +/− + −
MLG I + + + − +/− +
coordination
MLG II − − 0 + − −
coordination
Democratic 0 0 + − − −
control
Equity − − − − − −
Note: +: increase; −: decrease; 0: no change; +/−: partial increase, partial decrease (variance by
cases).
a
Aggregated case study findings (see Ebinger, Grohs, & Reiter, 2011; Grohs et al., 2012;
Kuhlmann et al., 2011, 2014; Reiter et al., 2010 for further references).
210 SABINE KUHLMANN
On the one hand, there can be no doubt that the reforms and subse-
quent institutional changes have exerted a significant influence on task
fulfillment and the performance of service delivery. We have seen that
any type of task transfer to lower levels of government exacerbates exist-
ing performance disparities or creates new ones. Thus, irrespective of
whether MLG practice corresponds to type I or type II, task devolution
(decentralization/de-concentration) furthers the interlocal variation
and makes the equity of service delivery shrink. Furthermore, there is a
general tendency of improved horizontal/MLG type I coordination capa-
cities, especially after political decentralization, less in the case of
administrative decentralization. This seems to prove our initial hypo-
thesis that the integration of tasks within multi-functional, politically
accountable local governments may help to improve territorial MLG type
I coordination within a given administrative jurisdiction. By contrast after
de-concentration (English schools), vertical/MLG II coordination capaci-
ties have markedly increased whereas all other cases have witnessed a
deterioration or at least no improvement in this performance dimension.
Our study also demonstrates that the effectiveness of task fulfillment
tends to be positively influenced by political decentralization, while the
opposite may be said with regard to de-concentration. This finding stands
in contrast to our theoretical expectations outlined at the beginning.
However, the euphoric expectations placed upon decentralization strate-
gies cannot be justified. Decentralization often entails considerable addi-
tional costs and burdens which sometimes overload local governments. In
none of the cases examined here have national/state governments shown
much inclination to sufficiently address the budgetary problems of local
governments by reimbursing costs. Such circumstances frequently carry
the risk of leading them to default on their performance obligations and
of creating implementation failures or inconsistencies of law application.
We need to emphasize, however, that the MLG capacities of local gov-
ernments and their impacts on the performance of service delivery are
also shaped by other intervening factors, such as the local budgetary and
staff situation, policy properties (e.g., person-related vs. technical tasks),
local policy preferences and political interests in conjunction with the sal-
ience of the transferred tasks. To provide empirical evidence on the
impact of these factors further comparative research into the relationship
between MLG and institutional reforms in the intergovernmental setting
is needed.
NOTES
1. In the following only focus on England, since after devolution some partly
differing developments are to be observed in Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland.
2. Owing to space limitations, not all evidence for our qualifications has been
made explicit in this chapter. A more detailed analysis of the case studies including
supporting materials can be found in Kuhlmann et al. (2011); see also Kuhlmann
et al. (2014).
3. Strictly speaking, the RMI is a welfare aid for 25- to 65-year-old people able
to work. It was created by the Socialist government of Michel Rocard in 1988 and
stood out vis-à-vis the other, more group-related social help regimes (minima
sociaux; see Clément, 2012) as a first universal aid. Moreover, it was conceptualized
as an “activating” regime. According to the Socialist government, the formal com-
mitment of an individual RMI recipient to attend measures of active employment
and social policy (individual social inclusion contract; contrat d’insertion (CI))
should complement the payoff of the financial welfare aid (see Reiter & Kuhlmann,
2015).
4. Meanwhile, almost 90 percent of all French local authorities belong to some
form of cooperative grouping (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014, 158 et seq.).
5. We predominantly refer to the period of observation from the early
1980 2009. The chapter does not take into account developments after this period
(e.g., outcomes of the 2014 Scottish referendum).
6. The most common definition (cf. Skelcher, 1998, p. 13) of quangos includes
so-called NDPBs (non-departmental public bodies), which do not belong directly to a
ministry, but are publically financed and perform separate tasks. Quangos operate
largely outside the influence of local authorities/councils and are financially, etc.
dependent on central government (cf. Skelcher, 2000). They are directed by
appointed boards (hence the common term “appointed bodies”), represented by cen-
tral government and further actors.
7. One by one, the quangos are being abolished. But at what cost? Morris
(2010).
8. At the same time, a new kind of regional planning, the Regional Spatial
Strategies (RSSs) was introduced and the responsibility for this task was assigned to
the newly created Regional Planning Bodies (RPBs; see Grohs et al., 2012;
Kuhlmann et al., 2014). In this chapter, we concentrate on local planning.
9. This portfolio includes the following documents: Development Plan
Documents (DPDs), a document for project planning called the Local Development
Scheme (LDS), an annual monitoring report (AMR), a document that defines the
consultation processes (Statement of Community Involvement (SCI)), and addi-
tional policy documents (SPDs; see ODPM, 2004a).
10. Only residual planning tasks (e.g., waste and minerals) are retained by the
counties. In compensation, these bodies were granted some participation rights in
regional planning.
11. The comparative research project was funded by the German Science Council
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG) and jointly headed by Jörg Bogumil
(University of Bochum) and the author. Case studies were carried out from 2005 to
212 SABINE KUHLMANN
2007 by Falk Ebinger, Stephen Grohs (University of Konstanz), and Renate Reiter
(University of Hagen).
12. The Government Offices, along with the entire system of regional spatial
planning, were abolished after the change of government in 2010.
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BRIDGING THE GAPS IN
NEW SPACES OF INTERACTIONS
AND MULTIPLE
ACCOUNTABILITIES IN ENGLISH
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Joyce Liddle
ABSTRACT
Purpose This chapter examines whether Type 1 and Type 2 models of

Multi-Level Governance (MLG) are suitable frameworks for analysing
the operation of local enterprise partnerships (LEPs) as significant new
partnerships at the sub-national level of governance in England. In doing
so it bridges some gaps in knowledge, largely absent from MLG litera-
ture, by demonstrating how actors in economic development attempt to
solve governance problems through co-operation rather than central
steering and control.
Methodology/approach The approach follows Stubbs (2005) who
called for more political anthropological or ethnographic analyses, and

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004009
217
218 JOYCE LIDDLE
the chapter draws on primary interview data and secondary documentary

evidence from two LEPs in the north east of England.
Findings Some advocates of MLG believe that governance should
serve citizen needs but it is clear from the contents of this chapter that
MLG has a number of weaknesses in this respect, as well as neglecting
power relationships and misinterpretations of the concept of territory.
The conclusion shows that LEPs as multi-agency partnerships need to be
accountable and it is essential to adopt models that facilitate a clearer
understanding of new spaces of interactions and multiple accountabilities.
Using a stakeholder analysis fills some gaps in understanding of how
partnerships work and who they are accountable to, as well as assessing
how public services delivery models operate within a multi-level govern-
ance setting. All 39 LEPs have varying levels of trust between partners,
as well as responding to multiple accountabilities. Neither Type I nor
Type II MLG is sufficient on its own as an explanatory framework for
analysing LEPs, but each does offer a useful entreé into this important
field of enquiry.
Research implications The MLG concept is a helpful starting point,
but its utility is governed by how it is augmented with other, more appro-
priate models of analysis. LEPs are a challenge to the dynamics of public
accountability as they involve private actors at the heart of public service
delivery; they are also interesting examples of persistent contestation
between actors with different mind sets on outcomes and on legitimacy,
accountability and representativeness. Stakeholder analysis allows a dee-
per appreciation of the interactions in space and multiple accountabilities
of actors in LEPs.
Practical implications LEPs in England are the preferred instrument
for driving economic growth in regions and sub-regions. The findings
help to explain more fully some of the intricate power and trust relation-
ships in these partnerships. The chapter also examines multiple account-
abilities and how actors connect within territories.
Social implications Critically the findings show an absence of real
citizen engagement or expression of public opinions and feedback loops
to citizens/publics/individuals/other organisations within such diffuse
partnership arrangements. In an era of Localism it is essential for
partnerships to be accountable to a wider group of societal
stakeholders
Bridging the Gaps in Multi-Level Governance 219
Originality/value The chapter takes a novel approach to analysing

LEPs and builds on some existing work on MLG to obtain a deeper ana-
lysis of some of the complex inter-relationships and connections between
actors on LEPs.
Keywords: Multi-level governance; partnerships; accountability;
stakeholders
INTRODUCTION: THE INTRODUCTION OF

LOCAL ENTERPRISE PARTNERSHIPS IN
ENGLAND: BUSINESS-LED GROWTH THROUGH
MULTI-AGENCY PARTNERSHIPS
This chapter focuses on local enterprise partnerships (LEPs) in England, a

complex and novel form of polity in which state and non-state actors are
activated at different jurisdictions, in the intersection between central and
local state levels. It contributes to the overall theme of the book by testing
the explanatory power of multi-level governance (MLG) frameworks, by
introducing findings to fill current gaps in knowledge on the dynamics of
state and non-state stakeholders (actors) in specific situations to drive eco-
nomic development. The stakeholder dimension, originally derived from
managerial literature, can capture some important elements to illustrate
how various actors at intermediate levels of governance assign tasks, build
trust and co-ordinate activities in new and flexible policy architectures.
These missing linkages, located beyond traditional hierarchies are absent
from existing MLG literature.
LEPs are a major plank in the UK government plans for stimulating
economic growth and business development. Very soon after the formation
of the Coalition government in 2010, local areas were asked to submit pro-
posals to establish business-led (though multi-agency in nature) partner-
ships for identifying local priorities to stimulate economic growth. The
avowed aim was to provide more room for local manoeuvre by reducing
central government control, guidance and bureaucracy, and introduce new
incentivised mechanisms such as Regional Growth Funds, Enterprise
Zones and Growing Places Funds to drive the growth agenda. As a result
of the bidding process, The Ministers for BIS/CLG agreed to the eventual
220 JOYCE LIDDLE
creation of 39 LEPs to cover the whole geography of England. LEPs

replaced Regional Development Agencies, the bodies created over a decade
earlier to further economic development, skills and employment, promote
business and investment, and improve regional competitiveness. RDAs,
together with the panoply of regional architecture were dismantled by a
Coalition government committed to enterprise and determined to foster a
local, sub-regional, and city-region agenda. A Local Growth White Paper
(BIS, 2011) emphasised the need for
Local economies to prosper: and that parts of the country previously over-reliant on
public funding see resurgence in private sector enterprise and employment; and that
everyone gets to share in the resulting growth. (DCLG, 2011)
and a Localism Act (2012) embodied ideas on the ‘Big Society’, Prime
Minister Cameron’s core elements of a long-term radical reform of the way
in which public services are designed, delivered and measured (Liddle,
2010). Localism is regarded as essential to improving public services by
devolving power to communities and stripping out government control.
Under the new legislation local authorities have a new ‘general power of
competence’ and new freedoms and flexibilities, whereas communities have
new rights and powers to challenge decisions across a whole range of policy
areas (DCLG, 2010a, 2010b). The legislation is designed to invigorate local
communities and to ‘disperse power, adapt decisions to local circum-
stances, and innovate to deliver services more effectively and at lower cost’
(Greg Clark).
LEPs are sub-national, private-led leadership configurations
described as ‘the only show in town’ in respect of economic develop-
ment. Much political, popular, policy and academic attention that has
been directed towards LEPs (All Party Parliamentary Group on Local
Growth, 2012), and since their inception, concerns have been raised
about the legitimacy and accountability of these non-statutory partner-
ships, prompting accusations that they will be prone to capture by elite
business interests or other non-state actors/coalitions. Underlying issues
around ‘regional’ accountability, legitimacy and representativeness have
been a thorny issue for a succession of UK governments, especially
pertaining to the so-called ‘English Question’ in reference to the sub-
national democratic governance void. Local authorities are still ‘respon-
sible bodies’ for allocating what were formerly regeneration and other
monies emanating under previous local strategic partnerships (LSPs)
regimes (neighbourhood renewal and working neighbourhood funds),
but it is very unclear how they will administer funds under a ‘Big
Society’ agenda. Furthermore, there are very tenuous links between

LSPs and LEPs, and without clarity embodied in legislation, the lines
of accountability between local citizens-Local Authorities-LSPs-LEPs
are confused. The demise of the Audit Commission, the dismantling of
the National Performance Framework and the ‘unknowns’ on LEP
accountability mechanisms and performance measurement means that
we can only speculate on the future. In the sections to follow, findings
on LEPs are presented within an MLG framework to evaluate its utility
and assess any gaps and limitations.
MLG: A SUITABLE FRAMEWORK FOR

ANALYSIS OF LEPS?
According to Faludi (2012) the MLG concept arose in order to understand

the operation of the European Structural Funds, more especially Cohesion
Policy. Structural Policies were considered to be in flux, sub-national gov-
ernments were being mobilised in unconventional ways as funding for
Cohesion Policy grew. These changes led to the adoption of more open tex-
tured multi-level perspectives (Marks, 1993, p. 192), because instead of con-
sistent patterns of policy making, there was a complex set of multi-layered
decision-making processes reaching beneath and above state governments
(Faludi, 2012).
The concepts of MLG and partnership have been widely discussed over
the past 30 years to explain the changing nature of both domestic and inter-
national politics. Both continue to generate fierce debate (e.g., see Benz &
Eberlein, 1998). Scholars utilise MLG and partnership as part of a wider
methodological toolkit to include policy networks, social network analysis,
comparative policy analysis and historical institutionalism (Pollack, 1996;
Rhodes, 1997; Risse-Kappen, 1996). In addition, the European
Commission (EC) makes reference to MLG and partnership in its White
Paper on European Governance adopted in 2001. This document identified
the need for public authorities to co-operate, interact and broaden the
involvement of different stakeholders when drafting and implementing
Community policies (Committee of the Regions [COR], 2009). In June
2009 the Committee of the Regions (CoR) adopted its White Paper on
Multilevel Governance. In this document, the CoR formulates its vision on
the future European governance system that involves regional and local
authorities in the formulation and implementation of community policies.
222 JOYCE LIDDLE
European Union (EU) governance is multi-dimensional denoting that the

process of governing encompasses a multiplicity of political, legal, social
and executive actors. The latter operate along and across various levels of
authority of a regional, national and supranational nature. MLG has been,
in recent years, the most prominent approach in the description and analy-
sis of the European integration process (Bache, 2010).
In 1993, Marks originally focused the MLG (Type 1) concept on vertical
complexity, stressing the importance of governments, whereas later Bache
and Flinders (2004a, 2004b), though accepting it was still a flawed concept,
moved closer to a Type 2 definition encompassing governance with a
Shared concern with complexity, proliferating jurisdictions, the rise of non-state actors,
and challenges to state powers. (Bache & Flinders, 2004a, 2004b, pp. 1 11)
Both also moved the analysis from vertical levels of government based
on discrete territorial places, towards complex, overlapping networks that
were transforming the state architecture for achieving strategic co-
ordination and a more steering rather than rowing. For Bardach (1998)
partnership collaboration can be defined as any joint activity by two or
more agencies that are intended to increase public value by working
together, rather than separately. It is also an attempt to solve governance
problems through co-operation rather than control (Teisman & Klijn,
2002, pp. 197 205), whereby partners can draw on contributions and
resources from different agencies to realise goals more efficiently and effec-
tively, doing more for less, than alternative forms of governance. Thus,
partnership offers potential for inclusivity and better forms of government
than traditional institutions and representative democracy (Lowndes &
Skelcher, 1998, pp. 313 333). However, multi-dimensional co-operation is
not a natural act (Barnard, 1938), so social purpose as well as material gain
and individual interests are crucial. Moore and Pierre (1988, pp. 169 178)
proposed that both public and private elites voluntaristically occupy politi-
cal space created by democratic gaps in governance, and where pragmatism
overcame ideology.
Partnership literature uncritically accepted that elites willingly collabo-
rate, and minimised power relationships and history, expectations and in-
built professional assumptions, but the inevitable conflict must be managed
for effective working (Darwin, 1999, pp. 125 138; Diamond, 2001). The
size of resources are important, the type of people involved, discretion they
have, whether or not the relationships are formal through contractual
agreements, or informal and based on trust. Diversity of multi-
organisational relationships has led researchers to develop numerous
typologies and classificatory frameworks; located on a continuum, with co-

operation, as loosely coupled arrangements at the lower end of the conti-
nuum, co-ordination located at the centre, and collaboration at the high
end (Huxham & Barr, 1993). Very little research focused on improving
partnerships performance and it is rare for partnerships to explicitly evalu-
ate their work. There are ‘how to do guides’ on setting up partnerships
(Vangen & Huxham, 1993, cited Mitchell & McQuaid, 2001, pp. 395 496),
and processes models (Mackintosh, 1992, cited Mitchell & McQuaid, 2001,
pp. 395 496). However, despite these toolkits, such partnerships struggled
to involve communities as elites traditionally failed to shed or share power,
or accept that mature communities can develop their own ideas and imple-
ment their own visions (Robinson & Shaw, 1998, pp. 24 42).
Task forces became a preferred and emergent model of adaptable and
entrepreneurial organisation, and they thrived in uncertain conditions, as
they developed, dissolved and reconstituted as new needs arise (Pike, 2000,
p. 3). The LEP, business-driven model of sub-national governance, with
local authority and other state involvement takes much of its philosophy
and structure from a mixture of the city-region model and the flexible
‘Task Force’ model based on a ‘trouble shooting’ role for multi-agency lea-
ders to tackle sub-national economic/social decline. Leadership is a crucial
element in sub-national fortunes, and it is generally agreed that entrepre-
neurialism in all sectors is beneficial. Unlike the shallow politics of oppor-
tunism found in Manchester (Peck & Tickell, 1994, pp. 55 78) and
conflicts in Sheffield (Peck & Tickell, 1994, pp. 16 46), a dominant busi-
ness class-lacking cohesion (Harding, 1991, pp. 295 317) or the indolent
groups only concerned with profit (Cooke & Morgan, 1993, pp. 543 564),
the autonomous actors who only act voluntarily to gain wider leverage
(Bassett, 1996, pp. 539 555), business elites are also ‘political opportunity
structures’ in which businesses choose an appropriate action repertoire to
focus on the critical factors for success, develop frames of reference, mobi-
lise collective support, and broaden appeal beyond the business class
(Lipsky, 1968, pp. 1144 58). It is therefore essential on multi-agency
partnerships of state and non-state actors for entrepreneurial leaders to
turn external stimuli into internal responses, and secure collective goals
(Bennett & Krebs, 1994, pp. 119 140).
We currently lack a proper understanding of the ways in which business
people develop a ‘civic consciousness’ or the diverse motives that drive peo-
ple to become involved, and existing research failed to recognise the com-
plex interplays between state and non-state actors in intermediate spaces,
where some partnerships share similar objectives, operations and personnel,
224 JOYCE LIDDLE
but others have quite different compositions and objectives within overlap-
ping jurisdictions (Wood, Valler, & North, 1998, pp. 10 27). Public leaders
(political and agency heads) had always been drawn into elite activities to
legitimise activities, purposes and rationale, and LEPs appear to be no dif-
ferent in that respect. Uncertainties and ambiguity in policy directions
means that business elites need to work alongside public leaders to clarify,
and help to adapt policies to local needs. As the context and space for col-
lective action enlarged, state and non-state elites have sought to increase
their autonomy, and indeed have been granted privileged access, to act
through a grapevine, informality and loosely coupled arrangements such as
LEPs (Kanter, 1994, pp. 96 112)
LEPs typify networked partnerships created at sub-national level of gov-
ernance in 39 geographical locations across England (some at sub-regional
level but some covering a whole region). They are complex, overlapping
informal networks based on discrete functional areas. They vary in cover-
age and are not coterminous with existing administrative and government
arrangements, and the purpose is to foster a sub-national and local enter-
prise growth agenda by bringing together key partner agencies. There is no
legislative basis to the formation of each LEP and they challenge our tradi-
tional notions of democratic accountability.
A lack of formal mechanisms or institutional frameworks can create dif-
ficulties in holding LEPs together, but the strength of multi-agency leader-
ship, the informal interactions and longevity of relationships provide a
historical cohesion. LEPs have broad agendas, a shared vision that location
was more than profit/investment-based activities and non-business elements
of community governance were equally important. Co-operation, does not
necessarily depend on altruism, personal honour, common purpose, inter-
nalised norms, or shared beliefs but in a set of values embodied in an exist-
ing culture. Where there is a long history of harmonious multi-agency
engagement LEPs have had some early successes, in particular those who
were designated as Enterprise Zones of those capable of successfully bid-
ding from the RGF and Capacity Funds. LEPs were a clear attempt by the
UK coalition government to move decision-making away from purely state
forms of decision-making and to decentralise decisions more locally at the
functional economic level.
Congruence or communion cannot be assumed on any partnership, espe-
cially an LEP where members are drawn from different agencies with dif-
ferent socio-political interests, and a fragmented business class representing
the interests of varied business organisations. Not all will share the same
allegiance, but elites share a partnership based around articulation of
locality interests, and energetic lobbying of the central state. Elites have
bought into a set of strategies to find solutions to, in some cases, perennial
and intractable problems, but the overriding objective is to regenerate their
locality, and choose appropriate projects to facilitate this. Already there
are conflicts even within the business community on LEPs, as the following
commentary indicates
Former president of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce’s appointment as the

Chair of the LEP has caused fury across other business communities and branded a
‘stitch up’. The Chamber will turn into its own little fiefdom because of its cosy rela-
tionship with Birmingham City Council.
LEP elites co-operate on the basis of relational contracts, based on trust,

mutuality and collaboration dependent on a series of repeated transactions
over the long term (Kay, 1993). Despite all contributing to an LEP propo-
sal and set of strategies, in the early stages there were no explicit rules, reg-
ulations and formality, because commitment and flexible responses were
critical, and achieved by free flows of information. There was also an impli-
cit, rather than explicit understanding that the partners must continue to
co-operate in a series of repeated transactions for mutual benefit. On LEPs
all elites have signed up to improve local conditions, and claim that local
dependency is more important than self-interest. It is cautionary to note,
however, that interviews do not always reveal true feelings, and actors may
be pursuing their individual goals at the same time as furthering the inter-
ests of the locality. Strategies are formulated and implemented to pursue
projects aimed at meeting unmet economic, social and cultural needs, even
though it would be interesting to examine more deeply beneath the rhetoric
and hype to investigate real motives. Obviously business people have
employment and inward investment uppermost in their minds, and all elites
are concerned with their career paths but all LEP members claim to have
altruistic motives, and will be pursuing growth strategies.
In general all LEPs were created to provide strategic leadership by set-
ting out local priorities, and to help to rebalance the economy towards the
private sector, as well as creating the right environment for business and
enterprise. They had the primary purpose of providing a clear vision to
drive sustainable private-sector led growth and job creation, and to help
foster an integrated approach to transport, housing and planning. They
were expected to work with Central Government to set out key investment
priorities, including transport infrastructure and supporting or co-
ordinating project delivery in their LEP functional area. LEP Boards also
co-ordinated proposals or bids directly for the Regional Growth Fund and
226 JOYCE LIDDLE
for a Capacity Fund to build up research capacity. They are expected to

support high growth businesses, for example through involvement in bring-
ing together and supporting consortia to run new growth hubs. Co-
operation has been encouraged around industrial clusters, for example the
aerospace industry in the North West and South West.
LEPs were set an ambitious deadline of September 2010 for joint
public private proposals, which meant that partners had just 70 days to
negotiate territorial alliances between stakeholders with a backdrop of local
politics, histories of cross-boundary and multi-sector collaboration, busi-
ness views and the logic of ‘functional economic geographies’ (Pugalis,
2011, p. 7). The different spatial levels are expected to work together in the
interests of the functional area, but it is up to elites to deal with cross
boundary conflicts and work across territorial units. One major problem is
the link between LSPs at district and county levels and the exact nature of
that linkage. LSPs brought together all key state, non-state and societal
agencies in a given locality to allocate Neighbourhood Renewal Funds,
Working Neighbourhood, Total Place and other funding streams, but apart
from the latter, the others are being phased out. The ‘Big Society’ and
‘Localism’ agendas are taking over the agenda (contentious as they both
are) and the role of LSPs in developing Sustainable Community Strategies
is still hanging on by a thread, though without the vital funding streams to
maintain their activities, and in the light of public sector cuts, many LSPs
are being slimmed down and reconfigured to become either commissioning
bodies, productivity panels or whole systems forums for achieving effi-
ciency gains and ‘lean’ management approaches.
Many of the activities of regional agencies such as RDAs, GOs and
others have either been clawed back by central government, hived off to
other agencies or ceased altogether. The Department of Business,
Innovation and Skills (BIS) established Local BIS teams in each region,
but each is manned with only 3 or 4 personnel and will be responsible for
many business support activities, as well as offering support to LEPs, the
business community and local authorities. Numerous territorial uncertain-
ties remain to be explained more fully.
There are varied and different categories of business representation on each of the 39
LEPs and there is no ‘one size fits all’.
In the absence of legislation, it is clear that LEP Board members have

no ‘real’ legitimacy to act on behalf of either civic society or the ‘locality’
or ‘place’, as their activities are relational rather than contractual, and the
level of direct and indirect involvement varies between programmes/
projects. For some activities LEP will act as the commissioning, rather
than the delivery body so they may exert influence rather than power. This
will rather depend on the governance and accountability mechanisms put
into place. It will also depend on how their performance is measured, and
by whom? From a moral basis, which guides behaviour, elites on LEPs (in
theory, at least) are acting on behalf of the locality, and claim to have a
social rather than financial gain as their main motive. Regularity of partici-
pation in decision-making, the profile of actors and the ability to harness
resources depends on many variables, not least legislative/mandatory or
other obligations. Financial risk will be a consideration because, although
resources committed to LEP activities are not of a personal nature, the lack
of real funds means that they must harness tangible (private and public
funds, staff, premises) and intangible (knowledge, information, stakeholder
management, capacity to lobbying) resources to achieve their strategies.
They must also seek legitimacy for their actions.
Clearly LEPs are a new form of governance and exemplify increased
participation of non-state actors; indeed they were deliberately created to
be business-led and involve a range of key stakeholders, but hardly any of
the 39 LEPs in England have members from the voluntary, third-sector or
citizens’ groups. Instead they consist of business, local authority and other
elites but there is a question mark over how well they are satisfying citizen
concerns, or whether any LEPs have feedback loops in place to citizens/
publics/individuals/other organisations or have the capacity to respond to
public opinions. On some LEPs local authority representatives are board
members, so there is an indirect link to the general public, but most LEP
Board members see their legitimacy and accountability drawn from the
organisations they represent.
LEPs are partnerships that encompass state and non-state actors work-
ing in partnership to achieve economic aims, so the MLG framework pro-
vides a useful starting point for analysis, but it has a variety of flaws.
According to Stubbs (2005), a major critic of MLG, the main value of the
concept of MLG is that it allows an understanding of the complexity and
dispersal of authority between levels of governance, vertically and horizon-
tally between states and non-state actors and between public-private part-
nerships. Faludi (2012) concurs that MLG is the interaction between layers
of government, each responsible for a given territory. However, two critical
weakness of MLG are that it fails to challenge traditional notions of demo-
cratic accountability because it downplays the issues of power relations and
accountability mechanisms. For Stubbs it is simply a re-hashed version of
neo-pluralism characterised by diverse interests distributed across various
228 JOYCE LIDDLE
dimensions, though he acknowledges that some later work centred on coali-

tions and links between the state and organised business. His strongest cri-
tique is directed towards those who provide nebulous examples of policy
communities alongside more established interest groups. Faludi challenges
the idea that territories are fixed entities, but instead are malleable social
constructs. As Conzelmann (2008, p. 26) asserted
Many implementation networks are situated at regional or local level but their bound-
aries often do not converge with administrative delineations in the sense that they are
ephemeral, based on functional need rather than regional empowerment or federalism
LEPs are not based on territories in the strictest sense of the term
whereby state governments has jurisdiction, because although each is
located in a functional economic area, the actors had a certain amount
of discretion on which agencies and actors became members, at inception.
Each LEP sits (hierarchically at least) between central and local govern-
ment, but are specific sub-national bodies driving a localism agenda and
the local state is but one actor on the partnership. They do not sit nested
in a hierarchical constitutional order, not only because the United
Kingdom does not possess a constitution, but they are deliberately fluid
forms of governance, with imprecise boundaries and not coterminous
with existing structures; in most cases they overlap with existing struc-
tures. They are forums influencing societal decision-making and blur the
lines between public and private as they are a deliberate creation to pro-
duce integrated packages of activities and coherent outcomes on growth
and business development. LEPs are co-ordinating, decision-making
bodies where each member brings their own legitimacy and representative
accountability, and though the agencies involved have no democratic
mandate, each claims representativeness from their own agency. They
are, as Rhodes (1997, p. 660) defined, ‘self-organising, inter-
organisational networks with the characteristics of inter-dependence, and
regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by participants’,
however it is questionable how much autonomy each LEP has from the
central state, given they are a creation of the UK coalition government
intend on pursuing a pro-business and pro-growth ideology. They are
also largely dependent on state forms of funding, though expected to be
self-financing in time. Furthermore, and contrary to Rhodes definition of
governance, trust relationships are not a given. In the case of a number
of LEPs trust between actors was fairly absent in the beginning and even
now, some LEPs are yet not developing trusting relationships, as LEP
partner suggested
Trust had to be built up by all partners. You cannot measure trust in output terms but
it has to be there to succeed. (interview)
All LEPs are led by business leaders, and all had to involve the ‘local
state’ but each LEP has engaged different elements of the local state (in
some elected representative members are part of the LEP; others have
administrative or executive leaders; and yet others have members from
other parts of the local state such as health service, work and pensions
etc.). They are shifting constellations of interests, with some involving aux-
iliary actors such as University Vice Chancellors, leaders of Utilities, rural
interests, maritime, military or voluntary, charity sector representatives).
LEPs are deliberately constructed partnerships based on economic func-
tional areas and though the rhetoric from central government is about
decentralising decision-making to localities, in effect decisions are taken by
a few selective elites, rather than a broader involvement of citizen needs.
LEPs do not have formalised authority in the same way that state bodies
do, and none of their activities are enshrined legally (though there are plans
to enhance their powers over time; such as in planning and transport).
For Faludi (2012) Type 1 and Type 2 MLG differ in that the former is
firmly focused on interactions between hierarchical levels of government,
but the latter has become ubiquitous in organising spill over in the absence
of authoritative co-ordination, with Hooghe and Marks (2010) regarding
Type 2 as playing a decisive role in eliciting knowledge and preferences of
citizens in specific places. The evidence on LEPs suggests otherwise, that
citizen preferences are not directly expressed, other than via indirect lin-
kages through elected representatives (but not all LEPs have any elected
representatives as they all vary).
What is missing from both Type 1 and Type 2 analyses is the awareness
of different types of territory, and how states are changing in different parts
of the world. LEPs are a good example of territorial management if terri-
tory is the area over which government and state formations exercise juris-
diction and where bureaucratic and political elites exercise power, then
LEP areas challenge this notion because each of the LEP areas is config-
ured differently, depending on local economic need, and each LEP engages
a different constellation of actors and agencies. They are varied and have
mixtures of state and non-state actors and agencies, as already suggested.
For Stubbs (2005) MLG exemplifies Western Euro-centricism with its
emphasis firmly placed on the role of the state, but he argues that in dif-
ferent parts of the world (he was focusing his attention on South East
Europe) the role of the state and how policies are implemented differs
230 JOYCE LIDDLE
greatly from Western Europe. His examples illustrate the shifting archi-
tecture of governance in which new configurations of actors, agencies,
themes and initiatives challenge engage in governance. These multi-level,
multi-actor, multi-sited, political, policy and practice arenas are more rea-
listic and can involve a host of think tanks, universities, NGOs, policy
initiatives. The inadequacies of MLG led Stubbs to call for scholars to
adopt either a policy transfer framework or a political anthropological
and ethnographic approach to enhance understanding on who the actors
are and how policies are carried out. Likewise Faludi (2012) prefers the
term ‘multi-level polities’ rather than Type 1 or Type 2 MLG, because he
acknowledges that Type 1 does not qualify as governance because of the
focus on interactions between hierarchical tiers of government; Type 2 is
about governance, but far from being multi-level it is much more about
diffuse patterns of interactions.
Clarke (2004) developed the concept of ‘assemblages of political
discourses’ which change, shape and produce ‘hybrids, paradoxes, tensions
and incompatibilities, rather than coherent implementations of a unified
discourse and plan’. In a similar vein to Clarke (2008) refers to ‘territorial
assemblages that define new material, cultural and discursive relationships’
as more appropriate contingent and non-geographically specific than the
neo-liberal forums identified in MLG, and Sassen sees ‘assemblages’ as
spaces where local, regional, national and supranational actors come
together (2006), but for Rosenau this can lead to fragmentation as
public and private sectors collaborate and compete in shifting coalitions
(1999).
Undoubtedly LEPs are partnerships in which actors interact in spaces,
each representing vertical and hierarchical levels of government, adminis-
tration and business as well as other interests such as universities, third sec-
tor etc. Places are economically, socially and culturally produced as
meanings are generated by complex interactions between various actors in
their diverse social, political, professional and other worlds. LEPs are clas-
sic neo-liberal hybrid forums with the sole purpose of fostering a business
and growth agenda. They are a good example of the assemblages referred
to by Peck and Tickell and Sassen where local interests come together, but
they are also symptomatic of fragmentation of state forms as state and
non-state actors collaborate within their economic functional area, but
compete with other LEPs for inward investment and development and
growth funding from national and European states. Furthermore, and since
their inception, concerns have been raised about the legitimacy and
accountability of these non-statutory partnerships, prompting accusations
that they will be prone to capture by elite business interests or other non-
state actors/coalitions. Accountability, legitimacy and representativeness
are perennial issues in a modernised British state where the lack of a writ-
ten constitution exacerbates some of the problems, as the following discus-
sion shows.
ACCOUNTABILITY TO WHOM? LEPS AS

MULTI-AGENCY PARTNERSHIPS
In representative democracies, all branches of government remain publicly

accountable, have obligations to provide satisfactory explanations for their
activities, and exercise power on behalf of their people (Aucoin & Jarvis,
2005)), and accountability has been the subject of many scholarly articles,
books and much discussion (Acar & Robertson, 2004). It can mean differ-
ent things to different people and has been used as a synonym for good
governance, transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness,
responsibility and integrity. It now stands as a general term for any
mechanism that makes powerful institutions respond to their particular
publics (Mulgan, 2003). It is fundamentally concerned with (re)distribution
of power (Flinders, 2001) or ‘produced within particular discourses that
shape the logics of appropriate action’ (Newman, 2001, p. 30). In the
United Kingdom new state arrangements in which state and non-state
actors work across organisational boundaries to achieve commonly agreed
objectives have exposed gaps in institutional coverage and challenged
democratic accountability and scrutiny; both remain key unresolved issues
at the heart of a modernised British state (Liddle, 2007, p. 398).
It is important not to confuse accountability with legitimacy, where the
starting point in the organisational studies literature is Weber’s introduc-
tion of the concept into sociological theory. He loosely defined it as social
practice orientated towards maxims or conformity to general social norms
and more formal laws or rules (Deephouse & Shuman, 2008, p. 50).
Accountability represents one of the basic values or principles of democ-
racy and is crucial for not only improving public performance, but in reviv-
ing trust in governments. The global significance of accountability lies not
only in growing public demand for better services, greater responsiveness
and citizen participation (Milakovich, 2003). The shift in the nature of state
formations in favour of market driven policies and institutions within neo-
liberal ideologies has changed the dimensions of political accountability as
232 JOYCE LIDDLE
traditional, vertical bureaucracies gave way to horizontal; pluralistic struc-

tures, such as LEPs. Moreover, there has been a worldwide trend towards
direct accountability to citizens interest groups, NGOs and the media
(Bovens, 2003). More crucially with regard to LEPs, the importance of
constellations of public-private, and non-state, or para-state partnerships,
are now a significant element of new forms of public service delivery, albeit
ones that largely exclude citizens directly.
Partnerships, such as LEPs, are an appropriate response to the chal-
lenges of a networked society (Castells, 2000) and for Bovaird (2004,
p. 206) those created between state and non-state actors can play a useful
role but only in very restricted circumstances because partnership working
within the private sector or those involving public-private consortia must
be scrutinised very carefully for anti-competitive behaviour or granting pri-
vate firms the right to act monopolistically. He does, however, accept that
public agencies can longer act alone in tackling the ‘wicked problems’ and
must be prepared to work with a wide range of other organisations in the
public, private and voluntary sectors (Bovaird, 2004, p. 208). However,
partnerships mean heterogeneity, fragmentation, blurring of responsibilities
and accountabilities. The new models for delivering public services in net-
worked partnerships led to the emergence of multiple accountabilities, and
the associated complications for public accountability in New Zealand
and Australia (Mulgan, 2003), and these multiple stakeholder lines of
accountability have been examined by Gomes and Liddle in Brazil and the
United Kingdom (2010), and Salemenin and Lehto in Finland (2012,
pp. 147 162).
The need to appreciate stakeholder orientation is essential as states can
no longer act alone or have the financial means for manoeuvre. Solutions
to public policy issues tend to be ‘quick fixes’ where not all likely causes or
long-term effects of proposed actions are taken into account (Hofmeister &
Borchert, 2004, p. 218). This is particularly true of economic development,
where the UK government has been pursuing a policy of growth at sub-
national governance and a survey of all 39 LEPs, when asked to say who
they believed they are accountable to, revealed four main stakeholders, that
is the LEP (for setting local priorities), the local community (to improve
economic growth), central government (to provide Value for money for
public funds) and to the private sector, but crucially in all literature central
government urges communication and transparency to all stakeholders
(BIS, 2013). In the following section the stakeholder model is further
examined.
STAKEHOLDER MODELS AND MULTIPLE

ACCOUNTABILITIES
Earlier analyses of sub-national governance offered partial and particularis-

tic insights but failed to capture the complexity, fluidity, flexibility, advo-
cacy or internal and external forces. Therefore LEPs, as another example
of sub-national governance offer interesting opportunities to draw on sta-
keholder theories, because of the unique nature of each ‘place’ and different
elite engagement, though direct comparisons are difficult. The multi-faceted
nature of sub-national change and linkages between the levels, require
explanatory frameworks that allow us to isolate key actors and agencies
and understand the complexities and power relationships in ‘managing’
sub-national space. Cultural, political, historical and external dimensions
of change, and micro and macro elements can be incorporated into the ana-
lysis to explore how stakeholders ‘strategise’ in spaces. Gomes, Liddle, and
Gomes’s (2010) five-sided model of stakeholder influence will be used to
examine LEP strategy and decision-making processes later in this section,
but first there is an exploration of the stakeholder concept.
The stakeholder concept emerged in the 1960s as a simple but controver-
sial idea, and was popularised by Freeman (1984, p. 46) and defined as ‘any
group of individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an
organisation’s objectives’. The ambiguity and indeterminacy of the term led
writers to distinguish between the descriptive, instrumental, and normative
aspects Donaldson and Preston (1995, pp. 65 91). The concept had been
used mainly in the field of politics, with little empirical evidence to illustrate
its economic or social advantages, and had been challenged because it is
based on a pluralist premise that a multitude of actors with diverse and
competing interests can be managed by assessing, arbitrating and allocating
resources. This created an imbalance between those who are managing and
those being managed, implies a hierarchy, and is not always a means of get-
ting from exclusion to inclusion, because it failed to deal with the structural
reality of redistributive conflict between stakeholders’ (Froud, Haslam,
Suckdev, Shaoul, & Williams, 1996, p. 120).
Freeman’s (1984) definition is still considered by most scholars to be the
classical norm, but six important additional conceptual qualifications can
be identified, a legitimate claim on the organisation (Cornell & Shapiro,
1987, pp. 5 14; Evan & Freeman, 1988, pp. 75 84; Carroll, 1989;
Alkhafaji, 1989, pp. 61 75; Hill & Jones, 1992, pp. 131 154), formal con-
tracts (Freeman & Evan, 1990, pp. 337 359), direct or critical impact on
234 JOYCE LIDDLE
survival (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987, pp. 5 14), a moral obligation to make
decisions for fair distribution of harms and benefits (Carroll, 1989;
Langtry, 1994, pp. 431 443; Donaldson & Preston, 1995, pp. 65 91), risk-
bearing, either financial or otherwise (Clarkson, 1994). For Lukes (1974a),
pluralists believed that the focus of power was determined by who prevailed
in decision-making, or where conflict was observable, but these were inade-
quate mainly because the structures of decision-making determined the
kinds of explanations and outcomes. His three-dimensional model of power
identified (i) overt conflict, that is A has power to get B to do something B
would otherwise not do, (ii) non-decision-making aspects, identified by
Bacharach and Baratz (1962, pp. 946 952) and (iii) a radical structural
view of decisive socialisation processes, in which A educated and persuaded
B to accept an assigned role, and conflict was diffused. The latter, more
insidious and unobtrusive type of power, or management of meaning
allowed power to be retained by dominant interests (Fulop & Linstead,
1999, p. 125). A fourth, relational dimension of power showed how each
partner to the interaction is constrained by roles, contextually specific prac-
tices, techniques procedures and forms of knowledge routinely developed
to shape the conduct (Fulop & Linstead, 1999, p. 126).
Observable and non-observable aspects of power are notoriously diffi-
cult to discern and secrecy and informality lubricates elite decision-making.
Wider social influences are rarely challenged by groups excluded from
decision-making, and as has already been noted, in the case of LEPs, third-
sector organisations have been conspicuous by their absence. A report
showed that despite ‘nearly nine out of ten voluntary and community
groups interested in being part of LEPs, only 15% had been approached’
(Townsend, 2010). Undoubtedly LEPs capture the flavour of ‘the highly
fragmented, networked shape of sub-national power structures’ (Pike, 1997,
p. 3), and exemplify a poorly institutional context, increased non-
democratic input, and a patchwork of governmental and non-governmental
elites trying to regulate space (Mawson, 1997). They also confirm earlier
views of the significance of business input (Davies, 1995). Figs. 1 and 2
illustrate simplified models of primary and secondary stakeholders.
The governance and formation of LEPs was not predetermined by central
government, except that they were expected to exemplify collaboration
between business and civic leaders, normally including equal representation
on the Board, and there was a strong steer to work closely with universities
and further education colleges. Central Government made it clear that they
had no intention of defining LEPs in legislation, instead they would be
‘loosely coupled’ and collaborative arrangements, with constitutional and
Fig. 1. Primary Stakeholders on LEPs.
Fig. 2. Secondary Stakeholders on LEPs.
legal status a matter for the partnership. The Board was required to have a
prominent business person as Chair and ‘sufficiently robust governance’
structures and proper ‘accountability’ mechanisms in place for delivery. The
key criterion for governance was that each LEP would be structured to meet
local circumstances and opportunities within a ‘Localist’ agenda, but inter-
estingly few local citizens or groups representing citizens are consulted or
236 JOYCE LIDDLE
involved on the activities of LEPs, despite the fact that all 39 LEPs claim to
be accountable to local communities. There is limited evidence to show any
mechanisms for engaging community, civic or third-sector stakeholders.
Despite the fact that each LEP Board submitted an LEP proposal outlin-
ing their proposed strategies for growth, many elites are pursuing very differ-
ent and innovative approaches. Indeed the uncertainties and ambiguous
mandatory guidance has left a vacuum for entrepreneurial action to fill.
Flexibility had been crucial in formulating and elaboration of strategic agen-
das, drawing on organisational resources and information to implement cho-
sen strategies. LEP Boards need to manipulate symbols and images of
growth to foster an ideology of transformation, as they pursue growth led
strategies; an expectation in the BIS/CLG agreement for their establishment.
The balance of direct and indirect power/interest will change over time, as
will the elites involved and specific projects/programmes identified. Some
elite stakeholders remain powerful in some circumstances but become less
powerful at other times. The unity, diversity, alliance or rifts between stake-
holders changes in line with circumstances, and level, nature and frequency
of communication impacts on strategic direction. The LEP regimes will be
sustained by their exclusionary nature, but they do have to maintain unity of
purpose and frequent contact between elites, if survival is to be guaranteed.
Specific events can often trigger stakeholder formation (Johnson &
Scholes, 1993/1997), and already evidence shows that in the short life of
LEPs key critical incidences and formal/informal inter-connections have
galvanised elite support for strategic aims. Rhetoric and symbolism are
used to remove obstacles to change and to convince detractors that a parti-
cular course of action is not only necessary, but vital. These activities legiti-
mise activities and each LEP is developing symbolic projects appropriate to
local needs. Elites may have overt executive power (those who have proved
themselves the most powerful in fulfilling contracts or doing their duties),
reputational power (the degree of respect they command) or cultural power
(transmitted through ideas, active persuasion, through values, and codes of
conduct that prevail). Elite agency representatives also use the media in
their own way to achieved credibility, or notoriety, in some cases.
Gomes and Liddle (2010) proposed a five-sided model of stakeholder
influence which can be applied to LEP strategy and decision-making pro-
cesses, to include the following:
• The Limitation cluster (who has the power to limit actions of LEPs?)
• The Collaboration cluster (which interactions with partners influence
strategy?)
• The Inspection cluster (who are LEPs accountable to?)

• The Orientation cluster (who sets the main agenda of LEPs?)
• The Legitimacy cluster (how democratic are LEPs?).
The power to limit the actions of LEPs (limitation cluster) is initially

held by the Coalition government, and the Ministers of BIS and CLG, as
they were responsible for determining whether or not an LEP should be
created. Moreover, until (and whether) LEPs are able to lever in private
finance they are dependent on Regional Growth Fund, Enterprise Zone
and Capacity Fund monies, if successful, and any asset transfer from
RDAs. There is an expectation that each LEP Board will seek to draw on
other agency resources (state and non-state), but there is no guarantee that
these funds will be available. This rather depends on how well the relation-
ships between agencies develop and how easy it is to co-ordinate a variety
of different funding streams. The collaboration cluster is perhaps the most
well-developed of all influences on LEP activities, due mainly to the fact
that in many sub-regions multi-agency actors have now long established
relationships within economic development agencies. Despite the usual turf
wars between local authorities, and the different styles of operating
between state and non-state agencies, many local authorities and other
public agencies have established good working relationships. As explained
earlier, the inspection cluster is perhaps the most ambiguous and vague
influence on LEP activities and one that will be clarified once legislation is
enacted to show how they are accountable and measured on performance,
both internally and externally. In line with the Coalition government’s
expectation, business is afforded a privileged role on LEPs and the business
growth and enterprise agenda has been firmly set, though there is an expec-
tation that business will work harmoniously with local authorities and
other public/service and auxiliary agencies. The Legitimacy cluster is very
problematic indeed as LEPs are ‘loosely coupled’ entities somewhere on a
continuum between a partnership and a network. Most of the elites on
LEPs are self-appointed, and not elected by anyone. LEPs therefore sit out-
side the democratic system of electoral politics, and as such are not subject
to the same democratic control as elected politicians.
Strategies and agendas have been set by the Board of LEPs, and of
course the composition of LEPs varies between different sub-national local-
ities across England. In some cases the business voice dominates; others
display more harmonious state and non-state relationships and strategies
have been agreed by consensus; and in some auxiliary elites/service elites
have been allowed to influence the agendas/strategies. Nearly all LEPs are
238 JOYCE LIDDLE
served by officers from the collaborating local authorities or chambers of

commerce, who are able to draw on relevant skills, expertise and technical
knowhow from across the partnership. Most LEP proposals indicate that
the Boards will commission delivery agencies to carry out specific projects,
although until there is some clarity on funding, they may have to draw on
the partnership agencies for delivery of existing or proposed programmes.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has developed an initial stakeholder analysis to seek to explain
the evolution of a new form of governance (LEPs) across sub-national
functional economic areas across England. It has examined how coherent
and locally dependent these bodies are, and in addition to governance,
power and influence between stakeholders, it has considered multiple
accountabilities and some of the limitations of MLG analyses. LEPs are
‘loosely coupled’ pragmatic arrangements that encourage locally contingent
solutions for localised problems, and this new localism is an attempt to
devolve power and resources from the central state to sub-national partner-
ships and structures to deliver what works (Coaffee & Headlam, 2007)
However, they are deficient in democratic terms, as well as lacking real
power and capacity to exercise any serious influence on the state apparatus
(Geddes, 2006), but rhetorically at least they are an espousal by the
Coalition government of bringing state and non-state actors together in
localities to identify priorities and effect economic/social and cultural trans-
formation. The lack of explicit funding and the expectation that private
capital can make up the shortfall in state funding of services restricts their
capacity to be effective. LEPs as regimes of ‘autonomous, self-organising
governance networks’, part of the mix of market, hierarchy and network of
contemporary governance are deeply problematic and flawed arrange-
ments, because they need to harness a host of tangible (private and public
funds, staff, premises) and intangible (knowledge, information, stakeholder
management, capacity to lobbying) resources to achieve their strategies.
They must, above all, seek the necessary legitimacy for their actions.
Leadership of ‘place’ presents challenges across policy and spatial bound-
aries, not least the lengthy and complex supply chains, vertically between
different tiers of governance, but also horizontal spheres of influence
across, and between policy arenas. Seeking legitimacy for actions and
drawing together various policy agendas should be aimed at building
confidence in ‘places’. Any escalation in social problems has the potential

for greater conflict/unrest, so leaders’ decisions need support from those
people affected by decisions. Building trust is perhaps the greatest challenge
faced by leaders, with so many groups still excluded from political pro-
cesses (Liddle, 2010, pp. 657 664)
Moving beyond some of the early speculations and formative analyses,
this chapter examined some interactions in space and multiple accountabil-
ities of LEPs, their fluidity and continual reformulations. It shifts the
debate closer to developing a multi-dimensional accountability framework,
though there is much work still to be done on taking various forms of
accountability and testing them out more rigorously in LEPs.1
A central argument of the chapter is that LEPs are contemporary
English leadership forums and an important part of what Macleod
(2011) and Deas (2013) refer to as the new post-political and post-
democratic landscape. It is suggested that such leadership is more visible
nowadays, with a greater need to account for actions. The combination
of the legacy of neo-liberalism, the crises in economies and the challenges
to those leading and managing change suggest that we need new and
alternative ways of thinking about and conceptualising the nature of
accountability, legitimacy and representativeness. The multi-dimensional
framework based on the findings in the two cases adds to the debates and
directions in urban and regional leadership research. Each LEP has its
own distinct understanding of ‘accountability’ and thus whom they are
accountable to and for what, differs considerably, and legitimacy and
representativeness have widely differing interpretations from the perspec-
tive of agents/actors on each LEP. Most LEPs recognise that they have
multiple accountabilities (see 2013 Smith Institute Report and House of
Commons (HOC)), but how these are operationalized and have distinc-
tive elements and understandings.
LEPs have emerged as the official conduit for government to communi-
cate with localities on, not only economic development matters, but a series
of other spatial concerns housing, transport etc. This raises some signifi-
cant dilemmas for leadership, legitimacy and accountability, and they will
have an evolving role as LEPs gain more responsibilities and resources over
time. Local Growth Plans and EU Structural Funds Investment Strategies,
for example necessitate a rethink of the original governance structures and
accountability frameworks for LEPs. How has each LEP adapted to the
evolution and accruing of new powers/responsibilities? Representativeness
and representation differs across LEPs, as does engagement, transparency
and communication. Few LEPs take direct citizen and public opinions into
240 JOYCE LIDDLE
account and some are developing trusting relationships, but the variability
in this respect makes it difficult to generalise.
Finally, the chapter has moved the debates from Type 1 and Type 2
MLG, by recognising that earlier frameworks provided a useful entrée to
analyse sub-national governance, but both are insufficient to deal with the
many complexities of modern day state and non-state governance forums,
such as LEPs with a myriad of formal and informal interactions across
multiple spatial levels of governance and jurisdictions. LEPs are intermedi-
ate forms of governance, located between the central and local state, and
involving a wider range state and non-state stakeholder participation
(though limited in citizen and community involvement). As voluntaristic,
complex decision-making forums beyond traditional institutional hierar-
chies and representative democracy, they enable each stakeholder to occupy
political space in democratic gaps and seek pragmatic and entrepreneurial
solutions to those wicked issues surrounding economic development. Using
stakeholder analysis to address multiple accountabilities tests the efficacy
of existing MLG frameworks, and fills some gaps in knowledge on how sta-
keholders assign tasks, build trust, and co-ordinate activities to achieve
common ends within a new policy architecture. The chapter has moved the
analysis some way towards dealing with MLG failure to challenge tradi-
tional notions of democratic accountability and the significance of analys-
ing power relationships.
NOTE
1. The author is working on a separate academic journal paper to determine the

various types of accountability mechanisms LEP members adhere to.
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APPENDIX: MAP OF 39 ENGLISH LOCAL ENTERPRISE

PARTNERSHIPS
Source: Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0 www.gov.uk/
bis-11-768-local-enterprise-partnerships-boundary-map-august-2013.pdf
METAGOVERNANCE, RISK AND
NUCLEAR POWER IN BRITAIN
Keith Baker
ABSTRACT
Purpose This chapter argues that the concept of metagovernance

offers an alternative to multi-level governance (MLG) for understanding
how policy is delivered through complex networks. Whereas MLG por-
trays the state as a diminished entity, metagovernance argues for a
strong, capable state that can govern through the deployment of policy
tools. The chapter identifies and evaluates how policy tools are selected
to realise the strategic objectives of government.
Methodology/approach A critical case methodology is employed.
Nuclear power is held to be a most difficult test for the British govern-
ment’s ability to metagovern. The empirical data was collected from in-
depth qualitative interviews conducted between August 2008 and July
2013.
Findings The chapter shows that the British government’s metagover-
nance efforts are informed by the risks that would-be developer face. The
British government is shown to have some ability to practice metagover-
nance but the complexities of nuclear power and the existence of a MLG
structure create risks that government cannot overcome. It is also

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004010
247
248 KEITH BAKER
observed that in nuclear power programmes, the risks of construction

cost overruns and electricity price fluctuations have the greatest impact
on the calculations of would-be developers.
Research implications The findings offer insight into the limits of gov-
ernment capacity in the face of networks and claims of continued state
power. The chapter links together the literature on risk and the emergent
literature on metagovernance. It is shown that institutional risks in the
form of political opportunism are ever present and cannot be easily
overcome.
Practical implications Government are often called upon oversee diffi-
cult projects that are delivered by commercial actors. The findings indi-
cate how governments might approach the task and point to a need for
greater sensitivity to the nature of the project itself.
Social implications The empirical results show that to moderate risk,
government has tended to adopt very technocratic policies that limit
wider democratic consultation in favour of working directly with com-
mercial actors.
Originality/value The chapter presents a detailed analysis of govern-
ment decision-making in a highly controversial area of public policy
nuclear power.
Keywords: Metagovernance; multi-level governance; energy policy;
Britain
INTRODUCTION: NUCLEAR POWER IN BRITAIN
Successive British governments have stated that the construction of a new

generation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is necessary to supply Britain
with secure low carbon electricity. Since the privatisation of Britain’s elec-
tricity industry in 1990, British governments have largely deferred to the
investment decisions of private energy utilities and have not sought to
impose specific technologies upon the energy industry. The decision to
explicitly champion nuclear power represents a radical policy departure.
However, the technology and expertise necessary to realise this policy goal
is dispersed amongst a network of international players. Furthermore,
nuclear power is embedded in an extremely complex regulatory environ-
ment in which national and even international legislation is interpreted and
Metagovernance, Risk and Nuclear Power in Britain 249
enforced by an array of national and sub-national agencies. This is largely

consistent with the concept of multi-level governance (MLG).
To realise its energy policy goals, the British government must seek to
manage through a complex, multi-level network. Governments are thought
capable of advancing their policy goals in the face of networks through
metagovernance (Peters, 2010; Porras-Gómez, 2014). Metagovernance
involves the deployment of a range of policy tools to shape and coordinate
the behaviour of networked actors. Successful metagovernance depends on
government’s capacity to change the common denominator within a net-
work; the key value shared by all the actors. The actors involved in nuclear
power all consider their decisions in terms of risk. Therefore, metagover-
nance of nuclear power is dependent on the ability of government to
influence through policy tools how risk is assessed.
This chapter argues that metagovernance represents an analytical alter-
native to MLG and offers the opportunity to focus on how governments
seek to realise their policy goals in multi-level environments. Furthermore,
studies of MLG have largely neglected the concept of risk. This inattention
is odd as studies of risk have long observed that the organisation and
actions of governing institutions are informed by how risk is understood
and that institutional arrangements moderate and give rise to risks
(Aven & Renn, 2010; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1999).
The chapter has five sections. The section ‘Governance, Multi-Level
Governance and Metagovernance’ will consider the concepts of MLG and
metagovernance before explaining how governments govern through policy
tools. The next section ‘Understanding Risk’ presents a framework for ana-
lysing how risk is assessed in infrastructure megaprojects. The section
‘Methodology’ outlines the qualitative methodology used in the study
whilst ‘Reviving Nuclear Power in Britain through Metagovernance’ pre-
sents an analysis of the efforts of the British governments to metagovern a
revival of nuclear power. The last section offers some concluding comments
about success or failure of metagovernance in multi-level environments
through the moderation of risk.
GOVERNANCE, MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND

METAGOVERNANCE
Over the last 30 years, governments around the world have increasingly
transferred responsibility for the delivery of public infrastructure and
250 KEITH BAKER
services to networks of private concerns. The way in which governments

develop and realise policy objectives in the face of networks is generally
described as governance (Kettl, 1993; Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001). It is
claimed that within a fragmented polity, government cannot rely on com-
mand and control mechanisms and must learn to embrace a range of policy
tools that can be used to coerce, incentivise or encourage interdependent
networked actors to act in a desired fashion (Salamon, 2002). A key debate
within the study of government focuses on the dynamics of the relationship
between the state and society (Chhotray & Stoker, 2009). Some writers see
governance in society centric terms whilst others advocate a state-centric
perspective.
Society centric accounts of governance suggest that governance is
describing the devolution of power to reflexive societal actors (see Rhodes,
1997). In response to changed circumstances, governments must seek to
manage networks by guiding and facilitating interaction between net-
worked actors (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997). This is variously
achieved by persuading networked actors to work together, responding to
resource dependencies, or by promoting the development of a shared set of
norms and values within the network (Rhodes, 2007). In contrast, state-
centric accounts view networks as operating within the ‘shadow of hierar-
chy’ cast by the state (Scharpf, 1994). Governments are viewed as powerful
actors that are capable of steering by leveraging their control of the legal
and regulatory framework that underpins the network (Mayntz, 1993) or
by exploiting the dependencies of networked actors (Bell & Hindmoor,
2009).
The dispute between state and society centric accounts of governance is
overlain by the debate surrounding MLG. Marks and Hooge (2004) argue
that MLG describes how different institutions operating at different spatial
and jurisdictional levels interact within governing processes (see also
Skelcher, 2005). The decisions and actions of governing authorities may be
countermanded or contested by an authority at a higher level of govern-
ance or by stakeholders at lower levels of governance. Although MLG
draws attention to the fact that networked actors and governing authorities
may operate at several different spatial levels, it does not offer an account
of the practice of governance. Furthermore, implicit within MLG is the
notion that government has become a diminished entity within its terri-
tories whose powers have been constrained or transferred to others at
higher or lower levels of governance.
The emerging concept of metagovernance challenges the narrative of the
decline of state power and presents an account of how capable, powerful
states can continue to govern (Whitehead, 2003). Metagovernance holds

that governments are capable of structuring and coordinating ‘… devolved
governance processes …’ that characterise the interactions between institu-
tions at multiple levels (Peters, 2010, p. 37). Jessop (2013) argues that meta-
governance is an attempt to reconcile the continued power of government
within a fragmented, multi-level polity of reflexive societal actors.
Metagovernance and Policy Tools
Governments play several roles within networks; government is at once a

player within the network but is also the actor of last resort who determines
the rules of the game whilst guaranteeing the integrity of the network
(Jessop, 2002, 2013; Whitehead, 2003). The term metagovernance describes
the way in which governments leverage their peculiar position to achieve
their ends. Sørensen (2006) identified four key techniques of metagover-
nance: (1) the hands-off framing of self-governance, (2) hands-off storytell-
ing, (3) hands-on support and facilitation and (4) hands-on participation.
As such, governments are thought able to enlist and recruit autonomous
networked actors whist retaining the ability to structure, facilitate or other-
wise organise networks. Jessop (1997, 2002) emphasises the importance of
metagovernance as a means of containing ‘… governance failure …’ in
which direct government intervention (participation) can assure against the
risks and consequences faced by networked actors if the network breaks
down.
The ability of governments to engage in metagovernance can be
regarded as a function of state capacity; the ability of governments to
deploy a range of policy tools to ‘… implement logistically political deci-
sions throughout the realm …’ (Mann, 2003, p. 55). In a situation of gov-
ernance, governments do not act directly and seek to use the policy tools at
their disposal to influence the behaviour of networked actors (Salamon,
2002). Hood (1986) and Hood and Margetts (2007) propose in their ‘tools
of government’ framework that policy tools can be classified into four
groups: Nodality, Authority, Treasure and Organizational tools (NATO).
Nodality tools are based on government’s ability to communicate,
express its will and persuade others. Authority tools rely on government’s
ability to invoke hierarchy to instruct others and create and enforce rules
and regulations. Governments can authorise and legitimate particular
actions whilst forbidding or discouraging others. Treasure-based tools
allow governments to leverage the resources at their disposal to induce or
252 KEITH BAKER
incentivise through the exchange of fungible assets. Finally, organisational

tools make use of the capabilities of the ‘stock of people’ within govern-
ment (Hood, 1986, p. 6) and the administrative and matériel resources of a
capable state (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009).
Schneider and Ingram (1990) argue that policy tools allow government
to manipulate the internal and external motivations of societal actors
though persuasion, incentives, constraints and penalties. However, such a
behavioural account views the inability of government to treat upon a net-
work is due to limitations upon state capacity. This neglects the reflexivity
and interdependence of networked actors (Mathews, 2014). A way for-
wards is offered by examining the selection and deployment of policy tools
in reference to the shared values of the network that government is seeking
to manage through (see Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007). This approach to
metagovernance preserves the relative centrality of the state whilst respond-
ing to the autonomy of networked actors. In some respects this argument is
not entirely dissimilar to the notion of network management (Kickert
et al., 1997). In the energy industry, the shared value is risk as energy infra-
structure investments are extremely expensive and long run.
UNDERSTANDING RISK
The concept of risk proceeds from the observation that the future is uncer-
tain and that human agency has consequences (Aven & Renn, 2010; Renn,
1998). As humans can envisage the future, risk provides a means of expres-
sing information about possible futures and likelihood of those conse-
quences occurring. Giddens (1999, p. 3) argues that risk ‘… is bound up
with the aspiration to control and particularly with the idea of controlling
the future.’ The composition of the institutional environment in which indi-
viduals are embedded plays a significant role in determining how they come
to understand the nature of the risks they face and the range of actions
open to them (Renn, 2008). Risk has become critically important in the
decision-making processes of both government and commerce. In fact,
Rothstein (2006, p. 216) even goes as far as to suggest that the moderation
and control of risk has become ‘… organizing principle of public policy and
corporate governance …’
Lessard and Miller (2000) identified three broad categories of risk: (1)
institutional risk, (2) completion risk and (3) market risk. Institutional risk
refers to the difficulties involved in obtaining the necessary regulatory
permissions or the risk that political support will disappear. Completion

risk relates to the problems that may be encountered in the process of con-
structing complex technologies whilst market risk captures to the uncertain-
ties surrounding the financial viability of a project over its lifetime. The size
and scope of institutional, completion and market risks are shaped by the
composition of the networks within which contractors are embedded, the
regulatory and political structures of a state, and the way different institu-
tions interact with each other at different levels of governance.
Governments attempt to influence the process of risk assessment by deploy-
ing policy tools in effort to steer networked actors in a particular direction.
METHODOLOGY
George and Bennett (2005) argue that the qualitative analysis of a case
study is useful in exploring causality in situations when it is difficult to dis-
aggregate variables. The degree to which risk animates decision-making
can be uncovered by examining the actions of the different organisations
seeking to develop, promote or govern nuclear power in Britain. The study
of the British government’s efforts to revive nuclear power through its
metagovernance represents a critical case methodology a most difficult
case. Nuclear power is widely recognised as the most difficult and demand-
ing of all infrastructure projects and if the British government can metago-
vern away the risks in nuclear power, it is likely that it could do so in other
less trying circumstances.
The empirical data was collected through a document review and a series
of semi-structured interviews. The documents included a wide range of gov-
ernment policy papers, industry publications and reports and articles in the
popular, scholarly and expert press. The documents were also used to
develop an initial list of interviewees. Between August 2008 and July 2013,
32 individuals were interviewed through a combination of telephone and
face-to-face interviews. The interviewees included civil servants and policy
advisors, nuclear and energy industry regulators, politicians, environmental
campaigners and industry professionals. Each interview lasted between 30
minutes and 2 hours. At the end of each interview, the interviewee was
asked to identify further documents and additional interviewees. This pro-
cess continued until no new evidence was uncovered.
Qualitative analysis software (NVivo 8) was used to carry out a nominal
and process analysis. Nominal analysis is concerned with the presence or
254 KEITH BAKER
absence of a particular factor associated with an observed event whilst pro-

cess analysis is sensitive to the sequencing of events. The development of a
nuclear station follows a tightly defined sequence whilst the different types
of risk (institutional, completion and market) can be understood as nom-
inal variables to which each government has (or has not) responded.
REVIVING NUCLEAR POWER IN BRITAIN

THROUGH METAGOVERNANCE
Britain has maintained a modest nuclear power industry since the mid-
1950s. At its peak, nuclear power provided nearly 20% of Britain’s electri-
city. However, Britain’s NPPs proved to be unreliable and expensive to
operate. In fact, Energy industry expert 1 commented that: ‘Nuclear power
has never produced an economic kilowatt hour’ (telephone interview,
January 2009). The last NPP built in Britain was Sizewell B. Sizewell B was
commissioned in 1982 but planning consent was not granted until 1987 due
to an exhaustive public inquiry and the station was not completed until
1995.
Britain’s electricity industry was privatised in 1990. Nuclear power was
excluded from the privatisation effort because the newly commercial utili-
ties were uninterested in purchasing aging, inefficient power plants. There
has been no commercial investment in new nuclear capacity since privatisa-
tion. In 1996, the eight most modern NPPs (including Sizewell B) were pri-
vatised as British Energy. The British government remained in control of
the oldest nuclear sites. These sites were eventually transferred to the publi-
cally owned Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) in 2004.
Following a sustained fall in electricity prices due to a surplus of natural
gas, British Energy experienced a de-facto bankruptcy in 2002 and was
effectively renationalised through government intervention. British Energy
was ultimately restructured and sold to Électricité de France (EDF) in
2009.
There is some interest in new nuclear build in Britain. EDF is intending
to develop a new NPP at Hinkley Point C in Somerset. Toshiba is planning
to construct new nuclear units at Springfields in Cumbria through the
NuGen partnership whilst the Horizon Partnership of Hitachi and General
Electric are intending to build a total of four units at Wlyfa in Wales and
Oldbury in South Gloucestershire. In total, the total capacity of the
planned new build is estimated at some 16 Gigawatts. Although EDF,
Hitachi and Toshiba have made commitments to the British government,

the European Commission (2013, S.6.3, para. 122) notes in their review
that the companies are ‘… not obliged to build the nuclear plant …’ and nor
are they ‘… obligated to build it by a certain date. The UK authorities cannot
enforce any obligation in this respect, they can only terminate the contract.’
Britain’s electricity system has long relied on indigenous reserves of nat-
ural gas but these are now dwindling and essential supplies must now be
imported (Department of Trade and Industry [DTI], 2006). Furthermore,
many of Britain’s coal-fired power stations are slated for closure under the
European Large Combustion Plants Directive (EU 2001/EC/80) and the
majority of Britain’s NPPs are approaching the end of their working lives.
In 2006, the Labour government announced that a new generation of NPPs
should be constructed to provide a secure, low carbon source of electricity.
Nuclear power was seen as a way of assuring against the risk that Britain’s
dependency on imported energy could be exploited by hostile foreign
powers.
British civil servant 1 explained that interest in nuclear power was lar-
gely driven by the gas supply dispute between Ukraine and Russia in late
2005: ‘What really moved up the agenda was security of supply there was a
realisation that we are at the end of a very long chain of supply in Europe’
(personal interview, June 2009). British policy advisor 1 reflected that the
political consequences of an energy shortage were unacceptable: ‘You can’t
privatise failure. If the lights go out the Minister gets sacked’ (personal inter-
view, July 2009). British civil servant 2 explained that in Britain’s liberal
energy market ‘… any new power stations will be built by the commercial
sector which is commercially driven’ (personal interview, February 2009).
When interviewed in August 2008, Environment Agency official 1
explained that the British government delivered its policy goals through
metagovernance: ‘Energy is a strategic issue. Government policy would say
that you recognise what you need from a strategic purposes and you play
around with the market to deliver that.’
Table 1 summarises how the British government has sought to metago-
vern by using the four tools of government to metagovern by responding to
the risks involved in nuclear power.
Institutional Risk
There are two key institutional risks in nuclear power: the risk that politi-
cians will withdraw support and that the necessary regulatory permissions
256 KEITH BAKER
Table 1. Risk Factors and Policy Tools.

Risk Factor
Institutional Completion Market
Nodality Communicating Reassuring industry that Emphasising that climate

political support expensive redesigns are change is a serious threat
for nuclear power not required post- to discourage carbon
Fukushima emissions
Authority Changing the Changing the visa regime Imposing a carbon price
planning laws to for skilled worker floor through legislation
centralise the and the tax system
planning system
Treasure Sale of old nuclear Creating Loan Creating the Contracts for
sites Guarantees to allow Difference (CfD)
capital to be secured mechanism
Organisational Regulatory Skills training through Managing the financial
capacity facilitation the National Nuclear infrastructure for waste
through GDA Academy disposal
cannot be secured. Energy industry executive 1 noted that nuclear power is

a long-term investment: ‘We operate for 60 years and we must manage for
100 years’ (telephone interview, July 2013). The timescales involved in
nuclear power discourage energy utilities from commissioning NPPs in a
country where there is political division and regulatory turbulence as the
future must be predictable. British policy advisor 2 explained the impor-
tance of nodal policy tools to reassure a risk adverse industry: ‘Government
has a voice. Simply by broadcasting its intentions, government can change the
risk profile that the market assigns to a particular energy technology’ (perso-
nal interview, June 2009).
When the Labour government announced their support for nuclear in
2006, they took care to secure the support of the then opposition
Conservative party. British policy advisor 1 commented that: ‘There is a not a
cigarette paper’s difference between the [then Labour] government and the
Conservatives …’ In 2008, the Conservatives sought to assure the energy utili-
ties and the financial industry that there was no risk that the policy environ-
ment would change: ‘…[the] essential elements required for building new
nuclear power plants will remain unchanged should a Conservative Government
take control after the next election’ (Hendry, 2008). Conservative commitment
to nuclear power was reiterated in their energy policy published before the
2010 General Election (Conservative Party, 2010).
Following the 2010 General Election, the Conservative Party entered

into a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. When the coalition agreement
was signed, the Liberal Democrats were opposed nuclear power. However
in 2012, the Liberal Democrats determine that they would support nuclear
power. The terms of coalition agreement were designed to reassure industry
that the coalition government would not oppose new investment in nuclear
power. A measure of the effectiveness of this nodal communication strategy
was expressed by energy industry executive 2 ‘Government needs to be very
clear in the development of their strategic plans. They need to give market
clarity. The UK government has done a remarkable job in developing the
planning system, the licensing and providing the clarity. If you look at where
we are developing reactors; it is in countries that have given us clarity’ (tele-
phone interview, May 2010).
The British government has also attempted to use authority, treasure
and organisational-based tools to encourage investment in nuclear power.
Environment Agency official 1 explained that because new NPPs cost
upwards of £6bn to build, energy utilities are reluctant to commit unless
they are convinced that they can secure the required permissions: ‘No-one is
going to shell out that kind of money without been sure that there is a likely
outcome of the planning process …’ A British MP (personal interview, June
2009) explained that the electricity industry ‘… operates subject to the exter-
nal corset of government regulation …’ and that by changing the nature of
the regulations, government could shape the perceptions of investors and
developers through the exercise of authority.
Britain’s planning regime has historically afforded local authorities the
right to award planning consent. British policy advisor 3 noted that MLG
within the planning system undermined the confidence of would-be develo-
pers: ‘The one thing that was going to deter investors would be a botched
planning regime’ (personal interview, February 2009). In 2008, the Labour
government centralised the planning system through the 2008 Planning
Act. The Planning Act allowed Ministers to designate certain projects
such as power stations as critical national infrastructure projects through
the use of National Policy Statements. If a project was deemed to be of
national importance, the Planning Act referred the planning application to
a newly created expert body The Infrastructure Planning Commission
(IPC). British Civil Servant 3 argued that the centralisation of planning law
was intended to ‘… take what was done at the local [level] and start doing it
at the national level. The reform of the planning [system] is to make the
planning process more efficient … make it less risky for business’ (telephone
interview, May 2009). The Conservative and the Liberal Democrats both
258 KEITH BAKER
criticised the Planning Act as an affront to Britain’s traditions of local

democracy in the planning process.
In 2011, the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition abolished the
IPC under the 2011 Localism Act. The Localism Act retained the concept
of National Policy Statements but transferred the right to grant planning
permission for national infrastructure projects to Ministers following a
parliamentary vote endorsing the National Policy Statement. The
Localism Act provides the British government with a strong policy tool
to support nuclear power by leveraging the democratic legitimacy and
authority of parliament. However, the Localism Act does require that
would-be infrastructure developers consult with local authorities and
respond to any objections prior to any planning application. If there is
significant local opposition, it is hard to imagine that a project would go
ahead because of the electoral consequences of overriding the wishes of a
local community.
Nuclear power is a controversial and often unpopular technology due to
the perceived risks of nuclear accident and radiation exposure (see Peters &
Slovic, 1996). As such, finding suitable sites is extremely difficult. However,
where the general public can perceive direct benefits from nuclear power,
opposition is far less pronounced (Visschers, Keller, & Siegrist, 2011). This
has produced an assumption amongst policy makers that the ideal loca-
tions for new nuclear builds are established nuclear sites as local commu-
nities are invested in the continued operation of the plant. Through the
NDA and public ownership of British Energy, the British government
could dispose of considerable resources. British policy advisor 3 was expli-
cit: ‘[The NDA] had a whole bunch of assets, and we were quite instrumental
in trying to make sure that those assets became available for potential inves-
tors … […]… But it was also just public acceptance: if you have a nuclear
power station in your back garden, you’re more likely to be comfortable with
it next time.’
An NPP cannot be constructed or operated unless Britain’s regulators
the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) are willing to issue a nuclear
licence. Britain’s nuclear regulatory regime is independent of government
and extremely rigorous and is based around the principle of ‘As Low As
Reasonable Practical’ or ALARP. An ALARP system the would-be develo-
per must prove that their technology is as safe as can realistically be
achieved. British nuclear regulator 1 explained: ‘We ask them why can’t
you go that bit further? And they will come back and say we have looked at it
and it causes problems elsewhere or perhaps the cost is disproportionate’ (per-
sonal interview, August 2008). This system increases the costs and the risk
that licence will be denied or delayed considerably as developers cannot

determine in advance what the ONR’s requirements will be.
In response, the British government sought to encourage the ONR to
introduce a system of pre-licencing. British nuclear regulator 1 was acid ‘…
politicians get bees in their bonnets. Some [politicians] were talking about
pre-licensing without knowing what it meant. They wanted pre-licensing like
the Americans and you could take a design off the shelf then …’ British
nuclear regulator 2 explained that ‘I think we have accepted for quite a long
time there is scope for pushing things further back or forwards to try to get as
much assessment done as possible … Government asked a few questions, we
asked a few questions and the industry asked a few questions and we came up
with Generic Design Assessment’ (personal interview, August 2008).
The GDA involves would-be developers submitting a reference design to
the ONR for assessment in advance of a specific application for a nuclear
licence. British nuclear regulator 2 explained that the GDA involves a ‘…
more partnership type of way of working. You are talking about licensees
who are not creating any risk, they are talking about potential designs that
may not ever be built.’ However GDA has ‘… limited vires …’ and ‘… does
not give legal guarantees.’ Both British nuclear regulators 1 and 2 were at
pains to stress that the key feature of the GDA was that it preserved the
independence of the ONR’s licencing process. It is expected by both the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Union that nuclear
regulatory agencies operate independently of national governments. The
GDA appears to be represented an attempt to leveraging the organisational
capacity of Britain’s regulators subject to the constraints imposed by inter-
national agencies.
Completion Risk
Nuclear power stations are extremely difficult to construct and time con-
suming to construct. The British MP commented that: ‘… nuclear power
stations cost far more and take far longer than the industry claims.’
Construction delays increase the capital costs to the point where the power
station cannot produce enough saleable electricity to repay its construction
costs. Financial Analyst 1 was explicit: ‘The risks in construction overruns
are huge. If you were an equity investor half equity, half debt, then your
entire equity could be wiped out before construction is finished’ (personal
interview, November 2011). As Energy industry expert 2 put it: ‘You end up
paying interest on the interest’ (personal interview, October 2012). The 2011
260 KEITH BAKER
accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi in Japan has forced the nuclear industry to

consider how to design power plants to withstand events that it had pre-
viously dismissed as unlikely. Energy industry executive 1 explained: ‘After
Fukushima, we have to go beyond. We now have to consider for extreme
events in the design and engineering.’
The British government has employed a variety of strategies in response
to these risks. To address the perception that the Fukushima accident will
increase costs through increased safety requirements, the British govern-
ment has communicated that Britain’s regulatory regime will not be tigh-
tened (Weightman, 2012). Although the ONR’s report into the implications
of Fukushima emphasises that whilst individual power plants might require
enhanced sea defences or other improvements, there will no demand for
class or industry wide changes (Office of Nuclear Regulation [ONR], 2011).
This action is intended to reassure industry that construction costs will not
radically increase. However, it must be noted that all the new NPPs in
Britain exist only on paper and making changes to blueprints is a relatively
low-cost exercise.
In 2012, the British government introduced a system of loan guarantees
as part of the 2012 Infrastructure Financial Assistance Act (Infrastructure
UK, 2013). The loan guarantees are intended to reassure investors that any
loans made to a developer will be repaid if construction costs escalate.
However, whilst loan guarantees may make it easier for a developer to
secure capital financing, they cannot reduce the risk of construction delays
because they do impact upon the construction process itself.
When interviewed, Energy industry executive 1 explained that because
no new nuclear power stations have been constructed since the mid-1980s,
the core engineering and construction skills have atrophied. This has led to
errors in construction of new NPPs in Finland and France. The previous
Labour government recognised the importance of the skills base and
altered Britain’s VISA regime so that individuals with engineering skills
could secure employment in Britain. British policy advisor 3 commented
that: ‘The Home Office altered its permit list [for work VISAs] in the time
we where there to put nuclear skills as one of the key skills that the UK was
looking for.’ The current coalition government has largely continued with
these policies. However, British policy advisor 1 was scathing: ‘Nuclear
power is not a job for people in their forties who have been on a course. It’s a
job for people in their fifties who have done it.’
The policy tools used to address completion risk appear to be of limited
utility. Although the British government has emphasised that it will not
require substantive redesigns of NPPs in light of the Fukushima accident,
the deployment of this nodal policy tool may somewhat redundant as

would-be developers are still finalising their designs. Treasure-based tools
in the form of loan guarantees may allow developers to secure financing
but cannot reduce the likelihood of cost overruns and whilst authority and
organisational tools can address skill shortages, they cannot change the
fundamental lack of experience amongst engineering contractors.
Market Risk
NPPs are massively expensive and investors must be reassured that a newly
built station can produce sufficient saleable electricity to repay construc-
tion, operating and liability costs. In a commercial electricity market, the
price of electricity is determined by the generating costs of the plant used to
generate the last kilowatt demanded. The plant that has the highest mar-
ginal generating costs will always provide the last kilowatt and marginal
generating costs are largely a function of fuel costs. The generating costs of
nuclear power are not determined by fuel prices but by construction costs.
The World Nuclear Association (2013) indicates that price of fuel
accounts for only 28% of the costs of nuclear power. As such, nuclear
power has relatively fixed generation costs. In contrast, the costs purchas-
ing fuel account for some 89% and 78% of the generating costs of gas and
coal fired power plants. As gas is the most expensive fuel, it has the highest
marginal costs and the price of electricity is determined by the price of gas.
Nuclear power is commercially attractive if gas and electricity prices are
high because, with fixed generation costs, an NPP can reap significant
profit. However, an NPP can be effectively bankrupted in any given year if
electricity prices fall below the generating costs of nuclear power. This cre-
ates a considerable market risk. British civil servant 3 explained that:
‘Nuclear power stations are all about upfront capital costs so you are very
operationally geared to a bad outcome on community prices.’ Nuclear power
also has considerable future liabilities in the form of radioactive waste. The
disposal of radioactive waste requires infrastructure in the form of storage
facilities. If radioactive waste cannot be transferred to a third party for dis-
posal, it represents an indefinite liability for nuclear operators (Sovacool,
2011). The market risks of nuclear power are such that British policy advi-
sor 1 commented that the British government must find a way of ‘… dis-
rupting the financial risks …’ if it was advance nuclear new build.
At interview, energy industry expert 3 noted that commercial interest in
nuclear power was driven by a belief that the burning of carbon emitting
262 KEITH BAKER
fossil fuels would be restricted (telephone interview, December 2008). Both

the previous Labour government and current coalition government have
emphasised their commitment to reducing carbon emissions. In 2004, the
then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, argued that climate change represented
the ‘… world’s greatest environmental challenge …’ (Blair, 2004). David
Cameron, the current Prime Minister, has described climate change as ‘…
one of the most serious threats that this country and this world face …’ and
stressed that his government aims to ‘… reduce carbon [emissions] right
across our economy’ (Hansard, 2014). As successive British governments
have indicated their opposition to fossil fuels, nuclear power would appear
to be the more attractive investment for the longer term. In fact, energy
industry expert 3 noted that industry expected that fossil fuels would be
‘… hammered …’ by punitive taxation. British civil servant 1 commented
that: ‘… without formal power, you can still do a lot through persuasion.’
This nodal strategy is consistent with the story-telling approach to metago-
vernance recommended by Sørensen (2006).
NPPs are hugely expensive capital investments and energy utilities will
not undertake such an investment unless they are certain that they maintain
their revenue streams. In Britain’s commercial electricity market, electricity
prices are a function of fuel prices. Recent statements by the opposition
Labour leader, Ed Miliband, are likely to have increased the market risks
that utilities believe that they face. In response to rising domestic fuel bills,
the Labour party has demanded that the energy utilities freeze their prices.
Ed Miliband has even gone as far as to accuse energy companies of
‘… profiteering …’ at the expense of the customer (Wintour & Macalister,
2014). The Labour party is attempting to tell a story that casts Labour as
the champion of the financially pressured consumer. Rising energy prices
have presented the Labour party with an opportunity to gain a short-term
political advantage. It is likely, based on the current opinion polls, that the
Labour party will win the 2015 General Election (BBC, 2014).
Although the ‘voice’ of government may be seeking to promote invest-
ment in nuclear power by discouraging investment in fossil fuels, the leader
of the opposition is creating an atmosphere that discourages energy utilities
from making any form of investment by creating uncertainty as to the sta-
bility and security of their revenue streams. In Britain’s adversarial political
system, such political opportunism is to be expected. This is despite the
care that was previously taken to develop a political consensus over nuclear
power. The actions of the Labour party are somewhat ironic given that the
push for a revived nuclear industry started under a Labour government
in which Ed Miliband served as Minister for Energy and Climate Change.
If political consensus over energy policy is shaken by political dynamics,

then it can be concluded that institutional risk will remain a crucial issue in
nuclear policy for any democratic country.
The British government has also deployed authority tools to increase the
price of fossil fuels. This will help to reduce market risk by ensuring that
nuclear power will remain profitable. This has been achieved by increasing
the taxes charged on carbon emissions through a ‘Carbon Price Floor’ or
CPF a policy tool that imposes additional charge on top of the existing
Climate Change Levy (a tax on the burning of fossil fuels). The CPF can
be understood as a de-facto carbon tax as the legislative authority for its
imposition is drawn from the 2013 Finance Act and is administered by HM
Revenue and Customs (see 2013 Finance Act C.29). Whilst a carbon tax is
likely to be effective in driving up fuel costs and encouraging utilities away
from coal and gas, energy industry expert 2 argued that carbon taxation is
problematic. Energy utilities will invariably pass on the costs to the consu-
mer or will simply close down older power stations creating the risk of
an energy shortfall ‘… as a businessman, a carbon tax is not a good idea … it
will produce economic dislocation.’ When interviewed, energy industry
expert 3 expressed a belief that government rarely understood the conse-
quences of its actions: ‘The problem is that the government thinks it has con-
trol but it doesn’t. It doesn’t know what it’s doing.’
In the European Union, it is illegal for governments to offer direct finan-
cial support or state aid to a particular industry unless support is provided
to correct market failure (Art. 107, 2012 Consolidated Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union). To circumvent these rules and deploy
treasure-based policy tools, the British government has introduced a finan-
cial mechanism known as a CfD into the electricity market through the
2013 Energy Act (C.32).
A CfD allows the government to determine the sale price (the strike
price) of electricity generated from a particular plant whilst requiring suppli-
ers to reimburse generators if the sale price of electricity is less than the
strike price. If the sale price of electricity is higher than the strike price, the
generator must pay the supplier the difference. This ensures that the genera-
tor cannot lose money on the sale of electricity. The adjustments paid to
suppliers and generators will be conducted through a CfD counterparty; an
arm’s length, non-executive agency that operates on behalf of the govern-
ment (2013 Energy Act, C.32, S.2, para. 6 26). The CfD counterparty
raises the necessary funds by imposing levies on generators and suppliers.
Therefore, the CfD mechanism represents the transfer of funds from the pri-
vate sector to the public sector (i.e., acquisition of treasure by government).
264 KEITH BAKER
This treasure is then distributed in an effort to support government’s

favoured policy agenda. Initially, the British government envisaged each
CfD would be in place for an agreed period and would not last longer than
was necessary to ensure that construction costs could be recouped.
CfD represent a sophisticated attempt to overcome restrictions on state
aid. The European Commission initially indicated that it considered CfDs
to represent a form of illegal state aid (European Commission, 2013).
However, the British government has revised the CfD mechanism so that
the CfD is valid for the entire lifetime of the project and has established a
required that as soon as profits exceed an agreed threshold, a percentage of
the profits will be shared with the British government. If construction costs
are lower than expected, then ‘… gains will be shared …’ The European
Commission has agreed that the modified CfD scheme does not constitute
state aid as it is made on ‘… terms that a private operator would have
accepted under market conditions …’ (European Commission, 2014).
Although it is worth noting that market support for nuclear power is vir-
tually nonexistent, a financial analyst commented that: ‘… as a private
investor you would steer clear of nuclear power. There has never been a pri-
vately funded nuclear power plant’ (personal interview, November 2011).
Britain currently lacks a permanent geological depository for high-level
radioactive waste. The key problem is not the physical storage of radioac-
tive waste but rather the financing of waste management so that energy uti-
lities can determine with certainty what their costs will be in advance.
Following the privatisation of British Energy, the British government
established the Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) a trust that would receive
contributions from British Energy to pay for waste management and
nuclear decommissioning. The NLF is managed and supervised by public
appointees independently of British Energy (and later EDF), public stew-
ardship of the fund was considered essential to ensure that the public good
was protected but also to prevent the fund from mismanaged in pursuit of
commercial gain. The NFL is funded by fixed financial contributions
£15,000 for every tonne of spent fuel produced by Sizewell B plus an addi-
tional £24m per annum to fund the management of the waste produced
from Britain’s other NPPs.
In the 2008 Energy White Paper, the British government indicated that
new nuclear operators would have to pay their ‘… fair share …’
(Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008) of waste
management and decommissioning costs. Under the terms of the 2008
Energy Act, new nuclear operators will have to demonstrate that they have
made financial preparations for waste management and decommissioning.
It seems likely that such arrangements will fall under the rubric of the NLF
as the infrastructure and supervision arrangements already exist.
The British government’s efforts to moderate market risk have had vary-
ing degrees of success. Although attempts have been made to create a dis-
course that would encourage energy utilities to avoid fossil fuels, the
interventions of other policy actors have undermined government’s nodal-
ity. This has increased the market risks that would-be nuclear developers
believe they face. The leveraging of authority through the imposition of a
de-facto carbon tax is likely to be proven effective in encouraging invest-
ment in nuclear power. However, the use of specifically targeted, punitive
taxation is likely to increase costs to the consumer and will cause energy
companies to shut down coal and gas-fired power plants. This will likely
produce the very energy shortage that government is trying to avoid in the
short term. The imposition of state authority is a somewhat crude tool and
energy markets appear to require a degree of finesse that government may
not possess.
Nuclear power is embedded within a multi-levelled governance environ-
ment. The British government’s efforts to use treasure-based policy tools
(in the form of CfDs) required substantial modification before the
European Commission agreed that they did not constitute state aid.
Furthermore, the CfD mechanism had to be organised on principles deter-
mined by European rules. The argument that the British government might
leverage the NFL to establish an infrastructure for waste management is
somewhat speculative. However, the NFL has been successful in overseeing
the steady accumulation of funds necessary to manage the legacy of
Britain’s existing power stations and it is not unreasonable to suggest that
this model will be extended
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The British government has deployed a variety of policy tools in its efforts
to metagovern towards a renewed investment in nuclear power. The policy
tools themselves have been designed to address the risks that would-be
developers might face. As such, some evidence has been presented for the
contention of the paper that metagovernance involves deploying policy
instruments in response to the value system of the network that is to be
managed. The British government was able to use policy tools most effec-
tively to address institutional risks, but was unable to substantially alter the
completion and market risks that would-be nuclear developers face.
266 KEITH BAKER
The British government has made efforts to address completion and

market risks but the policy tools deployed have been somewhat ineffective.
Efforts to assure investors against construction cost overruns may convince
investors that they can safely lend to a would-be nuclear developer but can-
not reduce the risk of costly delays or solve problems on site. Likewise,
attempts to train the necessary personnel will not produce experienced engi-
neers within a reasonable timeframe. The National Nuclear Academy may
help to sustain a revived nuclear industry in Britain but cannot help to
bring one into existence. Construction cost overruns can be managed if the
profitability of nuclear power can be guaranteed. However, the authority
and treasure-based policy tools used to achieve this objective were subject
to review by authorities higher level of governance and the British govern-
ment was forced to alter its plans to use Contracts for Difference. MLG
explicitly describes such a scenario and accounts for the interaction
between the different levels of governance. In contrast, metagovernance
draws upon a literature that predates the emergence of the European
Union as a significant factor in the affairs of European governments (see
Hood, 1983). Although metagovernance does offer an account of how gov-
ernment practices governance in multi-level environments, it casts the juris-
diction and spatial hierarchy that is central to MLG (see Bache & Flinders,
2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2010) as limits on state power rather than as part
of the environment in which governments operate. Whilst this distinction
may reflect how governments appear to think, it does little to advance
understanding of how governments might cope in a complex interdepen-
dent world.
In a democratic system of government there is always the temptation for
political parties to place short-term political gain above the wider strategic
needs of the economy. Energy policy is an area where investments are
extraordinarily expensive and utilities acutely sensitive to the risk that they
may not recoup their capital expenditure. Nodal attempts by government
to create the story that might encourage energy utilities away from a parti-
cular technology can be easily undercut by the stories and actions of
another political actor. This problem seems intrinsic to democratic political
environments and suggests that there is an element of systemic risk that
cannot be moderated.
The ability of the British government to metagovern towards new invest-
ment in NPPs is severely constrained. Nuclear power programmes have
massive risks that cannot be easily controlled or governed away. It may be
that government is simply unable to mitigate these challenges unless it acts
directly but in a MLG environment this is not always possible. If the risks
of the ‘lights going out’ are so great that government must frantically seek
to metagovern, then perhaps government should eschew working through
networks and deliver through hierarchy.
Although MLG encourages scholars to consider how different institu-
tions and agencies interact, it offers a limited analytical approach for the
study of how governments might identify and advance policy goals in the
face of a multi-level polity. To address this limitation in the literature, it
was necessary to turn to the concept of metagovernance and the study of
risk. Risk offered insight into the strategic selectivity of government when
faced with multi-levelled networks. However, some caution should be exer-
cised. The actors within the networks through which nuclear power is deliv-
ered were sensitive to risk but it should not be assumed that this will hold
true in other areas of public policy. In addition, this study explored nuclear
power in Britain and further research is necessary to determine whether the
conclusion hold in other countries and systems of government. It may be
that outside the EU, the arguments of metagovernance have greater cur-
rency than MLG.
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world-nuclear.org/info/Economic-Aspects/Economics-of-Nuclear-Power/
POLITICS AND POLITICAL
STRATEGIES IN MULTI-LEVEL
SYSTEMS
Duncan McTavish
ABSTRACT
Purpose Existing work on multi-level governance (MLG) has concen-

trated on decentring of the state (e.g., Rhodes, R. A. W. (1994). The
hollowing out of the state: The changing nature of the public service in
Britain. Political Quarterly, 65(2), 138 141; Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997).
Understanding governance: Policy networks, governance, reflexivity
and accountability. London: Open University Press; Rhodes, R. A. W.
(2008). Understanding governance: Ten years on. Organisation Studies,
28(8), 1243 1264); growth of non-state actors in governing
(e.g., Crouch, 2004; Jessop, B. (2004). Multi level governance and
multi-level metagovernance-changes in the European Union as integral
moments in the transformation and re-orientation of contemporary state-
hood. In I. Bache & M. Flinders (Eds.), Multi level governance.
Oxford: Oxford University Press); classifying different types of govern-
ance (e.g., type 1 and type 2 MLG see Hooghe & Marks, 2003;
Ongaro, E., Massey, A., Holzer, M., & Wayenberg, E. (Eds.). (2010).
Governance and intergovernmental relations in the European Union

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004011
271
272 DUNCAN MCTAVISH
and the United States: Theoretical perspectives. Cheltenham: Edward

Elgar). The purpose of the chapter is to complement these approaches
by focusing on politics and political strategies in multi-level systems.
Methodology/approach The chapter draws on an extensive literature
in governance and political accountability and on political dynamics,
management and strategies within multi-level state systems. Although in
international context, particular accentuation is placed on the UK case.
Findings There are three broad findings. First, while the growth of
MLG and in particular supra state activities and institutions have under-
mined conventional conceptions of political accountability, more nuanced
interpretations are provided; as are cases of successful popular challenge
to a seemingly inevitable application of neo-liberal new public manage-
ment driven approaches to public service provision, as witnessed in exam-
ples of public service de-privatisation and re-municipalisation. Second, as
seen in the United Kingdom, political strategies in a multi-state system
are presented in terms of zero sum or alternatively win-win scenarios. In
Scotland, for example, though there have been difficulties for state wide
parties in managing multi-level politics in the devolved arena, yet in that
arena win-win strategies have been played out; and in Northern Ireland
with a contextual backdrop of conflict, there is also evidence of win-win
political actions. Third, some general findings are presented which outline
a range of centrifugal and centripetal forces found in some European
countries and how these affect the choice of political strategy.
Keywords: Political strategies; parties; multi-level governance
INTRODUCTION
The concept (and reality) of globalisation is very much enmeshed in multi-
level governance (MLG). Free (by historical comparison) movement of
capital, labour (less so) and trade flows have led to interconnectedness in
institutional and policy contexts between national and supranational bodies
through policy forums like United Nations, World Trade Organisation,
International Monetary Fund, G8; there is a regulatory dimension to this,
all of which has undoubted impact on nation states and national institu-
tions (Peters & Pierre, 2004). Particular primacy is also accorded to a range
Politics and Political Strategies in Multi-Level Systems 273
of actors external to the governmental nexus, in particular global firms

which according to some, although external to government, have become
key institutions ‘dominating the running of government’ (Crouch, 2004,
p. 44). Such state decentring is paralleled at national level ranging from the
use of ‘non traditional’ sources of advice brought into government, to the
multiplicity of providers (including private sector) employed in delivery of
publically funded services, to the substantial range and number of arms
length bodies, executive agencies, non-departmental public bodies
embedded in regulating and delivering much governmental activity. This
can be presented as a form of ‘output legitimacy’, democratically under-
pinned since elected governments are ultimately accountable (Borzel &
Risse, 2010, p. 116). This can of course lead to difficulty indeed a legiti-
macy crisis where there is real or perceived mismatch between input
legitimacy (traditional legitimacy through electoral process and representa-
tive democracy) and outputs when the system is seen not to be effectively
producing the outputs: witness the EU’s attempts to manage the eurozone
crisis (Scharpf, 2012; Smismans, 2013) and perhaps way beyond.
To the extent that there are global drivers of MLG, we can detect a set
of doctrines and practices applied trans-nationally, though with consider-
able degrees of variety across national contexts. These doctrines and prac-
tices in turn profoundly shape public governance. Conceptually two of the
most important sets of arrangements (which could be termed modes of gov-
ernance) are ‘new public management’ and ‘monitory democracy’. The for-
mer, an important facet of MLG has introduced a variety of actors, agents
and instruments into the governing process, has been fully written about. It
includes a focus on managerial and cost accountability procedures, target
and performance management, (often) a privileging of market and private
business norms and a separation of policy making and service delivery. To
the extent that it downplays political inputs and processes, new public man-
agement can be considered a form of depoliticisation (see Flinders &
Wood, 2014); though this view carries much weight, it does require some
qualification and this is described below. Monitory democracy has accom-
panied new public management and is a mode of governance which has
seen a rapid almost exponential growth of extra parliamentary scrutinising
mechanisms, often undertaken by unelected bodies which operate in the
MLG environment ‘within, underneath and beyond the boundaries of terri-
torial states’ (Keane, 2011, p. 218). These modes of governance are concep-
tually important when examining the ‘degradation of politics and political
accountability’.
274 DUNCAN MCTAVISH
In the strictly governmental sense (i.e., in the arena of elected govern-

ments as distinct from the relationship between government and non-state
players) there is a plethora of systems and configurations between different
state levels not to mention the wide variety of arrangements for local
and municipal government. First, there are ‘designed’ federal systems, like
the United States and Germany, where power is distributed between the
various levels and layers of government a dual federalism (Corwin,
1950), a layer cake (Grodzins, 1966) or type 1 MLG (Hooghe & Marks,
2003). In designed systems there may also be those displaying an intermin-
gling of roles between levels, described as type 2 MLG (Hooghe & Marks,
2003) where policy sectors (or industries) are viewed not through distinct
levels but operate in overlapping jurisdictions, or a marble cake (Grodzins,
1966). Second, there are also federal or quasi federal arrangements which
are not designed (or at least not designed from inception) but arise due to a
transference of power and the creation of local sovereignties for example,
Belgium. Third, there are arrangements for autonomous, ‘home rule’, or
devolved regions or nations. A typology of such arrangements, set out in
the early 2000, still has much explanatory value with the key variables
being constitutional arrangements; legal contours; linguistic (and other)
asymmetries; competency delineation; channels of intergovernmental insti-
tutional representation; fiscal arrangements (degree of own source reven-
ues, central financing, fiscal discretion, major revenue source) (see
Agranoff, 2004). There is also the converse process above the level of the
state: where there is some loss of national sovereignty to a supranational
entity, with sovereignty of the state being pooled or shared in a suprana-
tional setting for example the EU. This situation is referred to below
when discussing the degradation of politics and political accountability.
MLG, DEGRADATION OF POLITICS AND POLITICAL

ACCOUNTABILITY
The idea that MLG and new public management and monitory democracy
erodes political accountability has particular resonance given the signifi-
cance traditionally accorded to nation state representative institutions, that
is parliaments and other popularly elected legislatures (Judge, 2014). It is
argued that in the politico-economic world of globalisation key interests
are over privileged (e.g., global firms having strong purchase on govern-
mental policies to promote de-regulation, favourable fiscal regimes to
advance competitiveness in the ‘competition state’) (Cerny, 2005). Some

writers use the term ‘post democracy’ outlining ‘the claims made by global
firms that they will not be able to operate profitably unless freed from regu-
lations and subordination of criteria of welfare and redistribution will con-
tinue to trump all political democratic debate’ (Crouch, 2004, p. 122); it is
also claimed that not only are specific government policy arenas captured,
but that such firms ‘have also come to dominate the running of the govern-
ment’ (Crouch, 2004, p. 44). It is also argued that popular opinion is not
simply ignored in this environment, but that parliaments as the conven-
tional institutional venues of political expression are by-passed. The less
deferential and politically sceptical electorate are not (always) ignored;
indeed governments and political parties go to great lengths to target and
elicit the views of key groups through focus groups, marketing and political
communication techniques, often responding to populist pressure, leading
at least one author to claim that ‘politics is neither representative nor parti-
cipatory, nor indeed responsible. On the contrary, the post democratic
fusion of populism and corporate dictates gives rise to highly irresponsible
government’ (Bludhorn, 2007, p. 308).
Other approaches to politics and political accountability focus less on
the influence of external (mainly economic) interests and the re-shaping or
downplaying of parliamentary representation, instead framing the debate
in terms of input and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy is that which is
premised on electoral representation and majoritarian institutions (Scharpf,
1999). Output legitimacy is where institutions which may lack the input
legitimacy traditionally held by national parliaments are seen as having
problem-solving capacity and with the ability to consistently produce pol-
icy and other outputs to satisfy the populace. Typically, EU institutions,
either non-elected or indirectly elected have been analysed (indeed
designed) in this way (see Majone, 2005); beyond the EU, all democratic
states have become reliant on such output legitimacy from ‘non majoritar-
ian’ institutions considered more important than directly elected
accountable bodies for the delivery of a range of government, policy and
public service outputs.
Within the frame of input and output legitimacy there is a particular
political accountability issue with reference to the EU. Post financial crash
attempts to manage the eurozone crisis saw the output legitimacy of EU
institutions and their rescue measures especially strained (Scharpf, 2012),
with vastly different impact on eurozone nations, some northern nations
(especially Germany) relatively unscathed but another group, to varying
degrees, blighted (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus). Yet the
276 DUNCAN MCTAVISH
responsibility and accountability for dealing with this was passed to the
institutions of ‘input legitimacy’, that is national parliaments. National
institutions had to ‘sell’ and impose sacrifices on their populations and con-
sequently face the hostility and opposition from the populace with devas-
tating impact on incumbent governments and political parties (Puntscher
Riekmann & Wydra, 2013).
But the erosion of national parliaments with the input legitimacy they
can represent is not a one way street in the EU context. There is a sense in
which national parliaments have been given recognition in EU thinking.
The Lisbon Treaty saw an attempt to activate national parliaments in EU
matters through pre-legislative ‘subsidiarity checks’ and improved monitor-
ing (Judge & Earnshaw, 2008); the Lisbon Treaty did state the ‘Union shall
be founded on representative democracy’, with both European and
national parliaments essential to the good functioning of the EU
(Bellamy & Kroger, 2012). In fact to take the argument about national par-
liaments further, despite taking the remit of national parliamentary-based
parties beyond the nation state (i.e., into the European Parliament) where
transnational alliances exist (e.g., Party of European Socialists or the
European People’s Party), all the evidence indicates the overwhelming
national priorities remain dominant whether this is viewed in political career
patterns, or the status and importance accorded to national parties over colla-
borative arrangements with party family groupings trans-nationally.
Additionally, studies of European integration and national implementa-
tion of policy have focused on assessing European and national norms
thereby analysing the degree of ‘fit’ (or ‘misfit’) (e.g., Risse, Green Cowles, &
Caporaso, 2001); how domestic policies put into effect European policy
(e.g., Schmidt & Raedelli, 2004) or how domestic policies can be uploaded to
gain best traction on European policies (e.g., Borzel & Risse, 2000) in
effect all rather unidirectional in approach. This has been questioned as fail-
ing to properly account for domestic salience, feedback loops and political
timing at nation state level. Recent work on Europeanisation and the ‘new
economic governance’ (initiated with the Stability and Growth Pact, now the
European Stability Mechanism and the intergovernmental Treaty on
Stability, Co-ordination and Governance, ‘The Fiscal Compact’) has shown
through study of France, Germany and Greece, considerable impact on
aspects of European policy, made at EU level of domestic time frames and
political salience (Saurugger, 2014).
Specific case studies too can show that democratic political action and
parallel accountability can take place at levels below the nation state, belying
the hegemony of the degradation of politics and political accountability
thesis. A recently well-researched study of the re-municipalised Berlin Water

Company highlights this. The case has two important points to make. First,
the original privatisation of water supply in the city was very much in keep-
ing with the neo-liberal new public management paradigm: privatisation as
the inevitable policy outcome after the build up of debt and investment need
along with the public sector’s unwillingness to service such; a degraded poli-
tical accountability caused by the perceived inability of mainstream parties
(in this case including the former Communists Die Linke) to conceive and
implement alternatives to privatisation; however despite this public owner-
ship and political accountability void the provision of a form of output
legitimacy, that is the effective supply of a public service water.
So the above makes two significant points. First, the case is clearly com-
patible with the degradation of politics and political accountability thesis.
This was compounded by the lack of transparency regarding cost to the
municipality and citizens, on the basis of commercial confidentiality.
However the second point which the case makes about the reversal of
privatisation and re-municipalisation of water supply is significant. An
effective citizens’ movement developed (Berliner Wassertisch, Berlin Water
Action Group) and this owed its growth to the seeming inability of the
main party system, an Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD, the
social democrats) Die Linke controlled authority to reverse privatisa-
tion; the movement gained access to commercial contractual information
about profit guarantees (previously deemed commercially confidential); and
it used the judicial system in support of the group’s aims. Re-
municipalisation was eventually achieved by using a popular political
accountability instrument (a referendum). Political action led to the water
supply being taken into city control, but importantly this occurred out-with
the mainstream party and political system (Beveridge & Naumann, 2014).
If the first point of the case shows that water privatisation in Berlin
lends support to the broad degradation of political accountability thesis,
the second point concerning how popular pressure was used to reverse the
policy and re-municipalise water supply indicates how this thesis is not
necessarily fixed or irreversible.
SOME STATE WIDE APPROACHES TO

MANAGEMENT OF MULTI LEVELISM
Both institutional and fiscal-expenditure approaches are instrumental in the

management of multi levelism. Institutional arrangements can be illustrated
278 DUNCAN MCTAVISH
in the contrasting approaches of Germany, Belgium (both of which are fed-

erations), the United Kingdom and Spain (each with devolved polities).
For example, in Germany the second chamber (the Bundesrat) comprises
representatives of Land governments, and while as a second chamber it has
the power of veto, in effect the joint decision making with the first chamber
(the Bundestag) has been one of bargaining and compromise rather than
gridlock: the trend has been co-operation, territorial interdependence with
the most recent Federal Reform Settlement (2006) stressing the need for
balance (Detterbeck, 2012). In other polities the political institutional con-
figuration is managed differently. In Belgium, Regions and Communities
have substantial policy portfolios with sub state governments having
the constitutional right to conduct foreign policies within their sphere of
competence indeed at the EU the Belgian delegation is led by sub state
representatives who articulate the domestically agreed position (Beyers &
Bursens, 2006). This decentralisation and centrifugal pressure all requires
considerable vertical and horizontal co-ordination through inter-ministerial
conferences and intra-party linkages (De Winter & Dumont, 2006). A
major irony is that while the political parties compete over a strong voice
for the region (and there is in effect no statewide party competition in
Belgium, the main players gaining support which is regionally or linguisti-
cally based), they need to make this co-ordination work (Detterbeck, 2012).
In the United Kingdom, a unitary state has managed multi levelism since
the late 1990s through a system of devolution with a range of powers
reserved to the Westminster parliament (‘high state’ functions like foreign
policy, defence and most macro-economic, fiscal and welfare policies) and
other powers (in the main relating to the design and delivery of public ser-
vices) devolved to legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
with varying degrees of power. Spain however has attempted to operate a
more fluid system, based on the post-Francoist constitution in 1978
attempting to hold together a multi-national polity, with no neat constitu-
tional separation between levels and most policy domains having shared
legislation for example the Cortez passing basic legislation and sub states
supplementing this. Unlike, the Bundesrat in Germany the territorial sec-
ond chamber (Senate) as a multi-level management instrument is weak: it
does have veto power but only a proportion of members are appointed as
representatives of Autonomous Communities, regions have no role with
regard to law making (Aja, 2001).
Fiscal arrangements too are key in multi-level management.
In Germany, federal uniformity in taxation (and the associated benefits in
welfare standards and education) is strong with some diversity in the
east though there is some debate (or disquiet) over the costs of state
wide equity and fiscal equalisation from the ‘rich south’ (Detterbeck,
2012). In Belgium, fiscal arrangements can be challenging for systemwide
management. Here, fiscal autonomy at sub state level is limited, with
Regions and Communities getting shared tax revenue and non-conditional
block grants, but aspects of fiscal decision making require special major-
ity, therefore need consent among linguistic groups. In Spain, most taxes
are controlled by the centre with national legislation determining distri-
bution (except for Basque country and Navarra which have tax auton-
omy), thus giving the centre considerable influence over a wide range of
policy objectives in much of Spain (Swenden, 2006). However, even
where there is considerable fiscal and expenditure control from the
centre, there can still be significant policy differentiation across the
multi-level system if there is policy permissiveness in centre/region rela-
tionships. Although the main source of funding for devolved polities in
the United Kingdom is a formula-based block grant (the Barnet formula)
based on overall UK expenditure agreed by the Westminster parliament,
the allocation is permissive (especially in Scotland where the devolved
parliament’s legislative powers are strongest) enabling allocation of
spending along priorities not necessarily congruent with Westminster’s.
This has led to major policy differences in education and health care
between Scottish and UK governments, helping fuel a perception, in
England, of over generous funding for the Scottish Government (FoES,
2012)1; this in itself could be de-stabilising, making multi-level system
management more challenging.
A key aspect of understanding the operation and management of multi-
level systems is the extent to which there is substantially, often constitution-
ally, embedded power locally. There can be considerable local embedding
even in unitary states. For example, in the decentralised unitary states of
Sweden, Norway, Netherlands and Denmark, sub national units are
involved in policy making often at the municipal level; some have even
referred to such arrangements as ‘implementation federalism’ (e.g., Van
den Berg, 2011). In fact in Europe, the United Kingdom is one of the few
countries where the constitutional status of local embedding (through local
government) is not guaranteed. And in some countries, service provision
and way beyond merely implementing the centre’s policies is highly
dependent on this tier in the multi-level system. For example, in Germany
75% of the entire public capital investment is handled by local authorities.
Local authority companies are key players in the energy market, having
displayed considerable policy pro-activity in their approach to joint public
280 DUNCAN MCTAVISH
private ventures, re-municipalisation of economic and business activity

after a period of less than successful privatisations, and so on (Wollman &
Marcou, 2010).
PARTY AND POLITICAL ACTION IN MULTI-LEVEL

SYSTEMS. THE UK CASE IN INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT
A Win-Lose, Zero Sum Game?
Much of the political debate and some of the academic writing have pre-
sented the UK’s political and party experience with multi levelism as a win-
lose, zero sum game. This leads to an hypothesis: is the practice of multi
levelism in the UK’s case, a win-lose, zero sum game? The most fractious
part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, is an interesting case.
Ethnic outbidding in consociational democracies has been well documented
(e.g., see Barry, 1975; Luther, 1999) and the rise of the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP), usurping the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) as the
largest party of the protestant unionist community, alongside the parallel
rise of Sinn Fein (SF) and its eclipse of Social Democratic and Labour
Party (SDPL) in the catholic nationalist community can be analysed thus.
This has a strong multi-level element in the sense that loyalist communities
and parties have an allegiance to the United Kingdom with nationalist
communities and parties (and in particular SF) having a traditional leaning
to the Irish Republic. Multi levelism is indeed reinforced through the Good
Friday Agreement and the subsequent St Andrews Agreement where,
although Northern Ireland is a devolved part of the United Kingdom there
is also a range of cross border institutional arrangements with the Irish
Republic. So although the very existence and performance of a consocia-
tional devolved institution in Belfast located within a multi-level environ-
ment clearly indicates an alternative to zero sum, win-lose politics, the
potential for community outbidding presented as X wins therefore Y loses
can be seen as a driver in the opposite direction: the potency of such can be
evidenced in the reaction of parts of the Northern Irish community to deci-
sions on marches and the display of flags and other symbols; it is also
argued over the longer term that the very structures, processes and institu-
tions designed to power share between the two communities, do themselves
solidify and consolidate pre-existing communal, religious and ethnic loyal-

ties with their negative path dependencies (e.g., Wilford & Wilson, 2006).
Nonetheless, there is clearly a sense in which aspects of the Northern Irish
political environment can be seen as engaging with the multi-level system in
a way difficult to describe as conflictual or win-lose. For example, the sub
state (Irish) nationalism of SF, the second largest political party in the
north, has been refocused and repositioned towards gaining resources and
recognition within the context of UK devolution rather than sustained
opposition to the British state (Nagle, 2013); this lends support to earlier
writing on Quebec, Catalan, Basque and Scottish nationalism indicating a
‘lock in’ to the central state where potentially secessionist or centrifugal
agents enjoy substantial powers, but simultaneously press for greater
resources and legislative power; nationalist movements in this analysis
become essentially problem-solving mobilisations (Guiberneau, 2006;
Keating, 1996; Nagle, 2013).
With reference to the Scottish-UK question much of the debate and
political articulation has been presented in zero sum terms, especially in
relation to (Scottish) nationalist politics. According to some commentators
there has been an assumption of the predominance of Westminster as the
key focus for UK political activity. Nationalist politics can therefore be
seen as at best diversionary but often in win-lose terms. A leading UK com-
mentator’s view of the Scottish National Party (SNP) success in achieving
an overall majority in elections to the Scottish Parliament in 2011 in an
electoral system designed to prevent single-party government was ‘that
the SNP borrowed Labour voters for this particular election to Holyrood’
(Kellner, 2011, cited in Hassan, 2011). Some Labour and Labour sympa-
thetic voices have been particularly strident in this regard, which is hardly
surprising given the significant number of Labour MPs which Scotland has
sent to Westminster since the late 1970s; this argument was used extensively
by Labour in Scotland throughout the 2015 UK general election. Much of
the language used has been in terms of the ‘gravitational pull’ of the inde-
pendence issue, with ‘wins’ for a strongly resourced Scottish polity pre-
sented as ‘losses’ to English taxpayers (see Hassan, 2011, p. 374). How this
plays out politically will be significant in the context of the virtual wipe-out
of Labour MPs in Scotland (reduced to one seat) after the 2015 election
and their replacement by a total of 56 SNP MPs. However, in reality, many
aspects of nationalist politics in Scotland have not been really about nation
state zero sum games, but rather engagement with other players, participa-
tion in interdependent relationships (e.g., UK government, EU bodies,
282 DUNCAN MCTAVISH
elements of civil society, other devolved polities). The SNP appears to

represent this type of politics, certainly in its rhetoric which envisages a
place for Scotland within British unionism in terms of a ‘social union’, ‘cur-
rency union’ and a range of political co-operative arrangements with the
rest of the UK ‘in the interests of Scotland and the rest of the UK’; aca-
demic studies of the SNP leadership and membership base appear to indi-
cate comfort and acceptance of these parameters of nationalist politics
(Mitchell, Bennie, & Johns, 2011; Hassan, 2009; Mitchell, Johns, & Bennie,
2009). That said, in the dynamic post referendum environment the presen-
tation of further powers to Scotland, and the resource implications, may be
structured and presented as win-lose for political party advantage and there
is considerable evidence that this structuring of argument was used by key
UK players in the 2015 election.
Another dimension of the win-lose theme has been presented with
reference to other devolved polities in the UK with a tendency for newly
established sub national governments ‘grabbing power from local govern-
ments’ (Laffin, 2004, p. 214), a trend which has been observed in
Flanders and Catalonia (Loughlin, 2007). Others writing about England
describe increased prescription and control from the centre with very lim-
ited scope left for the exercise of local authority democracy (e.g., Copus,
2006). Evidence from Scotland is somewhat more mixed. On the one
hand, the substantial proportion of local authority funding which is
transferred from the centre, rather than raised locally (proportion much
the same as other parts of UK), along with a council tax freeze (albeit
voluntary) since 2008 would seem to represent substantial leverage from
the centre and centralisation at the expense of local autonomy and discre-
tion. On the other hand, there has been much focus on the notion of a
‘Scottish policy style’ which has a different perspective than a centralising
win-lose zero sum game when explaining the relationship between central
and local levels in the system (McGlynn, Tonge, and McAuley, 2014).
This style refers to new ways in which the Scottish Government makes
policy using consultation with pressure participants including local gov-
ernment a policy path facilitated by Scotland’s size (permitting close
relationships between actors), and a relatively low policy capacity of the
Scottish Government (Cairney & McGarvey, 2013; Keating, 2010), and a
similarly underinvested capacity in the Scottish Parliament. This
has prompted (relatively) less use of top down measures like performance
target regimes more reliance on expertise out-with government (witness
the extensive use of local authority and other personnel on a range of
consultations, task forces and other policy initiatives in Scotland). The
organisation and implementation of much public service delivery is

through Single Outcome Agreements (SOA), one for each local authority
area based on how the SOA partners (i.e., the main public sector bodies
for instance local council, health boards, police, organisations representing
the third sector) articulate and implement the Scottish Government’s
National Performance Framework aimed at improving a range of public
service delivery outcomes. The SOA process is led by the local authority
and the local authority chief executive is the responsible public official
reporting to the Scottish Government. It can therefore be argued that the
relationship between government and councils is defined by collaboration
for improved outcomes (win-win) rather than zero sum.2 It should be noted
of course that this does not imply that there is a democratic win-win all
round there is a sense in which the Scottish Parliament can often be by-
passed: a particular feature of this approach to multi-level politics since
2007 has been for local authorities (and often health authorities too) to
resist the Parliament’s calls for information ‘on the basis that they [i.e., local
authorities] are not accountable to the Parliament because they have their
own elections and mandates’ (see Cairney, 2014). One would have to con-
clude, based on the illustrations used, the win-lose zero sum hypothesis is
not proven.
Party Political Strategies
The devolved multi-level arrangements across the United Kingdom are

asymmetric. Chief amongst the asymmetries is that England, by far the lar-
gest part of the United Kingdom is without any English devolved govern-
ment (London Mayor and Assembly notwithstanding); Scotland is the
largest and most powerful of the devolved polities, with the strongest non-
statewide nationalist party, and has been involved in an independence
referendum campaign. Therefore, political strategies and actions in the
United Kingdom multi-level system see attention focus largely on England
and Scotland. There are two broad elements of political strategies which
will be analysed: first, how approaches to devolved politics are contextua-
lised within a broader UK prism; second, how the main parties address the
inherent asymmetries. These issues are outlined in overview, since it is
beyond the scope of this piece to give a more detailed analysis.
First, using the case of the 2011 Scottish Parliament election, it appears
that Labour’s poor showing was in part due to a failure to differentiate
between two electoral arenas: Scottish Parliament (where the election was
284 DUNCAN MCTAVISH
fought) and Westminster Parliament. This seems to be broadly accepted

both by political commentary and academic analysis. According to Brian
Taylor (BBC Scotland):
Labour’s strategy was misplaced. It was perhaps summed up by the speech delivered by
Ed Miliband to the Scottish Labour conference in Glasgow at the outset of the cam-
paign. Yes Mr Miliband talked about the SNP. But his prime focus was to assure his
colleagues that they were about to take the first step (by winning in Scotland) towards
victory for Labour at the next UK general election it over-emphasised the subsidiary
nature of the contest. Folk in Scotland understand devolution. They get the concept.
But they believed that they were voting in a parliamentary election a Scottish
Parliamentary election. Not a rehearsal not a dry run. (Taylor, 2011)
In reality, almost in contradiction to the above, studies of devolved elec-

tions in Wales and Scotland have found ‘arena effects’, that is differential
voting at UK and devolved levels, electoral behaviour determined in part
by perceptions of which parties are more relevant to which electoral arena
(Scully, 2013; Trystan, Scully, & Wyn Jones, 2003). This of course substan-
tially qualifies the notion of ‘second order elections’ which assumes that
statewide general elections will be regarded by voters as ‘first order’, with
other elections seen through the first-order prism (see, e.g., Reif & Schmitt,
1980). In addition the most recent research shows that regions and
devolved nations with greater autonomy and those with a stronger context
of distinctiveness are more inclined in sub state elections to vote for the
regionalist or autonomist parties (Jeffery & Schakel, 2013). In fact, studies
of devolved elections in the UK have identified valence politics voting
behaviour based on competence and perceived effectiveness of parties to
deliver broadly shared objectives (e.g., prosperity and efficient public
services) as key to explaining electoral outcomes. Voting at both UK
and devolved levels is determined by valence issues: the valence issues may
differ between levels, but electoral behaviour is not explained by first-
order/second-order thinking (Johns, Denver, Mitchell, & Pattie, 2010;
Johns, Mitchell, & Carman, 2013; Scully, 2013).
Second is how the main political parties address multi levelism in the
United Kingdom. Some international comparisons are instructive. In some
federal systems (often those which are not multi-national for example, the
United States, Germany or Australia) single-party systems operate in all
parts of the state. In multi-national systems whether federal (e.g., Belgium,
Canada) or not (e.g., Spain) there are often different or fragmented party
systems operating in the multi-level polity. As illustration, Belgian parties
only operate in Flemish or French language communities and though there
are sister parties operating in different parts of the federation these have no
organisational links. In Spain, Catalonia has a distinctive system with
Catalan Socialists competing with radical pro-independence nationalists
(ERC), more moderate nationalists (Convergencia) and the statewide
Partido Popular, while Basque politics are contested by Basque nationalists
(PNV) and statewide Socialists (PSOE). Canada has separate parties con-
testing federal and provincial elections, and though there are financial and
other links between federal and provincial Conservative and Liberal
Parties, they are organisationally distinct at federal and provincial levels.
Quebec provides the most vivid example: here the Liberals and
Conservatives contest federal elections but do not perform particularly
well the federalist Parti Liberal du Quebec (PLQ) and the sovereignist
Parti Quebecois (PQ) are key players but do not contest federalist elections;
the Bloc Quebecois (BQ) does not contest provincial elections but has close
links to PQ. Only the New Democrats (NDP) operate across the country
and at both federal and provincial levels and although the NDP per-
formed well in Quebec in the 2011 federal elections, by bringing together a
coalition of federalists, sovereignists and across the left right spectrum, it
remains to be seen if this represents a paradigmatic shift in the multi-level
configuration of Quebec politics (see Fournier, Cutler, Soroka, Stolle, &
Belanger, 2013).
So, the United Kingdom with the strong position of state wide parties
in a devolved multi-level multi-national system (Northern Ireland notwith-
standing) is somewhat unusual. And this presents particular challenges for
these parties. The relationship between Labour at the United Kingdom
and devolved polity levels (especially Scotland) is an uneasy one, particu-
larly so after the Scottish referendum where despite Labour being on the
winning side (‘No’) much of its traditional support clearly voted the other
way (‘Yes’) with the post referendum resignation of Scottish Labour’s lea-
der claiming the UK party ‘treated Scottish Labour like a branch office’.
There has been some decentralisation to recognise devolved polities for
example, in matters like candidate selection for the devolved institutions;
the leader of Scottish Labour is party leader in Scotland, elected by the
party in Scotland; but it seems not to have fundamentally altered the dom-
inance of the UK structures an investigation into Falkirk constituency
candidate selection in 2014 was led by UK labour with little input from
the Scottish leader. Labour has no representation for its Scottish nor
Welsh national parties on its National Executive Committee, nor have
these parties a locus over candidates for party leadership or Westminster
elections (Mycock & Hayton, 2014). It is also claimed that in the early
286 DUNCAN MCTAVISH
years of devolution, Gordon Brown (using his strong support in the

Scottish party) was a key figure in persuading the Scottish leadership not
to press for major change in the constitutional relationship between the
party in Scotland and at UK level (Hopkin & Bradbury, 2006). Labour’s
severe loss in Scotland in 2015 will make this relationship especially diffi-
cult if not unviable.
For all UK parties, the main underlying issue is that the organisational
arrangements and configuration of each party inevitably reflects the size
and dominance of England in the United Kingdom (population of England
c. 85% of UK total) as well as the fact that the United Kingdom is a tradi-
tionally centrist state, despite the fact that Scottish and Welsh political
elites have played a disproportionally high part at senior levels of UK poli-
tics. This has led to challenges for the three main parties when addressing
their English constituencies, since the differentiated polity which currently
comprises the United Kingdom with separate legislatures and institutions
in Wales and Scotland are clear for all to see. For most parties, if there is a
logic of devolution (i.e., addressing decentralised representative governance
arrangements throughout the United Kingdom) then it has been effectively
ignored, given the absence of such arrangements for England, giving rise to
a range of anomalies and issues ranging from the ‘West Lothian question’
(or ‘English Votes for English Laws, EVEL) to funding and fiscal arrange-
ments, policy spillover effects, etc. The Conservatives have from time to
time pronounced on the value of English MPs voting on English matters,
as a response to the West Lothian question (and this has assumed salience
in the immediate referendum aftermath, though without endorsing the idea
of an English Parliament; and there does seem to be some disquiet about
the Barnett formula meaning ‘English taxpayers being asked to subsidise
for people in Scotland a range of services not available in England’ (cited
in Mycock & Hayton, 2014, p. 259). The Conservatives have very few seats
out-with England, so ironically for the traditional party of union, have lit-
tle to lose from appearing as ‘the English party’. In this sense the apparent
ease of the relative autonomy accorded the Scottish Conservatives, includ-
ing the right to select candidates for UK elections is understandable; so too
a credible pitch from a major contender for leader of the Scottish
Conservatives in 2011 to lead a breakaway party with a distinctive Scottish
identity (Fraser, 2011); statements too have been made by leading Welsh
Conservatives distancing themselves from the UK party (cited in Mycock &
Hayton, 2014, p. 253). But for Labour, the issue is particularly vexing. The
party until the 2015 election had a large number of MPs from Scotland
(prior to the election 41 of a total 59 Scottish MPs); this has been wiped
out, reduced to one MP post election. To form a future UK government,

Labour could conceivably require a large block of Scottish MPs; the party
must therefore be seen as a key player addressing Scottish issues, but the
dominant electoral arithmetic requires that concerns of the English and
‘Englishness’ must be addressed, indeed be dominant. Although there did
not appear any democratic appetite for English regional devolution over a
decade ago, with the clear rejection in a referendum by electors in the north
east of England the only region where it was thought there was any sup-
port it has been argued that this result was ‘connived at’ by northern
English Labour MPs (Parry, 2013). While there have been calls from lead-
ing Labour figures to question why there is a Scottish Labour and Welsh
Labour but no English Labour and calls for ‘a truly English Labour Party’
(e.g., from John Cruddas, cited in Mycock & Hayton, 2014, p. 261),
Labour leadership’s response has been somewhat muted.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has addressed a relatively under explored aspect of MLG,
that is the politics of MLG and in particular the political strategies
adopted in multi-level political systems. Implicitly embedded in the globa-
lised governance environment are the modes of governance described as
new public management and monitory democracy and within this con-
ceptual framework depoliticisation and the degradation of accountability
has been a key debate. Although there is much evidence too much to
ignore in support of the degradation thesis, more nuanced (and indeed,
normatively, more positive) interpretations are offered both in terms of
high politics at the EU level and more local cases as instanced in aspects
of Berlin’s utility re-municipalisation. The management of statewide multi
levelism was also addressed, with a range of institutional arrangements
outlined in different federal and devolved contexts including Germany,
Belgium, the United Kingdom and Spain allied to the use of fiscal and
funding instruments in the co-ordination and management of multi-level
polities.
In the case of the United Kingdom, two aspects of multi-level politics
were addressed. First, in the context of the win-lose zero sum view, a
hypothesis was addressed (that the practice of multi levelism in the United
Kingdom is seen as a win-lose zero sum game). Second, the party strategies
adopted given the particularly asymmetric nature of devolved
arrangements.
288 DUNCAN MCTAVISH
On the first point, there is an interesting answer to the hypothesis pre-

sented given the cases used. Northern Ireland with its historical back-
ground could be expected to display much in the way of win-lose politics;
however it showed a refocus of key players towards political strategies not
characterised as win-lose. In Scotland, much of the debate crystallising
around the 2014 referendum was presented in win-lose, zero sum terms;
however over the longer term some key players have not acted in this way
nor is the relationship between central and local government depicted as
such (which may be at odds with much of the writing on local central rela-
tions in England).
Second, beyond an exploration of the win-lose hypothesis, the configura-
tion of UK political parties was seen to be particularistic among multi-level
multi-national states, given the strong maintenance of British statewide
parties quite different from other multi-national systems whether federal
or devolved. Given this Brito-centric prism, the main political parties
appear to have difficulties in responding to the strategic challenges posed
by multi-level devolved governance, particularly in Scotland. The largest
UK party player in Scotland, Labour, has appeared behind the curve by
not addressing the different arena requirements of devolved elections,
instead acting through a UK prism. The statewide parties’ overall strategies
to the reality of multi levelism do of course differ. While all are
UK-focused, the number of Scottish MPs representing the main parties has
traditionally been strongly slanted towards Labour (not withstanding the
current post 2015 election position). Scottish MPs therefore are much more
important to Labour at UK level than is the case with the Conservatives.
Consequently, the greater autonomy of the Scottish Conservatives is under-
standable (though there is little evidence of policy difference). Labour too
has decentralised its structures, roles and activities to accommodate devolu-
tion, yet the party remains very much UK-dominant. Ironically the party
whose institutional arrangements are most in tune with devolution (Liberal
Democrats with a strong federal structure and considerable autonomy for
the party in Scotland) experienced electoral meltdown in Scotland and the
United Kingdom as a whole due to its coalition partnership with
Conservatives at Westminster.
Finally, beyond the United Kingdom, some general comments can be
made about political strategies and zero sum or win-win processes and
outcomes in multi-level systems. Centripetal forces are likely to lead to
(win-win) strategies focusing on co-operation, negotiation and joint
problem-solving. Such forces may be in the context of constitutional frame-
works which embed joint decision making, bargaining and compromise,
like in Germany. Another centripetal force leading to similar political stra-

tegies may be the existence of strong statewide parties’ ability, through
resourcing mechanisms (like large block grants, degrees of tax autonomy
and/or fiscal equalisation) to deliver acceptable arrangements to the com-
ponent parts of the multi-level system. Until recently the UK devolution
settlements exemplified this through the relatively permissive block grant
funding system. Conversely any reduction in the statewide parties’ ability
to deliver such may lead to less co-operative strategies (more akin to zero
sum), especially if a powerful non-statewide party is present.
Centrifugal forces are likely to include a perceived imbalance between
fiscal autonomy and fiscal equalisation where, for example, a relatively
prosperous region or nation has minimal tax autonomy and perceived
under resourcing through the state’s fiscal transfer arrangements; this cen-
trifugal force is likely to be given strong expression where there is the pre-
sence of non-statewide party competition. Flanders could be an example:
this is the wealthiest region of Belgium and the party structure in the state
is regionally and linguistically fragmented (there are no state wide parties
in Belgium). This is likely to lead to what at first glance may appear oppos-
ing political strategies. On the one hand, a strong pro autonomous, even
secessionist strategy (e.g., the Flemish Movement); on the other hand, co-
ordination strategies between parties required to make the system as a
whole work (i.e., win-win) for example, as occurred/occurs in Belgium
after gridlocked general elections and protracted attempts at government
formation.
The existence or absence of formal federal arrangements and structures
also affect political strategies. In Spain (non-federal, unlike Germany and
Belgium) a perceived imbalance between (lack of) tax autonomy and fiscal
transfer will be a centrifugal force (like in Belgium) but given the non-
federal status of Spain and the degree of fiscal centralisation (except for the
Basque country and Navarro), political strategies around this are unlikely
to include systemic negotiation with state wide parties; hence political stra-
tegies in Catalonia have been about sub state party competition, plus com-
petition with the state wide Partido Popular, as well as the extreme example
of non-negotiated process and use of a political instrument (a referendum
on Catalan independence) not recognised by the state’s constitution or the
ruling state wide party so an unlikely scenario for win-win.
Suffice to say of course that these general comments are particular to
centrifugal and centripetal forces pertaining at a point in time, and in some
multi-level settings these are likely to change over the medium-longer term
leading to altered political strategies.
290 DUNCAN MCTAVISH
NOTE
1. It should be noted however that funding arrangements of the devolution in the

UK will change with some tax raising powers granted to devolved institutions espe-
cially in Scotland. At the time of writing the scale and scope of such change is still
to be determined.
2. If we look beyond the central local government relationship, a different or
more nuanced picture may emerge. The Christie Commission (Christie, 2011)
findings accepted by Scottish Government recommended that the drive in public
service delivery should steer towards prevention and the ‘empowerment’ of indivi-
duals and communities, with the third sector having a key role to play in interfacing
between communities and various tiers of government. Scottish Government fund-
ing for the third sector has been relatively well protected in the current tight spend-
ing environment, yet a key relationship is that between local councils and third
sector organisations. In some significant instances this relationship has not been an
exemplar of collaborative working; rather it has been one of the local authority
unwilling to cede or share power and resources with third sector and community-
based organisations an example of win-lose thinking and practice (personal
information).
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MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF
HYDROPOWER IN CHINA? THE
PROBLEM OF TRANSPLANTING A
WESTERN CONCEPT INTO THE
CHINESE GOVERNANCE CONTEXT
Oliver Hensengerth
ABSTRACT
Purpose The chapter attempts to evaluate the utility of applying
multi-level governance outside of the EU, and also outside of the group
of democratic states, to states that have defied the third wave of demo-
cratization and that are characterized by a so-called new authoritarian-
ism. The case is the People’s Republic of China, and the focus falls on
policy-making and implementation in the field of hydropower with special
attention to the issue area of environmental protection.
Methodology/approach The chapter draws on the notion of scales
and indigenous Chinese governance concepts and brings these into a con-
versation with the concept of multi-level governance. Case studies on
hydropower decision-making in China contribute empirical data in order

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004012
295
296 OLIVER HENSENGERTH
to investigate the utility of multi-level governance in the Chinese govern-

ance context.
Findings The chapter argues that if multi-level governance is to have
utility in other cultural contexts it needs to move away from a considera-
tion of pre-given scales as locus of authority and consider indigenous gov-
ernance concepts and notions of scale, and it crucially needs to map
power relationships in the making and implementation of policies in order
to reach analytical depth.
Research implications The case of China shows that authoritarian
regimes can be analysed in terms of multiple levels as authoritarianism
no longer automatically implies strict top-down entities. Instead, auto-
cracies can be highly fragmented and subject to complex decision-making
processes that can arise during processes of administrative reform. This
can lead to vibrant and reflexive systems of governance that exhibit
adaptive skills necessary to ensure regime survival amidst a continuously
diversifying society and changing external circumstances. As a conse-
quence, a research programme looking at the new authoritarianism from
a multi-level governance perspective has the capacity to uncover and
describe new forms of governance, by bringing the concept into a conver-
sation with indigenous governance concepts.
Practical implications In China, informal networks between the
energy bureaucracy and hydropower developers determine the hydro-
power decision-making process. This is particularly detrimental at a time
when the Chinese government emphasizes the importance of the rule of
law and social stability. Informal networks in which key government
agencies are involved actively thwart the attempt of creating reliable
institutions and more transparent and accountable processes of decision-
making within the authoritarian governance framework.
Social implications The findings show the dominance of informal net-
works versus the formal decision-making process. This sidelines the
environmental bureaucracy and fails to fully realize the importance of
public input into the decision-making process as one potential element of
institutionalized conflict resolution.
Originality/value The chapter builds on existing multi-level govern-
ance approaches and fuses them with notions of scales and indigenous
Chinese governance concepts in order to enable the applicability of
the concept of multi-level governance outside of its area of origin. This
Multi-Level Governance of Hydropower in China? 297
advances the explanatory depth and theoretical reach of multi-level

governance.
Keywords: Multi-level governance; scales; China; hydropower;
environment
INTRODUCTION
The concept of multi-level governance was developed in order to better

understand policy-making within the European Union (EU) (Hooghe &
Marks, 2001, 2003; Marks, 1992, 1993). As a consequence, it has found it
difficult to make its way beyond the confines of the EU, except in the guise
of global multi-level governance and, more recently, as an attempt to bring
the concept into a conversation with intergovernmentalism in the United
States (Ongaro, Massey, Holzer, & Wayenberg, 2010, 2011). This chapter
attempts to evaluate the utility of applying multi-level governance outside
of the EU, and also outside of a democratic state. The case is the People’s
Republic of China, looking specifically at decision-making in the field of
hydropower with special attention to the issue area of environmental
protection.
The chapter argues that the level-focussed multi-level governance
approach does not capture the complexities of political processes in China.
The concept therefore needs to be coupled with indigenous approaches to
the study of central local interactions and a sophisticated understanding
of scales. However, in moving the concept out of its European and demo-
cratic context and applying it to states that have defied the third wave of
democratization, the concept has the potential to help uncover new modes
of governance that are not practiced in democratic states and to forward
especially comparative analysis of policy-making in these states.
While the chapter recognizes that multi-level governance describes pro-
cesses of upwards, downwards, and sideways distribution of authority from
the central government, the analysis here focuses on the downwards and
sideways distribution in order to identify the usefulness of multi-level gov-
ernance for the analysis of decision-making in China. However, China is
increasingly enmeshed in global governance processes, and an analysis of
upwards distribution or an analysis of China in global multi-level govern-
ance processes is an interesting course of action for research. However, this
is beyond the scope of this chapter.
The chapter begins by looking at types of multi-level governance includ-
ing regional varieties. It then makes a case for applying the concept to
post-Cold War authoritarian states. Following this, the chapter examines

China’s tiered governance structure, indigenous approaches to the analysis
of policy-making, and then uses hydropower decision-making as a case
study to illustrate these processes. The field of hydropower and the role of
environmental protection therein is a particularly instructive case as it
shows the discrepancies between formal and informal processes, the tension
and cooperation between state and non-state actors, the creation of con-
tending alliances across China’s governance levels and the tension between
horizontal and territorial administrations. A conclusion evaluates the utility
of multi-level governance for the analysis of policy-making in China,
arguing that in order to understand policy-making in China using Western
concepts, we at least need to supplement multi-level governance with a flex-
ible approach to scales and an understanding of indigenous governance
concepts. This is, in our view, a key missing linkage in the extant scientific
debate on multi-level governance, and its consideration might further the
applicability of such theoretical frame.
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND ITS

REGIONAL VARIETIES
The concept of multi-level governance enables a ‘focus on the shift from a

unified authority, acting rationally at the centre of government, towards a
diffusion of power and “multiple centres”’ (Cairney, 2012, p. 155).
Developed to understand policy processes in the EU (Marks, 1992, 1993) it
describes the vertical and horizontal diffusion of power in a process that is
characterized by negotiation and fragmentation rather than compulsion
and centralization. We therefore face a fragmented, segmented and disag-
gregated state that is forced to share power and to negotiate with other
actors (Bache & Flinders, 2004). This also means that we may face uncer-
tainty about who is in charge, bargaining processes instead of clear chains
of command that determine policy-making and implementation, and
blurred boundaries between policy areas.
The literature has identified many forms of governance that can be sub-
sumed under the term multi-level governance, including processes of decen-
tralization, issues of networked governance between central governments,
regions, non-state actors, and supranational organizations, and the erosion
of central authority at the hands of sub-national units and other actors in
policy implementation (Bruszt, 2007, p. 1).
Amongst those having attempted a generic categorization of multi-level

governance are Hooghe and Marks (2001, 2003). They identified two types
of multi-level governance. Type I can be found mostly in conventional ter-
ritorial government where central government shares authority with a lim-
ited number of sub-national jurisdictions. Type II can mostly be found in a
number of settings that include the ‘public/private frontier’, the ‘national/
international frontier’, ‘[d]ensely populated frontier regions of bordering
states’, and at the local level ‘where local government interacts with com-
munity associations’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). While analytically distin-
guishable, both types are ideal-types and coexist in real life (Hooghe &
Marks, 2001, 2003). Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics.
A later categorization of multi-level governance can be found in Bruszt
(2007, p. 3). He identified four types along two dimensions: The ‘properties
of the rules of making binding decisions about the goals and means of
sub-national development, and the distribution of opportunities for auton-
omous action for lower levels of the state’. Accordingly, he finds four ideal-
type forms of governance (p. 5, Figure 1):
• Hierarchical-centralized: rules are hierarchical and room for autonomous

decision-making is low.
• Hierarchical with some decentralization: rules are hierarchical and room
for autonomous decision-making is high.
• Inclusive-centralized: rules are distributed and room for autonomous
decision-making is low.
• Networked: rules are distributed and room for autonomous decision-
making is high.
While Hooghe and Marks (2001, 2003) developed their ideal-types

with relevance to the EU and the Western European core EU-countries,
Table 1. Types of Multi-Level Governance.
Type I Type II
General-purpose jurisdictions/multiplex Task-specific jurisdictions/functional

competencies specificity
Non-intersecting jurisdictions Intersecting membership
Jurisdictions organized in a limited number of No limit to the number of jurisdictional
levels levels
System-wide architecture Flexible/ad hoc policy-specific architecture
Limit the number of actors that need to be Limit interaction among actors
coordinated
Source: Hooghe and Marks (2001: Table 1; 2003: Table 2, p. 236).

Bruszt (2007) developed his categories for the analysis of governance in

post-accession Eastern European countries: The Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland. In a similar vein, but more critical, Stubbs (2005) identified a
South-Eastern European version of multi-level governance. Critiquing the
mainstream multi-level governance literature as locked in a premature nor-
mativism, abstract modelling, and rehashed neo-pluralism, Stubbs argues
that without enriching the concept with an interpretivist and reflexive meth-
odology it does not have relevance beyond its Western European origins.
In particular, in order to find application to state and governance forms
that are different to the ones found in North-western Europe,1 multi-level
governance needs to be enriched with two concepts: complex forms of pol-
icy transfer in order to capture the ways in which development policies are
formulated, and a critical notion of scale.
Stubbs’s critique and call for a reconceptualised notion of multi-level
governance resonates with the aim of this chapter. Indeed, as the next sec-
tions will show, although the Chinese polity appears to be levelled, the pro-
cess of policy-making strongly defies a view whereby territorial scales are
hierarchically ordered and reflect inclusiveness and authority of decision-
making. Scales can be seen as nested geographical hierarchies global,
regional, national and local (Delaney & Leitner, 1997). However, scales can
also be seen as relationships of authority especially where political author-
ity and geographical unit do not coincide and where horizontal and vertical
relationships of authority are in conflict (for this view see Bulkeley, 2005,
later in this chapter). Indeed, the view of scales as distinct bounded terri-
tories has come under pressure. As Jessop (2005, p. 226) argued, ‘multiple
scales exist that are often individually tangled and mutually disconnected.
The number of scales and temporalities of action that can be distinguished
is immense but relatively few of these (although still many) get explicitly
institutionalised.’ Swyngedou (1996) sees scales as manifestations of power
struggles, however temporary. This view means that scales are relational,
meaning they are socially constructed entities (Howitt, 1993; Smith, 1993).
At the same time, the chapter follows Paasi’s (2008, p. 406) observation
that ‘relational and territorial spaces may exist concomitantly.’ As a result,
the view that authority to make decisions is formally located within a speci-
fic geographical scale becomes difficult to maintain. In China, authority
might be formally located within a distinct geographical scale. However,
the reality of decision-making is often different, with informal networks
working against a view of decision-making taking place in nested
hierarchies.
It is important to note at this point that attempts have been made more
recently to move the concept of multi-level governance beyond its
European home. The most significant of these were coordinated efforts,
through two edited volumes (Ongaro et al., 2010; Ongaro et al., 2011), to
bring multi-level governance into a conversation with the concept of inter-
governmental relations in order to expand the debate on multi-level gov-
ernance to the United States. Apart from this transatlantic dialogue, the
literature has remained incidental. Shair-Rosenfeld, Marks, and Hooghe
(2014) utilize multi-level governance to understand the process of decentra-
lization in democratizing states of Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines) as well as South Korea. While this could have
significantly advanced our understanding of these polities, the authors
essentially hark back to the early work of Hooghe and Marks, assuming
the relevance of pre-given levels, sticking to a notion of hierarchically
ordered territorial scales, and uncritically transplanting the Western
European concept of the state.
In particular, the work deterministically associates regionalization with
democratization. Because of this it ignores a complex mix of economic,
social and political factors that inform processes of decentralization,
including rapid economic growth and urbanization, demands of an expand-
ing population for better public service delivery and demands for better
local representation (Kersting, Caulfield, Nickson, Olowu, & Wollmann,
2009, p. 167). Furthermore, the case of China shows that processes of
decentralization should not be taken to automatically assume an underly-
ing process of democratization. Instead, such developments might be
informed by the lack of central government capacity to effectively and effi-
ciently deliver public services. The consequence is that we learn little from
Shair-Rosenfeld, Marks and Hooghe about the quality and depth of demo-
cratization, the role and ability of the regions in the exercise of authority
within the political structure, the influence of traditional policy-making
(such as patronage and bureaucratic politics), patterns of economic growth,
social change or the influence of ethnic tensions although at the end of
the article the authors point out the potential importance of indigenous,
ethnonationalist, and religious groups.
Yet, the identification of regional models, together with the above-
referred to flexibility of the concept to describe a multitude of ‘levelled’ pol-
icy processes, should invite attempts to push the concept further, not only
beyond EU member states, but indeed also beyond the cluster of demo-
cratic countries. The next section looks into the possibility of situating the
concept of multi-level governance in the context of post-Cold War ‘new’

authoritarian states.
THE ‘NEW AUTHORITARIANISM’ AND ITS

RESILIENCE
As multi-level governance was developed in order to make sense of EU pol-

icy processes, the concept, arguably, has therefore principally to do with a
multi-tiered structure of policy-making and the question of autonomy of
actors other than the central government. Although all core EU states are
established democracies, this can be considered secondary for the utility of
the concept. Therefore, we can attempt to look at other types of governing
systems that are more authoritarian in nature but all of which have a form
of governance that allows entities other than the centre to become involved
in decision-making. States characterized by the ‘new authoritarianism’
(Krastev, 2011) seem a proper pattern for depicting such contexts.
Notions of the new authoritarianism have emerged as some regimes
have defied the so-called third wave of democratization. Carothers (2002)
argued that the transition paradigm the assumption that countries move
from authoritarianism to democracy does no longer conform to reality.
Instead, many countries have stayed authoritarian, have experienced only
initial openings, or have seen political turnovers that resulted in the hand-
over from one authoritarian regime to another. Yet, rather than being grey
and dull top-down countries, some authoritarian countries have exhibited
surprising vibrancy in social and economic development (Krastev, 2011)
and have developed flexible governance structures that allows them to
accommodate social and economic change, including capitalist reforms and
a diversification of society.
Some scholars such as He and Warren (2011, p. 270) have called for
such states not to be classified as hybrid or semi-authoritarian and thus not
to be viewed as unfinished democracies, but as a category of political sys-
tems of their own. Along these lines, for example, Levitsky and Way (2002,
2010) called autocracies with electoral systems ‘competitive authoritarian-
ism,’ although they also use the hybrid label to describe them.
The sources of institutional resilience of these autocracies are complex,
manifold and often contradictory ranging from ideology, insulation,
mechanisms of social inclusion, to the creation of accountability structures
in the context of increasing social diversification (Abrami, Malesky, &
Zheng, 2013; Armstrong, 2013; Dimitrov, 2013; Tsai, 2013). Gallagher and
Hanson (2013) point out that the remaining communist regimes have sur-
vived under stark contrasting conditions: While China, Laos and Vietnam
have embarked on a mix of ‘political repression and growth-generating
public goods,’ Cuba and North Korea have survived despite overseeing sig-
nificant economic downturns in the 1990s. Authoritarian resilience there-
fore depends on a country-unique mixture of carrots and sticks.
Hess (2013, pp. 2 5) finds that sources of resilience can lie in an effec-
tive security apparatus; robust economic growth combined with control of
resources that produces dependence of the material wellbeing of large seg-
ments of the population on the regime and thus on the perpetuation of
existing power structures; effective political institutions controlled by a
hegemonic party that binds the elite together; and insulation from external
pressures. In addition, and most relevant for the present study, Hess finds
that regimes with decentralized structures are more resilient than highly
centralized regimes. This, he says, is because decentralized structures pre-
sent local authorities as responsible decision-makers. As a consequence,
local governments become the target of popular protests. This not only
diverts attention away from the central government as responsible for pop-
ular grievances, but it also creates fragmented and localized forms of pro-
test. This diffuses a threat to the central government (pp. 11 18. For a
similar argument see Cai, 2008).
Indeed, Nathan (2003) points out that the Chinese government has cre-
ated a resilient authoritarian state by developing institutions for public par-
ticipation that have created input legitimacy (pp. 6 7). Such institutions
‘allow Chinese citizens to believe that they have some influence on policy
decisions and personnel choices at the local level’ (p. 14). They are further
designed for individual, not group-based input, and they concentrate com-
plaints against local level government offices, thus ‘diffusing possible
aggression against the Chinese party-state generally’ (p. 15).
The analysis ties in with Wright’s (2010) argument that amongst the fac-
tors explaining why the majority of the Chinese population accepts authori-
tarian rule is a perceived widening of political options within the system
together with a decline of ‘appealing political alternatives’. This includes
village elections and the ability to voice grievances through petitions and
legal recourse. Wright argues that while such developments in other coun-
tries have led to increased calls for more political participation, in China
‘this widening of possibilities for political participation has been perceived
as an attempt by central authorities to rein in corrupt and ill-intentioned
local elites. As a result, potential political dissatisfaction with the overall
political system has been undermined’ (p. 4). This mirrors Tong and Lei’s
(2014) analysis that the Chinese state has been responsive to widespread
social grievances and has introduced a range of mechanisms to address it,
thus showing flexibility in absorbing protest potential and generating con-
tinued legitimacy.
As a consequence, decentralization of authority in autocratic regimes,
including the limited creation of public participation, does not necessarily
lead to a breakdown of the regime. Rather, it can strengthen it by improv-
ing regime performance and creating controlled valves for popular grie-
vances. As such, the distribution of authority is directly tied to the attempt
of the government to achieve greater legitimacy through better perfor-
mance by addressing capacity problems. In China, authority over economic
policy has been shifted to local governments, resulting in significant eco-
nomic growth (Montinola, Qian, & Weingast, 1995; Weingast, 1995). This
however has put the government in a difficult position: As it decentralizes,
it needs to retain authority over the localities. The evidence here is contra-
dicting: While Weingast (1995) shows that the central government finds it
difficult to retain effective control over policy implementation, Landry
(2008) argues that the central government’s promotion system for local
cadres enables the government to reconcile decentralization with central
control over local governments. Landry calls this system ‘decentralized
authoritarianism’.
China’s fiscal decentralization after 1980 has aimed at putting local
governments on a self-financing basis (Wong, 1991), including funding
and staffing their local bureaucracies. In order to decrease its financial
burden and in the realization that it is unable to provide many public
goods itself, the Chinese government has decentralized the provision of
most public goods and services to local governments (Lü, 2014, p. 425).
According to the World Bank (2002 cited in Lü, 2014, p. 425), local gov-
ernments finance almost 70 per cent of public goods provision. In many
cases where local governments are unable to provide public goods them-
selves, such as in the social sector, they engage NGOs or the private sec-
tor. This is the case, for example, in Nanjing’s Gulou District where
NGOs are an important vehicle for the local government to deliver their
support services for the elderly (interview with a researcher in Nanjing,
31 October 2008). NGOs therefore become important service organiza-
tions to supplement state capacity and assist the state in realizing policy
goals. This has resulted in a sideways distribution of authority, albeit one
that is strongly limited by the wider authoritarian framework
(Hildebrandt, 2013; Lu, 2007; Teets, 2013, 2014).
The result is a socio-political arrangement that Balzer called ‘managed

pluralism’ (Balzer, 2004). While the formal structure of the authoritarian
political system has not changed, actors other than government agencies
have been allowed to play a role, and these actors are increasingly trying
not only to resist government policies but to ‘change the substance of
broader policies’ (Mertha, 2010, p. 71). The following section addresses the
issue of multi-level governance in managed pluralism by focussing on the
case on hydropower governance with particular attention to environmental
issues.
DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORITY IN THE

ENVIRONMENTAL AND HYDROPOWER POLICY
FIELD AND THE LEVELLING OF AUTHORITY
STRUCTURES
Hydropower decision-making occurs under composite conditions character-
ized by inherent tensions and divergent forces: Policy-making unfolds
between central state control and the autonomy of local actors, between for-
mal and informal decision processes, and between the primacy of the gov-
ernment as the locus of decision-making and bottom-up pressures to
protect the environment. The consequence is that a seemingly neatly levelled
governance structure is contradicted by a fragmented policy process.
This fragmentation has been described by Lieberthal and Oksenberg
(1988, pp. 137 151) as ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ and has to date
remained an important tool for the analysis of Chinese policy processes.
Fragmented authoritarianism contains the following key elements: A ten-
sion in central local relationships and the competition between vertical
(tiao) and horizontal (kuai) authority; the nature of the functional bureau-
cracies (xitong); and the administrative status of state actors, which
includes state-owned companies and interagency relationships.
A key feature of the Chinese political system is the competition between
territorially (kuai) and vertically (tiao) organized authority. As a general
feature, central government ministries have counterparts on all lower levels
of government, called bureaus, thereby ostensibly producing a clearly
levelled state structure. The Ministry of Environmental Protection thus cor-
responds with local Environmental Protection Bureaus on the five levels of
government (and their sub-divisions or sub-types): province (sheng,
including the directly administered municipalities Beijing, Shanghai and

Tianjin, all of which have provincial-level ranking), prefecture (diqu),
county (xian), township (xiang) and village (cun).
As fiscal decentralization ‘shifted control over resources and decision-
making to local governments and enterprises’ (Zhang, 2012, p. 55), the
role of Environmental Protection Bureaus has been greatly enhanced.2
Traditionally, the bureaus functioned as implementing agencies for the
central government ministries. As a consequence of decentralization,
however, bureaucracies are mostly built on decentralized leadership rela-
tions (Mertha & Lowry, 2006, p. 11). While the bureaus report to the
Ministry of Environmental Protection, they are dependent on the local
government for funding and staffing (Economy, 2004, p. 92). The local
bureaus are therefore at the cross lines of vertical and territorial chains
of command.
In order to ensure the implementation of national legislation, the central
government has allowed the emergence of NGOs, thus seemingly distribut-
ing authority sideways. As the central government devolved responsibilities
to the local level, it needed to make sure that local governments would
implement central policy. As a consequence, NGOs serve the purpose of
controlling local governments (Ho, 2001; Schwartz, 2004; Yang, 2005).
Indeed, Economy (2004, p. 21, 129 175) points out that Chinese leaders
have allowed the growth of NGOs and ‘aggressive media attention’
to environmental degradation for an instrumental purpose: to make up
for the weakness of the Environmental Protection Bureaus in local
governments.
Ho and Edmonds (2007) view Chinese civic organizations as existing in
a state-society relationship that is best described as ‘embedded social acti-
vism,’ their environmental activism taking the form of ‘embedded environ-
mentalism.’ Being embedded means that in China’s political system, civic
organizations and individuals rely on a diffuse and informal network with
other individuals, groups, loose networks and organizations that enable
them to bridge the divide between party-state and society and therefore re-
negotiate their relationship with the party-state. Most environmental
NGOs thus prefer to cooperate with government agencies rather than enga-
ging in an antagonistic relationship, relying on their networks with govern-
ments to ensure their survival and prevent sanctions against their
operations (Zawahri & Hensengerth, 2012), although in rare cases environ-
mental NGOs have managed to form alliances with actors in the media,
national parliament or government to extract concessions from local
governments.
In order for the building of a dam to be authorized, the hydropower

developer has to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA). For
large dams, the Ministry of Environmental Protection is responsible for
approving the EIA and for monitoring the hydropower company’s adher-
ence to environmental conditions, including the environmental manage-
ment plan (Government of China, 2003, Articles 22 23; McElwee, 2008,
p. 4; National Development and Reform Commission, 2007a, 2007b). In
order to increase the effectiveness of environmental implementation, the
State Council and the Ministry of Environmental Protection passed a num-
ber of high profile laws and regulations detailing the procedures for EIA
and the role of the public in it.
The EIA Law, adopted in 2002 and effective since 2003, for the first
time stipulated the requirement that the public must be involved in the pro-
cess of EIA (State Council, 2002). While the stipulations are quite general
in the 2003 EIA Law, in 2006 the State Environmental Protection
Administration the organization upgraded to the Ministry of
Environmental Protection in 2008 published the Provisional Measures
for Public Participation in EIA. These provided more detailed descriptions
of when and how the public needs to be involved (State Environmental
Protection Administration, 2006). In May 2008 the State Council issued
the Government Information Disclosure Regulations (State Council, 2008),
followed by the 2008 Environmental Impact Disclosure Measures of the
Ministry of Environmental Protection. In 2013, the Ministry of
Environmental Protection passed further measures: the Government
Information Disclosure Guide for EIAs of Construction Projects (for Trial
Implementation), which includes specific requirements for information dis-
closure, public access to the information contained in EIA reports, and the
Notice on Effectively Strengthening EIA Supervision and Administration,
which includes strengthened supervision of EIA agencies and the public
participation process.
However, the problem is implementation. In order to draw up the EIA
the hydropower developer contracts an EIA agency. Thus, the developer
and the agency are responsible for putting the stipulations on public parti-
cipation into practice. Yet, the 2006 Provisional Measures stipulate that the
public has the right to be consulted for ‘major items’ and ‘major issues’,
but leave both terms undefined. The Provisional Measures also do not spe-
cify the groups that are eligible to participate. Project developers and EIA
agencies therefore have much leeway in narrowing the scope of public con-
sultation to the extent that it is no longer a viable factor in project plan-
ning. Similarly, in order to enforce the Disclosure Regulations and
Disclosure Measures, government commitment is essential but not always

present (Qin, 2008, pp. 13 14). In particular, local government conserva-
tism, cultural norms, fears that an enhanced role of the public might
lead to a reversal of government decisions, and a low number of staff and
lack of funding of local Environmental Protection Bureaus make imple-
mentation of the public participation provisions difficult (Ge, Bi, & Wang,
2009; Li, Ng, & Skidmore, 2012; Ren, 2013; Song, Mulder, Frostell,
Ravesteijn, & Wettersten, 2011; Wang, Morgan, & Cashmore, 2003). The
problem is particularly pronounced for large dams: In addition to the
above factors, informal networks between the hydropower developers and
the energy bureaucracy are a key factor in the decision-making process.
Complying with environmental regulation is therefore seen as not only
costly but also unnecessary by politically connected companies.
Indeed, the wider literature on policy implementation and environ-
mental policy implementation specifically has found that a range of fac-
tors affects the implementation of government policy. These include, but
are not limited to, competing organizational interests, role conflicts, local
versus national priorities, and incompatible governance frameworks at dif-
ferent levels of government (e.g., Nilsson, Eklund, & Tyskeng, 2009;
Trummers, Vermeeren, Steijn, & Bekkers, 2012). The next sections will dis-
cuss these issues with reference to China’s hydropower sector.
BEYOND LEVELS: NETWORKS AND INFORMALITY

IN THE POLICY PROCESS
Five state-owned electricity companies are in charge of developing hydro-

power in China’s river basins: Huaneng, Huadian, Datang, Guodian, and
China Power Investment. They were formed in 2003 from the assets of the
State Power Corporation, which in turn had been created from the
Ministry of Electric Power in 1997. Having their origin in a central govern-
ment agency, the companies have excellent political links. The directors of
these companies are not professional managers but appointed bureaucrats.
For example, Huadian, the company in charge of Nu River development,
is chaired by Yun Gongmin, former vice-chairman of Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region, vice-governor of Shanxi Province and vice-secretary
of the Shanxi Province Communist Party Committee. Even more pro-
nounced, Li Xiaolin, daughter of the former Chinese premier Li Peng, is
vice-president of China Power Investment and president of its subsidiary,
China Power International Development. This creates informal networks

that are not captured by formal processes.
Article 15 of the 2002 Water Law states that the plan to build a dam
must first be approved by one of the seven River Basin Commissions in
whose jurisdiction the dam is to be built. The company’s hydropower
development plans must therefore conform to the commissions’ compre-
hensive basin plans. Following approval by the River Basin Commissions,
the commissions submit the hydropower plans to the National
Development and Reform Commission for further approval (Magee, 2006).
Yet, their political connections enable the five companies to circumvent the
River Basin Commissions by applying directly to the National
Development and Reform Commission for having their dam proposals
approved (Magee, 2006). For example, for the Nu River, the River Basin
Commission in charge would have been the Changjiang Water Resources
Commission. However, Magee reports that no comprehensive basin plan
exists for the Nu, and the commission was bypassed when Huadian referred
the development plan for a 13-dam Nu River Cascade directly to the
National Development and Reform Commission (Magee, 2006, p. 250).
The power position of the electricity companies is further enhanced by
their administrative rank. The administrative rank of actors in China is a
key characteristic to determine the relationships of authority between them,
as ‘units of equal rank cannot issue binding orders to each other’
(Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988, p. 143). The five electricity companies,
being state-owned companies, have bureaucratic ranks that mirror the
ranks of government agencies. State-owned companies exist on all levels of
government, creating a structure of state-owned firms that mirrors the
levelled structure of the government system. The five electricity companies
have vice-ministerial rank, but their directors have ministerial rank
(Mertha, 2008, p. 46). They thus have the same rank as the director of the
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC), the entity supposed to supervise them (Mertha, 2008, p. 46).
They also have the same rank as the Minister of Environmental Protection,
the entity in charge of enforcing the 2003 EIA Law.
The power of the Ministry of Environmental Protection is further dimin-
ished by another feature of the Chinese system: The vertically integrated
functional bureaucracy, or xitong (literally: system). Xitong are primarily
based on a central ministry and its bureaus on the lower levels of govern-
ment. Thus, for example, the environment xitong includes the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and its local bureaus, plus ministerial think
tanks and other affiliated agencies. Meanwhile, the five electricity
companies are not part of the environment xitong, but that of SASAC.
Therefore, while the environmental bureaucracy is formally managed by
the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the electricity companies are for-
mally managed by SASAC. The Ministry of Environmental Protection,
although formally charged with enforcing environmental legislation, finds
itself in a difficult position. It would require the cooperation of SASAC,
but this is made difficult by the system of administrative ranks. Higher-level
support is therefore required, but in most cases the companies managed to
evade sanctions against their operations (Mertha, 2008, pp. 46 48).
Adding more complexity are administrative guidelines, which specify
interagency relations (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988, pp. 148 149).
Leadership relations, or lingdao guanxi, exist between higher and lower
ranking units. Professional/business relations, or yewu guanxi, exist
between units in ‘interrelated areas of activity’ (ibid., p. 149). This can be
between superior and subordinate units whereby the superior unit recog-
nizes that the subordinate unit has considerable scope to modify or ignore
directives (ibid.), such as between the Ministry of Environmental Protection
and its lower level bureaus. Professional/business relations can also exist
between units that have no formal channels of communication but whose
areas of activity need frequent consultation (ibid.), a situation which can
involve units of the same level.
For example, Huaneng is in charge of building hydropower projects
along the Lancang River through the Huaneng Lancang River
Corporation. According to Andrew Mertha, the Yunnan provincial gov-
ernment owns 30 per cent of Yunnan Huaneng operations, and national-
level Huaneng owns the other 70 per cent. While this would give the
provincial government some say, national-level Huaneng has centralized
leadership relations (tiaoshang lingdao guanxi) with Huaneng Lancang at
the provincial level, which restricts the influence of the provincial govern-
ment (Mertha, 2008, pp. 46 47).
In another case, relationships are not what they seem to be when looking
at the levels of government. Mertha and Lowry (2006) report the case of
the Yangliuhu Dam in Sichuan Province. A point of contention was that
the dam project would have destroyed the ancient site of the Dujiangyan
Irrigation Project, making it a case of protection of China’s cultural
heritage. While the Dujiangyan municipal government including the
Environmental Protection Bureau and the cultural heritage bureaucracy
opposed the project, the Sichuan Province Water Resources Bureau,
the municipal-level Dujiangyan Management Bureau, and Huadian were
in favour. Different organizational interests thus clashed. The Water
Resources Bureau, located at the provincial level, attempted to pressure the

Dujiangyan municipal government into accepting the Yangliuhu proposal,
and it tried to do this through the Dujiangyan Management Bureau
(Mertha & Lowry, 2006, pp. 10 11). In China’s levelled governance struc-
ture, the Dujiangyan Management Bureau could easily be seen as a
municipal-level agency under direct control of the municipal government
that would supply budget and staff. Accordingly it would have only decen-
tralized leadership relations with the provincial government level. However,
in this case, the Dujiangyan Management Bureau has vertical leadership
relations with the provincial Water Resources Bureau from where it
receives its budget and staff. This anomaly gives the provincial government
a greater direct influence on the municipal level than it otherwise would
have had (ibid.).
In the event, however, the provincial government and the Dujiangyan
Management Bureau were thwarted as the municipal government and its
offices, including the Dujiangyan Cultural Relics Bureau, the Dujiangyan
Word Heritage Office and the Dujiangyan Environmental Protection
Bureau managed to counteract this influence by feeding information to the
press which framed the issue as a threat to China’s cultural heritage. In
cooperation with national and provincial officials, including the Sichuan
Province Bureau of Construction, they increasingly isolated the Yangliuhu
proponents and finally forced them to give up their plans (Mertha &
Lowry, 2006, pp. 8 17).
Perhaps the most high profile case in relation to hydropower occurred
in 2003 when Huadian attempted to push through its plans to build 13
dams on the Nu River. The Nu dam cascade had been in the planning
process for a number of years when in 2002 the central government
adopted the EIA Law, which came into force in September 2003. As
mentioned above, this law for the first time made EIA a legal requirement
and it included provisions for public consultation, thus giving the public
a legal right to be heard about large infrastructure projects. Anticipating
that the new law would complicate decision-making and implementation
of the Nu River cascade, Huadian attempted to push a decision by the
National Development and Reform Commission before the coming into
force of the EIA Law. However, when plans of the cascade were leaked
to the public, a country-wide alliance of opponents emerged. This alliance
included environmental activists, policy entrepreneurs, media outlets and
politicians in the National People’s Congress (China’s parliament) and
the China People’s Political Consultative Conference (a deliberative organ
without formal power but which can function in an advisory capacity to
the government). The unprecedented alliance between social activists

and central-level politicians forced then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to
personally intervene and mandate that Huadian conduct an EIA under
the 2003 law. This resulted in the 13 dams being scaled down to four
(Mertha, 2008).
These two events of civil society and media protest against large dams
were cases in which an invigorated societal level prevented or significantly
changed hydropower plans. In the Nu case, the issue was particularly the
intention of Huadian to avoid the implementation of environmental laws.
Yet, these are rare cases in which social forces managed to force companies
and government agencies to follow legal procedures rather than rely on
their informal networks and exert power based on administrative rank and
leadership relations. However, for the most part, informal networks
between companies, leadership relations, and ranks determine decisions in
hydropower processes, with the role of administratively weak organizations
such as the environmental bureaucracy relying on high-level political
support.
This means that the formal levelling of the governance structure is not
necessarily indicative of power in practical political life. Without an under-
standing of authority relationships therefore the concept of multi-level
governance is not a useful analytical tool. At the same time, however,
multi-level governance is also about the governance dimensions of civic
society and state-horizontal relations. In this sense multi-level governance
can provide an apt frame. The key critique here is that the concept is
descriptive rather than explanatory, and that without understanding both
cross-cutting authority relationships and informal decision-making in the
specific context description is not enough. Indeed, if the concept is to have
utility outside its area of origin it has to engage with indigenous concepts
of governing and pay close attention to relationships of authority that defy
formal-legal stipulations.
CONCLUSION: LEVELS, FRAGMENTS, AND THE

UTILITY OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE. TOWARDS
A SCALAR-NETWORK APPROACH FOR CHINA’S
REFLEXIVE AUTHORITARIANISM
Formally, China has a multi-level system. The process of decentralization

is embedded within a multi-level structure, so multi-level governance can be
used to understand the formal-legal positions of central government and

local level governments. However, when it comes to the reality of govern-
ing, multi-level governance needs to be infused with traditional notions of
governing to assess the outcome of bargaining as otherwise the complexity
of tiao, kuai, xitong, ranks and interagency relations remains hidden under
a vision of levels.
Looking at Hooghe and Marks’s (2001, 2003) generic ideal-types, it is
easily possible to find some of the features in China, but as a complex
simultaneousness of Type I and Type II characteristics: As a territorial
state that has devolved some of its authority, China has a general-purpose
government, but the implementation capacity is heavily determined by net-
works covering not only sub-national levels but also bureaucratic ranks,
competing functional hierarchies, conflicts between territorial (kuai) and
vertical (tiao) chains of command, and interagency relations determined by
administrative regulations.
Functional hierarchies (xitong), ranks and territorial jurisdictions there-
fore overlap and transcend the basic multi-level structure. This produces a
large amount of jurisdictions across all levels of government. Although the
basic levelling of the governance system is system-wide, the shape and out-
come of policies are determined by networked processes. There is therefore
a large amount of actors involved in a large amount of interactions.
Therefore, if the concept is to have utility outside of its European demo-
cratic home, it needs to take into consideration organizing parameters that
are distinct from the experience of Western European states. The case of
China shows that authoritarian regimes can be analysed in terms of multi-
ple levels as authoritarianism no longer automatically implies strict top-
down hierarchies. Indeed, autocracies can be highly fragmented and subject
to complex decision-making processes. As a consequence, a research pro-
gramme looking at the new authoritarianism from a multi-level governance
perspective has the capacity to uncover and describe a host of new forms of
governance by bringing the concept into a conversation with indigenous
governance concepts.
In order to make multi-level governance applicable to China, we need to
arrive at a more sophisticated understanding of networked governance,
especially in relation to the interaction between territorially and horizon-
tally organized authority and the interaction of vertical and horizontal dif-
fusion of authority that has spawned a range of actors becoming involved
in policy-making. To integrate these dimensions in a new analytical frame-
work, in the following I consider the notion of scales to assist with this
process.
Surveying the literature on scales, Büchs (2009) argues that there are
two recent approaches to scales: A post-modern approach which views
scales as socially constructed and relational rather than territorially and
hierarchically ordered; and the notion of state rescaling, which can be
regarded as a response to the post-modern approach by arguing that ‘place,
space and scale are not becoming entirely deconstructed, but merely reorga-
nized’ (Brenner, 1999 cited in Büchs, 2009, p. 38). Yet, Brenner (2004)
recognized that processes of state rescaling are socially produced and are
therefore fluid and unstable, but at the same time he maintains a nested
vision of territorial scales. Prügl (2011, p. 22) argues that this makes
Brenner’s work akin to Hooghe and Marks’s concept of Type II multi-level
governance ‘but expanded by a consideration of social forces’.
At the same time, Brenner (2004) points out that state rescaling is his-
torically embedded and path-dependent. Such abstraction allows testing
the rescaling concept, which has traditionally been applied to North
America and Western Europe, in non-Western contexts (Park, 2013,
p. 1116), and including authoritarian states. Indeed, the Chinese state has
been found to scale and rescale, both in top-down and bottom-up pro-
cesses (Chen, Zhang, Li, & Zhang, 2014; Li & Wu, 2012, p. 87; Smart &
Lin, 2007). Power is scaled up or down whereby the central government
is motivated by regulatory capacity problems (Li & Wu, 2012; Luo,
Cheng, Yin, & Wang, 2014). But rescaling also involves a horizontal
dimension where governments cooperate with non-state actors (Li, Xu, &
Yeh, 2014). As a consequence, the Chinese state is scaled and rescaled
along vertical and horizontal lines. The important issue here is the idea
that territorial and horizontal shifts of authority are interlinked as the
state attempts to maintain legitimacy and effectiveness in policy delivery
(Büchs, 2009).
This is akin to the premise of multi-level governance of vertical and hori-
zontal power diffusion. Yet, in contrast to multi-level governance, state
rescaling provides a more flexible tool that recognizes the formal and infor-
mal reorganization of space and the motivation for it. It therefore intro-
duces greater flexibility and explanatory power into the consideration of
the role of levels in policy processes by not adhering to pre-given levels in
the consideration of state and space. At the same time, scales and levels
might not be the appropriate place to start when considering the govern-
ance of a particular issue area, as the fragmented authoritarianism model
shows.
For hydropower governance, this chapter noted before that although
the Chinese state is levelled, these levels are not necessarily indicative of
policy processes. It is true, as the state rescaling literature emphasizes, that

scales remain a relevant unit of analysis. However, in order to understand
their role in the policy process, it is necessary to map decision-making pro-
cesses, both for policy-making and policy implementation. The mapping of
policy processes therefore qualifies the notion of territorial scales as rele-
vant for policy-making and implementation and introduces a network
notion that is not tied to territorial scales.
Given the informality of many parts of the policy process, we might thus
consider a different notion of scales. Bulkeley (2005) argued that scales
should be regarded as ordered by authority relationships rather than nested
territories in order to resolve the seeming contradiction between territorial
and horizontal governance. We can thus conceive of scales as relationships
of authority that transcend the territorial notion of scale yet allows taking
into account the essentially hierarchical structure of the Chinese state. This
could lead to a reclassification of multi-level governance, not as pre-given
scales, but as scales of authority relationships. Thus conceived multi-level
governance acquires fresh flexibility when infused with a consideration of
authority. Reformulated in this way, the concept has relevance to countries
outside of the EU, USA or democracies as it can capture policy processes
under conditions of authoritarianism.
As a consequence, state rescaling as a Western concept can be applied to
the Chinese case, but needs considerable qualification and refinement, as
the literature has pointed out (Chen et al., 2014; Li & Wu, 2012; Li et al.,
2014). We thus return to the idea that the Chinese state is not a hybrid but
a category of its own. As such it has variously been described as a soft
authoritarian or resilient authoritarian (Nathan, 2003) state with strong
adaptive capacities, a consultative authoritarian state (Teets, 2013) that
does not operate in traditional top-down fashion but includes a multitude
of actors in policy processes.
The central government is required to do so in the sense of Balzer’s
(2004) above-mentioned ‘managed pluralism’ in order to overcome the sys-
tem’s fragmentation for which it is partly responsible. The central govern-
ment has thus engaged in processes of vertical and horizontal rescaling and
thereby exhibited its adaptive capacity. The sideways and downwards diffu-
sion of authority requires a rethinking of China’s authoritarianism in terms
of policy implementation. New legislation detailing public participation in
EIA and access to information recognizes the rapid social diversification
and the multiplication of societal interests. The interaction between infor-
mal networks, ranks, functional bureaucracies, vertical and horizontal
lines of authority, and interagency relationships defy a simple notion of
re-territorialization. It is necessary to understand that informal processes

are at least as important as formal processes, and that formal restructuring
has been accompanied by a creation or reconfiguration of informal net-
works as the case of the reform of the electricity sector attests. Interlinked
processes of adaptive capacity, networks and scales of authority are key
ingredients in a conceptual framework necessary to expand multi-level gov-
ernance outside of its comfortable democratic European home.
NOTES
1. The literature on governance traditions in Europe subdivides European coun-

tries into regions. For example, covering Southern Europe (e.g., Ferrera, 1996 and
Ongaro, 2009).
2. For an in depth discussion of the effects decentralization had on the tiao-kuai
relationship see Wong (1991), Huang (1996), Tsui and Wang (2004).
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UNDERPLAYED FEATURES,
OVERBLOWN EXPECTATION
AND MISSING LINKAGES
Simona Piattoni
ABSTRACT
Purpose This chapter attempts to answer some of the questions raised

in this volume, in particular: (1) provide a concise but precise definition
of multi-level governance; (2) prove that it is a theoretical and not just a
descriptive concept and (3) dispel some of the misconceptions associated
with it, for example, that (a) multi-level governance underplays and con-
ceals the exercise of power or (b) it is incompatible with democracy.
Methodology/approach The chapter is correspondingly organized in
four sections, preceded and followed by short introductory and conclud-
ing sections. The four sections address, respectively: (1) the definition of
multi-level governance (MLG) (‘Solving the dependent variable pro-
blem’); (2) the causes that explain the emergence and diffusion of MLG
arrangements (‘The contextual causes of MLG’); (3) the changes that
it triggers in the manner in which power is deployed (‘The institutional

ISSN: 2045-7944/doi:10.1108/S2045-794420150000004013
321
322 SIMONA PIATTONI
consequences of MLG’); (4) the democratic implications of the diffusion

of MLG arrangements (‘Are MLG arrangements democratic?’).
The methodology employed is mainly that of ‘conceptual analysis’
(Sartori, 1984), which implies that the connotational features (those
features which minimally allow us to identify cases of MLG) of the con-
cept are identified so that we can delimit the denotational extension of
the concept (the universe of phenomena which can be identified as cases
of MLG). This chapter contains a highly abridged version of this concep-
tual analysis, which is fully developed in Piattoni (2010a).
Findings MLG denotes a growing class of policymaking arrangements
characterized by the simultaneous activation of governmental and non-
governmental actors at various jurisdictional levels. These arrangements
have identifiable contextual causes, even if the precise contours of MLG
arrangements depend on the capacity of the actors to mobilize arguments
and people on behalf of their specific ideas, values and interest. The pre-
cise shape that these arrangements will take, therefore, depends on the
mobilization capacity of the actors (and on the capacity of other actors
to contain or delimit such mobilization). The causes of mobilization are
mainly contextual, having to do with the increased complexity and over-
load of state activities and with the growing request for direct involve-
ment on the part of civil society organizations. Both these trends induce
states to seek joint solutions to common problems, hence MLG dynamics
occur on three axes: a centre-periphery axis, a state-society axis, and a
national-international axis which challenge, respectively, the centrality,
the distinctiveness and the sovereignty of the state.
Research/practical implications This conceptualization of MLG
allows us to analyse the extent to which different policymaking arrange-
ments respond to MLG logics and to understand which actors and which
levels are mostly responsible for the particular configuration that obtains.
This conceptualization of MLG, although here deployed in a purely dis-
cursive manner, could enable us to ‘measure’ the degree of institutional
and political empowerment of subjects, other than central state actors, in
various policy realms.
Social implications The most important social implication is the
impact that MLG arrangements have on how democratic decision-
making occurs, on what we mean by democracy, and on the societal per-
ception of how contemporary democracies work. The chapter argues that
trying to apply to MLG arrangements democratic criteria and standards
Multi-Level Governance 323
that were developed for the unitary, distinctive and sovereign state is mis-
leading and that we must rather develop an updated notion of democracy
appropriate for the interconnected, multi-level context in which we live.
The concept of ‘transnational democracy’ is cursorily offered as a pro-
mising direction for further reflection.
Originality/value The chapter is wholly based on the long-term work
and reflection of the author on MLG and on the scholarly contributions
of the other authors of the volume.
Keywords: Policymaking; multi-level governance; MLG theory;
societal mobilization; transnational democracy; MLG narratives
INTRODUCTION
There is really no better way to begin a piece on multi-level governance

(MLG) than to report the still very apt description and assessment that
Philippe Schmitter produced some 10 years ago: ‘Multi-level governance
can be defined as an arrangement for making binding decisions that
engages a multiplicity of politically independent but otherwise interdepen-
dent actors private and public at different levels of territorial aggrega-
tion in more-or-less continuous negotiation/deliberation/implementation,
and that does not assign exclusive policy competence or assert a
stable hierarchy of political authority to any of these levels’ (Schmitter,
2004, p. 49).
In our increasingly interconnected world, MLG is a very apt descriptor
of many current political, institutional and administrative arrangements.
Its success is probably in part due to the fact that its contours are not yet
unanimously specified, in turn a possible consequence of its being under-
theorized. Although publicly decried, this state of affairs is in fact rather
convenient as it allows a vast community of scholars from different theo-
retical traditions to speak about ‘roughly’ the same type of phenomena.
This is no small service in itself, as perhaps we still need to compare and
contrast many disparate phenomena in order to define the contours of a
decision-making mode which departs so radically from what we learned
in political science and public administration books. In this sense, MLG
is also a ‘(dis)ordering framework’ that makes ‘grand-theorizing difficult’
(Rosamond, 2000, p. 111). More than to intrinsic problem with the con-
cept itself, then, MLG’s theoretical bluntness is probably due to the
324 SIMONA PIATTONI
interest of the social scientific community in ‘overstretching’ it (Sartori,

1970). This should not excuse us, however, from trying to sharpen it,
knowing very well that the more the connotational field of this concept is
enriched, the less encompassing its denotational purchase will become
(Sartori, 1984). This exercise is all the more necessary, the more we wish
to move from a purely descriptive and analytical level to a prescriptive or
even predictive one. MLG is often accused of evils it was never meant to
cause or it is credited with merits it was never meant to earn. In fact, it is
not even clear which negative and positive features really pertain to
MLG. We still lack, as Zito (2015) would put it, the ‘dependent variable’
or, as I would put it, we have not yet agreed on a widely shared definition
of MLG.
Among the most frequent critiques levied against MLG is the blurring
of accountability relations between democratic principals and their agents
(Liddle, 2015), either because both principals and agents are multiple the
so-called many eyes and many hands problem (Benz, 2007; Papadopoulos,
2007) or because the chains of delegation and accountability are broken
in several places (Curtin, 2007; Scharpf, 2009). MLG would not only be
associated with democratic deficits, but positively be their cause. In a mir-
ror fashion, MLG is sometimes credited with merits that it perhaps does
not have. The flattening of governmental hierarchies implicit in MLG
arrangements (Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999; Mayntz, 1998), their greater
openness to non-governmental actors and their supposed proneness to
coordination and learning are not always realized in practice nor are they
the main drivers for the establishment of such arrangements. Networked
governance is not and never was meant to be synonymous with ‘good gov-
ernance’ (but see Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004) or even less with
‘better regulation’ (Radaelli & Meuwese, 2009).
In this chapter, I plan to provide a theoretical account of MLG which
shows that this concept does suggest causal relations between certain real-
world phenomena economic globalization, civil society mobilization,
subnational differentiation, regional integration and other political, insti-
tutional and administrative developments which force us to question if not
the centrality of the state at least the way in which the state is still concep-
tualized and operates in contemporary societies (Piattoni, 2010a, 2010b). I
will then offer a normative assessment of MLG that fully factors in the pro-
found changes that have occurred in our interconnected democracies. I
may thus be able to shed some light on the democratic promises that MLG
can realistically deliver. By doing so I hope to bring into relief features of
MLG which have been relatively underplayed, to dispel a few myths and to
downsize some overblown expectations. In a word, to fill in a few missing

linkages.
DEFINING MLG: SOLVING THE DEPENDENT

VARIABLE PROBLEM
MLG should be considered as a syndrome: as a cluster of phenomena that

appear to be linked together through either causal relations or simple corre-
lations. As such, we already have a handful of excellent descriptions and
definitions of MLG, from which scholars may choose depending on which
sub-cluster of phenomena they want to study.
Marks provided us with the minimalist definition which everyone can
embrace: MGL is ‘a system of continuous negotiations among nested gov-
ernments at several territorial tiers’ (Marks, 1993, p. 392). This system of
negotiations, according to the same author, gives rise to arrangements in
which ‘supranational, national, regional and local governments are
enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks’ (Marks, 1993,
pp. 402 403). Ongaro opens this volume by recalling in the introductory
chapter the following definition of MLG as ‘the simultaneous activation of
governmental and non-governmental actors at various jurisdictional levels’
(Piattoni, 2010b, p. 159) an apt summary of the more articulated proposi-
tions contained in Piattoni (2010a, pp. 288 291). Like Marks, I too have
insisted in my work on the need to include, in the definition of MLG, the
simultaneous presence of more than two levels of government not just
the national and the inter- or supra-national, but also the subnational level
or levels and the presence of non-governmental organizations and social
partners.
The reason for this fairly strong requirement is that I think it would be
misleading to talk about MLG if all we had in mind were intergovernmen-
tal relations either in the highly restrictive sense of international relations
where the levels are only two and for which we have many well-known
theoretical tools, such as that of ‘dual-level game’ (Putnam, 1988) or
‘second image reversed’ (Gourevitch, 1978) to make just two examples or
in the sense of intergovernmental relations that take place within the same
polity as described by federalism or regionalism (among others, by
Elazar, 2001; Hooghe, Marks, & Schakel, 2010; Keating, 1988). The rela-
tionships and assonance of these two already ample research agendas have
been already explored (Ongaro, Massey, Holzer, & Wayenberg, 2010,
2011), but I believe there is no need to mobilize MLG unless we expected to
326 SIMONA PIATTONI
gain a clearer vision of both sets of phenomena by placing them in relation to

one another, that is, unless we plan to investigate how the internal articulation
of the state is transformed by its increasing interconnectedness with other
states. And this is precisely why I think that MLG needs to indicate rela-
tions among at least three levels of government and it needs to also factor in
the participation of non-governmental actors.
The whole field of international relations is about the interrelations
among states and hence studies the interactions between the national and
the international levels. We do not need to murk the waters by addressing
some of the same issues with different concepts unless, of course, we
thought that international developments are such that we are in fact witnes-
sing new phenomena that cannot be captured through the existing analyti-
cal apparatuses. The still relatively novel concept of MLG is truly
worthwhile, I believe, only if we take seriously two components of this
term: multi-level governance. The ‘multi’ prefix would not be justified if the
levels were authentically only two, hence the need to investigate also subna-
tional dynamics. The ‘nance’ suffix would not be justified if we were to talk
only about governmental actors, where by ‘governmental’ I mean adminis-
trative or political actors legitimized to decide and implement policies by
some direct or indirect act of representative delegation.1 This suffix is justi-
fied, then, only insofar as it points to either the involvement of non-
governmental actors in authoritative decision-making (in contrast to their
involvement in the mere implementation and assessment of decisions) or to
the novel ways in which governmental and non-governmental actors inter-
act in the decision, implementation and assessment of public policies.
To restate, governance indicates a blurring of the paradigmatic and per-
haps ideal-typical distinction between state and society, which assumes that
they operate in clearly distinct spheres of authority and behave according
to different normative and legal parameters. In governance, this distinction
is called into question as either society steps in and partakes in authorita-
tive policymaking as if it were a public actor and state actors interact
among themselves and with others as if they were private actors. This is
why both the direct involvement of civil society organizations in the man-
agement and delivery of public services and the discharge of public business
according to private law criteria can be placed under the rubric of
governance.2
In conclusion, MLG can be defined as a type of policymaking arrange-
ments characterized by the simultaneous activation of governmental and
non-governmental actors at different jurisdictional levels and such that the
interrelationships thus created defy existing hierarchies and rather take the
form of non-hierarchical networks. These policymaking arrangements cer-

tainly challenge the ideal-typical notion of Westphalian state, but their ulti-
mate impact crucially depends on the mobilization capacity of all actors
involved.
MLG theorists have not framed clear expectations about the dynamics of this polity. If,
as these theorists claim, competencies have slipped away from central states both up to
the supranational level and down to the sub-national level, then, ceteris paribus, one
would expect greater interaction among actors at these levels. But the details remain
murky and, apart from a generalized presumption of increasing mobilization across
levels, they provide no systematic set of expectations about which actors should mobi-
lize and why. (Marks, Liesbet, & Kermit, 1996, p. 167)
THE CONTEXTUAL CAUSES OF MLG
Different authors suggest that different causes lie at the bases of these phe-
nomena and hence produce different narratives as to what ultimately
prompts multiple levels of governmental and non-governmental actors to
jointly decide, implement and assess public policies. They also obviously
differ as to the consequences, both practical and normative, of doing that.
Let’s first look at the causes.
We can distinguish between internal and external causes of MLG. One
internal narrative emphasizes the increasing complexity of policymaking in
contemporary plural societies in which citizens expect increasing services
from the state and demand to be directly involved in decisions that affect
their lives. This is a broad narrative the ‘governmental overload’ narra-
tive (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975) that departs from state-
ments about the emergence of non-material values in the sixties and
seventies and, through various paths of increasing civil society mobiliza-
tion, leads to increasing demands being placed upon governmental authori-
ties and the consequent desire of the latter to offload some of this burden
back onto society by directly involving the ultimate receivers of governmen-
tal services. A second broad narrative the ‘consociational/neocorporatist
narrative’ (Berger, 1981; Katzenstein, 1985; Schmitter & Lehmbruch, 1979)
also departs from plural societies and/or small economies to chart the way
in which these managed to withstand the pressure of increasingly turbulent
and competitive markets by involving social partners in macroeconomic
policymaking and by involving social groups in the ideation and delivery of
social services. A third narrative the ‘regional awakening narrative’
328 SIMONA PIATTONI
(Keating, 1988; Rokkan & Urwin, 1982) emphasizes how the subnational
level emerged since the late sixties as a more authentic and significant basis
for cultural, economic and political mobilization and how the national level
met these expectations by granting subnational levels of government and
society ampler self-governing powers. In all three narratives, the ultimate
drivers of change are internal dynamics which induce the state to do less
‘steering rather than rowing’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Pierre & Peters,
2000) and do it differently. In all three narratives, increased demands for
social services and for societal participation are met by redefining the role
of the state and by theorizing the higher efficiency of allowing the private
sector and the market provide for public goods. Regardless of whether they
ended up being associated with greater societal mobilization (à la new
social movements) or with the retrenchment of the state (à la public choice
theory), these narratives point to the new way in which state authorities
intervene in public life.
External dynamics were considered insofar as they changed the context
in which contemporary societies faced the cultural and economics upheavals
of the sixties and seventies, but they were not central in any of the previous
narratives. There are, however, a number of external narratives that place
international and global developments at the core. One of these narratives
the ‘globalization’ narrative emphasizes the transformation of the world
economy in which competitive rather than comparative advantages induce
companies to relocate or to enter complex productive and trade agreements
with companies in other parts of the world along value chains that bind the
entire globe (Porter, 1998; Rodrik, 2011). A variant of this narrative the
‘financialization of the world economy’ narrative points in the direction
of a third ‘great transformation’ (from subsistence to commercial agricul-
ture, from agriculture to industry, and from industry to financial markets),
which has occurred in the eighties and nineties and which is transforming
the ultimate objective of economic activity, which no longer aims at maxi-
mizing material production, but immaterial financial wealth (Epstein, 2006).
A third external narrative the ‘transnational society mobilization’ narra-
tive points to the increasing mobility and interconnectedness of social
groups which mobilize all over the world and attempt to join forces in an
attempt to match the global scale of today’s environmental, demographic,
economic and social displacements (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
These external narratives all have societal and economic actors as their
prime movers, while a fourth narrative places governmental actors at the
centre. This is the grand narrative of ‘regional integration’, in general, and
of ‘European integration’, in particular. Whether as one of the phenomena
that compose and react to globalization or as one of its prime causes, the
decision of national governments to pool their sovereignty together in
order to attain higher benefits than they would be able to attain severally,
the regional integration narrative creates a context of heightened interde-
pendence among formerly (and formally) sovereign states which is at the
root of all other phenomena and narratives. Whether it leads to the crea-
tion of supranational institutions, like those of the European Union, or
simply to international agreements and regimes, an increasingly tighter web
of transnational relations characterizes the ‘business of rule’ both inside
and among countries (Ansell, 2000; Slaughter, 2004). It is not by chance,
then, that the terms ‘multi-level governance’ would emerge particularly in
connection with European integration studies and would spill from there
over to other fields of social scientific inquiry.
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF MLG

The previous sections aimed at settling the ‘dependent variable’ problem
and at providing a complex, but manageable definition of MLG, suffi-
ciently wide to encompass a number of rather diverse empirical phenom-
ena, but sufficiently precise to be able to distinguish cases of simple
international or intergovernmental relations from MLG regimes.
Definitional problems escalate if we try to include in the definition of MLG
not only necessary empirical connotational properties that allow to deter-
mine when we have instances of MLG, but also accessory normative prop-
erties that may or may not be associated with it. In this case, we would
almost certainly end up with a concept which is apparently rich, but does
not encompass many real life phenomena: ultimately, an empty concept. It
should be clear that I am in favour of keeping the definition of MLG as
succinct as possible and to leave to empirical observation to determine
which consequences or normative assessments should be associated with it
under which circumstances. In particular, I would recommend avoiding
attaching any normative positive or negative connotations to it by
definition.
When this temptation is not resisted, it is inevitable to attach to MLG
positive consequences that are sometimes never borne out in practice or
negative ones that often never surface. Typically, they are two faces of the
same coin. Take the often cited advantage that, through MLG, power is
dispersed or not exercised, hence that MLG arrangements secure
330 SIMONA PIATTONI
spontaneous coordination without the need for threats or sanctions and

that, rather, mutual learning induce governmental and non-governmental
actors situated at different levels to cooperate and converge towards shared
goals. This blissful outcome is certainly possible, but is it plausible to
expect that it will inevitably occur and hence to include it in the very defini-
tion of MLG? Clearly not.
In a mirror image, MLG is not autocratic rule in disguise. The ‘shadow
of hierarchy’ argument states that multi-level or networked governance
arrangements are created in order to allow actors at different governmental
levels as well as non-governmental actors to express their views and voice
their concerns and to try and arrive at shared solutions for common pro-
blems (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008). The assumption, however, is that this
is a circuitous way of arriving at solutions that central government could
have identified right away, which is solely aimed at eliciting consensus and
creating good-will in the process. No real learning is expected to emerge
from these processes. The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ argument further implies
that the roles respectively of principal the legislator, as representative of
the citizens and agent the governmental bureaucracy or the network
of governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations can be
kept neatly distinct and that the principal is actually capable of identifying
the problems, devise the solutions and steer the implementation.3
This is what many authors call meta-governance (e.g. Baker, 2015): the
capacity to establish the ultimate goal of a policy, align the values and
incentives for the networked actors, and steer their behaviour so as to
achieve the policy goal with minimum coercion and maximum effective-
ness. Understood this way, meta-governance is a major manifestation of
state capacity. Referring to the work of Peters (2010), Baker states that
‘Metagovernance holds that governments are capable of structuring and
coordinating “… devolved governance processes …” that characterise the
interactions between institutions at multiple levels’ (Baker, 2015). Meta-
governance can be achieved in a number of ways Sørensen (2006) sug-
gests four such ways (Baker, 2015) some of them consisting in convincing
and reorienting the values and preferences of the actors and some of them
more classically consisting of doling positive and negative inducements.
There is no assurance, however, that coordination will take place and that
goals will be attained. Whether this will happen in reality, it is something
that needs to be assessed case by case and which has more to do with the
political and administrative culture of a country, with the polarization of
the political system and the intensity of its societal pluralism, and with
the existence of appropriate institutions than with the definition of MLG.
The notion of MLG, in other words, does not include its own successful
deployment.
In fact the opposite may be true. MLG may equally signal the determi-
nation of the central government to open up decision-making processes to
non-governmental organizations and to subnational authorities to the point
of challenging existing hierarchies, precisely because the state is incapable
or unwilling to change its internal structures, for example, by giving
devolved powers to subnational tiers of government or by relinquishing
regulatory powers to professional associations. Central government may
therefore opt for more ‘fluid’ MLG solutions. MLG arrangements need no
major institutional or constitutional reform: they can be assembled and dis-
assembled at will and, therefore, lend themselves to be used either as a way
of overcoming existing formal hierarchies or as a way of keeping them
untouched. It does, however, open up novel spaces for expressing voice,
judgement and will to actors which are not conventionally involved in pol-
icymaking and thus gives them the political opportunity to exploit this pol-
icymaking springboard to promote and increase their institutional
standing. The extent to which (policy) governance arrangements translate
into (polity) institutional gains depends on the capacity of subnational and
non-governmental actors to mobilize values, ideas and people (politics).
European Union dynamics make this point abundantly clear. Despite
efforts at anticipating which institutional or non-institutional actors would
be at an advantage in the ‘MLG game’ for example, those states or
regions in federal or regionalized states which are domestically empowered
to participate in central policymaking processes or those social partners in
neocorporatist countries which play an important role in macroeconomic
policymaking (Green-Cowles, Caporaso, & Risses, 2000) it is impossible
to come to firm predictions. In fact, actors who are domestically authorized
to take part in national policymaking processes and who developed with
time the institutional capacities to operate at that level are often ill-
equipped to operate in multi-level, cross-sector and project-oriented ones
(Piattoni, 2008). In other words, it is impossible to determine a priori which
political-institutional system will show a better ‘degree of fit’ (Börzel &
Risse, 2003), as much will depend on the capacity and interest of the indivi-
dual institutional and non-institutional actors to take advantage of MLG
arrangements to translate their policy competence into institutional rele-
vance (Piattoni, 2014). This has been shown in a number of studies
(e.g., Bukowski, Piattoni, & Smyrl, 2003) and emerges also from Liddle’s
study of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). ‘LEPs are not based on ter-
ritories in the strictest sense of the term … They do not sit nested in
332 SIMONA PIATTONI
a hierarchical constitutional order, not only because the UK does not

possess a constitution but [because] they are deliberately fluid forms of gov-
ernance, with imprecise boundaries and not coterminous with existing
structures … They are forums influencing societal decision-making and
blur the lines between public and private …’ (Liddle, 2015).
This explains why MLG arrangements are particularly appropriate for
the European Union context. The Commission needs the knowledge and
good-will of actors ‘on the ground’ to make its policies work. It is therefore
interested in involving them in the formulated, implementation and assess-
ment of policies which require detailed knowledge of local economic and
social conditions. It cannot, however, directly authorize or empower subna-
tional and non-institutional actors to become involved in formal decision-
making processes, as this would amount to an unwarranted interference
with the sovereign right of member states to determine their internal insti-
tutional structure. Put more simply, the Commission cannot meddle with
the territorial articulation and with the consultative tradition of the mem-
ber states (at least directly, but see Egeberg & Trondal, 2011; Ongaro,
Barbieri, Bellè, & Fedele, 2015). It can, however, create MLG arrange-
ments in which national, subnational and civil society representatives sit,
metaphorically, at the same table in order to give them all a chance to
make their contribution. This results in an implicit flattening of hierarchies,
even though it does not formally challenge them. This is why, as remarked
by many, ‘the constitutional definition of institutional competences
have tended to remain unaltered despite the presence of MLG dynamics’
(Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 80 quoted in Zito, 2015).
ARE MLG ARRANGEMENTS DEMOCRATIC?
However expedient, MLG arrangements are considered suspect from a

democratic point of view. The very aspects that make them potentially
effective tools for collecting knowledge, encouraging learning and facilitat-
ing convergence on policy solutions make them also democratically weak
(Zito, 2015). This is the conventional argument. I would like to challenge
this argument on three grounds: first, by referring to similar situations
which obtain within national democracies but which are not considered
democratically problematic; second, by unveiling the illusoriness of pursu-
ing a notion of democracy based on delegation and accountability (in a
conventional sense) which cannot obtain in interconnected settings; and,
third, by showing that a fuller notion of democracy requires more than
simple delegation-accountability relations. Our contemporary democracies

have profoundly changed in the last 50 years and it is high time we began
to update our normative standards to real-world situations rather than to
fictitious ideal-typical worlds that no longer exist.
The most common critique levied against MLG is that it defies conven-
tional understandings of democratic decision-making. Conventional wis-
dom pins democratic legitimacy on the simultaneous existence of unbroken
chains of delegation and legitimation, that run from the sovereign people
to the legislators to administrative executives, and of matching chains of
accountability running in the opposite direction (Strøm, Müller, &
Bergman, 2003). This requirement is frequently retained also in intergo-
vernmental settings (Bovens, Curtin, & ‘t Hart, 2010), where the suprana-
tional agencies eventually charged with the implementation of decisions
made by governmental and administrative representatives cannot exceed
the precisely defined boundaries of the mandate given by the representative
organs (so-called Meroni doctrine, Curtin, 2007; Scharpf, 2009). We would
otherwise have a situation in which an unrepresentative organ legislates on
behalf of the sovereign people without having been expressly delegated to
do so. If this were the case, accusations of undemocratic technocracy would
be plausible.
The counterargument is sometimes made (Majone, 1999, 2000;
Moravcsik, 2002) that also within national democracies there are areas of
discretionary decision-making which are attributed to technocratic (non-
majoritarian, in Majone’s terminology) bodies for example, independent
central banks and other independent administrative agencies whose deci-
sions are not punctually controlled by the representatives of the sovereign
people. In fact, their very raison d’eˆtre is that they are politically indepen-
dent, hence they can subtract sensitive decision-making areas from the vag-
aries of the electoral market which ‘notoriously’ reacts to short-term
incentives and fails to take the long-term view. But is this really so? And,
even if this argument were valid for the national context, in which the
representative assembly can always check, limit and otherwise rein in the
powers of these non-majoritarian agencies, can it be extended to a suprana-
tional context in which many decisions are taken with qualified majority
voting? These are the arguments which the German Constitutional Court
and many scholars have produced in the recent years, building up the by
now vast debate on the democratic deficit of the EU (Lord & Pollak, 2013).
It may be useful to refer to some aspects of this debate to make sure
that the standard arguments are fleshed out. To begin with, the argument
that elected legislators always react only to short-term stimuli is
334 SIMONA PIATTONI
unwarranted: no costly policy decisions, no institutional reforms, no consti-

tutional amendments would ever be decided if legislators were always cap-
tive of short-termism. More to the point: not even independent central
banks would ever be created if legislators always only pursued their short-
term electoral interest! The creation of independent administrative agencies
that limit the space for political bargaining are an act of self-restraint on
the part of legislators made in order to bind themselves for the future, a
typical ‘Ulysses and the sirens’ scenario’s (Elster, 1985). True, these agen-
cies are more easily justified in particularly technical policy areas, but as we
know the distinction between technical and political issues is not always so
clear-cut (Følledsal & Hix, 2006). Majone (1999) argues that legislators can
design ex-ante incentives and set up ex-post controls so as to make sure
that independent administrative agencies do not shirk from the goals
assigned to them and further argues that legislators always retain the power
to rein agencies in by redefining their mandate and limiting their budget.
However, too many ex-ante and ex-post controls and too frequent institu-
tional redesigns defeat the very purpose of having independent administra-
tive agencies, so the balance between delegation and accountability is not
easily struck even within the national context.
What’s more, the very notion that, in contemporary societies, we could
have clearly identifiable principals and agents must be called into question.
In public policymaking, the principal-agent model presupposes that policy
objectives are established before they are entrusted to agencies for their
implementation. The nature of the delegation relationship is one of ends-
to-means, where the ends are supposedly set by democratically elected
representatives (the principals) and the means are identified by authorized
dependent or independent administrators (the agents). In highly novel con-
texts, this neat distinction between principals and agents does not obtain.
As recalled above, agents often identify or ‘discover’ the ends of a policy as
they discuss the means and elaborate the metrics for the measurement of
goal attainment (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008, 2010). More than that: the very sub-
jects, in whose name policy ends are pursued, are in fact crafted during the
decision-making process. The authors of delegation are the outcome, not
the precondition of delegation. Delegation, therefore, is no longer really
such: it is an act of more or less successful claim-making (Saward, 2006,
2009) through which ‘A maker of representations (M) puts forward a sub-
ject (S) which stands for an object (O) which is related to a referent (R) and
is offered to an audience (A)’ (Saward, 2006, p. 5).
At EU level this is all the more problematic. To begin with, the argu-
ment that member states that is to say, the democratically legitimated
governmental representatives sitting in the Council or in the European

Council are still the ‘masters of the treaties’ (Weiler, 1999) implying
that they can always redesign the institutional powers and boundaries of
EU supranational agencies and otherwise constrain their decision-making
powers is a weak one. Qualified majority voting has effectively limited
this power for any member state which happens to be in the dissenting
minority, and withdrawing from entire chapters of legislation or from the
EU altogether because of disputes over the powers entrusted to this or
that supranational agency is equivalent to a ‘nuclear option’ (Pollack,
2003) that is seldom chosen. In the European Union, surrenders of sover-
eignty are significant, real and (short of) irreversible. In fact, it can be
argued more generally that, in international settings, power is effectively
alienated and not just delegated, as it cannot be fully retrieved (Agné,
2007).
MLG arrangements share some of the problems of principal-agent rela-
tions caught in the tension between delegation and accountability but their
multi-level and governance nature compound them further. MLG arrange-
ments include next to networked independent administrative agencies
(Christiansen & Larsson, 2007; Curtin, 2007) also social partners, civil
society representatives and NGOs, whose representative nature and demo-
cratic mandate is highly dubious. Despite efforts on the part of the
Commission to establish a registry of associations which give at least mini-
mal guarantees of internal transparency and democracy (Smismans, 2008),
the suspicion that they may represent only a subset of all legitimate con-
cerns and stakeholders cannot be completely eliminated. Moreover, the
decision of which social partners, civil society organizations and NGOs
should be involved is partly up to the Commission, itself an independent
administrative agency which has a clear incentive to invite friendly organi-
zations and to leave hostile or more pugnacious ones out. The inclusiveness
and representativeness of the non-governmental actors which participate in
MLG arrangements is inevitably questioned.
These arguments would be nearly fatal to the democratic legitimacy of
MLG if we could be convinced to extend to the inter- or supra-national
level arguments that are commonly made for the national level. In fact, the
opposite is true. What happens in the European Union and other interna-
tional settings reveals features of our current democracies that would par-
tially go unnoticed if we only focussed on the national level. In other
words, criteria of democratic legitimacy have changed or should change
also at the national level. To begin with, we must squarely confront the
challenge deriving from replacing government with governance: regardless
336 SIMONA PIATTONI
of whether governance is ‘government plus’ or ‘government minus’

(Sbragia, 2002, p. 6), it implies the inclusion in a public policymaking capa-
city of private subjects which have no democratic credential according to a
delegation vision of democracy (Piattoni, 2013). We must conclude that it
is that vision which is by now at fault and that we must update our notion
of democracy both for the national and for the inter- or supra-national
setting.4
The notion of democracy which I propose to use takes full account of
the interconnected nature of our societies and acknowledges that ‘nation-
ally organized constitutional states are becoming increasingly incapable of
acting democratically. They cannot include all those who will be affected
by their decisions in the electoral process, and vice versa, citizens cannot
influence the behaviour of those that are making decisions on their
behalf’ (Joerges quoted in Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007, p. 26). This
is true both nationally, where policy decisions must see the involvement
of governments at different levels and of representatives of civil society,
and inter- and supra-nationally, where care must be taken not to impose
onto third country citizens decisions which interfere arbitrarily with their
rights and freedoms. The redefinition of democracy in interconnected set-
tings benefits from the recent reflection on non-domination (Pettit, 1997),
tolerance (Weiler, 2003) and solidarity (Habermas, 2011). Bohman (2007)
proposes to call it ‘transnational democracy’. In this sense, MLG arrange-
ments that respond to a new, enlarged notion of transnational democracy
would lead to even more encompassing collective aims than decisions
taken according to established democratic channels. ‘Democracy is that
set of institutions by which individuals are empowered as free and equal
citizens to form and change the terms of their common life together,
including democracy itself. In this sense, democracy is reflexive and con-
sists of procedures by which its rules and practices are made subject to
the deliberation of citizens themselves. Democracy is thus an ideal of self-
determination, in that the terms and boundaries of democracy are made
by citizens themselves and not by others’ (Bohman, 2007, p. 2).
Transnational democracy implies non-domination and this in turn implies
that the interests and ideas of all affected parties should be fully tracked
before a decision, which potentially interferes with their freedom, can be
considered legitimate. In Pettit’s words, ‘an act of interference will be
non-arbitrary to the extent that it is forced to track the interests and
ideas of the persons suffering the interference’, where ‘the relevant inter-
ests and ideas will be those that are shared in common with others’
(Pettit, 1997, p. 55).
Unfortunately, the institutional architecture of transnational democracy

has not been fully theorized yet and we are therefore still operating with
institutions that were thought and created for a different type of demo-
cratic standard. As Zito correctly remarks, ‘The public will continue to
hold the state accountable for actions taken by the network even if policy
decisions and responsibilities are now shared’ (Zito, 2015). Rather than
government without accountability, we appear to live in a strange world of
accountability without government. In fact, our current democracies have
intensified accountability and control mechanisms (Rosanvallon, 2008).
The myth of the self-regulating network is at least as fictitious as the myth
of the self-regulating society or that of the self-regulating market.
Networks, once set up according to a mix of representative and expertise
criteria, should be encouraged to produce their own policy goals, means,
metrics and standards for decision-making provided they report back to
representative institutions periodically and be subjected to public scrutiny
(Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008). Only in this way, whichever lessons have been
drawn through various forms of learning will become part of the entire
societal repertoire. It would appear difficult to ensure such sophisticated
mechanisms of participation and control be enacted in non-democratic con-
texts, like China (Hensengerth, 2015).
CONCLUSION
To conclude, in this chapters I have argued that some of the missing lin-
kages identified in this volume may be more apparent than real. MLG indi-
cates essentially public policy arrangements which, however, are caused by
and reveal new mechanisms of political mobilization (politics) and exert
powerful forces for polity restructuring. I therefore disagree with those who
see it as a mere add-on to a state of affairs which has supposedly remained
unchanged. The contemporary state has changed also because of MLG
arrangements, though it has not lost its relevance. Furthermore, MLG is a
descriptive as well as a theoretical concept which points, among its causes,
to the multiple locations and levels at which political mobilization can trig-
ger MLG dynamics and, among its consequences, to a transformed institu-
tional architecture of the state and to a transformed notion of democracy
that we must develop to make sense of current networked modes of govern-
ance. The European Union remains the setting in which these trends are
clearest, even though they have developed also within purely national
contexts.
338 SIMONA PIATTONI
NOTES
1. These could be either directly elected central/regional/local governments or

second-order subnational governments.
2. In continental, civil law legal systems this distinction is very clear, hence the
blurring is immediately perceived as problematic, while it is less clear and striking,
at least terminologically, in common law systems. In civil law systems, jus regulates
dealings among private actors (individual and corporate), while lex regulates rela-
tionships between public authorities and private actors. Since the 1930s (Shonfield,
1965) we have witnessed the legal innovation of public firms operating as private
actors for public ends, and thus we have become accustomed to a certain transgres-
sion of the boundaries. However, it is not until the nineties (Rhodes, 1997) that we
have started to challenge the wisdom of keeping them theoretically distinct.
3. This assumption is fundamentally questioned by, for example, the proponents
of Directly Deliberative Polyarchy who claim that agents are in fact required to
identify the problems in the course of devising the solutions and that the principals
know no better than the agents (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008, 2010).
4. True, the fact that the institutions of a delegation-accountability model of
democracy are still in place and still formally respond for the decisions that they
authorize (Zito, 2015) creates confusion and blurs the new sources of legitimacy.
MLG arrangements will be assessed differently depending on the tradition of state
prevalent in each national setting (Liddle, 2015).
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POSTFACE
Emanuela Prina and Madlen Serban
‘Multi-Level Governance: The Missing Linkages’ is a book that goes

straight to the heart of the Multi-Level Governance (MLG) debate. Its
added value lies on the one hand within the EU borders identifying ‘what
the EU is and how the EU works’ and exploring criticisms and responses
to the debate on EU MLG. On the other hand, both within and
beyond the frontiers of the EU, the diagnosis and analysis of the ‘missing
linkages’ are an invitation to explore the potential of the learning value of
MLG as a pillar to support social and economic cohesion, growth and
competitiveness.
The European Training Foundation (ETF) is an EU agency created in
1994 with the specific mandate, in the frame of EU external relations poli-
cies, to contribute to human capital development in EU partner countries,
through improvements in vocational education and training (VET). Over
the time ETF has discovered how MLG is of paramount importance, as it
supports better effectiveness and efficiency of human capital policies and
fosters the efficacy of VET policies.
At the ETF the operationalization of MLG has been made through action
research, mainly focusing on the multi-level VET systems of governance,
practiced in Europe and abroad. We equally got inspiration from other devel-
opments like the European Committee of the Regions approach to MLG, as
described in the ‘White paper on multilevel governance’1 issued in 2009. By
means of an integrated approach, it entails the joint participation of the dif-
ferent tiers of government and representative economic and social partners,
as well as other civil society actors, in the formulation of policies and legisla-
tion, in their implementation and monitoring. The ETF supports the call for
multiple levels of government and active involvement of non-governmental
organisations, including social partners, in MLG frames.
The very much appreciated contribution to the MLG conceptualisation,
theorisation and application provided by this book can powerfully help
343
344 POSTFACE
public entities like the ETF, engaged in supporting the policy process in
multi-level settings. The experience of the ETF showcases the ‘missing lin-
kages’ potential to expand the use of the MLG notion and its practice, and
to apply it to policy making and in reform processes.
Firstly, MLG brings actors together, across levels and sectors, public
and private, hence bolstering a participatory approach to policy making.
The benefit for human capital policies is the opportunity to bring the world
of education and the world of work together, including the beneficiaries of
the public policies, exploiting the global, national, and local-territorial
potential for skills and jobs.
Secondly, developing systems of MLG unleashes the potential for the
creation of partnerships and the development of policy networks, unlock-
ing the potential contribution of each actor in the policy cycle through pol-
icy learning, and the possible contributions of each stakeholder to the
development and implementation of collective actions towards shared
results.
Finally, in our experience we have discovered that MLG has a value
beyond democratic states, whereby partnership and consultation can be
supported and created despite the lack of formal elective systems, division
of powers, and legal status of liberal-democratic rights and obligations
values that we uphold, but the development of MLG frames, we would
argue, contributes to building trust in public policies and making them
transparent and accountable for results also in different circumstances.
The recognition of the strategic importance of multilevel participatory
governance is growing in EU partner countries. This implies the recogni-
tion of the role of social partners, civil society and territorial authorities,
namely regional and local actors in contributing to shape and implement
human capital policies and impact on socio economic cohesion, growth
and competitiveness. In our work as policy advisors we have detected a
missing linkage, the one between public institutions and social and eco-
nomic actors, and through the joint work with stakeholders in EU partner
countries, we have contributed to create new trends of cooperation, part-
nerships and ultimately sustainable change in the human capital policy
domain.
Other ‘missing linkages’ are there to be explored and exploited. This
book opens up to policy makers, practitioners and researchers in all fields
the possibility to make connections, and through the added value of learn-
ing in MLG frames, to invest in new areas of joint work. Policies need to
be as flexible as possible and integrated to contribute to social and eco-
nomic cohesion, growth and competitiveness. Policies need to take into
Postface 345
account the unpredictability of change, the success of innovation and the

limited absorption capacity of the social systems. Only through integration
and co-ordination social and economic cohesion can be targeted. These
processes can only take place when effective and efficient MLG across the
vertical and horizontal dimensions takes place. Dialogue among actors,
coalitions, networks, sectoral and cross-sector dialogue are to be supported
and promoted.
It is then of paramount importance to find the ‘missing linkages’, both
theoretical, in the disciplines enabling an improved understanding of
MLG, and practical, in the ways in which MLG systems are set up and
evolve over time, and to connect them, reinforce these connections and use
them, to further develop the MLG approach and create an ecosystem
among disciplines. This exchange and cross-disciplinary debate is key to
bringing about the potential of multiple disciplines to cross-fertilize each
other and learn from each other, leading to unleashing the potential and
promises of the MLG agenda in the European Union and beyond.
NOTE
1. “Multilevel governance is a dynamic process with a horizontal and vertical

dimension, which does not in any way dilute political responsibility. On the con-
trary, if the mechanisms and instruments are appropriate and applied correctly, it
helps to increase joint ownership and implementation. Consequently, multilevel
governance represents a political ‘action blueprint’ rather than a legal instrument
and cannot be understood solely through the lens of the division of powers.”
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Simone Baglioni is a Reader in Politics at Glasgow Caledonian University,

Glasgow, where he is also associated with the Yunus Centre for Social
Business and Health. Simone’s research focuses on civil society, social
movements and youth employment issues. His last book, co-edited with
Marco Giugni, is entitled Civil Society Organizations, Unemployment and
Precarity in Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
Keith Baker is an assistant professor at Oregon State University, Oregon,
USA. Keith’s work concerns the intersection between public administration
and public policy and his research interests focus on governance, metago-
vernance, energy policy and nuclear power. Prior to joining Oregon State
University in 2014, Keith has held positions at Northumbria University,
the University of Southampton and the University of Manchester. Outside
of academia, Keith lists his hobbies as spending time in airport departure
halls, playing squash (badly) and enjoying craft beer.
Dario Barbieri, Ph.D. in Business Administration and Management at
Bocconi University in Milan, is partner of the consultancy firm BeP (bep-
consulenza.it) in Milan and former post doc fellow at Public Management
department of Bocconi. He has been visiting fellow at Oslo University
(Norway) and Leuven University (Belgium). His main field of studies are
strategic planning and organizational performance of public administra-
tions, agencification, management of international organizations, networks
of enterprises, internationalization, change management, capacity building
and monitoring and evaluation of cooperation projects. He has been con-
sultant for the United Nations Development Program. He has published
scientific articles, chapters in books and conference papers in Italian,
English, Spanish and French.
Nicola Bellé is assistant professor in the Department of Policy Analysis and
Public Management at Bocconi University in Milan, Italy. His research
focuses on work motivation, leadership, employee attitudes and public sec-
tor reform.
347
348 AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Paolo Fedele is assistant professor of management at Udine University. He

holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration and Management from Parma
University and a Master in Public Management from Bocconi University.
His main research interests are public management reform, interactive gov-
ernance and strategic management.
Oliver Hensengerth is a political scientist based at Northumbria University

in Newcastle, UK. He works on transboundary water governance and
environmental politics in China, Cambodia and the Mekong River Basin.
Over the last 10 years he has worked for academic institutions and think
tanks in the United States, Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom.
Oliver has extensive field work experience in the Mekong Region.
Hussein Kassim is Vincent Wright Chair 2014-15, Sciences Po. Paris and
Professor of Politics in the School of Political, Social and International
Studies and faculty member of the Centre for Competition Policy at the
University of East Anglia. He has read PPE at New College, Oxford, and
studied for an MPhil and DPhil at Nuffield College, Oxford. He has taught
previously at Birkbeck, University of London, the University of
Nottingham, and the University of Oxford, and has held visiting positions
at Columbia University, Harvard University, New York University,
Sciences Po. Paris, and the University of Oslo. His research investigates
EU institutions, the relationship between the EU and the member states,
and EU policy. He is co-author of Air Transport and the European Union
(Palgrave, 2010) and lead author of The European Commission of the
Twenty-First Century (OUP, 2013). He is currently working on the
European Competition Network, and the regulatory state, as well as var-
ious projects on the European Commission.
Sabine Kuhlmann, since April 2013, holds the chair for “Political Science,
Administration and Organization” at the University of Potsdam, Germany.
Before, she lectured as Professor for “Comparative Public Administration”
at the German University of Administrative Sciences in Speyer and as a vis-
iting professor at the Humboldt-University of Berlin as well as the
University of Konstanz. She is Vice-President of the European Group for
Public Administration (EGPA) since September 2012, member of the
National Regulatory Control Council advising the German Federal
Government since September 2011 and besides that, deputy editor of the
journal International Review of Administrative Sciences (IRAS) as well as
Editorial Board member of various journals (i.e., Public Administration
Review (PAR); der moderne staat (dms)).
Author Biographies 349
Joyce Liddle joined IMPGT, University of Aix-Marseilles in September

2013 as Professor of Public Leadership and Management, Head of
CERGAM. She is Visiting Professor with the Universities of Eastern
Finland, Glasgow Caledonian, Northumbria, Edge Hill and Plymouth,
UK, and Honorary Chair of the UK Joint University Council, the Learned
Society for public administration. She is a Fellow of the British Academy
of Social Sciences, and Regional Studies Association. Until February 2015,
she was editor in chief and book review editor of the International Journal
of Public Sector Management (and has assumed the role of Chair of the
EAB)as well as EAB member for other notable journals. She researches in
the areas of public leadership, entrepreneurship, territorial governance,
partnerships, networks and published over 200 articles, 20 book chapters
and seven edited/authored books, as well as editing an annual series for
Emerald publishers on International Public Sector Management. In 2016
she is commissioned editor of a book on Public Entrepreneurship.
Emmanuelle Mathieu is a postdoctoral research fellow at the German
Research Institute for Public Administration Speyer (Germany) where she
works on multi-level implementation conflicts and litigation between the
member states and the Commission. She completed her Ph.D. on delega-
tion in the EU regulatory space at the European University Institute
(Italy). Prior to this, she worked as a researcher at the Université
Catholique de Louvain (Belgium) on the multi-level regulation of network
industries. Her research is located at the crossroads between EU studies
and public administration. She has worked on EU regulatory governance
(EU regulatory networks, EU regulatory agencies, committee system), the
implementation of EU policies, national independent regulatory agencies
and their relationship to the EU and the Europeanization of intergovern-
mental relationships within federal and regionalized countries. In terms of
policy fields, she specialised in the regulation of telecommunications, elec-
tricity and food safety.
Duncan McTavish is Professor of Public Policy and Management at
Glasgow Caledonian University. He has worked in public, private and
third sectors in consulting and management. He is currently a non-
executive director with Glasgow Council for the Voluntary Sector, one of
Scotland’s largest third sector organizations operating at the policy service
delivery interface. In academia he has held posts in a number of universities
including senior positions in subject and research management. He has
published, individually and jointly, highly regarded articles, book chapters,
books; his research interests include public policy, public service
management and governance, the politics of multi-level governance. He is

currently editing and contributing to a major book on Scottish politics.
Arnout Mijs is a Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of
International Relations ‘Clingendael’ since 2010, after having worked as a
consultant for BMC. His research at the Europe cluster predominantly
consists of EU economic and financial affairs such as the EU budget, eco-
nomic policy coordination, better regulation and Banking Union. In this he
provides an institutional perspective, specifically on multilevel EU govern-
ance issues and the functioning of the European Commission. He has con-
ducted several consultancy projects for the Dutch Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, Finance and Economic Affairs.
Edoardo Ongaro (BSc, MSc, Politecnico di Milano; MPhil, The London
School of Economics and Political Science; PhD, King’s College London) is
Professor of International Public Services Management and Director of the
Northumbria University Research Centre on International Public Policy
and Management. He has published extensively on topics of comparative
public governance and management. He is author of Public Management
Reform and Modernization: Trajectories of Administrative Change in Italy,
France, Greece, Portugal and Spain (Elgar) and co-author (with Ewan
Ferlie) of Strategic Management of Public Services Organizations:
Concepts, Schools and Contemporary Issues (Palgrave). He is editor or co-
editor of 10 books, including Governance and Intergovernmental Relations
in the EU and the US: Theoretical Perspectives and Policy, Performance and
Management in Governance and Intergovernmental Relations (both with
Marc Holzer, Andrew Massey and Ellen Wayenberg) (Elgar). He is
President of the European Group for Public Administration (EGPA) and
Editor of Public Policy and Administration.
Simona Piattoni (BA, MA in Economics, Bocconi University; Ph.D. in
Political Science, MIT) is Professor of Political Science at the University of
Trento, Italy, where she lectures in Comparative Politics, European Politics
and Local Government. She has previously taught at the universities of
Tromsø, Norway, and Innsbruck, Austria, and has been visiting fellow at
the European University Institute, Florence, the Max-Planck Institute for
Social Studies, Cologne, and the Institute for Governmental Studies,
Berkeley. Her main research interests are clientelism and corruption
(Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation. The European
Experience in Comparative Perspective, CUP, 2001), informal and multile-
vel governance (Informal Governance in the European Union, with Thomas
Author Biographies 351
Christiansen, EE 2003; The Theory of Multilevel Governance, OUP, 2010),

European democracy (The European Union: Democratic Principles and
Institutional Architectures in Times of Crisis, OUP, 2015). She has been
Chair of the Executive Committee of the ECPR (European Consortium for
Political Research) from 2012 to 2015.
Adriaan Schout is coordinator EU studies at the Netherlands Institute of
International Relations ‘Clingendael’ in The Hague. Dr Schout has written
extensively about multi-level EU governance and specifically about the
interdependence between EU and national administrations. His book
co-authored with Andrew Jordan The Coordination of the European Union
won the UACES price for ‘Best Book in Contemporary European Studies’.
Dr Schout has recently published a book on Dutch EU politics The
Netherlands as an EU Member: Awkward or Loyal Partner? and is currently
working on the links between national and European better regulation pro-
grammes. He is also a member of the European Integration Committee of
the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs of the Dutch
government.
Esther van Zimmeren is a research professor in ‘Globalization, Multi-Level
Governance and Federalism’ at the faculty of Law of the University of
Antwerp. She has particular expertise in IP law, competition law, contract
law, innovation policy and international trade law. Most of her research is
interdisciplinary (i.e. collaborations with geneticists, particle physicists,
economists and political scientists). Before her appointment at the
University of Antwerp, she worked as an assistant professor at the
University of Liège (2011 2013) and as a research fellow, a Ph.D.
researcher and a post-doctoral researcher at the KU Leuven (2004 2013).
Between 2002 and 2004 she was a legal assistant at the General Court of
the EU in Luxembourg. Professor van Zimmeren has frequently been
invited as a visiting scholar to various universities and research institutes
around the world, including the University of California, Berkeley; Duke
University; Gakushuin University; Hanken Business School; the Brocher
Foundation and the Institute of Intellectual Property in Tokyo.
Koen Verhoest is Research Professor in Comparative Public Administration
and Globalization at the University of Antwerp, and Visiting Professor at
the Public Governance Institute (Catholic University of Leuven). He has
published extensively in international journals including Governance, Public
Management Review, Organization Studies, International Review of
Administrative Sciences, Policy Studies and Public Administration and
Development. Books include The Autonomy and Control of State Agencies,

The Governance of Public Sector Organisations: Autonomy, Proliferation
and Performance and Multi-Level Regulation in Telecommunications (all
Palgrave McMillan). He has managed over 30 fundamental and policy-
oriented national and international research projects, and was/is involved
in European COST Actions and a H2020 project. He is co-chair of the
ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory Governance, the EGPA Study
Group on Governance of Public Sector Organizations and of the COBRA
network on public sector organization.
Anthony R. Zito is Professor of European Public Policy at Newcastle
University since August 2013. Professor Zito is currently Politics
Postgraduate Director and Co-Director of the Jean Monnet Centre for
Excellence at Newcastle University. He is Joint Editor of the leading inter-
national environmental politics journal, Environmental Politics. His broad
research interests focus on the European Union decision-making process
and governance, policy-making processes and expert networks. Dr. Zito
was a 2007 Leverhulme Fellow, and has been conducting a comparative
analysis of environmental agencies in the EU and the United States. In
2000–2003, he was co-investigator (with his co-researchers Drs. Wurzel and
Jordan) of a project (within the UK ESRC Future Governance
Programme) that examined the use of new environmental policy instru-
ments and was rated as ‘Outstanding’ by the ESRC. He has authored
Creating Environmental Policy in the European Union (Palgrave, 2000) and
has co-authored Environmental Governance in Europe (2013). He has
numerous articles in Political Studies, Public Administration, Governance,
Journal of European Public Policy, and other journals, focusing on the
European Union policy process and environmental actors and policy-
making. In 2013–2014, he was funded by a British Academy grant to com-
pare governance arrangements in Germany and the Netherlands to
Australia and Canada.

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MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE:

THE MISSING LINKAGES

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Certificate Number 1985

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD xi

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: THE MISSING

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, EU PUBLIC POLICY

REVISITING THE ‘MANAGEMENT DEFICIT’: CAN

THE INDEPENDENT EU COMMISSIONER: AN

EU AGENCIES AND THE EUROPEAN MULTI-LEVEL

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN AGENCIES,

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, THE EU AND CIVIL

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN THE

BRIDGING THE GAPS IN MULTI-LEVEL

METAGOVERNANCE, RISK AND NUCLEAR POWER

POLITICS AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES IN

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF HYDROPOWER IN

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: UNDERPLAYED

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES 347

Simone Baglioni Yunus Centre for Social Business and

Duncan McTavish Department of Social Sciences, Media and

Graeme Chesters Muiris MacCarthaigh

Ricardo C. Gomes Ivan Maly

Dorothée Allain-Dupré and Luiz de Mello

which raises critical coordination challenges, not only between levels of

arrangements all shape the selection of instruments that can be used to

Purpose The explanatory power of Multi-Level Governance (MLG)

Multi-Level Governance: The Missing Linkages

Multi-Level Governance (MLG) is a highly influential, supple and ductile,

2010b) a term coined in the context of EU studies (to some extent in

have underlined: the weaknesses in the internal operation of the

chapter written by Ongaro and colleagues. They notice that EU agencies

analysis, to draw the required conceptual resources. This way, Liddle

Duncan McTavish in the chapter ‘Politics and Political Strategies in

implies strict top-down entities. Instead, autocracies can be highly frag-

Purpose This contribution argues that there is a fundamental problem

Multi-Level Governance: The Missing Linkages

variable that underpins the MLG approach. With multiple principals

One of the most devastating and pithy, and particularly devastating

Multi-level governance was formulated by Gary Marks as a riposte to

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND ITS

to pose an alternative to the IR theoretical focus on the importance of

by recognising the importance of subnational territory, in this case regions.

larger ones while still sharing a similar basic institutional architecture

formally organised collectivities. These collectivities include governments,

rightly note that the constitutional definitions of institutional competences

In addition to the concept of steering, a number of the governance

change’ (Metcalfe, 1993, p. 183) . Organisations at a micro level can inno-

consequence, chains of indirect influence over several intermediaries, while

PA APPROACH AND POLICY LEARNING

The PA approach offers several advantages to MLG, particularly the

result when one relaxes both fundamental PA assumptions (i.e. conflicts

Table 1. Principal-Agent Scenarios.